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1、Performance of Maritime Logistics Case-Specific Policy AnalysisCase-Specific Policy AnalysisPerformance of Maritime Logistics The International Transport Forum The International Transport Forum is an intergovernmental organisation with 64 member countries.It acts as a think tank for transport policy

2、 and organises the Annual Summit of transport ministers.ITF is the only global body that covers all transport modes.The ITF is politically autonomous and administratively integrated with the OECD.The ITF works for transport policies that improve peoples lives.Our mission is to foster a deeper unders

3、tanding of the role of transport in economic growth,environmental sustainability and social inclusion and to raise the public profile of transport policy.The ITF organises global dialogue for better transport.We act as a platform for discussion and pre-negotiation of policy issues across all transpo

4、rt modes.We analyse trends,share knowledge and promote exchange among transport decision makers and civil society.The ITFs Annual Summit is the worlds largest gathering of transport ministers and the leading global platform for dialogue on transport policy.The Members of the Forum are:Albania,Armeni

5、a,Argentina,Australia,Austria,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Belgium,Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria,Cambodia,Canada,Chile,China(Peoples Republic of),Colombia,Croatia,Czech Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Georgia,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Iceland,India,Ireland,Israel,Italy,Japan,Kazakhstan,Korea,Latvia,Lie

6、chtenstein,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,Mexico,Republic of Moldova,Mongolia,Montenegro,Morocco,the Netherlands,New Zealand,North Macedonia,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Russian Federation,Serbia,Slovak Republic,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,Tunisia,Trkiye,Ukraine,the United Arab Emirates,the Unit

7、ed Kingdom,the United States and Uzbekistan.International Transport Forum 2 rue Andr Pascal F-75775 Paris Cedex 16 contactitf-oecd.org www.itf-oecd.org Case-Specific Policy Analysis Reports The ITFs Case-Specific Policy Analysis series presents topical studies on specific issues carried out by the I

8、TF in agreement with local institutions.Any findings,interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Transport Forum or the OECD.Neither the OECD,ITF nor the authors guarantee the accuracy of any data or other in

9、formation contained in this publication and accept no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use.This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the ITF.This document,as well as any data and map included herein,are without prejudice to the status of or sov

10、ereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Cite this work as:ITF(2022),“Performance of Maritime Logistics”,International Transport Forum Policy Papers,No.106,OECD Publishing,Paris.Acknowledgements This repor

11、t was written by Olaf Merk of the International Transport Forum(ITF)and Antonella Teodoro(MDS Transmodal).It builds on discussions on maritime logistics performance within the framework of the ITF Global Maritime Logistics Dialogue.As such,it benefits from discussions with:Pyers Tucker(Hapag Lloyd),

12、Henning Schleyerbach(Digital Container Shipping Association),Chong Meng Tan(PSA International),Ghim Siew Ho(PSA International),Lamia Kerdjoudj-Belkaid(Federation of European Private Port Companies and Terminals,Feport),Daniel Hosseus(Feport),Isabelle Ryckbost(European Seaports Organisation)Anne Stuh

13、lmann(European Seaports Organisation),Nicolette van der Jagt(European Association for Forwarding,Transport,Logistics and Customs Services,CLECAT),Migl Bluseviit(CLECAT),Jens Roemer(International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations,FIATA),Gene Seroka(Port of Los Angeles),Eric Caris(Port of

14、Los Angeles),Iris Scheel(Port of Hamburg),Andrea Thiel(Port of Hamburg),Luc Arnouts(Port of Antwerp),Pieter de Waard(Port of Rotterdam),Katherine Bamford(Port of Vancouver),Jordi Espin(European Shippers Council)and James Hookham(Global Shippers Forum).It also benefits from data provided by container

15、 terminal operators.The report was reviewed by Stephen Perkins(ITF),Ingrid Bocqu(Hamburg Port Authority)and representatives from the Danish Maritime Authority,the European Community Shipowners Associations,the Global Shippers Forum,the European Association for Forwarding,Transport,Logistics and Cust

16、oms Services,the International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations and the Federation of European Private Port Companies and Terminals.The report was edited by Hilary Gaboriau(ITF).The report was made possible by a voluntary contribution from the Hamburg Port Authority.TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

17、PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022Table of contents Executive summaryExecutive summary .7 7 Performance of containerised maritime transportPerformance of containerised maritime transport.1010 The price of container shipping.10 Reliability.16 Speed.18 Direct liner connectivity.23 Causes

18、and effects of maritime performanceCauses and effects of maritime performance .2525 Demand for containerised transport.25 Container shipping capacity.29 Ship reliability and port congestion.35 Maritime performances impact on trade,modal shift and vertical integrationMaritime performances impact on t

19、rade,modal shift and vertical integration .3838 Trade patterns.38 Modal shifts.40 Vertical integration.42 Policy implicationsPolicy implications .4444 Improve competition monitoring in container shipping.45 Reconsider competition arrangements for liner shipping.47 Focus regulatory attention on fair

20、door-to-door container transport.48 Increase transparency of container shipping rates and charges.49 Collect comprehensive indicators on performance.51 Secure the strategic value of container shipping.52 Reconsider port networks.53 Increase cost coverage of public maritime infrastructure.54 Referenc

21、esReferences .5555 Figures Figure 1.Evolution of containerised spot rates,2016Figure 1.Evolution of containerised spot rates,2016-20222022 .1111 Figure 2.Figure 2.Evolution of containerised spot rates by trade laneEvolution of containerised spot rates by trade lane .1212 Figure 3.Container Trade Pri

22、ce Index(CTS),2016Figure 3.Container Trade Price Index(CTS),2016-2222 .1313 Figure 4.Link between spot rates and conFigure 4.Link between spot rates and contract rates on Asiatract rates on Asia-Europe and Europe and AsiaAsia-North America routes,2019North America routes,2019-2121 .1414 TABLE OF CON

23、TENTS PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 5 Figure 5.Changes in deteFigure 5.Changes in detention and demurrage charges forntion and demurrage charges for container carriers container carriers since January 2020since January 2020 .1515 Figure 6.Container shipping schedule reliability,201

24、8Figure 6.Container shipping schedule reliability,2018-2222 .1616 Figure 7.Global average arrival delays for container ships,2018Figure 7.Global average arrival delays for container ships,2018-2222 .1717 Figure 8.Actual calls per scheduled port calls,2019Figure 8.Actual calls per scheduled port call

25、s,2019-2121 .1818 Figure 9.Evolution of time at sea between 2019 and 202Figure 9.Evolution of time at sea between 2019 and 2021 1 .1919 Figure 10.Time in port and time at anchorage in container ports globally,2019Figure 10.Time in port and time at anchorage in container ports globally,2019-2121 .202

26、0 Figure 11.Time in port and time at anchorage in UnitedFigure 11.Time in port and time at anchorage in United States container ports,2019States container ports,2019-2121 .2121 Figure 12.Time in port and time at anchorage in Chinese container ports,2019Figure 12.Time in port and time at anchorage in

27、 Chinese container ports,2019-2121 .2121 Figure 13.Time in port and time at anchorage in European container ports,2019Figure 13.Time in port and time at anchorage in European container ports,2019-2121 .2222 Figure 14.Average waitinFigure 14.Average waiting time for inland barges in the ports of g ti

28、me for inland barges in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam,2020Antwerp and Rotterdam,2020-2222 .2323 Figure 15.Figure 15.Scheduled deployed capacity by regions served and number of Scheduled deployed capacity by regions served and number of direct connections,2019direct connections,2019-2121 .2424 F

29、igure 16.Development of direct liner Figure 16.Development of direct liner connectivityconnectivity .2424 Figure 17.Global container volumes transported perFigure 17.Global container volumes transported per month,2013month,2013-2121 .2525 Figure 18.Container volumes transported to and from the Far E

30、ast per month,2019Figure 18.Container volumes transported to and from the Far East per month,2019-2121 .2626 Figure 19.Container volumes transported to from North America per month,2019Figure 19.Container volumes transported to from North America per month,2019-2121 .2626 Figure 20.Freight container

31、 volumes transported to and from Europe per month,2019Figure 20.Freight container volumes transported to and from Europe per month,2019-2121 .2727 Figure 21.Ship utilisation rate,Far EastFigure 21.Ship utilisation rate,Far East-North America,2019North America,2019-2121 .2828 Figure 22.Ship utilisati

32、onFigure 22.Ship utilisation rate,Far Eastrate,Far East-Europe,2019Europe,2019-2121 .2828 Figure 23.Idle container ship capacity in twentyFigure 23.Idle container ship capacity in twenty-foot equivalent unitsfoot equivalent units,2009,2009-2121 .2929 Figure 24.Scheduled and actually deployed capacit

33、y,2019Figure 24.Scheduled and actually deployed capacity,2019-2121 .3030 Figure 25.Global container transport demand versus scheduled liner service capacity,2010Figure 25.Global container transport demand versus scheduled liner service capacity,2010-2020 .3131 Figure 26.Net shift of AsiaFigure 26.Ne

34、t shift of Asia-Europe capacity to transEurope capacity to trans-Pacific routesPacific routes .3131 Figure 27.Share of container sFigure 27.Share of container ship capacity operated via consortia,2006hip capacity operated via consortia,2006-2121 .3232 Figure 28.Interlinkages between carriers via all

35、iances and consortiaFigure 28.Interlinkages between carriers via alliances and consortia .3434 Figure 29.Industry concentration on the trade routFigure 29.Industry concentration on the trade route between North Europe and the e between North Europe and the east coast of North America,2006east coast

36、of North America,2006 2121 .3434 Figure 30.Added,cancelled and diverted Figure 30.Added,cancelled and diverted calls in the port of Rotterdam calls in the port of Rotterdam according to ship size,according to ship size,January to March 2021January to March 2021 .3535 Figure 31.Added,cancelled and di

37、verted calls in the portFigure 31.Added,cancelled and diverted calls in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beachs of Los Angeles and Long Beach according to ship size,January to March 2021according to ship size,January to March 2021.3636 Figure 32.Expected and actual port calls in the port of Oakland

38、,2019Figure 32.Expected and actual port calls in the port of Oakland,2019-2121 .3737 Figure 33.FarFigure 33.Far-East market share in global exports per industry sector,2016,2020 and 2021East market share in global exports per industry sector,2016,2020 and 2021 .3838 TABLE OF CONTENTS 6 PERFORMANCE O

39、F MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022Figure 34.Shifts in Far East market shares in the clothing and accessories sector Figure 34.Shifts in Far East market shares in the clothing and accessories sector by importing regionby importing region .3939 Figure 35.Shifts in European import shares for the cFigur

40、e 35.Shifts in European import shares for the clothing and accessories sectorlothing and accessories sector by exporting regionby exporting region.4040 Figure 36.Containerised deepFigure 36.Containerised deep-sea cargo flows and volumes transported by container sea cargo flows and volumes transporte

41、d by container shipping lines,2016shipping lines,2016-2121 .4141 Figure 37.AsiaFigure 37.Asia-Europe containerised rail transport,2016Europe containerised rail transport,2016-2121 .4141 Figure 38.Operational profit margins of the ten largest container carriers,2008Figure 38.Operational profit margin

42、s of the ten largest container carriers,2008-2121 .4242 TablesTable 1.CTS Price Index developments for main traTable 1.CTS Price Index developments for main trade lanes,2020de lanes,2020-2222 .1313 Table 2.Number of links between the top ten carriers via consortia in 2021Table 2.Number of links betw

43、een the top ten carriers via consortia in 2021 .3333 Table 3.Acquisitions by selected container carriers in maritime logistics,2020Table 3.Acquisitions by selected container carriers in maritime logistics,2020-2121 .4343 Table 4.Maritime lTable 4.Maritime logistics performance indicatorsogistics per

44、formance indicators .5151 Boxes Box 1.Federal Maritime Commission:FBox 1.Federal Maritime Commission:Functions and responsibilitiesunctions and responsibilities .4545 Box 2.Merchant shipping reform in the UnitedBox 2.Merchant shipping reform in the United StatesStates .4949 Box 3.Merchant shipping r

45、eform in the PhilippinesBox 3.Merchant shipping reform in the Philippines .5050 Box 4.Merchant shipping reform in IndiaBox 4.Merchant shipping reform in India .5050 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 7 Executive summary What we did Liner shipping and container ports ha

46、ve repeatedly made headline news since 2020,as companies across supply chains were hit with price hikes and shipment delays.Predictability became a thing of the past.This report assesses these disruptions to containerised maritime transport and analyses their causes and impacts.What we found The pri

47、ce of container shipping has increased substantially since the beginning of 2020.Spot rates were around six times higher on average by the end of 2021 and contract rates 2.9 times higher.However,these numbers underestimate the cost increase of container transport.Shippers confront a range of additio

48、nal surcharges and increased fees for demurrage and detention.During the same period,ship schedule reliability decreased from 65%to 34%,meaning that two out of three ships arrive in port at least one day behind schedule.Moreover,unscheduled port cancellations have also increased.The ship turnaround

49、time in ports in the Peoples Republic of China and the United States has doubled since the beginning of 2020,while in Europe it rose by less than 15%.Many countries in Europe,Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa saw fewer direct liner connections following reconfigurations of liner shipping networks

50、.These challenges,plus the strain on port and inland logistics capacity as well as Covid-19-related labour shortages,have undermined just-in-time business and logistics models.The globalised nature of container shipping has resulted in local supply chain problems spilling over to other regions and c

51、reating worldwide difficulties.Shippers and freight forwarders in Europe face exponential increases in ocean freight rates to and from Europe and increasing difficulties booking cargo space-even though in Europe demand for container shipping is essentially flat and port congestion is negligible.Glob

52、al container shipping companies have used capacity-management strategies to shift ship capacity to trans-Pacific trade routes in order to accommodate increased demand for consumer goods in the United States.Public policies have facilitated this situation.Regulators have allowed carriers to use co-op

53、eration arrangements to jointly manage fleet capacity.This option has become the main element of co-ordination between shipping lines following regulatory initiatives in the European Union and the United States in the early 2000s to prohibit joint price-fixing in shipping conferences.Expectations th

54、at this intervention would stimulate price competition and lower shipping prices were confounded,however,by the record-high freight rates since 2020.Thanks to these freight rates,the operational profit margin of the ten largest container shipping companies reached an estimated USD 160 billion in 202

55、1,a substantial part of which has been used to fund acquisitions in the freight forwarding and logistics business to achieve vertical integration.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022What we recommend Improve competition monitoring in container shipping Improve competit

56、ion monitoring in container shipping Governments should build up their capacity to monitor competition in maritime transport.The role of specialised agencies should strengthened.Competition authorities should enhance cross-border co-operation,as their actions are interdependent.Reconsider the compet

57、ition arrangements for liner shipping Reconsider the competition arrangements for liner shipping The current institutional arrangements for competition in liner shipping have not resulted in price stability,lower prices or more competition.A reconsideration is warranted to ensure a sufficiently wide

58、 choice of operators and reliable services.Competition arrangements for liner shipping could limit joint capacity management by carriers to foster more competition between them.Focus regulatory attention on fair competition in door-to-door container transport Focus regulatory attention on fair compe

59、tition in door-to-door container transport The ongoing vertical integration of the container shipping industry poses new challenges for competition regulation.Shipping companies can use their exemptions from competition law in many jurisdictions and their leverage as carriers to acquire competitive

60、advantages in markets where they now directly compete with freight forwarders,port service providers or logistics operators that do not have such competition law exemptions.Regulators should ensure sufficient competition in the land-side port and logistics markets that the maritime container carrier

61、s have entered.Increase transparency of container shipping rates and charges Increase transparency of container shipping rates and charges Governments should put in place measures to make the various surcharges levied by maritime shipping companies more transparent.One measure could be making lists

62、of accepted surcharges,and requirements on how these are calculated.The burden of proof for justifying surcharges should be on the carrier,rather than on the shippers,who now often have to prove that these lack justification.The demurrage and detention charges levied on shippers to smooth transport

63、flows in ports should be made more effective by ensuring they are related to costs incurred.They should only be charged if shippers and freight forwarders can remedy the situation,not where others are responsible.Collect performance information on the containerised transport chain Collect performanc

64、e information on the containerised transport chain Containerised transport will benefit from better information about its performance,notably by benchmarking the efficiency of the interfaces between the different actors in the logistic chain.Governments could adopt the comprehensive set of indicator

65、s developed by the International Transport Forum together with maritime transport stakeholders and collect relevant data to feed it.Secure the strategic value of container shipping Secure the strategic value of container shipping Governments will need to clearly articulate their expectations for lin

66、er shipping and outline how to achieve them.Considering their substantial support to the shipping industry,governments are in a position to expect that shipping companies provide the strategic value that they are supposed to provide.Governments could make clear that their support hinged on the conti

67、nued proof of this strategic value.Charge users of public maritime infrastructure more to increase cost coverage Charge users of public maritime infrastructure more to increase cost coverage Cost coverage of public maritime infrastructure is currently low.In the European Union,carriers contribute on

68、ly 4%of the cost of financing and maintaining infrastructure in ports and in inter-oceanic canals.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 20229 Generally,carriers only pay a fraction of these costs and less than in all other transport modes.Ports also cause considerable external

69、 costs(e.g.via air pollution from ships).For more efficient public policy outcomes,governments should recover a larger share of infrastructure costs via fees and charges.PERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 10 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Performance of containerised ma

70、ritime transport The performance of containerised transport can be described by four main criteria:price,reliability,speed and direct liner connectivity.These criteria have evolved over recent years.The price of container transport and transit times have increased,whereas reliability and connectivit

71、y have decreased.The price of container shipping Companies that want their goods to be moved shippers generally have two ways to directly procure shipping services:via a contract with a container shipping company(a carrier)for a certain period,or on a flexible,last-minute basis on the spot market.In

72、 the case of contracted shipping services,prices are negotiated between the shipper and the carrier,and fixed for a certain period,often one or more years.In the case of flexible,last-minute shipping services,prices are determined on what is called the spot market,which fluctuates on a daily basis.T

73、he prices for last-minute shipping services are called spot rates.Large shippers with predictable and steady containerised cargo flows engage in contracts with carriers,whereas companies with low and unpredictable container volumes more frequently use the container spot markets.Large shippers often

74、use a combination of both methods:contracts for cargo that can be guaranteed and spot markets for additional or incidental cargo flows.Alternatively,shippers can outsource the procurement of shipping services to a logistics service provider or freight forwarder.Most small and medium-sized enterprise

75、s use freight forwarders who consolidate shipments and negotiate contract rates that they would likely not be able to acquire themselves.The container shipping revenues are a mix of revenues from contract rates and spot rates.The advantage of contract rates for container carriers is that it locks in

76、 future revenues if spot rates fall.Should the spot rates rise,carriers will try to accommodate containers on the spot market as much as possible to increase their revenues.Container shipping companies have different strategies as to the share of trade from contract and spot markets.Unsurprisingly,t

77、he contract shares are different depending on the carrier,maritime route and period.A variety of indexes monitor contract and spot rates,some of which will be mentioned here.Spot rate developments The Drewry World Container Index is frequently used to assess the increases of container spot rates.It

78、is a composite of container freight rates on eight major routes to and from Asia,Europe and the United States in USD per 40-foot container per week.The Drewry World Container Index shows that spot rates at the end of 2021(week 47)were approximately six times higher than two years earlier.The Index s

79、tarted to rise in June 2020,first fairly gradually and then more abruptly during November-December 2020 and between May 2021 and September 2021(Figure 1).Fluctuations in this index reflect the various price increases on different trade routes during different periods(Drewry n.d.).PERFORMANCE OF CONT

80、AINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 202211 Asia-Europe spot rates rose by a factor 4.7(Shanghai-Genoa)to 5.9(Shanghai-Rotterdam)between the first week of 2020 and the end of 2021,trans-Pacific rates(Shanghai-Los Angeles)by a factor 5.5 and Transatlantic rates(Rott

81、erdam-New York)by a factor 2.4(Figure 2).The trans-Pacific rates were the first to rise substantially.This increase started in June 2020 and reached a plateau by November 2020 that lasted until May 2021.Over this same period,the Transatlantic rates remained more or less stable.The Asia-Europe rates

82、started to move up very quickly between November and December 2020,after which they declined slightly until April 2021.From May 2021 onwards the spot rate developments on the two main East-West routes(Asia-Europe and trans-Pacific)moved in parallel and showed a more or less similar rapid upward swin

83、g until September 2021.The Transatlantic rate increase started at the same date(May 2021)but halted around July 2021(Drewry n.d.).Figure Figure 1 1.Evolution of cEvolution of containerised spontainerised spot ratesot rates,2016,2016-20222022 Source:Drewry(n.d.).02 0004 0006 0008 00010 00012 00023412

84、3412341234123412341 22016201720182019202020212022Freight rate(USD per 40ft container)Year and quarterPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 12 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022Figure Figure 2 2.Evolution of cEvolution of containerised spot rates by trade laneontainerised spot

85、rates by trade lane Source:Drewry(n.d.).Contract rate developments Contract rates are negotiated between shippers and carriers.For reasons of confidentiality,they are not publicly available.What are available are container trade price indexes,as communicated by Container Trade Statistics(CTS),the or

86、ganisation that releases statistics derived from data supplied by major container shipping lines.CTS Price Indexes are based on the weighted average of the sea-freight rates including all surcharges and ancillary charges with the exception of inland haulage.As such,the CTS Price Index includes both

87、contract and spot rates.The CTS Price Index multiplied by a factor of 2.9 between January 2020 and January 2022(Figure 3).Similarly to the spot-rate developments,there is considerable variety between different trade routes,with increases ranging between a factor of 1.5 and 5.4 for the main trade lan

88、es(Table 1).The largest observed increases took place on the Far East-Europe and Indian Subcontinent-Europe trades,whereas intra-Europe and intra-US trades showed relatively limited increases(CTS,n.d.).02 0004 0006 0008 00010 00012 00014 00016 000123456789 10 11 12123456789 10 11 12 1234562020202120

89、22Freight rate(USD per 40-foot container)Year and monthShanghai-Los AngelesShanghai-RotterdamShanghai-GenoaRotterdam-New YorkPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 202213 Figure Figure 3 3.Container Trade Price Index Container Trade Price Index(CTS

90、)(CTS),2016,2016-2222 Source:Container Trade Statistics(n.d.).Table Table 1 1.CTS Price Index developments for main trade lanesCTS Price Index developments for main trade lanes,2020,2020-2222 Trade routeTrade route Index value at Index value at January January 20202020 Index value at Index value at

91、January January 20222022 IncreaseIncrease (in%)(in%)Far East-Europe 61 331 443%Indian Subcontinent and Middle East-Europe 47 207 340%Far East-South and Central America 57 244 328%Intra Far East 81 268 231%Far East-North America 89 293 229%Europe-South and Central America 56 165 195%Europe-North Amer

92、ica 84 231 175%Indian Subcontinent and Middle East-sub-Saharan Africa 62 167 169%Intra-North America 83 150 81%Intra-Europe 76 128 68%North America-South and Central America 60 89 48%Source:Container Trade Statistics(n.d.).There is a clear link between spot rates and contract rates.Increases in spot

93、 rates generally lead to increases in contract rates but with a certain time lag,as contract rates are fixed for a certain pre-determined period.A comparison of the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index(SFCI),considered a proxy for spot rates,with the CTS Price Index,considered a proxy for contract r

94、ates,shows that the price increase in contract rates over 2020-21 occurred approximately a yearly quarter later than in spot rates.The price developments of spot rate and CTS index followed a remarkably parallel pattern on the Asia-North America 050100150200250123412341234123412341234122016201720182

95、019202020212022CTS Price IndexYear and quarterPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 14 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022trade route,whereas the spot-rate increases on the Asia-Europe trade route in 2021 were significantly steeper than the increases of the CTS Price Index for

96、that trade route(Figure 4).The differences between the two trade routes could be explained by differences in long-term contract shares on these trade routes,with Asia-Europe routes likely subject to more contracts than the Asia-North America route.The limited time lag between spot rate and contract

97、rate could indicate that the majority of contracts have very short time spans or might suggest other phenomena.Figure Figure 4 4.Link between spot Link between spot rates rates and contract ratesand contract rates on Asiaon Asia-Europe and Europe and AsiaAsia-North America routesNorth America routes

98、,2019,2019-2121 Note:Index 2019 Q1=100.The Container Trade Statistics(CTS)Price index is used as a proxy for contract rates.The Shanghai Containerised Freight Index(SCFI)is used as a proxy for container spot rates.Source:CTS(n.d.),Shanghai Shipping Exchange(n.d.)Several carriers have managed to use

99、the current situation to increase their share of contract business.In 2021,Maersk managed to secure 64%of the long-haul volumes on long-term contracts compared to 50%the year before(Maersk,2021).COSCO is reported to have increased its contract share on the Asia-Europe routes to 45%in 2022(Alphaliner

100、,2021a).This rise in contract business implies that the current high container transport prices are increasingly locked in,which means they will be sustained for at least another year,regardless of the development of the spot rates.Two carriers announced in September 2021 that they would freeze spot

101、 rates:CMA CGM until February 2021 and Hapag Lloyd“for the time being”(Porter,2021).Notably,this freeze does not apply to contract rates,nor to surcharges that carriers apply in addition to spot or contract rates.010020030040050060070080090012341234123201920202021Freight rate developmentYear and qua

102、rterAsia to Europe contact rateAsia to N America contract rateAsia to Europe spot rateAsia to N America spot ratePERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 202215 Surcharges Container shipping companies regularly apply demurrage and detention surcharge

103、s.Demurrage charges are applied when a container remains in the terminal beyond its allotted free days(e.g.because it has not been picked up by a truck or ship).The idea of demurrage charges is to minimise the dwell time of containers in terminals.Detention refers to the time outside the port.Detent

104、ion charges are applied when a container has been picked up in a terminal but not returned to the carrier in the allotted free time.The purpose of the introduction of detention charges is to decrease the turnaround time of a container.Information on demurrage and detention charges of carriers is not

105、 systematically collected.There is no overview of these surcharges and their development over time.Some carriers provide this kind of information on their websites,which makes it possible to assess the extent to which demurrage and detention charges have increased since January 2020.Assessment of th

106、ese data on surcharges applied by the carrier Hapag Lloyd in EU countries shows that demurrage and detention charges in most EU countries with seaports have increased substantially,and by more than 100%in Italy and Poland(Figure 5).Figure 5Figure 5.C Changehanges s in detentin detention and demurrag

107、e chargesion and demurrage charges for for container carriercontainer carriers s since January 2020since January 2020 Source:Based on data from Hapag Lloyd(n.d.).-40%-20%0%20%40%60%80%100%120%140%160%BelgiumBulgariaCroatiaFinlandFranceGermanyItalyMaltaNetherlandsPolandRomaniaSloveniaSwedenDetention

108、and Demurrage importDetention importDemurrage importDetention and Demurrage exportDetention exportDemurrage exportPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 16 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022Container shipping companies have applied additional charges since the Covid-19 crisis t

109、hat are not included in the spot or contract rates.An example is a congestion surcharge levied by several carriers following the surge in container traffic to European ports(Knowler,2021a).Another example is the premium that shippers are reportedly expected to pay to get an assured booking,with carr

110、iers charging premiums of up to USD 10 500 per container in addition to the regular rate(Knowler,2021b).Carriers have also charged shippers with peak season surcharges and equipment imbalance surcharges.It is difficult to understand how such surcharges can be justified as covering additional costs f

111、or carriers,considering that congestion and equipment imbalance are also contributing to the scarcity of cargo space that is driving the increase in freight rates.Given the limited choice of carriers and the fact that most of them apply similar surcharges,most container shippers have no choice but t

112、o accept the surcharges.Reliability The schedule reliability of container carriers has worsened considerably since the pandemic,according to data from maritime consultancy firm Sea-Intelligence(2022).In February 2022,two out of three vessels arrived with a delay of one calendar day compared to the o

113、fficial schedule.Put differently,the global schedule reliability in that month was 34%,compared to average scores of 75%in the years prior to the outbreak of Covid-19(Figure 6).The global schedule reliability went up at the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis,from 65%in February 2020 to 78%in June 2020

114、,but deteriorated thereafter,dropping to 35%in January 2021.During the whole of 2021,schedule reliability improved slightly between March and June,but decreased again to 33-34%in August 2021.(Sea-Intelligence,2022)Figure Figure 6 6.C Container shippingontainer shipping s schedule rchedule reliabilit

115、yeliability,2018,2018-2222 Source:Sea-Intelligence(2022).0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%12341234123412341220182019202020212022Schedule reliabilityYear and quarterPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 17 The average delays of late container ship

116、s rose during that period,from 4.9 days in January 2020 to 7.3 days in December 2021(Figure 7).The improvement in global schedule reliability in the second quarter of 2020 did not translate into shorter average delays of late vessels.A slight improvement in that respect occurred during July-August 2

117、020,followed by a continuous increase in average delay times until February 2021,reaching an average global delay of seven days.After some fluctuations,the average delay time of late vessels reached 7.1 days in February 2022.(Sea-Intelligence,2022)Figure Figure 7 7.Global average Global average arri

118、val arrival delays for delays for container shipscontainer ships,2018,2018-2222 Source:Sea-Intelligence(2022).During the Covid-19 crisis,the number of cancellations of scheduled port calls also increased.Figure 8 shows that actual port calls(as a share of the scheduled calls)started declining in the

119、 third quarter of 2019.There was a temporary rise in the third quarter of 2020,when the number of actual calls reached 80%of the scheduled calls.That percentage fell again,though,to 72%in the third quarter of 2021.012345678912341234123412341220182019202020212022Average container ship delays(in days)

120、Year and quarterPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 18 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022Figure Figure 8 8.A Actual calls per scheduled port calls,2019ctual calls per scheduled port calls,2019-2121 Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Speed How quickly a container arrives at its dest

121、ination depends on three different parts of the transport chain:the time at sea,the time in port(which,in turn,is divided into the time at anchor before entering the port and the time at berth in port)and the time in hinterland transport.Time at sea Ships average time at sea between ports has increa

122、sed since 2019.Figure 9 shows that ships spent 5.7 days at sea in the first quarter of 2019,compared to 7.5 days in the third quarter of 2021.The peak value eight days was reached in the third quarter of 2020.This pattern of increased time at sea could be explained by two factors.First,average ship

123、speed might have gone down since 2019.Lower ship speeds might have been a way to reduce the effective ship capacity during the Covid-19 lockdowns,as lower speed requires more ships to carry out the same weekly service rotation.This is a way to use ships that would have otherwise been inactive during

124、 the drop in demand for maritime transport.Second,it may also have been a strategy by carriers to reduce the number of port calls per shipping service,an issue that will be explored in more depth in the section on direct liner connectivity.65%70%75%80%85%90%123412341234201920202021Actual calls per s

125、cheudled port callsYear and quarterPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 19 Figure Figure 9 9.Evolution of tEvolution of time at sea ime at sea between 2019 and 2021between 2019 and 2021 Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Time at anchor The time at

126、anchor for container ships has increased globally since the beginning of 2020,coinciding with the economic lockdowns related to Covid-19 in the second quarter of 2020 and the associated drop in maritime transport demand.Time at anchor tripled at the same time that the number of active container ship

127、s declined from 4 725 to 4 542.Globally,time at anchor declined slightly after May 2020,but remained at a structurally higher level than before the Covid-19 crisis.(MDS Transmodal,n.d.)These higher times at anchor have frequently been interpreted as increased waiting times before entering ports.This

128、 could be true in port regions that experienced surges in demand and port congestion due to physical constraints,and to a lack of transport workers who were suffering from Covid-19.However,it may also give testimony to the direct collation between time at anchor and the extent of idle container ship

129、s:in case of cancelled services,ships are idled at anchor until services resume.Changes in time at anchor have varied considerably in the different world regions.Time at anchor in Chinese ports in October 2021 was seven times higher than in January 2019;in October 2021 time at anchor was more than f

130、ive times higher in US ports,but less than two times higher in European ports,compared to January 2019.Since May 2020,the development of time at anchor in these three regions has followed different patterns.The United States saw volatile movement in time at anchor,which fell sharply after May 2020 t

131、o pre-Covid-19 levels,rose again in October that same year to peak in January 2021,only to decline again until May 2021.After that,there was a steep rise in time at anchor that reached new peaks in August and October 2021.In the Peoples Republic of China,time at anchor remained more or less at the l

132、evel reached in May 2020,starting a continuous rise in May 2021 that reached a new peak in 012345678912341234123201920202021Average number of days between two port callsYear and quarterPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 20 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 August 2021,decl

133、ining since then.In Europe,time at anchor has gone down since May 2020,subject to fluctuations.(MDS Transmodal,n.d.)The differences in time at anchor might be explained by the following factors.First,US ports generally perform fewer transhipment functions than the main Chinese and European ports,lea

134、ding to fewer opportunities for idling ships due to service cancellations.Second,there is a link between time at anchor and time in port.The increase in time in port has been very limited in European ports,which might have resulted in the relatively limited increase of time at anchor,in contrast to

135、US and Chinese ports.Time in ports The time that container ships spend in ports has increased since March 2020:in October 2021,the average time in port was approximately 50%longer than in January 2019.There are various explanations for this.Port terminals plan for the arrival of a ship by,for exampl

136、e,positioning containers in the yard in such a way that the loading and unloading of the ship takes the least amount of time.As a result,the fewer the ships that respect their announced arrival time,the more difficult terminal planning becomes,lowering the terminals efficiency.The link between ship

137、schedule reliability and port terminal congestion can turn in a vicious circle whereby lower ship reliability leads to port congestion,leading to even lower ship reliability.In various ports,Covid-19 affected port workers and protocols to minimise the spread of Covid-19 slowed cargo handling operati

138、ons.Some ports none of them in Europe were confronted with closures.Border closures also affected maritime trade flows and had a large impact on seafarers.They complicated the process of crew changes,contributing to a large number of seafarers staying aboard ships much longer than what is customary.

139、Few governments facilitated crew changes effectively and the situation was not helped by the decisions of market players,including shipping companies,registries,charterers and ports.Figure Figure 1010.Time in port and time at anchorage in Time in port and time at anchorage in container portscontaine

140、r ports globallyglobally,20192019-2121 Note:Index 2019 Q1=100 Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).4 2004 3004 4004 5004 6004 7004 8004 9005 0005 1005 200050100150200250300350400123412341234201920202021Number of active ships calling at portsTime in port and at anchorage(index)Year and quarterNumber

141、of active shipsTime at anchorageTotal time in portPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 21 Figure Figure 1111.Time in port and time at anchorage in UTime in port and time at anchorage in Unitednited S Statestates container portscontainer port

142、s,20192019-2121 Note:Index 2019 Q1=100 Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Figure Figure 1212.Time in port and time at Time in port and time at anchorage in Chinese container portsanchorage in Chinese container ports,20192019-2121 Note:Index 2019 Q1=100 Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).01002003

143、004005006007008000100200300400500600700123412341234201920202021Number of active ships calling at portTime in port and at anchorage(index)Year and quarterNumber of active shipsTime at anchorageTotal time in port02004006008001 0001 2001 4001 6001 8002 00001002003004005006007008001234123412342019202020

144、21Number of active ships calling at portTotal time in port and at anchorage(index)Year and quarterNumber of active shipsTime at anchorageTotal time in portPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 22 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 A ships time in port varies considerably among

145、 port regions.In China and the United States,the time in port in October 2021 was twice as high as in January 2020,whereas port time in Europe over that same period increased by less than 15%(Figure 13).The time in port in China consistently and gradually increased since March 2020,whereas the devel

146、opment in US ports was subject to more fluctuations.Another difference was the more significant decrease of active ships calling European ports since March 2020,compared to US and Chinese ports,where the decrease was more moderate.(MDS Transmodal n.d.)Figure Figure 1313.Time in port and time at anch

147、oragTime in port and time at anchorage in European container portse in European container ports,20192019-2121 Note:Index 2019 Q1=100 Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Time in hinterland transport Limited information exists on time in hinterland transport modes(ie.transport modes in areas beyond s

148、ea ports)or waiting time for hinterland transport modes in ports.Some ports collect such information and provide these on a regular basis on their website,but this is generally rare.Unsurprisingly,there are no publicly available data aggregated for port regions.The data at the level of individual po

149、rts show certain patterns,but it is difficult to say if these are place-specific or illustrative of a wider tendency.Data on average waiting times for inland barges from the barge company Contargo in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam show a slight increase in waiting times,but also many fluctuation

150、s,with peaks in March 2020,September 2021 and February 2022(Figure 14).1 2001 2501 3001 3501 4001 4501 5001 550050100150200250300123412341234201920202021Number of active ships calling at port Time in port and at anchorage(index)Year and quarterNumber of active shipsTime at anchorageTotal time in por

151、tPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 23 Figure Figure 1414.Average waitAverage waiting time ing time for inland barges in the ports of Antwerpfor inland barges in the ports of Antwerp andand Rotterdam,2020Rotterdam,2020-2 22 2 Source:Contar

152、go(n.d.).Direct liner connectivity Since the third quarter of 2020,shipping lines have been adjusting their networks,shifting capacity from services serving more than two regions in favour of those serving only two.In doing so,shipping lines have been reducing port calls,thus increasing the number o

153、f country pairs(countries that can be reached directly without transhipment via container shipping from another country)without direct connections.Based on capacity scheduled to be deployed in May 2022,this report estimates that the number of countries directly connected has now reached its lowest l

154、evel since the first quarter of 2006,the start of the MDS Transmodal(n.d.)dataset.The deterioration in direct connectivity has only been accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic,as the downward trend was already occurring in 2019(Figure 15).020406080100120140160180123412341202020212022Average waiting ti

155、me(in days)Year and quarterAntwerpRotterdamPERFORMANCE OF CONTAINERISED MARITIME TRANSPORT 24 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Figure 15Figure 15.Scheduled deployed capacity by regions served and number of direct connectionsScheduled deployed capacity by regions served and number of d

156、irect connections,2019,2019-2121 Note:Index 2019 Q1=100 Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).An assessment of the development of container shipping schedules shows that this direct liner connectivity has decreased in particular in Latin America(where 35 countries were confronted with drops in direct connecti

157、ons),in Europe(reductions for 26 countries)and sub-Saharan Africa(reductions for 26 countries).France and Italy are among the countries with particularly large drops in direct connectivity.The region that showed the lowest drop in direct liner connectivity was Australasia and Oceania(Figure 16).Figu

158、re Figure 1616.Development of Development of direct direct liner connectivityliner connectivity from the second quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2022 Source:MDS Transmodal.708090100110120130123412341234122019202020212022Scheduled deployed ship capacity Year and quarterIntra-regionMore than t

159、wo regionsTwo regionsNo of country pairs directly connected05101520253035Number of countries Number of countries with directconnections decreased by more than50%Number of countries with directconnections decreased by less than 50%Number of countries with same directconnectionsNumber of countries wit

160、h directconnections increased by less than 50%Number of countries with directconnections increased by more than50%CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 25 Causes and effects of maritime performance The maritime transport chain consists of many dif

161、ferent,interconnected parts.It is not always easy to distinguish between the causes and effects of certain phenomena.This section focuses on three possible causes for the current situation in the containerised maritime transport chain:development in demand for containerised transport,ship capacity m

162、anagement by carriers and port congestion.Demand for containerised transport The rapid increase in container freight rates could be explained by the combination of pent-up demand during economic lockdowns and government fiscal stimulus policies at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic.The combination o

163、f the two arguably created a situation of unprecedented demand for containerised transport for which container shipping companies could not have prepared.However,when looking at the actual container transport volumes and the utilisation rates of ships,this explanation does not hold.The volume of con

164、tainers transported by the major container shipping companies continues to increase steadily,albeit with many seasonal fluctuations(including,for example,reductions at the time of the Chinese New Year).The effect of the Covid-19 lockdowns shows up in a protracted slump in container volumes during Fe

165、bruary-June 2020.Although volumes rebounded after June 2020,growth rates are in line with trend growth(Figure 17).Figure Figure 1717.Global cGlobal container volumesontainer volumes transported transported per monthper month,20132013-2 21 1 Source:Based on Container Trade Statistics(n.d.).0246810121

166、416181 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4201320142015201620172018201920202021Twenty-foot equivalent units,millionsYear and quarterCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE 26 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022There is a remarkable difference between r

167、egions in the development of demand for containerised transport.In the Far East and North America(Figures 18 and 19),there appears to have been a rebound in demand for containerised goods in the second half of 2020 and the first half of 2021.However,the volumes in container transport to and from Eur

168、ope remained more or less flat,with the volumes in the first eight months in 2021 almost the same as those in 2019(Figure 20).Figure 18Figure 18.Container volumesContainer volumes transporttransporteded to and to and from from the Far East per monththe Far East per month,20192019-2121 Note:TEU=twent

169、y-foot equivalent unit Source:Based on Container Trade Statistics(n.d.).Figure 19Figure 19.Container volumesContainer volumes transported to transported to from from North America per monthNorth America per month,20192019-2121 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent unit Source:Based on Container Trade Stat

170、istics(n.d.).024681012141618JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovember DecemberContainers transported(million TEUs)2019202020210.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.5JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovember DecemberContainers trasnsported(million TEUs)2019202

171、02021CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 27 Figure 20Figure 20.FreiFreight cght container volumesontainer volumes transported to and transported to and from from Europe Europe per monthper month,2 2019019-2121 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent uni

172、t Source:Based on Container Trade Statistics(n.d.).The figures on containers transported could reflect a situation of unfulfilled demand:there might be demand for container transport that cannot be serviced due to a lack of ship capacity.If this were the case,it would normally show up in very high s

173、hip utilisation rates.However,utilisation rates are not extremely high.On both the Far East-North America and Far East-Europe trades,the ship utilisation rate reached a low during the first quarter 2020,after which it increased until the third quarter of 2020,followed by a gradual decline of utilisa

174、tion rates at around 70%for both trade routes at the time of the writing of this report(figures 21 and 22).On the Far East-North America route,capacity has been growing at a faster rate than demand since the third quarter of 2020.01234567JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNove

175、mber DecemberContainers transportedin million TEUs201920202021CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE 28 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Figure 21Figure 21.Ship utilisation rate,Far EastShip utilisation rate,Far East-North AmericaNorth America,20192019-2 21 1 Source:MDS Transmodal

176、(n.d.).Figure 22Figure 22.Ship utilisation rate,Far EastShip utilisation rate,Far East-EuropeEurope,20192019-2121 Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%01 000 0002 000 0003 000 0004 000 0005 000 0006 000 0007 000 0008 000 0009 000 000Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2201920202021Utilisation rat

177、es(in%)Container volumesin twenty-foot equivalent units(TEU)SupplyDemandUtilisation rate0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%01 000 0002 000 0003 000 0004 000 0005 000 0006 000 0007 000 000Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2201920202021Utilisation rate(%)Container volumes in twenty-foot equivalent units(TEU)SupplyDemandUt

178、ilisation rateCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 29 Container shipping capacity Container carriers have been able to adapt to the economic realities of the Covid-19 lockdowns via their management of container ship capacity.More precisely:carrie

179、rs collectively idled a considerable part of their fleet during the economic lockdowns when demand for containerised maritime transport declined.A large part of this took the form of cancelled services or cancelled port calls.At the peak of these cancellations in June 2020,idle container ship capaci

180、ty was at 12%of the total container ship fleet,representing approximately 2.7 million twenty-foot equivalent units(TEU)in container ship capacity(Figure 23).Idling capacity continued until September 2020,when most of the container ship capacity was active again.The timing of this phasing in of activ

181、e capacity is remarkable,considering that container spot rates had already begun to increase in June 2020,reflecting a rebound in demand for containerised transport.In a fully competitive market,such a strategy would not have been feasible,as there would always be companies that would have provided

182、more capacity or lower prices in order to gain market share.Figure 23Figure 23.Idle containerIdle container ship capacityship capacity in twentyin twenty-foot equivalentfoot equivalent unitunits s(TEU(TEU),20092009-21 21 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent units Source:Alphaliner(n.d.).-500 000 1 000 00

183、0 1 500 000 2 000 000 2 500 000 3 000 0001 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 123 4 122009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021Idle containership capacity(in TEUs)Year and quarterCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE 30 PERFORMANCE O

184、F MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Figure 24Figure 24.Scheduled and actually deployed capacityScheduled and actually deployed capacity,2019,2019-2121 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent units Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Container shipping companies attempted to accommodate the surge in demand for mariti

185、me transport in in the second half of 2020 in the Far East and North America.However,they were constrained by their decisions on capacity deployment prior to the crisis:whereas supply of deployed container ships outstripped demand during 2010-17,the inverse was the case for 2017-20.During this perio

186、d,compound annual growth rates for container transport demand reached 3.5%,but only 2.3%for the supply of deployed container ships(Figure 25).The scarcity of container ship capacity in the second half of 2020 was born of the previous restraining of capacity since 2017.At the time of writing of this

187、report,this scarcity is projected to continue until at least 2024,with projected demand at around 3.2%that is,higher than the projected ship capacity(including ship orders,net of scrapping)estimated to be in the order of 2.5%over 2021-24.Carriers reacted to the demand surge in the Far East and North

188、 America by shifting capacity to the trans-Pacific trade from other routes,such as East-West round-the-world-services that touch Asia-Europe-North America and Asia.As a result,a net shift of capacity from Asia-Europe to the trans-Pacific route occurred in the second quarter of 2020.Asia-Europe capac

189、ity in the first quarter of 2021 was at a slightly lower level than in the first quarter of 2020.This scarcity of capacity could have been one of the causes of the increase in Asia-Europe freight rates(Figure 26).After the first quarter of 2021,Asia-Europe capacity increased.859095100105110115123412

190、341234201920202021Container ship capacity in TEUs(index)Year and quarterCapacity actually deployedScheduled capacityCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 31 Figure Figure 2525.GlobaGlobal container transport demand versusl container transport dema

191、nd versus scheduled scheduled liner service liner service capacity,capacity,20201010-2020 Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Figure Figure 2626.Net shNet shift of ift of AsiaAsia-Europe Europe capacity to capacity to t transrans-P Pacific routesacific routes Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%

192、2.5%3.0%3.5%4.0%4.5%2010-20172017-2020Compund annual growth rate(%)DemandSupply(scheduled capacity)-1 000 00001 000 0002 000 0003 000 0004 000 0005 000 0006 000 0007 000 0001234123420202021Container ship capacityin twenty-foot equivalent units Year and quarterTranspacific capacityAsia-Europe capacit

193、yShift from Asia-Europe to Transpacific capacityCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE 32 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Alliances and consortia Container carriers have been able to withdraw and reposition ship capacity thanks to consortia and alliances.Consortia are co-operativ

194、e arrangements between one or more container carriers to share vessels on a specific trade route.Alliances can be considered a bundle of consortia,operating on the main East-West trade routes(Asia-Europe,trans-Pacific,and Transatlantic).The main nine container carriers are all part of three alliance

195、s;the capacity of the nine carriers represents around 85%of total global container ship capacity.There are hundreds of consortia,operating on almost all global trade routes.Since 2006,the competitive environment for container shipping has changed in three fundamental ways.First is the emergence of a

196、lliances as an inevitable vehicle to share information and resources for all major carriers.Second is the transformation of consortia as a tool for alliances:in 2006,around 12%of container ship capacity was operated by consortia with members that were part of an alliance;by 2021,that percentage had

197、risen to 42%.Third is the growing importance of consortia as“bridges”between alliances.A considerable part of the consortia(13%in 2021)consists of members from different alliances(Figure 27).In this way,carriers are inter-related via interlinked consortia(Table 2 and Figure 28).This provides carrier

198、s with the mechanisms to co-ordinate,withdraw and expand ship capacities,and reposition ships on different trade lanes depending on changing demand and evolving perspectives for profits.Figure 2Figure 27 7.Share of container ship capacity operated via consortiaShare of container ship capacity operat

199、ed via consortia,2006,2006-2121 Source:Merk and Teodoro(2022).The reality of alliances and consortia is not taken into account in traditional market concentration indicators applied to the shipping sector.The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index(HHI)is a frequently used indicator for estimating industry conce

200、ntration.The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each competing firm in an industry and then adding up the resulting numbers.Consortia can be considered as vehicles for what has been referred to in the competition literature as“common ownership”,applied to container shipping.Common own

201、ership refers to situations in which one or more owners of a company also owns shares in one or more competing companies in the same industry(OECD,2017).Consortia could 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%2006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021Consortia of carriers part of same allianceCons

202、ortia of carriers part of different alliancesOther consortiaCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 33 be thus be seen as joint ventures of two or more container carriers that pool ships to provide a jointly operated shipping service(Merk and Teodor

203、o,2022).In order to measure market concentration in the presence of common ownership,Bresnahan and Salop(1986)developed a so-called modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index(MHHI)to take account such cross-company ownership in competing companies.OBrien and Salop(2000)generalised this modification,while M

204、erk and Teodoro(2022)applied the MHHI to container shipping.Their analysis shows the increased relevance of consortia when determining industry market concentration of liner shipping.For example,on the trade route between North Europe and the east coast of North America,there was a difference of app

205、roximately 250 points between the HHI and MHHI between 2006-14;this difference increased significantly after 2014 to around 900 points due to changes in consortia and the emergence of new alliances.The MHHI on this trade corridor has reached the threshold of 2 500 points,despite an HHI score of arou

206、nd 1 500(Figure 29).Based on such an MHHI score,the Transatlantic trade could be considered as“highly concentrated”,rather than“moderately concentrated”when the traditional HHI is applied,as is the case in FMC(2022).Table 2.Table 2.Number of lNumber of links between inks between the the top tentop t

207、en carriecarriers via consortia in 2021rs via consortia in 2021 2M2M Ocean AllianceOcean Alliance THE AllianceTHE Alliance TotalTotal MaerskMaersk MSCMSC CMA CMA CGMCGM COSCOCOSCO EvergreenEvergreen Hapag Hapag LloydLloyd HMMHMM ONEONE Yang Yang MingMing ZIMZIM 2M Maersk 2 4 3 4 4 2 19 MSC 2 1 2 4 1

208、 3 1 14 Ocean Alliance CMA CGM 4 1 10 5 8 2 1 2 33 COSCO 3 2 10 12 6 10 5 3 51 Evergreen 5 12 3 1 5 3 2 31 THE Alliance Hapag Lloyd 4 4 8 6 3 5 11 6 1 48 HMM 1 1 5 6 4 17 ONE 4 3 2 10 5 11 6 7 3 51 Yang Ming 1 5 3 6 4 7 26 ZIM 2 1 2 3 2 1 3 14 Total 19 14 33 51 31 48 17 51 26 14 Source:Merk and Teod

209、oro(2022).CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE 34 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Figure 28.Figure 28.Interlinkages between carriers via alliances and consortiaInterlinkages between carriers via alliances and consortia Source:Merk(17 December 2019).Figure Figure 2929.Industry c

210、oncentration on the trade route between North Europe and the Industry concentration on the trade route between North Europe and the east coast of North America,2006east coast of North America,2006 2121 Source:Merk and Teodoro(2022).05001 0001 5002 0002 5003 0002006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

211、 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021Index scoresHerfindahl-Hirschman IndexModified Herfindahl-Hirschman IndexCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 35 Ship reliability and port congestion Container carriers have frequently claimed that port con

212、gestion is one of the reasons ship capacity has become less effective,thus increasing freight rates.Any discussion on port congestion should consider the interlinkages between ship schedule reliability and port congestion.When port terminals run at 100%schedule reliability,they can fully anticipate

213、the arrival of vessels and prepare the sequence of port services so that waiting time and time at berth are as short as possible.When ships arrive late,their planned slots at port are no longer available.They must then wait for docking space to become available.Longer waiting times in ports could,in

214、 turn,have a knock-on effect on ship reliability:ships delayed by port congestion will likely arrive late at the next port in their service loop,even if they increase their ship speed between the two ports.Ship reliability and port congestion in the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports in 2020 and 2021

215、provide more clarity on the sequence of both.Ship schedule reliability on the Shanghai-Los Angeles trade route started to decrease in June 2020,dropping from almost 90%in that month to just over 10%in the first quarter of 2021.The decreasing schedule reliability did not seem to affect port congestio

216、n in the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports until November 2020,when container waiting times estimated by counting the number of ships at anchor started to rise.From November 2020 to February 2021,ship waiting time increased as ship schedule reliability decreased.However,the second quarter of 2021 saw

217、 a decrease in ship waiting times and an increase in ship schedule reliability(Sea Intelligence n.d.).Figure Figure 3030.AddedAdded,cancelled cancelled and diand diverted verted calls icalls in the pn the port of Rotterdamort of Rotterdam according to ship size,according to ship size,January to Marc

218、h January to March 20212021 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent units Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).Port congestion can have disruptive spillover effects on the global transport chain if the congested ports cannot be replaced by other container ports.Some parts of the world have a system in which

219、 ships can be diverted from a congested port to another port nearby.This was arguably the case in northern Europe in the first quarter of 2021.When a substantial number of calls at the port of Rotterdam were cancelled,they were replaced by added calls elsewhere in the region(Figure 30).This was true

220、 for large ships(with a 0102030405060708090100Added calls at RotterdamCancelled calls at RotterdamAdded calls elsewhere in NorthEuropeNumber of ship calls3 000-4 900 TEU5 000-9 999 TEU10 000-14 999 TEU15 000+TEUCAUSES AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE 36 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF

221、2022 capacity over 10 000 TEU)and small ships(with capacities of between 3 000 and 5 000 TEU)alike,suggesting that not only calls from ocean carriers could be shifted but feeder calls as well.In other parts of the world,the regional port system is less flexible.The port complex of Los Angeles/Long B

222、each handles more volumes than the port of Rotterdam.It was considerably more congested over the same period yet had far fewer diverted calls to other ports in North America West Coast(NAWC)(Figure 31)than Rotterdam and northern Europe.Even more strikingly,the difference between expected and actual

223、port calls(lost calls)in Oakland since 2019 increased significantly(Figure 32)when the Oakland container port could have functioned as an alternative to Los Angeles/Long Beach.There are various possible reasons for this.It may be that carriers find that the advantages of the Los Angeles and Long Bea

224、ch ports to other NAWC ports outweigh the long waits.Some carriers have terminal subsidiaries that operate in Los Angeles/Long Beach,so they might want to generate cargo flows to these terminals.It is also worth noting that carriers have benefitted from the situation,as port congestion generates sca

225、rcity in ship capacity that can sustain high freight rates.Figure 3Figure 31 1.Added,cancelled and diverted calls in the ports of Los AngeAdded,cancelled and diverted calls in the ports of Los Angelesles and and Long BeachLong Beach according to ship sizeaccording to ship size,January to March Janua

226、ry to March 2021 2021 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent units Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).0102030405060708090100Added calls at LA/Long BeachCancelled calls at LA/Long BeachAdded calls elsewhere in NAWC(excl LA)Number of ship calls3 000-4 900 TEU5 000-9 999 TEU10 000-14 999 TEU15 000+TEUCAUSES

227、 AND EFFECTS OF MARITIME PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 37 Figure 32Figure 32.Expected and actual port calls in the port of OaklandExpected and actual port calls in the port of Oakland,20192019-2121 Source:Based on MDS Transmodal(n.d.).0500 0001 000 0001 500 0002 000 000

228、2 500 000123412341234201920202021Ship capacity calling at port of Oaklandin twenty-foot equivalent unitsYear and quarterCapacity lostCapacity actually offeredMARITIME PERFORMANCES IMPACT ON TRADE,MODAL SHIFT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 38 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Maritime perform

229、ances impact on trade,modal shift and vertical integration The current developments in the containerised maritime transport chain may have repercussions for other transport sectors and the wider economy.This section assesses the first impacts in terms of trade patterns,modal shift and vertical integ

230、ration.Trade patterns The sharp increase in container freight rates,especially along the main East-West routes,has driven up the price of imports and exports compared to locally traded goods.Sourcing from far away has become more expensive,especially for low-value goods.The question now is whether m

231、anufacturers will start to source more regionally rather than globally.An attempt at answering this question may be made by assessing changes in export market shares of the Far East in the main exporting sectors.Figure 33 illustrates the evolution of export shares in several sectors between 2016,202

232、0 and 2021.It shows significant drops in export shares between 2020 and 2021 in the clothing and accessories,specialised machinery,rubber manufactures and mineral manufactures sectors.Figure Figure 3 33 3.FarFar-East East market market shareshare in global exports per industry sectorin global export

233、s per industry sector,2016,2020 and 20212016,2020 and 2021 Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.).0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Vegetables and fruitPaper and paperboardOther chemicalsIron and steelPlatics in non-primary formsRoad vehiclesMineral manufacturesPlastics in primary formsOrganic chemicalsGeneral

234、industrial machineryFurnitureRubber manufacturesSpecialised machineryMetal manufactures-otherMiscellanous ManufacturesElectrical machineryTexiles and made-up articlesClothing and accessoiresTelecom and recording equipmentOffice machines and adp202120202016MARITIME PERFORMANCES IMPACT ON TRADE,MODAL

235、SHIFT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 39 The Far Easts export market share in clothing and accessories plummeted by two percentage points between 2020 and 2021,after having steadily grown by 2.5 percentage points in the previous four-year period(2016-20).This

236、 may suggest that a new external factor influenced the drop,rather than a decline in competitiveness.Figure 34 illustrates the Far-East market shares in clothing and accessories by importing region.It shows that the main cause for the regions market share drop is a four percentage point decline in i

237、mports from Europe and the Mediterranean.When looking at the European import shares in clothing and accessories in Figure 35,the declining imports from the Far East can be identified but so can a simultaneous increase in imports from the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent as well as from Europe and th

238、e Mediterranean.In other words,there was a near-shoring tendency in Europe and the Mediterranean in the clothing and accessories sector over 2020-21.That said,it is too early to tell if this tendency will last.FigureFigure 3 34 4.Shifts in Far East market shares in Shifts in Far East market shares i

239、n the the clothing clothing andand accessories sector by importing region accessories sector by importing region Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.)-6-4-202468North AmericaEurope andMediterraneanFar EastGulf and IndiansubcontinentLatin AmericaSub-SaharanAfricaAustralasia andOceaniaShift in Far East market s

240、hares(percentage points)2016-20202020-21MARITIME PERFORMANCES IMPACT ON TRADE,MODAL SHIFT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 40 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Figure Figure 3 35 5.Shifts in European impShifts in European import shares ort shares for the for the clothing andclothing and access

241、ories sector accessories sector by exporting region by exporting region Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.)Modal shifts The substantial increase in containerised freight rates has eroded container shippings cost competitiveness compared to other transport modes,in particular that of rail freight transport.A

242、lmost all long-range containerised cargo used to be transported by the principal container shipping companies.However,a shift began in 2021.As the demand for containerised cargo grew,other actors stepped in to fill those needs.Figure 36 illustrates this shift by charting the evolution of total conta

243、inerised cargo flows compared to that of container freight transported by the principal container shipping companies.At least part of the additional container cargo volumes have been accommodated by freight rail.Figure 37 shows that the rail freight company United Transport and Logistics Company Eur

244、asian Rail Alliance(UTLC ERA),which handles 90%of the containers transported via rail between Asia and Europe,transported considerably more containers in 2020 and 2021 than in the four previous years(UTLC ERA,n.d.).It is difficult to establish to what extent the higher ocean-freight rates have playe

245、d a determining role in this development,as the Asia-Europe rail freight market started expanding as early as 2016.However,it is clear that the rising costs of container shipping have increased the relative attractiveness of Asia-Europe rail freight.Ocean-freight rates have increased so much that ai

246、r cargo has become a cost-competitive alternative.Some shippers have decided to shift to air cargo in light of the problems with schedule reliability and the difficulties in securing containers on container vessels.This modal shift resulted in substantial increases in air freight rates in 2021(Georg

247、iadis,2021).-6-5-4-3-2-101234Europe andMediterraneanFar EastGulf and IndiansubcontinentNorth AmericaLatin AmericaSub-SaharanAfricaAustralasia andOceaniaShift in European import shares(percentage points)2016-20202020-2021MARITIME PERFORMANCES IMPACT ON TRADE,MODAL SHIFT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION PERFO

248、RMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 41 Figure 3Figure 36 6.Containerised Containerised deepdeep-sea sea c cargo flows and volumes argo flows and volumes transported by containertransported by container shippingshipping lineslines,2016,2016-2121 Note:Index:2016 Q1=100.TEU=twenty-foot equivalen

249、t units Source:MDS Transmodal(n.d.),Container Trade Statistics(n.d.)Figure 3Figure 37 7.AsiaAsia-Europe containerised rail transportEurope containerised rail transport,20162016-2121 Note:TEU=twenty-foot equivalent unit,which is a standard container.Source:Adapted from UTLC Eurasian Rail Alliance(n.d

250、.).809010011012013014012341234123412341234123201620172018201920202021Transported container volumes(TEUs)Year and quarterContainerised cargo flowsVolumes transported by container lines0100200300400500600700800201620172018201920202021Asia-Europe rail volumes(1 000 TEUs)MARITIME PERFORMANCES IMPACT ON

251、TRADE,MODAL SHIFT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 42 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 New entrants High prices,inadequate services and limited availability of container shipping space have led some large shippers,including retailers like Walmart,Home Depot,Alibaba and Costco,to charter their

252、 own ships.Other shippers,like Amazon and Ikea,not only charter their own ships but started to purchase their shipping containers.Estimates put the number of Amazon-owned and manufactured containers at 5 000 to 10 000(Schoolov,2021).The largest shippers can afford the cost of charting vessels and mo

253、ving their own cargo,but this is not an option for most shippers.Although these new entrants show that it is possible to enter into the container shipping market,their market shares are,for the moment,marginal,not exceeding 0.2%of scheduled capacity and not substantially increasing since 2019.It is

254、likely that most of these initiatives are temporary,with most shippers probably shifting back to container shipping when prices and reliability have improved.Vertical integration Container shipping companies were highly profitable in 2020 and 2021.The ten largest container shipping companies recorde

255、d a profit of USD 17 billion in 2020 and an estimated USD 160 billion over 2021(Alphaliner,2022).Since the beginning of 2020,the operational profit margins have increased each quarter to levels never before observed(Figure 38).Figure Figure 3838.Operational pOperational profitrofit mamarginrgins s o

256、f the ten of the ten largest container carrierslargest container carriers,2008,2008-2121 Note:The ten largest container carriers are Maersk,MSC,CMA CGM,COSCO,Hapag Lloyd,ONE,Evergreen,HMM,Yang Ming and ZIM.Source:Alphaliner(2021b).-30%-20%-10%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3

257、 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 32008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020 2021Operational profit margin(%)Year and quarter MARITIME PERFORMANCES IMPACT ON TRADE,MODAL SHIFT AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 202243 C

258、arriers use the funds provided by these profits to acquire port terminals,forwarders and freight airlines and to achieve their ambition of becoming vertically integrated providers of door-to-door logistics solutions.These ambitions were articulated and operationalised well in advance of the Covid-19

259、 crisis,the high profits recorded in 2020 and 2021 provide an even greater impetus for expansion.Many of the largest container shipping companies have recently acquired companies that will help them achieve their goal of becoming integrated logistics companies(Table 3).As such,they are competing wit

260、h freight forwarders traditionally in the business of providing transport and logistics solutions for shippers.Various container shipping companies also consolidated their position in the air-freight business.Maersk ordered five freight airplanes and acquired the freight forwarder Senator Internatio

261、nal(which has an air-freight fleet).CMA CGM launched its airline in February 2021 with the acquisition of four freighters to be operated by Air Belgium,and the order of two additional freighters in September 2021.Table 3Table 3.Acquisitions by Acquisitions by selected selected container carriers in

262、maritime logisticscontainer carriers in maritime logistics,20202020-2121 Container shipping companyContainer shipping company AcquisitionAcquisition Type of activityType of activity Maersk HUUB E-commerce logistics Maersk Visible Supply Management E-commerce logistics Maersk B2C Europe E-commerce lo

263、gistics Maersk Senator International Freight forwarding Maersk KGH Customs Services Customs brokerage Maersk Performance Team Warehousing CMA CGM Ingram Micro CLS E-commerce logistics CMA CGM FMS Terminal Los Angeles Container terminal CMA CGM Continental Rail Freight rail operations CMA CGM Oxatis

264、E-commerce logistics CMA CGM ASTI Logistics COSCO Container Terminal Tollerort Hamburg Container terminal COSCO RSGT Terminal,Jeddah,Saudi Arabia Container terminal Hapag Lloyd Jade Weser Port Terminals Container terminal POLICY IMPLICATIONS 44 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 Policy

265、implications The current situation in the containerised maritime transport chain creates huge challenges for importers and exporters.The extreme rises in ocean transport costs present costs to shippers that are translated into higher prices for consumers that could either fuel inflation(OECD,2021),o

266、r threaten the profitability of shippers,in particular small and medium enterprises that have less negotiating power vis-vis carriers and are often more dependent on spot markets.The average global spot rate for transporting a container in the third quarter of 2021 represented 19%of the mean value o

267、f the goods transported in that container.This rate was only 3%in the first quarter of 2020(MDS Transmodal,n.d.).The record-low ship schedule reliability,related port waiting times and unpredictability of cargo arrival times has undermined“just-in-time”business and logistics models.The challenges re

268、lated to securing cargo space on container ships has introduced so much uncertainty that shippers who are large enough and can afford it have chartered their own ships.The global character of container shipping means that local supply chain problems in particular poor performance of the transport ch

269、ain in the United States spill over to other places and have become global problems.European shippers are right to wonder why the ocean freight rates to and from Europe have risen exponentially and why it has become increasingly difficult to book cargo space,considering that the European demand for

270、container shipping is essentially flat and port congestion in Europe is negligible.One principal reason could be capacity management of a globalised container shipping industry that shifted ship capacity to trans-Pacific trade lanes in order to accommodate increased demand for consumer goods in the

271、United States.In this way,European shippers are paying the price for a US-driven demand boom for consumer goods,US port congestion and the ability of the global container shipping industry to shift capacity to where profits are highest.Policies have facilitated this situation.Many jurisdictions have

272、 regulations in place that are supportive of alliances and consortia that have allowed carriers to do two things that are essential ingredients of the current supply chain crisis.First,the largest carriers have co-operated to create integrated shipping networks that span the globe.This might have be

273、en justified by expectations of increased efficiencies from integrated supply chains,but the integration has also created a situation in which local problems can easily become global.A few decades ago,liner shipping consisted of a multitude of regional shipping companies specialised in specific trad

274、es.This regional specialisation would have acted as a buffer and guaranteed that local problems remain local.Second,regulators have allowed carriers to use these co-operation arrangements to jointly manage fleet capacity.Governments and other jurisdictions have facilitated the rise of ocean freight

275、rates by creating a supportive legal framework for alliances and consortia.However,doing so made it possible for carriers to withdraw ship capacity between January and September 2020 to such an extent that it had an upward effect on freight rates.In addition,by repositioning ship capacity since then

276、 towards the trans-Pacific trade lane,freight rates on other trade lanes,such as Asia-Europe,also rose rapidly.Other explanations for the relative scarcity of capacity relate to limited investment in containers and ship capacity since 2017.Policy responses by governments and public authorities have

277、been diverse.They have focused both on resolving immediate short-term operational challenges and more structural challenges that can only be resolved in the medium-term and could require legislative changes.Policy measures have covered port POLICY IMPLICATIONS PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/

278、ITF 2022 45 bottlenecks,transparency of freight rates,monitoring of competition and securing strategic value in return for support to container shipping.Improve competition monitoring in container shipping Competition in liner shipping goes largely unchecked due to the lack of specialised government

279、 agencies in this area.Competition authorities in most countries only occasionally review the competitive conditions of the liner shipping industry,often in response to official complaints.Existing maritime authorities in most countries do not deal with economic regulation.There are a few exceptions

280、 to this general tendency,including agencies such as the US Federal Maritime Commission(Box 1).Box 1Box 1.Federal Maritime CommissionFederal Maritime Commission:F Functions and responsibilitiesunctions and responsibilities The Federal Maritime Commission(FMC)is an independent federal agency in the U

281、nited States responsible for the regulation of the US ocean-borne international transport.Its mission is to“ensure a competitive and reliable international ocean transportation supply system that supports the US economy and protects the public from unfair and deceptive practices”(FMC,n.d.).The FMC h

282、as an annual budget of approximately USD 30 million and a staff of around 115 people.The FMC has extensive responsibilities for the review and monitoring of shipping rates,including confidential service contracts,rates and rules of government-owned or controlled carriers,and agreements between carri

283、ers and terminal operators.It ensures that tariff rates and charges of common carriers are published in automated tariff systems and electronically available to the public.It can investigate and rule on complaints regarding rates,charges and practices of carriers,terminal operators and forwarders.Th

284、e FMC can also help resolve disputes.In July 2021,the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice(DoJ)and the FMC signed a Memorandum of Understanding(MOU)to foster co-operation and communication between the agencies to enhance competition in the maritime industry.Key provisions of the MOU facil

285、itate communication and co-operation between the agencies.In particular,the MOU establishes a framework for the Antitrust Division and the FMC to continue regular discussions and review law enforcement and regulatory matters affecting competition in the maritime industry.The MOU includes provisions

286、to establish periodic meetings among the respective agencies officials.It also provides for the exchange of information and expertise that may be relevant and useful to the agencies oversight and enforcement responsibilities,as appropriate and consistent with applicable legal and confidentiality res

287、trictions(US DoJ,2021).A second MOU signed by the same organisations on 28 February 2022 gives the DOJ lead responsibility on competition law compliance matters affecting the shipping industry,and commits the DOJ to providing lawyers and staff support to the FMC for enforcement of violations of the

288、Shipping Act(US DoJ,2022).In 2021,the US Congress created a 24-member shipper advisory committee composed of US importers and exporters to advise the FMC on“policies relating to the competitiveness,reliability,integrity,and fairness of the international ocean freight delivery system”(Gillis,2020).So

289、urce:www.fmc.gov POLICY IMPLICATIONS 46 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022Competitive liner shipping is of strategic importance for global supply chains.As such,countries should monitor competition in maritime transport and enhance the functions of specialised agencies in this area.Cert

290、ain information is necessary to monitor competition in liner shipping,for example,ocean carrier service contracts and co-operation agreements between carriers,which carriers need to file in some jurisdictions(e.g.the United States)but not in others(such as the European Union).In some countries,some

291、form of monitoring is carried out by government bodies.For example,Australia asked its Productivity Commission to conduct“an independent review into the long-term structural issues affecting the productivity of Australias maritime logistics system”,foreseen for publication by August 2022(Productivit

292、y Commission,2021).Considering the regulators role in facilitating the current supply chain crisis,they are responsible for ensuring that carriers behaviour is in line with the relevant competition regulation.It is essential that carrier actions respect the conditions set out in the regulations and

293、exemptions that are specific to container shipping.For example,the EU Consortia Block Exemption Regulation(CBER),extended in April 2020 until 2024,allows carrier consortia to jointly manage capacity“to adapt to fluctuations of demand and supply”(EC,2009).However,these privileges only apply to consor

294、tia that do not exceed a threshold of 30%market share on a particular trade corridor.As it happens,consortia with market shares above 30%operate on all 20 trade corridors to and from Europe(Merk,2021).On many of these trade corridors,consortia with market shares over 30%have been common for a long t

295、ime:they started to emerge in the 2010s,well before the prolongations of the CBER were decided in 2014 and 2020(Merk and Teodoro,2022).The European Commission itself considers that the CBER no longer applies to two of the three global alliances(EC,2019).This raises the question of the legality of jo

296、int capacity management carried out by alliances and consortia that exceeded the 30%market share threshold in 2020 and 2021.Regulators in various countries have interacted with carriers on the development of freight rates.In November 2020,the Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries met with nine lin

297、es and the Korea Shipowners Association.The Ministry warned that shippers were airing grievances that they were unable to export their goods and indicated that any reported unjust contract violation or unilateral change in contract terms would be scrutinised and punished if necessary(Szakonyi and Wa

298、llis,2020).The Chinese Ministry of Transport convoked carriers to a meeting in September 2020,demanding to normalise pricing and deploy more capacity in the trade routes to North America(Jiang,2020).Some of these regulatory interventions seem to have been effective in a sense.In the wake of the disc

299、ussion with Chinese regulators,several carriers cancelled their announced general rate increases and shifted capacity to the trans-Pacific trade route.However,the shift of resources from the Asia-Europe routes to the trans-Pacific trade route was itself not without consequences.It resulted in reduce

300、d capacity on the Asia-Europe trade route and rapid increases in freight rates on that route(AJOT,2021).This underlines the interdependence of liner trades and the domino effect that regulators interventions have on different jurisdictions.Considering this interconnectedness,co-operation between the

301、 main competition authorities should be enhanced.Monitoring container shipping competition can only be comprehensive when carried out at a global level,for example by examining the impact of shifting capacity between different trade corridors.Small steps have been taken in this direction:the US Fede

302、ral Maritime Commission,the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Transportation meet once every two years to discuss competition in the shipping sector.This enhanced co-operation could take the form of continuous information exchanges between age

303、ncies and more regular high-level meetings,possibly supported by a permanent and dedicated support function.There should also be a wider POLICY IMPLICATIONS PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 202247 international monitoring of competition in liner shipping.In fact,competition authorities Aus

304、tralia,Canada,New Zealand,the United Kingdom and the United States recently announced exactly this.In light of the disruption in supply chains,a working group comprised of specialists from these countries will monitor shipowners worldwide and share intelligence to identify behaviour that restricts o

305、r distorts competition(Dixon,2022).Such co-operation is needed,as several countries are reluctant to act in isolation for fear of carriers backlash(e.g.fewer direct calls).International organisations could help developing countries build capacity within their competition authorities to assess compet

306、ition issues in the container shipping industry.Reconsider competition arrangements for liner shipping For a large part of its history,the liner shipping industry has been allowed to fix prices in shipping conferences.Such shipping conferences represented an inherent trade-off:they provided price st

307、ability,but restrained competition.In order to increase competition in liner shipping,the United States,the European Union and other jurisdictions have prohibited shipping conferences since the 2000s.The trade-off between price stability and competition continued to exist but prohibiting conferences

308、 signalled policy makers priority for more competition.The policy makers took away regulatory privileges related to price fixing,but strengthened privileges for co-ordination of capacity.This had two consequences.First,competition increased,mostly in the form of price competition that was destructiv

309、e for considerable periods during the 2000s and 2010s.This meant that the dominant business strategy became saving costs via economies of scale(larger ships)and industry consolidation(increasing market share).Second,the possibilities for capacity co-ordination were exploited via the creation of larg

310、e global alliances and a multitude of consortia to an extent and of a character not anticipated by the policy makers in the 2000s,even if the risks were already highlighted by some far-sighted academics(Haralambides et al.2003).The logical outcome of this process is a select group of highly intercon

311、nected liner companies that are able to sustain high freight rates via co-ordination,withdrawing and repositioning their ship capacities at will.Shifting the policy from allowing price co-ordination to allowing capacity co-ordination seems to have deteriorated rather than increased competition in li

312、ner shipping.The current institutional arrangements have not resulted in price stability,lower prices or more competition.A reconsideration of these arrangements seems warranted to ensure that public interests are served,such as reasonable and stable freight rates,a sufficiently wide choice of opera

313、tors,direct liner connectivity and reliable services.The evaluation of the EU Consortia Block Exemption Regulation,undertaken by the European Commission in 2019,fell short of such a fundamental reconsideration,in part because of the narrow range of criteria used in the evaluation.There are three con

314、ceptual ways in which competition arrangements for liner shipping could be reformed to increase the public interest:1)by limiting the possibilities for joint capacity management;2)by introducing a form of price regulation or 3)a combination of the two.The preferred option would be to limit the possi

315、bilities of joint capacity management in order to introduce more real competition between carriers.There are different ways in which this could be achieved.For example,competition authorities and regulators could require their prior consent for joint withdrawal by alliances or consortia of ship capa

316、city on relevant trade routes.They could restrict the possibilities of carriers active in alliances to form consortia with carriers active in different alliances.Alternatively,they could require the dissolution of a consortium if the combined market share of its members reaches a certain threshold.P

317、OLICY IMPLICATIONS 48 PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 2022 If restraining joint capacity management is not possible,governments could consider intervening on pricing.Although regulators apply price regulation for network industries and also sometimes in the port industry,increasing interv

318、ention in the market may have unintended consequences and erode efficiency further.As such,limiting joint capacity management(which is illegal under competition law as applied to most sectors of the economy)is probably preferable to price controls.Some clarity would also be warranted on the limits w

319、ithin which data exchanges along the containerised transport chain are permitted.Ideally,regulators from different jurisdictions could align their policy measures via the sort of global inter-agency co-ordination described earlier.Focus regulatory attention on fair door-to-door container transport V

320、ertical integration can be economically beneficial.It eliminates transaction costs and improves the interfaces between different parts of the transport chain,including the integration of digital data.That said,it could also reduce the flexibility and resilience of the same chain.Moreover,vertical in

321、tegration may create dominant market positions the minute a pivotal component of the supply chain(i.e.the carrier)controls upstream and/or downstream activities of the chain,thus reducing competition with non-integrated competitors(Merk,Hoffmann and Haralambides,2022).The ongoing vertical integratio

322、n by the container shipping industry poses new challenges to competition regulation.This is especially the case if shipping companies can use their antitrust immunity and their leverage as carriers to acquire competitive advantages in markets where they compete with freight forwarders,port service p

323、roviders or logistics operators that do not have antitrust immunity.A recent example is the reported ceasing of contracts with forwarders as of 1 January 2022 by Hamburg Sd,part of the Maersk Group,leaving them to reserve cargo space via the less attractive spot market.Freight forwarders suffer from

324、 these practices but so do shippers and end-consumers due to the lack of service options.Another example is carriers waiving demurrage and detention charges for clients for which they operate as integrators(carrier haulage),disadvantaging merchant haulage(door-to-door transport organised by shippers

325、 or forwarders).Carriers have also set up a mandatory supply chain database,TradeLens,that strengthens their ability to control the end-to-end movement of cargo throughout the entire transport chain via anti-trust-exempt agreements among carriers.Competition authorities will need to pay special atte

326、ntion to the vertical integration in the carrier industry,and regulators will need to make sure that there is fair competition in the markets where carriers have started to compete.Regulators may choose to target demurrage and detention charges that limit the possibilities of discrimination between

327、merchant and carrier haulage.Governments will also need to ensure that the special shipping-related privileges,such as competition exemptions and favourable tax treatment,are exclusively applied to shipping activities and cannot be used to skew competition in freight forwarding,logistics and port se

328、rvices.The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting(OECD,2021)provides a relevant development in this respect.The Framework includes model rules for the global minimum tax.Pillar 2 of the Framework and its accompanying Commentary do not consider logistics,forwarding and inlan

329、d transport to be qualifying ancillary activities that could benefit from the exclusion of a global minimum tax as international shipping does(OECD,2021;OECD,2022).Governments will need to make sure that transpositions in national and supra-national legislation including for shipping-specific scheme

330、s such as tonnages taxes and regulations like the EU Maritime State Aid Guidelines are in line with the OECD/G20 model regulation and the Commentary.POLICY IMPLICATIONS PERFORMANCE OF MARITIME LOGISTICS OECD/ITF 202249 Increase transparency of container shipping rates and charges Over the last two y

331、ears,changes in ocean freight rates and surcharges have become increasingly unpredictable and unjustified.While this is not a new challenge,it has become strikingly evident in light of the current supply chain crisis.Demurrage and detention charges are often a contentious part of freight transport c

332、osts.The charges are intended to give incentives to shippers to return empty containers quickly to carriers.These charges can improve the efficiency of supply chains if,for example,they result in the speedier return of empty containers to carriers,provided that shippers actually have influence over

333、the return process.However,it is not reasonable to charge shippers for the late return of containers if ports are saturated or on strike;nor does it make sense to charge for longer dwell times if they are due to the late arrival of ships.In order to increase the effectiveness of demurrage and detention charges in improving transport flows in ports and terminals,these charges would need to be restr