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1、The Global RisksReport 202318th EditionI N S I G H T R E P O R TIn partnership with Marsh McLennan and Zurich Insurance GroupTerms of use and disclaimerWorld Economic Forum91-93 route de la CapiteCH-1223 Cologny/GenevaSwitzerlandTel.:+41(0)22 869 1212Fax:+41(0)22 786 2744E-mail:contactweforum.orgwww

2、.weforum.orgCopyright 2023by the World Economic ForumAll rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted,in any form or by any means,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,or otherwise without the prior permission of the World Economic Forum.ISBN

3、-13:978-2-940631-36-0The report and an interactive data platform are available at https:/www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2023/.This document is published by the World Economic Forum as a contribution to a project,insight area or interaction.The findings,interpretations and conclusions ex

4、pressed herein are a result of a collaborative process facilitated and endorsed by the World Economic Forum but whose results do not necessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum,nor the entirety of its Members,Partners or other stakeholders.Global Risks Report 2023January 2023Global R

5、isks Report 2023 2Preface Overview of Methodology Executive SummaryChapter 1:Global Risks 2023:Todays Crisis 1.1 Current crises 1.2 The path to 2025 Cost-of-living crisis Economic downturn Economic warfare Climate action hiatus Societal polarization 1.3 Looking ahead EndnotesChapter 2:Global Risks 2

6、033:Tomorrows Catastrophes 2.1 The world in 2033 2.2 Natural ecosystems:past the point of no return 2.3 Human health:perma-pandemics and chronic capacity challenges 2.4 Human security:new weapons,new conflicts 2.5 Digital rights:privacy in peril 2.6 Economic stability:global debt distress EndnotesCh

7、apter 3:Resource Rivalries:Four Emerging Futures 3.1 Anticipating“polycrises”3.2 Polycrisis:natural resources,climate and cooperation 3.3 Four futures for 2030 EndnotesChapter 4:Conclusion:is preparedness possible?EndnotesAppendix A Technical Notes:Global Risks Perception Survey 2022-2023Appendix B

8、Executive Opinion Survey:National Risk PerceptionsAcknowledgements45613131415171921232526292931353842465057575760676973747996 2023 World Economic Forum.All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,including photocopying and recording,or

9、 by any information storage and retrieval system.ContentsGlobal Risks Report 2023January 2023Global Risks Report 2023 3PrefaceLast years Global Risks Report warned that a divergent economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic risked deepening divisions at a time when collaboration was urgently requi

10、red to address looming global challenges.Yet despite hard-learned lessons around the interdependence of global risks,few would have anticipated the extent of instability that would soon unfold,this time driven by a new war in Europe.The health and economic aftereffects of the pandemic have quickly s

11、piraled into compounding crises.Carbon emissions have climbed,as the post-pandemic global economy fired back up.Food and energy have become weaponized by the war in Ukraine,sending inflation soaring to levels not seen in decades,globalizing a cost-of-living crisis and fueling social unrest.The resul

12、ting shift in monetary policy marks the end of an economic era defined by easy access to cheap debt and will have vast ramifications for governments,companies and individuals,widening inequality within and between countries.As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine approaches one year,economies and

13、 societies will not easily rebound from continued shocks.In this years Global Risks Perception Survey,more than four in five respondents anticipated consistent volatility over the next two years.The persistence of these crises is already reshaping the world that we live in,ushering in economic and t

14、echnological fragmentation.A continued push for national resilience in strategic sectors will come at a cost one that only a few economies can bear.Geopolitical dynamics are also creating significant headwinds for global cooperation,which often acts as a guardrail to these global risks.The 18th edit

15、ion of the Global Risks Report considers this backdrop of simmering geopolitical tensions and confluence of socioeconomic risks.It identifies the most severe perceived risks to economies and societies over the next two years.The worlds collective focus is being channeled into the“survival”of todays

16、crises:cost of living,social and political polarization,food and energy supplies,tepid growth,and geopolitical confrontation,among others.Yet much-needed attention and resources are being diverted from newly emerging or rapidly accelerating risks to natural ecosystems,human health,security,digital r

17、ights and economic stability that could become crises and catastrophes in the next decade.A low-growth,low-investment and low-cooperation era further undermines resilience and the ability to manage future shocks.In recognition of growing complexity and uncertainty,the report also explores connection

18、s between these risks.The analysis focuses on a potential polycrisis,relating to shortages in natural resources such as food,water,and metals and minerals,illustrating the associated socioeconomic and environmental fall-out through a set of potential futures.The report is underpinned by our annual G

19、lobal Risks Perception Survey,which brings together leading insights from over 1,200 experts across the World Economic Forums diverse network.It draws on the collective intelligence of the worlds foremost risk experts,including the Global Risks Advisory Board and the Chief Risk Officers Community,as

20、 well as thematic experts from academia,business,government,the international community and civil society.The report has also benefited greatly from the expertise of the World Economic Forums platforms,which work daily to drive tangible,system-positive change for the long term.We are deeply grateful

21、 to our long-standing partners in the reports development:Marsh McLennan and Zurich Insurance Group.The 2023 edition of the Global Risks Report highlights the multiple areas where the world is at a critical inflection point.It is a call to action,to collectively prepare for the next crisis the world

22、 may face and,in doing so,shape a pathway to a more stable,resilient world.Saadia Zahidi Managing DirectorGlobal Risks Report 2023January 2023Global Risks Report 2023 4The Global Risks Perception Survey(GRPS)has underpinned the Global Risks Report for nearly two decades and is the World Economic For

23、ums premier source of original global risks data.This years GRPS has brought together leading insights on the evolving global risks landscape from over 1,200 experts across academia,business,government,the international community and civil society.Responses for the GRPS 2022-2023 were collected from

24、 7 September to 5 October 2022.“Global risk”is defined as the possibility of the occurrence of an event or condition which,if it occurs,would negatively impact a significant proportion of global GDP,population or natural resources.The GRPS 2022-2023 included the following components:Outlook invited

25、respondents to predict global volatility to provide context to the evolution of the global risks landscape.Severity assessed the perceived likely impact of global risks over a one-,two-and 10-year horizon,to illustrate the potential development of individual global risks over time.Consequences asked

26、 respondents to consider potential impacts of a risk arising,to highlight relationships between global risks and the potential for compounding crises.Risk preparedness and governance invited respondents to assess the current effectiveness of the management of global risks and reflect on which stakeh

27、olders are best placed to effectively manage them,to elicit opportunities for global action and collaboration.Qualitative questions on risks sourced expert knowledge to identify new and emerging risks.Refer to Appendix A:Technical Notes:Global Risks Perception Survey 2022-2023 for more detail,includ

28、ing relevant definitions for each of the 32 global risks.To complement GRPS data on global risks,the report also draws on the World Economic Forums Executive Opinion Survey(EOS)to identify risks that pose the most severe threat to each country over the next two years,as identified by over 12,000 bus

29、iness leaders in 121 economies.When considered in context with the GRPS,this data provides insight into local concerns and priorities and points to potential“hot spots”and regional manifestations of global risks.Refer to Appendix B:Executive Opinion Survey:National Risk Perceptions for more detail.F

30、inally,the report integrates the views of leading experts to generate foresight and to support analysis of the survey data.The Global Risks Report harnesses contributions from over 40 colleagues across the World Economic Forums platforms.Qualitative insights were also collected from over 50 experts

31、from across academia,business,government,the international community and civil society through community meetings,private interviews and thematic workshops conducted from July to November 2022.These include the Global Risks Advisory Board and the Chief Risks Officers Community.Refer to Contributors

32、for more detail.Overview of methodologyGlobal Risks Report 2023January 2023Global Risks Report 2023 5The first years of this decade have heralded a particularly disruptive period in human history.The return to a“new normal”following the COVID-19 pandemic was quickly disrupted by the outbreak of war

33、in Ukraine,ushering in a fresh series of crises in food and energy triggering problems that decades of progress had sought to solve.As 2023 begins,the world is facing a set of risks that feel both wholly new and eerily familiar.We have seen a return of“older”risks inflation,cost-of-living crises,tra

34、de wars,capital outflows from emerging markets,widespread social unrest,geopolitical confrontation and the spectre of nuclear warfare which few of this generations business leaders and public policy-makers have experienced.These are being amplified by comparatively new developments in the global ris

35、ks landscape,including unsustainable levels of debt,a new era of low growth,low global investment and de-globalization,a decline in human development after decades of progress,rapid and unconstrained development of dual-use(civilian and military)technologies,and the growing pressure of climate chang

36、e impacts and ambitions in an ever-shrinking window for transition to a 1.5C world.Together,these are converging to shape a unique,uncertain and turbulent decade to come.The Global Risks Report 2023 presents the results of the latest Global Risks Perception Survey(GRPS).We use three time frames for

37、understanding global risks.Chapter 1 considers the mounting impact of current crises(i.e.global risks which are already unfolding)on the most severe global risks that many expect to play out over the short term(two years).Chapter 2 considers a selection of risks that are likely to be most severe in

38、the long term(10 years),exploring newly emerging or rapidly accelerating economic,environmental,societal,geopolitical and technological risks that could become tomorrows Executive SummaryGlobal risks ranked by severity over the short and long termFIGURE ASourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPercep

39、tion Survey 2022-2023.12345678910Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnological2 years10 yearsFailure to mitigate climate changeFailure of climate-change adaptationNatural disasters and extreme weathereventsBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseLarge-scale involuntary migrat

40、ionNatural resource crisesErosion of social cohesion and societalpolarizationWidespread cybercrime and cyber insecurityGeoeconomic confrontationLarge-scale environmental damageincidents12345678910Cost-of-living crisisNatural disasters and extreme weatherevents Geoeconomic confrontationFailure to mit

41、igate climate changeErosion of social cohesion and societalpolarizationLarge-scale environmental damageincidentsFailure of climate change adaptationWidespread cybercrime and cyber insecurityNatural resource crisesLarge-scale involuntary migrationPlease estimate the likely impact(severity)of the foll

42、owing risks over a 2-year and 10-year periodGlobal Risks Report 2023January 2023Global Risks Report 2023 6crises.Chapter 3 imagines mid-term futures,exploring how connections between the emerging risks outlined in previous sections may collectively evolve into a“polycrisis”centred around natural res

43、ource shortages by 2030.The report concludes by considering perceptions of the comparative state of preparedness for these risks and highlighting enablers to charting a course to a more resilient world.Below are key findings of the report.Cost of living dominates global risks in the next two years w

44、hile climate action failure dominates the next decadeThe next decade will be characterized by environmental and societal crises,driven by underlying geopolitical and economic trends.“Cost-of-living crisis”is ranked as the most severe global risk over the next two years,peaking in the short term.“Bio

45、diversity loss and ecosystem collapse”is viewed as one of the fastest deteriorating global risks over the next decade,and all six environmental risks feature in the top 10 risks over the next 10 years.Nine risks are featured in the top 10 rankings over both the short and the long term,including“Geoe

46、conomic confrontation”and“Erosion of social cohesion and societal polarisation”,alongside two new entrants to the top rankings:“Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity”and“Large-scale involuntary migration”.As an economic era ends,the next will bring more risks of stagnation,divergence and distre

47、ssThe economic aftereffects of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have ushered in skyrocketing inflation,a rapid normalization of monetary policies and started a low-growth,low-investment era.Governments and central banks could face stubborn inflationary pressures over the next two years,not least give

48、n the potential for a prolonged war in Ukraine,continued bottlenecks from a lingering pandemic,and economic warfare spurring supply chain decoupling.Downside risks to the economic outlook also loom large.A miscalibration between monetary and fiscal policies will raise the likelihood of liquidity sho

49、cks,signaling a more prolonged economic downturn and debt distress on a global scale.Continued supply-driven inflation could lead to stagflation,the socioeconomic consequences of which could be severe,given an unprecedented interaction with historically high levels of public debt.Global economic fra

50、gmentation,geopolitical tensions and rockier restructuring could contribute to widespread debt distress in the next 10 years.Even if some economies experience a softer-than-expected economic landing,the end of the low interest rate era will have significant ramifications for governments,businesses a

51、nd individuals.The knock-on effects will be felt most acutely by the most vulnerable parts of society and already-fragile states,contributing to rising poverty,hunger,violent protests,political instability and even state collapse.Economic pressures will also erode gains made by middle-income househo

52、lds,spurring discontent,political polarization and calls for enhanced social protections in countries across the world.Governments will continue to face a dangerous balancing act between protecting a broad swathe of their citizens from an elongated cost-of-living crisis without embedding inflation a

53、nd meeting debt servicing costs as revenues come under pressure from an economic downturn,an increasingly urgent transition to new energy systems,and a less stable geopolitical environment.The resulting new economic era may be one of growing divergence between rich and poor countries and the first r

54、ollback in human development in decades.Geopolitical fragmentation will drive geoeconomic warfare and heighten the risk of multi-domain conflictsEconomic warfare is becoming the norm,with increasing clashes between global powers and state intervention in markets over the next two years.Economic poli

55、cies will be used defensively,to build self-sufficiency and sovereignty from rival powers,but also will increasingly be deployed offensively to constrain the rise of others.Intensive geoeconomic weaponization will highlight security vulnerabilities posed by trade,financial and technological interdep

56、endence between globally integrated economies,risking an escalating cycle of distrust and decoupling.As geopolitics trumps economics,a longer-term rise in inefficient production and rising prices becomes more likely.Geographic hotspots that are critical to the effective functioning of the global fin

57、ancial and economic system,in particular in the Asia-Pacific,also pose a growing concern.Global Risks Report 2023 7Interstate confrontations are anticipated by GRPS respondents to remain largely economic in nature over the next 10 years.However,the recent uptick in military expenditure and prolifera

58、tion of new technologies to a wider range of actors could drive a global arms race in emerging technologies.The longer-term global risks landscape could be defined by multi-domain conflicts and asymmetric warfare,with the targeted deployment of new-tech weaponry on a potentially more destructive sca

59、le than seen in recent decades.Transnational arms control mechanisms must quickly adapt to this new security context,to strengthen the shared moral,reputational and political costs that act as a deterrent to accidental and intentional escalation.Technology will exacerbate inequalities while risks fr

60、om cybersecurity will remain a constant concernThe technology sector will be among the central targets of stronger industrial policies and enhanced state intervention.Spurred by state aid and military expenditure,as well as private investment,research and development into emerging technologies will

61、continue at pace over the next decade,yielding advancements in AI,quantum computing and biotechnology,among other technologies.For countries that can afford it,these technologies will provide partial solutions to a range of emerging crises,from addressing new health threats and a crunch in healthcar

62、e capacity to scaling food security and climate mitigation.For those that cannot,inequality and divergence will grow.In all economies,these technologies also bring risks,from widening misinformation and disinformation to unmanageably rapid churn in both blue-and white-collar jobs.However,the rapid d

63、evelopment and deployment of new technologies,which often comes with limited protocols governing their use,poses its own set of risks.The ever-increasing intertwining of technologies with the critical functioning of societies is exposing populations to direct domestic threats,including those that se

64、ek to shatter societal functioning.Alongside a rise in cybercrime,attempts to disrupt critical technology-enabled resources and services will become more common,with attacks anticipated against agriculture and water,financial systems,public security,transport,energy and domestic,space-based and unde

65、rsea communication infrastructure.Technological risks are not solely limited to rogue actors.Sophisticated analysis of larger data sets will enable the misuse of personal information through legitimate legal mechanisms,weakening individual digital sovereignty and the right to privacy,even in well-re

66、gulated,democratic regimes.Climate mitigation and climate adaptation efforts are set up for a risky trade-off,while nature collapsesClimate and environmental risks are the core focus of global risks perceptions over the next decade and are the risks for which we are seen to be the least prepared.The

67、 lack of deep,concerted progress on climate targets has exposed the divergence between what is scientifically necessary to achieve net zero and what is politically feasible.Growing demands on public-and private-sector resources from other crises will reduce the speed and scale of mitigation efforts

68、over the next two years,alongside insufficient progress towards the adaptation support required for those communities and countries increasingly affected by the impacts of climate change.As current crises diverts resources from risks arising over the medium to longer term,the burdens on natural ecos

69、ystems will grow given their still undervalued role in the global economy and overall planetary health.Nature loss and climate change are intrinsically interlinked a failure in one sphere will cascade into the other.Without significant policy change or investment,the interplay between climate change

70、 impacts,biodiversity loss,food security and natural resource consumption will accelerate ecosystem collapse,threaten food supplies and livelihoods in climate-vulnerable economies,amplify the impacts of natural disasters,and limit further progress on climate mitigation.Global Risks Report 2023 8Food

71、,fuel and cost crises exacerbate societal vulnerabilities while declining investments in human development erode future resilienceCompounding crises are widening their impact across societies,hitting the livelihoods of a far broader section of the population,and destabilizing more economies in the w

72、orld,than traditionally vulnerable communities and fragile states.Building on the most severe risks expected to impact in 2023 including“Energy supply crisis”,“Rising inflation”and“Food supply crisis”a global Cost-of-living crisis is already being felt.Economic impacts have been cushioned by countri

73、es that can afford it,but many lower-income countries are facing multiple crises:debt,climate change and food security.Continued supply-side pressures risk turning the current cost-of-living crisis into a wider humanitarian crisis within the next two years in many import-dependent markets.Associated

74、 social unrest and political instability will not be contained to emerging markets,as economic pressures continue to hollow out the middle-income bracket.Mounting citizen frustration at losses in human development and declining social mobility,together with a widening gap in values and equality,are

75、posing an existential challenge to political systems around the world.The election of less centrist leaders as well as political polarization between economic superpowers over the next two years may also reduce space further for collective problem-solving,fracturing alliances and leading to a more v

76、olatile dynamic.With a crunch in public-sector funding and competing security concerns,our capacity to absorb the next global shock is shrinking.Over the next 10 years,fewer countries will have the fiscal headroom to invest in future growth,green technologies,education,care and health systems.The sl

77、ow decay of public infrastructure and services in both developing and advanced markets may be relatively subtle,but accumulating impacts will be highly corrosive to the strength of human capital and development a critical mitigant to other global risks faced.As volatility in multiple domains grows i

78、n parallel,the risk of polycrises accelerates Concurrent shocks,deeply interconnected risks and eroding resilience are giving rise to the risk of polycrises where disparate crises interact such that the overall impact far exceeds the sum of each part.Eroding geopolitical cooperation will have ripple

79、 effects across the global risks landscape over the medium term,including contributing to a potential polycrisis of interrelated environmental,geopolitical and socioeconomic risks relating to the supply of and demand for natural resources.The report describes four potential futures centred around fo

80、od,water and metals and mineral shortages,all of which could spark a humanitarian as well as an ecological crisis from water wars and famines to continued overexploitation of ecological resources and a slowdown in climate mitigation and adaption.Given uncertain relationships between global risks,sim

81、ilar foresight exercises can help anticipate potential connections,directing preparedness measures towards minimizing the scale and scope of polycrises before they arise.SourceWorld Economic Forum,Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Short-and long-term global outlookFIGURE B2 years13%69%14%2%2%1

82、0 yearsProgressive tipping points and persistent crises leading to catastrophic outcomesConsistently volatile across economies and industries with multiple shocks accentuating divergent trajectoriesSlightly volatile with occasional localised surprisesLimited volatility with relative stabilityRenewed

83、 stability with a revival of global resilience20%34%26%11%9%Which of the following best characterizes your outlook for the world over the short-term(2 years)and longer-term(10 years)?Global Risks Report 2023 9In the years to come,as continued,concurrent crises embed structural changes to the economi

84、c and geopolitical landscape,they accelerate the other risks that we face.More than four in five GRPS respondents anticipate consistent volatility over the next two years at a minimum,with multiple shocks accentuating divergent trajectories.However,respondents are generally more optimistic over the

85、longer term.Just over one-half of respondents anticipate a negative outlook,and nearly one in five respondents predict limited volatility with relative and potentially renewed stability in the next 10 years.Indeed,there is still a window to shape a more secure future through more effective preparedn

86、ess.Addressing the erosion of trust in multilateral processes will enhance our collective ability to prevent and respond to emerging cross-border crises and strengthen the guardrails we have in place to address well-established risks.In addition,leveraging the interconnectivity between global risks

87、can broaden the impact of risk mitigation activities shoring up resilience in one area can have a multiplier effect on overall preparedness for other related risks.As a deteriorating economic outlook brings tougher trade-offs for governments facing competing social,environmental and security concern

88、s,investment in resilience must focus on solutions that address multiple risks,such as funding of adaptation measures that come with climate mitigation co-benefits,or investment in areas that strengthen human capital and development.Some of the risks described in this years report are close to a tip

89、ping point.This is the moment to act collectively,decisively and with a long-term lens to shape a pathway to a more positive,inclusive and stable world.Digital power concentrationDigital inequalityBreakdown of criticalinformation infrastructureState collapseCollapse or lack of publicinfrastructure a

90、nd servicesErosion of social cohesionProliferation of illiciteconomic activityCollapse of a systemicallyimportant supply chainFailure to stabilize price trajectoriesEmployment crisesSevere mentalhealth deteriorationChronic health conditionsInfectious diseasesDebt crisesAsset bubble burstProlonged ec

91、onomicdownturnLarge-scaleinvoluntary migrationNatural resourcecrises Environmentaldamage incidentsGeoeconomicconfrontationInterstate conflictUse of weaponsof mass destructionTerrorist attacksMisinformation anddisinformationAdverse outcomesof frontier technologiesWidespread cybercrimeand cyber insecu

92、rityIneffectiveness ofmultilateral institutions Cost-of-living crisisBiodiversity loss andecosystem collapseFailure to mitigateclimate changeNatural disasters andextreme weatherFailure ofclimate-changeadaptionDigital power concentrationDigital inequalityBreakdown of criticalinformation infrastructur

93、eState collapseCollapse or lack of publicinfrastructure and servicesErosion of social cohesionProliferation of illiciteconomic activityCollapse of a systemicallyimportant supply chainFailure to stabilize price trajectoriesEmployment crisesSevere mentalhealth deteriorationChronic health conditionsInf

94、ectious diseasesDebt crisesAsset bubble burstProlonged economicdownturnLarge-scaleinvoluntary migrationNatural resourcecrises Environmentaldamage incidentsGeoeconomicconfrontationInterstate conflictUse of weaponsof mass destructionTerrorist attacksMisinformation anddisinformationAdverse outcomesof f

95、rontier technologiesWidespread cybercrimeand cyber insecurityIneffectiveness ofmultilateral institutions Cost-of-living crisisBiodiversity loss andecosystem collapseFailure to mitigateclimate changeNatural disasters andextreme weatherFailure ofclimate-changeadaptionSourceWorld Economic Forum,Global

96、RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Global risks landscape:an interconnections mapFIGURE CRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalEdgesRelative influenceHighLowMediumRisk influenceNodesHighLowMediumGlobal Risks Report 2023 10Currently manifesting risksFIGURE DSourceWorld Ec

97、onomic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.“Please rank the top 5 currently manifesting risks in order of how severe you believe their impact will be on a global level in 2023”Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalEnergy supply crisis1Cost-of-living crisisRis

98、ing inflationFood supply crisisCyberattacks oncritical infrastructure2345Global risks ranked by severityFIGURE ESourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalPlease estimate the likely impact(severity)of the fo

99、llowing risks over a 2-year and 10-year period 1Cost-of-living crisis2Natural disasters and extreme weather events3Geoeconomic confrontation4Failure to mitigate climate change5Erosion of social cohesion and societal polarization6Large-scale environmental damage incidents7Failure of climate-change ad

100、aption8Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity9Natural resource crises10Large-scale involuntary migration11Debt crises12Failure to stabilize price trajectories13Prolonged economic downturn14Interstate conflict15Ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions and international cooperation16Misinforma

101、tion and disinformation17Collapse of a systemically important industry or supply chain18Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse19Employment crises20Infectious diseases21Use of weapons of mass destruction22Asset bubble bursts23Severe mental health deterioration24Breakdown of critical information inf

102、rastructure25State collapse or severe instability26Chronic diseases and health conditions27Collapse or lack of public infrastructure and services28Proliferation of illicit economic activity29Digital power concentration30Terrorist attacks31Digital inequality and lack of access to digital services32Ad

103、verse outcomes of frontier technologiesShort term1Failure to mitigate climate change2Failure of climate-change adaption3Natural disasters and extreme weather events4Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse5Large-scale involuntary migration6Natural resource crises7Erosion of social cohesion and socie

104、tal polarization8Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity9Geoeconomic confrontation10Large-scale environmental damage incidents11Misinformation and disinformation12Ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions and international cooperation13Interstate conflict14Debt crises15Cost-of-living crisis16B

105、reakdown of critical information infrastructure17Digital power concentration18Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies19Failure to stabilize price trajectories20Chronic diseases and health conditions21Prolonged economic downturn22State collapse or severe instability23Employment crises24Collapse of

106、a systemically important industry or supply chain25Severe mental health deterioration26Collapse or lack of public infrastructure and services27Infectious diseases28Use of weapons of mass destruction29Proliferation of illicit economic activity30Digital inequality and lack of access to digital service

107、s31Asset bubble bursts32Terrorist attacksLong termGlobal Risks Report 2023 11Terrorist attacksInfectious diseasesBreakdown of critical information infrastructureAsset bubble burstsChronic diseases and health conditionsUse of weapons of mass destructionCollapse or lack of public infrastructure and se

108、rvicesProlonged economic downturnAdverse outcomes of frontier technologiesProliferation of illicit economic activityWidespread cybercrime and cyber insecurityEmployment crisesState collapse or severe instabilityDigital inequality and lack of access to digital servicesCollapse of a systemically impor

109、tant industry or supply chainFailure to stabilize price trajectoriesDebt crisesInterstate conflictIneffectiveness of multilateral institutions and international cooperationGeoeconomic confrontationDigital power concentrationSevere mental health deteriorationLarge-scale environmental damage incidents

110、Cost-of-living crisisLarge-scale involuntary migrationErosion of social cohesion and societal polarizationNatural disasters and extreme weather eventsNatural resource crisesBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseMisinformation and disinformationFailure of climate-change adaptionFailure to mitigate

111、climate changeRisk nameRisk preparednessRisk governancePerceptionStakeholderRisk category10002550751000255075Please indicate the current effectiveness ofrisk management,taking into account mechanismsin place to prevent the risk from occurring orprepare to mitigate its impactWhich set of stakeholders

112、 can most effectivelymanage the risk?SourceWorld Economic Forum,Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Perceptions around preparedness and governanceFIGURE FHighly ineffectiveIneffectiveEffectiveHighly effectiveIndeterminate effectivenessEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalLocal g

113、overnmentNational governmentInternational organizationBusinessesPublic-Private cooperationBilateralMulti-countryRegionalGlobal Risks Report 2023 12Global Risks 2023:Todays Crisis1With the global landscape dominated by manifesting risks,we introduce this year three time frames for understanding globa

114、l risks:1)current crises(i.e.global risks which are already unfolding),2)risks that are likely to be most severe in two years,and 3)risks that are likely to be most severe in 10 years.This chapter address the outlook for the first two time frames.Most respondents to the Current crises1.1RankingShare

115、 of repsondentsHigher no.of respondentsHigher rankingCurrently manifesting risksFIGURE 1.1SourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Energy supply crisisCost-of-living crisisRising inflationFood supply crisisCyberattacks oncritical infrastructureDisruptions in global supplych

116、ains for non-food goodsFailure to set and meetnational net-zero targetsWeaponization ofeconomic policyDebt crisisWeakening of human rightsDeployment of nuclear weaponsContinued waves of COVID-19Structural failuresin health systemsDeployment of chemical and biological weaponsRisk categoriesEconomicEn

117、vironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnological“Please rank the top 5 currently manifesting risks in order of how severe you believe their impact will be on a global level in 2023”Todays CrisisGlobal Risks Report 2023January 2023Global Risks Report 2023 132022-2023 Global Risks Perception Survey(GRPS)c

118、hose“Energy supply crisis”;“Cost-of-living crisis”;“Rising inflation”;“Food supply crisis”and“Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure”as among the top risks for 2023 with the greatest potential impact on a global scale(Figure 1.1).Those that are outside the top 5 for the year but remain concerns inc

119、lude:failure to meet net-zero targets;weaponization of economic policy;weakening of human rights;a debt crisis;and failure of non-food supply chains.News headlines all over the world make these results largely unsurprising.Yet their implications are profound.Our global“new normal”is a return to basi

120、cs food,energy,security problems our globalized world was thought to be on a trajectory to solve.These risks are being amplified by the persistent health and economic overhang of a global pandemic;a war in Europe and sanctions that impact a globally integrated economy;and an escalating technological

121、 arms race underpinned by industrial competition and enhanced state intervention.Longer-term structural changes to geopolitical dynamics with the diffusion of power across countries of differing political and economic systems are coinciding with a more rapidly changing economic landscape,ushering in

122、 a low-growth,low-investment and low-cooperation era and a potential decline in human development after decades of progress.The result is a global risks landscape that feels both wholly new and eerily familiar.There is a return of“older”risks that are understood historically but experienced by few i

123、n the current generations of business leaders and public policy-makers.In addition,there are relatively new developments in the global risk landscape.These include widespread,historically high levels of public and in some cases private-sector debt;the ever more rapid pace of technological developmen

124、t and its unprecedented intertwining with the critical functioning of societies;and the growing pressure of climate change impacts and ambitions in an ever-shorter time frame for transition.Together,these are converging to shape a unique,uncertain and turbulent 2020s.The path to 20251.2The complex a

125、nd rapid evolution of the global risks landscape is adding to a sense of unease.More than four in five GRPS respondents anticipated consistent volatility over the next two years at a minimum,with multiple shocks accentuating divergent trajectories(Figure 1.10).Respondents to the GRPS see the path to

126、 2025 dominated by social and environmental risks,driven by underlying geopolitical and economic trends(Figure 1.2).There were some notable differences between the responses of government and business respondents,with“Debt crises”,“Failure to stabilize price trajectories”,“Failure to mitigate climat

127、e change”and“Failure of climate change adaptation”featuring more prominently for governments,and“Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity”and“Large-scale environmental damage incidents”featuring higher for business(Figure 1.3).The following sections explore the most severe 1Cost-of-living crisis2N

128、atural disasters and extreme weatherevents 3Geoeconomic confrontation4Failure to mitigate climate change5Erosion of social cohesion and societalpolarization6Large-scale environmental damageincidents7Failure of climate change adaptation8Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity9Natural resource cris

129、es10Large-scale involuntary migrationSourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Global risks ranked by severity over the short term(2 years)FIGURE 1.2Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGlobal Risks Report 2023 14Severity by stakeholder over t

130、he short term(2 years)FIGURE 1.3SourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.12345Failure of climate-change adaption6Debt crises7Erosion of social cohesion and societal polarization8Failure to stabilize price trajectories9Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity10Prolonged ec

131、onomic downturnGeoeconomic confrontationFailure to mitigate climate changeNatural disasters and extreme weatherCost-of-living crisis12345Large-scale environmental damage incidents6Erosion of social cohesion and societal polarization7Failure to mitigate climate change 8Natural resource crises 9Debt c

132、rises10Failure of climate-change adaptionWidespread cybercrime and cyber insecurityGeoeconomic confrontationNatural disasters and extreme weatherCost-of-living crisisRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalGovernmentBusinessglobal risks that many expect to play out over

133、the next two years,within the context of the mounting impacts and constraints being imposed by the numerous crises felt today.These are:cost-of-living crisis,economic downturn,geoeconomic warfare,climate action hiatus and societal polarization.We describe current trends associated with each risk,bri

134、efly cover the reasons behind them and then note their emerging implications and knock-on effects.Cost-of-living crisisRanked as the most severe global risk over the next two years by GRPS respondents,a global Cost-of-living crisis is already here,with inflationary pressures disproportionately hitti

135、ng those that can least afford it.Even before the COVID-19 pandemic,the price of basic necessities non-expendable items such as food and housing were on the rise.1 Costs further increased in 2022,primarily due to continued disruptions in the flows of energy and food from Russia and Ukraine.To curb d

136、omestic prices,around 30 countries introduced restrictions,including export bans,in food and energy last year,further driving up global inflation.2 Despite the latest extension,the looming threat of Russia pulling out of the Black Sea Grain Export Deal has also led to significant volatility in the p

137、rice of essential commodities.Although global supply chains have partly adapted,with pressures significantly lower than the peak experienced in April last year,3 price shocks to core necessities have significantly outpaced general inflation over this time(Figure 1.4).The FAO Price Index hit the high

138、est level since its inception in 1990 in March last year.4 Energy prices are estimated to remain 46%higher than average in 2023 relative to January 2022 projections.5 The relaxation of Chinas COVID-19 policies could drive up energy and commodity prices further-and will test the resilience of global

139、supply chains if policy changes remain unpredictable as infections soar.Cost-of-living crisis was broadly perceived by GRPS respondents to be a short-term risk,at peak severity within the next two years and easing off thereafter.But the persistence of a global cost-of-living crisis could result in a

140、 growing proportion of the most vulnerable parts of society being priced out of access to basic needs,fueling unrest and political instability.Continued supply-chain disruptions could lead to sticky core inflation,particularly in food and energy.This could fuel further interest rate hikes,raising th

141、e risk of debt distress,a prolonged economic downturn and a vicious cycle for fiscal planning.Despite some improvement during the pandemic,household debt has been on the rise in certain Global Risks Report 2023 15Inflation(percentage)Upper-middle incomeHigh incomeJanJanJan202120222020JanJanJan202120

142、222020051015-5202530051015-5202530JanMaySepJanMaySepJanMaySep202120222020JanMaySepJanMaySepJanMaySep202120222020051015-5202530051015-5202530MaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepMaySepSourceIMF,Consumer Price Index.NoteMedian year-on-year inflation,by income group.Price hikes in basi

143、c necessities,2020-2022FIGURE 1.4Low incomeLower-middle incomeCPI all itemsFood and non-alcoholic beveragesHousing,water,electricity,gas and other fuelseconomies.Global mortgage rates have reached their highest level in more than a decade.Some estimates suggest that the increase in rates amounts to

144、a 35%increase in mortgage payments for homeowners.6 Rent inflation has also followed suit in the United States of America,it is estimated to peak at over 8%in May this year before easing,7 disproportionately affecting lower socioeconomic groups who are more likely to rent but least able to afford re

145、ntal price hikes.Retirees will also be impacted as pensions fail to keep pace with higher inflation.8 Higher costs of food,energy and housing,causing lower real incomes,will result in trade-offs in essential spending,worsening health and wellbeing outcomes for communities.Economic impacts are often

146、cushioned by expansive fiscal policy and government programmes in countries that can afford them.9 Advanced economies continue to roll out measures,many of which have been broad-brush in approach ranging from caps on electricity bills,fuel rebates and subsidized public transport tickets for consumer

147、s,to export controls on food,tax relief,enhanced state aid and support for affected companies.The resulting pressure on fiscal balances may exacerbate debt sustainability concerns,leaving emerging and developing countries with far less fiscal room to protect their populations in the future.Both affo

148、rdability and availability of basic necessities can stoke social and political instability.Last year,the increase in fuel prices alone led to protests in an estimated 92 countries,some of which resulted in political upheaval and fatalities,alongside strikes and industrial action.10 The impact of ins

149、ecurity will continue to be felt most acutely in already vulnerable states including Somalia,Sudan,South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic but may also exacerbate instability in countries facing simultaneous food and debt crises,such as Tunisia,Ghana,Pakistan,Egypt and Lebanon.11A combination of ex

150、treme weather events and constrained supply could lead the current cost-of-living crisis into a catastrophic scenario of hunger and distress for millions in import-dependent countries or turn the energy crisis towards a humanitarian crisis in the poorest emerging markets.Energy shortages as a result

151、 of supplier shut-offs or natural,accidental or intentional damage Global Risks Report 2023 16to pipelines and energy grids could cause widespread blackouts and fatalities if combined with seasonal extreme weather.There is also a material possibility of a global food supply crisis occurring in 2023,

152、with the continuation of the war in Ukraine,the lagged effect of a price spike in fertilizer last year and the impact of extreme weather conditions on food production in key regions.Estimates suggest that over 800,000 hectares of farmland were wiped out by floods in Pakistan increasing commodity pri

153、ces significantly in a country that was already grappling with record 27%inflation.12 Predicted droughts and water shortages may cause a decline in harvests and livestock deaths across East Africa,North Africa and Southern Africa,exacerbating food insecurity.13Although some regions anticipate above-

154、average yields next year,unexpected production or transportation shocks in key exporters including water shortages in the Netherlands and droughts and large-scale insect loss in the United States of America and Brazil14 or controls imposed by these countries could further destabilize global food sec

155、urity,explored in Chapter 3:Resource Rivalries.“Severe commodity price shocks or volatility”was a top-five risk over the next two years in 47 countries surveyed by the Forums Executive Opinion Survey(EOS),while“Severe commodity supply crises”registered as a more localized risk,as a top-five concern

156、across 34 countries,including in Switzerland,South Korea,Singapore,Chile and Trkiye.The catastrophic effects of famine and loss of life can also have spill-over effects further afield,as the risk of widespread violence grows and involuntary migration rises.Economic downturnLast years edition of the

157、Global Risks Report warned that inflation,debt and interest rate rises were emerging risks.Today,governments and central banks led by developed markets,notably the United States of America,Eurozone and the United Kingdom of Great Britain are walking a tightrope between managing inflation without tri

158、ggering a deep or prolonged recession,and protecting citizens from a cost-of-living crisis while servicing historically high debt loads.Public-sector respondents to the GRPS ranked Debt crises(#6),Failure to stabilise price trajectories(#8)and“Prolonged economic downturn”(#10)in the top 10 risks ove

159、r the next two years(Figure 1.3).Managing inflation is a worldwide concern.“Rapid and/or sustained inflation”was also highlighted as a top-five risk over the next two years in 89 of the countries surveyed in the EOS,a significant increase from 2021(Figure 1.5).It was ranked as the top threat in a nu

160、mber of G20 countries including Brazil,South Korea and Mexico although inflationary pressures have affected both developed and developing economies.Inflation rates rose above 80%in Argentina and Trkiye,while Zimbabwe,the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,Lebanon,the Syrian Arab Republic and Sudan wit

161、nessed triple-digit inflation.Inflation in the United States of America peaked above 9%in June last year and hit record highs in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Eurozone in October,at 11.1%and 10.6%,respectively,forcing interest rates higher and inflicting more pain on emerging economies

162、.15A.Failure to stabilize price trajectories,2021B.Rapid and/or sustained inflation,20221102030Rank1102030RankSourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2022.FIGURE 1.5National risk perceptions:inflationWhich five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the n

163、ext two years?Global Risks Report 2023 17The IMFs most recent projections anticipate a decline in global inflation from almost 9%in 2022 to 6.5%this year and 4.1%in 2024,with a sharper disinflation in advanced economies.16 However,downside risks to the outlook loom large.The complexity of inflationa

164、ry dynamics is creating a challenging policy environment for both the public sector and central banks,given the mix of demand and supply-side drivers,including a prolonged war in Ukraine and associated energy-supply crunch,potential for escalating sanctions,and continued bottlenecks from a lingering

165、 pandemic or new sources of supply-side controls.Given currently low headline unemployment in advanced economies,persistent price pressures will likely lead to higher interest rates to avoid inflation de-anchoring.Central banks have sped up the post-pandemic normalization of monetary policy.Nearly 9

166、0%(33 of 38)of central banks monitored by the Bank for International Settlements raised interest rates in 2022,a dramatic shift away from the loose financial conditions that characterized the previous decade.17 With a rapid rise in rates,the risk of unintended consequences and policy error is high,w

167、ith possible overshoot leading to a deeper and more prolonged economic downturn and potential global recession.Even if the economic fallout remains comparatively contained,global growth is forecast to slow to 2.7%in 2023,with around one-third of the worlds economy facing a technical recession the th

168、ird-weakest growth profile in over 20 years.18 This downturn will be led by advanced markets,with projected growth falling to 1.1%in 2023,while the largest economies the EU,China and the United States of America face continued challenges to growth.However,for developing economies,there is a risk of

169、further economic distress and tougher trade-offs.Stubbornly high inflation and more disorderly containment will raise the likelihood of stagnant economic growth,liquidity shocks and debt distress on a global scale.Energy importers in particular will bear the brunt of higher energy prices stemming fr

170、om a strengthened US dollar,but its continued strength is importing inflation worldwide.Globalized capital flows over recent decades have increased exposure of emerging and developing markets to rising interest rates,especially those with a high proportion of USD-denominated debt,such as Argentina,C

171、olombia and Indonesia.19 Early tightening of monetary policy in many markets including Brazil,Mexico,Chile,Peru and Colombia minimized initial exposure.But while some countries have resorted to foreign-exchange interventions USD BillionDefaulted globalpublic debt as shareof global public debt1975198

172、019901985199520002005201020152020002468100200300400500600SourceBank of Canada and Bank of England,2022.20Sovereign debt in defaultFIGURE 1.6YearOther developing countriesEmerging-market and frontier economiesAdvanced economiesHeavily indebted poor countriesGlobal Risks Report 2023 18to limit currenc

173、y depreciation and debt-servicing loads,heightened volatility continues to drive demand for US assets.This has led to record capital outflows from markets with weaker macroeconomic fundamentals,with investors already withdrawing$70 billion from emerging market bond funds by October last year.21 Grow

174、th agendas,including the critical pivot to greener economies,have been based on the availability of cheap debt.The extent to which countries can continue to finance development will be dependent on domestic political and debt dynamics.Sri Lankas recent crisis provides a very real example of the spir

175、aling risks to human security and health that can arise from economic distress,where a debt default and shortage in foreign currency limited imports;disrupted access to food,fuel,healthcare and electricity;and led to violent protests and the resignation of the President.The scale of sovereign debt d

176、efaults could significantly rise in weaker emerging markets over the next two years,in terms of both the percentage value of total global debt and number of states in default(Figure 1.6).Although unlikely under the current trajectory to reach globally destabilizing levels,the proportion of countries

177、 in or at high risk of debt distress has already doubled from 2015 levels.22 This will increase the global influence of creditor nations and heighten state fragility as the capacity to address simultaneous crises in food and energy will be limited.23 Some countries will be unable to contain future s

178、hocks,invest in future growth and green technologies or build future resilience in education,healthcare and ecological systems,with impacts exacerbated by the most powerful and disproportionately borne by the most vulnerable,as explored in Chapter 2.6:Economic stability.Geoeconomic warfare“Geoeconom

179、ic confrontation”was ranked the third-most severe risk over the next two years by GRPS respondents.Interstate confrontations were anticipated by both GRPS and EOS respondents to remain largely economic in nature over the short term.Geoeconomic confrontation including sanctions,trade wars and investm

180、ent screening was considered a top-five threat over the next two years among 42 countries surveyed by the EOS and featured as the top risk in many East and South-East Asian countries,among others.In comparison,“Interstate conflict”was ranked as a top-five risk in 28 countries surveyed by the EOS(Fig

181、ure 1.7).The weaponization of economic policy between globally integrated powers has highlighted vulnerabilities posed by trade,financial and technological interdependence-for the public and private sector alike.The Ukraine conflict triggered the imposition of sanctions,nationalization of key player

182、s,and government appropriation of assets,such as Germanys seizure of Russian energy companies stakes in local refineries last year.24 Reputational and legal risks for multinational company operations in certain markets also grew:A.Geoeconomic confrontationB.Interstate conflict1102030Rank1102030RankS

183、ourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2022.FIGURE 1.7National risk perceptions:interstate confrontationWhich five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?Global Risks Report 2023 19consumer good companies faced boycotts after continuing

184、 to provide basic necessities to Russia,and a European energy company was accused of“complicity in war crimes”due to linkages to a Russian gas field.25In the face of vulnerabilities highlighted by the pandemic and then war,economic policy,particularly in advanced economies,is increasingly directed t

185、owards geopolitical goals.Countries are seeking to build“self-sufficiency”,underpinned by state aid,and achieve“sovereignty”from rival powers,through onshoring and“friend-shoring”global supply chains.Defensive measures to boost local production and minimize foreign interference in critical industrie

186、s include subsidies,tighter investment screening,data localization policies,visa bans and exclusion of companies from key markets.While initially driven by tensions between the United States of America and China,many policies are extra-territorial in nature or have been similarly adopted by other ma

187、rkets,with spill-over effects across a broad range of industries.For example,Switzerland is considering the introduction of a general cross-sectoral foreign direct investment screening regime for the first time.Expanded state aid to support self-sufficiency in“strategically important products”,inclu

188、ding climate mitigation and adaptation,has also heightened competition within global blocs.The EU has already raised concerns about the USAs Inflation Reduction Act,which includes significant tax credits and subsidies for local green technologies.26Economic levers are also being used to proactively

189、constrain the rise of rivals.This includes delisting of foreign companies,extensive use of the foreign direct product rule and export controls on key technologies and intellectual property as well as broad constraints on citizens and entities working with designated foreign companies.The introductio

190、n of an outbound investment screening regime has also been contemplated by the United States of America.27Together,these trends towards geoeconomic warfare risk creating widespread spillovers.More extensive deployment of economic levers to meet geopolitical goals risks a vicious and escalating cycle

191、 of distrust.Financial and technological ramifications may highlight further vulnerabilities,leading states to proactively wind back other interdependencies in the name of national security and resilience over the next two years.This may spur contrary outcomes to the intended objective,driving resil

192、ience and productivity growth lower and marking the end of an economic era characterized by cheaper and globalized capital,labour,commodities and goods.This will likely continue to weaken existing alliances as nations turn inwards,with enhanced state intervention perceived to drive a“race to the bot

193、tom”.Further pressure will be placed on multilateral governance mechanisms that act as mitigants to these risks,potentially mirroring the politicization of the World Health Organization(WHO)during the COVID-19 pandemic and the near paralysis of trade enforcement on more contentious issues by the Wor

194、ld Trade Organization(WTO)in recent years.28 It will also likely embed the importance of broader geopolitical spheres of influence in“dependent”markets,with global powers extensively exercising trade,debt and technological power.Although some developing and emerging markets may wield critical resour

195、ces as leverage,considered in Chapter 3:Resource Rivalries,anticipated controls on capital,labour,knowledge and technological flows risk widening the developmental divide.In addition,spheres of influence will not be purely contained to global powers,nor“dependent”developing and emerging markets.The

196、influence and alignment of the Middle East in regional and global politics will shift.Although the challenge of longer-Global Risks Report 2023 20term economic diversification remains a significant distraction domestically,the current energy crisis will raise economic,military and political capital

197、of numerous countries over the next two years.Comparative ties of the United States of America and China will have significant ramifications for the balance of power in the region,as well as global military dynamics,considered further in Chapter 2.4:Human security.29Strategies to enhance security ma

198、y also come at a wider economic cost.Intensified geopolitical tensions risk weakening the economic landscape even further,resulting in lingering inflation or depressed growth even if current pressures subside.If on-and friend-shoring continue to be prioritized particularly in strategic industries su

199、ch as technology,telecommunications,financial systems,agriculture,mining,healthcare and pharmaceuticals consumers will potentially face rising costs well into the future.As costs of compliance with divergent political and economic systems climb,multinational companies may pragmatically pick a side,s

200、peeding up divergence between various market models.While intended to lower risks associated with geopolitical and economic disruption,shortened supply chains may also unintentionally heighten exposure to geographically concentrated risks,including labour shortages,civil unrest,pandemics and natural

201、 weather events.Geopolitical risks posed by geographic hotspots that are critical to the effective functioning of the global financial and economic system,in particular in the Asia-Pacific,also pose a growing concern.Climate action hiatusDespite 30 years of global climate advocacy and diplomacy,the

202、international system has struggled to make the required progress on climate change.The potential failure to address this existential global risk first entered the top rankings of the Global Risks Report over a decade ago,in 2011.Today,atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide,methane and nitrous oxide ha

203、ve all reached record highs.Emission trajectories make it very unlikely that global ambitions to limit warming to 1.5C will be achieved.30 A Failure to mitigate climate change is ranked as one of the most severe threats in the short term but is the global risk we are seen to be the least prepared fo

204、r,with 70%of GRPS respondents rating existing measures to prevent or prepare for climate change as“ineffective”or“highly ineffective”(Figure 4.1).According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC),the chance of breaching the 1.5C target by as early as 2030 stands at 50%.Current commitm

205、ents made by the G7 private sector suggest an increase of 2.7C by mid-century,way above the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement.31Recent events have exposed a divergence between what is scientifically necessary and what is politically expedient.Current pressures should result in a turning point,en

206、couraging energy-importing countries to invest in“secure”,cleaner and cheaper renewable energy sources.32 Yet geopolitical tensions and economic pressures have already limited and in some cases reversed progress on climate change mitigation,at least over the short term.For example,the EU spent at le

207、ast EUR50 billion on new and expanded fossil-fuel infrastructure and supplies,and some countries restarted coal power stations.33Despite some longer-term government action on the energy transition,such as the USAs Inflation Reduction Act and the EUs REPowerEU plan,overall momentum for climate mitiga

208、tion is unlikely to rapidly accelerate in the next two years.Negotiations at the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC(COP27)failed to reach a much-needed agreement to phase out all fossil fuels,laying bare the difficulty of balancing short-term needs with longer-term ambitions.Policy-makers are i

209、ncreasingly confronted by perceived trade-offs between energy security,affordability and sustainability.The stark reality of 600 million people in Africa without access to electricity illustrates the failure to deliver change to those who need it and the continued attraction of quick fossil-fuel pow

210、ered solutions despite the risks of stranded assets,energy security challenges of exported fossil fuel commodities and lifetime carbon emissions that exceed the 1.5C limit.There is also growing recognition that not only the pace of the transition but also effectiveness and integrity matter:climate l

211、itigation is increasing and concerns about emissions under-reporting and greenwashing have triggered calls for new regulatory oversight for the transition to net zero.34 While some countries have made disclosure mandatory,much of the corporate world have not yet assessed or started to manage their c

212、limate risks.In the absence Global Risks Report 2023 21of clearer policy signals and consistent regulation and enforcement,mitigation efforts will be shaped by increasingly disruptive climate activism,raising the likelihood of stranded assets as well as people.A just transition that supports those s

213、et to lose from decarbonization is increasingly invoked by countries heavily dependent on fossil-fuel industries as a reason to slow down efforts.These challenges,against the backdrop of a deteriorating economic landscape and inflated input costs,may postpone investments in greener production method

214、s particularly in heavier,“dirtier”industries.35 All of this implies that the risks of a slower and more disorderly transition(extensively covered in last years Global Risks Report)have now turned into reality,potentially leading to dire planetary and societal consequences.Any rollback of government

215、 and private action will continue to amplify risks to human health(explored in Chapter 2.3:Human health)and spur the deterioration of natural capital,as discussed in Chapter 2.2:Natural ecosystems.Climate change will also increasingly become a key migration driver and there are indications that it h

216、as already contributed to the emergence of terrorist groups and conflicts in Asia,the Middle East and Africa.36Indeed,with 1.2C of warming already in the system,the compounding effect of a changing climate is already being felt,magnifying humanitarian challenges such as food insecurity,and adding an

217、other hefty bill to already stretched fiscal balances.37 In the GRPS results,“Natural disasters and extreme weather events”was considered the second-most severe risk over the next two years.As with many of the global risks featured in this years report,the impact of these events disproportionately a

218、ffects low-and middle-income countries.It registered as a top-five risk in 25 countries surveyed by the EOS,in particular in developing coastal states across Latin America,Africa and South-East Asia.As floods,heatwaves,droughts and other extreme weather events become more severe and frequent,a wider

219、 set of populations will be affected.In parallel,a consolidation of public-and private-sector resources may set up emerging and pressing trade-offs between disaster recovery,loss and damage,adaptation and mitigation.Although climate mitigation has been overwhelmingly favoured over adaptation in term

220、s of financing to date,particularly in the private sector,38 EOS results indicate that climate adaptation may now be seen as a more immediate concern in the short term by business leaders.Failure of climate change mitigation only featured in the top five risks over the next two years in one economy,

221、Zambia,whereas the Failure of climate-change adaptation was a top-five risk in 16 countries,such as the Netherlands,where it ranked first(Figure 1.8).The diversion of attention and resources towards adaptation may further slow progress on global-warming targets in the economies that remain the bigge

222、st contributors to greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions.39Despite plans for a global goal on adaptation to be agreed at COP28,there has also been insufficient progress towards the support required for infrastructure and populations already affected by the fallout from climate change.Adaptation has not been

223、adequately funded,with 34%of climate finance currently allocated to adaptation worldwide.40 A.Failure of climate-change adaptationB.Failure of climate-change mitigation1102030Rank1102030RankSourceWorld Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2022.FIGURE 1.8National risk perceptions:climate actionWhi

224、ch five risks are the most likely to pose the biggest threat to your country in the next two years?Global Risks Report 2023 22Nor do new investments in infrastructure or capital allocation decisions adequately consider current and future risks.Investors and policy-makers are locking themselves into

225、costly futures,likely to be borne by the most vulnerable.Disagreements on what constitutes adaptation,and the lack of shared goals and best practices,robust regulatory frameworks and metrics,add to a high risk of overshooting and undershooting adaptation efforts.Limits to adaptation are also increas

226、ingly evident.This has been highlighted by the Loss and Damage agenda which,after decades on the sidelines of the climate discourse,has now reached the mainstream.A new financing mechanism was tentatively agreed at COP27,although the contribution to this fund by high-emitting economies remains uncle

227、ar.Even as more funding is unlocked,there is a risk of ignoring or avoiding climate-proofing against future disasters,as governments scramble to provide relief and support in disaster-hit areas.Market-based mechanisms for managing financial shocks are inadequate and may diminish further within the n

228、ext two years.There is a risk of retreat by insurers from some areas of natural catastrophe coverage,with the gap in insurance estimated to have grown from$117 billion in 2020 to$161 billion in 2021.41 Only 7%of economic losses from flood events in emerging markets and 31%in advanced economies have

229、been covered by insurance in the last 20 years.42Societal polarization“Erosion of social cohesion and societal polarisation”has been climbing in the ranks of perceived severity in recent years.43 Defined as the loss of social capital and fracturing of communities leading to declining social stabilit

230、y,individual and collective wellbeing and economic productivity,it ranked as the fifth-most severe global risk faced in the short term by GRPS respondents.It was also seen as one of the most strongly influenced risks in the global network,triggered by many other short-and longer-term potential risks

231、 including debt crises and state instability,cost-of-living crises and inflation,a prolonged economic downturn and climate migration(Figure 1.9).A widening gap in values and equality is posing an existential challenge to both autocratic and democratic systems,as economic and social divides are trans

232、lated into political ones.Polarization on issues such as immigration,gender,reproductive rights,ethnicity,religion,climate and even secession and anarchism44 have characterized recent elections,referendums and protests around the world from the United States of America and China to the Islamic Repub

233、lic of Iran.Mounting citizen frustration at perceived gaps in direct governmental action,human development and social mobility manifested Digital power concentrationDigital inequalityState collapseCollapse or lack of publicinfrastructure and servicesErosion of social cohesionProliferation of illicit

234、economic activityFailure to stabilize price trajectoriesEmployment crisesSevere mentalhealth deteriorationChronic health conditionsInfectious diseasesDebt crisesProlonged economicdownturnLarge-scaleinvoluntary migrationInterstate conflictTerrorist attacksMisinformation anddisinformationCost-of-livin

235、g crisisEdgesSourceWorld Economic Forum,Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Risk interconnections:the erosion of social cohesionFIGURE 1.9Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalEdgesRelative influenceHighLowMediumRisk influenceNodesHighLowMediumReferenceGlobal Risks

236、 Report 2023 23in frequently divisive and unruly civil protests last year.More protests were observed between January and October than in all of 2021.45Consequences of societal polarization are vast,ranging from a drag on growth to civil unrest and deepening political fissures.And there are indicati

237、ons that increasing polarization is contributing to the decline of democracies and accompanying rise in hybrid regimes,with the share of the worlds population living in autocratizing countries rising from 5%in 2011,to 36%in 2021.Only 13%of the worlds population are currently living under a liberal d

238、emocracy,compared to 44%living under an electoral autocracy.46The erosion of the social and political centre risks becoming self-perpetuating.Divisions incentivize the adoption of short-term,more extreme policy platforms to galvanize one side of the population and perpetuate populist beliefs.Notably

239、,the contest between two,non-centrist candidates or positions is often close.47 Although heralded as a resurgence of leftist movements,the Brazilian presidential election of 2022 was won by President Lula by 1.8 points the slimmest margin recorded since it became a democratic nation.48 As such,a lar

240、ge proportion of the population can feel alienated and angered by leadership in the following term,acting as a multiplier to existing societal concerns and civil unrest.This is further amplified by social media,which increases polarization and distrust in institutions alongside political engagement.

241、49“Misinformation and disinformation”are,together,a potential accelerant to the erosion of social cohesion as well as a consequence.With the potential to destabilize trust in information and political processes,50 it has become a prominent tool for geopolitical agents to propagate extremist beliefs

242、and sway elections through social media echo chambers.It was perceived as a moderately severe risk by GRPS respondents,ranking 16th over the short term.Regulatory constraints and educational efforts will likely fail to keep pace,and its impact will expand with the more widespread usage of automation

243、 and machine-learning technologies,from bots that imitate human-written text to deepfakes of politicians.51Polarization undermines social trust and,in some cases,has reflected power struggles within a political elite more than underlying divisions in ideologies.52 Often,hardened polarization on key

244、issues lead to government gridlocks.Swings between parties each electoral cycle may stymie the adoption of a longer-term policy outlook,causing greater strife,especially when navigating the difficult and uncertain economic outlook of the coming years.Additionally,although less likely in more democra

245、tically robust states,an increasing presence of anocracies(those forms of government that are part democracy,part autocracy,referred to in Chapter 2.5:Digital rights)and factionalism may radicalize polarization.This could lead to increased incidences of threat campaigns and political violence,hate c

246、rimes,violent protests and even civil war.53Social and political polarization may also further reduce the space for collective problem-solving to address global risks.The far right has been elected in Italy and are now the second largest party in Sweden,while the left has resurged in Latin America.N

247、ational elections will take place in several G20 countries within the next two years,including the United States of America,South Africa,Trkiye,Argentina,Mexico and Indonesia.The election of less-centrist leaders and adoption of more“extreme”policies in economic superpowers may fracture alliances,li

248、mit global collaboration and lead to a more volatile dynamic.Global Risks Report 2023 24Looking ahead1.3The way risks play out over the next two years has ramifications for the decade to come.Nearly one in five respondents to the GRPS felt optimistic about the outlook for the world in the longer ter

249、m,predicting limited volatility with relative and potentially renewed stability over the next 10 years(Figure 1.10).Yet,over half anticipated progressive tipping points and persistent crises leading to catastrophic outcomes over the next 10 years,or consistent volatility and divergent trajectories.N

250、otably,younger age groups were more hopeful for the future:one in three respondents under the age of 40 shifted to a neutral or positive stance over the longer time frame.Shocks of recent years most notably,the war in Ukraine and COVID-19 pandemic have reflected and accelerated an epochal change to

251、the global order.Risks that are more severe in the short term are embedding structural changes to the economic and geopolitical landscape that will accelerate other global threats faced over the next 10 years.And as the confluence of current crises distracts focus and resources from risks arising ov

252、er the medium to longer-term horizon,we may face increasing burdens on natural and human ecosystems.Some of these risks are close to a tipping point,but there is a window to shaping a more secure future.Understanding them is vital.The next chapter considers the potential global shocks we are heading

253、 towards over the next decade,highlighting worrying developments emerging from the crises of today that are eroding the resilience and stability of the global system.It highlights a series of such emergent risks the shocks of tomorrow that can be reduced through collective attention and action today

254、.SourceWorld Economic Forum,Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.FIGURE 1.10Progressive tipping points and persistent crises leading to catastrophic outcomesConsistently volatile across economies and industries with multiple shocks accentuating divergent trajectoriesSlightly volatile with occasio

255、nal localised surprisesLimited volatility with relative stabilityRenewed stability with a revival of global resilience2 years13%69%14%2%2%10 years20%34%26%11%9%Short-and long-term global outlookWhich of the following best characterizes your outlook for the world over the short-term(2 years)and longe

256、r-term(10 years)?Global Risks Report 2023 251.Bogmans,Christian,Andrea Pescatori and Ervina Prifti,“Four Facts about Soaring Consumer Food Prices”,IMF Blog,24 June 2021,https:/www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/06/24/four-facts-about-soaring-consumer-food-prices;Hoffer,Brice,“On the rise:Growth of t

257、he global rental housing sector”,UBS,2021,https:/ Gopinath and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu,“Why We Must Resist Geoeconomic Fragmentation and How”,IMF Blog,22 May 2022,https:/www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/05/22/blog-why-we-must-resist-geoeconomic-fragmentation.3.Federal Reserve Bank of New York,Global S

258、upply Chain Pressure Index,https:/www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/gscpi#/interactive,accessed 27 October 2022.4.Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations(FAO),FAOSTAT:Consumer Price Indices,https:/www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/CP,accessed 27 October 2022.5.Gunette,Justin-Damien and J

259、eetendra Khadan,2022,“The energy shock could sap global growth for years”,World Bank blogs,22 June 2022.6.Anstey,Chris,“Whats Happening in the World Economy:Unforgiving Mortgage Rates”,B,6 October 2022,https:/ Interest Rate Hike from the Federal Reserve Is on the Way:Heres How It May Affect You”,CNB

260、C,31 October 2022,https:/ and Jim Dolmas,“Rent inflation expected to accelerate then moderate in mid-2023”,Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,16 August 2022.8.Pearce,Graham,Kate Bravery,Adrienne Cernigoi,and Sumer Drall,“Risk and retirement:where are the future financial hotspots?”,Marsh McLennan,Septem

261、ber 2022,https:/ Suisse Research Institute,Global Wealth Report 2022:Leading perspectives to navigate the future,2022,https:/www.credit- 14 November 2022;Federal Reserve Bank of New York,Total Household Debt Surpasses$16 trillion in Q2 2022;Mortgage,Auto Loan and Credit Card Balances Increase,2 Augu

262、st 2022.10.Gebreab,Efrem,Thomas Naadi,Ranga Sirilal and Becky Dale,“Fuel protests gripping more than 90 countries”,BBC,17 October 2022,https:/ and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations(FAO),War in Ukraine intensifies food security risks in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean,8 September

263、2022,https:/www.fao.org/support-to-investment/news/detail/en/c/1603647/.12.Haq,Mifrah,“Pakistan Faces Hunger Crisis as Floods Wash Away Crops,Livestock”,Nikkei Asia,13 September 2022,https:/ and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations(FAO),Crop prospects and food situation,September 2022,14 N

264、ovember 2022,https:/www.fao.org/3/cc2300en/cc2300en.pdf.14.Hance,Jeremy,“Trouble in the tropics:The terrestrial insects of Brazil are in decline”,Mongabay,5 October 2022;Jepsen,Sarina,“California Supreme Court let decision stand that bees can be protected by the California Endangered Species Act”,Xe

265、rces Society for Invertebrate Conservation,22 September 2022.15.Trading Economics,Inflation Rate,https:/ 14 November 2022;Amaro,Silvia,“Euro zone inflation hits record high of 10.7%as growth slows sharply”,CNBC,31 October 2022.16.IMF,World Economic Outlook Report October 2022:Countering the cost-of-

266、living crisis,October 2022,2022,https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/10/11/world-economic-outlook-october-2022.17.Bank of International Settlements,Central bank policy rates,https:/www.bis.org/statistics/cbpol.htm?m=2679,accessed 27 October 2022.18.IMF,World Economic Outlook Report Oct

267、ober 2022:Countering the cost-of-living crisis,October 2022,2022,https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/10/11/world-economic-outlook-october-2022.19.Echavarria,Paulina Restrepo and Praew Grittayaphong,“Dollar-denominated public debt in Asia and Latin America”,Federal Reserve Bank of St L

268、ouis,3 August 2021,https:/www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2021/august/dollar-exposure-public-debt-asia-latin-america.20.Beers,David,et.al,“BoC-BoE Sovereign Default Database:Whats new in 2022”,Bank of Canada,https:/www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/san2022-11.pdf,accessed 14 November

269、2022.EndnotesGlobal Risks Report 2023 2621.Wheatley,Jonathan,“Outflows from emerging market bond funds reach$70 billion in 2022”,Financial Times,2 October 2022.22.Chabert,Guillaume,Martin Cerisola and Dalia Hakura,Restructuring debt of poorer nations requires more efficient coordination”,IMF Blogs,7

270、 April 2022.23.Schnabel,Isabel,Speech:A new age of energy inflation:climateflation,fossilflation,and greenflation,17 March 2022,speech presented at The ECB and its Watchers XXII Conference,Frankfurt,https:/www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220317_2dbb3582f0a.en.html,accessed 14 Novemb

271、er 2022.24.Leggett,Theo,“Germany takes control of stakes in Rosneft oil refineries”,BBC,16 September 2022,https:/ and Sarah White,“Total accused of being complicit in Russian war crimes in Ukraine”,Financial Times,14 October 2022;Gretler,Connie,“Nestle defends its Russia stance saying food is a basi

272、c right amid war”,Bloomberg,7 April 2022.26.Bounds,Andy,“EU accuses US of breaking WTO rules with green energy incentives”,Financial Times,6 November 2022.27.Liu,Qianer,Kathrin Hille and Yuan Yang,“Worlds top chip equipment suppliers halt business with China”,Financial Times,13 October 2022.28.Farge

273、,Emma,“WTO can reach deals on difficult topics by early 2024-WTO chief”,Reuters,27 September 2022;Gruszczynski,Lukasz and Margherita Melillo,“The Uneasy Coexistence of Expertise and Politics in the World Health Organization”,International Organisations Law Review,24 March 2022.29.Moonakal,Nadeem Ahm

274、ed,“The Impact and Implications of Chinas Growing Influence in the Middle East”,The Diplomat,9 July 2022.30.2021 data.World Meterological Organization,Greenhouse Gas Bulletin,26 October 2022.31.Davis,James and Robert Bailey,“Missing the Mark”,Oliver Wyman&CDP,2022,https:/ Sanctions Weapon,Finance&De

275、velopment,June 2022;Papathanasiou,Demetrios,“Renewables are the key to green,secure,affordable energy”,World Bank Blogs,21 June 2022,https:/blogs.worldbank.org/energy/renewables-are-key-green-secure-affordable-energy.33.Hancock,Alice,“Europes new dirty energy:the unavoidable evil of wartime fossil f

276、uels”,Financial Times,6 September 2022.34.UN Secretary Generals High-Level Expert Group on Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities,Integrity Matters,8 November 2022,https:/www.un.org/en/climatechange/high-level-expert-group.35.The Economist,Germany faces a looming threat of deindustrial

277、isation,11 September 2022,https:/ and John Morrison,“Gathering Storm:An Introduction to the Special Issue of Climate Change and Terrorism”,Terrorism and Political Violence,vol.35,iss 5,5 July 2022,pp.883-893.37.For more detail on the complex link between extreme weather events and anthropogenic caus

278、es,refer to World Meteorological Organization,Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather,Climate and Water Extremes(19702019),WMO-No.1267,2021.38.Prtner,Hans-Otto(ed.)et.al,Climate Change 2022:Impacts,Adaptation and Vulnerability,IPCC,2022.39.Bellon,Matthieu and Emmanuele Massetti,“Economic

279、 Principles for Integrating Adaptation to Climate Change into Fiscal Policy”,IMF,March 2022;Prtner,Hans-Otto(ed.)et.al,Climate Change 2022:Impacts,Adaptation and Vulnerability,IPCC,2022.40.UN Environment Programme(UNEP),Adaptation Gap Report 2022,1 November 2022.41.Bevere,Lucia and Federica Remondi,

280、Sigma:Natural catastrophes in 2021:the floodgates are open,Swiss Re Institute,30 March 2022.42.Ibid.43.Formerly described as“Profound social instability”in the GRPS.44.Ganesh,Janan,“Anarchy is a likelier future for the west than tyranny”,Financial Times,21 June 2022.45.Carnegie Endowment for Interna

281、tional Peace,Global Protest Tracker,2022,November 9,https:/carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker.EndnotesGlobal Risks Report 2023 2746.V-Dem Institute,Democracy Report 2022:Autocratization Changing Nature?,University of Gothenburg,2022,https:/www.v- and Jennifer L.McCoy,“Per

282、nicious polarization,autocratization and opposition strategies”,Democratization,vol 28,12 Jan 2021;McCoy,Jennifer and Benjamin Press,What Happens When Democracies Become Perniciously Polarized?,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,18 January 2022.47.Buschschlter,Vanessa,“Brazil election:Lula m

283、akes stunning comeback”,BBC,31 October 2022.48.Mano,Ana and Anthony Boadle,“Brazils Bolsonaro Silent on Lula Victory,Transition Talks Begin”,Reuters,1 November 2022,https:/ the global decline in democracy linked to social media?We combed through the evidence to find out”,The Conversation,8 November

284、2022.50.Favaro,Marina,Neil Renic and Ulrich Khn,Negative Multiplicity:Forecasting the Future Impact of Emerging Technologies on International Stability and Human Security,Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy,September 2022.51.Lai,Samantha,Data misuse and disinformation:Technology and the

285、 2022 elections,Brookings Institute,21 June 2022.52.Lee,Amber Hye-Yon,“Social Trust in Polarized Times:How Perceptions of Political Polarization Affect Americans Trust in Each Other”,Political Behaviour,vol.44,no.3,18 March 2022,pp.1533-1544;Carothers,Thomas and Andrew ODonohue,How to Understand the

286、 Global Spread of Political Polarization,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,1 October 2019.53.Walter,Barbara,“Why should we worry that the US could become an anocracy again?Because of the threat of civil war”,The Washington Post,24 January 2022,https:/ Risks Report 2023 28Global Risks 2033:T

287、omorrows Catastrophes2As risks highlighted in the past chapter unfold today,much-needed attention and resources are being diverted from global risks that may become tomorrows shocks and crises.The Global Risks Perceptions Survey(GRPS)addresses a one-,two-and 10-year horizon.Chapter one addressed the

288、 present and two-year time frame,focusing on currently unfolding and shorter-term risks.This chapter focuses on the third time frame:risks that may have the most severe impact over the next 10 years.Based on GRPS results,the longer-term global risks landscape is also dominated by deteriorating envir

289、onmental risks(Figure 2.1).More specifically,climate-and nature-related risks lead the top 10 risks,by severity,that are expected to manifest over the next decade.Differentiated as separate risks for the first time in the GRPS,Failure to mitigate climate change and Failure of climate-change adaptati

290、on top the rankings as the most severe risks on a global scale,followed by Natural disasters and extreme weather events and“Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse”.The world in 20332.11Failure to mitigate climate change2Failure of climate-change adaptation3Natural disasters and extreme weathereven

291、ts4Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse5Large-scale involuntary migration6Natural resource crises7Erosion of social cohesion and societalpolarization8Widespread cybercrime and cyber insecurity9Geoeconomic confrontation10Large-scale environmental damageincidentsSourceWorld Economic Forum Global R

292、isksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Global risks ranked by severity over the long term(10 years)FIGURE 2.1Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalComparing the two-year and 10-year time frames provides a picture of areas of increasing,decreasing and continued concerns accord

293、ing to GRPS respondents(Figure 2.2).The top right of the graph indicates global risks that are perceived to be the most severe in both the short and long term.These are consistent areas of global concern and,arguably,attention.Four environmental risks have worsening scores over the course of the 10-

294、year time frame,indicating respondents concerns about increased severity of these risks in the longer term.“Large-scale involuntary migration,rises to fifth place in the 10-year time frame,while Erosion of social cohesion and societal polarization is perceived to be slightly more severe over the lon

295、ger term.Tomorrows CatastrophesGlobal Risks Report 2023January 2023Global Risks Report 2023 29Risks that are growing in severity over the longer term include“Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse”and“Misinformation and disinformation”.Among other technological risks,as indicated in the far left o

296、f the graph,“Digital inequality and lack of access to digital services”and“Adverse outcomes of frontier technologies”are also anticipated to significantly deteriorate over the 10-year time frame.The scores of multiple social risks are also worsening,including“Severe mental health deterioration”,“Col

297、lapse or lack of public infrastructure and services”,and“Chronic diseases and health conditions”.In contrast,economic risks such as“Failure to stabilize price trajectories”,“A prolonged economic downturn”,“Collapse of a systemically important industry or supply chain”,and“Asset bubble burst”are perc

298、eived to fall slightly in expected severity over the 10-year time frame.The far right of the graph indicates that todays most prominent risk,the“Cost-of-living crisis”,is anticipated to drop in severity over the longer term.Towards the center,the scores of geopolitical risks were mixed,with the“Use

299、of weapons of mass destruction”remaining consistent,“State collapse or severe instability”and“Ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions”worsening and Interstate conflict perceived as decreasing in severity.This year,we look at five newly emerging or rapidly accelerating risks clusters drawn from

300、the economic,environmental,societal,geopolitical and technological domains,respectively that could become tomorrows crisis.We explore their current drivers and emerging implications,and briefly touch on opportunities to forestall and reshape these outcomes by acting today.Short-term severityLong-ter

301、m severity3.34.05.06.04.05.06.03.3Relative severity of risks over a 2 and 10-year periodFIGURE 2.2SourceWorld Economic Forum Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.NoteSeverity was assessed on a 1-7 Likert scale 1 Low severity,7 High severity.Adverse outcomes offrontier technologiesDigital inqualit

302、yTerrorist attacksAsset bubble burstCollapse or lack of publicinfrastructure and servicesCost-of-living crisisGeoeconomic confrontationErosion of social cohesionand societal polarizationLarge-scale environmentaldamage incidentsDebt crisesFailure to stabilizeprice trajectoriesProlonged economicdowntu

303、rnInterstate conflictIneffectiveness of multilateral institutionsand international cooperationFailure to mitigate climate changeFailure of climate-change adaptionNatural resource crisesLarge-scaleinvoluntarymigrationWidespread cybercrimeand cyber insecurityMisinformation and disinformationSevere men

304、tal health deteriorationBiodiversity loss and ecosystem collapseNatural disastersand extreme weatherChronic diseases and health conditionsRisk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalHigherseverityHigherseverityGlobal Risks Report 2023 30These include:Natural ecosystems:deter

305、iorating risks to natural capital(“assets”such as water,forests and living organisms)due to growing trade-offs and feedback mechanisms relating to climate change,taking us past the point of no return.Human health:chronic risks that are being compounded by strained healthcare systems facing the socia

306、l,economic and health aftereffects of the COVID-19 pandemic.Human security:a nascent reversal in demilitarization and growing vulnerability of nuclear-armed states to emerging technologies,emerging from new weapons and multi-domain conflicts.Digital rights:the potential evolution of data and cyber i

307、nsecurity,given the slow-burning,insidious erosion of the digital autonomy of individuals,putting privacy in peril.Economic stability:growing debt crises,with repercussions for financial contagion as well as collapse of social services,emerging from a global reckoning on debt and leading to social d

308、istress.The newly emerging or rapidly accelerating risk clusters identified this year are not intended to be exhaustive.Rather,they aim to provide topic-specific analysis,nudge pre-emptive action and attention,and serve as examples for applying similar analysis to a range of other future risk domain

309、s.Natural ecosystems:past the point of no return2.2Biodiversity within and between ecosystems is already declining faster than at any other point during human history.1 Unlike other environmental risks,Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse was not seen as pressing of a concern by GRPS respondents

310、 over the short term.Yet it accelerates in perceived severity,rising to 4th place over the 10-year time frame(Figure 2.1).Human interventions have negatively impacted a complex and delicately balanced global natural ecosystem,triggering a chain of reactions.Over the next 10 years,the interplay betwe

311、en biodiversity loss,pollution,natural resource consumption,climate change and socioeconomic drivers will make for a dangerous mix(Figure 2.3).Given that over half of the worlds economic output is estimated to be moderately to highly dependent on nature,the collapse of ecosystems will have far-reach

312、ing economic and societal consequences.These include increased occurrence of zoonotic diseases,a fall in crop yields and nutritional value,growing water stress exacerbating potentially violent conflict,loss of livelihoods dependent on food systems and nature-based services like pollination,and ever

313、more dramatic floods,sea-level rises and erosion from the degradation of natural flood protection systems like water meadows and coastal mangroves.EdgesChronic health conditionsNatural resourcecrises Environmentaldamage incidentsBiodiversity loss andecosystem collapseFailure to mitigateclimate chang

314、eFailure of climate-changeadaptionSourceWorld Economic Forum,Global RisksPerception Survey 2022-2023.Compounding environmental crisesFIGURE 2.3Risk categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalEdgesRelative influenceHighLowMediumRisk influenceNodesHighLowMediumReferenceNatural dis

315、asters andextreme weatherGlobal Risks Report 2023 31Terrestrial and marine ecosystems are facing multiple pressure points due to their undervalued contribution to the global economy as well as overall planetary health.While not the sole drivers,at the heart of this potential catastrophe are key trad

316、e-offs and feedback mechanisms emerging from current crises.Without significant policy change or investments,the complex linkages between climate change mitigation,food insecurity and biodiversity degradation will accelerate ecosystem collapse.Exponentially accelerating nature loss and climate chang

317、e Nature loss and climate change are intrinsically interlinked a failure in one sphere will cascade into the other,and attaining net zero will require mitigatory measures for both levers.2 If we are unable to limit warming to 1.5C or even 2C,the continued impact of natural disasters,temperature and

318、precipitation changes will become the dominant cause of biodiversity loss,in terms of composition and function(Figure 2.4).3 Heatwaves and droughts are already causing mass mortality events(a single hot day in 2014 killed more than 45,000 flying foxes in Australia),while sea level rises and heavy st

319、orms have caused the first extinctions of entire species.4 Arctic sea-ice,warm-water coral reefs and terrestrial ecosystems have been found most at risk in the near term,followed by forest,kelp and seagrass ecosystems.5The impacts of climate change on ecosystems can further constrain their mitigatio

320、n effects.Increased severity and frequency of extreme weather events and other natural disasters are already degrading nature-based solutions to climate change,such as wildfires in forests used for carbon offsetting.7 In addition,a variety of ecosystems are at risk of tipping over into self-perpetua

321、ting and irreversible change that will accelerate and compound the impacts of climate change.Continued damage to carbon sinks through deforestation and permafrost thaw,for example,and a decline in carbon storage productivity(soils and the ocean)may turn these ecosystems into“natural”sources of carbo

322、n and methane emissions.8 The impending collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets may contribute to sea-level rise and coastal flooding,while the“die-off”of low-latitude coral reefs,the nurseries of marine life,are sure to impact food supplies and broader marine ecosystems.Trade-offs b

323、etween food security and nature conservationLand-use change remains the most prolific threat to nature,according to many experts.9 Agriculture and animal farming alone take up more than 35%of Earths terrestrial surface and are the biggest direct drivers of wildlife decline globally.The ongoing crisi

324、s in the affordability and availability of food supplies positions efforts to conserve and restore terrestrial biodiversity at odds with domestic food security,as explored in Chapter 3:Resource Rivalries.Conservation efforts and nature-based solutions(which can offer biodiversity co-benefits)will st

325、ruggle to be commercially competitive with intensive,yield-focused agricultural practices,particularly in Impacts of climate change on ecosystemsFIGURE 2.4Confidence in attribution to climate changeChanges in ecosystem structureEcosystemsSpecies range shiftsChanges in timing(phenology)TerrestrialFre

326、shwaterOceanGlobalSourceIPCC,2022.6AfricaAsiaAustralasiaCentral and South AmericaEuropeNorth AmericaSmall IslandsArcticAntarcticMediterrean regionTropical forestMountain regionsDesertsBiodiversity hotspotsTerrestrialFreshwaterOceanTerrestrialFreshwaterOceanHighHighHighHighHighHighHighHighHighMediumH

327、ighHighHighHighHighHighHighMediumHighHighHighHighHighMediumLim.evidenceLim.evidenceLim.evidenceHighN/ALim.evidenceHighHighHighHighHighHighHighHighHighMediumHighN/AN/AN/AHighHighHighLowHighHighHighHighHighHighMediumHighMediumHighHighHighHighLim.evidenceMediumLim.evidenceHighHighHighHighHighLim.eviden

328、ceMediumLim.evidenceMediumN/ALim.evidenceHighHighLim.evidenceHighHighHighHighHighHighMediumHighN/AN/AN/AHighHighLim.evidenceLowHighLim.evidenceHighHighHighHighMediumHighLim.evidenceHighLim.evidenceHighHighLowLowLim.evidenceLim.evidenceHighHighLim.evidenceMediumLim.evidenceLim.evidenceLim.evidenceLow

329、N/ALim.evidenceHighLowMediumLowLowHighHighMediumHighLim.evidenceMediumN/AN/AN/ANot assessedGlobal Risks Report 2023 32densely populated,agrarian nations.State incentives to boost local production and reduce reliance on imports in a reaction to current geopolitical and supply pressures could come at

330、the cost of ecosystem preservation.Technology will provide partial solutions in the countries that can afford it.For example,the global vertical farming market has been predicted to grow at a compound annual rate of 26%and hit$34 billion by 2033.10 These agricultural production techniques increase f

331、ood output per unit area with a smaller water and biodiversity footprint,but can actually be more carbon-intensive and may have an indirect land footprint that exceeds open-field farming in some regions.11Given a highly uncertain economic outlook,developing and emerging markets may struggle to close

332、 the funding gap to increase agricultural productivity.Pressure on biodiversity will likely be further amplified by continued deforestation for agricultural processes,with an associated demand for additional cleared cropland,12 especially in subtropical and tropical areas with dense biodiversity suc

333、h as Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.13 Biodiversity and ecosystem preservation could be supported through the expanded use of concessional financing and debt restructuring:58 developing countries exposed to climate change have almost$500 billion in collective debt reservicing payments due in the next four years.14 Increased deployment of debt-for-nature swaps,for example,could be targeted t