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1、WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDUPDATE2023JANInflation Peaking amid Low Growth Inflation Peaking amid Low Growth Global growth is projected to fall from an estimated 3.4 percent in 2022 to 2.9 percent in 2023,then rise to 3.1 percent in 2024.The forecast for 2023 is 0.2 percentage p

2、oint higher than predicted in the October 2022 World Economic Outlook(WEO)but below the historical(200019)average of 3.8 percent.The rise in central bank rates to fight inflation and Russias war in Ukraine continue to weigh on economic activity.The rapid spread of COVID-19 in China dampened growth i

3、n 2022,but the recent reopening has paved the way for a faster-than-expected recovery.Global inflation is expected to fall from 8.8 percent in 2022 to 6.6 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024,still above pre-pandemic(201719)levels of about 3.5 percent.The balance of risks remains tilted to the do

4、wnside,but adverse risks have moderated since the October 2022 WEO.On the upside,a stronger boost from pent-up demand in numerous economies or a faster fall in inflation are plausible.On the downside,severe health outcomes in China could hold back the recovery,Russias war in Ukraine could escalate,a

5、nd tighter global financing conditions could worsen debt distress.Financial markets could also suddenly reprice in response to adverse inflation news,while further geopolitical fragmentation could hamper economic progress.In most economies,amid the cost-of-living crisis,the priority remains achievin

6、g sustained disinflation.With tighter monetary conditions and lower growth potentially affecting financial and debt stability,it is necessary to deploy macroprudential tools and strengthen debt restructuring frameworks.Accelerating COVID-19 vaccinations in China would safeguard the recovery,with pos

7、itive cross-border spillovers.Fiscal support should be better targeted at those most affected by elevated food and energy prices,and broad-based fiscal relief measures should be withdrawn.Stronger multilateral cooperation is essential to preserve the gains from the rules-based multilateral system an

8、d to mitigate climate change by limiting emissions and raising green investment.The global fight against inflation,Russias war in Ukraine,and a resurgence of COVID-19 in China weighed on global economic activity in 2022,and the first two factors will continue to do so in 2023.Despite these headwinds

9、,real GDP was surprisingly strong in the third quarter of 2022 in numerous economies,including the United States,the euro area,and major emerging market and developing economies.The sources of these surprises were in many cases domestic:stronger-than-expected private consumption and investment amid

10、tight labor markets and greater-than-anticipated fiscal support.Households spent more to satisfy pent-up demand,particularly on services,partly by drawing down their stock of savings as economies reopened.Business investment rose to meet demand.On the supply side,easing bottlenecks and declining tra

11、nsportation costs reduced pressures on input prices and allowed for a rebound in previously constrained sectors,such as motor vehicles.Energy markets have adjusted faster than expected to the shock from Russias invasion of Ukraine.In the fourth quarter of 2022,however,this uptick is estimated to hav

12、e faded in mostthough not allmajor economies.US growth remains stronger than expected,with consumers continuing to spend from their stock of savings(the personal saving rate is at its lowest in more than 60 years,except for July 2005),unemployment near historic lows,and plentiful job opportunities.B

13、ut elsewhere,high-frequency activity indicators(such as business and consumer sentiment,purchasing manager surveys,and mobility indicators)generally point to a slowdown.COVID-19 deepens Chinas slowdown.Economic activity in China slowed in the fourth quarter amid multiple large COVID-19 outbreaks in

14、Beijing and other densely populated localities.Renewed lockdowns accompanied the outbreaks until the relaxation of COVID-19 restrictions in November and December,which paved the way for a full reopening.Real estate investment continued to contract,and developer restructuring is proceeding slowly,ami

15、d the lingering property market crisis.Developers have yet to deliver on a large backlog of presold housing,and downward pressure is building on house prices(so far limited by home price floors).The authorities have responded with additional monetary and fiscal policy easing,new vaccination targets

16、for the elderly,and steps to support the completion of unfinished real estate projects.However,consumer and business sentiment remained subdued in late 2022.Chinas slowdown has reduced global trade growth and international commodity prices.Monetary policy starts to bite.Signs are apparent that monet

17、ary policy tightening is starting to cool demand and inflation,but the full impact is unlikely to be realized before 2024.Global headline inflation appears to have peaked in the third quarter of 2022(Figure 1).Prices of fuel and nonfuel commodities have declined,lowering headline inflation,notably i

18、n the United States,the euro area,and Latin America.But underlying(core)inflation has not yet peaked in most economies and remains well above pre-pandemic levels.It has persisted amid second-round effects from earlier cost shocks and tight labor markets with robust wage growth as consumer demand has

19、 remained resilient.Medium-term inflation expectations generally remain anchored,but some gauges are up.These developments have caused central banks to raise rates faster than expected,especially in the United States and the euro area,and to signal that rates will stay elevated for longer.Core infla

20、tion is declining in some economies that have completed their tightening cyclesuch as Brazil.Financial markets are displaying high sensitivity to inflation news,with equity markets rising following recent releases of lower inflation data in anticipation of interest rate cuts(Box 1),despite central b

21、anks communicating their resolve to tighten policy further.With the peak in US headline inflation and an acceleration in rate hikes by several non-US central banks,the dollar has weakened since September but remains significantly stronger than a year ago.Winter comes to Europe.European economic grow

22、th in 2022 was more resilient than expected in the face of the large negative terms-of-trade shock from the war in Ukraine.This resiliencewhich is Figure 1.Twin Peaks?Headline and Core Inflation(Percent,year over year)2024681012141618Jan.2019Jul.19Jan.20Jul.20Jan.21Jul.21Jan.22Jul.22Nov.221.Headline

23、 Inflation20246810121416Jan.2019Jul.19Jan.20Jul.20Jan.21Jul.21Jan.22Jul.22Nov.222.Core InflationSources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the developments in headline and core inflation across 18 advanced economies and 17 emerging market and developing economies.Core i

24、nflation is the change in prices for goods and services,but excluding those for food and energy(or the closest available measure).For the euro area(and other European countries for which the data are available),energy,food,alcohol,and tobacco are excluded.The gray bands depict the 10th to 90th perce

25、ntiles of inflation across economies.United StatesMedian countryEuro areaBrazil visible in consumption and investment data for the third quarterpartly reflects government support of about 1.2 percent of European Union GDP(net budgetary cost)to households and firms hit by the energy crisis,as well as

26、 dynamism from economies reopening.Gas prices have declined by more than expected amid higher non-Russian pipeline and liquefied natural gas flows,compression of demand for gas,and a warmer-than-usual winter.However,the boost from reopening appears to be fading.High-frequency indicators for the four

27、th quarter suggest that the manufacturing and services sectors are contracting.Consumer confidence and business sentiment have worsened.With inflation at about 10 percent or above in several euro area countries and the United Kingdom,household budgets remain stretched.The accelerated pace of rate in

28、creases by the Bank of England and the European Central Bank is tightening financial conditions and cooling demand in the housing sector and beyond.Global growth,estimated at 3.4 percent in 2022,is projected to fall to 2.9 percent in 2023 before rising to 3.1 percent in 2024(Table 1).Compared with t

29、he October forecast,the estimate for 2022 and the forecast for 2023 are both higher by about 0.2 percentage point,reflecting positive surprises and greater-than-expected resilience in numerous economies.Negative growth in global GDP or global GDP per capitawhich often happens when there is a global

30、recessionis not expected.Nevertheless,global growth projected for 2023 and 2024 is below the historical(200019)annual average of 3.8 percent.The forecast of low growth in 2023 reflects the rise in central bank rates to fight inflationespecially in advanced economiesas well as the war in Ukraine.The

31、decline in growth in 2023 from 2022 is driven by advanced economies;in emerging market and developing economies,growth is estimated to have bottomed out in 2022.Growth is expected to pick up in China with the full reopening in 2023.The expected pickup in 2024 in both groups of economies reflects gra

32、dual recovery from the effects of the war in Ukraine and subsiding inflation.Following the path of global demand,world trade growth is expected to decline in 2023 to 2.4 percent,despite an easing of supply bottlenecks,before rising to 3.4 percent in 2024.These forecasts are based on a number of assu

33、mptions,including on fuel and nonfuel commodity prices,which have generally been revised down since October,and on interest rates,which have been revised up.In 2023,oil prices are projected to fall by about 16 percent,while nonfuel commodity prices are expected to fall by,on average,6.3 percent.Glob

34、al interest rate assumptions are revised up,reflecting intensified actual and signaled policy tightening by major central banks since October.For advanced economies,growth is projected to decline sharply from 2.7 percent in 2022 to 1.2 percent in 2023 before rising to 1.4 percent in 2024,with a down

35、ward revision of 0.2 percentage point for 2024.About 90 percent of advanced economies are projected to see a decline in growth in 2023.In the United States,growth is projected to fall from 2.0 percent in 2022 to 1.4 percent in 2023 and 1.0 percent in 2024.With growth rebounding in the second half of

36、 2024,growth in 2024 will be faster than in 2023 on a fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter basis,as in most advanced economies.There is a 0.4 percentage point upward revision for annual growth in 2023,reflecting carryover effects from domestic demand resilience in 2022,but a 0.2 percentage point downw

37、ard revision of growth in 2024 due to the steeper path of Federal Reserve rate hikes,to a peak of about 5.1 percent in 2023.Growth in the euro area is projected to bottom out at 0.7 percent in 2023 before rising to 1.6percent in 2024.The 0.2 percentage point upward revision to the forecast for 2023

38、reflects theeffects of faster rate hikes by the European Central Bank and eroding real incomes,offset bythe carryover from the 2022 outturn,lower wholesale energy prices,and additionalannouncements of fiscal purchasing power support in the form of energy price controls andcash transfers.Growth in th

39、e United Kingdom is projected to be 0.6 percent in 2023,a 0.9 percentage pointdownward revision from October,reflecting tighter fiscal and monetary policies and financialconditions and still-high energy retail prices weighing on household budgets.Growth in Japan is projected to rise to 1.8 percent i

40、n 2023,with continued monetary and fiscalpolicy support.High corporate profits from a depreciated yen and earlier delays inimplementing previous projects will support business investment.In 2024,growth is expectedto decline to 0.9 percent as the effects of past stimulus dissipate.For emerging market

41、 and developing economies,growth is projected to rise modestly,from 3.9 percent in 2022 to 4.0 percent in 2023 and 4.2 percent in 2024,with an upward revision of 0.3 percentage point for 2023 and a downward revision of 0.1 percentage point for 2024.About half of emerging market and developing econom

42、ies have lower growth in 2023 than in 2022.Growth in emerging and developing Asia is expected to rise in 2023 and 2024 to 5.3 percent and 5.2percent,respectively,after the deeper-than-expected slowdown in 2022 to 4.3 percentattributable to Chinas economy.Chinas real GDP slowdown in the fourth quarte

43、r of 2022implies a 0.2 percentage point downgrade for 2022 growth to 3.0 percentthe first time inmore than 40 years with Chinas growth below the global average.Growth in China is projectedto rise to 5.2 percent in 2023,reflecting rapidly improving mobility,and to fall to 4.5 percent in2024 before se

44、ttling at below 4 percent over the medium term amid declining businessdynamism and slow progress on structural reforms.Growth in India is set to decline from 6.8percent in 2022 to 6.1 percent in 2023 before picking up to 6.8 percent in 2024,with resilientdomestic demand despite external headwinds.Gr

45、owth in the ASEAN-5 countries(Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand)is similarly projected to slow to 4.3 percent in 2023 andthen pick up to 4.7 percent in 2024.Growth in emerging and developing Europe is projected to have bottomed out in 2022 at 0.7 percentand,since the October forecast

46、,has been revised up for 2023 by 0.9 percentage point to 1.5percent.This reflects a smaller economic contraction in Russia in 2022(estimated at 2.2percent compared with a predicted 3.4 percent)followed by modestly positive growth in 2023.At the current oil price cap level of the Group of Seven,Russi

47、an crude oil export volumes arenot expected to be significantly affected,with Russian trade continuing to be redirected fromsanctioning to non-sanctioning countries.In Latin America and the Caribbean,growth is projected to decline from 3.9 percent in 2022 to 1.8percent in 2023,with an upward revisio

48、n for 2023 of 0.1 percentage point since October.Theforecast revision reflects upgrades of 0.2 percentage point for Brazil and 0.5 percentage pointfor Mexico due to unexpected domestic demand resilience,higher-than-expected growth in major trading partner economies,and in Brazil,greater-than-expecte

49、d fiscal support.Growth in the region is projected to rise to 2.1 percent in 2024,although with a downward revision of 0.3 percentage point,reflecting tighter financial conditions,lower prices of exported commodities,and downward revisions to trading partner growth.Growth in the Middle East and Cent

50、ral Asia is projected to decline from 5.3 percent in 2022 to 3.2 percent in 2023,with a downward revision of 0.4 percentage point since October,mainly attributable to a steeper-than-expected growth slowdown in Saudi Arabia,from 8.7 percent in 2022(which was stronger than expected by 1.1 percentage p

51、oints)to 2.6 percent in 2023,with a negative revision of 1.1 percentage points.The downgrade for 2023 reflects mainly lower oil production in line with an agreement through OPEC+(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries,including Russia and other non-OPEC oil exporters),while non-oil growth

52、 is expected to remain robust.In sub-Saharan Africa,growth is projected to remain moderate at 3.8 percent in 2023 amid prolonged fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic,although with a modest upward revision since October,before picking up to 4.1 percent in 2024.The small upward revision for 2023(0.1 per

53、centage point)reflects Nigerias rising growth in 2023 due to measures to address insecurity issues in the oil sector.In South Africa,by contrast,after a COVID-19 reopening rebound in 2022,projected growth more than halves in 2023,to 1.2 percent,reflecting weaker external demand,power shortages,and s

54、tructural constraints.About 84 percent of countries are expected to have lower headline(consumer price index)inflation in 2023 than in 2022.Global inflation is set to fall from 8.8 percent in 2022(annual average)to 6.6 percent in 2023 and 4.3 percent in 2024above pre-pandemic(201719)levels of about

55、3.5 percent.The projected disinflation partly reflects declining international fuel and nonfuel commodity prices due to weaker global demand.It also reflects the cooling effects of monetary policy tightening on underlying(core)inflation,which globally is expected to decline from 6.9 percent in the f

56、ourth quarter of 2022(year over year)to 4.5 percent by the fourth quarter of 2023.Still,disinflation will take time:by 2024,projected annual average headline and core inflation will,respectively,still be above pre-pandemic levels in 82 percent and 86 percent of economies.In advanced economies,annual

57、 average inflation is projected to decline from 7.3 percent in 2022 to 4.6 percent in 2023 and 2.6 percent in 2024above target in several cases.In emerging market and developing economies,projected annual inflation declines from 9.9 percent in 2022 to 8.1 percent in 2023 and 5.5 percent in 2024,abov

58、e the 4.9 percent pre-pandemic(201719)average.In low-income developing countries,inflation is projected to moderate from 14.2 percent in 2022 to 8.6 percent in 2024still high,but close to the pre-pandemic average.The balance of risks to the global outlook remains tilted to the downside,with scope fo

59、r lower growth and higher inflation,but adverse risks have moderated since the October 2022 World Economic Outlook.Upside risksPlausible upside risks include more favorable surprises to domestic spendingas in the third quarter of 2022which,however,would increase inflation further.At the same time,th

60、ere is room for an upside scenario with lower-than-expected inflation and less monetary tightening:Pent-up demand boost:Fueled by the stock of excess private savings from the pandemic fiscal support and,in many cases,still-tight labor markets and solid wage growth,pent-up demand remains an upside ri

61、sk to the growth outlook.In some advanced economies,recent data show that households are still on net adding to their stock of excess savings(as in some euro area countries and the United Kingdom)or have ample savings left(as in the United States).This leaves scope for a further boost to consumption

62、particularly of services,including tourism.Table 1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)Year over Year Difference from October 2022 WEO Projections 1/Q4 over Q4 2/EstimateProjections EstimateProjections 2021 2022 2023 2024 2023 2024 2022 2023 2024

63、World Output 6.2 3.4 2.9 3.1 0.2 0.1 1.9 3.2 3.0 Advanced Economies 5.4 2.7 1.2 1.4 0.1 0.2 1.3 1.1 1.6 United States 5.9 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.3 Euro Area 5.3 3.5 0.7 1.6 0.2 0.2 1.9 0.5 2.1 Germany 2.6 1.9 0.1 1.4 0.4 0.1 1.4 0.0 2.3 France 6.8 2.6 0.7 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.8 Italy 6.7 3.9

64、 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.4 2.1 0.1 1.0 Spain 5.5 5.2 1.1 2.4 0.1 0.2 2.1 1.3 2.8 Japan 2.1 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.2 0.4 1.7 1.0 1.0 United Kingdom 7.6 4.1 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.8 Canada 5.0 3.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.1 2.3 1.2 1.9 Other Advanced Economies 3/5.3 2.8 2.0 2.4 0.3 0.2 1.4 2.1 2.2 Emerging Market and Developing

65、 Economies 6.7 3.9 4.0 4.2 0.3 0.1 2.5 5.0 4.1 Emerging and Developing Asia 7.4 4.3 5.3 5.2 0.4 0.0 3.4 6.2 4.9 China 8.4 3.0 5.2 4.5 0.8 0.0 2.9 5.9 4.1 India 4/8.7 6.8 6.1 6.8 0.0 0.0 4.3 7.0 7.1 Emerging and Developing Europe 6.9 0.7 1.5 2.6 0.9 0.1 2.0 3.5 2.8 Russia 4.7 2.2 0.3 2.1 2.6 0.6 4.1

66、1.0 2.0 Latin America and the Caribbean 7.0 3.9 1.8 2.1 0.1 0.3 2.6 1.9 1.9 Brazil 5.0 3.1 1.2 1.5 0.2 0.4 2.8 0.8 2.2 Mexico 4.7 3.1 1.7 1.6 0.5 0.2 3.7 1.1 1.9 Middle East and Central Asia 4.5 5.3 3.2 3.7 0.4 0.2 .Saudi Arabia 3.2 8.7 2.6 3.4 1.1 0.5 4.6 2.7 3.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 3.8 3.8 4.1

67、0.1 0.0 .Nigeria 3.6 3.0 3.2 2.9 0.2 0.0 2.6 3.1 2.9 South Africa 4.9 2.6 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.0 3.0 0.5 1.8 Memorandum World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates 6.0 3.1 2.4 2.5 0.3 0.1 1.7 2.5 2.5 European Union 5.5 3.7 0.7 1.8 0.0 0.3 1.8 1.2 2.0 ASEAN-5 5/3.8 5.2 4.3 4.7 0.2 0.2 3.7 5.7 4.0 Middle Eas

68、t and North Africa 4.1 5.4 3.2 3.5 0.4 0.2 .Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies 7.0 3.8 4.0 4.1 0.4 0.0 2.5 5.0 4.1 Low-Income Developing Countries 4.1 4.9 4.9 5.6 0.0 0.1 .World Trade Volume(goods and services)6/10.4 5.4 2.4 3.4 0.1 0.3 .Advanced Economies 9.4 6.6 2.3 2.7 0.0 0.4 .Emerging

69、Market and Developing Economies 12.1 3.4 2.6 4.6 0.3 0.0 .Commodity Prices Oil 7/65.8 39.8 16.2 7.1 3.3 0.9 11.2 9.8 5.9 Nonfuel(average based on world commodity import weights)26.4 7.0 6.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 2.0 1.4 0.2 World Consumer Prices 8/4.7 8.8 6.6 4.3 0.1 0.2 9.2 5.0 3.5 Advanced Economies 9/3.1 7

70、.3 4.6 2.6 0.2 0.2 7.8 3.1 2.3 Emerging Market and Developing Economies 8/5.9 9.9 8.1 5.5 0.0 0.2 10.4 6.6 4.5 Note:Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during October 26,2022-November 23,2022.Economies are listed on the basis of economic size.The agg

71、regated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1/Difference based on rounded figures for the current and October 2022 WEO forecasts.Countries whose forecasts have been updated relative to October 2022 WEO forecasts account for approximately 90 percent of world GDP measured

72、 at purchasing-power-parity weights.2/For World Output(Emerging Market and Developing Economies),the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 90 percent(80 percent)of annual world(emerging market and developing economies)output at purchasing-power-parity weights.3/Excludes the G

73、roup of Seven(Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,United Kingdom,United States)and euro area countries.4/For India,data and projections are presented on a fiscal year basis,with FY 2022/23(starting in April 2022)shown in the 2022 column.Indias growth projections are 5.4 percent in 2023 and 6.8 percent

74、 in 2024 based on calendar year.5/Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,Thailand.6/Simple average of growth rates for export and import volumes(goods and services).7/Simple average of prices of UK Brent,Dubai Fateh,and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.The average assumed price of oil in US dolla

75、rs a barrel,based on futures markets(as of November 29,2022),is$81.13 in 2023 and$75.36 in 2024.8/Excludes Venezuela.9/The inflation rate for the euro area is 5.7%in 2023 and 3.3%in 2024,that for Japan is 2.8%in 2023 and 2.0%in 2024,and that for the United States is 4.0%in 2023 and 2.2%in 2024.Howev

76、er,the boost to demand could stoke core inflation,leading to even tighter monetary policies and a stronger-than-expected slowdown later on.Pent-up demand could also fuel a stronger rebound in China.Faster disinflation:An easing in labor market pressures in some advanced economies due to falling vaca

77、ncies could cool wage inflation without necessarily increasing unemployment.A sharp fall in the prices of goods,as consumers shift back to services,could further push down inflation.Such developments could imply a“softer”landing with less monetary tightening.Downside risksNumerous downside risks con

78、tinue to weigh on the global outlook,lowering growth while,in a number of cases,adding further to inflation:Chinas recovery stalling:Amid still-low population immunity levels and insufficient hospital capacity,especially outside the major urban areas,significant health consequences could hamper the

79、recovery.A deepening crisis in the real estate market remains a major source of vulnerability,with risks of widespread defaults by developers and resulting financial sector instability.Spillovers to the rest of the world would operate primarily through lower demand and potentially renewed supply cha

80、in problems.War in Ukraine escalating:An escalation of the war in Ukraine remains a major source of vulnerability,particularly for Europe and lower-income countries.Europe is facing lower-than-anticipated gas prices,having stored enough gas to make shortages unlikely this winter.However,refilling st

81、orage with much-diminished Russian flows will be challenging ahead of next winter,particularly if it is a very cold one and Chinas energy demand picks up,causing price spikes.A possible increase in food prices from a failed extension of the Black Sea grain initiative would put further pressure on lo

82、wer-income countries that are experiencing food insecurity and have limited budgetary room to cushion the impact on households and businesses.With elevated food and fuel prices,social unrest may increase.Debt distress:Since October,sovereign spreads for emerging market and developing economies have

83、modestly declined on the back of an easing in global financial conditions(Box 1)and dollar depreciation.About 15 percent of low-income countries are estimated to be in debt distress,with an additional 45 percent at high risk of debt distress and about 25 percent of emerging market economies also at

84、high risk.The combination of high debt levels from the pandemic,lower growth,and higher borrowing costs exacerbates the vulnerability of these economies,especially those with significant near-term dollar financing needs.Inflation persisting:Persistent labor market tightness could translate into stro

85、nger-than-expected wage growth.Higher-than-expected oil,gas,and food prices from the war in Ukraine or from a faster rebound in Chinas growth could again raise headline inflation and pass through into underlying inflation.Such developments could cause inflation expectations to de-anchor and require

86、an even tighter monetary policy.Sudden financial market repricing:A premature easing in financial conditions in response to lower headline inflation data could complicate anti-inflation policies and necessitate additional monetary tightening.For the same reason,unfavorable inflation data releases co

87、uld trigger sudden repricing of assets and increase volatility in financial markets.Such movements could strain liquidity and the functioning of critical markets,with ripple effects on the real economy.Geopolitical fragmentation:The war in Ukraine and the related international sanctions aimed at pre

88、ssuring Russia to end hostilities are splitting the world economy into blocs and reinforcing earlier geopolitical tensions,such as those associated with the US-China trade dispute.Fragmentation could intensifywith more restrictions on cross-border movements of capital,workers,and international payme

89、ntsand could hamper multilateral cooperation on providing global public goods.1 The costs of such fragmentation are especially high in the short term,as replacing disrupted cross-border flows takes time.Securing global disinflation:For most economies,the priority remains achieving a sustained reduct

90、ion in inflation toward target levels.Raising real policy rates and keeping them above their neutral levels until underlying inflation is clearly declining would ward off risks of inflation expectations de-anchoring.Clear central bank communication and appropriate reactions to shifts in the data wil

91、l help keep inflation expectations anchored and lessen wage and price pressures.Central banks balance sheets will need to be unwound carefully,amid market liquidity risks.Gradual and steady fiscal tightening would contribute to cooling demand and limit the burden on monetary policy in the fight agai

92、nst inflation.In countries where output remains below potential and inflation is in check,maintaining monetary and fiscal accommodation may be appropriate.Containing the reemergence of COVID-19:Addressing the ongoing pandemic requires coordinated efforts to boost vaccination and medicine access in c

93、ountries where coverage remains low as well as the deployment of pandemic preparedness measuresincluding a global push toward sequencing and sharing data.In China,focusing vaccination efforts on vulnerable groups and maintaining sufficiently high coverage of boosters and antiviral medicines would mi

94、nimize the risks of severe health outcomes and safeguard the recovery,with favorable cross-border spillovers.Ensuring financial stability:Depending on country circumstances,macroprudential tools can be used to tackle pockets of elevated financial sector vulnerabilities.Monitoring housing sector deve

95、lopments and conducting stress tests in economies where house prices have increased significantly over the past few years are warranted.In China,central government action to resolve the property crisis and reduce the risk of spillovers to financial stability and growth is a priority,including by str

96、engthening temporary mechanisms to protect presale homebuyers from the risk of non-delivery and by restructuring troubled developers.Globally,financial sector regulations introduced after the global financial crisis have contributed to the resilience of banking sectors throughout the pandemic,but th

97、ere is a need to address data and supervisory gaps in the less-regulated nonbank financial sector,where risks may have built up inconspicuously.Recent turmoil in the crypto space also highlights the urgent need to introduce common standards and reinforce oversight of crypto assets.Restoring debt sus

98、tainability:Lower growth and higher borrowing costs have raised public debt ratios in several economies.Where debt is unsustainable,implementing restructuring or reprofiling early on as part of a package of reforms(including fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing supply-side reforms)can avert the

99、 need for more disruptive adjustment later.Supporting the vulnerable:The surge in global energy and food prices triggered a cost-of-living crisis.Governments acted swiftly with support to households and firms,which helped cushion effects on growth and at times limited the pass-through from energy pr

100、ices to headline inflation through price 1 See“Geo-Economic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism,”IMF Staff Discussion Note 2023/001.controls.The temporary and broad-based measures are becoming increasingly costly and should be withdrawn and replaced by targeted approaches.Preserving the

101、energy price signal will encourage a reduction in energy consumption and limit the risks of shortages.Targeting can be achieved through social safety nets such as cash transfers to eligible households based on income or demographics or by transfers through electricity companies based on past energy

102、consumption.Subsidies should be temporary and offset by revenue-generating measures,including one-time solidarity taxes on high-income households and companies,where appropriate.Reinforcing supply:Supply-side policies could address the key structural factors impeding growthincluding market power,ren

103、t seeking,rigid regulation and planning,and inefficient educationand could help build resilience,reduce bottlenecks,and alleviate price pressures.A concerted push for investment along the supply chain of green energy technologies would bolster energy security and help advance progress on the green t

104、ransition.Strengthening multilateral cooperationUrgent action is needed to limit the risks stemming from geopolitical fragmentation and to ensure cooperation on fundamental areas of common interest:Restraining the pandemic:Global coordination is needed to resolve bottlenecks in the global distributi

105、on of vaccines and treatments.Public support for the development of new vaccine technologies and the design of systematic responses to future epidemics also remains essential.Addressing debt distress:Progress has been made for countries that requested debt treatment under the Group of Twentys Common

106、 Framework initiative,and more will be needed to strengthen it.It is also necessary to agree on mechanisms to resolve debt in a broader set of economies,including middle-income countries that are not eligible under the Common Framework.NonParis Club and private creditors have a crucial role to play

107、in ensuring coordinated,effective,and timely debt resolution processes.Strengthening global trade:Strengthening the global trading system would address risks associated with trade fragmentation.This can be achieved by rolling back restrictions on food exports and other essential items such as medici

108、ne,upgrading World Trade Organization(WTO)rules in critical areas such as agricultural and industrial subsidies,concluding and implementing new WTO-based agreements,and fully restoring the WTO dispute settlement system.Using the global financial safety net:With the cascading of shocks to the global

109、economy,using the global financial safety net to its fullest extent is appropriate,including by proactively utilizing the IMFs precautionary financial arrangements and channeling aid from the international community to low-income countries facing shocks.Speeding the green transition:To meet governme

110、nts climate change goals,it is necessary to swiftly implement credible mitigation policies.International coordination on carbon pricing or equivalent policies would facilitate faster decarbonization.Global cooperation is needed to build resilience to climate shocks,including through aid to vulnerabl

111、e countries.Overall,financial stability risks remain elevated as investors reassess their inflation and monetary policy outlook.Global financial conditions have eased somewhat since the October 2022 Global Financial Stability Report,driven largely by changing market expectations regarding the intere

112、st rate cycle(Figure 1.1).While the expected peak in policy ratesthe terminal ratehas risen,markets now also expect the subsequent fall in rates will be significantly faster,and further,than what was forecast in October(Figure 1.2).As a result,global bond yields have recently declined,corporate spre

113、ads have tightened,and equity markets have rebounded.That said,central banks are likely to continue to tighten monetary policy to fight inflation,and concerns that this restrictive stance could tip the economy into a recession have increased in major advanced economies.Slowing aggregate demand and w

114、eaker-than-expected inflation prints in some major advanced economies have prompted investors anticipation of a further reduction in the pace of future policy rate hikes.Corporate earnings forecasts have been cut due to headwinds from slowing demand,and margins have contracted across most regions.In

115、 addition,survey-based probabilities of recession have been increasing,particularly in the United States and Europe.However,upside risks to the inflation outlook remain.Despite the recent moderation in headline inflation,core inflation remains stubbornly high across most regions,labor markets are st

116、ill tight,energy prices remain pressured by Russias ongoing war in Ukraine,and supply chain disruptions may reappear.To keep these risks in check,financial conditions will likely need to tighten further.If not,central banks may need to increase policy rates even more in order to achieve their inflat

117、ion objectives.Given the tension between rising recession risks and monetary policy uncertainty,markets have seen significant volatility.While many central banks in advanced economies have stepped down the size of hikes,they have also explicitly stated they will need to keep rates higher,for a longe

118、r period of time,to tamp down inflation.Risk assets could face significant declines if earnings retrench further or if investors reassess their outlook for monetary policy given central bank communications.Globally,the partial reversal of the dollar rally has contributed to recent easing due to impr

119、oved risk appetite,and some emerging market central banks have paused tightening amid tentative signs that inflation may have peaked.Financial market volatility is expected to remain elevated and could be exacerbated by poor market liquidity.For some asset classes(such as US Treasuries),liquidity ha

120、s deteriorated to the March 2020 lows of the COVID-19 pandemic.With the process of central bank balance sheet reduction(quantitative tightening)underway,market liquidity is expected to remain challenging.Figure 1.1.Global Financial Conditions:Selected Regions(Standard deviations from mean)Sources:Bl

121、oomberg Finance L.P.;Haver Analytics;national data sources;and IMF staff calculations.Note:AEs=advanced economies;EMs=emerging markets.GFSR=Global Financial Stability Report.32101234567060810121416182022United StatesEuro areaChinaOther AEsOther EMsOctober2022 GFSR2006 0810 12 14 16 18 20 22Figure 1.

122、2.Market-Implied Expectations of Policy Rates(Percent)Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff calculations.Note:GFSR=Global Financial Stability Report.123456Oct.22Apr.23Oct.23Dec.24Dec.261.United StatesLatestOctober 2022 GFSR12345Oct.22Apr.23Oct.23Dec.24Dec.262.Euro areaWEO Update 2023 ISBN:979-8-40023-224-4