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1、A World Bank Group Flagship ReportGlobal Economic ProspectsJUNE 2023Global Economic Prospects JUNE 2023 Global Economic Prospects 2023 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433 Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.org Some righ

2、ts reserved 1 2 3 4 26 25 24 23 This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,interpretations,and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank,its Board of Executive Directors,or the governments they repres

3、ent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy,completeness,or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors,omissions,or discrepancies in the information,or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information,methods,processes,or

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6、by/3.0/igo.Under the Creative Commons Attribution license,you are free to copy,distribute,transmit,and adapt this work,including for commercial purposes,under the following conditions:AttributionPlease cite the work as follows:World Bank.2023.Global Economic Prospects,June 2023.Washington,DC:World B

7、ank.doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1951-3.License:Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO TranslationsIf you create a translation of this work,please add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World B

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11、ssion is needed for that reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright owner.Examples of components can include,but are not limited to,tables,figures,or images.All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20

12、433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.ISBN(paper):978-1-4648-1951-3 ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-1952-0 DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-1951-3 Cover design:Bill Pragluski(Critical Stages)The Library of Congress Control Number has been requested.The cutoff date for the data used in the report was May 30,2023.v

13、 Summary of Contents Acknowledgments.xiii Foreword.xv Executive Summary.xvii Abbreviations.xix Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Statistical Appendix.149 Selected Topics.156 Global Outlook.1 Box 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks.17 Box 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-inco

14、me countries.23 Regional Outlooks.49 East Asia and Pacific.51 Europe and Central Asia.59 Latin America and the Caribbean.67 Middle East and North Africa.75 South Asia.83 Sub-Saharan Africa.89 Financial Spillovers of Rising U.S.Interest Rates.99 Fiscal Policy Challenges in Low-Income Countries.123 vi

15、i Contents Chapter 1 Global Outlook.1 Summary.3 Global context.7 Global trade.7 Commodity markets.8 Global inflation.10 Global financial developments.11 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook.12 Advanced economies.13 China.14 Emerging market and developing economies.14 Recent developments.1

16、5 Outlook.16 Global outlook and risks.28 Global outlook.28 Risks to the outlook.30 Policy challenges.35 Key global challenges.35 Challenges in emerging market and developing economies.37 References.44 Acknowledgments.xiii Foreword.xv Executive Summary.xvii Abbreviations.xix Regional Outlooks.49 East

17、 Asia and Pacific .51 Recent developments.51 Outlook.52 Risks.54 Europe and Central Asia.59 Recent developments.59 Outlook.60 Risks.62 Chapter 2 viii Latin America and the Caribbean.67 Recent developments.67 Outlook.68 Risks.71 Middle East and North Africa .75 Recent developments.75 Outlook.76 Risks

18、.78 South Asia.83 Recent developments.83 Outlook.84 Risks.86 Sub-Saharan Africa.89 Recent developments.89 Outlook.91 Risks.92 References.96 Chapter 2 Financial Spillovers of Rising U.S.Interest Rates.99 Introduction.101 Methodology and data.103 Differentiating between real,inflation,and reaction sho

19、cks.104 Estimating the impact on EMDEs.104 Modeling financial crisis probability.104 Assessing the role of financial market vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances.105 Shocks to U.S.interest rates and impact on EMDE financial markets.105 Shock decomposition during major episodes of sharp U.S.in

20、terest rates movements.105 Impact of U.S.interest rate shocks on EMDE financial markets.106 Correlates of financial crises.108 Role of EMDE vulnerabilities and macroeconomic imbalances.109 Role of credit ratings and sovereign risk.110 Role of twin deficits.111 Role of frontier market status.111 Conc

21、lusions and policy implications.112 Annex 3.1 Identifying U.S.interest rate shocks.115 Chapter 3 ix Chapter 4 Fiscal Policy Challenges in Low-Income Countries.123 Introduction.125 Evolution of fiscal positions in LICs.128 Conceptual framework.128 Evolution of debt.129 Evolution of primary deficits.1

22、31 Evolution of revenues.132 Evolution of expenditures.133 Fiscal policy options in LICs.135 Domestic resource mobilization.135 Expenditure efficiency.137 Robust fiscal frameworks.139 Conclusion.141 Annex 4.1 Debt decomposition.142 Annex 4.2 Measuring spending efficiency.143 References.145 Statistic

23、al Appendix.149 Data and Forecast Conventions.155 Selected Topics.156 1.1 Global prospects.5 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges.7 1.3 Global trade.8 1.4 Commodity markets.9 1.5 Global inflation.10 1.6 Global financial developments.12 1.7 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook 13 1.8 Rec

24、ent developments in emerging market and developing economies.15 Figures Boxes 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks.17 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries.23 Chapter 3 Annex 3.2 Estimating the impact of U.S.interest rate shocks on EMDEs.115 Annex 3.3 Modeling financial

25、 crisis probability.116 Annex 3.4 Assessing the role of EMDE vulnerabilities.117 Annex 3.5 Robustness analysis.117 References.120 x B1.1.1 Regional outlooks.18 B1.1.2 Regional risks.19 1.9 Outlook for emerging market and developing economies.22 B1.2.1 LICs:Recent developments.24 B1.2.2 LICs:Outlook

26、and risks.25 1.10 Per capita GDP growth.28 1.11 Global outlook.29 1.12 Risks of financial stress.30 1.13 Quantifying scenarios of financial stress.32 1.14 Other risks to the outlook.34 1.15 Global policy challenges.36 1.16 Monetary policy challenges in emerging market and developing economies.37 1.1

27、7 Fiscal policy challenges in emerging market and developing economies.39 1.18 Structural policy challenges in emerging market and developing economies.40 2.1.1 China:Recent developments.52 2.1.2 EAP excluding China:Recent developments.53 2.1.3 EAP:Outlook.54 2.1.4 EAP:Risks.55 2.2.1 ECA:Recent deve

28、lopments.60 2.2.2 ECA:Outlook.61 2.2.3 ECA:Risks.63 2.3.1 LAC:Recent developments.68 2.3.2 LAC:Outlook.69 2.3.3 LAC:Risks.70 2.4.1 MNA:Recent developments.76 2.4.2 MNA:Outlook.77 2.4.3 MNA:Risks.78 2.5.1 SAR:Recent developments.84 2.5.2 SAR:Outlook.85 2.5.3 SAR:Risks.86 2.6.1 SSA:Recent developments

29、.90 2.6.2 SSA:Outlook .91 2.6.3 SSA:Risks.93 3.1 Recent financial developments in the United States and EMDEs.102 3.2 Decomposition of U.S.interest rates.106 3.3 EMDE financial developments since the onset of the pandemic.107 Figures xi Tables 1.1 Real GDP.4 B1.2.1 Low-income country forecasts.26 1.

30、2 Emerging market and developing economies.43 2.1.1 East Asia and Pacific forecast summary.57 2.1.2 East Asia and Pacific country forecasts.57 2.2.1 Europe and Central Asia forecast summary.65 2.2.2 Europe and Central Asia country forecasts.66 2.3.1 Latin America and the Caribbean forecast summary.7

31、2 2.3.2 Latin America and the Caribbean country forecasts.73 2.4.1 Middle East and North Africa forecast summary.80 2.4.2 Middle East and North Africa economy forecasts.81 2.5.1 South Asia forecast summary.88 2.5.2 South Asia country forecasts.88 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary.94 2.6.2 Su

32、b-Saharan Africa country forecasts.95 Figures 3.4 Impact of U.S.interest rate shocks on EMDE financial markets.108 3.5 Financial crises in EMDEs.109 3.6 Sovereign spreads in EMDEs.110 3.7 Impact of reaction shocks on EMDE financial variables,by vulnerabilities.111 3.8 Impact of reaction shocks on EM

33、DE financial variables,by market status.112 4.1 Development challenges in LICs.126 4.2 Government debt.127 4.3 Decomposing increases in government debt.130 4.4 Decomposing changes in government debt.131 4.5 Primary deficits.132 4.6 Decomposing changes in primary balances.133 4.7 Revenues.134 4.8 Rev

34、enue composition.135 4.9 Expenditures.136 4.10 Conflict,natural disasters,and volatility.137 4.11 Composition and efficiency of primary expenditures .138 4.12 Domestic resource mobilization.139 4.13 Expenditure efficiency.140 4.14 Fiscal frameworks.141 4.15 Debt management and institutional quality.

35、141 xii Tables 3.1 Crisis probability:Panel logit model with random effects.118 3.2 Samples by dependent variable in panel local projection model.119 3.3 Variables for sign-restricted VAR(monthly data).119 3.4 Variables for the panel local projection models(quarterly data).119 3.5 Sample for panel l

36、ocal projection models.120 3.6 Variables for panel logit and probit models(annual data).120 4.1 List of Low-Income Countries.144 4.2 Difference in revenues,with per capita GDP and commodity exporter status controlled for,between the means for the bottom and top quartiles among EMDEs,by indicator of

37、institutional environment.144 4.3 Difference in spending,with per capita GDP and commodity exporter status controlled for,between the means for the bottom and top quartiles among EMDEs,by indicator of institutional environment.145 xiii Global and regional surveillance work was led by Carlos Arteta.T

38、he report was prepared by a team that included Marie Albert,Francisco Arroyo Marioli,John Baffes,Samuel Hill,Osamu Inami,Steven Kamin,Sergiy Kasyanenko,Philip Kenworthy,Jeetendra Khadan,Patrick Kirby,Joseph Mawejje,Nikita Perevalov,Dominik Peschel,Franz Ulrich Ruch,Naotaka Sugawara,Garima Vasishtha,

39、and Shu Yu.Research assistance was provided by Lule Bahtiri,Mattia Coppo,Franco Derossi Diaz Laura,Jiayue Fan,Yi Ji,Maria Hazel Macadangdang,Rafaela Martinho Henriques,Muneeb Ahmad Naseem,Vasiliki Papagianni,Lorz Qehaja,Juan Felipe Serrano Ariza,Shijie Shi,Kaltrina Temaj,and Juncheng Zhou.Modeling a

40、nd data work was provided by Shijie Shi.Online products were produced by Graeme Littler.Joe Rebello managed communications and media outreach with a team that included Nandita Roy,Paul Blake,Kristen Milhollin,and Mariana Lozzi Teixeira,and with extensive support from the World Banks media and digita

41、l communications teams.Graeme Littler provided editorial support,with contributions from Adriana Maximiliano and Michael Harrup.The print publication was produced by Adriana Maximiliano,in collaboration with Andrew Berg-hauser,Cindy Fisher,Michael Harrup,Maria Hazel Macadangdang,and Jewel McFadden.R

42、egional projections and write-ups were produced in coordination with country teams,country directors,and the offices of the regional chief economists.Many reviewers provided extensive advice and comments.The analysis also benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from World Bank Group

43、 country teams and other World Bank Group Vice Presidencies as well as Executive Directors in their discussion of the report on May 30,2023.However,both forecasts and analysis are those of the World Bank Group staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or their national authorities.Ac

44、knowledgments This World Bank Group Flagship Report is a product of the Prospects Group in the Development Economics(DEC)and Equitable Growth,Finance,and Institutions(EFI)Vice Presidencies.The project was managed by M.Ayhan Kose and Franziska Ohnsorge,under the general guidance of Indermit Gill.xv M

45、ore than three years after the coronavirus touched off the deepest global recession since World War II,the world economy remains hobbledfar short of the strength that will be necessary to make substantial progress on global ambitions to eliminate extreme poverty,counter climate change,and replenish

46、human capital.Emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)today are struggling just to copedeprived of the wherewithal to create jobs and deliver essential services to their most vulnerable citizens.The optimism that arose with the end of Chinas COVID-19 shutdown earlier this year proved to be fl

47、eeting.In EMDEs other than China,a pronounced slump is underway:growth is set to slow to 2.9 percent in 2023 from 4.1 percent in 2022.Besieged by high inflation,tight global financial markets,and record debt levels,many countries are simply growing poorer.By the end of 2024,per-capita income growth

48、in about a third of EMDEs will be lower than it was on the eve of the pandemic.In low-income countriesespecially the poorestthe damage is even larger:in about one-third of these countries,per capita incomes in 2024 will remain below 2019 levels by an average of 6 percent.Yet,as the World Bank Groups

49、 latest Global Economic Prospects report makes clear,new hazards are threatening to make matters worse.Despite the steepest global interest-rate hiking cycle in four decades,inflation remains high;even by end-2024,it will remain above the target range of most inflation-targeting central banks.Policy

50、makers in most economies will need to be exceptionally agile to cope with the risks that come with such rate hikes.Today,high interest rates arent merely crimping growth in EMDEs;they are also dampening investment and intensifying the risk of financial crises.These challenges would intensify in the

51、event of more widespread banking-sector strains in advanced economies.Low-income countries are especially vulnerable.Relative to the average EMDE,these countries spend only the tiniest fraction of government revenues on their most vulnerable citizensbarely 3 percent of GDP.Today,interest payments ar

52、e taking an ever-bigger bite out of these resourcesmore than one-fifth of revenues in many countriesleaving them with little fiscal space to cope with the next shock or make the investments necessary to revive growth.In addition,all the major drivers of global growthincluding productivity,trade,labo

53、r force and investment growthare expected to weaken over the remainder of this decade.Potential growththe maximum growth the global economy can sustain over the longer term without igniting inflationis expected to fall to a three-decade low over the remainder of the 2020s.These problems must be tack

54、led promptly if the world is to establish the economic footing necessary for even a semblance of success on global development goals.To curb climate change,stave off pandemics,and rebuild after conflict,developing countries need substantial resources.The necessary financing ramp-up to generate these

55、 resources depends both on faster growth and a more dynamic private sector.The World Banks latest projections indicate that the world economy will remain frailand at risk of a deeper downturnthis year and in 2024.Our baseline scenario calls for global growth to slow from 3.1 percent in 2022 to 2.1 p

56、ercent in 2023,before inching up to 2.4 percent in 2024.Even this tepid growth assumes that stress in the banking sector of advanced economies does not spill over to EMDEs.The lessons of economic history are forbidding.Rapid interest-rate increases of the kind that have been underway in the United S

57、tates over the past year are correlated with a higher likelihood of Foreword xvi financial crises in EMDEs.And if the current banking stress in advanced economies metas-tasizes into widespread financial turmoil affecting EMDEs,the worst-case scenario would have arrived:the global economy would exper

58、ience a deep downturn next year.This report offers a roadmap for policymakersnot only for avoiding the worst outcomes but also on how to put the global economy back on track.Five steps can make the difference:1.Mitigating financial contagion:Central banksespecially those in advanced econ-omiescan cu

59、rb the risk of disruptive spillovers to global financial markets by communicating their intentions as early and clearly as possible and calibrating their strategies so as to avoid abrupt changes in the policy outlook.2.Reducing domestic vulnerabilities:EMDE monetary authorities may need to tighten t

60、heir own policies in order to moderate capital outflows,currency depreciation,and resultant increases in inflation.Prudential standards and capital and liquidity buffers at EMDE banks and other financial institutions can be shored up to reduce the risk of financial contagion from banks in advanced e

61、conomies.In addition,EMDEs need to rebuild currency reserve buffers to mitigate the impact of volatile capital flows.3.Restoring fiscal sustainability.Among EMDEs,tax collection and administration must be improved to shore up revenues.Revenues in low-income countries have long been well below EMDE a

62、veragesand heavily depend-ent on grants from donors.But since 2015,grant financing has been declining as a share of their GDP.These countries will need to prioritize domestic resource mobilization,spending efficiency,and better debt management.4.Reinvigorating long-term growth.The slow-down in poten

63、tial growth can be reversed with steps to accelerate productivity-enhancing investment,strengthen health systems,improve student learning,and increase the participation of women and older workers in the labor force.Policies that promote trade and private capital mobili-zationparticularly for investm

64、ents in digital technology and climate-related projectswill help a great deal.5.Alleviating debt distress and strengthening the global financial safety net.This means ensuring that international financial institu-tions are adequately funded and focused on rapid support for EMDEs in distress.It also

65、requires new mechanisms to speedily and sensibly restructure the public debt of countries in debt distress.In the wake of bank failures in advanced economies,a renewed focus on global financial regulatory reform is also necessary.The global economy is in rough shapeand the extraordinary series of se

66、vere economic shocks and serious policy misjudgments are both to blame.Yet years before COVID-19 arrived,governments had already been turning their backs on free and fair trade.And long before the outbreak of the pandemic,governments across the world had developed an appetite for huge budget deficit

67、s.They turned a blind eye to the dangers of rising debt-to-GDP ratios.If a lost decade is to be avoided,these failures must be correctednow,not later.Indermit Gill Senior Vice President and Chief Economist World Bank Group xvii Executive Summary The global economy remains in a precarious state amid

68、the protracted effects of the overlapping negative shocks of the pandemic,the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine,and the sharp tightening of monetary policy to contain high inflation.Global growth is projected to slow significantly in the second half of this year,with weakness continuing in 202

69、4.Inflation pressures persist,and tight monetary policy is expected to weigh substantially on activity.Recent banking sector stress in advanced economies will also likely dampen activity through more restrictive credit conditions.The possibility of more widespread bank turmoil and tighter monetary p

70、olicy could result in even weaker global growth.Rising borrowing costs in advanced economies could lead to financial dislocations in the more vulnerable emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).In low-income countries,in particular,fiscal positions are increasingly precarious.Comprehensive po

71、licy action is needed at the global and national levels to foster macroeconomic and financial stability.Among many EMDEs,and especially in low-income countries,bolstering fiscal sustainability will require generating higher revenues,making spending more efficient,and improving debt management practi

72、ces.Continued international cooperation is also necessary to tackle climate change,support populations affected by crises and hunger,and provide debt relief where needed.In the longer term,reversing a projected decline in EMDE potential growth will require reforms to bolster physical and human capit

73、al and labor-supply growth.Global Outlook.After growing 3.1 percent last year,the global economy is set to slow substan-tially in 2023,to 2.1 percent,amid continued monetary policy tightening to rein in high inflation,before a tepid recovery in 2024,to 2.4 percent.Tight global financial conditions a

74、nd subdued external demand are expected to weigh on growth across emerging market and develop-ing economies(EMDEs).Projections for many countries have been revised down over the forecast horizon,with upgrades primarily due to stronger-than-expected data at the beginning of 2023 more than offset by d

75、owngrades thereafter.Inflation has been persistent but is projected to decline gradually as demand weakens and com-modity prices moderate,provided longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored.Global growth could be weaker than anticipated in the event of more widespread banking sector stress,o

76、r if more persistent inflation pressures prompt tighter-than-expected monetary policy.Weak growth prospects and heightened risks in the near term compound a long-term slowdown in potential growth,which has been exacerbated by the overlapping shocks of the pandemic,the Russian Federations invasion of

77、 Ukraine,and the sharp tightening of global financial conditions.This difficult context highlights a multitude of policy challenges.Recent bank failures call for a renewed focus on global financial regulatory reform.Global cooperation is also necessary to accelerate the clean energy transition,mitig

78、ate climate change,and provide debt relief for the rising number of countries experiencing debt distress.At the national level,it is imperative to implement credible policies to contain infla-tion and ensure macroeconomic and financial stability,as well as undertake reforms to set the foundations fo

79、r a robust,sustainable,and inclu-sive development path.Regional Prospects.Growth is projected to diverge across EMDE regions this year and next.It is expected to pick up in 2023 in East Asia and Pacific(EAP)and Europe and Central Asia(ECA),as Chinas reopening spurs a recovery and as growth prospects

80、 in several large economies improve.In contrast,growth is forecast to moderate in all other regions,particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC)and the Middle East and North Africa(MNA).Head-winds from weak external demand,tight global financial conditions,and high inflation will drag on act

81、ivity this year,especially in LAC,South Asia(SAR),and Sub-Saharan Africa(SSA).The lingering impact of Russias invasion of Ukraine will continue to weigh on growth across regions,xviii particularly in ECA.Next year,growth is project-ed to moderate in EAP and SAR but to pick up elsewhere as domestic h

82、eadwinds ease and external demand strengthens.Downside risks to the outlook for all regions include possible further global financial stress and more persistent domestic inflation than projected in the baseline.Geopolitical tensions,conflict and social unrest,and natural disasters stemming from clim

83、ate change also present downside risks,to varying degrees.The materialization of such risks could further weaken potential growth,leading to a prolonged period of slower growth in all EMDE regions.Financial Spillovers of Rising U.S.Interest Rates.The rapid rise in interest rates in the United States

84、 poses a significant challenge to EMDEs.As the Federal Reserve has pivoted toward a more hawkish stance to rein in inflation,a substantial part of the sharp increases in U.S.interest rates since early 2022 has been driven by shocks that capture changes in perceptions of the Feds reaction function.Th

85、ese reaction shocks are associated with especially adverse financial market effects in EMDEs,including a higher likelihood of experiencing a financial crisis.Their effects also appear to be more pronounced in EMDEs with greater economic vulnerabilities.These findings suggest that major central banks

86、 can alleviate adverse spillovers through proper communication that clarifies their reaction functions.They also highlight that EMDEs need to adjust macro-economic and financial policies to mitigate the negative impact of rising global and U.S.interest rates.Fiscal Policy Challenges in Low-Income Co

87、un-tries.The room for fiscal policy to maneuver has narrowed in low-income countries(LICs)over the past decade:LIC debt has grown rapidly as sizable and widening deficits offset the debt-reducing effects of growth.Fiscal deficits have reflected growing spending pressures,including on debt service,am

88、id persistent revenue weak-ness,especially for grants and income tax revenues.As a result,14 out of the 28 LICs were assessed as being in debt distress or at a high risk of debt distress as of end-February 2023.Creat-ing room for fiscal policy requires generating higher revenues,making spending more

89、 efficient,and improving debt management practices.These measures need to be embedded in improvements to domestic institutional frameworks and sup-ported by well-coordinated global policies both to improve fiscal policy management and to address debt challenges.xix Abbreviations AE CA CE CPI EAP ECA

90、 ECB EE EMBI EMDE EU FDI FY G20 GCC GDP GEP GFC GNFS IMF LAC LIC MNA NBFIs OECD OPEC OPEC+PMI PPP RHS RRF SAR SCC SOE SSA TFP VAR WAEMU WDI advanced economy Central Asia Central Europe and Baltic Countries consumer price index East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia European Central Bank Easte

91、rn Europe emerging market bond index emerging market and developing economy European Union foreign direct investment fiscal year Group of Twenty:Argentina,Australia,Brazil,Canada,China,France,Germany,India,Indonesia,Italy,Japan,Republic of Korea,Mexico,Russia,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,Trkiye,the Uni

92、ted Kingdom,the United States,and the European Union Gulf Cooperation Council gross domestic product Global Economic Prospects Global Financial Crisis goods and nonfactor services International Monetary Fund Latin America and the Caribbean low-income country Middle East and North Africa non-bank fin

93、ancial institutions Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC and Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Brunei Darussalam,Kazakhstan,Malaysia,Mexico,Oman,the Russian Federation,South Sudan,and Sudan Purchasing Managers Index purchasing power parity ri

94、ght-hand scale Recovery and Resilience Facility South Asia South Caucasus state-owned enterprise Sub-Saharan Africa total factor productivity vector autoregression West African Economic and Monetary Union World Development Indicators CHAPTER 1GLOBAL OUTLOOKCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 20

95、23 3 After growing 3.1 percent last year,the global economy is set to slow substantially in 2023,to 2.1 percent,amid continued monetary policy tightening to rein in high inflation,before a tepid recovery in 2024,to 2.4 percent.Tight global financial conditions and subdued external demand are expecte

96、d to weigh on growth across emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).Projections for many countries have been revised down over the forecast horizon,with upgrades primarily due to stronger-than-expected data at the beginning of 2023 more than offset by downgrades thereafter.Inflation has been

97、 persistent but is projected to decline gradually as demand weakens and commodity prices moderate,provided longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored.Global growth could be weaker than anticipated in the event of more widespread banking sector stress or if more persistent inflation pressures

98、 prompt tighter-than-expected monetary policy.Weak growth prospects and heightened risks in the near term compound a long-term slowdown in potential growth,which has been exacerbated by the overlapping shocks of the pandemic,the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine,and the sharp tightening of glo

99、bal financial conditions.This difficult context highlights a multitude of policy challenges.Recent bank failures call for a renewed focus on global financial regulatory reform.Global cooperation is also necessary to accelerate the clean energy transition,mitigate climate change,and provide debt reli

100、ef for the rising number of countries experiencing debt distress.At the national level,it is imperative to implement credible policies to contain inflation and ensure macroeconomic and financial stability,as well as undertake reforms to set the foundations for a robust,sustainable,and inclusive deve

101、lopment path.Summary The global economy remains in a precarious state amid the protracted effects of the overlapping negative shocks of the pandemic,the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine,and the sharp tightening of monetary policy to contain high inflation.The resilience that global economic a

102、ctivity exhibited earlier this year is expected to fade.Growth in several major economies was stronger than envisaged at the beginning of the year,with faster-than-expected economic reopen-ing in China and resilient consumption in the United States.Nonetheless,for 2023 as a whole,global activity is

103、projected to slow,with a pro-nounced deceleration in advanced economies and a sizable pickup in China(figure 1.1.A).Inflation pressures persist,and the drag on growth from the ongoing monetary tightening to restore price stability is expected to peak in 2023 in many major economies.Recent banking se

104、ctor stress will further tighten credit conditions.This will result in a substantial growth deceleration in the second half of this year.This slowdown will compound a period of already-subdued growthover the first half of the 2020s(2020-2024),growth in EMDEs is expected to average just 3.4 percent,o

105、ne of the weakest half-decades of the past 30 years(figure 1.1.B).This slowdown reflects both cyclical dynamics and the current trend of declining global potential output growth(figure 1.1.C).Global financial conditions have tightened as a result of policy rate hikes and,to a lesser extent,recent bo

106、uts of financial instability.Many banks experienced substantial unrealized losses due to the sharp rise in policy interest rates.Concerns about the viability of balance sheets of some banks led to depositor flight and market volatility in the United States and Europe earlier in the year,which were s

107、temmed by a swift and extensive policy response.Financial markets remain highly sensitive to evolving expectations about the future path of interest rates of major central banks.Spillovers from banking turmoil in advanced economies to EMDEs have so far been limited.However,countries with more pronou

108、nced macroeconomic policy vulnerabilities,as reflected by lower credit ratings,have experienced slower growth and greater financial stress,including large currency depreciations and a sharp widening of sovereign spreads.Projections for 2023 growth in these economies have fallen by more than half ove

109、r the past year(figure 1.1.D).Inflation pressures persist.Although global headline inflation has been decelerating as a result of base effects,abating supply chain pressures,and Note:This chapter was prepared by Carlos Arteta,Phil Kenworthy,Patrick Kirby,Nikita Perevalov,Dominik Peschel,and Garima V

110、asishtha,with contributions from John Baffes,Samuel Hill,Osamu Inami,Sergiy Kasyanenko,Jeetendra Khadan,and Naotaka Sugawara.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 4 TABLE 1.1 Real GDP1(Percent change from previous year unless indicated otherwise)2020 2021 2022e 2023f 2024f 2025f 2023f 2024f

111、World-3.1 6.0 3.1 2.1 2.4 3.0 0.4-0.3 Advanced economies-4.3 5.4 2.6 0.7 1.2 2.2 0.2-0.4 United States-2.8 5.9 2.1 1.1 0.8 2.3 0.6-0.8 Euro area-6.1 5.4 3.5 0.4 1.3 2.3 0.4-0.3 Japan-4.3 2.2 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 -0.2 0.0 Emerging market and developing economies -1.5 6.9 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.0 0.6-0.2 East Asia

112、and Pacific 1.2 7.5 3.5 5.5 4.6 4.5 1.2-0.3 China 2.2 8.4 3.0 5.6 4.6 4.4 1.3-0.4 Indonesia-2.1 3.7 5.3 4.9 4.9 5.0 0.1 0.0 Thailand-6.1 1.5 2.6 3.9 3.6 3.4 0.3-0.1 Europe and Central Asia-1.7 7.1 1.2 1.4 2.7 2.7 1.3-0.1 Russian Federation-2.7 5.6-2.1-0.2 1.2 0.8 3.1-0.4 Trkiye 1.9 11.4 5.6 3.2 4.3

113、4.1 0.5 0.3 Poland-2.0 6.9 5.1 0.7 2.6 3.2 0.0 0.4 Latin America and the Caribbean-6.2 6.9 3.7 1.5 2.0 2.6 0.2-0.4 Brazil-3.3 5.0 2.9 1.2 1.4 2.4 0.4-0.6 Mexico-8.0 4.7 3.0 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.6-0.4 Argentina-9.9 10.4 5.2-2.0 2.3 2.0 -4.0 0.3 Middle East and North Africa-3.8 3.8 5.9 2.2 3.3 3.0 -1.3 0.6 S

114、audi Arabia-4.3 3.9 8.7 2.2 3.3 2.5 -1.5 1.0 Iran,Islamic Rep.2 1.9 4.7 2.9 2.2 2.0 1.9 0.0 0.1 Egypt,Arab Rep.2 3.6 3.3 6.6 4.0 4.0 4.7 -0.5-0.8 South Asia-4.1 8.3 6.0 5.9 5.1 6.4 0.4-0.7 India 2-5.8 9.1 7.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 -0.3 0.3 Pakistan 2 -0.9 5.8 6.1 0.4 2.0 3.0 -1.6-1.2 Bangladesh 2 3.4 6.9 7.1

115、5.2 6.2 6.4 0.0 0.0 Sub-Saharan Africa-2.0 4.4 3.7 3.2 3.9 4.0 -0.4 0.0 Nigeria -1.8 3.6 3.3 2.8 3.0 3.1 -0.1 0.1 South Africa-6.3 4.9 2.0 0.3 1.5 1.6 -1.1-0.3 Angola-5.6 1.1 3.5 2.6 3.3 3.1 -0.2 0.4 Memorandum items:Real GDP1 High-income countries-4.3 5.4 2.8 0.8 1.3 2.3 0.2-0.3 Middle-income count

116、ries-1.2 7.1 3.4 4.2 4.0 4.1 0.8-0.3 Low-income countries 1.4 4.2 4.8 5.1 5.9 5.9 0.1 0.3 EMDEs excluding China-3.8 5.9 4.1 2.9 3.4 3.8 0.2-0.2 Commodity-exporting EMDEs-3.7 5.1 3.2 1.9 2.8 2.9 0.0 0.0 Commodity-importing EMDEs-0.3 7.9 3.9 5.0 4.4 4.5 0.9-0.4 Commodity-importing EMDEs excluding Chin

117、a-4.0 7.0 5.3 4.2 4.2 4.8 0.4-0.3 EM7-0.4 7.7 3.3 4.7 4.1 4.2 1.2-0.4 World(PPP weights)3-2.8 6.3 3.3 2.7 2.9 3.4 0.5-0.3 World trade volume 4-7.8 11.0 6.0 1.7 2.8 3.0 0.1-0.6 Commodity prices 5 Level differences from January 2023 projections Energy index 52.7 95.4 152.6 108.9 109.1 111.0 -21.6-9.2

118、Oil(US$per barrel)42.3 70.4 99.8 80.0 82.0 84.4 -8.0 2.0 Non-energy index 84.1 112.5 124.4 112.5 109.5 109.5 -1.2-3.5 WBG commodity price index 63.1 101.0 143.3 110.1 109.2 110.5 -14.9-7.3 Source:World Bank.Note:e=estimate(actual data for commodity prices);f=forecast.WBG=World Bank Group.World Bank

119、forecasts are frequently updated based on new information.Consequently,projections presented here may differ from those contained in other World Bank documents,even if basic assessments of countries prospects do not differ at any given date.For the definition of EMDEs,developing countries,commodity

120、exporters,and commodity importers,please refer to table 1.2.EM7 includes Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,the Russian Federation,and Trkiye.The World Bank is currently not publishing economic output,income,or growth data for Turkmenistan and Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela owing to lack of reli

121、able data of adequate quality.Turkmenistan and Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela are excluded from cross-country macroeconomic aggregates.1.Headline aggregate growth rates are calculated using GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.2.GDP growth rates are on a fiscal year bas

122、is.Aggregates that include these countries are calculated using data compiled on a calendar year basis.For India and the Islamic Republic of Iran,the column labeled 2022 refers to FY2022/23.For Bangladesh,the Arab Republic of Egypt,and Pakistan,the column labeled 2022 refers to FY2021/22.Pakistans g

123、rowth rates are based on GDP at factor cost.3.World growth rates are calculated using average 2010-19 purchasing power parity(PPP)weights,which attribute a greater share of global GDP to emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)than market exchange rates.4.World trade volume of goods and nonfa

124、ctor services.5.Indexes are expressed in nominal U.S.dollars(2010=100).Oil refers to the Brent crude oil benchmark.For weights and composition of indexes,see https:/worldbank.org/commodities.Percentage point differences from January 2023 projections CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 5 fa

125、lling commodity prices,core inflation in many countries remains elevated,and inflation is above target in almost all inflation-targeting economies.Inflation is expected to continue to be above its pre-pandemic level beyond 2024(figure 1.1.E).That said,inflation expectations in most inflation-targeti

126、ng countries have so far not undergone a major shift and appear to remain anchored.Energy prices have eased considerably since their peak in 2022 on account of weaker global growth prospects and a warmer-than-expected Northern winter,which reduced natural gas and electricity consumption.Metal prices

127、 increased in early 2023,reflecting signs of a stronger-than-anticipated recovery in China,but subsequently retraced those gains.Agricultural prices have been easing on the back of good production prospects for most crops.In all,global growth is forecast to slow from 3.1 percent in 2022 to 2.1 perce

128、nt in 2023,before edging up to 2.4 percent in 2024.Relative to the January projections,this is 0.4 percentage point stronger in 2023 and 0.3 percentage point weaker in 2024.Greater-than-expected resilience of major economies at the end of 2022 and early in 2023 led to the overall upgrade to growth i

129、n 2023.However,the drag on activity from tighter mone-tary policy is increasingly apparent,particularly in more interest-rate-sensitive activities such as business and residential investment,including construction.Growth over the rest of 2023 is set to slow substantially as it is weighed down by the

130、 lagged and ongoing effects of monetary tightening,and more restrictive credit conditions.These factors are envisaged to continue to affect activity heading into next year,leaving global growth below previous projections.Notwithstanding a continued recovery in tourism,global trade growth is likewise

131、 expected to slow in view of the ongoing rotation of consumption toward services,which tend to be less trade-intensive.Fiscal policy is expected to have little net impact on global growth over the forecast horizon,with modest tightening in EMDEs generally offsetting support in advanced economies.Gro

132、wth in advanced economies is set to decelerate substantially for 2023 as a whole,to 0.7 percent,and to remain feeble in 2024,due to monetary FIGURE 1.1 Global prospects The global economy is projected to slow substantially this year,with a pronounced deceleration in advanced economies.The first half

133、 of the 2020s is expected to be one of the weakest half-decades of the past 30 years for emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs),as a result of both cyclical dynamics and slowing potential growth.EMDEs with lower credit ratings are set to experience a particularly sharp slowdown this year.In

134、flation remains elevated in many countries and is envisaged to remain above pre-pandemic levels beyond 2024.Excluding China,EMDEs are expected to make next to no progress at closing the gap in per capita incomes with advanced economies over the forecast horizon.Sources:Consensus Economics;Haver Anal

135、ytics;Kose and Ohnsorge(2023a);Moodys Analytics;Oxford Economics;Penn World Tables;World Bank.Note:AEs=advanced economies;CPI=consumer price index;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LICs=low-income countries.A.B.F.Aggregate growth rates and GDP per capita calculated using real U.S.dollar

136、 GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.Data for 2023-24 are forecasts.B.Figure shows the non-overlapping 5-year average growth in EMDEs.C.Figure shows GDP-weighted averages of production function-based potential growth estimates for 29 advanced economies and 53 EMDEs,as in

137、Kose and Ohnsorge(2023a).Data for 2022-30 are forecasts.D.Comparison of GDP-weighted growth across editions of the Global Economic Prospects report,by credit ratings.Sample includes 9 Aa-A,62 Baa-B,and 25 Caa-C EMDEs.E.Model-based GDP-weighted projections of year-on-year country-level CPI inflation

138、using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model,using global oil price forecasts presented in table 1.1.Uncertainty bands constructed from the distribution of forecast errors for total CPI from Consensus Economics for an unbalanced panel of 18 economies.F.GDP per capita aggregates calculated as aggrega

139、ted GDP divided by the aggregate population.A.Contributions to global growth B.Growth in EMDEs C.Contributions to potential growth D.EMDE growth in 2023,by credit rating E.Model-based global CPI inflation projections F.EMDE GDP per capita 024681990-941995-992000-042005-092010-142015-192020-24Percent

140、02468024682000-102011-212022-302000-102011-212022-302000-102011-212022-30WorldAEsEMDEsLaborCapitalTotal factor productivityPotential growth(RHS)Percentage pointsPercent0246Aa-ABaa-BCaa-CJun-22 forecastJan-23 forecastCurrentPercent024681019Q420Q220Q421Q221Q422Q222Q423Q223Q424Q224Q480 percent90 percen

141、t2015-19 averageJan-23Jun-22Jun-23Percent036912152006200920122015 20182021 2024fEMDEsEMDEs excl.ChinaLICsPercent of advanced-economy level01234012342010-192022e2023f2024faverageUnited StatesEuro areaOther AEsChinaIndiaOther EMDEsWorld(RHS)Percentage pointsPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|J

142、UNE 2023 6 Another risk to the forecast pertains to the possi-bility of higher-than-expected global inflation.This would result in additional monetary policy tightening,which could trigger financial stress.This would be particularly important in the case of the United States,given the scale of inter

143、na-tional spillovers from hawkish policy reaction by the Federal Reserve to rein in inflationsuch spillovers could include a substantial further rise in borrowing costs in EMDEs,especially in those with underlying vulnerabilities(figure 1.2.B).In the longer term,the decades-long slowdown of the fund

144、amental drivers of potential growthlabor supply,capital accumulation,and total factor productivitymay be exacerbated by trade fragmentation and climate-related natural disasters.Debt distress in various EMDEs,including low-income countries(LICs),highlights the need for globally coordinated debt reli

145、ef that overcomes the challenges posed by the increasing diversity of lenders(figure 1.2.C).Sustained international cooperation is needed to accelerate the clean energy transition,help countries improve both energy security and affordability,and incentivize the investments needed to pursue a path to

146、ward resilient,low-carbon growth(figure 1.2.D).The global community also has a vital role to play in mitigating humanitarian crises stemming from food shortages and conflict.At the national level,central banks in some EMDEs face persistent inflation and heightened risks due to the impact of their po

147、licies on fiscal positions and the financial sector.The increase in central bank credibility in many EMDEs in recent decades is an important policy accomplishment.Any erosion of credibility at this critical juncture would make the job of inflation control much more difficult and could trigger destab

148、ilizing capital outflows.Policy makers can also reduce financial market volatility by maintaining ade-quate foreign reserve buffers,promoting rigorous financial supervision,and strengthening bank resolution frameworks.Proper monitoring of financial system exposure to an increase in defaults and othe

149、r dislocations can ensure that prompt corrective action can be taken,as needed.Tighter financing conditions,slowing growth,and elevated debt levels create significant fiscal chal-tightening,less favorable credit conditions,softening labor markets,and still-high energy prices.In EMDEs,aggregate growt

150、h is projected to edge up to 4 percent in 2023,almost entirely due to a rebound in China following the removal of strict pandemic-related mobility restrictions.Excluding China,growth in EMDEs is set to slow substantially to 2.9 percent this year.This projection is predicated on the assumption of a p

151、rotracted period of tight global monetary policy,fiscal consolidation in most EMDEs,and weak external demand.The slowdown is expected to be even more severe for EMDEs with elevated fiscal vulnerabilities and external financing needs.Persistent weak growth means that,excluding China,EMDEs are expecte

152、d to continue making next to no progress at closing the differential in per capita incomes relative to advanced economies(figure 1.1.F).By 2024,economic activity in EMDEs will still be about 5 percent below levels projected on the eve of the pandemic.Global inflation is projected to gradually edge d

153、own as growth decelerates,labor demand in many economies softens,and commodity prices remain stable.The slow pace of improvement means that core inflation is expected to remain above central bank targets in many countries throughout 2024.Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the down-side.Recent adv

154、anced-economy bank turmoil highlights the possibility of more disorderly failures,which could lead to systemic banking crises and protracted economic downturns,with spillovers to sovereigns and across borders.These failures could be triggered by mounting concerns about balance sheet quality,continue

155、d losses in the heavily leveraged commercial real estate sector,or by the ongoing decline in house prices in many countries.In a scenario where banking stress results in a severe credit crunch and broader financial stress in advanced economies,global growth in 2024 would only be 1.3 percent,about ha

156、lf the pace in the baseline forecast(figure 1.2.A).In another scenario where financial stress propagates globally to a far greater degree,the world economy would fall into recession in 2024,as global growth of only 0.3 percent would imply a contraction in global per capita GDP.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONO

157、MIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 7 lenges for EMDEs.The rising cost of servicing debt is increasing the risk of debt distress among EMDEs,particularly LICs(figure 1.2.E).Coun-tries need to pursue a carefully calibrated policy mix that avoids inflationary fiscal stimulus and ensures that government support is

158、 appropriately targeted to vulnerable groups.Measures to im-prove fiscal space without unduly damaging activity need to be prioritized.Across many EMDEs,especially LICs,strengthened institutions and improvements to domestic governance are needed to boost the efficiency of spending and taxation.Many

159、of the current challenges reflect underlying longer-run trends.Potential growth in EMDEs has been on a decades-long declining path because of slowing growth rates of labor force,investment,and productivity.The slowdown in these funda-mental factors has been exacerbated by the over-lapping shocks of

160、the pandemic,Russias invasion of Ukraine,and the sharp tightening of global monetary policy in response to high inflation.Reversing the decline in potential growth will require decisive structural reforms(figure 1.2.F).These include measures to improve investment conditions,develop human capital and

161、 infrastruc-ture,increase participation in the formal labor force,foster productivity growth in services,and promote international trade.In particular,foster-ing investment in green energy and climate resilience can ensure that growth is both robust and sustainable.Global context Global trade is bei

162、ng dampened by subdued global demand and the continued rotation of consumption toward services.Energy prices have eased considerably since their peak in 2022 as a result of weaker global growth prospects and a warmer-than-usual winter,which reduced demand for energy for heating.Core inflation around

163、 the world has been persistent,resulting in continued monetary tightening.EMDE financial conditions continue to be restrictive,with less creditworthy borrowers facing greater financial strains.Global trade Global goods trade growth slowed in the first half of 2023 in tandem with weakening global ind

164、us-FIGURE 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges An intensification of advanced-economy banking stress could result in a sharp slowdown in global growth in 2024,or even a global recession if it had major spillovers to emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).A more hawkish U.S.monetary policy

165、 reaction to inflation could also further raise borrowing costs in EMDEs,especially in those with underlying vulnerabilities.There is an increasing need for debt relief for low-income countries amid a greater diversity of lenders.Substantial investments are needed to achieve resilient and low-carbon

166、 growth.Rising debt servicing costs are increasing the risk of debt distress.Reversing the decline in potential growth requires decisive structural reforms.Sources:IDS(database);JP Morgan;Kose and Ohnsorge(2023a);Kose et al.(2022);MSCI;Oxford Economics;WDI(database);World Bank(2022a);World Bank.Note

167、:AEs=advanced economies;EMBI=emerging market bond index;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LICs=low-income countries.A.Global growth is computed by aggregating GDP at 2015 market exchange rates and prices from the Oxford Economics Model.B.Estimated with panel non-linear local projection

168、model with fixed effects and robust standard errors.Sample includes up to 9 frontier markets and up to 19 emerging markets,using 2022 MSCI classification.Whiskers are 90 percent confidence intervals.“EMBI spreads”based on EMBI global.C.Figure shows U.S.dollar GDP-weighted average of public and publi

169、cly guaranteed external debt.“Others”includes multiple lenders.Sample includes 119 EMDEs,including 24 LICs.D.Bars show annual investment needs to build resilience to climate change and reduce emissions by 70 percent by 2050.Estimates include investment needs for transport,energy,water,urban adaptati

170、ons,industry,and landscape.In some Country Climate and Development Reports estimates cannot be considered entirely“additional”to pre-existing financing needs.E.Net interest payments are the difference between primary balances and overall fiscal balances.Aggregates computed with government revenues i

171、n U.S.dollars as weights,based on 150 EMDEs,including 27 LICs.F.Figure shows annual GDP-weighted averages.Scenarios assume a repeat of each countrys best 10-year improvement as described in Kose and Ohnsorge(2023a).Data for 2022-30 are forecasts.A.Global growth under different scenarios B.Impact of

172、25-basis-point reaction shock on EMDE financial variables after one quarter C.Composition of external debt,by creditor D.Additional investment for a resilient and low-carbon pathway,2022-30 E.Government net interest payments in EMDEs and LICs F.Global potential growth under reform scenarios -2002040

173、6080FrontierEmergingFrontierEmerging10-year yieldsEMBI spreadsBasis points01020300246810201020192021201020192021EMDEs excl.LICsLICs(RHS)MultilateralParis ClubNon-Paris ClubBondholdersOthersPercent of GDPPercent of GDP0246810Low incomeLower middleincomeUpper middleincomePercent of GDP per year4681012

174、20102013201620192022EMDEsLICsPercent of government revenues012342011-212022-30Reform impactSocial benefit and labor market reformsEducation and health improvementsInvestment surgeBaselinePercent-20246202320242025202320242025202320242025WorldAEsEMDEsBaselineAE-centered stressGlobal stressPercentCHAPT

175、ER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 8 trial production.Services trade,by contrast,continued to strengthen following the easing of pandemic-induced mobility restrictions.Interna-tional tourist arrivals are expected to approach 95 percent of 2019 levels in 2023,an increase from 63 percent in 2022

176、(UNWTO 2023).Pressures on global supply chains have abated as goods demand has weakened and global shipping conditions have improved(figure 1.3.A).The global supply chain pressures index and suppliers delivery times reached their lowest levels in almost four years in the first half of 2023 and are e

177、x-pected to remain low.During the pandemic,trade growth was supported by a shift in the composition of demand toward tradable goods and away from services,which are less trade-intensive.The gradual rotation of demand back to its pre-pandemic composition is now slowing trade growthas is the fact that

178、 the recovery in China is expected to be predominantly driven by services,which will limit positive spillovers to its trading partners through demand for goods and commodities.The growing number of restrictive trade measures reflects a rising degree of geopolitical tensions and attempts by some majo

179、r economies to follow more inward-looking policies(figure 1.3.B).In the longer term,this will likely reshape global supply chains and increase trade costs(EBRD 2023;Ges and Bekkers 2022).Together,these factors are expected to further reduce the responsiveness of global trade to changes in outputresp

180、onsiveness that had already declined in the 2010s relative to previous decades(figure 1.3.C;Kose and Ohnsorge 2023a).Against this backdrop,global trade growth is forecast to slow from 6 percent in 2022 to 1.7 percent in 2023(figure 1.3.D).As global con-sumption returns to its pre-pandemic mix be-twe

181、en goods and services,trade is expected to recover to 2.8 percent in 2024,only slightly stronger than GDP growth.The trade outlook is subject to various downside risks,including weaker-than-expected global demand,tighter global financial conditions,worsening trade tensions between major economies,mo

182、unting geopolitical uncertainty,and a further rise in protectionist measures(Aiyar et al.2023;Metivier et al.2023).Commodity markets Energy prices have eased considerably since their peak in the third quarter of 2022.A warmer-than-expected northern hemisphere winter reduced natural gas and electrici

183、ty consumption,especially in Europe(figure 1.4.A).Oil prices have averaged$80/bbl in 2023 to date,but they have been volatile.This volatility reflected uncertainty about FIGURE 1.3 Global trade Supply chain pressures and supplier delivery times have dropped back to pre-pandemic levels as goods deman

184、d has weakened and global shipping conditions have improved.A rising number of new trade measures have been protectionist.The ongoing shift in global consumption toward less trade-intensive goods will likely continue to lower the growth rate of trade relative to output.This shift and subdued demand

185、are expected to dampen global trade growth substantially this year.Sources:Federal Reserve Bank of New York;GTA(database);Haver Analytics;World Bank.A.Figure shows manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index(PMI)suppliers delivery times and the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index(GSCPI).Data for delivery

186、 times are inverted by subtracting data from 100;therefore,increasing(decreasing)PMI data indicate slower(faster)delivery times.GSCPI is normalized such that zero indicates the average value for January 1998-April 2023,while positive(negative)values represent how many standard deviations the index i

187、s above(below)the average.Last observation is April 2023.B.Figure shows the number of implemented trade policy interventions since November 2008.Restrictive(liberalizing)measures are interventions that discriminate against(benefit)foreign commercial interests.Last observation is May 24,2023.C.Bars i

188、ndicate annual average growth.Global output growth is real GDP growth computed as a weighted average at 2010-19 average prices and exchange rates.Trade growth is the average growth of import and export volumes.D.Trade is measured as the average of export and import volumes.“June 2023”and“January 202

189、3”refer to the forecasts presented in the respective editions of the Global Economic Prospects report.A.Global supply chain pressures B.New trade measures C.Global trade and output growth D.Global trade forecast 02004006008001,00020092011201320152017201920212023RestrictingLiberalisingNumber of new p

190、olicy measures02461970-20082011-2023TradeOutputPercent024620222023f2024fJune 2023January 2023Percent-202468455055606570201520162017201820192020202120222023Suppliers delivery timesGlobal supply chain pressure index(RHS)Index,50+=slowerStandard deviations from average valueCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PR

191、OSPECTS|JUNE 2023 9 global growth prospects in the first quarter of 2023,followed by the announcement in early April by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+members of a cut to oil production of 1.16 mb/d.This pledge brings the total OPEC+expected cuts over the course of 2023 to 3.6 percent of global demand.

192、Russia has changed the destination of its oil exports without a material change in volumes(figure 1.4.B).The internationally coordinated price cap on its exports(currently set at$60/bbl)also does not appear to be a binding constraint to exports.Metal prices increased in early 2023 on expectations of

193、 a strong recovery in China,but have subsequently retraced those gains.Most agricultural commodity prices have eased this year,reflecting good production prospects for most crops,including grains and oilseeds.Crude oil prices are projected to average$80/bbl in 2023,a$8/bbl downward revision from the

194、 January forecast,and to edge up to$82/bbl in 2024,reflecting a modest pickup in demand.Prices for natural gas and coal are expected to moderate in 2023 and decline further in 2024,as Europe has made substantial progress in improv-ing efficiency and reducing energy demand.Natural gas prices in Europ

195、e are expected to remain well above their pre-pandemic five-year average,despite elevated inventories(figure 1.4.C).Energy prices could be lower if global demand is weaker than expected.In this respect,prospects in China play a particularly important role,as it is expected to account for more than h

196、alf of the increase in global oil demand in 2023.On the upside,risks to the price forecast relate to a lack of expansion in U.S.oil production,low levels of spare capacity among OPEC members,and to the possibility that the cartel may decide to cut output further.Metal prices are expected to decline

197、in 2023 and 2024,albeit to levels higher than their 2015-19 average.Price declines reflect a recovery of supply following production disruptions last year,as well as subdued global demand.Metal prices may be higher if Chinas real estate sector recovers faster than expected or if supply disruptions p

198、ersistthe importance of developments in China is illustrated by the fact that the country has accounted for a substantial proportion of global demand growth in recent months(figure 1.4.D).Agricultural prices are projected to fall 7.2 percent in 2023 and ease further in 2024,as production of grains a

199、nd oilseeds is expected to increase.None-theless,food prices have risen significantly faster than overall inflation since the pandemic,with substantially larger increases in some countries as a result of weaker currencies and transport disrup-tions.Overall,the agricultural price index is expected to

200、 remain well above pre-pandemic nominal levels in 2024.The key risks to agricul-tural production are adverse weather patterns(including the emerging El Nio),trade policy restrictions,and higher energy costs.Food insecu-rity remains a critical challenge in some EMDEs,reflecting severe weather events,

201、geopolitical conflict,and distortive trade measures.FIGURE 1.4 Commodity markets Commodity prices have returned to their pre-invasion levels but remain historically high.Energy prices have eased considerably this year,as a warmer-than-expected winter and lower European demand reduced natural gas,coa

202、l,and electricity consumption.Russian oil export volumes have not changed materially,but their destination has shifted sharply away from Europe,which has built up substantial natural gas inventories.Metals prices have remained subdued amid a weaker-than-expected industrial recovery in China.Sources:

203、GSE(database);IEA(2023a);World Bank;World Bureau of Metal Statistics.Note:OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.A.Monthly data,last observation is April 2023.B.Figure shows the share of the Russian Federations oil exports by destination.C.Sample includes 20 EU countries and the

204、 United Kingdom.Last observation is May 22,2023.D.Figure shows year-on-year,percent change.Last observation is February 2023.A.Commodity price indexes B.Destination of Russian Federations oil exports C.European natural gas inventories D.Metals demand growth 024682021Apr-23European UnionU.K.and U.S.O

205、ECD AsiaChinaIndiaOtherMb/d01234JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec2017-21 range20222023Trillion cubic feet-2502550Jan-21Jun-21Nov-21Apr-22Sep-22Feb-23OECDChinaOther non-OECDWorldPercent change050100150200250Jan-19Jun-20Nov-21Apr-23EnergyAgricultureMetalsIndex,100=January 2019CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONO

206、MIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 10 Global inflation Inflation remains above target in almost all inflation-targeting economies.Median headline global inflation stood at 7.2 percent year-on-year in April,down from a peak of 9.4 percent in July 2022.This deceleration largely reflects favorable base effects fr

207、om commodity prices falling below their 2022 peaks,along with abating supply chain pressures.Moderating energy prices help explain global inflation being somewhat softer in the first quarter of 2023 than previously anticipated.However,recent core inflation measures suggest the disinflation that star

208、ted last year has made only halting progress.Across EMDEs,three-month median core inflation has decelerated somewhat in recent months,while it has picked up in advanced economies(figure 1.5.A).Amid these develop-ments,global inflation is envisaged to remain further above its 2015-19 average than was

209、 expected in January,and for a longer period(figure 1.5.B).With supply chain pressures easing and energy prices declining,excess demand appears to be a key driver of continuing high inflation in ad-vanced economies,though lingering impairments to supply capacity may also still play a role(Bernanke a

210、nd Blanchard 2023).In Europe,the role of energy prices is particularly importantthe pass-through of energy costs into broader prices may be adding to inflation persistence,which could be further exacerbated by the sunsetting of fiscal programs that have attenuated price spikes for end-users(Pill 202

211、3).The absence of econom-ic slack may also be increasing the ability of firms and workers to exercise pricing power,such that inflation has become more responsive to economic activity(Borio et al.2023;Gagnon and Sarsenba-yev 2022).In some advanced economies,particularly the euro area,market-derived

212、measures of long-term inflation compensation have moved up since last year,despite a decline in oil prices,with which they have been correlated in the past(figure 1.5.C;Elliot et al.2015).This could signal greater risks of inflation remaining above target,but may also reflect increased inflation ris

213、k aversion among market participants(Bninghausen,Kidd,and de Vincent Humphreys 2018;Lane 2023).Consum-FIGURE 1.5 Global inflation Global core inflation remains elevated.Projections suggest inflation will continue to be above its pre-pandemic level beyond 2024.Market-based measures of long-term infla

214、tion compensation in advanced economies remain above 2 percent,despite a decline in oil prices.In many emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs),inflation is either accelerating or has stabilized at high levels.One-year-ahead EMDE inflation expecta-tions have declined only slightly.Longer-term

215、 projections point to a faster decline in inflation in countries with inflation targets.Sources:Bloomberg;Consensus Economics;Haver Analytics;International Monetary Fund;Oxford Economics;World Bank.Note:CPI=consumer price index;EA=euro area;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.A.Figure sho

216、ws median 3-month core inflation at an annualized rate.Sample includes 31 advanced economies and 40 EMDEs.Last observation is April 2023.B.Model-based GDP-weighted projections of year-on-year country-level CPI inflation using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model,using global oil price forecasts pr

217、esented in table 1.1.Uncertainty bands constructed from the distribution of forecast errors for total CPI from Consensus Economics for an unbalanced panel of 18 economies.C.Figure shows the deviation of month-end coupon on 5-year inflation swaps 5-years forward.Oil price refers to Brent crude spot p

218、rice.Last observation is May 2023.D.Accelerating(decelerating)is defined as annualized 3-month inflation 1 percentage point or more above(below)its level in the preceding quarter.Sample includes 83 EMDEs.E.Inflation expectations calculated as a time-weighted average of consensus inflation expectatio

219、ns for the current and following calendar year.Expectations range is the interquartile range.Realized inflation is median 3-month inflation for a sample of up to 101 EMDEs.F.Figure shows the proportion of EMDEs for which the 2028 inflation projection is more than 1 percentage point above average inf

220、lation in 2010-19.Sample includes 146 EMDEs.A.Core inflation B.Model-based global CPI inflation projections C.Deviation of long-term market inflation compensation from 2 percent D.Inflation momentum in EMDEs E.One-year-ahead expectations for EMDE inflation F.Share of EMDEs with five-year-ahead infla

221、tion projections substantially above pre-pandemic inflation 024681019Q420Q220Q421Q221Q422Q222Q423Q223Q424Q224Q480 percent90 percent2015-19 averageJan-23Jun-22Jun-23Percent507090110130-0.75-0.250.250.75Jan-21May-21Oct-21Mar-22Aug-22Dec-22May-23EA inflation compensationU.S.inflation compensationOil pr

222、ice(RHS)Percentage pointUS$/barrel0255075100Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23AcceleratingStableDeceleratingPercent of EMDEs2468101214Apr-21Jun-21Aug-21Oct-21Dec-21Feb-22Apr-22Jun-22Aug-22Oct-22Dec-22Feb-23Apr-23Expectations rangeMedian expectationRealized inflationPercent05101520Inflation-targetingEMDE

223、sOtherEMDEsPercent of EMDEs04812Oct-19Apr-20Oct-20Apr-21Oct-21Apr-22Oct-22Apr-23WorldAdvanced economiesEMDEsPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 11 above their long-term level.Tis pushed the U.S.yield curve into its steepest inversion(that is,two-year yields exceeding ten-year yields

224、)since 1981(figure 1.6.A).Such yield curve inversions have often preceded U.S.recessions.Advanced-economy banks started the year with unrealized losses on bond portfolios,which increased as interest rates rose.Tis,combined with shortcomings in risk management,contribut-ed to the failure of several r

225、egional banks in the United States.In Europe,Credit Suisse came under intense market pressure in March and was subject to an emergency takeover.Te initial emergence of banking stress drove a surge in market volatility,including the sharpest five-day drop in two-year U.S.yields in more than two decad

226、es and a large decline in bank equity prices(figure 1.6.B).To bolster market confidence and limit contagion to the broader financial system,authorities have responded with emergency liquidity facilities.Te U.S.authorities also introduced an expanded deposit guarantee for the banks that failed in Mar

227、ch.Central banks have nonetheless reaffirmed intentions to maintain,or increase,the tightness of monetary policy until inflation shows a clear trend toward target.Even with continued signs of banking stress,broader risk appetite in advanced-economy financial markets has been notably resilient.High-y

228、ield corporate risk spreads have mostly stayed below their post-2010 average,despite bank lending standards reaching their most restrictive levels since the global financial crisis(figure 1.6.C).For EMDEs,higher interest rates in advanced economies often entail an extended period of costly external

229、financing.Nonresident investors have remained cautious,which has persistently weighed on portfolio capital flows to EMDEs excluding China.Under the pressure of tight financial conditions,EMDEs have diverged into two broad subsets.1 Te first subset includes those er surveys indicate that medium-term

230、inflation expectations in the United States and the euro area have been fairly stable in 2023.In many EMDEs,inflation is either accelerating once again or has stabilized at high levels(figure 1.5.D).Some common responses to recent shocks,including(tacit or explicit)indexation of wages to inflation a

231、nd increases in untargeted fossil fuel subsidies,may have added to generalized inflation pressures(IEA 2023b).A protracted period of high inflation could be especially challenging for EMDEs,where inflation expectations are generally less stable than in advanced economies and more influenced by curre

232、nt inflation rates(Kamber,Mohanty,and Morley 2020).Consensus-derived expectations for EMDE inflation one-year-ahead moved up substantially as inflation initially picked up,but declined more slowly as inflation deceler-ated last year.The distribution of short-term inflation forecasts across EMDEs has

233、 also widened markedly,with double-digit inflation expected in more than a quarter of EMDEs(figure 1.5.E).Long-term forecasts suggest that EMDEs with inflation-targeting central banks may have an advantage in durably bringing inflation down.Five years ahead,only one-in-twenty inflation-targeting EMD

234、Es is projected to have inflation more than 1 percentage point above 2010-19 average levels,compared with about one-in-six non-inflation-targeting EMDEs(figure 1.5.F).The reopening of Chinas economy is not ex-pected to have a material impact on global infla-tion.While strengthening activity will put

235、 upward pressure on domestic inflation,this will likely be limited by slack in Chinas economy,including in the labor market.In addition,the recovery in China is projected to be less commodity-intensive than in past episodes of growth accelerations,and therefore less likely to boost global prices.Glo

236、bal financial developments Global financial conditions have become restric-tive as a result of the fastest global monetary policy tightening cycle since the 1980s,along with bouts of financial instability.For nearly a year,markets have interpreted U.S.policy rates as being well 1 According to recent

237、 Moodys credit ratings,73 percent of EMDEs have sovereign ratings of B or above,while 27 percent have ratings below B.This classification is similar to,but does not perfectly align with,the common practice in capital markets of dividing countries into“emerging”and“frontier”markets,which is done on t

238、he basis of a variety of characteristics such as financial market depth and liquidity.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 12 FIGURE 1.6 Global financial developments Prior to the advanced-economy bank failures in March,the U.S.yield curve registered its deepest inversion in four decades.Du

239、ring the banking stress,short-term government bond yields and bank stocks fell sharply.Despite these events,and much tightened bank lending standards,advanced-economy credit spreads remain contained.As borrowing costs have risen globally,currency depreciation and credit spread widening in emerging m

240、arket and developing economies have been disproportionately concen-trated in the countries with the weakest credit ratings.Sources:Bloomberg;European Central Bank;Federal Reserve Economic Data;Haver Analytics;J.P.Morgan;Moodys Analytics;World Bank.Note:EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.

241、A.Figure shows the largest negative value for the 5-day moving average of the 10-year minus the 2-year U.S.Treasury yield during each inversion.An inversion begins when this average turns negative and ends when it turns positive.B.Figure shows the largest 5-day changes in March 2023 as multiples of

242、the standard deviation of 5-day changes.“2-year”and“10-year”refer to 2-and 10-year government bond yields;“bank stocks”refers to price of an index of U.S.regional bank stocks and the banks subindex of the European STOXX 600 index.Sample is January 4,2000 to March 21,2023 for yields and January 3,201

243、2 to March 21,2023 for spreads.C.Bank lending is a simple average of the net percentage of banks tightening lending standards to non-financial enterprises in the United States and the euro area.“High-yield spreads”is an average of z-scores of high-yield bonds spread indices for the United States and

244、 the euro area.D.U.S.yield is the 5-year Treasury yield.Sovereign spread is the spread over U.S.yields for EMDE dollar-denominated sovereign debt.Changes are since February 2022 for 45 EMDEs.E.Indexes constructed by compounding daily average changes in exchange rates for each group.Sample includes 7

245、6 EMDEs.Last observation is May 25,2023.F.Median change in 5-year U.S.dollar-denominated credit default swaps for 48 EMDEs,including 19 investment-grade and 29 non-investment-grade countries.Whiskers indicate interquartile range.A.Yield curve inversions in the United States B.Advanced-economy yields

246、 and bank stocks during March 2023 banking stress C.Bank lending standards and high-yield spreads in advanced economies D.Change in EMDE borrowing costs since February 2022,by credit rating E.EMDE U.S.dollar exchange rate,by credit rating F.EMDE CDS premia around advanced-economy bank failures -12-8

247、-40U.S.2-yearU.S.10-yearU.S.bank stocksGermany 2-yearGermany10-yearEuropebank stocks5-day change,standard deviations-1.50.01.53.0-20-1001020304020102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023Bank lendingHigh-yield spreads(RHS)Banks tightening lending(net percent)Spreads(z-score)-505101520Aa

248、-aBaa-BCaa-CSovereign spreadU.S.yieldChange in borrowing costPercentage points-25-20-15-10-505Feb-22May-22Aug-22Nov-22Feb-23May-23Aa-aBaa-BCaa-CPercent050100150200250300Investment gradeNon-investment gradeBasis point change between March 6 and 20,2023-2.5-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.019801981198219891990200020

249、05200620072019202310-year minus 2-year yield(percentage points)with credit ratings of B or above(the majority of EMDEs),which have so far proved able to withstand global monetary tightening without incurring substantial increases in risk premia on external debt(figure 1.6.D).In some such EMDEs where

250、 inflation has been high,central banks have helped assuage market concerns by raising policy rates earlier,and by more than,advanced-economy counterparts.Nonetheless,since the Federal Reserve started to raise its policy rate,marginal dollar-denominated borrowing costs have increased by close to 200

251、basis points even among the most resilient EMDEs.Te second subset includes EMDEs with the lowest credit ratings(below B),which have proved far more vulnerable.Teir risk premia have increased substantially,in part because they have also experienced much greater currency deprecia-tion than most other

252、EMDEs(figure 1.6.E).Many of these countries have limited fiscal capaci-ty,large unhedged foreign currency liabilities,and other economic vulnerabilities.With little or no access to commercial debt markets,they have become reliant on official creditors,or their own diminishing reserves,to meet extern

253、al financing needs.Some have slipped into crises.Spillovers from advanced-economy banking stress have so far been limited in most EMDEs,but have exhibited a similar divergence.Market perceptions of the creditworthiness of investment grade EMDEs(as measured by credit-default swap premia)were little a

254、ffected in March,after the first bank failures in advanced economies;in contrast,credit default swap spreads for non-investment-grade sovereign borrowers widened notably(figure 1.6.F).Major economies:Recent developments and outlook Activity in advanced economies slowed less than expected in early 20

255、23 but is set to weaken substan-tially later this year.Past and ongoing monetary policy rate hikes,tighter credit conditions amid banking sector stress,softening labor markets,and the lingering effects of the energy price spike of 2022 are expected to weigh on activity.In China,growth is projected t

256、o rebound more quickly than previously CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 13 expected,reflecting the economic reopening and supportive policy,before moderating toward the end of 2023.Advanced economies Growth in advanced economies in late 2022 and early 2023 slowed less than expected,as t

257、ight labor markets supported robust wage growth and prevented a sharper slowdown in consumption(figure 1.7.A).The tightness in labor markets is in part related to a slowdown in labor supply,with labor force participation rates falling(partly because of a rise in early retirements)and,in the United S

258、tates,a decline in hours worked by those employed(Lee,Park,and Shin 2023).In the first quarter of 2023,GDP expanded by 1.1 percent in the United States on a quarterly basis,supported by broadly robust consumption.Euro area GDP grew by 0.3 percent at an annualized rate,reflect-ing lower energy prices

259、,easing supply bottlenecks,and fiscal policy support for firms and households.Advanced-economy growth is projected to slow to an annual average of 0.7 percent in 2023.This largely reflects the continued effect of considerable central bank policy rate hikes since early 2022.More restrictive credit co

260、nditions due to banking sector stress in advanced economies should slow domestic demand further in 2023.Past increases in energy prices and the expected softening in labor markets are also projected to weigh on activity.Growth is expected to accelerate modestly to 1.2 percent in 2024 due to a pickup

261、 in the euro area.Stronger-than-expected activity in early 2023 is projected to push average annual growth 0.2 percentage point above the January forecast,despite an expected weakening in the second half.In contrast,the pickup in growth in 2024 is weaker than previously forecast,owing to the more de

262、layed impact of monetary policy rate increases,as well as additional headwinds from tighter credit conditions.In the United States,growth is expected to weaken significantly through 2023 and early 2024,mainly as a result of the lagged effects of the sharp rise in policy rates over the past year and

263、a half aimed at bringing down the highest inflation FIGURE 1.7 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook Tight labor markets and high wage growth prevented a sharper slowdown in advanced economies in early 2023.Policy rate hikes and recent bank failures have contributed to a tightening of fina

264、ncial conditions and a slowdown in bank lending.Historically high job vacancy rates should decline as labor markets slow in advanced economies.The recovery in China is expected to be led by services activity,which tends to be less trade intensive.Sources:European Central Bank;Eurostat;Federal Reserv

265、e Economic Data;Haver Analytics;National Bureau of Statistics of China;U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis;U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics;World Bank.A.Figure shows the year-on-year percentage change in wages and salaries.Last observation is 2023Q1 for the United States and 2022Q4 for the euro area.B.Fig

266、ure shows six-month percentage change in the stock of credit,which is bank lending to nonfinancial private sector,monthly end of period,for the euro area and bank loans and leases from the H8 release by the Federal Reserve,monthly end of period,for the United States.Last observation is April 2023 fo

267、r the United States and March 2023 for the euro area.C.Figure shows job openings rate in the United States and the job vacancy rate in the euro area,as percentage points deviation from the average value for the period 2010-2019.Last observation is 2023Q1 for the United States and 2022Q4 for the euro

268、 area.D.Figure shows official manufacturing and non-manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index(PMI).PMI readings above(below)50 indicate expansion(contraction)in economic activity.Last observation is April 2023.A.Wage growth B.Bank lending C.Job vacancy rate D.PMIs in China rates since the early 1980s.

269、Model-based estimates show that the peak impact on growth from this tightening is likely to take place in 2023.In addition,recent bank failures have contributed to a slowdown in credit creation(figure 1.7.B).Tighter credit will also weigh on near-term activity.Consumption has been resilient but is e

270、xpected to slow substantially.Higher borrowing costs and tighter financial conditions will weigh on house-4-202468Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23Euro areaUnited StatesPercent-10123420Q120Q321Q121Q322Q122Q323Q1Euro areaUnited StatesPercentage points4045505560Jan-22Jun-22N

271、ov-22Apr-23Non-manufacturing PMIManufacturing PMIIndex,50+=expansion-8-4048121617Q117Q318Q118Q319Q119Q320Q120Q321Q121Q322Q122Q323Q1Euro areaUnited StatesPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 14 down further to 0.7 percent in 2024,partly as a result of the gradual unwinding of macroeco

272、nomic policy support.China Economic activity in China bounced back in early 2023,spurred by the earlier-than-expected eco-nomic reopening,which bolstered consumer spending,including on services-related activity(figure 1.7.D).The property sector began to emerge from a protracted slump,supported by wi

273、de-ranging policies.These included liquidity provisions to developers and measures to ensure the completion of unfinished projects.Meanwhile,goods trade remained subdued.Growth is projected to rebound to 5.6 percent in 2023,as the economic reopening drives consumer spending,particularly on domestic

274、services.Investment is expected to pick up only modestly as infrastructure-related stimulus fades,and high debt levels weigh on the property sector recovery.Weak external demand will also dampen growth.While the reopening will support services trade,subdued infrastructure and manufacturing sector ac

275、tivity will weigh on overall trade,as services activity tends to be less trade intensive.Inflation is expected to remain below target,allowing mone-tary policy to remain mildly accommodative.The fiscal policy stance is expected to be broadly neutral.With the reopening boost fading in the second half

276、 of the year,growth will slow to 4.6 percent in 2024,as moderating consumption offsets a small pickup in exports.Key downside risks include continuing stress in the real estate sector,a sharper-than-anticipated slowdown in global growth and trade,and the lingering possibility of disruptive COVID-19

277、waves.On the upside,a more vigorous consumption recovery could support growth for longer than expected.Emerging market and developing economies EMDE growth is expected to pick up in 2023 almost entirely due to Chinas economic reopening.Excluding China,growth in EMDEs is set to slow markedly.A protra

278、cted period of tight domestic hold spending as the large stock of savings accu-mulated during the pandemic is depleted,and unusually tight labor markets begin to rebalance,gradually reducing the historically high job vacancy rates(figure 1.7.C).Decelerating con-sumption and residential investment wi

279、ll likely contribute to very feeble activity in the second half of 2023.After growing 1.1 percent in 2023,the U.S.economy is likely to remain weak in 2024,decelerating to 0.8 percent.Activity is expected to pick up toward the end of next year,as inflation eases and the effects of monetary policy tig

280、htening fade.In the euro area,growth proved more resilient than expected at the turn of the year,supported by warmer weather and lower natural gas prices.Energy price pressures have been fading,but core inflation has remained elevated,reflecting the strength of the labor market,robust wage growth,la

281、gged effects from high gas and electricity prices,and broadening price pressures.The persistence of underlying inflation pressures,as seen in the core services component which excludes shelter,suggests that monetary policy may need to be tighter than previously expected.Growth is forecast to slow to

282、 0.4 percent in 2023,from 3.5 percent in 2022,owing mainly to the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening.The upward revision of 0.4 percentage point to growth this year relative to January mainly reflects the better-than-expected data at the beginning of the year and the downgrade to energy pr

283、ice projec-tions.After bottoming out in 2023,growth is expected to firm to 1.3 percent in 2024,supported by reforms and investments funded by the Recov-ery and Resilience Facility.The 0.3 percentage point downward revision to the forecast for 2024 partly reflects the effects of tight monetary policy

284、 over a longer period than previously expected.In Japan,growth is expected to slow to 0.8 percent in 2023,as the lagged effects of synchro-nized monetary policy tightening in major ad-vanced economies weigh on external demand.Although price pressures are expected to subside in the second half of 202

285、3 as the pass-through from a surge in import prices runs its course,persistent weakness in real wage growth will hold back consumer demand.Growth is anticipated to edge CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 15 monetary policy,fiscal consolidation,and weak external demand will curb growth in

286、many EMDEs.Although advanced-economy banking stress has so far not translated to EMDE financial sectors,the effects of more restrictive global financial conditions will remain a headwind to growth,particularly for EMDEs with weaker credit ratings.In LICs,domestic vulnerabilities,increased fragility,

287、and persistently high poverty rates,will continue to weigh on economic recoveries.Recent developments EMDE growth firmed somewhat in early 2023.External demand for many countries was support-ed by the pickup in growth in China and the unexpected resilience in advanced economies.Indicators of EMDE do

288、mestic demand have improved,but from a low level.Consumer confidence,for example,has improved slightly from its trough in the last quarter of 2022,but remains well below recent averages(figure 1.8.A).Services activity also picked up to start the year,with services PMIs indicating solid expansion in

289、several large EMDEs.Although measures of EMDE financial stress have generally declined since last year,financing costs remain elevated,reflecting both domestic and advanced-economy monetary policy tightening.This has weighed on EMDE investment and output in sectors that are more sensitive to interes

290、t rate movements,such as industrial production and construction(figure 1.8.B).Industrial production in EMDEs excluding China declined sharply in the second half of last year but rebounded some-what in the first quarter of 2023(figure 1.8.C).New orders in EMDE manufacturing PMIs have shown modestly i

291、ncreasing output,after signaling contraction for much of 2022.International tourism flows have been slow to respond to Chinas reopening but have normalized substan-tially compared with last year(figure 1.8.D).Activity in EMDE energy exporters remains firm,despite a decline in energy prices(especiall

292、y for coal and gas),reflecting momentum from a prolonged period of elevated export earnings.In the context of decelerating advanced-economy demand,subdued metal prices will provide little support for growth in EMDE metal exporters,many of which are also facing headwinds from tight financing conditio

293、ns.In large agricultural exporters,stable high prices have supported investment in machinery and equipment,soften-ing the contractionary impact of increased bor-rowing costs.Among poorer agricultural exporters,however,prohibitive fertilizer costs are crimping output.Among EMDE commodity importers,th

294、e decline in energy import costs has partially FIGURE 1.8 Recent developments in emerging market and developing economies Indicators of domestic demand in emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs),such as consumer confidence,have started to recover but remain weak.Tighter financial conditions

295、have weighed on activity in sectors more sensitive to interest rates,such as construction and industrial production,both of which have been subdued.Tourism has recovered substantially since 2022.Sources:Bloomberg;Goldman Sachs;Haver Analytics;World Bank.Note:EAP=East Asia and Pacific;EMDEs=emerging

296、market and developing economies.A.Figure shows the simple average of consumer confidence indices standardized against their historical values for 12 EMDEs(Albania,Argentina,Brazil,China,Colombia,Hungary,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Pakistan,Thailand,and Trkiye).Standard deviations for constituent scores a

297、re based on the period from 2015 to the last observation,which is March 2023.B.Increases in the financial conditions index imply more restrictive conditions.Increases in the EMDE construction activity proxy indicate greater confidence and increasing year-on-year activity in EMDE construction sectors

298、.The construction activity proxy is a simple average of z-scores,multiplied by 100,for variables capturing confidence and activity in construction sectors for 9 EMDEs(Argentina,Brazil,Mexico,Chile,China,Hungary,Romania,South Africa,and Thailand).EMDE financial conditions is a GDP-weighted average of

299、 the Goldman Sachs financial conditions indices for 12 EMDEs,lagged by 3 months(that is,the July 2022 value signifies conditions in April 2022).C.Figure shows the quarterly growth of industrial production in 31 EMDEs.D.Figure shows total arrivals for country groups,expressed as a percentage of the s

300、ame month in 2019.Sample includes 26 EMDEs,of which 5 are EAP.A.EMDE consumer confidence B.EMDE construction activity and financial conditions C.Growth of EMDE industrial production D.International tourist arrivals 9899100101102-60-40-200204060Nov-21Jan-22Mar-22May-22Jul-22Sep-22Nov-22Jan-23Mar-23Co

301、nstruction activity proxyEMDE financial conditions(RHS)Index,0=neutralIndex,100=Nov 2021-4-202422Q122Q222Q322Q423Q1EMDEsEMDEs excl.ChinaPercent-1.0-0.50.00.51.0Jul-21Sep-21Nov-21Jan-22Mar-22May-22Jul-22Sep-22Nov-22Jan-23Mar-23Consumer confidence2015-2019 averageIndex,0+=optimisticCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL EC

302、ONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 16 reversed the squeeze on consumers and industrial activity from last years worsening terms of trade.Across LICs,high prices for food and energy continue to weigh on consumptionespecially in fragile countries and in small agricultural com-modity producers,where violence,a

303、dverse weather shocks,and elevated production costs have dampened activity.Sizable financing needs,together with rising debt service costs,present a growing fiscal burden.Outlook EMDE outlook Growth in EMDEs is projected to edge up to 4 percent in 2023,which almost entirely reflects the rebound in C

304、hina.Excluding China,EMDE growth is set to decline to 2.9 percent this year,from 4.1 percent last year,due to the drag from high inflation and the associated monetary tight-eningboth domestically and via monetary policy spillovers from advanced economiesas well as from slowing external demand.From a

305、 regional perspective,growth is set to slow in all regions except EAP and ECA(box 1.1).Growth in EMDEs excluding China is expected to pick up modestly to 3.4 percent in 2024,as the effects of monetary tightening diminish and several larger EMDEs emerge from domestic strains,including natural disaste

306、rs,power shortages,and political turbulence.Substantial upgrades to projections for China and,to a lesser extent,Russia are the main drivers of the 0.6 percentage point upward revision to EMDE growth this year(figure 1.9.A).The improved near-term outlook for China reflects a greater-than-expected bo

307、ost from economic reopening.In Russia,the contraction this year is envisaged to be milder than initially forecast,partially due to the continued flow of energy exports.EMDE growth is expected to receive little support from external demand.Chinas recovery is envis-aged to be services oriented,rather

308、than trade-intensive.Aside from a pickup in tourism flows to Southeast Asian countries,the projections therefore entail only a muted growth impulse from China to other EMDEs.Similarly,near-term EMDE growth will benefit only marginally from stronger-than-expected advanced-economy growth in 2023,which

309、 largely reflects positive surprises at the beginning of the year giving way to weak subsequent growth in the second half of 2023 and in 2024.Gradual fiscal consolidation is expected in the majority of EMDEs in 2023;however,in aggre-gate,this is offset by a few larger EMDEs with increasing deficits.

310、Where consolidation takes place,adjustment is foreseen to occur primarily via reduced spending,as weak growth weighs on government revenue.Spending-led retrenchment is expected to intensify in 2024.This will help rebuild fiscal buffers,but also dampen demand.Accordingly,the aggregate EMDE fiscal imp

311、ulse is about neutral for growth this year and negative in 2024(figure 1.9.B).Many EMDE central banks have also continued to tighten monetary policies,or retained high rates for longer than previously expected.Given lags in the transmission of monetary tightening,invest-ment growth is expected to be

312、 weak throughout the year,with labor markets and consumption also softening.Moreover,market pricing suggests that inflation-adjusted policy rates will rise further in many EMDEs,as inflation declines only gradual-ly,taking aggregate EMDE real rates further into positive territory(figure 1.9.C).This

313、should help to combat inflation in many countries but will entail a continued drag on EMDE activity throughout 2024.The global tightening cycle has weighed especially on growth prospects in EMDEs with weaker sovereign credit profiles,which are expected to grow just 0.9 percent in 2023.Projections fo

314、r these economies have been repeatedly downgraded as global financial conditions have tightened(figure 1.9.D).In many such countries,debt service is consuming a large proportion of limited government revenues,and non-concessional external finance has largely dried up.In the absence of fiscal capacit

315、y to buffer commodity price shocks and support populations,living standards and macroeconomic stability have deteriorated.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 17 BOX 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook and risks Growth is projected to diverge across EMDE regions this year and next.It is expec

316、ted to pick up in 2023 in East Asia and Pacific(EAP)and Europe and Central Asia(ECA),as Chinas reopening spurs a recovery and as growth prospects in several large economies improve.In contrast,growth is forecast to moderate in all other regions,particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC)and

317、 the Middle East and North Africa(MNA).Headwinds from weak external demand,tight global financial conditions,and high inflation will drag on activity this year,especially in LAC,South Asia(SAR),and Sub-Saharan Africa(SSA).The lingering impact of the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine will conti

318、nue to weigh on growth across regions,particularly in ECA.Next year,growth is projected to moderate in EAP and SAR but to pick up elsewhere as domestic headwinds ease and external demand strengthens.Downside risks to the outlook for all regions include possible further global financial stress and mo

319、re persistent domestic inflation than projected in the baseline.Geopolitical tensions,conflict and social unrest,and natural disasters stemming from climate change also present downside risks,to varying degrees.The materialization of such risks could further weaken potential growth,leading to a prol

320、onged period of slower growth in all EMDE regions.Introduction EMDE regions are contending with a mix of predomi-nately negative global headwinds,resulting in diverging growth prospects.Amid weak growth of global demand and output,trade growth is expected to remain subdued and weigh on activity in a

321、ll regions.Inflation is moder-ating but remains elevated,prolonging monetary policy tightening cycles in many countries.Growth is project-ed to strengthen in EAP and ECA in 2023 but to decline in other regions.Commodity prices,particularly for energy and food,are expected to moderate this year.This

322、will help lower inflation and support activity in commodity-importing regions,including EAP and SAR,as well as some countries in LAC,but weigh on commodity exporters,particularly in ECA and MNA.Against the backdrop of subdued growth,all regions face a suite of downside risks.These include financial

323、sector stress and weaker growth stemming from tighter global financial conditions,with highly indebted regions,particularly ECA,LAC and SSA,and many oil-importing countries in MNA,especially vulnerable.In all regions persistently high inflation could lead to further domestic monetary policy tighteni

324、ng.Height-ened geopolitical tensions could disrupt trade and damage globally integrated sectors,especially in EAP and ECA.Further risks are posed by conflicts and social instability,already severe in ECA,LAC and MNA,and natural disasters,including extreme weather events related to climate change,wit

325、h SSA and small states in EAP and LAC heavily exposed.In this context,this box considers two questions:What are the cross-regional differences in the growth outlook?What are the key risks to the outlook for each region?Outlook Growth is projected to diverge across EMDE regions in 2023 in the face of

326、 persistently high inflation and global headwindsnotably slower growth in the major advanced economies and tight global financial condi-tions(figure B1.1.1.A).In EAP and ECA,growth is forecast to strengthen in 2023,to rates higher than projected in January,mainly reflecting developments in the two r

327、egions largest economiesChina and the Russian Federation.In China,an earlier-than-expected reopening of the economy is driving a rebound in growth this year,supported by consumer spending,particularly on services.Output in Russia is projected to contract less than anticipated in January mainly due t

328、o more resilient-than-expected oil production and higher-than-expected growth momentum from 2022.Persis-tent contraction in export volumes,weak domestic demand,policy uncertainty,and sanctions in response to Russias invasion of Ukraine will continue to weigh on activity.In other EMDE regions,growth

329、is forecast to weaken this year,and,except in LAC and SAR,more steeply than projected in January(figure B1.1.1.B).Growth in LAC and MNA is forecast to slow the most in 2023,following strong expansions in 2022 supported by economic reopening and high commodity prices.In MNAs oil exporters,cuts to oil

330、 productionwith Note:This box was prepared by Samuel Hill.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2023 18 spillovers to broader economic activityare expected to weigh on growth.In MNAs oil importers,high inflation,external financing pressures,and limited access to foreign currency are expected to c

331、onstrain activity.Growth is also projected to moderate in SARalbeit only marginallyand SSA,as combinations of weak external demand,high inflation,and instability,including from debt distress and natural disasters,weigh on activity.While headline inflation has declined from recent peaks in all EMDE r

332、egions,it remains elevated by historical standards,except in EAP and LAC,and above central bank targets in most inflation-targeting countries in most regions(figure B1.1.1.C).Inflation remains especially high in ECA and SSA,reflecting ongoing energy and food supply disruptions.While headline inflati

333、on is expected to continue moderating in the coming months,core inflation is likely to remain elevated,as higher production costs,including for labor,feed through to consumer prices.In crisis-afflicted economies,particularly in MNA and SAR,significant currency depreciations have added to inflationary pressures.Persistently high inflation will continue to be a drag on growth this year,eroding real