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1、WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023Re-globalization for a secure,inclusive and sustainable futureWhat is the World Trade Report?The World Trade Report is an annual publication that aims to deepen understanding about trends in trade,trade policy issues and the multilateral trading system.What is the 2023 Report
2、about?The 2023 World Trade Report evaluates how re-globalization integrating more people,economies and pressing issues into world trade can provide solutions to global challenges,and assesses the risks of trade fragmentation.Find out moreWebsite:www.wto.orgGeneral enquiries:enquirieswto.orgTel:+41(0
3、)22 739 51 11CONTENTSAcknowledgements .2Disclaimer.3Abbreviations.4Foreword by the WTO Director-General.6Executive summary.8Chapter A:Introduction.16Chapter B:The reshaping of global trade.241.A more fragmented and less predictable trade policy environment.262.Trade policy headwinds and uncertainty
4、start to affect trade flows.283.In other areas,trade and trade policy continue to make progress.334.Conclusions .42Chapter C:The impact of security concerns on trade.461.Introduction.482.The changing relationship between trade and security.483.Fragmentation is unlikely to increase security.564.Re-gl
5、obalization can contribute to a more resilient and thus safer world.575.Conclusions .60Chapter D:Re-globalization to reduce poverty and inequality.621.Introduction.642.The effects of globalization on poverty and inequality.643.The effects of fragmentation on poverty and inequality.684.How re-globali
6、zation can be made more inclusive.715.Conclusions .85Chapter E:Re-globalization to promote environmental sustainability.881.Introduction.902.Trade can contribute to environmental sustainability.903.The costs of fragmentation on environmental sustainability.934.The environmental gains from re-globali
7、zation.1025.Conclusions .108Chapter F:Conclusion.110Opinion pieces Pamela Coke-Hamilton,“Connected services:A pathway to development”.40 Pinelopi K.Goldberg,“The future of global trade”.52 Miaojie Yu,“Re-globalization or fragmentation:choices and challenges”.72 Adam Posen,“Re-globalizing subsidies f
8、or a sooner,fairer green future”.100Stephen Karingi,Melaku Desta and Jason McCormack,“Re-globalization around green trade challenges and opportunities for Africa”.107Bibliography .112-2-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The World Trade Report 2023 was prepared under the general responsibility
9、and guidance of Anabel Gonzlez,WTO Deputy Director-General,and Ralph Ossa,Director of the Economic Research and Statistics Division.Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,Chief of Staff Bright Okogu,and Trineesh Biswas from the Office of the Director-General provided valuable advice and guidance.The r
10、eport was coordinated by Alexander Keck and Victor Stolzenburg.Preparation of the chapters of the report was led by Marc Bacchetta,Eddy Bekkers,John Hancock,Roberta Piermartini,Stela Rubnov,and Ankai Xu.The main authors of the report are Marc Bacchetta,Eddy Bekkers,Michael Blanga-Gubbay,Emmanuelle G
11、anne,Kathryn Lundquist,John Hancock,Alexander Keck,Jos-Antonio Monteiro,Ralph Ossa,Roberta Piermartini,Yves Renouf,Stela Rubnov,Victor Stolzenburg and Ankai Xu.Contributions were also provided by Marc Auboin,Alya Belkhodja,Shradha Bhatia,Barbara DAndrea,Christophe Degain,Florian Eberth,Coleman Nee,S
12、imon Neumueller,Daniel Ramos,Roy Santana,Eric Ng Shing and Maxim Shmelev.Valuable research assistance was provided by Marius Fourn,Jiancheng Guo,Carlo Gussoni,Stefanie Pizzella,Joy Yang Jiao,Sameer Malik,Saptarshi Majumdar,Sang Hyun Park and Ruoyi Song.The following divisions in the WTO Secretariat
13、provided valuable comments on drafts of the report:Agricultural and Commodities Division(Jonathan Hepburn,Cdric Pene),Legal Affairs Division(Jorge Castro,Susan Hainsworth,Juan Pablo Moya Hoyos),Market Access Division(Arti Gobind Daswani,Simon Neumueller,Roy Santana),Trade in Services and Investment
14、Division(Antonia Carzaniga,Xiaolin Chai,Markus Jelitto,Juan Marchetti)and Trade Policy Review Division(Peter Pedersen).External contributions were received from Pamela Coke-Hamilton(International Trade Centre),Melaku Desta(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa),Pinelopi K.Goldberg(Yale Unive
15、rsity),Stephen Karingi(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa),Jason McCormack(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa),Adam Posen(Peterson Institute for International Economics),and Miaojie Yu(Liaoning University).Contributions were also received from the following WTO Chairs,in coordi
16、nation with Werner Zdouc and Andreas Sennekamp,supported by Sandra Rossier,of the Knowledge and Information Management,Academic Outreach and WTO Chairs Programme Division:Pallavi Arora and Monika(Centre for WTO Studies,India)and Satwik Shekhar(Centre for Trade and Investment Law,India)and Chahir Zak
17、i(Cairo University).The following teams/individuals from outside the WTO Secretariat also provided useful comments on early drafts of the report:Amrita Bahri,Emily Blanchard,Olalekan David,Rob Dellink,Teresa Fort,Antoine Gervais,Jean-Marie Grether,Kari Heerman,Yuko Ishibashi,Jacques de Jongh,Glenn M
18、agerman,Nicole Mathys,Phillip McCalman,Brad McDonald,Simon Lepot,Giovanni Maggi,Mikael Allan Mikaelsson,Hildegunn Kyvik Nordas,Dennis Novy,Marcelo Olarreaga,Gianmarco Ottaviano,Gregor Schwerhoff,Ronald Steenblik,Peet Strydom,the Trade and International Integration team of the World Bank Research Dep
19、artment,Hylke Vandenbussche,Wilma Viviers,Shunta Yamaguchi,Chahir Zaki and Maurizio Zanardi.The text production of the Report was managed by Anne Lescure and Diana Dent of the Economic Research and Statistics Division.The production of the Report was managed by Anthony Martin and Helen Swain of the
20、Information and External Relations Division.William Shaw and Helen Swain edited the report.Gratitude is also due to the translators in the Language and Documentation Services Division for the high quality of their work.-3-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREDISCLAIMERThe Wo
21、rld Trade Report and its contents have been prepared under the responsibility of the WTO Secretariat,except for the opinion pieces written by the external contributors,which are the sole responsibility of their respective authors.The Report does not necessarily reflect the positions or opinions of W
22、TO members and it is without prejudice to their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements.The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein are not intended to provide any authoritative or legal interpretation of provisions of the WTO agreements and shall in no way be read or understood to
23、have any legal implications.The authors of the Report also wish to exonerate those who have commented upon it from responsibility for any outstanding errors or omissions.-4-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023ABBREVIATIONSAfCFTA African Continental Free Trade AreaASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASYCU
24、DA Automated System for Customs DataAVE ad valorem equivalentsBCA border carbon adjustmentBASIS Bangladesh Association of Software&Information ServicesCBAM Carbon Border Adjustment MechanismCO2 carbon dioxideCPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific PartnershipDSB WTO Dispute Settlement Body
25、DSTRI Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness IndexDSU Dispute Settlement UnderstandingECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEIF Enhanced Integrated FrameworkEKC Environmental Kuznets CurveETS Emissions Trading SystemEV electric vehiclesFDI foreign direct investmentFTA free trade agreementG
26、ATS General Agreement on Trade in ServicesGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGDP gross domestic productGHG greenhouse gasGVC global value chainICT information and communications technologyIDB Inter-American Development BankIFD Investment Facilitation for DevelopmentILO International Labour O
27、rganizationIMF International Monetary FundIP intellectual propertyIRA Inflation Reduction ActIRENA International Renewable Energy AgencyISIC International Standard Industrial Classification ISOC Internet SocietyIT information technologyITC International Trade CentreITU International Telecommunicatio
28、ns UnionIUU illegal,unreported and unregulatedJSI Joint Statement InitiativeLCOE levelized cost of energyLDC least-developed countryMC11 11th WTO Ministerial ConferenceMC12 12th WTO Ministerial ConferenceMC13 13th WTO Ministerial ConferenceMENA Middle East and North AfricaMERCOSUR Southern Common Ma
29、rketMFN most favoured nationMID militarized interstate disputeMNE multinational enterprise MSME micro,small and medium-sized enterpriseNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementNDC nationally determined contributionNTM non-tariff measureOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPV ph
30、otovoltaic R&D research and developmentRCA revealed comparative advantage-5-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURERTA regional trade agreementS&D special and differential treatmentSDG United Nations Sustainable Development GoalSME small and medium-sized enterpriseSPS sanitary
31、 and phytosanitarySTC special trade concernSTDF Standards and Trade Development FacilityTBT technical barriers to tradeTESSD Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured DiscussionTFA WTO Trade Facilitation AgreementTISA Trade in Services AgreementTIWG Trade and Investment Working GroupTRIPS Tr
32、ade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property RightsTTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment PartnershipUN United NationsUNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade LawUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNECA United Nations Economic Commission for AfricaUNCTAD United Nations Confer
33、ence on Trade and DevelopmentUPU Universal Postal UnionUSMCA United States,Mexico,and Canada agreementWBG World Bank GroupWCO World Customs OrganizationWEF World Economic ForumWIPO World Intellectual Property OrganizationWTO World Trade OrganizationWTO GTM WTO Global Trade Model-6-WORLD TRADE REPORT
34、 2023The post-1945 international economic order was built on the idea that interdependence among nations through increased trade and economic ties would foster peace and shared prosperity.For most of the past 75 years,this idea guided policymakers,and helped lay the foundation for an unprecedented e
35、ra of growth,higher living standards and poverty reduction.Today this vision is under threat,as is the future of an open and predictable global economy.The“polycrisis”in geopolitics,public health,the environment and the economy has led many to argue that globalization exposes countries to excessive
36、risks.They contend that greater economic independence rather than interdependence would better serve the well-being of their constituencies.Such views have begun to shape trade policy.At the WTO we observe a sharp increase in the number of unilateral trade measures.If unchecked,this trend could ulti
37、mately fragment the world economy.Meanwhile,opponents of fragmentation argue that it would be extremely costly in economic terms,offers dubious benefits in terms of security,and would unwind the growth and development benefits that economic integration has delivered for people around globe.Even wors
38、e,far-reaching fragmentation would make it harder,possibly impossible,for the international community to address challenges of the global commons.The World Trade Report 2023:Re-globalization for a secure,inclusive and sustainable future reviews the evidence in these debates.It asks whether members o
39、bjectives would be better served by fragmentation of the world economy or a renewed drive towards a broader and more inclusive integration what we at the WTO have termed“re-globalization”.The report also examines some of the most contentious issues currently shaping trade policy:how globalization re
40、lates to security,the extent to which it has enhanced economic inequality,and how it interplays with environmental sustainability.With security considerations an increasingly influential factor in trade policy,the report finds that some reshuffling of current trading relationships may result from to
41、days tensions,but warns that taking this too far would be counterproductive.The long-term evidence suggests that trade has contributed positively to peace among nations.With regard to economic security,recent experiences with the COVID-19 pandemic,extreme weather events and the war in Ukraine have d
42、emonstrated how deep and diversified international markets help countries cope with unanticipated shortages by securing supplies from alternative sources.A strong and effective multilateral trading system that constrains unjustifiable trade barriers and offers peaceful dispute settlement provides th
43、e necessary underpinning for deep and liquid international markets with relatively low barriers to entry and diversification.Economic integration gives all members a stake in managing,containing and preventing bilateral or wider tensions,while institutions like the WTO offer fora in which to engage
44、to those ends.A second set of critiques of globalization deal with concerns about increased inequality and exclusion.The overall evidence is overwhelming that closer economic integration has led to a massive reduction in the share of the global population living in extreme poverty and deprivation.In
45、equality between rich and poor countries,and across the global population as a whole,declined starting in the 1990s for the first time since the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago,although integration and income convergence have been much slower in some developing economies,particularly in Afri
46、ca.Within countries,the inequality picture is more mixed.Several economies have experienced adjustment challenges from rapid and pronounced shifts in global trade flows,notably those linked to Chinas rapid ascent as a major trading power following its 2001 accession to the WTO.Outcomes have varied c
47、onsiderably across countries otherwise comparably exposed to trade and technological change.While in some FOREWORD BY THE WTO DIRECTOR-GENERAL-7-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREFOREWORD BY THE WTO DIRECTOR-GENERALmembers increased trade came along with increased within-
48、country inequality,in others,more trade came with increased economic inclusion.In fact,countries with higher trade openness frequently have lower levels of income inequality,especially after taxes and transfers are factored into the equation,underscoring the importance of domestic social and economi
49、c policies to cushion adverse impacts and expand opportunities related to trade.The report warns that a retreat from economic integration would roll back recent development gains,make it harder for countries to grow their way out of poverty,and harm future economic prospects for the poorest people t
50、he most.Fragmentation in global trade would also make it harder to meet environmental challenges,the final focus area of the report.Many of the biggest such challenges can only be effectively solved through global cooperation.Climate change knows no boundaries;biodiversity cuts across borders.Open g
51、lobal trade is indispensable for getting to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions:both to diffuse green goods and services around the world,and to enable the increased scale and competition that encourage innovation and drive down the cost of decarbonization.WTO economists estimate that 40per cent of th
52、e dramatic cost decline for solar panels over the past three decades was due to scale economies made possible in part by international trade and value chains.In contrast,fragmentation could make renewable energy more expensive than it otherwise would have been,disincentivizing the replacement of fos
53、sil fuels and slowing down the low-carbon transition.Narratives matter in economics and in policy.The currently ascendant narratives around trade may contribute to a gradual erosion of the trading system and the WTO.Taken together,the analysis in this World Trade Report suggests that we should be wa
54、ry of such an outcome:it could result in a world that is less secure,in which supplies are more vulnerable to shocks instead of more resilient to them;poorer,with more people and places shut out of economic progress;and less sustainable,with effective action on environmental protection harder to ach
55、ieve.Re-globalization offers a better path forward.Bringing more countries and communities from the margins of the global economy to the mainstream would make for deeper,more diversified markets that are more resilient to shocks.Less concentrated trading relationships would make interdependence hard
56、er for any single country to weaponize.A prime concern must be to make sure that the gains from trade are shared more equally within and across countries.Even as the traditional model of export-led industrialization has lost some of its job-creating power as manufacturing becomes less labour-intensi
57、ve,the report highlights the exciting possibilities for trade to drive growth,employment and greater environmental sustainability.For example,advances in information and communication technologies have made trade in services,particularly digital services,much easier,enabling the participation in glo
58、bal trade of hitherto underrepresented economies,as well as groups such as women and micro,small and medium-sized enterprises.Exports of digitally delivered services have more than tripled since 2005,far outpacing trade in goods and other services.Trade in environmental goods has almost quadrupled s
59、ince 2000.Research described in this report suggests that,once countries take environmental policy action,say,to correctly price water use or greenhouse gas emissions,trade is a powerful force multiplier for unlocking environmental gains:just as countries can reap economic gains by specializing in w
60、hat they are relatively good at,the world can reap environmental gains if countries specialize in activities that they are relatively green at.However,making the most of these opportunities requires international cooperation.The WTOs ongoing work on services domestic regulation,investment facilitati
61、on,and e-commerce promises to reduce services trade costs and enhance integration.Realizing environmental comparative advantages requires international coordination on environment and trade policies to ensure that one does not become the others collateral damage.Re-globalization must also address lo
62、ngstanding issues on the WTO agenda,particularly agriculture,which accounts for a large share of employment in many members.The report shows that trade costs in agriculture exceed those in manufacturing by 50 per cent,penalizing poorer segments in society that rely on this sector.The WTO is already
63、making a difference here recent research finds that the Trade Facilitation Agreement has had disproportionately positive effects on agricultural trade since its entry into force in 2017,with LDCs registering a 17 per cent increase in agricultural exports as a result.The WTO is not perfect far from i
64、t.But the case for strengthening the trading system is far stronger than the case for walking away from it.WTO members are already acting to reinvigorate the organization,as demonstrated by their collective success at the 12th Ministerial Conference in June 2022.Todays complex challenges requires mo
65、re,not less,international cooperation,and WTO members are actively looking at how to update and upgrade the WTO rulebook so that trade can contribute fully to effective responses.The alternative to rules-based integration is power-based fragmentation and a world of greater uncertainty,increased soci
66、oeconomic exclusion and heightened environmental decline.This report makes the case that“re-globalization”is a far more attractive alternative.I hope readers and policymakers in particular will find it useful in shaping the future of trade for peace,people and the planet.Dr Ngozi Okonjo-IwealaDirect
67、or-General-8-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe multilateral trading system overseen by the World Trade Organization was created just over 75 years ago based on the vision that fostering interdependence among economies would play a crucial role in achieving peace and prosperity.This vision
68、had emerged as a central lesson from three disastrous decades of deglobalization,marked by two world wars,the Great Depression,and political extremism.For three-quarters of a century it has guided policymakers as they laid the foundations for the integrated world we inhabit today.However,this vision
69、 is currently being called into question.Recent crises,such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine,have fed into perceptions that globalization exposes economies to excessive risks.Consequently,a trade-sceptic narrative has gained traction,suggesting that international trade is an obstacle
70、to building a more secure,inclusive,and sustainable world.Viewing interdependence as a vice rather than a virtue,policymakers are now placing greater emphasis on economic independence.Against this backdrop,the World Trade Report 2023 critically examines the role of international trade in addressing
71、some of the most pressing challenges of our time:maintaining peace and security,reducing poverty and inequality,and achieving a sustainable economy.The primary conclusion of the Report is that international trade,anchored in a strengthened multilateral trading system,plays an indispensable role in c
72、reating a more secure,inclusive,and sustainable world.Building upon these findings,the Report makes the case that a better alternative to fragmentation is“re-globalization”understood as extending trade integration to more people,economies and issues.Chapter B shows that global trade flows have been
73、resilient despite difficulties in the global trade policy landscape.To provide the context for this Report,Chapter B offers an empirical analysis of the current state of globalization and presents three key findings:first,the evolving narrative questioning international trade is increasingly manifes
74、ting itself as trade tensions.Second,these tensions are beginning to affect trade flows including in ways that point towards fragmentation.And third,despite these challenges,international trade continues to thrive in many ways,implying that talk of de-globalization is on balance still far from suppo
75、rted by the data.The chapter opens with a discussion of the proliferation of trade tensions.Scepticism towards international trade in global trade policymaking has been growing,leading to setbacks in regional trade integration efforts and a shift towards unilateral trade policies.This has resulted i
76、n tensions between some major traders,as unilateral trade measures and technical regulations have led to an increasing number of trade concerns raised by WTO members.Analysis of the work of WTO committees reveals a surge in trade concerns at the technical level,particularly in the Committee on Techn
77、ical Barriers to Trade(TBT)and the Committee on Market Access,with the latter registering a fourfold increase from 2015 to 2022.An increasing number of unresolved concerns is now being escalated to a more political level in the Council for Trade in Goods,where the number of trade concerns has increa
78、sed ninefold from 2015 to 2022(see Figure 1(a).The rising use of subsidies by governments has been another issue of concern,resulting in a sharp increase in the number of countervailing measures undertaken by WTO members(see Figure 1(b).Figure 1(a):Trade concerns raised in the Council for Trade in G
79、oods by meeting,2015-22Figure 1(b):Number of newly imposed countervailing measures,1995-225589121013 13121823 232528262933 3334374144452015-12015-22015-32016-12016-22016-32017-12017-22017-32018-12018-22018-32019-12019-22019-32020-12020-22021-12021-22021-32022-12022-22022-31943610251515583 3211919910
80、131215231828352441181995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022Meetings in each yearSource:WTO.Source:WTO.-9-EXECUTIVE SUMMARYRE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREChapter B also looks at the effects of trad
81、e tensions on international trade flows.It shows that the stagnation of the global trade-to-GDP ratio since the global financial crisis of 2008-09 does not seem to be driven by trade tensions as trade costs continued to fall after 2008-09.Instead,it reflects less policy-driven factors,such as the de
82、celeration of production unbundling,as more components could be sourced from within countries instead of across borders.The impact of rising trade tensions is,however,starting to become evident in current trade flows between China and the United States.While bilateral trade reached a record high in
83、2022,its composition underwent changes aligned with tariff measures,with trade slowing down sharply in some product categories such as semiconductors.More broadly,Chapter B suggests that trade is gradually becoming reoriented along geopolitical lines.To illustrate this trend,the chapter looks at hyp
84、othetical“blocs”based on foreign policy similarity indices.Trade between these blocs has experienced a growth rate that is on average 4-6 per cent lower than trade within blocs since the onset of the war in Ukraine in February 2022(see Figure 2).Chapter B finds that,despite these developments,claims
85、 of de-globalization are still greatly exaggerated.In fact,there are also clear signs of re-globalization and greater international cooperation.International trade has exhibited remarkable resilience,swiftly recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and adapting to the war in Ukraine.Indeed,trade was cr
86、ucial during the pandemic for scaling up the production of medical supplies and vaccines,and for bringing them to where they were needed.Similarly,the open and predictable trading system helped mitigate supply shortages and price spikes related to the war in Ukraine because countries were able to so
87、urce key supplies like wheat from alternative producers.Trade has also become more digital,green and inclusive.The digital revolution has bolstered trade in digitally delivered services(see Figure 3)by sharply reducing the costs of trading these services.The value of global trade in environmental go
88、ods has increased rapidly,outpacing total goods trade.And global value chains(GVCs)have expanded to encompass more economies for example,Cambodia,Romania and Viet Nam have seen a particularly rapid increase in their GVC participation.Trade policy has also made significant progress,and the WTO has pl
89、ayed an important role in this progress.Noteworthy examples include the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation,which entered into force in 2017,and the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies,adopted in June 2022,both at the multilateral level,and WTO negotiations among groups of members on services domes
90、tic regulation,investment facilitation and e-commerce.There have also been important regional agreements,such as the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA).But more remains to be done.Trade costs in developing economies remain almost 30 per cent higher than in high-income economies,and trade co
91、sts in agriculture are 50 per cent higher than those in manufacturing.Trade costs in services also remain high,albeit with large variation across sectors,as technology and policy have contributed to significant declines in costs associated with trading digitally delivered services.Figure 2:Trade wit
92、hin and between hypothetical geopolitical blocs,January 2019 to December 20224050607080901001101202019/012019/032019/052019/072019/092019/112020/012020/032020/052020/072020/092020/112021/012021/032021/052021/072021/092021/112022/012022/032022/052022/072022/092022/11Index January 2022=100Between bloc
93、sWithin blocsWar in UkraineSource:WTO Secretariat calculations based on Trade Data Monitor data.Note:Seasonally adjusted series.-10-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023Chapter C suggests that re-globalization can contribute more effectively than fragmentation to a more secure world.Chapter C looks at the role of
94、 international trade in maintaining peace and security.It starts with the observation that the notion of security invoked in a trade policy context has evolved to include economic aspects,such as access to critical goods and resilience to shocks.Based on this observation,the chapter takes a broad vi
95、ew of security and makes three main points.First,trade contributes to economic security by enabling risk diversification.It can also reduce conflicts,especially within a multilateral system of agreed rules.Second,fragmenting trade relationships tends to decrease economic security and increase confli
96、ct risks,implying that maintaining a diverse set of trading partners is likely to be Figure 3:Growth of digitally delivered services exports,2005-22050100150200250300350400450200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022Index 2005=100Digitally delivered services exportsGoo
97、ds exportsOther services exportsSource:WTO(2023b).Note:Digitally delivered services include General Agreement on Trade in Services(GATS)mode 1 exports of financial,insurance,telecommunications,computer and information services,charges for the use of intellectual property,and most other business serv
98、ices and personal,cultural and recreational services in the balance of payments.Figure 4:National security-related trade concerns raised in WTO committees are risingEXEC.SUM.-Figure 402468101219971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022Note
99、s:Figure 4 depicts the number of specific trade concerns(STC)relating to national security between 1997 and 2022 raised in the Market Access,Import Licensing,SPS and TBT Committees.Trade concerns raised at the Council for Trade in Goods(CTG)are not reported in the STC Database.Source:WTO STC Databas
100、e.https:/tradeconcerns.wto.org/en.-11-EXECUTIVE SUMMARYRE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREa safer strategy.Finally,re-globalization has the potential to enhance trades contribution to security by reducing trade barriers and facilitating diversification,while the multilater
101、al trading system aids peaceful dispute resolution and friction reduction.Security considerations are playing a rapidly increasing role in trade policy.For example,the number of trade concerns about measures referring to“national security”has risen sharply in recent years(see Figure 4).Chapter C sug
102、gests that open trade,supported by a robust multilateral trading system,serves as a key driver of economic security by enabling firms and households to access alternative options when faced with supply shortages.This conclusion is drawn from examining the response of trade to the COVID-19 pandemic a
103、nd to the war in Ukraine,as well as reviewing the broader literature on international trade,supply chain resilience and macroeconomic volatility.Although the relationship between trade and conflict is complex,the literature suggests that trade,particularly within the multilateral rules-based system,
104、plays a conflict-reducing role(see Figure 5).One reason for this is the fact that in multilateral trade networks,third parties negatively affected by bilateral tensions have an interest in mediating these tensions.Moreover,international organizations contribute to consolidating peace by fostering st
105、ability in international relations.Even at a purely bilateral level,trade can reduce the likelihood of conflict by raising its opportunity costs.This is a particularly important point in todays world where intricately formed supply chains bind economies together in complex ways,maximizing the gains
106、from trade but also the costs of severing trade relationships.Chapter C also examines the potential consequences of fragmentation on global security.While acknowledging the inevitability of some decoupling due to geopolitical dynamics,it suggests that excessive fragmentation is inadvisable because i
107、t would adversely impact security.This argument aligns with the earlier analysis,emphasizing the significance of international trade in maintaining peace and security.In addition,geopolitical affiliations undergo significant changes over time.Geopolitical affiliations from about 40 years ago,as indi
108、cated by United Nations(UN)voting patterns,only explain about 40 per cent of affiliations in the more recent past.Thus,concepts like friend-shoring can face implementation risks if the geopolitical landscape is unstable,especially if there is a tendency toward political polarization.The chapter conc
109、ludes by exploring strategies to further enhance trades contribution to security.The primary focus is on re-globalization,which promotes diversification in trading partners,enhances resilience,and mitigates the risk that economies might use trade policies against one another.One key opportunity lies
110、 in further opening up services trade,which currently still faces disproportionately high trade costs.Trade opening would,for example,enable economies to better respond to natural disasters or health crises by leveraging the expertise of foreign professionals in situations where they lack local expe
111、rtise.Progress is already being made in this area,with a group of WTO members having successfully concluded negotiations on services domestic regulation,which aim to increase the transparency,predictability and efficiency of authorization procedures for foreign service providers.In addition,integrat
112、ing more countries into GVCs offers another opportunity to further enhance trades contribution Figure 5:There is a strong negative correlation between trade openness and conflict probability00.10.20.30.40.50.60.7-7-6-5-4-3-2-1019401950196019701980199020002010Conflict probability(log scale)Trade open
113、nessNotes:Trade openness is defined as the sum of world imports and exports divided by world GDP.Conflict probability is defined as the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes between two hostile parties,excluding threats to use force and lower levels of hostility,divided by the number of part
114、ies.Source:Feenstra,Inklaar and Timmer(2015)and Klasing and Milionis(2014)for trade openness,and Maoz et al.(2019)and Correlates of War Project(2017)(https:/correlatesofwar.org/)for conflict probability.-12-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023to security.This would necessitate the removal of various trade barrie
115、rs,such as by addressing the difficulties in obtaining trade finance encountered by many developing economies.Nevertheless,the most important measure to take is to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system,as it provides the necessary framework for resilient supply chains and peaceful d
116、ispute resolution.Chapter D analyses the role of trade in reducing poverty and inequality and highlights the potential for inclusive growth offered by a strengthened multilateral trading system.Chapter D delves into the role of international trade in reducing poverty and inequality and highlights th
117、ree key points.First,trade has proved itself to be a powerful driver of inclusiveness,fostering convergence of incomes among economies and contributing significantly to poverty reduction.While,in the absence of adequate domestic policies,trade may increase within-country inequalities,it also provide
118、s important opportunities to those hit by labour market shocks.In addition,trade can support informal workers,women and micro,small and medium-sized enterprises.Second,fragmentation presents a major risk to the progress achieved in poverty and inequality reduction.While there might be some winners f
119、rom a reorientation of global value chains,most developing economies stand to lose,and poorer households are likely to suffer more from rising trade costs,as they are more dependent on tradable goods and services.Third,embracing a strengthened multilateral trading system could enable more inclusiven
120、ess,as poorer economies could benefit from greater participation in GVCs.This could be facilitated by reducing trade costs through agreements like the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.There are also opportunities for services-led growth,particularly digitally delivered services,which can also be sup
121、ported by WTO agreements.Chapter D highlights the pivotal role of trade in promoting global economic convergence and poverty reduction.Developing economies have significantly benefited from trade-driven growth,leading to income convergence with wealthier nations,facilitated by integration into globa
122、l value chains and declining trade costs.Trade has also contributed to an increase in inequality in some advanced economies by increasing the demand for skilled workers and shifting economic activity to urban centres.However,the evidence shows that trade openness can go hand in hand with economic in
123、clusion,pointing to the importance of complementary domestic policies.Also,the latest research casts doubt on earlier findings that import competition has played a major role in the recent decline in manufacturing employment in some advanced economies.The WTO has played a vital role in overseeing a
124、reduction in tariffs and non-tariff measures,which facilitates trade expansion and fosters economic growth.Trade has acted as a catalyst for poverty reduction,which is illustrated by the increased export share and declining poverty rates in low-and middle-income economies(see Figure 6).Comprehensive
125、 trade-opening has effectively bolstered economic growth and improved real income,also for low-income and middle-class households.However,certain regions,such as sub-Saharan Africa,have encountered slower progress due to limited trade growth,in contrast to the successful export-led growth experience
126、d in East Asia and Eastern Europe.Chapter D also examines the potential effects of fragmentation on poverty and inequality and finds that fragmentation poses a significant risk to the progress Figure 6:International trade has contributed to reducing extreme poverty by three-quarters since the 1990s1
127、015202530350102030405060198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019Exports of goods and services(%of global trade)Poverty headcount ratio at US$2.15 a day(2017 PPP)(%of population)Exports
128、 of goods and services(%of global trade)Poverty headcount ratio at US$2.15 a day(2017 PPP)(%of population)Source:Secretariat calculations,based on the World Banks World Development Indicators.-13-EXECUTIVE SUMMARYRE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREachieved in these areas.S
129、tudies indicate that fragmentation could potentially benefit a few countries,but that the majority would suffer losses.Simulations demonstrate the considerable negative impact on developing and least-developed economies under a worst-case scenario of full geopolitical rivalry.Rather than GDP converg
130、ence,as witnessed over past decades,developing economies would suffer from increased divergence with the developed world(see Figure 7),facing higher absolute GDP losses,while the GDP gap would widen by 3.5 per cent.This is because vulnerable workers in export-dependent sectors would be particularly
131、affected by labour market disruptions,while low-income households,which allocate a large proportion of their incomes to tradable goods and services,would face the burden of higher prices resulting from trade barriers.Under this scenario,micro,small and medium-sized enterprises(MSMEs)would encounter
132、challenges due to increased trade costs and reduced competitiveness in global markets.Women could also face additional barriers due to higher export costs and limited access to global trade,which would hinder their economic advancement.In addition,the foregone gains from trade associated with fragme
133、ntation can constrain the financial resources available for implementing measures aimed at addressing inequalities.The chapter concludes by showing how a revival of multilateral cooperation could help reduce poverty and inequality(see Figure 8),including through the work of international organizatio
134、ns.The WTO promotes inclusive globalization by facilitating the participation of economies in the global trading system through binding commitments and coordinated trade rules.It also helps members to address non-tariff measures,which currently represent around 14 per cent of total trade costs and h
135、inder participation of more economies in GVCs.Further opening of trade in agriculture and in services,and continuing e-commerce negotiations,could also expand participation in international trade,with significant potential benefits for growth,poverty reduction and inclusiveness.The WTO also helps to
136、 support least-developed countries(LDCs)in building their capacity for international trade through programmes such as the Aid for Trade initiative.Chapter E explores the complex interplay between trade and environmental sustainability,emphasizing the environmental benefits of more coordinated trade
137、and environmental governance.Chapter E explores the role of international trade in achieving a sustainable economy.Its first key finding is that the interplay between trade and environmental sustainability is complex because trade induces growth,a reallocation of production across firms and countrie
138、s,and a change in production technology.Thus,while trade generates emissions as a result of production and transport,it can mitigate negative environmental impacts by increasing the availability of environmental goods and services.Second,a fragmented approach to environmental sustainability is ineff
139、icient because global problems require global solutions,encompassing cohesive environmental policies to strengthen climate action,and maintaining an integrated global economy to facilitate technology diffusion.Third,re-globalization can offer environmental dividends by encouraging inherently greener
140、 trade methods,such as digitally delivered services,and by coordinating trade and environmental governance to unlock substantial environmental benefits.Figure 7:Fragmentation may slow down or prevent economic convergenceEXEC.SUM.-Figure 7-4-20242020202520302035204020452050Difference in cumulative GD
141、P growth rate in percentage points with respect to developed economies(%)Developing economies(full rivalry)Developing countries(partial rivalry)Least-developed economies(full rivalry)Least-developed economies(partial rivalry)Source:Mtivier et al.(2023).Note:The figure displays GDP growth rate differ
142、ence in percentage points between developed economies and developing economies and between developed economies and LDCs under both a“full rivalry”and a“partial rivalry”scenario.-14-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023Chapter E opens with an analysis of the link between international trade and greenhouse gas(GHG)
143、emissions.It shows that trade affects emissions by means of three effects:a scale effect,by causing economic growth;a composition effect,by changing patterns of specialization;and a technique effect,by inducing firms to adopt more efficient production technologies.Empirical evidence indicates that t
144、he negative scale effect is generally offset by a positive technique effect(see Figure 9),while the composition effect has a limited impact.Since 1995,advanced economies have experienced only a modest increase in total carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions,as the technique effect offset most of the additiona
145、l emissions stemming from higher output.Emerging economies have observed a larger increase in total emissions,primarily driven by Figure 8:Greater international trade cooperation supports economic convergenceEXEC.SUM.-Figure 8-4-3-2-11232020202520302035204020452050Difference in cumulative GDP growth
146、 rate in percentage points with respect to developed economies(%)Developing economies(full rivalry)Developing countries(revival of multilateralism)Least-developed economies(full rivalry)Least-developed economies(revival of multilateralism)Source:Source:Mtivier et al.(2023).Note:The figure displays t
147、he GDP growth rate difference in percentage points between developed economies and developing economies and between developed economies and LDCs under both a“full rivalry”and a“revival of multilateralism”scenario.Figure 9:Technology improvements had a strong impact in reducing CO2 emissions between
148、1995 and 2018-600-400-20002004006008001000High-incomeUpper middle-incomeLower middle-incomePercentage change in CO2 emissionsfrom 1995 to 2018(%)Net effect in CO2 emissionsChanges in CO2 due to changes in technologies(technique effect)Changes in CO2 due to changes in sectoral composition(composition
149、 effect)Changes in CO2 due to changes in economic size(scale effect)Source:Authors calculation based on OECD Trade in value-added(TiVA)and CO2 emissions embodied in international trade(TeCO2)databases.Notes:Scale effect represents the change in total output between 1995 and 2018.Scale+composition ef
150、fect is calculated assuming emission rates(tonnes of CO2 directly emitted per dollar of value added)remain the same for each country*sector in 2018 as it was in 1995.The net effect represents total change in emissions.Effects by countries are aggregated by World Bank income group,weighted by country
151、 GDP in 2018.-15-EXECUTIVE SUMMARYRE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREthe scale effect,but also benefitted from improved technology.Research suggests that,although emissions would be slightly lower without international trade,the welfare benefits trade brings far outweigh t
152、he associated environmental costs.Chapter E examines the implications of fragmentation for environmental sustainability,highlighting that fragmented environmental policies would weaken climate action and increase trade tensions.Signs of such tensions are already emerging,a case in point being the ri
153、sing number of trade concerns related to environmental measures raised in WTO committees(see Figure 10).Chapter E also discusses the adverse effects on environmental sustainability of a potential decoupling of the global economy,noting that looser trade relationships would impede the global spread o
154、f green technology.This diffusion of technology is vital for an effective response to climate change,as many economies still lack expertise in this domain.Chapter E concludes by presenting the case for re-globalization in the context of environmental sustainability.Key to this is that open trade can
155、 be a powerful force multiplier for internationally coordinated climate policies.Research shows that coordinated environmental policies could unlock substantial environmental gains from trade by incentivizing economies to specialize according to their environmental comparative advantage.While the ec
156、onomic gains from trade are driven by economies specializing in what they are relatively good at,the environmental gains from trade are driven by countries specializing in what they are relatively green at.Given that the environmental damage caused by carbon emissions is not priced in the market equ
157、ilibrium,the environmental gains from trade need to be unlocked by internationally coordinated environmental policies to ensure that trade can most effectively contribute to the fight against climate change.Chapter F discussed the need for more trade and more cooperation to address effectively the m
158、ost pressing challenges of our time.Overall,the findings of the Report clearly show that todays world needs more trade and more cooperation,not less.The major issues that policymakers are facing the world over from security to inclusiveness to climate change transcend nation states.Pandemics,conflic
159、ts and GHG emissions do not stop at borders.Spillovers from domestic choices and policies are much larger than they used to be.Therefore,solutions cannot be found unilaterally,in isolation of the actions of others.Globalization and cooperation need to be a part of the answer if the world is to solve
160、 its crises.But globalization itself needs to evolve,and to be accompanied by appropriate policies in related areas.Technological developments can provide new opportunities to expand trade to more people,sectors and economies,helping to contribute to addressing global environmental,social and securi
161、ty concerns.To reap these benefits,international cooperation needs to be strengthened on trade as well as on a wide range of other issues.This can be achieved through“re-globalization”,with a re-invigorated and reformed WTO playing a central role in this effort.Figure 10:Some environmental measures
162、have raised concerns in the WTOEXEC.SUM.-Figure 104519203720252216239118101210101411178151211251417229106141515161082320264329442940403125242134535445000000000000000011121236551115010203040506070809019951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192
163、02020212022Number of specifc trade concernsSanitary and phytosanitary measuresTechnical barriers to tradeCommittee on Market AccessSource:Authors elaboration based on the WTO Trade Concerns Database(https:/tradeconcerns.wto.org/en).Note:The database covers trade concerns raised in the Committee on M
164、arket Access(CMA),Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS)Committee and Technical Barriers to Trade(TBT)Committee.Other trade concerns discussed in the WTO,such as in the Council for Trade in Goods,are not reported.Environment-related concerns are identified by a list of environment-related keywords
165、.-16-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023AIntroductionThe ideas that shaped todays globalized world were a response to the disastrous deglobalized world of the first half of the 20th century.Having seen how a closed and divided world economy contributed to economic depression,conflict and
166、ultimately the Second World War,the post-war architects resolved to build an open and integrated world economy instead.Freer trade would deliver shared growth and development.Economic interdependence would give countries a stake in each others success.International rules and institutions would promo
167、te stability,trust and collaboration.The antidote to zero-sum economic nationalism was positive-sum global economic cooperation.“Globalization”and the unprecedented era of global prosperity and progress it has delivered is the realization of that post-war vision.But the very success of globalization
168、 has given rise to new challenges environmental strains,increased inequality,seismic shifts in global power that are fuelling counter-pressures to reverse globalization,unwind interdependence and return to a more divided world of regional blocs.This years World Trade Report asks whether fragmentatio
169、n would make the world more secure,equal or sustainable.It argues that the opposite is true that fragmentation would leave economies less prosperous,less innovative,less resilient,and less willing and well-equipped to cooperate on the social,environmental,and security challenges they face.The Report
170、 concludes that solving todays challenges actually requires more global openness,integration and cooperation,not less which in turn depends on reforming the international trade and economic system.Instead of fragmentation,with all the costs and dangers this would entail,the goal should be re-globali
171、zation.-17-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREAINTRODUCTIONGlobalization under strain Globalization dominates the modern era,but it is a fragile dominance.Global integration has helped to drive extraordinary economic progress unprecedented growth,widening circles of develo
172、pment,dizzying technological advances,the lifting of hundreds of millions of people out of extreme poverty.But it has also generated new challenges environmental spillovers,economic disruption and dislocation,and the diffusion,shift and realignment and rebalancing of global power.Even as economic an
173、d technological forces are pushing the world together,policy differences and geopolitical tensions risk pulling it apart.An integrated global economy fundamentally requires global cooperation,mutual trust and shared purpose to sustain it.And for over 70 years,ever wider and deeper global economic co
174、nvergence was the driving logic of world affairs.But as economies struggle to tackle the new challenges thrown up by globalization,there are growing pressures to slow or reverse integration,to unwind interdependence and to retreat into a more divided and fragmented world.This is not the first time t
175、hat globalization has faced a crisis.Two centuries ago,the world embarked on the first age of globalization.Like today,new technologies such as steamships,railways and telegraphs linked far-flung economies together.Also like today,goods,capital and people spread rapidly around the globe,spurred by b
176、ilateral tariff-cutting agreements,a worldwide shift to the gold standard,more openness to migration,and Britains role,as the dominant economic power,in upholding free trade and financial stability.The result was a world increasingly linked together by trade,investment and communications and the ris
177、e of the first truly open world economy.It was a time of great economic advance the so-called“Age of Progress”but also of rising policy and geopolitical tensions.Emerging economies flooded the industrialized world with cheaper products,especially agricultural goods,which helped to drive down the cos
178、t of living,especially for the poor,but which also threatening livelihoods and created pressure to raise tariffs in order to protect vulnerable sectors.The rise of new economic powers benefiting from the globalization of technologies,production and markets began to alter the geopolitical landscape,m
179、aking the old powers uneasy,prompting an arms race,and leading to new defensive alliances.Yet despite rising geopolitical tensions,many still assumed that this first age of globalization was unstoppable and irreversible.In his 1910 best-selling book,The Great Illusion,Norman Angell argued that deepe
180、ning economic interdependence among the great powers would make war so destructive as to be impossible(Angell,2016).The outbreak of the First World War just four years later proved him right about wars destructive power but wrong about its impossibility.What went wrong?While many factors triggered t
181、he First World War,an overarching cause was the failure of the international system to adopt to rapid technological,industrial and geoeconomic change,leading to the disintegration of trust among the great powers,growing geopolitical rivalry and the break-down of international cooperation.Disastrous
182、deglobalizationThe outbreak of the First World War in 1914 marked the end of the first age of globalization and the start of three decades of deglobalization.Open trade rapidly gave way to Figure 1:The great collapse of world trade,1929-3220,00021,00022,00023,00024,00025,00026,00027,00028,00029,0003
183、0,0001929193019311932US$millionsA-Figure A.1Source:Federico and Tena Junguito(2018a).Note:Based on the time series“Full sample,Constant prices,current borders(millions of 1913 US$),Imports,World”.-18-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023border restrictions,quotas and controls;the gold standard collapsed;and Europ
184、e,the former centre of the world economy,was left devastated and exhausted.After the war,the major economies made episodic,half-hearted efforts to rebuild an open world economy until the arrival of the Great Depression in 1929 swept away whatever willingness they had to work together.Economies turne
185、d inward,trade and currency wars escalated,and the world economy fractured into rival and inward-looking regional blocs.Between 1929 and 1932 the volume of world trade plummeted by almost one third with results that were collectively,and individually,disastrous(see Figure 1).In his seminal work,The
186、World in Depression,Charles Kindleberger argued that the root problem lay in the inability of economies to achieve cooperative action,their growing pessimism that collective solutions were even possible,and their resulting decision to defend their own national industries,jobs and markets,regardless
187、of the adverse impact on others thus triggering a downward spiral of protectionism,beggar-thy-neighbour currency devaluations and zero-sum economic nationalism.As Kindleberger put it:“When every country turned to protect its national private interest,the world public interest went down the drain,and
188、 with it the private interests of all”(Kindleberger,1986).This failure to cooperate across a range of issues and the economic insecurity,conflict,and depression that resulted helped pave the way for the outbreak of the Second World War,the last and most devastating chapter in the worlds deglobalizat
189、ion phase.Rebuilding globalizationAfter the devastation of the Second World War,countries embarked on a second age of globalization.But this time,globalization was to be built on new ideas,values and institutions.Central to this effort was the leadership of the United States,the dominant economic po
190、wer.If American isolationism had been a major cause of the international systems weakness and instability between the wars,the United States now resolved to play the opposite role,having learned the hard way that its national economic interest was bound up with the global economic interest.Not only
191、did the United States have the resources and leverage to underwrite a new global economic system,but,together with its allies,it had developed clear ideas about the kind of system that was needed,based on the“lessons”from the recent past.First,the system would be open,inclusive,and multilateral and
192、discourage the re-emergence of protectionist and inward-looking regional blocs that had done so much to fuel instability and resentment between the world wars.Second,it would be based on rules,not power,to avoid the economic anarchy,insecurity and beggar-thy-neighbour rivalries of the interwar perio
193、d.Third,it would balance the need for global economic integration with the need for domestic employment policies and social safety nets on the assumption,again learned from past mistakes,that open trade and integration would be supported domestically only if its benefits and costs were more evenly s
194、hared.Fourth,it would be backed by new international economic organizations the International Monetary Fund(IMF),the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT)(after plans for an International Trade Organization were aborted)explicitly mandated to support open world trade and to
195、 foster the confidence-building and cooperative outcomes that had been lacking in the 1920s and 1930s.And finally,this new international economic order would be anchored in a new international security order,the United Nations,ensuring that global prosperity and peace went hand in hand.Indeed the mo
196、st striking feature of this post-war system was the core assumption that advancing global growth,development and progress creating a future where the whole world could share in prosperity was the essential precondition of lasting peace.As former US President Roosevelt said near the end of the war,“W
197、e cannot succeed in building a peaceful world unless we build an economically healthy world”.1 Although the word“globalization”did not exist in 1945,it accurately captures the kind of open,interdependent,“one-world”economy the post-war architects were trying to build.This global economic vision has
198、proven extraordinarily successful.Over the last 70 years,the world economy has grown a remarkable 14-fold and world trade has expanded an even more astonishing 45-fold(see Figure 2),underscoring how global integration and global growth have gone hand-in-hand.The rapid rise of the developing world is
199、 a large part of this story,especially after large emerging economies increasingly opened up and embraced global integration in the 1980s:since then,developing economies share of world merchandise trade has grown from under a third to almost half,while their share of world output has risen from 24 p
200、er cent to over 43 per cent.China is the most striking example.It is now the worlds largest exporter;40 years ago,it ranked 32nd.Representing a fifth of humanity,China has grown at an average of 9.1 per cent a year for the past four decades,translating into unprecedented 38-fold expansion of its eco
201、nomy,although progress has recently slowed.India,with an even bigger share of the global population,has grown at an average of 6.1 per cent a year and is currently the fastest growing major economy in the world.While these and other rapidly emerging economies may have captured the most attention in
202、recent years,advanced economies have been expanding and progressing as well.Between 1980 and today,the G7 economies(i.e.,Canada,the European Union,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,the United Kingdom and the United States)collectively have grown two and a half times.Widening and deepening global economic g
203、rowth is not the only condition for development,but it is a necessary condition which explains why the modern globalization era has also been marked by unprecedented advances in-19-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREAINTRODUCTIONhealth,education,gender equality and poverty
204、 reduction.Since 1950,average life expectancy has risen by more than a third,from 45 years to over 73 today and life expectancy has increased across every economy in the world.Today 88 per cent of the worlds population is literate,compared to only 42 per cent in 1960.The share of the global populati
205、on living in extreme poverty has decreased from 80 per cent in 1960 to less than 10 per cent today(World Bank,2021)and in the last three decades alone,1.5 billion people have been lifted out of extreme poverty.This sharp downward trend in world poverty is even more remarkable considering that the gl
206、obal population has increased three-fold over the same period.None of this would have been possible without globalization and the unprecedented expansion of economic growth and technological progress it has helped drive forward.Solutions can create new challengesBut the success of globalization has
207、also given rise to new challenges.A central challenge is the environment.Rapid economic growth,underpinned by deepening global integration,has resulted in more production,more consumption,and rising living standards for a fast-expanding global population.But economic growth and material progress are
208、 also placing unsustainable strains on the global environment,resulting in rising levels of greenhouse gas emissions,rapid biodiversity loss,the over-exploitation of natural resources and the spread of air,land and water pollution.The fact that these environmental challenges are largely the by-produ
209、ct of extraordinary economic progress and development over the past seven decades does not alter the fact that they require immediate solutions,not least to ensure that continued global economic progress,development and poverty reduction are not derailed or worse.Another major challenge is inequalit
210、y.Although globalization has helped to reduce inequality between economies as many fast-growing emerging economies catch up and converge with advanced economies it has also contributed to increasing inequality within economies.The same forces that drive global economic progress specialization,compet
211、ition,innovation,producing more and better with less also create winners and losers,as new industries requiring new skills in new parts of the world flourish,even as older industries employing outdated skills struggle,shrink or disappear(Autor,Dorn and Hansen,2013;2016;Rodrick,2018).The fact that th
212、e global economy overall has benefited enormously from trade and technology-driven change,that this process has produced more winners than losers,and that many economies have successfully used domestic policy to cushion or mitigate the negative distributional impacts of economic change,does not alte
213、r the reality that some individuals,groups and even whole regions risk feeling left behind or“rejected”by globalization.Complicating efforts to address these global challenges is the diffusion and realignment of geopolitical power.Globalization has helped to turbo-charge development and fuel the eme
214、rgence of powerful new economic actors.But the“rise of the rest”,as Fareed Zakaria describes this Figure 2:The rise and fall and rise again of global economic integration,1830-20200%5%10%15%20%25%30%18301837184418511858186518721879188618931900190719141921192819351953196019671974198119881995200220092
215、016World merchandise exports(%of GDP)Source:Federico and Tena Junguito(2018b)and World Bank World Development Indicators.Notes:Data until 1959 based on the time series“Full sample,Current prices,Exports/GDP,World”in Federico and Tena Junguito(2018b);Data since 1960 based on time series“Merchandise e
216、xports(%of GDP)”in the World Banks World Development Indicators;data missing for 1939-49.-20-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023process,is also disrupting the old international order and shifting the global balance of power,unleashing enormous geopolitical and geo-economic shockwaves(Zakaria,2009).Advanced econ
217、omies remain key players,but they are no longer dominant.Fast-emerging economies in Asia,Africa and South America play a role in the system that was unimaginable just 20 years ago while even smaller economies want a greater say in a system in which they have a greater interest.For older powers,accus
218、tomed to playing the leading role,having to share the global stage with new actors can be unfamiliar,even unsettling.Their“inside order”,as John Ikenberry puts it,has suddenly become the“outside order”(Ikenberry,2018).Conversely,for many newer powers previously on side-lines of global high politics
219、having to assume shared leadership of a system in which they now have a major stake can be just as unfamiliar and challenging.This is occurring at the same time that globalization is reducing barriers,shrinking distances and pushing different economies,cultures and political regimes more closely tog
220、ether which can,in turn,increase systemic tensions and make reaching policy consensus more difficult.Subjects that were once domestic such as banking regulations,taxation or health policies now have global spillovers.Transborder issues that were never considered when the system was first designed su
221、ch as climate change,data flows or artificial intelligence now demand coordinated global solutions.This new multipolar world is more inclusive and equitable than the old bipolar or unipolar one;but it is also more complex and harder to coordinate.Meanwhile,a series of shocks over the last decade and
222、 a half the 2008-09 global financial crisis,the COVID-19 pandemic,and now the war in Ukraine has raised concerns about how dependent countries have become on each other for critical supplies,resources,energy and technologies;how distant disruptions can now reverberate and amplify along complex and i
223、ntegrated supply chains;and how interconnectivity and interdependence seem to make countries less self-sufficient,more vulnerable to external shocks,and too exposed to a turbulent world economy.Growing geopolitical conflicts highlighted by the war in Ukraine and rising United States-China tensions a
224、re only amplifying these concerns about over-dependency on foreign suppliers and waning national self-sufficiency.(Irwin,2020;Evenett,2022).These tensions are in turn straining what is arguably the most critical link holding todays globalized world together:trust.If global prosperity rests on interd
225、ependence,then interdependence rests on mutual trust and shared purpose the willingness of countries to lower barriers to each other,to rely on one another for critical supplies and technologies,and to work with rather than against each other to deliver win-win economic outcomes.If global cooperatio
226、n is proving more difficult in recent years,it is in no small part because the foundation of mutual trust is being eroded by mistrust and suspicion between East and West as well as North and South.Back to the future?In the face of these challenges,alternative narratives about globalization have emer
227、ged(Roberts and Lamp,2021).Instead of making economies stronger and more dynamic,some now claim that globalization makes economies weaker and more vulnerable by prioritizing efficiency over resilience “just in time”over“just in case”and by exposing them to excessive risks and unreliable foreign supp
228、liers(Posen,2020).Instead of generating the resources,investments and technologies needed to address key global challenges,such as poverty,inequality and climate change,some blame globalization for eroding countries economic strength,hollowing out their industries,and allowing others to copy or stea
229、l their technologies(Bijimakers,2013;Hinshir,2021;Shih,2022).Rather than being a way of helping to build global peace through growing prosperity and mutual interdependence,some claim that globalization makes the world less secure by empowering strategic rivals and strengthening authoritarian regimes
230、.According to this line of thinking,globalization is no longer part of the solution but part of the problem and the aim should be to slow or reverse global integration,to unwind interdependence,and to return to a more divided,deglobalized world.Ideas that had been discredited after the“mistakes”of t
231、he 1930s are now coming back into vogue(WTO,2020a).There are growing calls to near-shore or friend-shore supply chains or even to divide the world economy into self-sufficient regional trade blocs and economic spheres of influence,with cooperation limited to smaller groups of“friendly”and“like-minde
232、d”countries.There is also growing support for state-directed industrial strategies,subsidies,import-substituting tariffs,and export and investment restrictions all aimed at increasing economic resilience,building national self-sufficiency,bringing manufacturing jobs back home and“de-risking”geo-econ
233、omic relations(Wise and Loeys,2023).But a process of deglobalization will not solve the major challenges facing economies today in fact,it will make them worse and more intractable.Deglobalization would leave the world economy poorer,less efficient,less innovative and more resource-constrained,thus
234、reducing economies ability to advance their social,environmental or security priorities from strengthening social safety nets,to transitioning to clean technologies,to investing in the education,research and development and infrastructure that are now the key building blocks of economic competitiven
235、ess,technological leadership and national security and strength.Because many of the gains from globalization are the result of economies specializing in what they do best,these gains would be reversed if economies focus instead on increasing self-sufficiency and reducing-21-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SE
236、CURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREAINTRODUCTIONdependency on more efficient producers.Unwinding global openness and integration would also limit competition,technological diffusion and the exchange of ideas that are critical drivers of innovation.The WTO estimates that the cost of splitting the w
237、orld trade system into separate trade blocs would be about 5 per cent of real income at the global level,with some developing economies facing double-digit losses.Moreover,these numbers do not capture how fragmentation would limit access to key resources and technologies on which all economies now d
238、epend,leaving them less,not more,resilient and secure.This is especially true in advanced sectors,where not even the largest economies have all the essential components,sophisticated materials and technological know-how needed to be self-sufficient.For example,the Democratic Republic of Congo accoun
239、ts for 73 per cent of the worlds cobalt production;South Africa produces 70 per cent of the worlds platinum;and China produces over 80 per cent of the worlds solar panels and 60 per cent of wind turbines and electric car batteries resources and technologies that all economies will need in order to s
240、hift to clean energy and achieve their greenhouse gases emissions targets(White,2023).The answer to national economic resilience and strength in todays highly complex,deeply interdependent global economy lies in expanding and diversifying trade,not restricting or reshoring it.A bigger danger is that
241、 attempts to reverse globalization and rebuild economic walls could descend into a vicious circle of tit-for-tat retaliation,beggar-thy-neighbour protectionism,escalating economic conflict and the unravelling of a rules-based trading system making it harder for the world to cooperate,not just on eco
242、nomic matters,but on the urgent environmental,social and security issues it confronts.As was the case in the 1930s,declining global trust and rising insecurity could force economies to assert their own national interests,even at the expense of their collective interests,with the result that everyone
243、 is worse off.If globalization rested fundamentally on“positive sum”economic cooperation,deglobalization reflects and reinforces “zero-sum”economic nationalism and rivalry.Paradoxically,the answer to the challenges posed by globalization is more globalization,not less a more open,integrated and dive
244、rsified global economy,deeper cooperation among governments,improved coordination across policies and issues,a stronger,more inclusive,more effective and modern international trade and economic system.Instead of deglobalization,there is a pressing need for re-globalization.Re-globalizationThis years
245、 World Trade Report looks at the current debate surrounding globalization and the world trading system underpinning it.It focuses on three major challenges facing todays global economic order security and resilience,poverty and inclusiveness,and environmental sustainability and asks whether global i
246、ntegration or fragmentation offers a better way forward.It also considers whether the solution to todays challenges is a process of re-globalization that reforms,improves and updates the current international trade and economic system.Chapter B explores how growing scepticism about the benefits of o
247、pen trade,economic interdependence and globalization are shaping the trade policy landscape.It underlines that trade and the multilateral trading system have so far proven resilient despite an increasingly challenging policy environment.For example,world merchandise trade has continued to grow,thoug
248、h not at the pace seen before 2008,while services and especially digital trade are expanding at a much faster pace than goods trade.However,this chapter also observes that global trade cooperation faces growing headwinds and that the long-term trend towards increasing trade liberalization and deepen
249、ing integration appears to have slowed or stalled,especially compared to the major trade opening initiatives of the 1990s.The chapter also examines the evidence of the first signs of fractures in the global trading system,highlighting the increasing risk of trade friction,conflict and protectionism.
250、Chapter C examines the relationship between globalization and economic resilience and security.It argues that an integrated global economy can strengthen national economic resilience and security because it opens up alternative sources of supply,encourages adaptability and reduces dependence on sing
251、le markets.Conversely,reshoring or friend-shoring supply chains could have the opposite effect,making supply chains more fragile by cutting off global options.More broadly,this chapter also argues that the multilateral trading system is itself a source of global security because it promotes dialogue
252、,improves understanding,and encourages economies to rely on rules,rather than power,to resolve conflicts.While this chapter acknowledges that global trade cannot end conflict,it suggests that the world would be even more fractious without it.Indeed,this chapter argues that strengthening resilience a
253、nd security hinges on diversifying global trade relations,rather than limiting them,and on increasing global economic cooperation,rather than reducing it.Chapter D examines the impact of globalization on poverty and inequality.It notes that more open trade and deeper integration,underpinned by the r
254、ules-based multilateral trading system,have helped to reduce poverty and drive an historic convergence of income levels across economies,resulting in a more inclusive global economy.While trade can contribute to widening inequality within economies,as people and firms may benefit more or less from e
255、conomic specialization and change,trade is also critical to driving increasing growth overall,without which governments cannot provide training,adjustment assistance or income redistribution.It follows from this that complementary-22-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023domestic policies have a critical role to p
256、lay in ensuring that the benefits of trade are shared broadly within economies,and that no one is left behind.Conversely,economic fragmentation would weaken the trade engine that is driving higher living standards,reduced poverty and economic convergence globally,and it would further disadvantage po
257、orer citizens in all economies.Chapter E looks at the relationship between globalization and efforts to address environmental sustainability.It argues that expanding trade and integration can help drive the needed shift towards environmentally sustainable economic activities and away from polluting
258、ones by increasing global access to critical green goods,services and technologies.Through the logic of comparative advantage,expanding trade and integration can also lead to a greener distribution of global production and trade,provided that the right environmental policies are put in place.Green g
259、rowth and development opportunities could also be boosted by means of expanded trade in clean energy,raw materials and green goods.Conversely,economic fragmentation would impede the transition towards environmentally sustainable economic activities,undermine the operation of green comparative advant
260、ages,and hold back growth opportunities favourable to environmental sustainability,especially for developing economies.This chapter argues that re-globalization,by increasing cooperation,trade openness and trade diversification,is a key part of the answer to the current environmental crisis.Througho
261、ut this report,repeated reference is made to two key terms:re-globalization and fragmentation.These terms describe two alternative scenarios for the future of globalization.Fragmentation describes the turning away from the cooperative approach embedded in the current multilateral trading system towa
262、rds more local and bloc-based trade and unilateral policies.It is characterized by increased trade restrictions and deviations from commitments to international agreements.Examples include broad trade restrictions on subsets of economies or unilateral policies that do not account for spillovers and
263、externalities on other economies.Re-globalization,in contrast,describes an approach that extends trade integration to more people,more economies and more issues.It is an approach that places international cooperation at its centre and recognizes that global problems require global solutions.However,
264、re-globalization is not simply more globalization.Rather,it calls for a reform of the multilateral trading system to ensure that the principles of secure,inclusive and sustainable trade are respected.Re-globalization encompasses the reduction of trade barriers for those that have remained at the mar
265、gins of the trading system,from least-developed economies to workers in the industrial heartlands of advanced economies.Thereby,re-globalization advances resilience through diversification,inclusiveness through development,and sustainability through knowledge diffusion.This includes strengthening co
266、operation and coherence with other multilateral fora and across issues.And through all these advances,re-globalization unlocks trades potential to drive solutions to key challenges of today.-23-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREAINTRODUCTIONEndnote1.Message to Congress on
267、 the Trade Agreements Act of 26 March 1945,retrieved from https:/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-congress-the-trade-agreements-act.-24-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023BThe reshaping of global tradeThis chapter shows that,despite difficulties in the global trade policy landscape,global trade flows h
268、ave been resilient and continue to evolve in a direction that is more sustainable and inclusive.Narratives surrounding the benefits of globalization have turned more sceptical in the past decade.These narratives have started to reflect in global trade as the first policy-driven fractures appear in t
269、he system.Yet,the digital revolution continues to promote economic integration by facilitating trade in goods and,even more so,in services.There is still significant potential for trade to contribute further to the growth of the world economy,and to bring further benefits to developing economies via
270、 the expansion of global value chains.However,if the untapped potential of new trade flows is to be accessed,policies must remain outward-looking.4.Conclusions 47CONTENTS1.A more fragmented and less predictable trade policy environment 262.Trade policy headwinds and uncertainty start to affect trade
271、 flows 283.In other areas,trade and trade policy continue to make progress 334.Conclusions 42-25-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREBTHE RESHAPING OF GLOBAL TRADEKEY POINTSGeopolitical tensions and a series of crises have led to changing narratives surrounding trade and ec
272、onomic interdependence over the past decade.These trade-sceptic narratives have increasingly been translating into a more challenging global trade policy landscape,which is illustrated,among other things,by an increase in trade concerns and trade remedies notified to the WTO.The change in trade poli
273、cies has begun to affect trade flows.The tariff escalation between the United States and China has led to a slower growth in trade between the worlds two largest economies.Moreover,since the onset of the war in Ukraine,data have been showing first signs of trade reorientation along geopolitical line
274、s.However,negative headlines are obscuring a more optimistic picture.Global trade flows have been resilient throughout past shocks.Trade costs keep falling as digital technologies facilitate international transactions and economies continue to sign integration agreements.At the multi-and plurilatera
275、l levels,initiatives such as the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement,the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies,and the joint initiatives on services domestic regulation,investment facilitation for development,and electronic commerce are addressing key issues facing international trade.-25-26-WORLD TRADE
276、 REPORT 20231.A more fragmented and less predictable trade policy environmentPerceptions of the benefits of international trade and multilateral cooperation have been changing.A series of shocks in the space of 15 years first,the global financial crisis of 2008-09,then the COVID-19 pandemic,and now
277、the war in Ukraine have led to the sense that rather than making countries economically stronger,globalization exposes them to excessive risks.Coupled with increasing geopolitical tensions,these perceptions have fuelled narratives arguing for localization of supply chains and trade policy strategies
278、 based on geopolitical concerns.In the public debate,terms such as“offshoring”and“outsourcing”have been replaced by“re-shoring”,“near-shoring”,“friend-shoring”and“decoupling”.This scepticism with regard to globalization and the multilateral trading system is linked to three major challenges confront
279、ing policymakers today:a change in the geopolitical landscape with implications for security,poverty and inequality,and the accelerating climate crisis.Trade is increasingly seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution to these challenges.This is a perception that influences multilat
280、eral cooperation and global trade.(a)Headwinds for trade policy cooperationThe 1990s and early 2000s were marked by multilateral and regional economic integration and trade cooperation.The expansion of the WTO created a predictable global trade environment.Anchored in the multilateral trading system
281、,regional trade agreements(RTAs)deepened policy integration and further fuelled trade growth,not only between members but also with other trade partners(Lee et al.,2023).By 2015,more than 95 per cent of global goods trade was covered by WTO rules and more than 50 per cent flowed between RTA partners
282、.1However,scepticism with regard to international trade has become visible in global trade-policymaking since the mid-2010s.Examples include failures to advance multilateral and regional trade integration through the Trade in Services Agreement(TISA)and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner
283、ship(TTIP),and the reversal of economic integration between the European Union and the United Kingdom.Instead of making further progress in multilateral and regional cooperation,large economies began to resort to unilateral trade policies.Trade tensions that began in 2018 between the worlds largest
284、trading partners saw a tit-for-tat escalation of import tariffs,culminating in the imposition by the United States of an average import duty of 19.3 per cent on imports from China,and the imposition by China of an average import duty of 21.1 per cent on imports from the United States(Bown,2023).Unil
285、ateral trade-related measures,such as quantitative restrictions(e.g.,import prohibitions or export restrictions)and technical regulations,are generating an increasing number of trade concerns that are being raised by WTO members in different bodies.Based on the activity of WTO committees,there is a
286、clear increase in the number of trade concerns raised by WTO members(see Figure B.1),and the nature of these concerns seems to be changing.The number of trade concerns raised in the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary(SPS)Measures has shown Figure B.1:Trade concerns raised in the Market Access,S
287、PS and TBT Committees,1996-2022(left),and the number of trade concerns raised in the Council for Trade in Goods by meeting,2015-22(right)5589121013 13121823 232528262933 3334374144452015-12015-22015-32016-12016-22016-32017-12017-22017-32018-12018-22018-32019-12019-22019-32020-12020-22021-12021-22021
288、-32022-12022-22022-305010015020025030035040045050019961998200020022004200620082010201220142016201820202022Index 2014=100TBT CommitteeSPS CommitteeMarket Access CommitteeSource:WTO.Note:The figure includes both new and repeatedly raised concerns.-27-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAIN
289、ABLE FUTUREBTHE RESHAPING OF GLOBAL TRADEa sharp increase since 2020 while concerns raised at the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade(TBT)have increased since 2019.Trade concerns raised at the Committee on Market Access display an exponential increase:they more than doubled from 2020 to 2022 an
290、d quadrupled from 2015 to 2022.Some of the concerns are related to measures taken during the recent economic uncertainty exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic,the war in Ukraine and the food security crisis.Since the outbreak of the pandemic,443 COVID-19-related measures have been introduced by WTO m
291、embers and observers,about 44 per cent of them were trade-restrictive(WTO,2022h).As of mid-October 2022,79 per cent of the COVID-19-related trade restrictions were repealed.Their trade coverage remains nevertheless important at US$134.6 billion.WTO members have increasingly implemented new trade res
292、trictions in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food security crisis.Out of the 96 export-restrictive measures on food,feed,and fertilizers introduced since the start of the war in late February 2022,68 were still in place by the end of February 2023,covering roughly US$85 billion of trade(WT
293、O,2023b).Consistent with the pattern observed in technical committees,there has been a ninefold increase in the number of trade concerns raised at the Council for Trade in Goods between 2015 and 2022.Some of these are concerns that were not solved in the specific(technical)committees and were theref
294、ore elevated to this more political body.Among the recent trade concerns,some are related to unilateral environmental measures like Indonesias export restrictions on raw materials,Chinas export restrictions on gallium and germanium,the European Unions Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism(CBAM)and othe
295、r EU Green Deal measures,or the US Inflation Reduction Act(IRA).Other concerns are related to increased political tensions,including unilateral trade measures which had been allegedly used for economic coercion.Finally,government responses to the economic collapse following the global financial cris
296、is of 2008-09 and the rise of new industrial strategies have led to an increasing use of subsidies(WTO,2020a).Subsidies can distort international trade by boosting the competitiveness of domestic producers relative to their competitors from abroad,and these distortions may manifest themselves as an
297、erosion of market access commitments in the domestic economy or as an increase in exports that displaces other producers in foreign markets.The WTO allows and regulates the use of countervailing measures,which are typically border taxes,to protect markets against subsidized imports.In the absence of
298、 comprehensive subsidy statistics,the growing number of Figure B.2:The number of newly imposed countervailing measures,1995-202219436102515155833211919910131215231828352441181995199619981997199920002002200420062009201120132001200320052007201020122014201520162018201920212020202220172008Source:WTO.-28
299、-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023countervailing measures imposed by WTO members in the past decade corroborates the increased use of subsidies with a potentially trade-distortive effect(see Figure B.2).The use of unilateral trade policies threatens to result in a downward spiral of tit-for-tat responses and
300、a more fragmented world,dominated by regional trade blocs(see Chapter A).Such a development is likely difficult to reverse:once in place,trade policy changes alter the political economy balance between import-competing and export-oriented interest groups,making it difficult to turn back.For example,
301、the tariffs imposed in 2018 and 2019 by the United States on imports from China and the retaliatory tariffs imposed on US imports by China are still in place even though several economic studies have shown their detrimental effect on social welfare(e.g.,Amiti et al.,2020;Fajgelbaum et al.,2020;Caval
302、lo et al.,2021).(b)A less predictable trade environment Besides the increased use of restrictive trade policies,the current policy environment is also characterized by high levels of uncertainty.The urgency of achieving a sustainable economy,maintaining peace and security,and reducing poverty and in
303、equality mobilized many governments to employ all available public policy tools to address these global challenges,sometimes with unclear implications for the rules-based trading system and thus generating trade policy uncertainty.This matters because trade policy uncertainty acts as a barrier to tr
304、ade by reducing the incentives to incur the costs of entering new markets and to invest in adopting imported intermediate inputs(Handley and Limo,2022).Figure B.3 shows the evolution of policy uncertainty perception by large companies,gauged from their quarterly earnings conference calls with invest
305、ors and analysts,and focuses on global trade policy uncertainty,comparing it to global public policy uncertainty which comprises all areas of public policy(Hassan et al.,2019).For most of the period from 2003 to 2021,trade policy uncertainty evolved in tandem with public policy uncertainty,but in 20
306、18 the two indicators diverged markedly.Trade policy uncertainty climbed sharply in 2018 and 2019,while overall policy uncertainty peaked only in 2020,the year of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.In 2021,both trade-related and overall policy uncertainty abated,but remained above their 2017 leve
307、ls.2.Trade policy headwinds and uncertainty start to affect trade flowsScepticism about further progress of globalization has been part of public discussions since the shock of the global financial crisis.Discussions about the stagnation,or even decline,of the role played by international trade in t
308、he global economy pointed towards the rise in new industrial strategies,limits to global supply chains expansion as well as rising geopolitical tensions.Headwinds for trade policy cooperation and increased trade policy uncertainty brought about by recent shocks can further reshape global trade.Trade
309、 strategies to re-shore manufacturing production would lead to an Figure B.3:Trade policy uncertainty index,2003-21501001502002003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021Public policyTrade policySource:WTO calculations based on Hassan et al.(2019).Notes:Hassan et al.(
310、2019)derive the uncertainty index from quarterly earnings calls of publicly listed companies headquartered in 43 economies.Using tools from computational linguistics,they quantify the share of each earnings call devoted to discussing risk in general,risks associated with politics,and risks associate
311、d with particular political topics,such as healthcare and trade policy.-29-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREBTHE RESHAPING OF GLOBAL TRADEoverall decline in the importance of trade in the global economy.Other strategies such as bringing production closer to large markets
312、(near-shoring)or strengthening production networks with like-minded countries(friend-shoring)would lead to fragmentation of the global economy along regional and geopolitical lines.(a)Compositional changes in the global economy reduce the importance of global trade in GDP One of the key pieces of ev
313、idence supporting the de-globalization(or“slowbalization”)narrative is the trend in global trade as a share of GDP,and specifically its evolution following the global financial crisis of 2008-09(see Figure B.4).The share of global trade in GDP is a widely used metric for measuring trade openness.It
314、gauges the importance of international trade,measured by the value of imports plus exports,in relation to the overall economy,measured by GDP.Figure B.4 shows that the relative importance of global trade increased from 25 per cent in 1970 to a peak of 61 per cent in 2007.The global financial crisis
315、interrupted this steady increase,resulting in a decline of almost 9 percentage points in 2009.In 2010,there was a significant recovery,yet in the aftermath of the crisis the share was characterized by a decline.Consequently,in 2019,just before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,the share was at a
316、 level lower than that attained in 2003.A closer look at the evolution of the share of trade in GDP for the worlds largest economies(China,the European Union,Japan and the United States)suggests that the global financial crisis was not a watershed moment for global trade(see Figure B.5).Chinas trade
317、 share of GDP peaked and then sharply decreased before 2009.The trade share of GDP and the United States peaked in 2011,while for Japan,the peak occurred in 2014,and the European Union has not peaked yet.2 The fact Figure B.4:Global trade as a share of GDP,1970-202110%20%30%40%50%60%1971197319751977
318、1979198119831985198719891991199319951997199920012003200520072009201120132015201720192021Source:World Bank.Figure B.5:Trade as a share of GDP in selected economies,1970-20210%20%40%60%80%100%19701972197419761978198019821984198619881990199219941996199820002002200420062008201020122014201620182020ChinaE
319、uropean UnionJapanUnited StatesSource:World Bank.-30-WORLD TRADE REPORT 2023that the peak in the global ratio coincides with the global financial crisis is more coincidental than a true feature of the data(Baldwin,2022).The crisis was clearly a turning point in the global economy,but it was not the
320、sole culprit of the declining importance of trade in global GDP.The literature on the subject shows that many different factors contributed to the stagnating share of global trade in GDP.Multiple institutions and several studies have highlighted the various factors that contributed to this phenomeno
321、n(IMF,2016;Cabrillac et al.,2016;Lewis and Monarch,2016;Constantinescu et al.,2020).There is consensus that the slowdown of trade growth is likely to represent a“new normal”rather than a temporary phenomenon(Hoekman,2015).The shift towards services as the main source of income,the limits to the expa
322、nsion of global value chains(GVCs)(see Box B.1),the development of a domestic supplier base in China,a slowdown in trade liberalization,the diminishing impact of cost reductions from technology breakthroughs,the tightening of financial conditions with implications for foreign direct investment and t
323、rade credit,and government support for domestic industries are all cited as contributing factors.These factors fall into three main categories.The first category comprises factors that change the openness of Box B.1:The expansion of global value chains and the measurement of international tradeFrom
324、the 1980s,technological advances began to reduce transportation and communication costs dramatically.These developments enabled the unbundling of production,i.e.,the possibility of outsourcing some stages of production and of splitting different production stages geographically.Combined with ambitio
325、us trade policy liberalization and the integration of the former East and West blocs into a single global economy,technological advances have given rise to a complex structure of cross-border value chains that benefit from the specialization based on comparative advantage of any given economy in the
326、 value chain(World Bank,2020).Consequently,global trade,and trade in intermediate inputs especially,boomed.The expansion of global value chains leads to multiple counting of value-added,as intermediate inputs cross borders several times before reaching the final consumer.Thus,gross trade statistics
327、have become less and less comparable to value-added measures such as GDP.International input-output tables allow the calculation of value-added trade which measures international transactions in a manner consistent with commonly used value-added representations of production and preferences,making i
328、t explicitly comparable to GDP(Johnson and Noguera,2017).The comparison of value-added exports to gross exports offers a measure of global value chains evolution as GVCs expand,intermediate inputs cross borders more frequently and the ratio of value-added trade to gross trade diminishes.Figure B.6 i
329、llustrates the expansion of GVCs in the 1990s and early 2000s,as well as the stagnation of this process in the 2010s.Figure B.6:Ratio of value-added exports to gross exports,1970-20180.600.650.700.750.800.85197019721974197619781980198219841986198819901992199419961998200020022004200620082010201220142
330、0162018Source:WTO calculations based on Woltjer et al.(2021)and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)Inter-Country Input-Output tables 2021 edition.Note:Value-added exports are the sum of domestic value added that is exported and absorbed abroad.Data for 1970-2000 come from
331、 the World Input Output Database(WIOD),data for 1995-2018 come from OECD.Gross exports are total exports of goods and services.Based on data for 25 economies.-31-RE-GLOBALIZATION FOR A SECURE,INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTUREBTHE RESHAPING OF GLOBAL TRADEeach sector and economy,such as reductions in
332、trade costs driven by technology advancements or trade liberalization.It also includes the economys position in GVCs.For instance,economies positioned at the assembly stage of GVCs display very high openness because they import most of the intermediate inputs necessary to produce final products for
333、exports.As the economy grows,it can diversify and develop its own supplier base,capturing a larger part of supply chain activities.This can reduce the reliance on imported intermediate inputs,which then appears as reduced openness.The second category reflects the rise of GVCs.It comprises changes in the organization of production that amplify the impact of changes in openness on the share of trade