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1、Adaptation Gap Report 2023Underfinanced.Underprepared.Inadequate investment and planning on climate adaptation leaves world exposedAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.2023 United Nations Environment Programme ISBN:978-92-807-4092-9 Job number:DEW/2583/NADOI:https:/doi.org/10.59117

2、/20.500.11822/43796This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit services without special permission from the copyright holder,provided acknowledgement of the source is made.The UnitedNations Environment Programme would appreciate receiving a co

3、py of any publication that uses this publication as a source.No use of this publication may be made for resale or any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the United Nations Environment Programme.Applications for such permission,with a statement of the purpose

4、 and extent of the reproduction,should be addressed to unep-communication-directorun.org.DisclaimersThe designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning

5、 the legal status of any country,territory or city or area or its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.Mention of a commercial company or product in this document does not imply endorsement by the United Nations Environment Programme or the authors.The use of inf

6、ormation from this document for publicity or advertising is not permitted.Trademark names and symbols are used in an editorial fashion with no intention on infringement of trademark or copyright laws.The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

7、views of the United Nations Environment Programme.We regret any errors or omissions that may have been unwittingly made.Maps,photos,and illustrations as specifiedSuggested citation:United Nations Environment Programme(2023).Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Inadequate investment

8、 and planning on climate adaptation leaves world exposed.Nairobi.https:/doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/43796Production:NairobiURL:https:/www.unep.org/adaptation-gap-report-2023Co-produced with:Supported by:Adaptation Gap Report 2023Underfinanced.Underprepared.Inadequate investment and planning on cli

9、mate adaptation leaves world exposedIVAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.AcknowledgementsThe United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP)would like to thank the reports Steering Committee members,the lead and contributing authors,the reviewers and the project coordination team for

10、their contribution to the development of this report.The individuals mentioned below contributed to the production of the report.Authors and reviewers contributed in their individual capacities and their affiliations are only mentioned for identification purposes.STEERING COMMITTEEEdith Ofwona Adera

11、(African Development Bank AfDB),Muna Alamoodi(Ministry of Climate Change and Environment,the United Arab Emirates),Angela Andrade(Conservation International),Mirey Atallah(UNEP),Preety Bhandari(World Resources Institute WRI),Barbara Buchner(Climate Policy Initiative),John Christensen(UNEP Copenhagen

12、 Climate Centre UNEP-CCC),Barney Dickson(UNEP),Jian Liu(UNEP),Anil Markandya(Basque Centre for Climate Change),Shaemma Rashed Mebwana(Ministry of Climate Change and Environment,the United Arab Emirates),Abdalah Mokssit(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC),Youssef Nassef(Secretariat of the

13、 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC),Anne Olhoff(CONCITO Denmarks green think tank),Anand Patwardhan(University of Maryland),Jyotsna Puri(International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD),Cynthia Rosenzweig(NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia Universit

14、y)AUTHORS,ORGANIZED BY CHAPTERChapter 1.The political and scientific content Lead authors:Alexandre Magnan(IDDRI),Mara del Pilar Bueno Rubial(National Scientific and Technical Research Council CONICET Universidad Nacional de Rosario),Lars Christiansen(United Nations Environment Programme Copenhagen

15、Climate Centre UNEP-CCC),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP-CCC)Chapter 2.Global progress on adaptation planning Lead authors:Anne Hammill(International Institute for Sustainable Development IISD),Keron Niles(University of the West Indies),Thomas Dale(United Nations Environment Programme Copenhagen Climate Centre

16、UNEP-CCC)Contributing authors:Leona Harting(independent),Jheuel Carter-Guy(University of the West Indies),Ceri Cazabon(independent),Allyson Weekes(University of the West Indies),Myrico Morris(University of the West Indies),Peggy Arit Okey(University of the West Indies),Kwame Bradshaw(University of t

17、he West Indies),Mathias Hee Pedersen(independent)Chapter 3.Global progress on adaptation implementationLead authors:Timo Leiter(Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,The London School of Economics and Political Science LSE),Idowu Ajibade(Department of Environmental Scienc

18、es,Emory University),Lucy Njuguna(International Livestock Research Institute ILRI and The Alliance of Bioversity International and CIAT)Contributing authors:Eleanor Garrett(Portland State University),Henry Neufeldt(United Nations Environment Programme Copenhagen Climate Centre UNEP-CCC)Chapter 4.Ada

19、ptation finance gapLead authors:Paul Watkiss(Paul Watkiss Associates),Dipesh Chapagain(United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security UNU-EHS),Georgia Savvidou(Stockholm Environment Institute and Chalmers University of Technology),Pieter Pauw(Eindhoven University of Technolog

20、y),Blanche Butera(Paul Watkiss Associates)Contributing authors:Kelly de Bruin(Economic and Social Research Institute),Nella Canales(Stockholm Environment Institute),Shouro Dasgupta(Foundation Euro-Mediterranean Centre on Climate Change),Kristie Ebi(University of Washington),Nabil Haque(Stockholm Env

21、ironment Institute),Jochen Hinkel(Global Climate Forum),Alistair Hunt(Paul Watkiss Associates and University of Bath),Daniel Lincke(Global Climate Forum),Kennedy Mbeva(University of Oxford),Sneha Rai(independent),Julie Rozenberg(World Bank),Pieter Sayer(Paul Watkiss Associates),Ammara Shariq(World B

22、ank),Timothy Sulser(Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research CGIAR),Timothy Tiggeloven(Vrije Universiteit VU Amsterdam),Jenny Trltzsch(Ecologic Institute),Katharine Vincent(Kulima Integrated Development Solutions),Philip Ward(VU Amsterdam),Anita Wreford(Lincoln University),Luis Zama

23、rioli(independent)Chapter 5.Loss and damageLead authors:Emily Boyd(Lund University),Adelle Thomas(University of the Bahamas and Climate Analytics),Kees van der Geest(United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security UNU-EHS),Lisa Vanhala(University College London),Sivapuram Vent

24、aka Rama Krishna Prabhakar(Institute for Global Environmental Strategies IGES),Jon Barnett(University of Melbourne),Raju Pandit Chhetri(Prakriti Resources Centre Nepal)Contributing authors:Fatemeh Bakhtiari(United Nations Environment Programme Copenhagen Climate Centre UNEP-CCC),Nagisa Shiiba(IGES),

25、Daniel Puig(University of Bergen)Case studies:Bhim Adhikari(The International Development Research Center),Carolina Adler(Mountain Research Initiative),Kathryn Bowen(University of Melbourne),Jorge Clix Tejeda(Metropolitan School of Business and Management Honduras),Alvin Chandra(UNEP),Rosalind Cornf

26、orth(The Walker Institute,University of Reading),Luis Daniel Llambi(Consorcio para el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Ecorregion Andina),David Daou(United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security UNU-EHS),Karma Dupchu(National Centre of Hydrology and Meteorology,Royal Government o

27、f Bhutan),Kristie Ebi(University of Washington),Ansgar Fellendorf(UNEP),Janine Felson(University of Melbourne),Christine Gruening(The Frankfurt School of Finance and Management),Jeremy Hess(University of Washington),Laura Kempa(The Frankfurt School of Finance and Management),Babar Khan(International

28、 Centre for Integrated Mountain Development ICIMOD),Sabine McCallum VAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.(UNEP),Elise Moo(University of Melbourne),Ulf Moslener(The Frankfurt School of Finance and Management),Sher Muhammad(ICIMOD),Ghulam Muhammad Shah(ICIMOD),Thaven Naidoo(The Priv

29、ate Finance Advisory Network),Marcus Nield(UNEP),Celia Petty(The Walker Institute,University of Reading),Harri Pietarila(Finnish Meteorological Institute),Markus Repnik(Systematic Observations Financing Facility),Alvaro Rojas(UNU-EHS),Lorenzo Rovelli(UN Women),Elena Saggioro(The Walker Institute,Uni

30、versity of Reading),Elizabeth Sellwood(UNEP),Finu Shrestha(ICIMOD),Chandni Singh(Indian Institute for Human Settlements),Anna Sinisalo(GRID-Arendal),Maxime Souvignet(UNU-EHS),David Sprecher(The International Development Research Center),Joy St John(Caribbean Public Health Agency),Peter Storey(The Pr

31、ivate Finance Advisory Network),Constanza Tabbush(UN Women),James Thornton(MRI),Jessica Troni(UNEP),Filimone Tuivanualevu(Government of Fiji),Anne Verhoef(The Walker Institute,University of Reading),Rosie Witton(Stockholm Environment Institute),Jochem Zoetelief(UNEP),Johanna Zwahlen(Zo Environment N

32、etwork)REVIEWERS Maria Abogado(UNEP),Marlene Achoki(CARE International),Portia Adade Williams(Council for Scientific and Industrial Research),Edith Ofwona Adera(African Development Bank AfDB),Mozaharul Alam(UNEP),Muna Alamoodi(Ministry of Climate Change and Environment,the United Arab Emirates),Ange

33、la Andrade(Conservation International),Ariadna Anisimov(University of Antwerp),Mirey Atallah(UNEP),Ana Cristina Becerra Salas(UNEP),Preety Bhandari(World Resources Institute WRI),Raymond Brandes(UNEP),Barbara Buchner(Climate Policy Initiative),Nella Canales(Stockholm Environment Institute),Min Peng

34、Chen(Renmin University of China),Tinovonga Chimuka(C4 Ecosolutions),Sunungurai Dominica Chingarande(Womens University in Africa),John Christensen(UNEP-CCC),Amir Delju(World Meteorological Organization),Manishka De Mel(NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University),Paul Desanker(Un

35、ited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC),Barney Dickson(UNEP),Camila Donatti(Conservation International),Ophlie Drouault(UNEP),Danil Dring(C4 Ecosolutions),Kristie Ebi(University of Washington),Seth Eshun(UNEP-Finance Initiative UNEP-FI),Marisol Estrella(UNEP),Chiara Falduto(Organ

36、isation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD),Liam Fee(United Nations Development Programme UNDP),Francesca Gallisai(UNEP),Elisabeth Gilmore(Carleton University),Chris Gordon(University of Ghana),Niklas Hagelberg(UNEP),Alistair Hunt(Paul Watkiss Associates and University of Bath),Thaddeus

37、Idi Kiplimo(UNEP),Lili Ilieva(UNEP),Maarten Kappelle(UNEP),Atifa Kassam Manji(UNEP),Sumalee Khosla(UNEP),Anna Kilponen(UNEP),Obed Koringo(CARE International),Jian Liu(UNEP),Natalia Lpez(UNEP),Paz Lpez-Rey(UNEP),Cinzia Losenno(European Investment Bank EIB),Xianfu Lu(Asian Infrastructure Investment Ba

38、nk),Brian MacDonald(International Development Research Centre),Ruci Mafi Botei(UNEP),Anil Markandya(Basque Centre for Climate Change),Jade Maron(UNEP),Emily McConville(E4 Ecosolutions),Shaemma Rashed Mebwana(Ministry of Climate Change and Environment,the United Arab Emirates),Bavelyne Mibei(UNEP),Ka

39、vya Michael(Chalmers University of Technology),Anthony Mills(C4 Ecosolutions),Michael Mullan(OECD),Youssef Nassef(UNFCCC),Pelagia Neocleous(UNEP-FI),John Nordbo(Care International),Anne Olhoff(CONCITO),Anand Patwardhan(University of Maryland),Rajashree Padmanabhi(Climate Policy Initiative),Lou Perpe

40、s(UNEP),Balakrishna Pisupati(UNEP),Angela Prias(UNEP),Patrick Pringle(Tonkin and Taylor),Jyotsna Puri(IFAD),Rula Qalyoubi(UNEP),Nitya Rao(University of East Anglia),Morgan Richmond(Climate Policy Initiative),Erin Roberts(Loss and Damage Collaboration),Alvaro Rojas(UNU-EHS),Cynthia Rosenzweig(NASA Go

41、ddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University),Mahendra Sapkota(Tribhuvan University),Michiel Schaeffer(Climate Analytics),Sonya Schoeman(C4 Ecosolutions),Emmanuel Seck Sobel(ENDA Energie),Alessandra Sgobbi(European Commission),Roopam Shukla(Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee),Ghulam

42、 Muhammad Shah(ICIMOD),Arghya Sinha Roy(Asian Development Bank ADB),Paul Smith(UNEP-FI),Maxime Souvignet(UNU-EHS),Daniel Stadtmller(Global Shield Secretariat and Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit),Benjamin Sultan(Institut de Recherche pour le Dveloppement),Shweta Sunkur(C4 Ecoso

43、lutions),Lilia Tchemchirova(UNEP-FI),Julie Teng(UNDP),Chiara Trabacchi(British International Investment),Jessica Troni(UNEP),Elina Vnnen(EIB),Romain Weikmans(Universit Libre de Bruxelles),Olatunji Yusuf(Islamic Development Bank),Jinhua Zhang(UNEP)EDITORSHenry Neufeldt(Chief Scientific Editor,UNEP-CC

44、C),Lars Christiansen(UNEP-CCC),Thomas Dale(UNEP-CCC),Lasse Hemmingsen(UNEP-CCC)SECRETARIAT AND PROJECT COORDINATIONLars Christiansen(UNEP-CCC),Thomas Dale(UNEP-CCC),Maarten Kappelle(UNEP),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP-CCC),Kaisa Uusimaa(UNEP)COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIAUNEP Communication Division and UNEP-CCC com

45、munication teamLANGUAGE EDITING AND TRANSLATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARYStrategic Agenda DESIGN AND LAYOUTPhoenix Design Aid(figures),Strategic Agenda(layout),Beverley McDonald(cover)THANKS ALSO TO:UNEP:Angeline Djampou,Dany Ghafari,Selma Hedges,Andrea Hinwood,Jason Jabbour,Paz Lpez-Rey,Anita Mujumd

46、ar,Jane Muriithi,Lou Perpes,Pinya Sarasas,Ying Wang,Edoardo Zandri.The 2023 edition of the Adaptation Gap Report is supported by the Environment Fund UNEPs core financial fund.UNEP would like to thank the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their support to the production of this report.In additi

47、on,the finance chapter and assessment have been supported by the ECONOGENESIS project,funded by aid from the Government of the United Kingdom and by the International Development Research Centre,Ottawa,Canada as part of the Climate Adaptation and Resilience(CLARE)research programme,as well as the AC

48、CREU Project,funded by the HORIZON Europe Research and Innovation Action(RIA)and UK Research and Innovation under the United Kingdom Governments Horizon Europe Guarantee.VIAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Glossary The entries in this glossary are primarily taken or modified fro

49、m definitions provided by reports published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)or previous editions of the Adaptation Gap Report.Adaptation:The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.In human systems,adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploi

50、t beneficial opportunities.In some natural systems,human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects(IPCC 20221).Adaptation costs:Costs of planning,preparing for,facilitating and implementing adaptation measures,including transaction costs(IPCC 20072).Adaptation gap:Th

51、e difference between actually implemented adaptation and a societally set goal,determined largely by preferences related to tolerated climate change impacts and reflecting resource limitations and competing priorities(UNEP 20142).Adaptation limits:The point at which an actors objectives(or system ne

52、eds)cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions(IPCC 20221).Hard adaptation limit:No adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks.Soft adaptation limit:Options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks through adaptive action.Adaptive capacity:The abili

53、ty of systems,institutions,humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage,to take advantage of opportunities,or to respond to consequences(IPCC 20221).Baseline:The state against which change is measured.It might be a current baseline,in which case it represents observable,present-day condi

54、tions.It might also be a future baseline,which is a projected future set of conditions excluding the driving factor of interest.Alternative interpretations of the reference conditions can give rise to multiple baselines(IPCC 20072).Exposure:The presence of people,livelihoods,species or ecosystems,en

55、vironmental functions,services,and resources,infrastructure,or economic,social,or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected(IPCC 20221).Hazard:The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend that may cause loss of life,injury,or other heal

56、th impacts,as well as damage and loss to property,infrastructure,livelihoods,service provision,ecosystems and environmental resources(IPCC 20221).Impacts:The consequences of realized risks on natural and human systems,where risks result from the interactions of climate-related hazards(including extr

57、eme weather and climate events),exposure and vulnerability.Impacts generally refer to effects on lives;livelihoods;health and well-being;ecosystems and species;economic,social and cultural assets;services(including ecosystem services);and infrastructure.Impacts may be referred to as consequences or

58、outcomes and can be adverse or beneficial(IPCC 20221).Loss and damage:There is no agreed definition for loss and damage.IPCC(20221)distinguishes between Loss and Damage(title case),which is used to refer to political debate under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC),and

59、losses and damages(sentence case),which is used to refer broadly to harm from(observed)impacts and(projected)risks and can be economic or non-economic.In practice,loss and damage is most commonly understood as the adverse effects of climate change that are not or cannot be avoided by mitigation and

60、adaptation efforts(van der Geest and Warner 20204).Maladaptation:Actions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes,including via increased vulnerability to climate change,diminished welfare,or increased greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions,now or in the future.Maladaptation is usua

61、lly an unintended consequence(IPCC 20221).Mitigation(of climate change):A human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases(IPCC 20221).Resilience:The capacity of social,economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance,respondi

62、ng or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function,identity and structure.Resilience is a positive attribute when it maintains capacity for adaptation,learning and/or transformation(IPCC 20221).Residual risk:The risk related to climate change impacts that remains following adaptation

63、and mitigation efforts.Adaptation actions can redistribute risk and impacts,with increased risk and impacts in some areas or populations,and decreased risk and impacts in others(IPCC 20221).VIIAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Risk:The potential for consequences where something

64、of value is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain,recognizing the diversity of values.In the context of climate change impacts,risks result from dynamic interactions between climate-related hazards with the exposure and vulnerability of the affected human or ecological system to the hazards(IP

65、CC 20145;IPCC 20221).Vulnerability:The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and the lack of capacity to cope and adapt(IPCC 20221).1 https:/www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloa

66、ds/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Annex-II.pdf.2 https:/www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-app-1.pdf.3 https:/www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2014.4 https:/doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1704678.5 https:/www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-AnnexII_FINAL.pdf.VIIIAdaptation

67、Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Along with other women in Mangatsiotra village in Madagascars coastal Vatovavy Fitovinany region,Vivienne Rakotoarisoa uses a reed known locally as Rambo to weave together a mat to sell at a nearby market.Having previously relied heavily on rice farming-wh

68、ere harvests have been hampered by unpredictable rainfall in recent years-this climate-resilient crop is able to withstand periods of erratic rainfall,providing Vivienne and her family a more stable source of income in the face of a changing climate.More information at:https:/www.unep.org/news-and-s

69、tories/story/bend-never-break-weaving-climate-proof-future Photo:UNEP/Lisa Murray IXAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.ContentsAcknowledgements IVGlossary VIForeword XIExecutive summary XIIChapter 1 The political and scientific context 11.1 Introduction 21.2 Science exposes new c

70、hallenges foradaptation 21.3 Ongoing developments in the global policy context 41.4 Framing of the AGR 2023 5Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planning 72.1 Introduction 82.2 Global status of national adaptation planning 92.3 Potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning 102.4 Ad

71、aptation planning in LDCs andSIDS 14Chapter 3 Global progress on adaptation implementation 193.1 Introduction 203.2 Implemented adaptation actions funded by the Adaptation Fund,the Green Climate Fund and the Global Environment Facility 213.3 Actions reported in adaptation communications under the Pa

72、ris Agreement 23Chapter 4 Adaptation finance gap 294.1 Introduction and context 314.2 The costs of adaptation in developing countries 314.3 International adaptation finance flows 404.4 The adaptation finance gap 484.5 Gender equality and social inclusion 524.6 Bridging the gap 54Chapter 5 Loss and d

73、amage 615.1 Introduction 625.2 Adaptation limits and loss and damage 655.3 Conceptualizing loss and damage 675.4 Addressing loss and damage 695.5 Finance to address loss and damage 72References 76XAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.To help 43 communities in White Nile State,Sudan

74、 to adapt to climate change,a UNEP-led project has harnessed nature-based solutions to rehabilitate 3,792 hectares of forests and rangelands and has helped 8,389 households have access to climate change-resilient food and water sources.More information at:https:/www.unep.org/explore-topics/climate-a

75、ction/what-we-do/climate-adaptation/ecosystem-based-adaptation/ecosystem-17 Photo:UNEP/Lisa Murray XIAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.In 2023,climate change yet again grew more disruptive and deadly.Temperature records toppled,globally and regionally.Storms,floods,heatwaves and

76、 wildfires caused devastation.These intensifying impacts tell us two things:the world must urgently cut greenhouse gas emissions and it must increase adaptation efforts to protect vulnerable populations.Neither is happening.The Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Inadequate invest

77、ment and planning on climate adaptation leaves world exposed finds that progress on adaptation is slowing across all three areas annually assessed finance,planning and implementation when it should be rapidly accelerating.This has massive implications for people left to face the full force of climat

78、e impacts without any shield and,as a result,for losses and damages which are worldwide,but most forcefully felt in the developing countries least able to deal with them.Based on a detailed update,the adaptation finance gap now stands at US$194366 billion per year,with adaptation finance needs in de

79、veloping countries likely to be 1018 times as great as finance flows over 50 per cent higher than the previous range estimate.At the same time,new adaptation projects are being added more slowly and the number of new national adaptation planning instruments is plateauing.The new finance gap results

80、from growing needs coupled with adaptation finance flows to developing countries declining 15 per cent in 2021 to around US$21 billion.Considering that the finance needed to implement domestic adaptation plans in developing countries is currently estimated at US$387 billion per year until 2030 most

81、of which will require international support to deliver this is a hugely worrying deceleration.Neither the goal of doubling 2019 international finance flows to developing countries by 2025 nor a possible new collective quantified goal for 2030 will significantly close the finance gap on their own.The

82、refore,finding new ways to deliver finance for adaptation action is essential.This report identifies seven ways to increase finance,including through domestic expenditure,international finance and the private sector.Additional avenues include remittances,increasing and tailoring finance to small and

83、 medium enterprises and a reform of the global financial architecture,as proposed by the Bridgetown Initiative an action plan set forth by Barbadian Prime Minister MiaMottley.The loss and damage fund will also need to move towards innovative financing mechanisms to reach the necessary scale.Even if

84、the international community were to stop emitting all greenhouse gases today,it would take decades for the climate to stabilize.Climate disruption is here to stay for the long haul.I urge policymakers to take heed of this report and make COP 28 the moment that the world committed fully to insulating

85、 low-income countries and disadvantaged groups from damaging climate impacts.Inger AndersenExecutive DirectorUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeForewordAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.XIIExecutive summaryDespite the clear signs of accelerating climate risks and impacts worldw

86、ide,the adaptation finance gap is widening and now stands at between US$194 billion and US$366 billion per year.Adaptation finance needs are 1018 times as great as current international public adaptation finance flows at least 50 per cent higher than previously estimated.This is the main conclusion

87、of a comprehensive assessment of the literature and new analyses to provide updated estimates of the costs and needs of adaptation in developing countries,as well as the international finance flows required to address these needs.The report also provides updates on adaptation planning and implementa

88、tion and concludes that global progress on adaptation is slowing rather than showing the urgently needed acceleration.In view of ever-increasing weather extremes such as a multi-year drought in East Africa,flooding in China and Europe,and extreme heat and wildfires in the United States of America an

89、d Canada,among others,narrowing the adaptation finance gap is of particular importance because of the high benefits that investments in adaptation can offer in terms of reducing climate risks and improving equity and climate justice.Left unchecked however,increasing climate risks will inevitably lea

90、d to more climate-related losses and damages.Therefore,the Adaptation Gap Report 2023(AGR 2023)also focuses on loss and damage to support Parties in the negotiations following the decision at the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cl

91、imate Change(COP 27)in Sharm El-Sheikh to establish a loss and damage fund and funding arrangements for vulnerable developing countries.Global temperatures and climate impacts and risks continue to rise,highlighting the urgent need for rapid acceleration of global adaptation action.Current climate a

92、ction is woefully inadequate to meet the temperature and adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement.While global average temperatures are already exceeding 1.1C above pre-industrial levels,current plans reflected in the nationally determined contributions(NDCs)are putting us on a path towards 2.4C2.6C

93、by the end of the century.1 In the absence of an agreed definition,potential adequacy and effectiveness of national adaptation planning processes are assessed through using comprehensiveness,inclusiveness,implementability,integration,and monitoring and evaluation as proxy metrics.Even if the rise in

94、 temperature eventually slows as a result of more ambitious collective climate change mitigation efforts,climate risks will accelerate with every fraction of a degree because of the compounding and cascading nature of climate-related impacts.In addition,the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(

95、IPCC)concludes that residual climate risks that is risks remaining after ambitious adaptation efforts will persist even if the Paris Agreement goals are reached.Residual climate risks,in turn,will inevitably lead to both economic and non-economic losses and damages(figure ES.1).This demonstrates the

96、 importance of accelerating and scaling up both mitigation and adaptation action,to respectively avert catastrophic climate change and minimize the climate impacts that remain.In addition,more focus must be placed on anticipatory,just and effective adaptation action and support.One out of six countr

97、ies still does not have a national adaptation planning instrument and more must be done to close the remaining gap.Five out of six Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)have established at least one national adaptation plan,strategy or policy,and just under half

98、 of them have two or more national-level instruments,which serve to replace or update the initial ones(figure ES.2).Moreover,25 per cent of countries have put in place legal instruments that require national governments to plan for adaptation.There has also been significant improvement in certain as

99、pects of the potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning1 since 2021.Both findings suggest a growing determination to address climate risks,but more needs to be done to ensure implementation of planning instruments.Meanwhile,15 per cent of Parties still do not have a national adaptat

100、ion planning instrument,and the rate of increase dropped from 4 per cent to 1 per cent in 2022.While half of the 29countries without any such instrument are in the process of developing one,most of them are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts,and more must be done to support them to close the

101、 remaining gap faster.Executive SummaryXIIIFigure ES.1 The conceptual landscape of the Adaptation Gap Report series:connecting temperature change and levels of climate risk and adaptation with the international climate negotiationsSource:Panel A inspired by IPCC(2022,2023).https:/www.ipcc.ch/report/

102、ar6/syr/figures/figure-spm-4 and https:/www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/figures/summary-for-policymakers/.Panels B and C:Authors own elaboration.Note:SSP stands for shared socioeconomic pathway.Figure ES.2 Number of national adaptation planning instruments published globally each year,as at 5 August 2023

103、Number of countries2023(up to5 Aug)1st adaptation planning instrument2nd adaptation planning instrument3rd adaptation planning instrument4th(+)adaptation planning instrument51015202530200020022004200620082010201220142016201820202022C5.04.03.02.01.001.51950200020502100Projections for different scenar

104、iosSSP5-8.5SSP1-1.9SSP2-4.5SSP1-2.6SSP3-7.0A.Global surface temperature change relative to the period 18501900UndetectableModerateHighVery highIPCC risk scalePresent-dayrisk levelsResidualrisksremainingafterRisksavoidedthroughadaptationRisk level without adaptationLow HighEmission scenarioB.Risk lev

105、els at the end of the century under contrasting emission scenarios and a hypothetical adaptation scenarioNegotiations on adaptation financewill influence the extent to which developing countries are able to adapt.These negotiations are framed by the global goal on adaptation and the global stocktake

106、(section 1.3).C.Connection with the international climate negotiationsNegotiations on loss and damage will help developing countries address unavoided residual risks.adaptation(white arrow)(black arrow)Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.XIVProgress in adaptation implementation in

107、 developing countries is plateauing.The number of adaptation actions supported through the four international climate funds2 was lower in 2022 than in the previous year but their value has been rising due to investments in very large projects(figure ES.3).This probably does not reflect a trend,but r

108、ather points to fluctuations driven by non-climate-related events such as COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine.While there is significant variability in both value and number of new projects,the financial value continues to grow whereas the number of new projects appears to have stagnated for the past de

109、cade.2 Adaptation Fund,Green Climate Fund,and the Global Environment Facilitys Least Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund.This means that the gap between implementing adaptation actions and the accelerating climate risks is widening.Considering that the AGRs first detailed analys

110、is of adaptation communications shows that a majority of actions implemented by developing countries depend on external financial support,failure to reinvigorate investments in adaptation action will inevitably lead to more unabated climate impacts and subsequent loss and damage.This will make debt-

111、ridden developing countries even more vulnerable to climate-related extreme events and slow onset changes and is particularly true for least developed countries(LDCs)and small island developing States(SIDS).Figure ES.3 Number of new adaptation projects funded through the UNFCCC climate fundsEstimate

112、d adaptation costs and needs for developing countries are significantly higher than previous estimates,with a plausible central range of US$215 billion to US$387 billion per year thisdecade.This years AGR has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the literature and has commissioned new studies to

113、 provide updated estimates,using two major evidence lines.First,based on modelling analysis,the AGR 2023 estimates the costs of adaptation for developing countries(i.e.non-Annex I countries)in this decade at approximately US$215 billion per year(range:US$130 billion to US$415 billion).These adaptati

114、on costs are projected to rise significantly by 2050 because of growing climate risks.Second,the AGR 2023 has also assessed the adaptation finance needed to implement domestic adaptation priorities,based on extrapolation of costed NDCs and national adaptation plans(NAPs)to all developing countries.T

115、hese are estimated to be US$387 billion per year(range:US$101 billion to US$975 billion)in this decade.The estimated new range of US$215 billion to US$387 billion per year is significantly higher than earlier AGR estimates and is equivalent to between 0.6 per cent and 1.0 per cent of all developing

116、countries gross domestic product(GDP)combined.US$0.510 millionUS$1025 millionUS$50 millionTotal value of projects(per year)Total value of projects(5-year moving average)US$2550 million010020030040050060001020304050602007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022US$millionNumber of

117、projectsExecutive SummaryXVDespite the urgent need to accelerate and scale up international public adaptation finance to developing countries,these flows have declined since 2020.International public climate finance flows to developing countries decreased by 15 per cent to US$21.3 billion in 2021 af

118、ter having increased to US$25.2 billion between 2018 and 2020.In contrast,mitigation finance continuously increased over the same period,setting an important precedent.Meanwhile,international public adaptation finance over the past five years has also suffered from a low disbursement ratio,at 66 per

119、 cent,as compared to the overall development finance disbursement ratio of 98 per cent.This indicates that there are barriers specific to adaptation,such as low grant-to-loan ratios,and lack of knowledge about adaptation policies.To ensure adaptation finance flows from developed to developing countr

120、ies double to reach about US$40 billion by 2025 as pledged at COP 26 in Glasgow,finance providers must on average increase annual adaptation flows by at least 16 per cent between 2022 and 2025.The adaptation finance gap is likely 1018 times as great as current international adaptation finance flows

121、at least 50 per cent higher than previous range estimates.The adaptation finance gap that is the difference between estimated adaptation financing needs and costs(US$215 billion to US$387 billion)and finance flows(US$21.3 billion)has grown.The AGR 2023 estimates that the plausible central adaptation

122、 finance gap for developing countries is currently in the range of US$194 billion to US$366 billion per year.While the doubling of adaptation finance by 2025 and the new collective quantified goal for 2030 that is under deliberation will be instrumental in helping to close this finance gap,the incre

123、ase in international public finance alone is unlikely to close it.For example,achieving the goal of doubling adaptation finance(by 2025)would only reduce the gap by between 5 per cent and 10 per cent.Figure ES.4 Comparison of adaptation financing needs,modelled costs and international public adaptat

124、ion finance flows in developing countriesNote:Values for needs and flows are for this decade,while international public finance flows are for 2021.Domestic and private finance flows are excluded.Nonetheless,greater international public adaptation finance could still effectively reduce climate risks

125、and deliver high benefits.For instance,studies indicate that US$16 billion invested in agriculture per year would prevent about 78 million people from starving or chronic hunger because of climate change impacts.Similarly,every US$1 billion Doubling of adaptation finance(from 2019 levels)05010015020

126、0250300350400US$billion/year for developing countriesFinance needsModelled costsInternationalpublic finance(US$21 billionin 2021)Adaptationfinancing needs(US$387 billion/year up to 2030)Modelled costsof adaptation(US$215 billion/yearthis decade)The adaptationfinance gapThe gap is estimated at US$194

127、 to US$366 billion/year(based on 2021 adaptation finance flows)Adaptation costs/finance needs are 1018 times as much as current flowsFinance flowsAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.XVIinvested in adaptation against coastal flooding leads to a US$14 billion reduction in economic d

128、amages.Therefore,more must be done to bridge the adaptation finance gap.However,due to budgetary constraints,countries are often inactive,adapt reactively and/or rely on international support,causing overall costs to rise,limiting effectiveness and leading to maladaptation.Gender equality and social

129、 inclusion are inadequately included in adaptation finance needs and flows.There is global recognition that climate change can exacerbate inequality in multiple dimensions of social identity,including gender,indigeneity,age,ethnicity,migrant status or disability.At the same time,adaptation activitie

130、s considering gender and other social identities are linked with higher effectiveness in achieving their objectives.The AGR 2023 has analysed the integration of gender equality and social inclusion3 in costed NDCs and NAPs.It finds that only 20 per cent of these plans have a dedicated budget for suc

131、h activities,and that the amount allocated is generally low,averaging 2 per cent.Of the international public finance for adaptation that is also tagged with gender equality as a principal objective,only 2 per cent is assessed as gender-responsive,with a further 24 per cent considered gender-specific

132、 or integrative.Other aspects of social inclusion also receive little attention among both finance flows and needs.These findings highlight the need for greater transparency and consistency in the reporting of gender equality markers,and that climate finance providers must increase adaptation fundin

133、g that is responsive to gender and social inclusion in order to support more equitable and effective adaptation.Bridging the adaptation finance gap requires more international,domestic and private finance,ideally a reform of the global financial architecture and better international cooperation.Dome

134、stic expenditure and private finance are potentially important sources of adaptation finance,but quantitative estimates are not yet available because their flows remain difficult to track.Nonetheless,domestic budgets are likely to be a large source of funding for adaptation in many developing 3 Gend

135、er equality and social inclusion(GESI)was analysed based on an approach that included four categories of progressively greater gender and social inclusion:blind;specific;integrative;and responsive.4 This includes the Bretton-Woods Institutions(World Bank and International Monetary Fund)and the World

136、 Trade Organization,together with other international financing institutions,such as multilateral development banks.countries,ranging from 0.2 per cent to over 5 per cent of government budgets.There is also fragmented evidence of increasing private-sector adaptation interventions all over the world

137、and in most sectors(e.g.water,food and agriculture;transport and infrastructure;tourism).These include internal investments by large companies,financial institutions provision of finance for activities that contribute to adaptation,and companies provision of adaptation goods and services.In addition

138、,non-financial private-sector actions could have substantial impacts in reducing risks over time.For example,engineering,design,insurance,and lending practices and standards are moving towards incorporating climate science into their benchmarks,requirements and guidelines.However,neither domestic ex

139、penditures nor private finance flows are likely to bridge the adaptation finance gap alone,especially in low-income countries including LDCs and SIDS,and there are important equity issues related to using these flows to fill the gap in these countries.This report identifies seven ways to bridge the

140、adaptation financing gap(figure ES.5).The core continues to be dominated by(i)international public adaptation finance,(ii)domestic expenditure on adaptation and(iii)private-sector finance for adaptation,even if relative contributions to closing the adaptation finance gap remain uncertain.Four additi

141、onal potential approaches to bridge the finance gap are identified:(iv)remittances by migrants to their home countries which often contribute significantly to GDP,(v)increasing finance tailored to small and medium-sized enterprises since they comprise the bulk of the private sector in many developin

142、g countries,(vi)reform of the global financial architecture,4 for instance as proposed by the Bridgetown Initiative,which has enormous potential to support developing countries in boosting their resilience against future climate shocks,including through changes in managing vulnerable countries debt

143、burden,and(vii)implementation of article 2.1(c)of the Paris Agreement on making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low-carbon and climate-resilient development.It is important to note that these seven ways offer different opportunities and constraints across countries for example,LDCs r

144、ely most heavily on international support,in particular grants and bridging the adaptation finance gap requires attention to both quantitative and qualitative aspects such as access to finance and equity.Executive SummaryXVIIFigure ES.5 Seven ways to bridge the adaptation finance gap5 Intrinsic valu

145、es are revealed,for example,in World Heritage listings and peoples connections to places and values,so there is no commensurable substitute to their loss or damage.Instrumental values are those that arise from the goods and services provided by ecosystems to those who depend on them directly or indi

146、rectly.Slow and insufficient action on mitigation and adaptation is increasingly translating into soft and hard limits to adaptation,some of which may have already been reached.One of the ways in which loss and damage from climate change arise is when efforts to avoid or minimize climate impacts thr

147、ough mitigation and adaptation fail.The points at which adaptation fails to avert climate impacts are called the limits to adaptation,which can be hard or soft.Hard limits are those that arise in systems and that can only be averted through mitigation of greenhouse gases.Climate-sensitive ecosystems

148、,such as coral reefs and the cryosphere,may be among the first to experience hard adaptation limits leading to both intrinsic and instrumental loss and damage.5Soft limits are those that can be avoided or minimized through more concerted efforts at adaptation,though the limits may change over time a

149、s a result of shifts in both climate acceleration and technological and political development,or as the evaluation of trade-offs changes.By far the best and most cost-effective ways to reduce both hard and soft adaptation limits is through greatly accelerated investments in mitigation and adaptation

150、 but,considering the level of climate change already embedded in the system,some soft and even hard limits may be unavoidable.Lack of conceptual clarity is a clear barrier to making political and operational progress on loss and damage.While there is no universally agreed definition,conceptualizatio

151、ns range from considering all anthropogenic climate change impacts as loss and damage,to only considering impacts that occur after limits to adaptation have been reached as loss and damage.Justice is a major theme underpinning the conceptualizations of loss and damage,including by the UNFCCC,recogni

152、zing that losses and damages are experienced most harshly by those least responsible for or most sensitive to climate change:developing countries and vulnerable members of society.1.International public adaptation finance 3.Private-sector finance2.Domestic expenditure on adaptation Core approachesAd

153、ditional approaches4.Increase in financing for SMEs7.Implementation of article 2.1(c)of the Paris Agreement6.Reform of the global financial architecture5.RemittancesGreater international cooperation is required to unlock finance at scaleAdaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.XVIIIThe

154、re is also general agreement that losses and damages can be categorized as economic or non-economic.Economic losses and damages(ELD)include impacts that can be assigned a monetary value,such as damages to infrastructure or loss of earnings or productivity.Non-economic losses and damages(NELD)encompa

155、ss a wide spectrum of impacts that are not easily assigned a monetary value,such as loss of life,health or mobility;loss of territory,cultural heritage,or Indigenous or local knowledge;loss of biodiversity and so on.While there are well-established quantitative methods to assess ELD,for NELD the ass

156、essment is mainly qualitative,but it is important to avoid missing the climate impacts that cannot be priced.Because of this lack of clarity among stakeholders,there is an urgent need to reach international consensus on key concepts to ensure accelerated progress and operationalization of loss and d

157、amage,including the new loss and damage fund and funding arrangements agreed at COP 27 in 2022.Loss and damage is increasingly mentioned in NAPs and NDCs,but these documents say little about options to address loss and damage and largely miss NELD.Actions to address loss and damage include disaster

158、risk management,assessment of losses and damages,capacity-building,early warning systems,insurance,compensation,social protection measures,support for rebuilding livelihoods and for communities to preserve their culture,humanitarian response and forecast-based finance,reflecting the grey zone that e

159、xists in practice between adaptation and loss and damage.While countries capture ELD relatively well,only a handful of NAPs address NELD.Developing a list of measures addressing ELD and NELD,both ahead of and during/after events,will be important in the context of setting up the institutional framew

160、ork for addressing loss and damage within the UNFCCC and at national levels.Given the complex,compounding,cascading and transboundary nature of climate risk,coordination across global frameworks besides the UNFCCC,such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,and the Sustainable Developme

161、nt Goals,will contribute towards strengthening loss and damage management approaches.There is also a need for more regional and subnational cooperation on loss and damage with transboundary characteristics to take advantage of opportunities of scale and to overcome barriers to implementation.Finally

162、,all responses must respect country ownership and be equitable,inclusive,accessible and adequate.Figure ES.6 Averting,minimizing and addressing losses and damagesAdapted from:Richards,J.A.(2022).https:/www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/stories-op/how-does-loss-and-damage-intersect-with-climate-chan

163、ge-adaptation-drr-and-humanitarian-assistanceMitigationaverts loss and damageReduces risk|Avert loss and damage:Mitigation to reduce emissionsAdaptationminimizes loss and damageReduces risk|Minimize loss and damage:Adaptation Disater risk reductionResidual riskAddress loss and damage:Transfer risk e

164、.g.social protection insurance Retain risk e.g.contingency fundLoss and damageAddress loss and damage:Emergency response Rebuilding funds Relocation support Livelihood programmes Social protectionExtreme orslow onset event:Storm/Typhoon/Cyclone Extreme drought Rising sea levels Ocean acidification G

165、lacial melt Heatwave Flood WildfireClimatechangeeventExecutive SummaryXIXMany uncertainties remain regarding the financial needs for addressing loss and damage,but innovative funding sources and governance structures must be found to reach the necessaryscale.A recent study estimated that damages in

166、the 55 most climate-vulnerable economies alone exceeded US$500 billion over the past two decades.These costs will rise steeply in the coming decades,particularly in the absence of strong mitigation and adaptation,but more robust numbers are needed that underpin the urgency of addressing loss and dam

167、age.There is currently little evidence on the activities and associated costs of addressing loss and damage as it is a costly and time-consuming exercise requiring significant technical capacity,and most countries are yet to identify and assess their loss and damage risks and financial needs.Since t

168、he financial needs for addressing loss and damage are likely to grow significantly in the future,exploring innovative sources of finance(such as marine shipping levies,aviation levies,taxation,debt relief,debt swaps and special drawing rights)besides grants,insurance and concessional loans will be e

169、ssential to reach the necessary scale.As well as assisting developing countries particularly vulnerable to climate risks in coping with loss and damage,the finance must also be used for capacity-building,institutional strengthening,data collection and analysis,disaster preparedness,and management of

170、 the consequences of NELD while respecting the principles of equity,justice,inclusiveness and ownership.Governance arrangements to help deliver loss and damage finance could be built around the dedicated loss and damage fund,the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage(SNLD)and the Warsaw International

171、Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts(WIM)and could include existing institutions supporting humanitarian aid,disaster risk reduction,risk transfer,development finance and climate finance.11The political and scientific context Chapter 1Lead authors:Alexandre Magnan(IDD

172、RI),Mara del Pilar Bueno Rubial(National Scientific and Technical Research Council CONICET Universidad Nacional de Rosario),Lars Christiansen(United Nations Environment Programme UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre)On 3 November 2022 in Jacobabad,Sindh provi

173、nce,Pakistan,Aneefa Bibi holds her 5-year-old daughter,Hood,who is experiencing fever and chest pain.Photo:UNICEF/Saiyna Bashir 2Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.1.1 IntroductionThe Adaptation Gap Report(AGR)series assesses recent literature and tracks primary sources of inform

174、ation to provide annual policy-relevant updates on global progress in climate adaptation,building on an increasingly clear scientific evidence base(box 1.1)and diversifying policy landscape.First,as global warming intensifies,climate impacts are becoming more severe and widespread,raising concerns a

175、bout the severity of cascading and compounding risks and adaptation limits despite adaptation efforts.Second,the international policy arena is progressing towards establishing a framework for the global goal on adaptation,finalizing the first global stocktake,1 discussing loss and damage funding arr

176、angements,2 strengthening adaptation transparency through the enhanced transparency framework and mainstreaming adaptation into the reform of the global finance system.And third,there is increasingly robust scientific knowledge on how to move adaptation efforts from incremental action to transformat

177、ional processes,for example through further integrating social and gender equity into adaptation action(Birkmann et al.2022;Prakash et al.2022).What the available information does reveal,however,is whether countries,societies and communities are collectively on track to adapting to the global challe

178、nge of climate change.To address this fundamental question,the AGR series investigates,on a yearly basis,how adaptation is planned,implemented and financed,to answer three linked questions,taking into account uncertainties and the limited data available:What has been done to adapt until today?To wha

179、t extent are current adaptation actions reducing climate risks today?Are current adaptation efforts likely to reduce future climate risks?Making progress on addressing these three questions is critical as science increasingly warns about the need to consider climate risks in a more complex way.In ad

180、dition to this,and from an international policy perspective,the conclusion of the AGR 2022 that the adaptation gap is widening calls for an increased focus on several topics underlying effective and adequate adaptation.These include governance arrangements,transparency of policy processes,capacity-b

181、uilding,technology transfer,finance and equity(Birkmann et al.2022;New et al.2022),since 1 The global stocktake is a policy process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)that assesses the extent to which the world is making progress towards meeting the long-term goal

182、s of the Paris Agreement,based on the principle of equity and the best available science.This is a Party-driven process conducted in a transparent manner and with the participation of non-Party stakeholders.2 This mechanism has been established under the UNFCCC to further assist developing countries

183、 that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,through enhancing knowledge on risks and risk management approaches,strengthening dialogue and coordinated action among relevant stakeholders and enhancing action and support(including finance,technology and capacity-building

184、).women continue to be disproportionately affected by climate impacts.More than ever before,the AGR 2023 therefore pays specific attention to addressing the financial implications of adapting to climate change and dealing with its residual impacts by devoting in-depth chapters to adaptation finance

185、and loss and damage.1.2 Science exposes new challenges foradaptationPrevious editions of the AGR have already referenced various climate extremes(e.g.storms,droughts,floods)and slow onset events(e.g.sea level rise,changes in precipitation regimes)that affect countries,people and natural systems worl

186、dwide.Yet impacts are increasingly compounding and cascading,with examples including the successive cyclones that hit the Caribbean and south-east of the United States of America in 2017,and the devastating floods in Pakistan in 2022.Recent scientific studies therefore emphasize that greater conside

187、ration of the complexity of climate risks needs to be integrated into the ways that adaptation responses and strategies are planned,implemented and supported(New et al.2022;Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC 2023).While there is still limited information on how to take into account such

188、complexity,the scientific community agrees that current impact assessments are likely to be conservative due to insufficient consideration of the compounding,cascading and sometimes transboundary nature of climate risks(Anisimov and Magnan 2023).These new challenges for adaptation call for further e

189、xpanding and/or restructuring of the following key discussions under the UNFCCC:Adequacy and effectiveness.Adequacy and effectiveness are two cornerstone concepts used in climate negotiations to discuss whether policy instruments and support match the adaptation needs identified by countries and res

190、ult in reducing climate risks(Gao and Christiansen 2023).To date,however,dedicated methods and knowledge for assessing adequacy and effectiveness remain in their infancy(United Nations Environment Programme UNEP 2022).This raises concerns about our ability to anticipate and manage increasingly compl

191、ex climate risks.3Chapter 1 The political and scientific context The loss and damage fund and funding arrangements.Adaptation limits and residual risks raise concerns about further decreasing adaptive capacities,hence increasing the need for international cooperation to consider impacts occurring be

192、yond a given systems adaptation potential.The loss and damage fund and funding arrangements agreed upon at the twenty-seventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(COP 27)may therefore have to be additional to traditional adaptation fin

193、ance.The global stocktake and the global goal on adaptation.The last two years of this UNFCCC-led process have been dedicated to the collection and assessment of data required to produce the first global stocktake.However,within the aforementioned scientific context,a new question arises:to what ext

194、ent is complexity within climate risk being considered?And how might that impact discussions on the global goal on adaptation and progress towards it?Box 1.1 What does the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report cycle tell us about the urgency to adapt?Six major conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cl

195、imate Change(IPCC)Sixth Assessment Synthesis Report(2023)help scope the adaptation challenge and underline the urgent need to accelerate knowledge in order to anticipate future changes(planning),undertake the right actions on the ground(implementation)and allocate necessary means of implementation(i

196、n particular,finance).The conclusions of the report are as follows:About 40 per cent of humankind are already living in highly climate-vulnerable areas(Birkmann et al.2022).The world is on track to experience dangerous climate risk levels before the end of the twenty-first century,even under a warmi

197、ng scenario of 1.5C or 2C in global mean temperature(ONeill et al.2022),with the transition to globally-significant risks occurring at lower global warming levels in multiple IPCC reports(Zommers et al.2020;ONeill et al.2022).Some socioecological systems are already experiencing adaptation limits(Th

198、omas et al.2021),which explains why residual risks will occur even under a warming scenario of 1.5 or 2C,and will dramatically increase with further climate changes(Eisenberg 2021;Magnan et al.2021).Not all adaptation options are long-term adaptation solutions(Schipper 2020;Eriksen et al.2021;Reckie

199、n et al.2023).Some options can provide immediate benefits but are maladaptive over time through insidiously increasing exposure and vulnerability in situ(e.g.coastal dykes stimulating urbanization in low-lying areas)or displacing threats to other connected places,sectors and population groups(Anisim

200、ov and Magnan 2023).There is increasing concern that the solution space(i.e.the range of options available for adaptation)is shrinking with warming(Haasnoot,Lawrence and Magnan 2021).Some options,such as coral reef restoration,could become obsolete in the coming decades due to accelerating ocean war

201、ming and acidification.Although notable adaptation progress has been made(Berrang-Ford et al.2021;UNEP 2022),additional adaptation gaps remain when taking into account the full complexity of climate risks(cascading,compounding and accelerating)and challenges relating to adaptation limits,residual ri

202、sks and the potential for maladaptation.These findings demonstrate the need for urgent and forceful climate action in all three domains:mitigation to minimize global warming,adaptation to reduce existing and future climate risks and loss and damage to best address unavoidable climate risks and limit

203、s to adaptation(figure 1.1).4Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.1.3 Ongoing developments in the global policy context There has been some progress in international negotiations on adaptation and loss and damage in the UNFCCC.The decision to establish a new fund and funding arrang

204、ements for loss and damage,and the ongoing development of a framework for the global goal on adaptation represent examples of such progress.At the same time,the discussions are not moving at the pace necessary,resulting in limited progress in mitigation and adaptation(UNEP 2022).This section provide

205、s a cursory overview of ongoing developments related to adaptation and loss and damage within the global policy context,including the main challenges ahead of COP 28.1.3.1 The development of a framework for the global goal on adaptationAdopting a framework for the global goal on adaptation is antici

206、pated to strengthen national,local and transboundary adaptation responses through improving planning and implementation processes,while also providing a means to assess collective progress on adaptation action and support that builds on existing communication and reporting tools.While all components

207、 of the framework are still under discussion,defining globally-relevant targets and metrics against which to assess progress on adaptation is the most urgent challenge,together with defining a clear road map for implementation towards the second global stocktake in 2028(Adaptation Committee 2021;Lei

208、ter 2022;UNFCCC Secretariat 2022;Beauchamp and Jzefiak 2023;United Nations Foundation 2023).Figure 1.1 The conceptual landscape for the AGR series:connecting mitigation,adaptation and loss and damage with international climate negotiationsC5.04.03.02.01.001.51950200020502100Projections for different

209、 scenariosSSP5-8.5SSP1-1.9SSP2-4.5SSP1-2.6SSP3-7.0A.Global surface temperature change relative to the period 18501900UndetectableModerateHighVery highIPCC risk scalePresent-dayrisk levelsResidualrisksremainingafterRisksavoidedthroughadaptationRisk level without adaptationLow HighEmission scenarioB.R

210、isk levels at the end of the century under contrasting emission scenarios and a hypothetical adaptation scenarioNegotiations on adaptation financewill influence the extent to which developing countries are able to adapt.These negotiations are framed by the global goal on adaptation and the global st

211、ocktake(section 1.3).C.Connection with the international climate negotiationsNegotiations on loss and damage will help developing countries address unavoided residual risks.adaptation(white arrow)(black arrow)Source:Panel A inspired by IPCC(2022,2023).Panels B and C:Authors own elaboration.Note:This

212、 figure illustrates the narrative going from greenhouse gas emission scenarios(panel A)to associated risk levels(under low and high emission scenarios;panel B),and then corresponding areas of negotiations under the UNFCCC(panel C).Panel B illustrates that under each emission scenario adaptation can

213、reduce risks from maximum levels(occurring when no adaptation is deployed top of each bar),to a hypothetical risk level which is determined by our ability to overcome soft adaptation limits(lower part of the white arrow).The residual risk space situated below this risk level represents risks that ha

214、ve not been avoided in this adaptation scenario(black arrow).Panel C shows that negotiations on adaptation finance can support the extent to which risks are avoided while negotiations on loss and damage can help address unavoidable risks.It also shows that the global goal on adaptation and the globa

215、l stocktake serve as frameworks to accelerate action and support(especially for developing countries),and assess progress on adaptation globally.1.3.2 The completion of the first global stocktakeThe completion of the first global stocktake provides an opportunity to further strengthen the robustness

216、 and coherence of the adaptation agenda at the international level.However,the adaptation component of the global stocktake is facing challenges,such as the under-recognition of developing countries adaptation efforts,as mentioned by some groups of parties.Similarly,as a recent report by the co-faci

217、litators of the technical dialogue of the first global stocktake suggests(UNFCCC 2023),the work of constituted 5Chapter 1 The political and scientific contextbodies on the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support is not yet advanced enough to benefit the completion of the first global st

218、ocktake.This work,however,will remain important to inform the implementation and revision of the global goal on adaptation framework and,ultimately,the second global stocktake.At the same time,progress made in the preparation of adaptation communications3 is noteworthy,for example in terms of emphas

219、izing national priorities and required support,but may not be adequately utilized by the first global stocktake.This is relevant because synthesizing such information is key for the global stocktake process to be able to assess whether global adaptation efforts are adequate and effective,a question

220、the AGR has been seeking to answer for years and on which it could add value into the first global stocktake.1.3.3 Increasing finance for adaptation and loss and damageIn addition to maintaining political momentum from COP 27 and catalysing the accelerated implementation of actions,the outcome of CO

221、P 28 and the first global stocktake will largely be assessed by their ability to mobilize resources and deliver on pledges,such as doubling finance for adaptation and making the loss and damage fund operational.All this needs to be achieved without losing sight of the fact that the funding arrangeme

222、nts seek to fill a gap in the provision of financial resources to address losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing countries.Outside the UNFCCC arena,ongoing discussions are also relevant to gain an understanding of how finance,3 An adaptation communicat

223、ion is a document established under the Paris Agreement that aims to raise the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation,strengthen action and support for developing countries,inform the global stocktake and enhance the learning and under-standing of needs and actions(arti

224、cle 7.10 of the Paris Agreement and decision 9/CMA.1).with respect to the mitigationadaptationloss and damage nexus(figure 1.1),fits into the conversation about reforming the international financial architecture.Although adaptation mainstreaming is gaining momentum,the role of international financia

225、l institutions in climate finance(especially multilateral development banks),the potential channelling of special drawing rights for adaptation projects and the diffusion of other innovative solutions,such as debt-for-adaptation swaps,is still unclear.1.4 Framing of the AGR 2023The AGR series is str

226、uctured around regular updates on adaptation planning,implementation and finance,and also includes an in-depth chapter that focuses on varying topics.Compared with previous editions,the AGR 2023 delivers a detailed update of adaptation finance costs,needs and flows(chapter 4),which for the past thre

227、e editions have been based on estimates derived from the Adaptation Finance Gap Report(UNEP 2016).In response to the progress made in Glasgow(COP 26)and Sharm El-Sheikh(COP 27),the in-depth chapter of the AGR 2023 is on loss and damage(chapter 5).New also to the AGR 2023 are global case studies,whic

228、h illustrate global,regional and local impacts of climate change and adaptation responses.While not directly connected to the chapters,these case studies provide insight to the limits of adaptation and resulting losses and damages in various contexts and give a more detailed picture of local context

229、s needed to understand what is at stake for people and environments exposed to climate change.Case Study:Cascading impacts and floods Building adaptive capacity in Pakistan Over the past three decades,the increasing frequency,scale and magnitude of climate extremes in Pakistan have caused significan

230、t loss of life,while triggering a reversal of development gains.The compounding impacts of the climate crisis mean that for each climate disaster which occurs,the window to build back is getting smaller and people are falling deeper in the poverty trap.In Pakistan,the adverse and cascading impacts o

231、f disasters have eroded livelihoods and coping capacities.Flooding results in greater loss of life and damage to property than other natural hazards.The intensity and frequency of these events has increased since Pakistan was formed in 1947,with the most devastating floods to date occurring in 2022.

232、Responding to the cascading risks and impacts of the climate crisis requires a transdisciplinary,cross-scale and cross-sector approach.Understanding,identifying and attributing cascading effects to specific climate shocks and stressors is key to developing ways to build adaptive capacity and resilie

233、nce.However,it is very likely that the costs of adaptation will be higher than anticipated.Note:This case study is not connected to the chapter.The full case study is available online.Authors:Jessica Troni,Alvin Chandra(UNEP)627Lead authors:Anne Hammill(International Institute for Sustainable Develo

234、pment IISD),Keron Niles(University of the West Indies),Thomas Dale(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre)Contributing authors:Leona Harting(independent),Jheuel Carter-Guy(University of the West Indies),Ceri Cazabon(independent),Allyson Weekes(University of the West Indies),Myrico Morris(University of the W

235、est Indies),Peggy Arit Okey(University of the West Indies),Kwame Bradshaw(University of the West Indies),Mathias Hee Pedersen(independent)Members of REFAN(Rseau des Femmes Agricultrices du Nord)in Senegal,2021.Photo:UN Women/Yulia PanevinaGlobal progress on adaptation planning Chapter 28Adaptation G

236、ap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Key messages At present,85 per cent of countries have at least one national-level adaptation planning instrument(e.g.a policy,strategy or plan)in place.As the world moves towards complete coverage by national adaptation planning instruments,a rapid shift to

237、wards implementation and continued,iterative planning is vital which must be supported by,among other things,greater availability of and access to finance(chapter 4).Of the 15 per cent of countries that do not yet have a national planning instrument in place,just under half of these were found to be

238、 in the process of developing one.Reaching these remaining countries to help them finalize these processes will require additional support.Currently,25 per cent of countries have in place legal instruments(e.g.laws and acts)that require national governments to prepare a national adaptation planning

239、instrument.This percentage has risen slowly since the late-2000s.Given their importance in mandating and reinforcing adaptation planning,more countries should seek to prepare and adopt such instruments as a means of ensuring that adaptation planning is prioritized and that planning instruments are u

240、pdated periodically.The assessment of the potential adequacy and effectiveness of national-level planning conducted in the 2021 Adaptation Gap Report(AGR)has been updated.It indicates that there has been a notable increase in the implementability of adaptation planning processes,with 69 per cent of

241、countries putting a central administrative body in place to oversee adaptation action and 67 per cent allocating domestic finance towards implementing adaptation priorities.Less progress was observed on monitoring and evaluation(M&E),reflecting the difficulty of designing and implementing systems an

242、d processes for understanding the effectiveness of adaptation planning and action.M&E frameworks will become more important as legal instruments and more funding accelerate the implementation of adaptation,thereby increasing the pressure to demonstrate the impact of adaptation activities.While least

243、 developed countries(LDCs)and small island developing States(SIDS)are found to be in line with or above the global average for some of the criteria assessed,they appear to be lacking in certain areas recognized as contributing towards national adaptation planning being adequate and effective.This em

244、phasizes the need for SIDS and LDCs to receive financial and technical support to advance their adaptation planning.2.1 IntroductionIn March 2023,the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)concluded its sixth assessment cycle with the publication of the Synthesis Report for the IPCC Working

245、Group II Sixth Assessment Report(IPCC WGII AR6).This report states that“progress in adaptation planning and implementation has been observed across all sectors and regions,generating multiple benefits”(IPCC 2023,p.55).Three months later,the technical dialogue process for the first global stocktake c

246、oncluded at the Bonn Climate Change Conference,where adaptation planning was an important barometer of progress.The process found that“collectively,there is increasing ambition in plans and commitments for adaptation,but there also remains an implementation gap,in that plans are implemented inadequa

247、tely,unevenly and incrementally”(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC 2023a,p.17).The importance of adaptation planning is also reflected in discussions around the global goal on adaptation,where the proposed draft framework is structured around the dimensions of the iterativ

248、e adaptation(policy)cycle i.e.impact,risk and vulnerability assessment;planning;implementation;monitoring,evaluation and learning(Beauchamp and Jzefiak 2023;UNFCCC 2022a).The global goal on adaptation framework will be negotiated at the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the Parties to the U

249、NFCCC(COP 28)in Dubai,and there is a high likelihood 9Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planningthat progress in national adaptation planning possibly measured against a global target will feature strongly,and therefore be part of the assessment of collective progress on adaptation through the

250、 global stocktake.Recognizing the foundational importance of good planning in accelerating adaptation efforts around the world,and as with previous iterations of the AGR,this chapter aims to provide an assessment of global progress in adaptation planning by national governments.To do this,it first l

251、ooks at the overall number of national adaptation plans,strategies,policies and laws that have been put in place by the 197Parties to the UNFCCC(section 2.2).Following this,it looks at the potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning in these countries,updating the analysis last produ

252、ced in the AGR 2021(section 2.3).1 It is important to note that this analysis focuses more on the processes and outputs of national adaptation planning such as planning documents and institutional mechanisms rather than its outcomes,such as implementation of adaptation measures(chapter3).The cut-off

253、 for data collection within this analysis was 5August 2023.A detailed description of the methodology underlying the analysis presented in this chapter can be found in Annex 2.A.2.2 Global status of national adaptation planning2.2.1 Progress since the AGR 2022By 5 August 2023,85 per cent of countries

254、 had addressed adaptation at the national level through a plan,strategy or policy.In the previous 12 months,Parties to the UNFCCC had published 13 new national adaptation planning instruments.Of these,eight were national adaptation plans(NAPs)submitted by non-Annex I countries to the UNFCCC with six

255、 coming from LDCs and/or SIDS increasing the total number of published NAPs to 46.Only one of the 13 new planning instruments represents a countrys first planning instrument.Of the 29 countries that do not presently have a plan,strategy or policy in place,14 are in the process of developing one whil

256、e a further five are in the process of applying for Green Climate Fund(GCF)readiness funding to support them with adaptation planning(GCF 2023).1 The assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of national adaptation planning was last conducted in the AGR 2021.The AGR 2022 focused on assessing the

257、extent to which adaptation planning is implementable and inclusive.2.2.2 Longer-term pictureThis analysis shows that since the early 2000s,the number of countries that have prepared at least one national planning instrument for adaptation has been increasing year-on-year,with the highest rate of inc

258、rease occurring between 2010 and 2021(figure 2.1,panel A).In the last two years however,with so much of the world already covered by national adaptation planning instruments,the rate of increase has slowed to just 2 per cent between 2021 and 5 August 2023(four countries).As such,the pressure for sca

259、led-up implementation is greater than ever,as lack of planning is becoming a smaller barrier to action.However,progress in reducing the number of countries without a national adaptation planning instrument may also be slowing,pointing to the need to focus resources and support,particularly in the Gl

260、obal South,to achieve 100 per cent global coverage.Despite the slowdown in this metric,the analysis finds that the number of new adaptation planning instruments being published each year has been relatively constant since 2012(figure 2.1,panel B).This indicates that many countries are engaging in it

261、erative adaptation planning by putting in place new instruments that replace or update their initial one.In this regard,46 per cent of countries have prepared a second planning instrument,while 17 per cent and 3 per cent have prepared a third and fourth,respectively.Further,of the 39 per cent of cou

262、ntries that presently have only one planning instrument in place,many are in the process of preparing a second.These trends are positive as adaptation planning is an iterative process,whereby countries can continually update and improve their strategies,plans and policies based on lessons,evolving n

263、ational priorities and ever-changing climate risks(Woodruff 2016;Schinko et al.2017;Begum et al.2022).This growing number of countries engaged in iterative adaptation planning is encouraging and may reflect an increased understanding of and commitment to adaptation among Parties to the UNFCCC,enable

264、d by more technical and financial support particularly to developing countries in recent years.For example,in 2016 the GCF established an activity area dedicated to adaptation planning under its Readiness Programme.By 31 July 2023,92 developing countries had received or were receiving funding,while

265、a further 25 countries had proposals under review(GCF 2023).10Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Figure 2.1 Global progress in national adaptation planning since 2000.Panel A:Cumulative number of countries that have prepared a first,second,third or fourth national planning instru

266、ment or a legal instrument since 2000.Panel B:Number of national planning instruments published globally each year.Finally,this years analysis finds that 25 per cent of countries have put in place legal instruments(such as laws or acts)that require the national government to prepare national adaptat

267、ion planning instruments.In addition,a number of countries that do not have a legal instrument currently in place for this purpose report that they are in the process of preparing one.While such instruments are not a prerequisite for adaptation planning,the presence of dedicated legislation can play

268、 an important role in supporting effective governance of adaptation and driving adaptation planning processes(Nachmany,Byrnes and Surminski 2019;IPCC 2022).As such,the steady increase in the presence of legislative instruments for adaptation represents a positive trend and indicates countries increa

269、sing determination to address the risks posed by climate change.2.3 Potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning This section presents the results of the assessment of the potential adequacy and potential effectiveness of adaptation planning.Number of countriesNumber of countries2023(

270、up to5 Aug)2023(up to5 Aug)204060801001201401601801972000A.B.200220042006200820102012201420162018202020221st adaptation planning instrument2nd adaptation planning instrument3rd adaptation planning instrument4th(+)adaptation planning instrumentLegal instrument51015202530200020022004200620082010201220

271、14201620182020202211Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planningThe assessment applies the same methodology used in the AGR 2021(United Nations Environment Programme UNEP 2021).In this approach,five criteria are used to shed light on the extent to which the outputs of national adaptation plannin

272、g can reasonably be assumed to be adequate(sufficient)and effective(successful)in achieving the stated objectives(reducing climate risks and enhancing resilience)and,where relevant,targets.The five criteria and the indicators used to assess these criteria are described in table 2.1(see Annex 2.A for

273、 a description of the assessments methodology).The results of the assessment are discussed in the following sections.Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the results for all 197 Parties.Furthermore,given the acute vulnerability of LDCs and SIDS to the impacts of climate change,table 2.2 also disaggreg

274、ates the results for these groups.Table 2.1 Overview of criteria used to assess adaptation planning(including their underlying rationale)and associated indicatorsCriteria and rationaleIndicators1.ComprehensivenessIdentifying climate risks and hazards and assessing vulnerability to existing and futur

275、e climate hazards and impacts are foundational steps in the adaptation planning process.Countries can use this information to prioritize sectors for adaptation measures and develop a comprehensive adaptation plan by identifying adaptation options that align with these priorities and respond to the r

276、isks,hazards and vulnerabilities they face.1.1 Adaptation options address assessed risks,impacts,hazards or vulnerabilities in priority sectors.2.InclusivenessFor adaptation planning to adequately reflect existing and forthcoming risks and vulnerabilities and to effectively enhance the ownership of

277、any implementation,it must emphasize the engagement of all relevant stakeholders and take gender into consideration.Evidence that:2.1 Stakeholders are being engaged in adaptation planning processes2.2 Gender is considered in adaptation planning processes3.ImplementabilityPlanning can be assumed to b

278、e effective if it leads to real implementation by public and private actors.As such,planning can benefit from a central administrative body that is officially in charge of adaptation policymaking and a variety of policy instruments,including investment,incentives and regulations that lead to the des

279、ired outcomes.Evidence that countries have:3.1 A central administrative body responsible for adaptationEvidence that countries are using the following instruments in adaptation planning:3.2 Regulations3.3 Incentives3.4 Direct investment/domestic funding4.IntegrationIntegrating or mainstreaming adapt

280、ation planning and action horizontally(across sectors)and vertically(across levels of administration)is increasingly recognized as an important component of effective adaptation planning.This helps ensure that adaptation planning is comprehensive,avoids the duplication of effort or maladaptation,and

281、 enhances synergies.Evidence that countries have:4.1 Horizontal coordination mechanisms 4.2 Sectoral adaptation plans4.3 Vertical coordination mechanisms4.4 Subnational adaptation plans5.Monitoring and evaluation(M&E)For planning to remain adequate and effective,it must be periodically monitored and

282、 evaluated.Evidence that countries have:5.1 M&E systems for adaptation5.2 A published monitoring/progress report5.3 A published evaluation report 12Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.Figure 2.2 Potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning in 2023Note:As the criteri

283、a for allocating the“Indicator met”and“Indicator in progress towards being met”metrics were tightened for indicators 5.15.3,changes in the allocation of the“Increase in indicators being met”since 2021 metric cannot be displayed in this figure.With the exception of M&E,for which a comparison against

284、2021 is not possible,there have been increases in all criteria used to assess potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning.The greatest progress is observed in the implementability of adaptation planning processes,while efforts to link national and subnational level(s)of adaptation pl

285、anning are least evident.2.3.1 Comprehensiveness In terms of comprehensiveness,more countries are identifying adaptation options that cover a broad set of risks affecting their priority sectors.This years review showed that 81 per cent of countries have adaptation options that respond to the assesse

286、d climate vulnerabilities and risks in priority sectors,such as agriculture,water and health.This represents a 13 per cent increase compared with the 2021 analysis.While this trend is undoubtedly positive,the indicator does not reflect the quality or robustness of the vulnerability and risk assessme

287、nts that underpin the planning of adaptation options.Furthermore,it reveals that 19 per cent of countries are not addressing all of the vulnerabilities and risks that they themselves have identified as priorities.2.3.2 InclusivenessThe two metrics used to assess the inclusiveness of adaptation plann

288、ing processes also point to progress.The number of countries that reported that stakeholders are systematically engaged in their adaptation planning has increased to 83 per cent.Meanwhile,71 per cent of countries had evidence of integrating gender considerations into their adaptation planning effort

289、s.The way countries report on gender considerations continues to vary considerably,from generally emphasizing the differential vulnerability of women and men,boys and girls to identifying gender equality as a principle or cross-cutting theme in adaptation action,Criteria and indicators for potential

290、ly adequate?1.Comprehensiveness2.Inclusiveness3.Implementability4.Integration5.Monitoring and EvaluationPercentage of countries0%20%40%60%80%100%1.1 Options address assessed risks2.1 Stakeholder engagement2.2 Gender consideration3.2 Regulations3.3 Incentives3.1 Central administration in charge3.4 Di

291、rect investment/domestic funding4.1 Horizontal coordination mechanisms4.2 Sectoral adaptation plans4.3 Vertical coordination mechanisms4.4 Subnational adaptation plans5.1 M&E system in place5.2 Monitoring/Progress report published5.3 Evaluation report publishedIndicator metIndicator met since 2021In

292、dicator partially met or in progress towards being metIndicator not met13Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planningusing gender as a platform to highlight other vulnerable populations,or developing adaptation options that explicitly address gender equality(Daz and Hunter 2022).Overall,this con

293、tinued progress on the inclusiveness of adaptation planning is important,as it helps to ensure the credibility,relevance and legitimacy of adaptation action and,critically,avoid maladaptation,thereby leading to more effective and enduring outcomes(New et al.2022).Case study:Gender-responsive adaptat

294、ion Health insurance for women in SenegalThe climate crisis does not affect everyone equally.Adaptation action needs to consider how the climate crisis affects different genders.Gender-responsive adaptation planning founded on understanding how the climate crisis affects people of different genders

295、is key to addressing disparities.For adaptation efforts to effectively manage climate risks while closing gender gaps and structural inequalities,policy processes must allow communities to lead the way in crafting gender policy design features in close collaboration with womens rights organizations.

296、An example of health insurance for women farmers in northern Senegal illustrates the need for recognizing gendered risks and policy action that address these risks.It shows how consulting with womens organizations paved the way for tailored solutions attuned to the needs of women and points to steps

297、 needed for gender mainstreaming in adaptation planning and implementation.Note:This case study is not connected to the chapter.The full case study is available online.Authors:Constanza Tabbush,Lorenzo Rovelli(UN-Women)2.3.3 ImplementabilityThe 2023 analysis also saw some important progress in the i

298、mplementability of adaptation planning.The greatest progress made since the 2021 AGR analysis was around having a central administrative body in charge of adaptation policymaking.In August 2023,69 per cent of countries had evidence to meet this criterion,which represents a 25 per cent increase since

299、 it was last assessed.A central administrative body can be important for effective policy coordination,which itself is critical to adaptation,as it is“a complex,long-term,knowledge intensive problem,which poses a significant cross-sector and multilevel decision-making challenge”(Russel et al.2020,p.

300、2).However,just as the existence of an adaptation plan does not automatically translate into more or better implementation of adaptation priorities,the existence of a central coordinating body does not necessarily mean it is operational or leading to positive policy coordination.The authority assign

301、ed to these bodies often evidenced by legal mandates,technical and financial resources,and high-level political support can be important in this regard(ibid.).The other story of progress in the implementability of adaptation planning is around direct investment or funding,with 67 per cent of countri

302、es demonstrating that they are or are planning to set aside domestic financial resources for adaptation,including through direct budget allocations.This is up from 50 per cent of countries in the AGR 2021.The allocation of domestic funding is a central part of recognizing the adaptation efforts of d

303、eveloping countries within the context of the global stocktake and article 7 of the Paris Agreement.Yet,as noted in chapter 4 of this report,such finance is difficult to track and under-reported,while likely representing the largest source of funding for adaptation in many developing countries(UNEP

304、2021).These resources are being mobilized through activities such as the development of finance strategies and the establishment of dedicated domestic adaptation funds,and are typically channelled to adaptation priorities such as poverty alleviation,disease control,urban development and flood risk m

305、anagement(UNFCCC 2022b).Progress was also observed in the use of regulations and incentives 9 per cent and 12 per cent increases,respectively to enhance the implementability of adaptation planning,albeit from a much lower starting position.Regulations such as building codes,land-use zoning and water

306、 restrictions were mentioned in the descriptions of adaptation planning efforts in 58 per cent of countries.Just over 40 per cent of countries mentioned incentives,such as taxes or subsidies,to encourage adaptation.The description of specific regulations or fiscal policy instruments may be too granu

307、lar for the types of documents that were reviewed for this analysis.Further,jurisdictional considerations may mean that these types of policy levers for adaptation action are more often pursued at the subnational(e.g.municipal)level.Nonetheless,countries will require more support to ensure these imp

308、ortant levers of policy action are integrated into adaptation planning processes.14Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.2.3.4 Integration As a complex multisectoral and multilevel governance process,national adaptation planning is a massive exercise in coordination.Horizontal coord

309、ination involves working with and across sectors,recognizing that a range of development priorities will be affected by climate impacts and that actions to address these impacts in one domain or sector may have implications for another.This cross-sectoral nature of adaptation is well established,as

310、reflected by 77 per cent of countries having horizontal coordination mechanisms,such as interministerial committees,in place a 5 per cent increase since 2021.About two thirds of countries(68 per cent)have developed at least one dedicated sectoral adaptation plan in sectors such as agriculture,water

311、and health.Vertical coordination across different levels of government is not as advanced.Only 36 per cent of countries show evidence of having vertical coordination mechanisms,such as councils or platforms,that help manage strategic linkages between national and subnational adaptation actors.The pe

312、rcentage of countries with subnational adaptation plans is even lower,at 32 per cent,although the full extent of planning efforts under way in different jurisdictions is unlikely to be captured in the national documents reviewed.Regardless,this points to a need for more investment in multilevel gove

313、rnance for adaptation so that local realities are reflected in national priorities while national priorities enable adaptation at the subnational level(Daz,Price-Kelly and Rass 2016).Notably,these findings on integration only reflect evidence related to separate,stand-alone mechanisms and plans.In m

314、any cases,countries are also reporting having integrated adaptation considerations into sectoral and subnational strategies or plans.While mainstreaming adaptation into development planning and decision-making is widely recognized as being central to strengthening and sustaining adaptation actions,a

315、s well as being one of the two objectives of the UNFCCCs NAP process,such efforts are not captured using the current AGR review methodology(IPCC 2022;UNFCCC 2011).As such,full global progress on these aspects of adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning is likely an under-representation.Case

316、 study:Transboundary adaptation Local and regional benefits in the Middle EastThe climate crisis is making droughts more frequent and severe in the EasternMediterranean and MiddleEast,while at the same time changing rainfall patterns which are leading to more frequent and intense floods.When plannin

317、g adaptation actions in this type of context,governments,finance providers and local stakeholders need to understand the transboundary dimensions of climate risk.Ecosystem-based adaptation approaches can help to reverse negative feedback cycles such as sand and dust storms.The impacts of such cycles

318、 are far-reaching,spanning thousands of kilometres and extending across national borders.This means that new transboundary approaches to adaptation can help stakeholders to identify shared adaptation options.Transboundary approaches are being tested in the region and show potential to deliver both l

319、ocal and regional environmental co-benefits,while helping to build trust among communities and across national boundaries.Note:This case study is not connected to the chapter.The full case study is available online.Authors:Elizabeth Sellwood(UNEP),Rosalind Cornforth,Celia Petty,Elena Saggioro,Anne V

320、erhoef(University of Reading)2.3.5 Monitoring and evaluationIn line with the findings of the first global stocktake(UNFCCC 2023c),this analysis demonstrates that countries are generally lacking the infrastructure to adequately monitor and evaluate their national adaptation processes.Only 24 per cent

321、 of countries were found to have an M&E system in place,while another 19 per cent were found to be in the process of developing one.The analysis also demonstrates that the majority of ongoing M&E is tailored towards monitoring,rather than evaluation.Of the 49 countries that have an M&E system in pla

322、ce,43 have published a monitoring report,while only 16 have published an evaluation report.These findings suggest that countries are generally not well positioned to effectively learn from and update their adaptation plans and strategies,thus highlighting the importance of continued and enhanced cap

323、acity-building support in this area.2.4AdaptationplanninginLDCsandSIDSIPCC WGII AR6 recognizes that LDCs and SIDS are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints(IPCC2022).As such,progress in adaptation planning is especially important f

324、or 15Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planningthese countries and the aforementioned analyses have been disaggregated for SIDS and LDCs.Overall,LDCs and SIDS are found to be generally keeping pace with the global average in the development of adaptation planning instruments,with 89 per cent o

325、f SIDS and 85 per cent of LDCs having at least one national 2 Forty-six Parties are categorized as LDCs,while 38 are categorized as SIDS.It should be noted that the LDC and SIDS categories are not mutually exclusive,with some countries fitting into both groups.adaptation planning instrument in place

326、.They are however,found to be less likely to have put in place legal instruments that require the national government to prepare national adaptation planning instruments,with 18 per cent of SIDS and 11 per cent of LDCs having done so compared with 24per cent of all countries.Table 2.2 Potential adeq

327、uacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning globally and in LDCs and SIDS2 CriteriaIndicatorsPercentage of all 197 PartiesPercentage of LDCsPercentage ofSIDS1.Comprehensiveness1.1 Adaptation options address assessed risks(partially)81%(13%)78%(17%)84%(16%)2.Inclusiveness2.1 Stakeholder engagement(

328、in progress)83%(5%)87%(7%)89%(8%)2.2 Gender consideration(in progress)71%(9%)76%(11%)74%(11%)3.Implementability3.1 Central administrative body in place 69%65%63%3.2 Regulations 58%54%58%3.3 Incentives 42%30%32%3.4 Direct investment/domestic funding 68%59%66%4.Integration4.1 Horizontal coordination m

329、echanisms(in progress)77%(2%)83%(2%)79%(0%)4.2 Sectoral adaptation plans(in progress)68%(6%)72%(9%)68%(8%)4.3 Vertical coordination mechanisms(in progress)36%(9%)33%(9%)18%(5%)4.4 Subnational adaptation plans(in progress)32%(12%)15%(11%)5%(16%)5.Monitoring and evaluation(M&E)5.1 M&E framework in pla

330、ce(in progress)24%(20%)11%(28%)8%(18%)5.2 Progress/Monitoring report published 22%9%8%5.3 Evaluation report published 8%2%0%Note:The coloured circles in the LDCs and SIDS columns indicate how the values compare to the average value.indicates figures are 59 per cent higher than the average,indicates

331、that figures are between 4 per cent higher and 4 per cent lower than the average,indicates that figures are 59 per cent lower than the average and indicates that figures are+10 per cent lower.The values in parentheses refer to the percentage of Parties that have either partially met,or are making pr

332、ogress towards meeting,the criteria for the relevant indicator.16Adaptation Gap Report 2023:Underfinanced.Underprepared.The results are more mixed on potential adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning(table 2.2).While LDCs appear to be ahead of global averages on addressing gender considera

333、tions and horizontal coordination mechanisms in their adaptation planning,and SIDS are ahead on stakeholder engagement,they are significantly behind in several key areas.In particular,they are at least 10 per cent behind the global average when it comes to using incentives in adaptation,and performing at half of the global average on vertical integration and M&E.Relatively poor performance by LDCs