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1、NATIONALINTELLIGENCECOUNCIL.?biggest game-changers during the last century.Individually and collectively over the next 15-20 years,leaders are likely to be crucial to how developments turn out,particularly in terms of ensuring a more positive outcome.As we have emphasized,todays trends appear to be

2、heading toward a potentially more fragmented and conflicted world over the next 15-20 years,but bad outcomes are not inevitable.International leadership and cooperation will be necessary to solve the global challenges and to understand the complexities surrounding them.This study is meant as an aid

3、in that process:by laying out some of the alternative possibilities we hope to help policymakers steer us toward positive solutions.This page left intentionally blank.Global Trends 2025:A Transformed World For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,US Government Printing Office Internet:bookstore.g

4、po.gov Phone:toll free(866)512-1800;DC area(202)512-1800;Fax:(202)512-2104;Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington DC 20402-0001 ISBN 978-0-16-081834-9 To view electronic version:www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html November 2008 NIC 2008-003 We prepared Global Trends 2025:A Transformed World to stimulate strate

5、gic thinking about the future by identifying key trends,the factors that drive them,wherethey seem to be headed,and how they might interact.It uses scenarios to illustrate some of the many ways in which the drivers examined in the study(e.g.,globalization,demography,the rise of new powers,the decay

6、of international institutions,climate change,and the geopolitics of energy)may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future decisionmakers.The study as a whole is more a description of the factors likely to shape events than a prediction of what will actually happen.By examining a sm

7、all number of variables that we judge probably will have a disproportionate influence on future events and possibilities,the study seeks to help readers to recognize signposts indicating where events are headed and to identify opportunities for policy intervention to change or lock in the trajectori

8、es of specific developments.Among the messages we hope to convey are:“If you like where events seem to be headed,you may want to take timely action to preserve their positive trajectory.If you do not like where they appear to be going,you will have to develop and implement policies to change their t

9、rajectory.”For example,the reports examination of the transition out of dependence on fossil fuels illustrates how different trajectories will entail different consequences for specific countries.An even more important message is that leadership matters,no trends are immutable,and that timely and we

10、ll-informed intervention can decrease the likelihood and severity of negative developments and increase the likelihood of positive ones.Global Trends 2025 is the fourth installment in the National Intelligence Council-led effort to identify key drivers and developments likely to shape world events a

11、 decade or more in the future.Both the product and the process used to produce it benefited from lessons learned in previous iterations.Each edition of Global Trends has tapped larger and more diverse communities of experts.Our first effort,which looked out to 2010,relied primarily on expertise with

12、in the US Intelligence Community.There was some outreach to other elements of the United States Government and the American academic community.For Global Trends 2015,we engaged more numerous and more varied groups of non-US Government experts,most of whom were American citizens.For the third iterati

13、on,Global Trends 2020,we greatly expanded the participation of non-American specialists by convening six seminars on five continents.We also increased the number and varied the format of meetings in the United States.These sessions enhanced our understanding of both specific trends and drivers and t

14、he ways these factors were perceived by experts in different regions of the world.Each past iteration produced an even more interesting and influential report.Indeed,the worldwide response to Global Trends 2020 was extraordinary.The report has been translated into several languages,debated in govern

15、ment offices,discussed in university courses,and used as a point of departure in community meetings on international affairs.The report was closely read and constructively criticized by myriad experts and members of the public.Seeking to capitalize on the interest generated by previous reports and t

16、o capture even wider circles of expertise,we modified our processes yet again to produce Global Trends 2025.In addition to increasing still more the participation of non-USG experts from the United States and abroad to develop the framework for the current study,we shared several drafts with partici

17、pants via the Internet and a series of discussion sessions across the US and in several other countries.This iteration of Global Trends is the most collaborative yet produced;that collaboration has made it a better product and we are extremely grateful for the time and intellectual energy that liter

18、ally hundreds of people have devoted to this effort.As was the case with our previous looks at global trends that will shape the future,the process and spin-off benefits of preparing Global Trends 2025 were as important as the final product.The ideas generated and insights gained during the preparat

19、ion of the accompanying report have enriched the work of countless analysts and been incorporated into numerous analytic products published by the National Intelligence Council and other Intelligence Community agencies.Anecdotal evidence indicates they have also influenced the thinking and work of m

20、any participants in the process who do not work for the United States Government.We are pleased by and proud of these ancillary benefits and look forward to reaping many more when others have a chance to read and react to this edition of Global Trends.Many people contributed to the preparation of Gl

21、obal Trends 2025,but no one contributed more than did Mathew Burrows.His intellectual gifts and managerial abilities were critical to the production of this report and everyone involved owes him a huge debt of gratitude.Mats own note of appreciation on the following page lists others who made especi

22、ally noteworthy contributions.Many others also made important contributions.We could not have produced this edition of Global Trends without the support of everyone who participated and we are deeply grateful for the partnerships and the friendships that facilitated and resulted from this collaborat

23、ive effort.C.Thomas Fingar Chairman,National Intelligence Council Acknowledgements In preparing this work the National Intelligence Council received immeasurable help from numerous think tanks,consulting firms,academic institutions,and literally hundreds of experts inside and outside governments her

24、e in the United States and overseas.We cannot possibly name all the institutions and individuals we consulted but would like to acknowledge a number for their important contributions.The Atlantic Council of the United States and the Stimson Center were both important for opening doors to institution

25、s abroad and viewpoints that we would not easily have gathered for this project.Dr.William Ralston,Dr.Nick Evans and their team at SRI Consulting Business Intelligence provided needed S&T expertise and guidance.Dr.Alexander Van de Putte of PFC Energy International put together a series of meetings i

26、n three regional hubs across the globe to help us begin the process of conceiving and constructing the scenarios.Others involved in that effort include Professor Jean-Pierre Lehmann of the Evian Group at IMD in Lausanne and Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall at the Monitor Groups Global Business Networ

27、k in San Francisco.Professor Barry Hughes of the University of Denver contributed notably in the scenario construction process and in plotting out the possible trajectories of major powers.Dr.Jacqueline Newmyer and Dr.Stephen Rosen from the Long Term Strategy Group organized three workshops that wer

28、e critical to advancing our thinking on the complexities of the future security environment and the changing character of conflict.Several individuals and institutions helped organize roundtables to critique drafts or delve deeply into various aspects,including Dr.Geoff Dabelko at the Wilson Center;

29、Dr.Greg Treverton of RAND;Sebastian Mallaby at the Council on Foreign Relations;Carlos Pascual at Brookings;Dr.Michael Auslin at AEI;Professor Christopher Layne at Texas A&M University;Professor Sumit Ganguly at Indiana University and Dr.Robin Niblett and Jonathan Paris at Chatham House in London.Pr

30、ofessor John Ikenberry from Princetons Woodrow Wilson School organized several workshops of prominent international relations scholars,helping us with changing geopolitical trends.Two workshopsone organized by Professor Lanxin Xiang and hosted by CICIR in Beijing,the other organized and hosted by Dr

31、.Bates Gill at SIPRI in Stockholmwere particularly instrumental in gathering international perspectives on strategic challenges facing the world.Within the United States government,special thanks goes to Julianne Paunescu from the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research(INR).In helping

32、 us at every step of the way,she and her team fulfilled their mandate spearheading intelligence community outreach to nongovernmental experts in an outstanding manner.Marilyn Maines and her experts at NSA provided essential expertise on S&T and organized workshops with Toffler Associates to delve mo

33、re deeply into future trends.The NICs Analysis and Production staff,including Elizabeth Arens deft editorial hand,provided essential support.iContents Page Executive Summary vi Introduction:A Transformed World More Change than Continuity Alternative Futures 1 3 3 Chapter 1:The Globalizing Economy Ba

34、ck to the Future Growing Middle Class State Capitalism:A Post-Democratic Marketplace Rising in the East?Bumpy Ride in Correcting Current Global Imbalances Multiple Financial Nodes Diverging Development Models,but for How Long?6 7 8 8 11 12 13 Chapter 2:The Demographics of Discord Populations Growing

35、,Declining,and Diversifyingat the Same Time The Pensioner Boom:Challenges of Aging Populations Persistent Youth Bulges Changing Places:Migration,Urbanization,and Ethnic Shifts Demographic Portraits:Russia,China,India,and Iran 18 19 21 21 23 24 Chapter 3:The New Players Rising Heavyweights:China and

36、India Other Key Players Up-and-Coming Powers Global Scenario I:A World Without the West 28 29 31 35 37 Chapter 4:Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty?The Dawning of a Post-Petroleum Age?The Geopolitics of Energy Water,Food,and Climate Change Global Scenario II:October Surprise 40 41 45 51 57 Chapter 5:Gr

37、owing Potential for Conflict A Shrinking Arc of Instability by 2025?Growing Risk of a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East New Conflicts Over Resources?Terrorism:Good and Bad News Afghanistan,Pakistan,and Iraq:Local Trajectories and Outside Interests Global Scenario III:BRICs Bust-Up 60 61 61 63 68

38、72 76 iiChapter 6:Will the International System Be Up to the Challenges?Multipolarity without Multilateralism How Many International Systems?A World of Networks Global Scenario IV:Politics is Not Always Local 80 81 82 84 89 Chapter 7:Power-Sharing in a Multipolar World Demand for US Leadership Likel

39、y to Remain Strong,Capacities Will Shrink New Relationships and Recalibrated Old Partnerships Less Financial Margin of Error More Limited Military Superiority Surprises and Unintended Consequences Leadership Will Be Key 92 93 93 94 97 98 98 iii Textboxes:The 2025 Global Landscape Comparison Between

40、Mapping the Global Future:Report of the Intelligence Councils 2020 Project and Global Trends 2025:A Transformed World 2 Long-Range Projections:A Cautionary Tale 5 Globalization at Risk with the 2008 Financial Crisis?10 Science and Technology Leadership:A Test for the Emerging Powers 13 Latin America

41、:Moderate Economic Growth,Continued Urban Violence 15 Women as Agents of Geopolitical Change 16 Higher Education Shaping the Global Landscape in 2025 17 The Impact of HIV/AIDS 23 Muslims in Western Europe 25 Timing is Everything 44 Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World 46 Technology Breakthro

42、ughs by 2025 47 Two Climate Change Winners 52 Strategic Implications of an Opening Arctic 53 Sub-Saharan Africa:More Interactions with the World and More Troubled 56 A Non-nuclear Korea?62 Middle East/North Africa:Economics Drives Change,but with Major Risk of Turmoil 65 Energy Security 66 Another U

43、se of Nuclear Weapons?6 Why al-Qaidas“Terrorist Wave”Might Be Breaking Up The Changing Character of Conflict 7 End of Ideology?73 Potential Emergence of a Global Pandemic 7 Greater RegionalismPlus or Minus for Global Governance?83 Proliferating Identities and Growing Intolerance?86 Future of Democra

44、cy:Backsliding More Likely than Another Wave 87 Anti-Americanism on the Wane?95 69 iv 715 ivThe 2025 Global Landscape Relative Certainties Likely Impact A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China,India,and others.The relative power of nonstate actorsbusinesses,tribes,religious org

45、anizations,and even criminal networksalso will increase.By 2025 a single“international community”composed of nation-states will no longer exist.Power will be more dispersed with the newer players bringing new rules of the game while risks will increase that the traditional Western alliances will wea

46、ken.Rather than emulating Western models of political and economic development,more countries may be attracted to Chinas alternative development model.The unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to East now under way will continue.As some countries become more inv

47、ested in their economic well-being,incentives toward geopolitical stability could increase.However,the transfer is strengthening states like Russia that want to challenge the Western order.The United States will remain the single most powerful country but will be less dominant.Shrinking economic and

48、 military capabilities may force the US into a difficult set of tradeoffs between domestic versus foreign policy priorities.Continued economic growthcoupled with 1.2 billion more people by 2025will put pressure on energy,food,and water resources.The pace of technological innovation will be key to ou

49、tcomes during this period.All current technologies are inadequate for replacing traditional energy architecture on the scale needed.The number of countries with youthful populations in the“arc of instability”1 will decrease,but the populations of several youth-bulge states are projected to remain on

50、 rapid growth trajectories.Unless employment conditions change dramatically in parlous youth-bulge states such as Afghanistan,Nigeria,Pakistan,and Yemen,these countries will remain ripe for continued instability and state failure.The potential for conflict will increase owing to rapid changes in par

51、ts of the greater Middle East and the spread of lethal capabilities.The need for the US to act as regional balancer in the Middle East will increase,although other outside powersRussia,China and Indiawill play greater roles than today.Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025,but its appeal could l

52、essen if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.For those terrorists that are active the diffusion of technologies will put dangerous capabilities within their reach.Opportunities for mass-casualty terrorist attacks using chemical,biological,or less likely,nuc

53、lear weapons will increase as technology diffuses and nuclear power(and possibly weapons)programs expand.The practical and psychological consequences of such attacks will intensify in an increasingly globalized world.1 Countries with youthful age structures and rapidly growing populations mark a cre

54、scent or“arc of instability”stretching from the Andean region of Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa,the Middle East and the Caucasus,and through the northern parts of South Asia.vKey Uncertainties Potential Consequences Whether an energy transition away from oil and gassupported by improved ene

55、rgy storage,biofuels,and clean coalis completed during the 2025 time frame.With high oil and gas prices,major exporters such as Russia and Iran will substantially augment their levels of national power,with Russias GDP potentially approaching that of the UK and France.A sustained plunge in prices,pe

56、rhaps underpinned by a fundamental switch to new energy sources,could trigger a long-term decline for producers as global and regional players.How quickly climate change occurs and the locations where its impact is most pronounced.Climate change is likely to exacerbate resource scarcities,particular

57、ly water scarcities.Whether mercantilism stages a comeback and global markets recede.Descending into a world of resource nationalism increases the risk of great power confrontations.Whether advances toward democracy occur in China and Russia.Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the abs

58、ence of economic diversification.A growing middle class increases the chances of political liberalization and potentially greater nationalism in China.Whether regional fears about a nuclear-armed Iran trigger an arms race and greater militarization.Episodes of low-intensity conflict and terrorism ta

59、king place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict.Whether the greater Middle East becomes more stable,especially whether Iraq stabilizes,and whether the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved peacefully.Turbulence is likely to increase under most scenarios.Re

60、vival of economic growth,a more prosperous Iraq,and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute could engender some stability as the region deals with a strengthening Iran and global transition away from oil and gas.Whether Europe and Japan overcome economic and social challenges caused or compoun

61、ded by demography.Successful integration of Muslim minorities in Europe could expand the size of the productive work forces and avert social crisis.Lack of efforts by Europe and Japan to mitigate demographic challenges could lead to long-term declines.Whether global powers work with multilateral ins

62、titutions to adapt their structure and performance to the transformed geopolitical landscape.Emerging powers show ambivalence toward global institutions like the UN and IMF,but this could change as they become bigger players on the global stage.Asian integration could lead to more powerful regional

63、institutions.NATO faces stiff challenges in meeting growing out-of-area responsibilities with declining European military capabilities.Traditional alliances will weaken.viExecutive Summary The international systemas constructed following the Second World Warwill be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owin

64、g to the rise of emerging powers,a globalizing economy,an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East,and the growing influence of nonstate actors.By 2025,the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power2 continuing to narrow between

65、developed and developing countries.Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states,the relative power of various nonstate actorsincluding businesses,tribes,religious organizations,and criminal networksis increasing.The players are changing,but so too are the scope and breadth of transnational

66、 issues important for continued global prosperity.Aging populations in the developed world;growing energy,food,and water constraints;and worries about climate change will limit and diminish what will still be an historically unprecedented age of prosperity.Historically,emerging multipolar systems ha

67、ve been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones.Despite the recent financial volatilitywhich could end up accelerating many ongoing trendswe do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international system,as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization c

68、ame to a halt.However,the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks.Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade,investments,and technological innovation and acquisition,but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races,territorial expansion,an

69、d military rivalries.This is a story with no clear outcome,as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures.Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor,the United States relative strengtheven in the military realmwill decline and US levera

70、ge will become more constrained.At the same time,the extent to which other actorsboth state and nonstatewill be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear.Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be

71、 stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still-forming new order.Economic Growth Fueling Rise of Emerging Players In terms of size,speed,and directional flow,the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under wayroughly from West to Eastis without precedent in modern history.

72、This shift derives from two sources.First,increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf states and Russia.Second,lower costs combined with government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.Growth projections for Brazi

73、l,Russia,India,and China(the BRICs)indicate they will collectively match the original G-7s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country.If current trends persist,by 2025 China will have the worlds second largest econo

74、my and will be a leading 2 National power scores,computed by the International Futures computer model,are the product of an index combining the weighted factors of GDP,defense spending,population,and technology.viimilitary power.It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the bigg

75、est polluter.India probably will continue to enjoy relatively rapid economic growth and will strive for a multipolar world in which New Delhi is one of the poles.China and India must decide the extent to which they are willing and capable of playing increasing global roles and how each will relate t

76、o the other.Russia has the potential to be richer,more powerful,and more self-assured in 2025 if it invests in human capital,expands and diversifies its economy,and integrates with global markets.On the other hand,Russia could experience a significant decline if it fails to take these steps and oil

77、and gas prices remain in the$50-70 per barrel range.No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China,India,or Russia,and none is likely to match their individual global clout.We expect,however,to see the political and economic power of other countriessuch as Indonesia,Iran,and Turkeyin

78、crease.For the most part,China,India,and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development but instead are using a different model,“state capitalism.”State capitalism is a loose term used to describe a system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state.Other

79、 rising powersSouth Korea,Taiwan,and Singaporealso used state capitalism to develop their economies.However,the impact of Russia,and particularly China,following this path is potentially much greater owing to their size and approach to“democratization.”We remain optimistic about the long-term prospe

80、cts for greater democratization,even though advances are likely to be slow and globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures with the potential to undermine liberal institutions.Many other countries will fall further behind economically.

81、Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to economic disruption,population stresses,civil conflict,and political instability.Despite increased global demand for commodities for which Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major supplier,local populations are unlikely to experience significant

82、 economic gain.Windfall profits arising from sustained increases in commodity prices might further entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in several regions,diminishing the prospects for democratic and market-based reforms.Although many of Latin Americas major countries will have bec

83、ome middle income powers by 2025,others,particularly those such as Venezuela and Bolivia that have embraced populist policies for a protracted period,will lag behindand some,such as Haiti,will have become even poorer and less governable.Overall,Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and othe

84、r fast-growing areas in terms of economic competitiveness.Asia,Africa,and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over the next 20 years;less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West.Europe and Japan will continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and

85、India in per capita wealth,but they will struggle to maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease.The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration.T

86、he number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to relatively privileged countries is likely to increase.viiiThe number of countries with youthful age structures in the current“arc of instability”is projected to decline by as much as 40 percent.Three of every four youth-bulge countries that

87、 remain will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa;nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East,scattered through southern and central Asia,and in the Pacific Islands.New Transnational Agenda Resource issues will gain prominence on the international agenda.Unprecedented glob

88、al economic growthpositive in so many other regardswill continue to put pressure on a number of highly strategic resources,including energy,food,and water,and demand is projected to outstrip easily available supplies over the next decade or so.For example,non-OPEC liquid hydrocarbon productioncrude

89、oil,natural gas liquids,and unconventionals such as tar sandswill not grow commensurate with demand.Oil and gas production of many traditional energy producers already is declining.Elsewherein China,India,and Mexicoproduction has flattened.Countries capable of significantly expanding production will

90、 dwindle;oil and gas production will be concentrated in unstable areas.As a result of this and other factors,the world will be in the midst of a fundamental energy transition away from oil toward natural gas,coal and other alternatives.The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 pe

91、rcent by 2030,as a result of growing world population,rising affluence,and the shift to Western dietary preferences by a larger middle class.Lack of access to stable supplies of water is reaching critical proportions,particularly for agricultural purposes,and the problem will worsen because of rapid

92、 urbanization worldwide and the roughly 1.2 billion persons to be added over the next 20 years.Today,experts consider 21 countries,with a combined population of about 600 million,to be either cropland or freshwater scarce.Owing to continuing population growth,36 countries,with about 1.4 billion peop

93、le,are projected to fall into this category by 2025.Climate change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcities.Although the impact of climate change will vary by region,a number of regions will begin to suffer harmful effects,particularly water scarcity and loss of agricultural production.Regional

94、 differences in agricultural production are likely to become more pronounced over time with declines disproportionately concentrated in developing countries,particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa.Agricultural losses are expected to mount with substantial impacts forecast by most economists by late

95、 this century.For many developing countries,decreased agricultural output will be devastating because agriculture accounts for a large share of their economies and many of their citizens live close to subsistence levels.New technologies could again provide solutions,such as viable alternatives to fo

96、ssil fuels or means to overcome food and water constraints.However,all current technologies are inadequate for replacing the traditional energy architecture on the scale needed,and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025.The pace of technological innov

97、ation will be key.Even with a favorable policy and funding environment for biofuels,clean coal,or hydrogen,the transition to new fuels will be slow.Major technologies historically have had an“adoption lag.”In the energy sector,a recent study found that it takes an average of 25 years for a new produ

98、ction technology to become widely adopted.ixDespite what are seen as long odds now,we cannot rule out the possibility of an energy transition by 2025 that would avoid the costs of an energy infrastructure overhaul.The greatest possibility for a relatively quick and inexpensive transition during the

99、period comes from better renewable generation sources(photovoltaic and wind)and improvements in battery technology.With many of these technologies,the infrastructure cost hurdle for individual projects would be lower,enabling many small economic actors to develop their own energy transformation proj

100、ects that directly serve their interestse.g.,stationary fuel cells powering homes and offices,recharging plug-in hybrid autos,and selling energy back to the grid.Also,energy conversion schemessuch as plans to generate hydrogen for automotive fuel cells from electricity in the homeowners garagecould

101、avoid the need to develop complex hydrogen transportation infrastructure.Prospects for Terrorism,Conflict,and Proliferation Terrorism,proliferation,and conflict will remain key concerns even as resource issues move up on the international agenda.Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025,but its app

102、eal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East.Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists ranks,but othersmotivated by a variety of factors,such as a desire for revenge

103、or to become“martyrs”will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives.In the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression,conditions will be ripe for disaffection,growing radicalism,and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups.Terrorist groups

104、in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groupsthat inherit organizational structures,command and control processes,and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radica

105、lized.For those terrorist groups that are active in 2025,the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach.One of our greatest concerns continues to be that terrorist or other malevolent groups might acquire and employ

106、 biological agents,or less likely,a nuclear device,to create mass casualties.Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable,other countries worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers,acquire additional

107、 weapons,and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran.Episodes of low-intensity conflict ta

108、king place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.We believe ideological conflicts akin to the Cold War are unlikely to take root in a world in which most states will be preoccupie

109、d with the pragmatic challenges of globalization and shifting global power alignments.The force of ideology is likely to be strongest in the Muslim worldparticularly the Arab core.In those countries that are likely to struggle with youth bulges and weak economic underpinningssuch as Pakistan,Afghani

110、stan,Nigeria,and Yementhe radical Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction.xTypes of conflict we have not seen for awhilesuch as over resourcescould reemerge.Perceptions of energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies.In the worst case

111、,this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,for example,to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regimes.However,even actions short of war will have important geopolitical consequences.Maritime security

112、concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts,such as Chinas and Indias development of blue-water naval capabilities.The buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions,rivalries,and counterbalancing moves but it also will create opportunitie

113、s for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.With water becoming more scarce in Asia and the Middle East,cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states.The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years,although rema

114、ining very low,is likely to be greater than it is today as a result of several converging trends.The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups.Ongoing low

115、-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers.The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea also continues to ra

116、ise questions regarding the ability of weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years,the international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian,economic,and political-military repercussions.A future use of nuclear

117、weapons probably would bring about significant geopolitical changes as some states would seek to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others would push for global nuclear disarmament.A More Complex International System The trend toward greater diffusion of autho

118、rity and power that has been occurring for a couple decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new global players,the worsening institutional deficit,potential expansion of regional blocs,and enhanced strength of nonstate actors and networks.The multiplicity of actors on the interna

119、tional scene could add strengthin terms of filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutionsor further fragment the international system and incapacitate international cooperation.The diversity in type of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades,partic

120、ularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community.The rising BRIC powers are unlikely to challenge the international system as did Germany and Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries,but because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout,they will have a h

121、igh degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms.They also are likely to want to preserve their policy freedom to maneuver,allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with such issues as terrorism,climate change,proliferati

122、on,and energy security.xiExisting multilateral institutionswhich are large and cumbersome and were designed for a different geopolitical orderwill have difficulty adapting quickly to undertake new missions,accommodate changing memberships,and augment their resources.Nongovernmental organizations(NGO

123、s)concentrating on specific issuesincreasingly will be a part of the landscape,but NGO networks are likely to be limited in their ability to effect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments.Efforts at greater inclusivenessto reflect the emergence of the n

124、ewer powersmay make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges.Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted.Greater Asian regionalismpossible by 2025would

125、 have global implications,sparking or reinforcing a trend toward three trade and financial clusters that could become quasi-blocs:North America,Europe,and East Asia.Establishment of such quasi-blocs would have implications for the ability to achieve future global World Trade Organization(WTO)agreeme

126、nts.Regional clusters could compete in setting trans-regional product standards for information technology,biotechnology,nanotechnology,intellectual property rights,and other aspects of the“new economy.”On the other hand,an absence of regional cooperation in Asia could help spur competition among Ch

127、ina,India,and Japan over resources such as energy.Intrinsic to the growing complexity of the overlapping roles of states,institutions,and nonstate actors is the proliferation of political identities,which is leading to establishment of new networks and rediscovered communities.No one political ident

128、ity is likely to be dominant in most societies by 2025.Religion-based networks may be quintessential issue networks and overall may play a more powerful role on many transnational issues such as the environment and inequalities than secular groupings.The United States:Less Dominant Power By 2025 the

129、 US will find itself as one of a number of important actors on the world stage,albeit still the most powerful one.Even in the military realm,where the US will continue to possess considerable advantages in 2025,advances by others in science and technology,expanded adoption of irregular warfare tacti

130、cs by both state and nonstate actors,proliferation of long-range precision weapons,and growing use of cyber warfare attacks increasingly will constrict US freedom of action.A more constrained US role has implications for others and the likelihood of new agenda issues being tackled effectively.Despit

131、e the recent rise in anti-Americanism,the US probably will continue to be seen as a much-needed regional balancer in the Middle East and Asia.The US will continue to be expected to play a significant role in using its military power to counter global terrorism.On newer security issues like climate c

132、hange,US leadership will be widely perceived as critical to leveraging competing and divisive views to find solutions.At the same time,the multiplicity of influential actors and distrust of vast power means less room for the US to call the shots without the support of strong partnerships.Development

133、s in the rest of the world,including internal developments in a number of key statesparticularly China and Russiaare also likely to be crucial determinants of US policy.xii2025What Kind of Future?The above trends suggest major discontinuities,shocks,and surprises,which we highlight throughout the te

134、xt.Examples include nuclear weapons use or a pandemic.In some cases,the surprise element is only a matter of timing:an energy transition,for example is inevitable;the only questions are when and how abruptly or smoothly such a transition occurs.An energy transition from one type of fuel(fossil fuels

135、)to another(alternative)is an event that historically has only happened once a century at most with momentous consequences.The transition from wood to coal helped trigger industrialization.In this case,a transitionparticularly an abrupt oneout of fossil fuels would have major repercussions for energ

136、y producers in the Middle East and Eurasia,potentially causing permanent decline of some states as global and regional powers.Other discontinuities are less predictable.They are likely to result from an interaction of several trends and depend on the quality of leadership.We put uncertainties such a

137、s whether China or Russia becomes a democracy in this category.Chinas growing middle class increases the chances but does not make such a development inevitable.Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the absence of economic diversification.Pressure from below may force the issue,or a lea

138、der might begin or enhance the democratization process to sustain the economy or spur economic growth.A sustained plunge in the price of oil and gas would alter the outlook and increase prospects for greater political and economic liberalization in Russia.If either country were to democratize,it wou

139、ld represent another wave of democratization with wide significance for many other developing states.Also uncertain are the outcomes of demographic challenges facing Europe,Japan,and even Russia.In none of these cases does demography have to spell destiny with less regional and global power an inevi

140、table outcome.Technology,the role of immigration,public health improvements,and laws encouraging greater female participation in the economy are some of the measures that could change the trajectory of current trends pointing toward less economic growth,increased social tensions,and possible decline

141、.Whether global institutions adapt and reviveanother key uncertaintyalso is a function of leadership.Current trends suggest a dispersion of power and authority will create a global governance deficit.Reversing those trend lines would require strong leadership in the international community by a numb

142、er of powers,including the emerging ones.Some uncertainties would have greater consequencesshould they occurthan would others.In this work,we emphasize the overall potential for greater conflictsome forms of which could threaten globalization.We put WMD terrorism and a Middle East nuclear arms race

143、in this category.The key uncertainties and possible impacts are discussed in the text and summarized in the textbox on page vii.In the four fictionalized scenarios,we have highlighted new challenges that could emerge as a result of the ongoing global transformation.They present new situations,dilemm

144、as,or predicaments that represent departures from recent developments.As a set,they do not cover all possible futures.None of these is inevitable or even necessarily likely;but,as with many other uncertainties,the scenarios are potential game-changers.?In A World Without the West,the new powers supp

145、lant the West as the leaders on the world stage.xiii?October Surprise illustrates the impact of inattention to global climate change;unexpected major impacts narrow the worlds range of options.?In BRICs Bust-Up,disputes over vital resources emerge as a source of conflict between major powersin this

146、case two emerging heavyweightsIndia and China.?In Politics is Not Always Local,nonstate networks emerge to set the international agenda on the environment,eclipsing governments.1The international systemas constructed following the Second World Warwill be almost unrecognizable by 2025.Indeed,“interna

147、tional system”is a misnomer as it is likely to be more ramshackle than orderly,its composition hybrid and heterogeneous as befits a transition that will still be a work in progress in 2025.The transformation is being fueled by a globalizing economy,marked by an historic shift of relative wealth and

148、economic power from West to East,and by the increasing weight of new playersespecially China and India.The US will remain the single most important actor but will be less dominant.As was true of the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries,China and India will at times be reticent and at other t

149、imes impatient to assume larger roles on the world stage.In 2025,both will still be more concerned about their own internal development than changing the international system.Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states,the relative power of various nonstate actorsincluding businesses,trib

150、es,religious organizations,and even criminal networkswill continue to increase.Several countries could even be“taken over”and run by criminal networks.In areas of Africa or South Asia,states as we know them might wither away,owing to the inability of governments to provide for basic needs,including

151、security.By 2025,the international community will be composed of many actors in addition to nation-states and will lack an overarching approach to global governance.The“system”will be multipolar with many clusters of both state and nonstate actors.Multipolar international systemslike the Concert of

152、Europehave existed in the past,but the one that is emerging is unprecedented because it is global and encompasses a mix of state and nonstate actors that are not grouped into rival camps of roughly equal weight.The most salient characteristics of the“new order”will be the shift from a unipolar world

153、 dominated by the United States to a relatively unstructured hierarchy of old powers and rising nations,and the diffusion of power from state to nonstate actors.“we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international systemHowever,the next 20 years of transition toward

154、 a new international system are fraught with risks”History tells us that rapid change brings many dangers.Despite the recent financial volatility,which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends,we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdownas occurred in 1914-1918 when an earli

155、er phase of globalization came to a halt.However,the next 20 years of transition toward a new international system are fraught with risksmore than we envisaged when we published Mapping the Global Future3 in 2004.These risks include the growing prospect of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and

156、possible interstate conflicts over resources.The breadth of transnational issues requiring attention also is increasing to include issues connected with resource constraints in energy,food,and water;and worries about climate change.Global institutions that could help the world deal with these transn

157、ational issues and,more generally,mitigate the risks of rapid change currently appear incapable of rising to the 3 See Mapping the Global Future:Report of the National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project,National Intelligence Council,December 2004,which can be found at:www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_projec

158、t.html.2Comparison Between Mapping the Global Future:Report of the Intelligence Councils 2020 Project and Global Trends 2025:A Transformed World The most dramatic difference between Mapping the Global Future:Report of the Intelligence Councils 2020 Project and Global Trends 2025:A Transformed World

159、is the latters assumptions of a multipolar future,and therefore dramatic changes in the international system.The 2025 report describes a world in which the US plays a prominent role in global events,but the US is one among many global actors who manage problems.In contrast,the 2020 report projects c

160、ontinued US dominance,positing that most major powers have forsaken the idea of balancing the US.The two documents also differ in their treatment of energy supply,demand,and new alternative sources.In 2020,energy supplies“in the ground”are considered“sufficient to meet global demand.”What is uncerta

161、in,according to the earlier report,is whether political instability in producer countries,supply disruptions,or competition for resources might deleteriously affect international oil markets.Though 2020 mentions the global increase in energy consumption,it emphasizes the domination of fossil fuels.I

162、n contrast,2025 sees the world in the midst of a transition to cleaner fuels.New technologies are projected to provide the capability for fossil fuel substitutes and solutions to water and food scarcity.The 2020 report acknowledges that energy demands will influence superpower relations,but the 2025

163、 report considers energy scarcity as a driving factor in geopolitics.Both reports project probable strong global economic growthfueled by the rise of Brazil,Russia,India,and China,absent major shocks.The 2025 report,however,assesses the likelihood of major discontinuities to be high,emphasizing that

164、“no single outcome seems preordained”and that the next 20 years of transition toward a new international system are fraught with risks,such as a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and possible interstate conflicts over resources.The scenarios in both reports address the future of globalization,the

165、 future structure of the international system,and the dividing lines among groups that will cause conflict or convergence.In both reports,globalization is seen as a driver so pervasive that it will reorder current divisions based on geography,ethnicity,and religious and socio-economic status.3challe

166、nges without concerted efforts by their leaders.More Change than Continuity The rapidly changing international order at a time of growing geopolitical challenges increases the likelihood of discontinuities,shocks,and surprises.No single outcome seems preordained:the Western model of economic liberal

167、ism,democracy,and secularism,for example,which many assumed to be inevitable,may lose its lusterat least in the medium term.In some cases,the surprise element is only a matter of timing:an energy transition,for example,is inevitable;the only questions are when and how abruptly or smoothly such a tra

168、nsition occurs.Other discontinuities are less predictable.Recognizing that what may seem implausible today could become feasible or even likely by 2025,we have looked at a number of single development“shocks.”Examples include the global impact of a nuclear arms exchange,a rapid replacement for fossi

169、l fuels,and a“democratic”China.New technologies could provide solutions,such as viable alternatives to fossil fuel or means to overcome food and water constraints.A critical uncertainty is whether new technologies will be developed and commercialized in time to avert a significant slowdown in econom

170、ic growth owing to resource constraints.Such a slowdown would jeopardize the rise of new powers and deal a serious blow to the aspirations of those countries not yet fully in the globalization game.A world in which shortages predominate could trigger behaviors different from one in which scarcities

171、are overcome through technology or other means.Alternative Futures This study is organized into seven sections that examine:?The Globalizing Economy.?Demographics of Discord.?The New Players.?Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty.?Growing Potential for Conflict.?Will the International System Be Up to the

172、Challenges?As with our previous works,we will describe possible alternative futures that could result from the trends we discuss.4 We see the next 15-20 years as one of those great historical turning points where multiple factors are likely to be in play.How such factors intersect with one another a

173、nd the role of leadership will be crucial to the outcome.In constructing these scenarios,we focused on critical uncertainties regarding the relative importance of the nation-state as compared with nonstate actors,and the level of global cooperation.In some of the scenarios,states are more dominant a

174、nd drive global dynamics;in others,nonstate actors,including religious movements,nongovernmental organizations(NGOs),and super-empowered 4 See Global Trends 2015,A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts,National Intelligence Council,December 2000;and Mapping the Global Future:Report of

175、 the National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project,National Intelligence Council,December 2004.The reports can be found at www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_global trends 2015.html and www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2020_project.html respectively.Power-Sharing in a Multipolar World.4individuals play more important roles.In so

176、me of the scenarios,key players interact in competing groups,through partnerships and cross-border affiliations.Other scenarios envision more interaction as autonomous players operate independently and sometimes conflict with one another.In all the fictionalized scenarios,we highlight challenges tha

177、t could emerge as a result of the ongoing global transformation.The scenarios present new situations,dilemmas,or predicaments that would cause upheavals in the global landscape,leading to very different“worlds.”None of these is inevitable or even necessarily likely;but,as with many other uncertainti

178、es,they are potential game-changers.A World Without the West.In this world,described in a fictional letter from a future head of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO),new powers supplant the West as the leaders on the world stage.The US feels overburdened and withdraws from Central Asia,includi

179、ng Afghanistan;Europe will not step up to the plate and take the lead.Russia,China,and others are forced to deal with the potential for spillover and instability in Central Asia.The SCO gains ascendance while NATOs status declines.Anti-China antagonism in the US and Europe reaches a crescendo;protec

180、tionist trade barriers are put in place.Russia and China enter a marriage of convenience;other countriesIndia and Iranrally around them.The lack of any stable blocwhether in the West or the non-Western worldadds to growing instability and disorder,potentially threatening globalization.October Surpri

181、se.In this world,depicted in a diary entry of a future US President,many countries have been preoccupied with achieving economic growth at the expense of safeguarding the environment.The scientific community has not been able to issue specific warnings,but worries increase that a tipping point has b

182、een reached in which climate change has accelerated and possible impacts will be very destructive.New York City is hit by a major hurricane linked to global climate change;the NY Stock Exchange is severely damaged and,in the face of such destruction,world leaders must begin to think about taking dra

183、stic measures,such as relocating parts of coastal cities.BRICs Bust-Up.In this world,conflict breaks out between China and India over access to vital resources.Outside powers intervene before the conflict escalates and expands into a global conflagration.The clash is triggered by Chinese suspicion o

184、f efforts by others to threaten Beijings energy supplies.Misperceptions and miscalculations lead to the clash.The scenario highlights the importance of energy and other resources to continued growth and development as a great power.It shows the extent to which conflict in a multipolar world is just

185、as likely to occur between rising states as between older and newer powers.Politics is Not Always Local.In this world,outlined in an article by a fictional Financial Times reporter,various nonstate networksNGOs,religious groups,business leaders,and local activistscombine to set the international age

186、nda on the environment and use their clout to elect the UN Secretary General.The global political coalition of nonstate actors plays a crucial role in securing a new worldwide climate change agreement.In this new connected world of digital communications,growing middle classes,and transnational inte

187、rest groups,politics is no longer local and domestic and international agendas become increasingly interchangeable.5Long-Range Projections:A Cautionary Tale In the 20th century,experts forecasting the next 20 yearsroughly the time frame of this studyoften missed major geopolitical events,basing thei

188、r predictions largely on linear projections without exploring possibilities that could cause discontinuities.Before WW I,while tensions between European“great powers”were on the rise,few had an inkling of major changes in the offing,from the extent of mutual slaughter to the downfall of age-old empi

189、res.In the early 1920s,few envisioned the lethal situation about to unfold,ushered in by the Great Depression,Stalins gulags,and an even more bloody world war encompassing multiple genocides.The postwar period saw the establishment of a new international systemmany of whose institutionsthe UN and Br

190、etton Woodsremain with us.Although the bipolar and nuclear age did not lack war and conflict,it did provide a stable framework until the collapse of the Soviet Union.The development of a globalized economy in which China and India play major roles has opened a new era without clear outcomes.Lessons

191、from the last century,however,appear to suggest:?Leaders and their ideas matter.No history of the past hundred years can be told without delving into the roles and thinking of such leaders as Vladimir Lenin,Josef Stalin,Adolf Hitler or Mao Zedong.The actions of dominating leaders are the hardest ele

192、ment to anticipate.At several junctures in the 20th century,Western experts thought liberal and market ideas had triumphed.As demonstrated by the impacts of Churchill,Roosevelt,and Truman,leadership is key even in societies where institutions are strong and the maneuvering room for wielding personal

193、 power is more constrained.?Economic volatility introduces a major risk factor.Historians and social scientists have discovered a strong correlation between rapid economic changeboth positive and negativeand political instability.The massive dislocation and economic volatility introduced by the end

194、of the“first”globalization in 1914-1918 and the rise of protectionist barriers in the 1920s and 1930s,combined with the lingering resentments over the Versailles peace settlement,laid the groundwork for WW II.The collapse of multinational and ethnic empiresbegun after WW I and continuing with the en

195、d of the colonial empires in the post-WW II periodalso unleashed a long series of national and ethnic conflicts that reverberates today.Todays globalization also has spurred the movement of people,disrupting traditional social and geographic boundaries.?Geopolitical rivalries trigger discontinuities

196、 more than does technological change.Many stress the role of technology in bringing about radical change and there is no question it has been a major driver.Weas othershave oftentimes underestimated its impact.However,over the past century,geopolitical rivalries and their consequences have been more

197、 significant causes of the multiple wars,collapse of empires,and rise of new powers than technology alone.7In terms of size,speed,and directional flow,the global shift in relative wealth and economic power now under wayroughly from West to Eastis without precedent in modern history.This shift derive

198、s from two key sources.First,sustained increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf states and Russia.Second,relatively low labor costs combined with certain government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.Strong g

199、lobal demand for these products has made for wide economies of scale margins across Asia,particularly in China and India.These shifts in demand and supply are deep and structural,which suggests that the resulting transfer of economic power we are witnessing is likely to endure.These shifts are the d

200、riving force behind globalization thatas we underlined in our Mapping the Global Future reportis a meta-trend,transforming historic patterns of economic flows and underlying stocks,creating pressures for rebalancing that are painful for both rich and poor countries.“In terms of size,speed,and direct

201、ional flow,the global shift in relative wealth and economic power now under wayroughly from West to Eastis without precedent in modern history.”Although this transfer is not zero-sum,early losers such as most of Latin America(with the exception of Brazil and a few others)and Africa are receiving nei

202、ther a stake in the initial asset transfer nor any significant inbound investment from the recipient countries.Certain industrialized states such as Japan also appear increasingly challenged by inchoate financial links among these emerging markets.The US and Eurozone are receiving much of this emerg

203、ing market liquidity,but whether they will benefit relative to their current position depends on several factors,including the ability of Western countries to reduce oil consumption and demand,the ability of these states to capitalize on a favorable export climate in sectors of comparative strength,

204、such as technology and services,and the domestic policies of recipient states,particularly on issues of monetary policy and openness to foreign investment.Back to the Future Asias economic powerhousesChina and Indiaare restoring the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approxima

205、tely 30 percent and India 15 percent of the worlds wealth.China and India,for the first time since the 18th century,are set to be the largest contributors to worldwide economic growth.These two countries will likely surpass the GDP of all other economies except the US and Japan by 2025,but they will

206、 continue to lag in per capita income for decades.The years around 2025 will be characterized by the“dual identity”of these Asian giants:powerful,but many individual Chinese or Indians feeling relatively poor compared to Westerners.Growth projections for Brazil,Russia,India,and China have them colle

207、ctively matching the original G-7s share of global GDP by 2040-2050.According to these same projections,the eight largest economies in 2025 will be,in descending order:the US,China,India,Japan,Germany,the UK,and France,and Russia.China,especially,has emerged as a new financial heavyweight,claiming$2

208、 trillion in foreign exchange reserves in 2008.Rapidly developing countries,including China and Russia,have created sovereign wealth funds(SWFs)5 with the aim of using their hundreds 5 Sovereign wealth funds(SWFs)constitute capital generated from government surpluses and invested in private markets

209、abroad.Since 2005,the number of 8of billions of dollars worth of assets to achieve higher returns to help them weather economic storms.Some of these funds will return to the West in the form of investments,thereby promoting greater productivity and economic competitiveness.However,foreign direct inv

210、estment(FDI)by emerging powers in the developing world is increasing significantly.A generation of globally competitive companies is emerging from the new powers,helping to further solidify their position in the global marketplace;from Brazil in agribusiness and offshore energy exploration;Russia in

211、 energy and metals;India in IT services,pharmaceuticals,and auto parts;and China in steel,home appliances,and telecommunications equipment.Of the top 100 new global corporate leaders from the non-OECD world listed in a 2006 report from The Boston Consulting Group,84 were headquartered in Brazil,Russ

212、ia,China and India.Growing Middle Class We are witnessing an unprecedented moment in human history:never before have so many been lifted out of extreme poverty as is happening today.A stunning 135 million people escaped dire poverty between 1999 and 2004 alonemore than the population of Japan and al

213、most as many as live in Russia today.states with SWFs has grown from three to over 40,and the aggregate sum under their control from around$700 billion to$3 trillion.The range of functions served by SWFs also has expanded,as many of the states that created them recently have done so out of a desire

214、to perpetuate current account surpluses,or to cultivate intergenerational savings,rather than to buffer commodity market volatility.Should current trends hold,SWFs will swell to over$6.5 trillion within five years,and to$12-15 trillion within a decade,exceeding total fiscal reserves and comprising s

215、ome 20 percent of all global capitalization.Over the next several decades the number of people considered to be in the“global middle class”is projected to swell from 440 million to 1.2 billion or from 7.6 percent of the worlds population to 16.1 percent,according to the World Bank.Most of the new en

216、trants will come from China and India.?However,there is a dark side to the global middle class coin:continued divergence at the extremes.Many countriesespecially the landlocked and resource-poor ones in Sub Saharan Africalack the fundamentals for entering the globalization game.By 2025-2030,the port

217、ion of the world considered poor will shrink by about 23 percent,but the worlds poorstill 63 percent of the globes populationstand to become relatively poorer,according to the World Bank.State Capitalism:A Post-Democratic Marketplace Rising in the East?The monumental achievement of millions escaping

218、 extreme poverty underpins the rise of new powersespecially China and Indiaon the international scene but does not tell the whole story.Today wealth is moving not just from West to East but is concentrating more under state control.In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis,the states role in t

219、he economy may be gaining more appeal throughout the world.With some notable exceptions like India,the states that are beneficiaries of the massive shift of wealthChina,Russia,and Gulf statesare non-democratic and their economic policies blur distinctions between public and private.These states are

220、not following the Western liberal model for self-development but are using a different model“state capitalism.”State capitalism is a loose term to describe a system of 9economic management that gives a prominent role to the state.Otherslike South Korea,Taiwan,and Singaporealso chose state capitalism

221、 as they initially developed their economies.However,the impact of Russia,and particularly China,following this path is potentially greater given their weight on the world stage.Ironically,the major enhancement of the state role in Western economies now under way as a result of the current financial

222、 crisis may reinforce the emerging countries preference for greater state control and distrust of an unregulated marketplace.These states typically favor:?An Open Export Climate.Given the wealth flowing into these states,their desire for a weak currency despite strong domestic economic performance r

223、equires heavy intervention in currency markets,leading to heavy official asset accumulation,typically until now in the form of US Treasury bonds.423587AI 11-080102030405060Latin AmericaChinaUnited StatesIndiaEU15EU+12 aGini Index,most recent survey(0-100)aEuropean Union Nations that acceded in 2004

224、or later.Source:UNDP,Human Development Report 2007/2008:World Bank.More unequal income distributionRegional Income Inequality:European Inequality Lower Than Most 10 Globalization at Risk with the 2008 Financial Crisis?As with most of the trends discussed in this report,the impacts from the financial

225、 crisis will depend heavily on government leadership.Proactive fiscal and monetary policies probably will onal recessions will not turn into an extended depression,although reduced economic growth could slow globalizations pace,increasing protectionist pressures and financial fragmentation.The crisi

226、s is accelerating the global economic rebalancing.Developing countries have been hurt;several,such as Pakistan with its large current account deficit,are at considerable risk.Even those with cash reservessuch as South Korea and Russiahave been severely buffeted;steep rises in unemployment and inflat

227、ion could trigger widespread political instability and throw emerging powers off course.However,if China,Russia,and Mideast oil exporters can avoid internal crises,they will be in a position to leverage their likely still sizeable reserves,buying foreign assets and providing direct financial assista

228、nce to still-struggling countries for political favors or to seed new regional initiatives.In the West,the biggest changenot anticipated before the crisisis the increase in state power.Western governments now own large swaths of their financial sectors and must manage them,potentially politicizing m

229、arkets.The crisis has increased calls for a new“Bretton Woods”to better regulate the global economy.World leaders,however,will be challenged to renovate the IMF and devise a globally transparent and effective set of rules that apply to differing capitalisms and levels of financial institutional deve

230、lopment.Failure to construct a new all-embracing architecture could lead countries to seek security through competitive monetary policies and new investment barriers,increasing the potential for market segmentation.?Sovereign Wealth Funds(SWFs)and Other State Investment Vehicles.Having amassed huge

231、assets,Gulf Cooperation Council(GCC)and Chinese officials have increasingly used various forms of sovereign investment.States entering private markets are doing so partly for the prospect of higher return.SWFs are the most widely publicized but only one of many sovereign investment vehicles.?Renewed

232、 Efforts Toward Industrial Policy.Governments that highly manage their economies often have an interest in industrial policy.China,Russia,and the Gulf states have state plans to diversify their economies and climb the value-added ladder into high technology and service sectors.The significant differ

233、ence between todays efforts and those of earlier periods,however,is that these states now directly own the economic wherewithal to implement their plans and need not rely on incentivizing parties or luring foreign capital.?Rollback of Privatization and the Resurgence of State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs)

234、.In the early 1990s,many economists predicted that SOEs would be a relic of the 20th century.They were wrong.SOEs are far from extinction,are thriving,and in many cases seek to ensure the current panic and likely deep nati 11 expand beyond their own borders,particularly in the commodities and energy

235、 sectors.SOEs,especially national oil companies,are likely to attract investment for the surfeit of ready capital that these states are accumulating.Much like SWFs,SOEs serve a secondary function as pressure valves,helping to relieve inflation and currency appreciation pressures.They also can act as

236、 vehicles for increased political control.To the extent state-owned firms reach across state borders,they may become vehicles for geopolitical influence,particularly those dealing in key strategic resources such as energy.The increasing role of the state as a player in emerging markets has contraste

237、d until recently with nearly opposite trends in the West,where the state has struggled to keep pace with private financial engineering,such as derivatives and credit swaps.The seeds of this capital markets depth and complexity date to the 1980s but grew with rising asset prices and bull markets from

238、 the 1990s until recently.The financial engineeringbased upon a magnitude of leverage unthinkable even a decade agoin turn has injected an unprecedented degree of risk and volatility into global markets.Greater controls and international regulationa possible outcome of the current financial crisisco

239、uld change this trajectory,although a gap on the role of the state in the economy is likely to remain between the West and the rapidly emerging economic powers.Bumpy Ride in Correcting Current Global Imbalances The refusal of emerging markets to allow currency appreciation despite booming economies,

240、together with the willingness of the US to incur greater sums of debt,has created a mutually supporting,albeit ultimately unsustainable cycle of imbalances.Indeed,the Wall Street events of 2008 mark the opening chapters of a larger story of rebalancing and course correction from these imbalances.The

241、 righting of these imbalances will be bumpy as the global economy moves into realignment.The difficulties of global economic policy coordinationin part a byproduct of the growing political and financial multipolarityincrease the chances of a bumpy ride.One of the following developments or a combinat

242、ion could cause an adjustment:a slowdown in US consumption and an attendant increase in the US savings rate,and an increase in demand from emerging Asian markets,particularly China and India.Whether imbalances stabilize or rebound out to 2025 depends in part on the particular lessons that the emergi

243、ng powers choose to draw from the financial crisis.Some may interpret the crisis as a rationale for hoarding yet more in the way of a cushion,while othersin understanding that few if any emerging economies were immune from the widespread downturncould come to regard the stockpiling of reserves as le

244、ss of a priority.Major financial disruptions and the needed economic and political readjustments have often spread beyond the financial arena.History suggests that this rebalancing will require long-term efforts to establish a new international system.Specific problems to be overcome include:?Greate

245、r Trade and Investment Protectionism.Increasingly aggressive foreign acquisitions by corporations based in the rapidly emerging economiesmany will be state-ownedwill raise political tensions,potentially creating a public backlash in countries against foreign trade and investment.The perception of un

246、even benefits from 12 globalization in the US may fuel protectionist forces.?An Accelerated Resource Grab.The new powers increasingly will have the means to acquire commodities in an effort to ensure continued development.Russia,China,and India have linked their national security to increased state

247、control of and access to energy resources and markets through their state-owned energy firms.Gulf states are interested in land leases and purchases elsewhere to ensure adequate food supplies.?Slowing Democratization.China,particularly,offers an alternative model for political development in additio

248、n to demonstrating a different economic pathway.This model may prove attractive to under-performing authoritarian regimes,in addition to weak democracies frustrated by years of economic underperformance.?The Overshadowing of International Financial Institutions.Sovereign wealth funds have injected m

249、ore capital into emerging markets than the IMF and World Bank combined,and this trend could even continue with unwinding global imbalances.China already is beginning to couple SWF investment with direct aid and foreign assistance,often directly outbidding the World Bank on development projects.Such

250、foreign investment by newly rich states such as China,Russia,and the GCC states will lead to diplomatic realignments and new relationships between these states and the developing world.?A Decline in the Dollars International Role.Despite recent inflows into dollar assets and the appreciation of the

251、dollar,the dollar could lose its status as an unparalleled global reserve currency by 2025,and become a first among equals in a market basket of currencies.This may force the US to consider more carefully how the conduct of its foreign policy affects the dollar.Without a steady source of external de

252、mand for dollars,US foreign policy actions might bring exposure to currency shock and higher interest rates for Americans.Growing use of the euro is already evident,potentially making it harder for the US in the future to exploit the unique role of the dollar in international trade and investment to

253、 freeze assets and disrupt the financial flows of its adversaries,such as it recently has accomplished with financial sanctions against the leadership in North Korea and Iran.Incentives and inclinations to move away from the dollar will be tempered,however,by uncertainties and instabilities in the i

254、nternational financial system.Multiple Financial Nodes Anchored by the US and EU in the West,Russia and the GCC states in Central Asia and the Middle East,and China and eventually India in the East,the financial landscape for the first time will be genuinely global and multipolar.Insomuch as the rec

255、ent financial crisis heightens interest in less leveraged finance,Islamic finance may also see a boost.While such a global and multipolar financial order signals a relative decline for US power and a likely increase in market competition and complexity,these downsides are likely to be accompanied by

256、 many positives.Over time,and as they develop,these multiple financial centers may create redundancies that help insulate markets against financial shocks and currency crises,quelling their effects before global contagion takes hold.Similarly,as regions become more invested in their financial epicen

257、ters,incentives to preserve geopolitical stability to 13 Science and Technology Leadership:A Test for the Emerging Powers The relationship between achievements in science and technology and economic growth has been long established,but the path is not always predictable.More significant is the overa

258、ll effectiveness of a nations National Innovation System(NIS)the process by which intellectual concepts are moved toward commercialization for the benefit of a national economy.According to a NIC-contracted global survey of scientific experts,the United States currently boasts a stronger innovation

259、system than the developing economies of China and India.?The idea of an NIS was first developed in the 1980s as an aid to understanding how some countries were proving better than others at turning intellectual concepts into commercial products that would boost their economies.The NIS model is evolv

260、ing as information technology and the effect of increased globalization(and multinational corporations)influence national economies.According to the NIC-commissioned study,nine factors can contribute to a modern NIS:fluidity of capital,flexibility of the labor pool,government receptivity to business

261、,information communication technologies,private sector development infrastructure,legal systems to protect intellectual property rights,available scientific and human capital,marketing skills,and cultural propensity to encourage creativity.China and India are expected in 10 years to achieve near par

262、ity with the US in two different areas:scientific and human capital(India)and government receptivity to business innovation(China).China and India will narrow significantly but not close the gap in all remaining factors.The United States is expected to remain dominant in three areas:protection for i

263、ntellectual property rights,business sophistication to mature innovation,and encouragement of creativity.Companies in China,India,and other major developing countries have unique opportunities to be the first to develop a host of emerging technologies.This is especially the case in those instances w

264、here companies are building new infrastructure and not burdened by historical patterns of development.Such opportunities include distributed electrical power generation,development of clean water sources,and the next generation of Internet and new information technologies(such as ubiquitous computin

265、g and the Internet of Thingssee the foldout).Early and significant adoption of these technologies could provide considerable economic advantage.shelter these financial flows will increase.History suggests,however,that such a redirection toward regional financial centers could soon spill over into ot

266、her areas of power.Rarely,if ever,have such“financiers of last resort”been content to limit their influence to strictly financial realms.Inter-regional tensions could divide the West with the US and EU having increasingly divergent economic and monetary priorities,complicating Western efforts to lea

267、d and jointly grow the global economy.Diverging Development Models,but for How Long?The state-centric model in which the state makes the key economic decisions and,in the case of China and increasingly Russia,democracy is restricted,raises questions about the inevitability of the traditional Western

268、 reciperoughly liberal economics and 14 democracyfor development.Over the next 15-20 years,more developing countries may gravitate toward Beijings state-centric model rather than the traditional Western model of markets and democratic political systems to increase the chances of rapid development an

269、d perceived political stability.While we believe a gap will remain,the enhanced role of the state in Western economies may also lessen the contrast between the two models.In the Middle East,secularism,which also has been considered an integral part of the Western model,increasingly may be seen as ou

270、t of place as Islamic parties come into prominence and possibly begin to run governments.As in todays Turkey,we could see both increased Islamization and greater emphasis on economic growth and modernization.“China,particularly,offers an alternative model for political development in addition to dem

271、onstrating a different economic pathway.”The lack of any overarching ideology and the mix-and-match of some of the elementsfor example Brazil and India are vibrant market democraciesmeans the state-centric model does not yet constitute anything like an alternative system and,in our view,is unlikely

272、ever to be one.Whether China liberalizes both politically and economically over the next two decades is a particularly critical test for the long-term sustainability of an alternative to the traditional Western model.Although democratization probably will be slow and may have its own Chinese charact

273、er,we believe the emerging middle class will press for greater political influence and accountability of those in charge,particularly if the central government falters in its ability to sustain economic growth or is unresponsive to growing“quality of life”issues such as increasing pollution or the n

274、eed for health and education services.The governments own efforts to boost S&T and establish a“high tech”economy will increase incentives for greater openness to develop human capital at home and attract expertise and ideas from outside.Historical patterns evinced by other energy producers suggest d

275、eflecting pressures for liberalization will be easier for Russian authorities.Traditionally,energy producers also have been able to use revenues to buy off political opponents;few have made the transition to democracy while their energy revenues remain strong.A sustained plunge in the price of oil a

276、nd gas would alter the outlook and increase prospects for greater political and economic liberalization in Russia.15 Latin America:Moderate Economic Growth,Continued Urban Violence Many Latin American countries will have achieved marked progress in democratic consolidation by 2025,and some of these

277、countries will have become middle income powers.Others,particularly those that have embraced populist policies,will lag behindand some,such as Haiti,will have become even poorer and still less governable.Public security problems will continue to be intractableand in some cases unmanageable.Brazil wi

278、ll become the leading regional power,but its efforts to promote South American integration will be realized only in part.Venezuela and Cuba will have some form of vestigial influence in the region in 2025,but their economic problems will limit their appeal.Unless the United States is able to deliver

279、 market access on a permanent and meaningful basis,the US could lose its traditionally privileged position in the region,with a concomitant decline in political influence.Steady economic growth between now and 2025perhaps as high as 4 percentwill fuel modest decreases in poverty levels in some count

280、ries and a gradual reduction of the informal sector.Progress on critical secondary reforms,such as education,regressive tax systems,weak property rights,and inadequate law enforcement will remain incremental and spotty.The relative growing importance of the region as a producer of oil,natural gas,bi

281、ofuels,and other alternative energy sources will spur growth in Brazil,Chile,Colombia,and Mexico,but state ownership and political turmoil will impede efficient development of energy resources.The economic competitiveness of Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and some other fast growing

282、areas.Population growth in the region will be relatively moderate,but the rural poor and indigenous populations will continue to grow at a faster rate.Latin America will have a graying population as the growth rate of adults aged 60 and over rises.Parts of Latin America will continue to be among the

283、 worlds most violent areas.Drug trafficking organizations,sustained in part by increased local drug consumption,transnational criminal cartels,and local crime rings and gangs,will continue to undermine public security.These factors,and persistent weaknesses in the rule of law,will mean that a few sm

284、all countries,especially in Central America and the Caribbean,will verge on becoming failed states.Latin America will continue to play a marginal role in the international system,except for its participation in international trade and some peacekeeping efforts.US influence in the region will diminis

285、h somewhat,in part because of Latin Americas broadening economic and commercial relations with Asia,Europe,and other blocs.Latins,in general,will look to the United States for guidance both globally and for relations with the region.An increasingly numerous Hispanic population will ensure greater US

286、 attention to,and involvement in,the culture,religion,economics,and politics of the region.16 Women as Agents of Geopolitical Change Economic and political empowerment of women could transform the global landscape over the next 20 years.This trend already is evident in the area of economics:The expl

287、osion in global economic productivity in recent years has been driven as much by fostering human resourcesparticularly through improvements in health,education,and employment opportunities for women and girlsas by technological advances.?The predominance of women in Southeast Asias export manufactur

288、ing sector is a likely key driver of that regions economic success;women agricultural workers account for half the worlds food productioneven without reliable access to land,credit,equipment,and markets.?Over the next 20 years the increased entry and retention of women in the workplace may continue

289、to mitigate the economic impacts of global aging.Women in much of Asia and Latin America are achieving higher levels of education than men,a trend that is particularly significant in a human capital-intensive global economy.?Demographic data indicate a significant correlation between a higher level

290、of female literacy and more robust GDP growth within a region(e.g.,the Americas,Europe,and East Asia).Conversely,those regions with the lowest female literacy rates(southern and western Asia;the Arab world;and Sub-Saharan Africa)are the poorest in the world.?Improved educational opportunities for gi

291、rls and women also are a contributing factor to falling birth rates worldwideand by extension better maternal health.The long-term implications of this trend likely include fewer orphans,less malnutrition,more children in school,and other contributions to societal stability.Although data on womens p

292、olitical involvement are less conclusive than those regarding economic participation,political empowerment of women appears to change governmental priorities.Examples as disparate as Sweden and Rwanda indicate that countries with relatively large numbers of politically active women place greater imp

293、ortance on societal issues such as healthcare,the environment,and economic development.If this trend continues over the next 15-20 years,as is likely,an increasing number of countries could favor social programs over military ones.Better governance also could be a spinoff benefit,as a high number of

294、 women in parliament or senior government positions correlates with lower corruption.Nowhere is the role of women potentially more important for geopolitical change than in the Muslim World.Muslim women do far better assimilating in Europe than their male relatives,partly because they flourish in th

295、e educational system,which facilitates their entry into jobs in information or service industries.Sharply declining fertility rates among Muslims in Europe demonstrate this willingness to accept jobs outside the home and a growing refusal to conform to traditional norms.In the short term,the decline

296、 of traditional Muslim family structures may help explain the openness of many young Muslim men to radical Islamic messages.However,in (Continued on next page)17(Continued)rearing future generations,women might help show the way to greater social assimilation and reduce the likelihood of religious e

297、xtremism.The impact of growing numbers of women in the workplace may also have an impact outside Europe.The modernizing countries of the Islamic Mediterranean have close ties to Europe,to which these countries have sent many migrants.Migrants return to visit or resettle and bring with them new ideas

298、 and expectations.These Islamic countries also receive foreign influences from European mass media,through satellite dishes and the Internet.Higher Education Shaping the Global Landscape in 2025 As global business grows increasingly borderless and labor markets more seamless,education has become a k

299、ey determinant of countries economic performance and potential.Adequate primary education is essential,but the quality and accessibility of secondary and higher education will be even more important for determining whether societies successfully graduate up the value-added production ladder.The US l

300、ead in highly skilled labor will likely narrow as large developing countries,particularly China,begin to reap dividends on recent investments in human capital,including education but also nutrition and healthcare.India faces a challenge because inadequate primary education is widespread in the poore

301、r regions and top-flight educational institutions cater to a relatively privileged few.Funding as a proportion of GDP has grown to around 5 percent in most European countries,although few European universities are rated as world class.Spending on education in the Arab world is roughly on par with th

302、e rest of the world in absolute terms and surpasses the global mean as a percentage of GDP,lagging only slightly behind OECD high-income countries.UN data and research findings by other institutions suggest,however that training and education of Middle Eastern youth is not driven by the needs of emp

303、loyers,especially for science and technology.There are some signs of progress.The US may be uniquely able to adapt its higher education and research system to rising global demand and position itself as a world education hub for the growing number of students that will enter the education market out

304、 to 2025.Although further opening of US classrooms and laboratories could mean greater competition for US students,the US economy would likely benefit because companies tend to base their operations near available human capital.Continued export of US educational models with the building of US campus

305、es in the Middle East and Central Asia could boost the attractiveness and global prestige of US universities.19 Trends in birth,death,and migration are changing the absolute and relative size of young and old,rural and urban,and ethnic majority and minority populations within and among emerging and

306、established powers.These demographic reconfigurations will offer social and economic opportunities for some powers and severely challenge established arrangements in others.The populations of more than 50 countries will increase by more than a third(some by more than two-thirds)by 2025,placing addit

307、ional stresses on vital natural resources,services,and infrastructure.Two-thirds of these countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa;most of the remaining fast-growing countries are in the Middle East and South Asia.Populations Growing,Declining,and Diversifyingat the Same Time World population is projecte

308、d to grow by about 1.2 billion between 2009 and 2025from 6.8 billion to around 8 billion people.Although the global population increase is substantialwith concomitant effects on resourcesthe rate of growth will be slower than it was,down from levels that added 2.4 billion persons between 1980 and to

309、day.Demographers project that Asia and Africa will account for most of the population growth out to 2025 while less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the“West”Europe,Japan,the United States,Canada,Australia,and New Zealand.In 2025,roughly 16 percent of humanity will live in the West,down fr

310、om the 18 percent in 2009 and 24 percent in 1980.?The largest increase will occur in India,representing about one-fifth of all growth.Indias population is projected to climb by around 240 million by 2025,reaching approximately 1.45 billion people.From 2009 to 2025,Asias other giant,China,is projecte

311、d to add more than 100 million to its current population of over 1.3 billion.(See graphic on page 22.)?In aggregate,the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to add about 350 million people during the same period,while those in Latin America and the Caribbean will increase by about 100 milli

312、on.?Between now and 2025,Russia,Ukraine,Italy,almost all countries in Eastern Europe,and Japan are expected to see their populations decline by several percent.These declines could approach or exceed 10 percent of the current populations in Russia,Ukraine,and a few other Eastern European countries.?

313、The populations of the US,Canada,Australia,and a few other industrial states with relatively high immigration rates will continue to growthe US by more than 40 million,Canada by 4.5 million,and Australia by more than 3 million.By 2025,the already diverse array of national population age structures p

314、romises to be more varied than ever,and the gap between the youngest and oldest profiles will continue to widen.The“oldest”countriesthose in which people under age 30 form less than one-third of the populationwill mark a band across the northern edge of the world map.In contrast,the“youngest”countri

315、es,where the under-30 group represents 60 percent of the population or more,will nearly all be located in Sub-Saharan Africa.(See maps on page 20.)20 World Age Structure,2005 and Projected 2025784355AI(G00975)11-0820052025Source:US Census data.60 or more45 to 5930 to 44Less than 30No dataPercentage

316、of Population Younger Than 30 Years Old 21 The Pensioner Boom:Challenges of Aging Populations Population aging has brought todays developed countrieswith a few exceptions such as the USto a demographic“tipping point.”Today,nearly 7 out of every 10 people in the developed world are in the traditional

317、 working years(ages 15 to 64)a high-tide mark.This number has never before been so high and,according to experts,in all likelihood will never be so high again.In almost every developed country,the period of most rapid growth in the ratio of seniors(age 65 and older)to the working-age population will

318、 occur during the 2010s and 2020s,boosting the fiscal burden of old-age benefit programs.By 2010,there will be about one senior for every four working-age people in the developed world.By 2025,this ratio will have climbed to one to three,and possibly higher.?Japan is in a difficult position:its work

319、ing-age population has been contracting since the mid-1990s and its overall population since 2005.Todays projections envision a society in which,by 2025,there will be one senior for every two working-age Japanese.?The picture for Western Europe is more mixed.The UK,France,Belgium,the Netherlands,and

320、 the Nordics will likely maintain the highest fertility rates in Europe but will remain below two children per woman.In the rest of the region,fertility probably will stay below 1.5 children per woman,on par with Japan(and well below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman).Large and sustain

321、ed increases in the fertility rate,even if they began now,would not reverse the aging trend for decades in Europe and Japan.If fertility rose immediately to the replacement level in Western Europe,the ratio of seniors to people in their working years would continue to rise steadily through the late

322、2030s.In Japan,it would continue to rise through the late 2040s.The annual level of net immigration would have to double or triple to keep working-age populations from shrinking in Western Europe.By 2025,non-European minority populations could reach significant proportions15 percent or morein nearly

323、 all Western European countries and will have a substantially younger age structure than the native population(see page 20).Given growing discontent with current levels of immigrants among native Europeans,such steep increases are likely to heighten tensions.The aging of societies will have economic

324、 consequences.Even with productivity increases,slower employment growth from a shrinking work force probably will reduce Europes already tepid GDP growth by 1 percent.By the 2030s,Japans GDP growth is projected to drop to near zero according to some models.The cost of trying to maintain pensions and

325、 health coverage will squeeze out expenditures on other priorities,such as defense.Persistent Youth Bulges Countries with youthful age structures and rapidly growing populations form a crescent stretching from the Andean region of Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa,the Middle East and the Cauca

326、sus,and then through the northern parts of South Asia.By 2025,the number of countries in this“arc of instability”will have decreased by 35 to 40 percent owing to declining fertility and maturing populations.Three quarters of the three dozen“youth bulge countries”projected to linger beyond 2025 will

327、be located in Sub-Saharan Africa.The remainder will be 22 located in the Middle East and scattered across Asia and among the Pacific Islands.?The emergence of new economic tigers by 2025 could occur where youth bulges mature into“worker bulges.”Experts argue that this demographic bonus is most advan

328、tageous when the country provides an educated work force and a business-friendly environment for investment.Potential beneficiaries include Turkey,Lebanon,Iran,and the Maghreb states of North Africa(Morocco,Algeria and Tunisia),Colombia,Costa Rica,Chile,Vietnam,Indonesia,and Malaysia.?The current yo

329、uth bulges in the Maghreb states,Turkey,Lebanon,and Iran will diminish rapidly but those in the West Bank/Gaza,Iraq,Yemen,Saudi Arabia and adjacent Afghanistan and Pakistan will persist through 2025.Unless employment conditions change dramatically,youth in weak states will continue to go elsewhereex

330、ternalizing volatility and violence.The populations of already parlous youth-bulge statessuch as Afghanistan,Democratic Republic of Congo(DROC),Ethiopia,Nigeria,Pakistan,and Yemenare projected to remain on rapid-growth trajectories.Pakistans and Nigerias populations are each projected to grow by abo

331、ut 55 million people.Ethiopia and DROC will likely add about 40 million each,while the populations of Afghanistan and Yemen are projected to grow more than 50 percent larger than todays.All will retain age structures with large proportions of young Total Population Billion peopleSource:US Census Dat

332、a423712ID 11-080.501.01.52.0USWestern EuropeRussiaJapanIranIndiaChinaNow 2025 23 The Impact of HIV/AIDS Neither an effective HIV vaccine nor a self-administered microbicide,even if developed and tested before 2025,will likely be widely disseminated by then.Although prevention efforts and local behav

333、ioral changes will depress infection rates globally,experts expect HIV/AIDS to remain a global pandemic through 2025 with its epicenter of infection in Sub-Saharan Africa.Unlike today,the vast majority of people living with HIV will have access to life-extending anti-retroviral therapies.?If prevention efforts and effectiveness remain at current levels,the HIV-positive population is expected to cl