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1、A World Bank Group Flagship ReportGlobal Economic ProspectsJUNE 2024Global Economic Prospects JUNE 2024 Global Economic Prospects 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433 Telephone:202-473-1000;Internet:www.worldbank.org Some righ

2、ts reserved 1 2 3 4 27 26 25 24 This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions.The findings,interpretations,and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank,its Board of Executive Directors,or the governments they repres

3、ent.The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy,completeness,or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors,omissions,or discrepancies in the information,or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information,methods,processes,or

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7、ses,under the following conditions:AttributionPlease cite the work as follows:World Bank.2024.Global Economic Prospects,June 2024.Washington,DC:World Bank.doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-2058-8.License:Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO TranslationsIf you create a translation of this work,please add

8、the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This translation was not created by The World Bank and should not be considered an official World Bank translation.The World Bank shall not be liable for any content or error in this translation.AdaptationsIf you create an adaptation of this work,p

9、lease add the following disclaimer along with the attribution:This is an adaptation of an original work by The World Bank.Views and opinions expressed in the adaptation are the sole responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed by The World Bank.Third-party contentTh

10、e World Bank does not necessarily own each component of the content contained within the work.The World Bank therefore does not warrant that the use of any third-party-owned individual component or part contained in the work will not infringe on the rights of those third parties.The risk of claims r

11、esulting from such infringement rests solely with you.If you wish to reuse a component of the work,it is your responsibility to determine whether permission is needed for that reuse and to obtain permission from the copyright owner.Examples of components can include,but are not limited to,tables,fig

12、ures,or images.All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to World Bank Publications,The World Bank Group,1818 H Street NW,Washington,DC 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.ISSN:1014-8906 ISBN(paper):978-1-4648-2058-8 ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-2059-5 DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-2058-8 C

13、over design:Bill Pragluski(Critical Stages)Library of Congress Control Number:2024910800.The cutoff date for the data used in the report was June 4,2024.v Summary of Contents Statistical Appendix.183 Selected Topics.190 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 The Global Outlook.1 Box 1.1 Regional pe

14、rspectives:Outlook and risks.19 Box 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries.25 Regional Outlooks.51 East Asia and Pacific.53 Europe and Central Asia.61 Latin America and the Caribbean.69 Middle East and North Africa.77 South Asia.85 Sub-Saharan Africa.93 Harnessing the Benefits

15、of Public Investment.103 Box 3.1 Public investment dynamics around adverse events.126 Box 3.2 Macroeconomic impacts of public investment:A literature review.129 Fiscal Challenges in Small States:Weathering Storms,Rebuilding Resilience.147 Acknowledgments.xiii Foreword.xv Executive Summary.xvii Abbre

16、viations.xix vii Contents Chapter 1 Global Outlook.1 Summary.3 Global context.9 Global trade.9 Commodity markets.10 Global inflation.11 Global financial developments.12 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook.14 Advanced economies.14 China.15 Emerging market and developing economies.16 Recen

17、t developments.16 EMDE outlook.17 LICs outlook.24 Per capita income growth.24 Global outlook and risks.30 Summary of global outlook.30 Risks to the outlook.31 Policy challenges.37 Key global challenges.37 EMDE monetary and financial policy challenges.40 EMDE fiscal policy challenges.41 EMDE structur

18、al policy challenges.43 References.47 Acknowledgments.xiii Foreword.xv Executive Summary.xvii Abbreviations.xix Regional Outlooks.51 East Asia and Pacific .53 Recent developments.53 Outlook.54 Risks.56 Europe and Central Asia.61 Recent developments.61 Chapter 2 viii Outlook.61 Risks.64 Latin America

19、 and the Caribbean.69 Recent developments.69 Outlook.69 Risks.72 Middle East and North Africa .77 Recent developments.77 Outlook.78 Risks.80 South Asia.85 Recent developments.85 Outlook.86 Risks.88 Sub-Saharan Africa.93 Recent developments.93 Outlook.94 Risks.96 References.100 Chapter 2 Harnessing t

20、he Benefits of Public Investment.103 Introduction.105 Evolution of public investment.109 Public investment-growth nexus:Channels of transmission.111 Macroeconomic implications of public investment.113 Database and methodology.113 Results.113 Policies to improve the macroeconomic benefits of public i

21、nvestment.118 Expansion of fiscal space.118 Efficiency of public investment.120 Enhanced global support.124 Conclusion.124 References.139 Chapter 3 Fiscal Challenges in Small States:Weathering Storms,Rebuilding Resilience.147 Introduction.149 Fiscal vulnerability to shocks.152 Evolution of fiscal po

22、sitions in small states.154 Conceptual framework.154 Chapter 4 ix Statistical Appendix.183 Data and Forecast Conventions.189 Selected Topics.190 1.1 Global prospects.5 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges.7 1.3 Global trade.9 1.4 Commodity markets.11 1.5 Global inflation.12 1.6 Global financial de

23、velopments.13 1.7 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook.15 1.8 Recent developments in emerging market and developing economies.17 1.9 Outlook in emerging market and developing economies.18 B1.1.1 Regional outlooks.20 B1.1.2 Regional risks.21 Figures Boxes 1.1 Regional perspectives:Outlook

24、and risks.19 1.2 Recent developments and outlook for low-income countries.25 3.1 Public investment dynamics around adverse events.126 3.2 Macroeconomic impacts of public investment:A literature review.129 Evolution of debt.155 Widespread rise in government debt.155 Deficit-driven government debt bui

25、ldup.156 Reliance on official creditors.156 Evolution of primary deficits.157 Evolution of government revenues.158 Evolution of government expenditure.160 Fiscal policy options in small states.161 Domestic revenue mobilization.163 Expenditure efficiency.165 Robust fiscal frameworks.167 International

26、 cooperation.169 Conclusion.171 References.176 Chapter 4 Annexes 3.1 Identification of public investment shocks.133 3.2 Estimation of public investment multipliers.135 4.1 Debt decomposition.173 4.2 Fiscal reaction function.173 x B1.2.1 LICs:Recent developments.26 B1.2.2 LICs:Outlook and risks.27 1.

27、10 Per capita income growth.30 1.11 Global outlook.31 1.12 Risks from conflicts,trade fragmentation,and higher-for-longer policy rates.32 1.13 Other risks to the outlook.35 1.14 Global policy challenges.38 1.15 EMDE monetary and financial policy challenges.40 1.16 EMDE fiscal policy challenges.42 1.

28、17 EMDE structural policy challenges.43 2.1.1 China:Recent developments.54 2.1.2 EAP excluding China:Recent developments.55 2.1.3 EAP:Outlook.56 2.1.4 EAP:Risks.57 2.2.1 ECA:Recent developments.62 2.2.2 ECA:Outlook.63 2.2.3 ECA:Risks.64 2.3.1 LAC:Recent developments.70 2.3.2 LAC:Outlook.71 2.3.3 LAC

29、:Risks.72 2.4.1 MNA:Recent developments.78 2.4.2 MNA:Outlook.79 2.4.3 MNA:Risks.81 2.5.1 SAR:Recent developments.86 2.5.2 SAR:Outlook.87 2.5.3 SAR:Risks.89 2.6.1 SSA:Recent developments.94 2.6.2 SSA:Outlook .95 2.6.3 SSA:Risks.97 3.1 Infrastructure investment needs and investment growth.106 3.2 Publ

30、ic investment patterns in EMDEs.110 3.3 Macroeconomic impacts of public investment in EMDEs.114 3.4 Effects of public investment on output conditional on country characteristics.116 3.5 Effects of public investment on output by EMDE groups.117 3.6 Fiscal space in EMDEs.119 3.7 Public investment effi

31、ciency.121 3.8 Private sector participation in infrastructure.123 B3.1.1 Public investment dynamics around adverse events.127 Figures xi Tables 1.1 Real GDP.4 B1.2.1 Low-income country forecasts.28 1.2 Emerging market and developing economies.46 2.1.1 East Asia and Pacific forecast summary.59 2.1.2

32、East Asia and Pacific country forecasts.60 2.2.1 Europe and Central Asia forecast summary.66 2.2.2 Europe and Central Asia country forecasts.67 2.3.1 Latin America and the Caribbean forecast summary.74 2.3.2 Latin America and the Caribbean country forecasts.75 2.4.1 Middle East and North Africa fore

33、cast summary.82 2.4.2 Middle East and North Africa economy forecasts.83 2.5.1 South Asia forecast summary.90 2.5.2 South Asia country forecasts.91 2.6.1 Sub-Saharan Africa forecast summary.98 2.6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa country forecasts.99 B3.2.1 Output effects of public investment:Summary of the lite

34、rature.131 A3.2.1 Sample used in the estimation of public investment multipliers.137 A3.2.2 Summary statistics for public investment shocks.137 Figures 4.1 Small states and other economies:Output growth and structural characteristics.151 4.2 Fiscal outcomes around major events in small states and ot

35、her EMDEs.154 4.3 Output since the COVID-19 pandemic in small states and other EMDEs.155 4.4 Government debt in small states and other EMDEs.156 4.5 Contributors to increases in government debt in small states.157 4.6 Fiscal balances in small states and other EMDEs.158 4.7 Contributors to changes in

36、 primary balances in small states and other EMDEs.159 4.8 Government revenue in small states and other EMDEs.160 4.9 Tax revenue composition in small states and other EMDEs.161 4.10 Government expenditure in small states and other EMDEs.162 4.11 Composition of government expenditure in small states

37、and other EMDEs.163 4.12 Domestic revenue mobilization in small states and other EMDEs.164 4.13 Expenditure efficiency in small states and other economies.166 4.14 Fiscal performance and fiscal frameworks.167 4.15 Donor support for small states and other EMDEs.170 EMBARGOED:NOT FOR PUBLICATION,BROAD

38、CAST,OR TRANSMISSION UNTIL TUESDAY,JUNE 11,2024,AT 9:30 AM ET,WHICH IS 1:30 PM UTCxii Tables A3.2.3 Definitions of data used and sources.138 A3.2.4 Selected additional results and robustness checks.138 4.1 EMDE small states,by feature.172 A4.1.1 List of small states included in the debt decompositio

39、n analysis and the fiscal reaction function analysis.175 A4.2.1 Variables,definitions,and data sources for fiscal reaction function analysis.175 A4.2.2 Small States fiscal reaction functions:Results.175 xiii The report was prepared by a team that included Amat Adarov,Marie Albert,Francisco Arroyo Ma

40、rioli,John Baffes,Mirco Balatti,Samuel Hill,Philip Kenworthy,Jeetendra Khadan,Joseph Mawejje,Valerie Mercer-Blackman,Alen Mu-labdic,Nikita Perevalov,Dominik Peschel,Peter Selcuk,Shijie Shi,Naotaka Sugawara,Takuma Tanaka,Garima Vasishtha,and Collette Wheeler.Research assistance was provided by Guille

41、rmo Caballero,Mattia Coppo,Franco Diaz Laura,Jiayue Fan,Yi Ji,Maria Hazel Macadangdang,Rafaela Martinho Henriques,Vasiliki Papagianni,Lorz Qehaja,Kaltrina Temaj,Urja Singh Thapa,Matias Urzua,and Juncheng Zhou.Modeling and data work was provided by Shijie Shi.Online products were produced by Graeme L

42、ittler,with assistance from the Open Knowledge Repository.Joe Rebello managed communications and media outreach with a team that included Nandita Roy,Kristen Milhollin,and Mariana Lozzi Teixeira,and with extensive support from the World Banks media and digital communica-tions teams.Graeme Littler pr

43、ovided editorial support,with contributions from Adriana Maximiliano and Michael Harrup.The print publication was produced by Adriana Maximiliano,in collaboration with Maria Hazel Macadangdang.Regional projections and write-ups were produced in coordination with country teams,country directors,and t

44、he offices of the regional chief economists.Many reviewers provided extensive advice and comments.The analysis also benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from World Bank country teams and other World Bank Vice Presidencies as well as Executive Directors in their discussion of the

45、report on June 4,2024.However,both forecasts and analysis are those of the World Bank staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or their national authorities.The Prospects Group gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Policy and Human Resources Development(PHRD)Fund provid

46、ed by the Government of Japan,which helped underpin the analytical work in chapter 3.Acknowledgments This World Bank Flagship Report is a product of the Prospects Group in the Development Economics(DEC)Vice Presidency.The project was managed by M.Ayhan Kose and Carlos Arteta,under the general guidan

47、ce of Indermit Gill.xv The good news is that global growth is holding steady,having slowed for three consecutive years.Inflation has been cut to a three-year low.Financial conditions have brightened.The world economy,in short,appears to be in final approach for a“soft landing.”Yet,more than four yea

48、rs after the upheavals of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent global shocks,its clear the worldand developing economies,in particularhas yet to rediscover a reliable path to prosperity.Global growth is stabilizing at a rate insufficient for progress on key development goals2.7 percent a year on ave

49、rage through 2026,well below the 3.1 percent average in the decade before COVID-19.By the end of this year,one in four developing economies will be poorer than it was on the eve of the pandemic.By 2026,countries that are home to more than 80 percent of the worlds popula-tion would still be growing m

50、ore slowly,on average,than they were in the decade before COVID-19.Without better policies,it would take a stroke of luck for that outlook to improve:average global interest rates are expected to average 4 percent through 2026,double the average of the previous two decades.Progress toward prosperity

51、 occurs when govern-ments put in place policies that foster productivi-ty,entrepreneurship,and innovationand when they do so in a setting of closer international cooperation.That was the model that flourished after the fall of the Berlin Wall.By encouraging the flow of goods,capital,and ideas across

52、 borders,it ushered in an extraordinary era of global prosperity:a span of roughly 25 years when the incomes of the poorest nations,on average,were catching up with those of the wealthiest,and when the world came within striking distance of ending extreme poverty.This edition of Global Economic Pros

53、pects offers a sobering assessment of the extent to which that model of international cooperation has been fracturingand what it will take to retool it for the needs of this decade and the next.Trade-policy uncertainty has reached this centurys highest level if you consider years involving major ele

54、ctionswhen countries that collectively account for at least 30 percent of GDP went to the polls.Trade measures designed to restrain cross-border commercial flows are proliferating at a historic pace.From 2013 through 2023,investment growth in developing economies more than halved,on average,from the

55、 pace of the 2000s.Against this backdrop,nearly half of developing economies will see their per capita income gap relative to advanced economies widen over the first half of the 2020sthe highest share since the 1990s.Per capita income growth in developing economies is expected to average just 3 perc

56、ent through 2026,well below the average of 3.8 percent in the decade before COVID-19.Many developing economies are expected to see no relative catch-up with advanced economies in the near term.There are,of course,notable bright spots in the global economy.The U.S.economy,in particu-lar,has shown imp

57、ressive resilience.Growth has remained buoyant in the teeth of the fiercest monetary policy tightening in four decades.U.S.dynamism,in fact,is one reason the global economy enjoys some upside potential over the next two years.India and Indonesia are two additional examples of robust performance.Indi

58、as economy has been buoyed by strong domestic demand,with a surge in investment,and robust services activity.It is projected to grow an average of 6.7 percent per fiscal year from 2024 through 2026making South Asia the worlds fastest-growing region.Indonesia is expected to benefit from a growing mid

59、dle class and generally prudent economic policies,expanding by an average of 5.1 percent over the next two years.Foreword xvi The performance of these and a few other economies makes it clear that high growth can be sustainedeven in difficult conditions.Coun-tries can enhance long-term growth by ena

60、cting policies that build human capital,boost produc-tivity,improve the efficiency of public spending,and encourage more women to enter the labor force.This edition of Global Economic Prospects features two analytical chapters of topical importance to policymakers.The first outlines how public inves

61、tment can boost economic growth and facilitate private investment.In developing economies,public investment accounts for just a quarter of total investment,on average,but it can be a powerful policy lever.Scaling up public investment by 1 percent of GDP can increase the level of GDP by more than 1 p

62、ercent over the medium term.The impact on private investment is also significantit grows by as much as 2 percent over five years.These benefits are greatest when countries meet two criteria:they enjoy the fiscal space to increase public spending,and they have a track record of efficient public inves

63、tment.The second analytical chapter explores the tragic predicament of developing economies that are small statesthose with a population of around 1.5 million or less.These economies are home to just 17 million people but are often at the frontline of climate challenges.They face chronic fiscal diff

64、iculties.Two-fifths of them are at high risk of debt distress or already in it.They face climate-related natural disasters at a frequency eight times the average of other developing economies.Comprehensive reforms can alleviate these challenges.First,small states should improve their ability to mobi

65、lize revenue from domestic sources,which constitute a more stable base than other alternatives.Second,they should improve spending efficiencyespecially in health,education,and infrastructure.They should establish fiscal frameworks capable of managing frequent natural disasters and other shocks.These

66、 steps are all essential,together with coordinated global policies and financial support,to help them stay on a sustainable fiscal path.Policymakers have cause to celebrate today:a global recession has been avoided despite the steepest rise in global interest rates since the 1980s.But they would be

67、wise to keep their eye on the ball:growth rates remain too slow for progress.Without stronger international coopera-tion and a concerted push for policies that advance shared prosperity,the world could become stuck in the slow lane.Indermit Gill Senior Vice President and Chief Economist The World Ba

68、nk Group xvii Executive Summary Global Outlook.Global growth is projected to stabilize at 2.6 percent this year,holding steady for the first time in three years despite flaring geopolit-ical tensions and high interest rates.It is then expected to edge up to 2.7 percent in 2025-26 amid modest growth

69、in trade and investment.Global inflation is projected to moderatebut at a slower clip than previously assumed,averaging 3.5 percent this year.Given continued inflation-ary pressures,central banks in both advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)will likely remain cautiou

70、s in easing monetary policy.As such,average benchmark policy interest rates over the next few years are expected to remain about double the 2000-19 average.Despite an improvement in near-term growth prospects,the outlook remains subdued by historical standards in advanced economies and EMDEs alike.G

71、lobal growth over the forecast horizon is expected to be nearly half a percentage point below its 2010-19 average pace.In 2024-25,growth is set to underperform its 2010s average in nearly 60 percent of economies,representing more than 80 percent of global population and world output.EMDE growth is f

72、orecast to moderate from 4.2 percent in 2023 to 4 percent in both 2024 and 2025.Prospects remain especially lackluster in many vulnerable econo-miesover half of economies facing fragile-and conflict-affected situations will still be poorer by the end of this year than on the eve of the pandemic.Glob

73、al risks remain tilted to the downside despite the possibility of some upside surprises.Escalating geopolitical tensions could lead to volatile commodity prices,while further trade fragmenta-tion risks additional disruptions to trade networks.Already,trade policy uncertainty has reached exceptionall

74、y high levels compared to other years that have featured major elections around the world since 2000.The persistence of inflation could lead to delays in monetary easing.A higher-for-longer path for interest rates would dampen global activity.Some major economies could grow more slowly than currentl

75、y anticipat-ed due to a range of domestic challenges.Additional natural disasters related to climate change could also hinder activity.On the upside,global inflation could moderate more quickly than assumed in the baseline,enabling faster monetary policy easing.In addition,growth in the United State

76、s could be stronger than expected.Against this backdrop,decisive global and national policy efforts are needed to meet pressing challenges.At the global level,priorities include safeguarding trade,supporting green and digital transitions,delivering debt relief,and improving food security.At the nati

77、onal level,persistent inflation risks underscore the need for EMDE monetary policies to remain focused on price stability.High debt and elevated debt-servicing costs will require policy makers to seek ways to sustainably boost investment while ensuring fiscal sustainability.To meet development goals

78、 and bolster long-term growth,structural policies are needed to raise productivity growth,improve the efficiency of public investment,build human capital,and close gender gaps in the labor market.Regional Prospects.Growth is projected to soften in most EMDE regions in 2024.In East Asia and Pacific,t

79、he expected slowdown this year mainly reflects moderating growth in China.Growth in Europe and Central Asia,Latin America and the Caribbean,and South Asia is also set to decelerate amid a slowdown in their largest economies.In contrast,growth is projected to pick up this year in the Middle East and

80、North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa,albeit less robustly than previous-ly forecast.Harnessing the Benefits of Public Investment.Public investment can be a powerful policy lever in EMDEs to help ignite growth,including by catalyzing private investment.However,public investment in these economies has

81、experienced a significant slowdown in the past decade.In xviii EMDEs with ample fiscal space and a record of efficient government spending,scaling up of public investment by one percent of GDP can increase output by up to 1.6 percent over the medium term.Public investment also crowds in private inve

82、stment and boosts productivity,promoting long-run growth in these economies.To maximize the impact of public investment,EMDEs should undertake wide-ranging policy reforms to improve public investment efficiencyby,among other things,strengthening govern-ance and fiscal administrationand create fiscal

83、 space through revenue and expenditure measures.The global community can play an important role in facilitating these reformsparticularly in lower-income developing countriesthrough financial support and technical assistance.Fiscal Challenges in Small States:Weathering Storms,Rebuilding Resilience.T

84、he COVID-19 pandemic and the global shocks that followed have worsened fiscal and debt positions in small states.This has intensified their already substantial fiscal challengesespecially the need to manage more frequent climate change-related natural disasters.Two-fifths of the 35 EMDE small states

85、 are at high risk of debt distress or already in it,roughly twice the share for other EMDEs.Fiscal deficits in small states have widened since the pandemic,reflecting increased government spending to support households and firms,as well as weaker revenues.Comprehensive fiscal reforms are essential t

86、o address the fiscal challenges confronting small states.First,small states revenues,which are highly volatile,should be drawn from a more stable and secure tax base.Second,spending efficiency needs to be improved.These changes should be complement-ed by reforms to fiscal frameworks,including better

87、 utilization of fiscal rules and sovereign wealth funds.Finally,the global community can bolster funding for small states to invest in climate change resilience and adaptation,and other priority areas,including technical assistance in fiscal policy and debt management.xix CEMAC CFA CPI EAP ECA EM7 E

88、MDE EU FCS FY GCC GDP GEP GNFS GPR HDI IDA ILO IMF LAC LIC MNA/MENA OECD OPEC OPEC+SOEs PMI PPI PPP PPP RHS RRF SAR SDGs SSA UN UNHCR VAR VATs WAEMU Abbreviations Central African Economic and Monetary Union African Financial Community consumer price index East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asi

89、a Emerging Market Seven(Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,the Russian Federation,and Trkiye)emerging market and developing economy European Union fragile and conflict-affected situations fiscal year Gulf Cooperation Council gross domestic product Global Economic Prospects goods and nonfactor servi

90、ces geopolitical risk index human development index International Development Association International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Latin America and the Caribbean low-income country Middle East and North Africa Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization

91、of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC and Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Brunei Darussalam,Kazakhstan,Malaysia,Mexico,Oman,the Russian Federation,South Sudan,and Sudan state-owned enterprises purchasing managers index private participation in infrastructure purchasing power parity public-private partnership

92、 right-hand scale European Unions Recovery and Resilience Facility South Asia Sustainable Development Goals Sub-Saharan Africa United Nations United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees vector autoregression value-added taxes West African Economic and Monetary Union CHAPTER 1GLOBAL OUTLOOKCHAPTER

93、1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 3 The global economy is stabilizing,following several years of negative shocks.Global growth is projected to hold steady at 2.6 percent this year,despite flaring geopolitical tensions and high interest rates,before edging up to 2.7 percent in 2025-26 alongside m

94、odest expansions of trade and investment.Global inflation is expected to moderate at a slower clip than previously assumed,averaging 3.5 percent this year.Central banks in both advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)are likely to remain cautious in easing policy.As suc

95、h,markedly higher interest rates than prior to the pandemic are set to sustain for an extended period.Despite some improvement,the outlook remains subdued.Global growth over the forecast horizon is expected to be nearly half a percentage point below its 2010-19 average,with a slower pace of expansio

96、n in economies comprising over 80 percent of the global population.EMDE growth is projected to moderate from 4.2 percent in 2023 to 4 percent in 2024.Amid heightened conflict and violence,prospects remain especially lackluster in many vulnerable economiesover half of fragile and conflict-affected ec

97、onomies will still be poorer in 2024 than on the eve of the pandemic.Risks have become more balanced but remain tilted to the downside.Escalating geopolitical tensions could lead to volatile commodity prices.In a context of elevated trade policy uncertainty,further trade fragmentation risks addition

98、al disruptions to trade networks.More persistent inflation could lead to higher-for-longer interest rates.Other risks include weaker-than-anticipated activity in key economies and disasters related to climate change.Against this backdrop,policy makers face daunting challenges.Global efforts are need

99、ed to safeguard trade,support green and digital transitions,deliver debt relief,and improve food security.Still-pronounced inflation risks underscore the need for EMDE monetary policies to remain focused on price stability.High debt and elevated debt-servicing costs will require EMDE policy makers t

100、o balance sizable investment needs with fiscal sustainability.To meet development goals,policies are needed to raise productivity growth,improve the efficiency of public investment,build human capital,and close gender gaps in the labor market.Summary The global economy is stabilizing,following sever

101、al years of overlapping negative shocks.Despite elevated financing costs and heightened geopolitical tensions,global activity firmed in early 2024.Global growth is envisaged to reach a slightly faster pace this year than previously expected,due mainly to the continued solid expansion of the U.S.econ

102、omy.However,the extent of expected declines in global interest rates has moderated amid lingering inflation pressures in key economies.By historical standards,the global outlook remains subdued:both advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)are set to grow at a slower pac

103、e over 2024-26 than in the decade preceding the pandemic(figure 1.1.A).Domestic demand is projected to improve in many EMDEs this year,in line with a moderate cyclical recovery from the effects of high inflation,tight financial conditions,and anemic industrial activity.Aggregate EMDE growth is nonet

104、heless poised to decelerate slightly mainly because of idiosyncratic factors in some large economies.Moreover,significant challenges persist in vulnerable economiesincluding in low-income countries(LICs)and those facing elevated levels of conflict and violencewhere growth prospects have deteriorated

105、 markedly since January.Global trade growth is recovering,supported by a pickup in goods trade.Services-trade growth is expected to provide less of a tailwind this year,given that tourism has nearly recovered to pre-pandemic levels.However,the trade outlook remains lackluster compared to recent deca

106、des,partly reflecting a proliferation of trade-restrictive measures and elevated trade policy uncertainty.Aggregate commodity prices have increased since late last year.Amid fluctuations,average oil prices are expected to be slightly higher in 2024 than in 2023,underpinned by a tight demand-supply b

107、alance in a context of continued geopolitical tensions.Nonetheless,average energy prices are projected to be marginally lower this year than Note:This chapter was prepared by Carlos Arteta,Phil Kenworthy,Nikita Perevalov,Peter Selcuk,Garima Vasishtha,and Collette Wheeler,with contributions from John

108、 Baffes,Mirco Balatti,Samuel Hill,Alen Mulabdic,Dominik Peschel,Shijie Shi,Naotaka Sugawara,and Takuma Tanaka.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 4 TABLE 1.1 Real GDP1(Percent change from previous year unless indicated otherwise)2021 2022 2023e 2024f 2025f 2026f 2024f 2025f World 6.3 3.0 2

109、.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 0.2 0.0 Advanced economies 5.5 2.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.3 0.1 United States 5.8 1.9 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.8 0.9 0.1 Euro area 5.9 3.4 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.3 0.0-0.2 Japan 2.6 1.0 1.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 -0.2 0.2 Emerging market and developing economies 7.3 3.7 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.9 0.1 0.0 East Asia and Pacific 7.6

110、3.4 5.1 4.8 4.2 4.1 0.3-0.2 China 8.4 3.0 5.2 4.8 4.1 4.0 0.3-0.2 Indonesia 3.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 0.1 0.2 Thailand 1.6 2.5 1.9 2.4 2.8 2.9 -0.8-0.3 Europe and Central Asia 7.2 1.6 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.8 0.6 0.2 Russian Federation 5.9-1.2 3.6 2.9 1.4 1.1 1.6 0.5 Trkiye 11.4 5.5 4.5 3.0 3.6 4.3 -0.1-0.3 Po

111、land 6.9 5.6 0.2 3.0 3.4 3.2 0.4 0.0 Latin America and the Caribbean 7.2 3.9 2.2 1.8 2.7 2.6 -0.5 0.2 Brazil 4.8 3.0 2.9 2.0 2.2 2.0 0.5 0.0 Mexico 6.0 3.7 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 -0.3 0.0 Argentina 10.7 5.0-1.6-3.5 5.0 4.5 -6.2 1.8 Middle East and North Africa 6.2 5.9 1.5 2.8 4.2 3.6 -0.7 0.7 Saudi Arabia

112、4.3 8.7-0.9 2.5 5.9 3.2 -1.6 1.7 Iran,Islamic Rep.2 4.7 3.8 5.0 3.2 2.7 2.4 -0.5-0.5 Egypt,Arab Rep.2 3.3 6.6 3.8 2.8 4.2 4.6 -0.7 0.3 South Asia 8.6 5.8 6.6 6.2 6.2 6.2 0.6 0.3 India 2 9.7 7.0 8.2 6.6 6.7 6.8 0.2 0.2 Bangladesh 2 6.9 7.1 5.8 5.6 5.7 5.9 0.0-0.1 Pakistan 2 5.8 6.2-0.2 1.8 2.3 2.7 0.

113、1-0.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.4 3.8 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.0 -0.3-0.2 Nigeria 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.7 0.0-0.2 South Africa 4.7 1.9 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.5 -0.1-0.2 Angola 1.2 3.0 0.9 2.9 2.6 2.4 0.1-0.5 Memorandum items:Real GDP1 High-income countries 5.5 2.8 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 0.3 0.1 Middle-income countries 7.5 3.5 4.5

114、4.1 4.0 4.0 0.1 0.0 Low-income countries 4.1 5.0 3.8 5.0 5.3 5.5 -0.5-0.3 EMDEs excluding China 6.5 4.3 3.4 3.5 4.0 3.9 0.0 0.2 Commodity-exporting EMDEs 5.8 3.4 2.6 2.8 3.4 3.2 -0.1 0.3 Commodity-importing EMDEs 8.0 3.9 4.9 4.7 4.3 4.3 0.3-0.1 Commodity-importing EMDEs excluding China 7.3 5.3 4.5 4

115、.4 4.6 4.7 0.2 0.1 EM7 7.8 3.3 5.1 4.5 4.0 4.0 0.4-0.1 World(PPP weights)3 6.6 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2 0.2 0.1 World trade volume 4 11.2 5.6 0.1 2.5 3.4 3.4 0.2 0.3 Commodity prices 5 Oil(US$per barrel)70.4 99.8 82.6 84.0 79.0 78.1 3.0 1.0 Non-energy index 112.1 122.1 110.2 110.1 106.4 106.6 2.4-0.2 WBG

116、 commodity price index 100.9 142.5 108.0 106.0 102.1 101.5 1.1-0.1 Energy index 95.4 152.6 106.9 104.0 100.0 99.0 0.6 0.0 Source:World Bank.Note:e=estimate(actual data for commodity prices);f=forecast.EM7=Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,the Russian Federation,and Trkiye.WBG=World Bank Group.Worl

117、d Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new information.Consequently,projections presented here may differ from those contained in other World Bank documents,even if basic assessments of countries prospects do not differ at any given date.For the definition of EMDEs,developing countries,com

118、modity exporters,and commodity importers,please refer to table 1.2.The World Bank is currently not publishing economic output,income,or growth data for Turkmenistan and Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela owing to lack of reliable data of adequate quality.Turkmenistan and Repblica Bolivariana de Venez

119、uela are excluded from cross-country macroeconomic aggregates.1.Headline aggregate growth rates are calculated using GDP weights at average 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.2.GDP growth rates are on a fiscal year(FY)basis.Aggregates that include these countries are calculated using data comp

120、iled on a calendar year basis.For India and the Islamic Republic of Iran,the column for 2022 refers to FY2022/23.For Bangladesh,the Arab Republic of Egypt,and Pakistan,the column for 2022 refers to FY2021/22.Pakistans growth rates are based on GDP at factor cost.3.World growth rates are calculated u

121、sing average 2010-19 purchasing power parity(PPP)weights,which attribute a greater share of global GDP to emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs)than market exchange rates.4.World trade volume of goods and nonfactor services.5.Indexes are expressed in nominal U.S.dollars(2010=100).Oil refers

122、 to the Brent crude oil benchmark.For weights and composition of indexes,see https:/worldbank.org/commodities.Percentage point differences from January 2024 projections Level differences from January 2024 projections CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 5 lastreflecting notable declines in

123、prices for natural gas and coalwhile remaining well above pre-pandemic levels.Metals prices are expected to be little changed over the forecast horizon,as demand related to metals-intensive clean energy investments and a broader pickup in global industrial activity attenuate the impact on commodity

124、demand of declining real estate activity in China.Well-supplied markets for grains and other agricultural commodities should see edible food crop prices decline modestly.Inflation continues to wane globally,making progress toward central bank targets in advanced economies and EMDEs,but at a slower p

125、ace than previously expected.Core inflation has remained stubbornly high in many economies,supported by rapid growth of services prices.Over the remain-der of 2024,continued tight monetary policy stances and slowing wage increases should help reduce inflation further.By the end of 2026,global inflat

126、ion is expected to settle at an average rate of 2.8 percent,broadly consistent with central bank targets(figure 1.1.B).The anticipated extent of monetary easing in advanced economies this year has diminished substantially since late 2023by more than a percentage point in the case of the United State

127、s.Expected policy rate paths diverge across major economies,as the European Central Bank proceeds with policy easing while the U.S.Federal Reserve keeps rates on hold for longer.Indeed,aside from short-term fluctuations,market expectations for the path of U.S.interest rates have repeatedly moved hig

128、her since 2022(figure 1.1.C).Despite this market reassessment,global financial conditions have eased this year,reflecting solid risk appetite following last years progress on disinflation and diminished concerns about the possibility of a sharp slowdown in global growth.In particular,global equity m

129、arkets have made sizable gains.EMDE financial conditions similarly became more accommodative early this year,aided by declining domestic policy rates,improving global sentiment,and expected easing of advanced-economy monetary conditions.EMDE conditions turned somewhat less accommodative in the FIGUR

130、E 1.1 Global prospects The global economy is stabilizing but the outlook remains subduedboth advanced economies and EMDEs are projected to grow at a slower pace over 2024-26 than in the pre-pandemic decade.Recent upward pressures on global core inflation are anticipated to gradually ease,such that h

131、eadline inflation converges to levels broadly consistent with central bank targets by 2026.Market expectations for the path of U.S.policy rates have been repeatedly revised higher.Amid elevated borrowing costs,about two-fifths of EMDEs are acutely vulnerable to debt stress.In 2024-25,growth is expec

132、ted to underperform its 2010-19 average in countries comprising more than 80 percent of global output and population.The multiple shocks of recent years have impeded per capita income catch-up,with almost half of EMDEs losing ground relative to advanced economies over 2020-24.Sources:Bloomberg;Conse

133、nsus Economics;Fitch Ratings;International Monetary Fund;Moodys Analytics;Oxford Economics;S&P 500 Index;UN World Population Prospects;World Bank.Note:f=forecast;AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.GDP aggregates are calculated using real U.S.dollar GDP weights at a

134、verage 2010-19 prices and market exchange rates.B.Model-based GDP-weighted projections of consumer price inflation using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model.Sample includes 65 economies,including 31 EMDEs,and excludes Argentina and Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela.Confidence bands are derived fr

135、om Consensus Economics forecast errors using the pre-pandemic sample.Horizontal line shows the average of most recent country-specific inflation targets,where available,or the 2015-19 average.C.Solid blue line is the upper bound of the target range for the U.S.federal funds rate.Dotted lines are vin

136、tages of market-based policy rate expectations,derived from derivatives markets.D.Sample includes those with weak credit ratings and those judged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to be in or at high risk of debt distress.E.“Economies”refers to the share of countries,“GDP”refers

137、to the share of world GDP,and“population”is the share of the world population.F.Horizontal line indicates the 50 percent threshold.A.Contributions to global growth B.Global consumer price inflation C.Market expectations of U.S.policy rates D.Share of EMDEs vulnerable to debt-related stress E.Lower a

138、verage GDP growth in 2024-25 compared to 2010-19 F.Share of EMDEs with GDP per capita growth lower than in advanced economies 0246819Q420Q220Q421Q221Q422Q222Q423Q223Q424Q224Q425Q225Q426Q226Q490 percentInflation targetsJanuary 2024June 2024Percent0246Jan-22Apr-22Aug-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Oct-23Feb-24Ma

139、y-24Sep-24Jan-25Apr-25Aug-25Dec-25Jun-22Jun-23Jan-24May-24Policy ratePercent010203040EMDEsEMDEpopulationEMDEGDPPercent0204060801990-941995-992000-042005-092010-142015-192020-24f2025f-26fPercent of EMDEs01234012342010-19average2024f2025f2026fUnited StatesEuro areaChinaOther AEsOther EMDEsWorld(RHS)Pe

140、rcentage pointsPercent020406080100EconomiesGDPPopulationShare of world totalPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 6 much of which emanated from shocks to supply chains and commodity prices.Yet this trend is set to continue in the coming years,suggesting potentially enduring supply-sid

141、e weakness.Growth in EMDEs is forecast to hover around 4 percent a year over 2024-26.Growth in China is expected to slow this year and ease further in 2025 and 2026,with cyclical headwinds weighing on growth in the near term,along with a continuing structural slowdown.Excluding China,EMDE growth is

142、projected to edge up to 3.5 percent this year and then firm to an average of 3.9 percent in 2025-26.In many EMDEs,this pickup reflects improving domestic demand,supported by receding inflation and easing financial conditions,and a cyclical rebound in trade,reflecting firming demand from some advance

143、d economies.Across EMDE regions,the outlook is expected to diverge somewhat,with growth forecast to be weaker than the 2010-19 average in East Asia and Pacific,Europe and Central Asia,and South Asia,but broadly returning to pre-pandemic averages in most other regions over 2025-26.Growth in LICs is f

144、orecast to improve over the forecast horizon from a subdued 3.8 percent in 2023 to 5 percent this year.This reflects increas-ing activity among several commodity-exporting economiesmainly metal exportersas well as expected improvement among fragile economies.However,forecasts have been downgraded si

145、gnificantly for several countries amid elevated uncertainty and ongoing conflicts.Moreover,despite the projected pickup,the recovery from the 2020 global recession will remain weak:growth in many LICs and economies in fragile and conflict-affected situations(FCS)is expected to underperform pre-pande

146、mic growth rates by at least half a percentage point.Many LICs are poorer now than they were in 2019,and will continue to contend with acute economic challenges,including slow progress in poverty reduction,depleted fiscal space,and elevated susceptibility to debt distress.GDP per capita in EMDEs is

147、forecast to grow at about 3 percent on average over 2024-26,well below the average in 2010-19.Excluding China,EMDE per capita GDP growth is forecast to be second quarter,as a strengthening of the U.S.dollarprompted by geopolitical tensions and firm inflation data in the United Statescoincided with a

148、 bout of capital outflows.Although market perceptions of sovereign credit risk have generally eased this year,EMDE borrowing costs continue to be high,and marked divergences persist.Indeed,credit ratings and debt sustainability analyses indicate that about 40 percent of EMDEs remain acutely vulnerab

149、le to debt-related stress(figure 1.1.D).Following two years of sharp fiscal consolidation at the global level,fiscal policy became generally supportive of growth in 2023,especially in advanced economies.Going forward,fiscal consolidation is projected to resume,exerting a material drag on near-term g

150、rowth in advanced economies and a modest headwind in EMDEs.This reflects government efforts to rebuild fiscal space,which has been eroded by the run-up in debt since the onset of the pandemic and the sharp increases in borrowing costs.Against this backdrop,global growth is expected to remain subdued

151、 at 2.6 percent in 2024 unchanged from the previous yearreflecting tepid investment growth amid broadly restrictive monetary policies,and moderating consumption growth,in part because of receding savings buffers and diminishing fiscal support.Growth is projected to edge up to an average of 2.7 perce

152、nt in 2025-26,as trade growth strengthens and broad but measured monetary policy easing supports activity in both advanced economies and EMDEs.Across the forecast horizon,global growth remains lackluster by recent historical standards,at about 0.4 percentage point below the 2010-19 average.In 2024-2

153、5,growth is set to underperform its average pace in the 2010s in nearly 60 percent of economies,representing more than 80 percent of global output and population(figure 1.1.E).The subdued outlookdespite the anticipated moderation of various cyclical headwindsunderscores a secular deceleration of pot

154、ential growth in many large economies.Relative to pre-pandemic norms,growth has weakened notably in countries that experienced high rates of inflation,CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 7 lower still,averaging 2.5 percent over 2024-26.Some large EMDEs,such as India,are expected to see con

155、tinued solid per capita growth.Yet the trend of the 2020s so far is one of uneven and limited progress.Nearly half of EMDEs are set to lose ground relative to advanced economies when viewed over the 2020-24 period(figure 1.1.F).Although this trend is expected to improve somewhat over 2025-26 in EMDE

156、s as a whole,per capita growth is set to remain stagnant in many LICs and FCS.Risks to the outlook have become somewhat more balanced since January,with the global economy thus far proving resilient to high financing costs.However,the balance of risks remains tilted to the downside amid elevated unc

157、ertainty(figure 1.2.A).Heightened geopolitical tensions could sharply depress sentiment,disrupt trade and commodity markets,push up inflation,and hurt economic activity;in particular,a conflict-related disruption to global oil supply could push oil prices markedly higher and undermine the disinflati

158、on process.Elevated trade policy uncertaintyalready at an unusually high level relative to previous years with major elections since 2000and proliferating trade restrictions could weigh on trade prospects and economic activity(figure 1.2.B).Further trade fragmenta-tion could have adverse global repe

159、rcussions via declining economic confidence,increasing trade distortions,and related financial market reactions.Advanced-economy interest rates are at levels last seen before the 2008-09 global financial crisis,and,in light of persistently above-target inflation and tight labor markets,they are like

160、ly to remain high for some time.Over the next couple of years,policy interest rates in advanced economies are expected to be more than double their 2000-19 average(figure 1.2.C).Although the global economy has withstood high interest rates better than was anticipated,interest rate-sensitive componen

161、ts of activity will continue to be restrained.Moreover,if further delays in the disinflation process emerge,policy rate cuts may be postponed.A higher resulting path for interest rates,relative to the baseline,could give rise to markedly tighter financial conditions and significantly weaker global g

162、rowth(figure 1.2.D).FIGURE 1.2 Global risks and policy challenges Risks to the outlook are somewhat more balanced but remain skewed to the downside.Pronounced trade policy uncertaintyalready at its highest level compared with other years of major elections since 2000could portend further trade restr

163、ictions and weigh on global trade.Advanced-economy interest rates are expected to remain well above 2000-19 average levels and could turn out higher still if inflationary pressures persist,substantially slowing global growth.Conflict-related oil supply disruptions could raise oil prices,dampen econo

164、mic activity,and undermine the disinflation process.EMDE fiscal policy makers confront exacting trade-offs,given elevated borrowing costs and large financing needs.Improving public investment efficiency in EMDEs is crucial,especially given constrained fiscal space.Sources:Bloomberg;Caldara et al.(20

165、20);Consensus Economics;Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis;Haver Analytics;IMF(2021);Ohnsorge,Stocker,and Some(2016);Oxford Economics;IMF-WEO(database);World Bank.Note:EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LICs=low-income countries.A.Probabilities use the range and skewness implied by oil and

166、 equity price derivatives,and term spread forecasts.Values for 2024 and 2025 use 6-month-and 18-month-ahead forecast distributions.Last observation is May 30,2024,and May 2024 for Consensus Economics forecasts.B.Panel shows the average trade policy uncertainty index in the first five months of each

167、year in which elections were held in countries cumulatively representing more than 30 percent of global GDP.Last observation is May 2024.C.Average annual policy rates.Aggregates are calculated as GDP-weighted averages of the policy rates and policy rate expectations for the United States,the euro ar

168、ea(using aggregated national policy rates as a proxy over the 1990-99 period),and the United Kingdom.Policy rate expectations are based on futures curves observed on May 31,2024.D.Scenarios are produced using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model.E.Sample includes 98 EMDEs and 10 LICs.Data are medi

169、ans.Whiskers show interquartile range.F.Bars show group medians of the IMF(2021)public infrastructure efficiency index.Sample includes 27 advanced economies and 93 EMDEs,of which 15 are LICs.A.Probability distribution around global growth forecast B.Global trade policy uncertainty in years with majo

170、r elections C.Monetary policy interest rates in advanced economies D.Change in global growth in alternative scenarios E.Gross public financing needs F.Public infrastructure investment efficiency 048121620192023EMDEsLICsPercent of GDP2030405060708090AdvancedeconomiesEMDEs excl.LICsLICsIndex,0-100,100

171、=highest0204060802000200420122024Index024681990-992000-092010-192025-261990-2019Higher-for-longer scenarioPercent0246202220232024202550 percent80 percent90 percentBaselinePercent-0.3-0.2-0.10.00.1Higher oil priceHigher-for-longerpolicy rates202420252026Percentage point deviation from baselineCHAPTER

172、 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 8 Weaker-than-expected growth in Chinatriggered,for instance,by a more prolonged and deeper property sector downturncould have notable negative spillovers,particularly for EMDE commodity exporters.Severe climate-change-related natural disasters could result in

173、considera-ble losses in lives,livelihoods,and output.Such events could also cause spikes in food prices,stalling or even reversing the decline in global inflation and exacerbating food insecurity.These downside risks,should they materialize,would likely hit the poorest and most vulnerable EMDEs hard

174、est.On the upside,global disinflation could proceed at a faster pace than currently envisioned,aided by stronger productivity growth.This could be driven by the rapid adoption of new technologies,enabling advanced economies to extend recent gains and EMDEs to recoup post-pandemic productivity losses

175、.Other possible triggers for lower inflation might include improvements in supply chains and greater declines in commodity prices than currently projected.Faster global disinflation would allow central banks to lower policy rates more than assumed.Global activity would likely strengthen as a result

176、of both stronger productivity and lower policy rates,reflecting easier financial conditions,higher real incomes,and improved sentiment.In addition,EMDEs could benefit from firming capital inflows.Another upside risk is that U.S.growth could be higher than expected on account of continued strong labo

177、r supply dynamics,underpinned by rising labor force participation and elevated absorption of working-age migrants.Policy makers face a range of daunting challenges.Coordinated improvements in debt relief will be necessary to free up resources for growth-enhancing investments,particularly in some of

178、the most vulnerable EMDEs,given elevated financing needs(figure 1.2.E).Enhanced international cooperation is needed to tackle the threat of climate change,the fragmentation of trade networks,and mounting food insecurity and conflict.Global cooperation is also essential to leverage the benefits of ne

179、w technologies such as artificial intelligence(AI),including by tapping AI solutions to address global challenges.By late last year,most EMDE central banks were holding policy rates steady or lowering them,as inflation declined.However,in many EMDEs,bringing inflation durably to target will require

180、a moderation of persistent service-sector price pressures.In this context,EMDE central banks can help anchor inflation expectations by communicating a steadfast focus on price stability and willingness to pause easing if necessary.Given reduced expectations for policy rate cuts by major advanced-eco

181、nomy central banks,continued monetary easing in EMDEs may further narrow interest rate differentials relative to advanced economies,potentially leading to increased financial market volatility.As such,confined interventions to manage capital flows and currency volatility could become appropriate in

182、limited circumstances.In addition,close supervi-sion of bank credit quality and capital levels,complemented by macroprudential policies,can help strengthen the resilience of EMDE financial sectors.Fiscal space remains narrow in many EMDEs amid weak revenues and elevated debt-servicing costs.Decisive

183、 measures will be needed to boost fiscal resources for public investment.These could include reforms to mobilize domestic revenues,the harnessing of digital technologies to simplify tax payments and records management,and reform of costly and inefficient subsidies.Furthermore,even with increased pub

184、lic re-sources,improved spending efficiency will be needed to meet a wide range of development challenges.In particular,it is critical to improve infrastructure investment efficiency,where EMDEs significantly lag advanced economies(figure 1.2.F).In the case of small states,elevated exposure to exter

185、nal shocks poses a formidable fiscal challenge,underscoring the need to balance additional investments in human capital and climate-resilient infrastructure with the mainte-nance of adequate fiscal buffers.To raise productivity growth,advance prosperity,and address persistent longer-term challenges,

186、policies should aim to increase the scale and efficacy of public investment programs,enhance human capital,address climate change,and confront persistent food insecurity.Additionally,targeted policies are needed to better leverage CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 9 womens economic poten

187、tial and reduce gender discrimination,as well as to address high youth unemployment rates in many EMDEs.Global context The near-term global economic landscape has improved,but notable challenges remain.Trade growth,which came to a halt last year,is showing signs of recovery amid a pickup in goods tr

188、ade.Commodity prices have come off their 2022 peaks and supply-chain pressures have waned,helping to moderate global inflation.Yet the pace of disinflation has slowed since last year,particularly with respect to core prices.Monetary policy easing,as a result,is expected to proceed at a cautious pace

189、 as policy makers remain focused on ensuring price stability.Financial conditions in EMDEs have become less restrictive,in part because robust risk appetite has counterbalanced higher benchmark borrowing costs.However,about 40 percent of EMDEs remain vulnerable to debt-related stress.Global trade Gl

190、obal trade in goods and services was nearly flat in 2023the weakest performance outside of global recessions in the past 50 years.Amid a sharp slowdown in global industrial production,the volume of goods trade contracted for most of 2023 and fell by 1.9 percent for the year as a whole(figure 1.3.A).

191、The evolution of goods trade diverged across regions,with volumes declining in advanced economies,especially in Europe,and stagnating in EMDEs as expansions in China and Europe and Central Asia(ECA)offset contrac-tions in Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC),Sub-Saharan Africa(SSA),and Middle East a

192、nd North Africa(MNA).The value of global services trade grew about 9 percent in 2023,driven primarily by a recovery in tourism flowsexports of travel services surged by about 38 percent(WTO 2024).However,the pace of expansion in tourism was substantially below that in 2022,with recent data indicatin

193、g tourism activity in line with pre-pandemic levels,suggesting a near-full recovery in most regions.Stabilization in services trade is reflected in the steadying of the global services PMI for new export orders,which has remained closer to neutral thresholds compared to last year(figure 1.3.B).The n

194、umber of new trade-restricting measures is still well above pre-pandemic levelsalthough down from the historical high reached in 2023exerting a further drag on global trade.Recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea,coupled with climate-related shipping disruptions in the Panama Canal,have

195、affected maritime transit and freight rates along these critical routes(Bogetic et al.2024).These disruptions,however,have not yet led to a substantial increase in global supply chain pressures or lengthened global supplier delivery times.Adverse effects have been FIGURE 1.3 Global trade Global trad

196、e in goods and services was nearly flat in 2023 amid goods trade contractions for most of the year.Leading indicators suggest that services trade has stabilized.Global trade in goods and services is projected to expand by 2.5 percent in 2024 and 3.4 percent in 2025 but remain well below the average

197、rates of the two decades preceding the pandemic.In all,global trade growth in 2020-24 is set to register the slowest half decade of growth since the 1990s.Sources:CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis;Haver Analytics;World Bank.Note:e=estimate;f=forecast;PMI=purchasing managers index.Trade in

198、goods and services is measured as the average of export and import volumes.A.Panel shows goods trade volumes.Last observation is March 2024.B.Panel shows manufacturing and services subcomponents of the global purchasing managers index(PMI)new export orders series.PMI readings above(below)50 indicate

199、 expansion(contraction).Last observation is April 2024.D.Panel shows five-year averages of growth in global trade in goods and services.A.Growth of global goods trade B.Global PMI new export orders C.Global trade growth D.Trade growth since 1990s 455055Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24GoodsServic

200、esIndex,50+=expansion-4-202468Jan-22Mar-22May-22Jul-22Sep-22Nov-22Jan-23Mar-23May-23Jul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24Percent,year-on-year024681990-941995-992000-042005-092010-142015-192020-24fPercent02462000-09average2010-19average2023e2024f2025fPercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 10 l

201、imited to a few regions and specific industries so far.Global trade growth is projected to pick up to 2.5 percent this year,a significant improvement from last year but well below the average rates observed in the two decades preceding the pandemic(figure 1.3.C).The forecast entails a pickup in good

202、s trade growth after a sluggish start to the year,supported by a rebound in global goods demand as inventory restocking resumes in the United States and the euro area,and as demand from China stabilizes.Meanwhile,services trade growth is expected to stabilize near its pre-pandemic pace.In 2025,trade

203、 growth is expected to firm to 3.4 percent,in tandem with a pickup in growth in the euro area and EMDEs excluding China,and remain steady in 2026.Despite the expected growth in trade this year,by the end of 2024 global trade is set to register the slowest half-decade of growth since the 1990s,mirror

204、ing subdued global GDP growth(figure 1.3.D).In the near term,the responsiveness of global trade to global output is likely to remain lower than before the pandemic,reflecting muted investment growth and the recent proliferation of trade restrictions worldwide.The trade outlook is subject to various

205、downside risks,including weaker-than-anticipated global demand,escalating geopolitical tensions,and further disruptions in maritime transport.Moreover,with elections taking place in many countries this year,heightened trade policy-related uncertainty and the potential for more inward-looking policie

206、s could weigh on trade prospects and economic activity.Commodity markets After a sharp decline between mid-2022 and mid-2023,commodity price swings were less pro-nounced in the second half of last year.In 2024,aggregate commodity prices have generally risen against a backdrop of tight supply conditi

207、ons and signs of firmer industrial activity(figure 1.4.A).Average commodity prices are nonetheless forecast to recede slightly over the forecast period,mainly reflecting improving supply conditions,while remaining well above pre-pandemic levels(figure 1.4.B).Oil prices have fluctuated this year,tren

208、ding substantially higher in April in the context of escalating tensions in the Middle East,but subsequently pulling back(figure 1.4.C).Against a backdrop of continued geopolitical risks,the average price of Brent oil is forecast to be slightly higher this year than last,at$84/bbl,before receding to

209、$79/bbl in 2025 amid the partial unwind of OPEC+supply cuts and expanding non-OPEC+production.The near-term oil price forecast is notably uncertain,however,given the potential for price spikes resulting from conflict-related supply disruptions.Natural gas prices fell nearly 28 percent in the first q

210、uarter of 2024,relative to the previous quarter,amid robust production,mild winter weather,and elevated inventories.After reaching a nearly 30-year low in March,the price of U.S.natural gas surged in May,in part due to increased liquefied natural gas(LNG)exports.U.S.natural gas prices are expected t

211、o stabilize in the near term,before increasing further in 2025 as gas liquefaction capacity expands,allowing more supplies to be diverted to other markets(figure 1.4.D).Europe-an natural gas prices rebounded in the second quarter of 2024,reflecting persistent supply risks related to ongoing conflict

212、s.Despite the anticipat-ed growth of U.S.LNG exports,average European gas prices are envisaged to rise by 11 percent in 2025,as industrial activity picks up,supporting demand.Most metal prices were relatively stable during the first quarter of this year.However,among precious metals,gold prices reac

213、hed record highs,fueled by geopolitical concerns and central bank purchases.In the second quarter,copper prices rose to a record nominal high on supply concerns,while benchmark aluminum prices spiked after the introduction of new sanctions on the Russian Federation.Metals prices,excluding those of p

214、recious metals,are projected to remain little changed,on average,in 2024-25,staying well above pre-pandemic levels.Weaker metals demand associated with lower real estate invest-ment in China is likely to be substantially CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 11 FIGURE 1.4 Commodity markets A

215、ggregate commodity prices have generally increased in 2024 after declining,on average,last year.Over the forecast period,commodity prices are projected to decline slightly but remain well above 2015-19 levels.Oil prices have remained volatile this year amid a confluence of heightened geopolitical te

216、nsions and OPEC+production cuts.U.S.natural gas liquefaction capacity is set to advance next year,enabling more gas supplies to be diverted to other markets.Robust growth of clean energy investment is expected to continue supporting base metals prices.Food prices are projected to soften in the next

217、two years,aided by growing supplies of grains and edible crops.Sources:Bloomberg;IEA(2023);U.S.Energy Information Administration(EIA);World Bank.Note:bbl=barrels;OPEC+=Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Azerbaijan,Bahrain,Brunei Darussalam,Kazakhstan,Malaysia,Mexico,Oman,the Russi

218、an Federation,South Sudan,and Sudan.A.Monthly data in U.S.dollar terms.Last observation is April 2024.B.Commodity prices line refers to the World Bank commodity price index,excluding precious metals.Dashed lines indicate forecasts.C.Daily Brent prices.Last observation is May 29,2024.Yellow lines sho

219、w the 1.3 and 2.2 million barrels per day(mb/d)cuts.Red lines indicate geopolitical events,including the October 2023 events in the Middle East,the strikes on Houthis by the United Kingdom and United States,and the rejection of the ceasefire in Gaza.D.2024 and 2025 are EIA estimates based on up-to-d

220、ate project information.Last update is 2024Q1.E.Total global investment in each three-year period.2023 values are estimated.“Other”refers to end-use renewable energy,electrification in building,transport,and industrial sectors,and battery storage.F.2024 and 2025 values are forecasts.A.Commodity pric

221、es B.Commodity price projections C.Oil prices and key events D.Additional U.S.natural gas liquefaction capacity counterbalanced by firming global industrial demand and metals-intensive clean energy investments(figure 1.4.E).Agricultural commodity prices were close to unchanged,in aggregate,in the fi

222、rst quarter.Average prices are set to soften somewhat in 2024-25.Food prices are forecast to dip by 6 percent in 2024 and 4 percent in 2025,mainly reflecting ample supplies for grains as well as oils and meals(figure 1.4.F).Volatile weather and increasing trade restrictions or disruptions could none

223、theless push prices higher.Despite declining consumer food price inflation,acute food insecurity is estimated to have further worsened last year and doubled globally since 2019.Surging hunger is linked to a combination of still-elevated consumer food prices and proliferating violence and instability

224、 in vulnerable areas,notably in parts of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.Global inflation Global inflation has continued to decline,yet it remains above target in most advanced economies and in about one-fourth of inflation-targeting EMDEs.The initial phase of disinflation after the pandemic

225、was underpinned by falling energy prices as well as waning supply chain pressures.Recently,the pace of consumer price disinflation has slowed,reflecting a partial rebound in energy prices,along with a notable slowdown in the rate of decline in core inflation(figure 1.5.A).In advanced economies,disin

226、flation in consumer goods prices appears to have bottomed out,while inflation in consumer services remains elevated(figure 1.5.B).In the United States,resilient economic activity,alongside rapid increases in the cost of shelter,has given rise to persistently high services and,more broadly,core infla

227、tion over the past few months.To some extent,the strength of U.S.productivity growth has mitigated these trends,likely lessening the inflationary effects of rising wages.In contrast,subdued productivity in the euro area has driven economy-wide labor costs higher,underpinning elevated core and servic

228、es inflation,despite anemic euro area demand.E.Global clean energy investment F.Food commodity price forecasts 501001502002502019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025EnergyMetals and mineralsAgricultureCommodity pricesIndex,100=2015-19 average707580859095100105Sep-23Oct-23Nov-23Dec-23Jan-24Feb-24Mar-24May-

229、24US$/bbl1.3 mb/doil cutOctober 2023 events in the Middle EastOPEC+2.2 mb/d cutStrikes on HouthisRejection of ceasefireOPEC+2.2 mb/d cut extension0510152025302018201920202021202220232024e2025fBillion cubic feet05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0002015-172018-202021-23Renewable powerOtherGridsElect

230、ric vehicleTotal investmentUS$,billions-20-10010GrainsOils andmealsOther food20232024f2025fPercent,annual change255075100125150Jan-19Jun-19Nov-19May-20Oct-20Mar-21Aug-21Feb-22Jul-22Dec-22Jun-23Nov-23Apr-24EnergyMetals and mineralsAgricultureCommodity price indexIndex,100 =January 2022CHAPTER 1 GLOBA

231、L ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 12 advanced economies,persistently high core inflation in EMDEs has been driven by services prices,including for shelter(figure 1.5.C).Greater-than-anticipated inflationary pressures earlier this year have led to an upward revision to the projection for near-term globa

232、l inflation(figure 1.5.D).Nevertheless,aside from a small group of countries where very high inflation reflects idiosyncratic domestic challenges,global inflation is expected to decline to 3.5 percent in 2024,before easing further,to 2.9 percent in 2025 and 2.8 percent in 2026,broadly consistent wit

233、h average country inflation targets.The slowdown is expected to be driven by softening core inflation,as services demand moderates and wage growth slows,in addition to a modest decline in commod-ity prices.Surveys of inflation expectations similarly imply gradual global disinflation over the next tw

234、o years.Global financial developments Global financial conditions have eased,on balance,since last year,primarily reflecting declines in risk premia amid still-elevated interest rates.Central banks across major advanced economies are expected to gradually lower policy rates this year,but the level o

235、f real interest rates is set to remain a headwind to economic activityalbeit a diminishing onefor some time.Policy rate projections derived from financial markets have been volatile since U.S.policy tightening started in 2022,with expectations repeatedly revised higher over time(figure 1.6.A).Mean-w

236、hile,most advanced-economy central banks continue to emphasize that the pace of easing will be cautious,reflecting persistent inflationary pressuresand,in the case of the United States,robust economic activity.As such,government bond yields are well above pre-pandemic levels and are likely to remain

237、 so,absent large negative shocks to growth.Risk appetite picked up globally early in the yearparticularly in advanced economiessignaling optimism that continued steady disinflation might accompany resilient growth.With volatility subdued,advanced economy equity valuations reached elevated levels,esp

238、ecially FIGURE 1.5 Global inflation The pace of decline in core inflation has slowed this year.In major advanced economies,disinflation in consumer goods prices appears to have bottomed out,while inflation in consumer services prices remains elevated.High core inflation in EMDEs was driven by servic

239、es,including shelter.Global inflation is expected to gradually decelerate toward average inflation targets by 2026,amid softening core inflation.Sources:Eurostat;Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis;Haver Analytics;Oxford Economics;World Bank.Note:AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and develop

240、ing economies;YTD=year to date.A.Panel shows median consumer price inflation excluding food and energy,measured in three-month annualized percent changes.Sample includes up to 32 advanced economies and 46 EMDEs.Last observation is April 2024.B.Panel shows year-on-year consumer price inflation in the

241、 goods and services categories.U.S.goods inflation is a weighted average of consumer durable and nondurable price inflation rates,U.S.services excludes energy services.Last observation is April 2024.C.Median three-month annualized inflation rates by component;averages computed over months in the fir

242、st and second halves of 2023,and year-to-date in 2024.Sample includes up to 36 advanced economies and 100 EMDEs.Last observation is April 2024.D.Model-based GDP-weighted projections of consumer price inflation using Oxford Economics Global Economic Model.Sample include 65 economies,including 31 EMDE

243、s,and excludes Argentina and Repblica Bolivariana de Venezuela.Confidence bands are derived from Consensus Economics forecast errors using the pre-pandemic sample.The green line shows the average of most recent country-specific inflation targets.The 2015-2019 average is used when the target is not a

244、vailable.A.Core inflation,three-month annualized B.Goods and services inflation C.Inflation by component,three-month annualized D.Global consumer price inflation -30369121518Jul-19Oct-19Jan-20Apr-20Jul-20Oct-20Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24U.S.se

245、rvicesU.S.goodsEuro area servicesEuro area goodsPercent0246810GlobalAEsEMDEsAEsEMDEsGlobalAEsEMDEsAEsEMDEsHeadlineFoodCoreShelter2023H12023H22024YTDPercent0246819Q420Q220Q421Q221Q422Q222Q423Q223Q424Q224Q425Q225Q426Q226Q490 percentInflation targetsJanuary 2024June 2024Percent-2024681012Jul-19Oct-19Ja

246、n-20Apr-20Jul-20Oct-20Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24WorldAdvanced economiesEMDEsPercentIn EMDEs,headline inflation has generally continued to recede on a 12-month basis.Across most EMDEs in East Asia and Pacific(EAP)and LAC,headline inflation bro

247、adly continued to trend near or below pre-pandemic averages through late 2023 and early 2024,despite reaccelerating in some countries.However,progress has been slow and uneven in other regions,with elevated core price increases contributing to high headline inflation rates.As in CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECO

248、NOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 13 in the United States,where confidence regarding potential productivity gains from AI played a key role(figure 1.6.B).Sentiment briefly wilted in April,amid firm U.S.inflation data and escalating geopolitical tensions,but rebounded thereafter.Although the cost of credit r

249、emains high,perceptions of corporate credit risk appear mutedexcept for asset classes,such as office real estate,that have been adversely affected by structural post-pandemic shifts in activity.Corporate credit spreads remain well below 2010-19 average levels in both the United States and the euro a

250、rea(figure 1.6.C).Banks in these jurisdic-tions continue to report tightening of standards for lending to firms,but by markedly narrowing majorities.EMDE financial conditions also eased in the first quarter of 2024,reflecting expectations of easing advanced-economy monetary conditions,improving glob

251、al investor sentiment,and ongoing policy rate cuts in many large EMDEs(figure 1.6.D).Conditions turned less accommodative early in the second quarter,as safe haven flows and declining expectations of U.S.rate cuts stoked a notable strengthening of the U.S.dollar and a bout of debt and equity portfol

252、io outflows.Sovereign spreads have nonetheless trended to below 2010-19 levels in the majority of middle-income EMDEs,signaling investor confidence that financial stress risks are broadly contained.In contrast,spreads remain elevated among EMDEs with weak credit ratings,even if they have declined su

253、bstantially this year(figure 1.6.E).Indeed,despite some easing of global conditions,financial stress concerns remain acute in about 40 percent of EMDEscomprising those with weak credit ratings,and those where debt sustainability analyses indicate a high risk of,or existing,debt distress(figure 1.6.F

254、).Among weakly rated countries that had market access in the 2010s,a combination of political instability,the pandemic and other external shocks,and financial crises in the 2020s has rendered non-concessional debt prohibitively expensive.Among unrated coun-triesmany of them low-income countriesdebt

255、burdens have grown increasingly severe owing to a decade of debt build-up in the 2010s,coupled with anemic post-pandemic recoveries and rising debt-service costs(World Bank 2023a).FIGURE 1.6 Global financial developments Financial market expectations for the path of U.S.policy rates have been repeat

256、edly revised higher.The tightening of global financial conditions through higher interest rates has been dampened,however,by narrowing risk premia,reflected in buoyant equity valuations and tight corporate credit spreads.On net,EMDE central banks have been easing policy since the second half of 2023

257、.EMDE sovereign risk spreads have declined,but they remain elevated among economies with weak credit ratings.In all,nearly 40 percent of EMDEshome to about one-fifth of the EMDE populationface an elevated likelihood of debt-related stress.Sources:Barclays;Bloomberg;Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis;F

258、itch Ratings;Haver Analytics;Ice Data Indices;International Monetary Fund;J.P.Morgan;Moodys Analytics;MSCI(database);S&P 500 Index;UN World Population Prospects;World Bank.Note:EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.A.Solid blue line represents the upper bound of the target range for the U.S

259、.federal funds rate.Dotted lines represent vintages of market-based expectations for the upper bound of the policy rate range.B.Lines depict the percentile rank of equity index valuations.Underlying valuation is based on the excess earnings yield,where lower(higher)excess yield implies higher(lower)

260、valuation.Excess earnings yield is the cyclically adjusted earnings yield(inverse CAPE ratio)minus the 10-year inflation-protected U.S.Treasury yield.Last observation is April 2024.C.Corporate credit spreads derived from indexes of option-adjusted high-yield corporate bonds.Last observation is May 2

261、9,2024.D.Bars indicate number of central banks raising(lowering)policy rates in the preceding three months.Yellow line indicates net number of central banks.Sample includes 58 EMDEs and excludes economies with strict currency pegs.Last observation is April 2024.E.Median spreads for up to 22 weakly r

262、ated EMDEs and up to 49 other EMDEs.Weak ratings are defined as Caa+/CCC+and below for long-term foreign currency debt.Shaded areas represent September 2008-August 2009 and January-December 2020.F.Sample of vulnerable EMDEs includes those with weak credit ratings,and those judged by the Internationa

263、l Monetary Fund and the World Bank to be in or at high risk of debt distress.A.Market expectations of U.S.policy rates B.Equity market valuation by percentile,1998-2024 C.Non-investment-grade corporate credit spreads D.EMDE monetary policy rate changes E.EMDE sovereign spreads by credit rating F.Sha

264、re of EMDEs vulnerable to debt-related stress -50-2502550Jan-19Oct-19Jul-20Apr-21Jan-22Oct-22Jul-23Apr-24TighteningLooseningNumber of central banks00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9105101520252005200820112014201720202024Economies with weak ratingsOther economiesMedian(since 2005)Median(since 2005)Percenta

265、ge points02040608010019982000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024United StatesEuropePercentile234567Jul-22Sep-22Nov-22Jan-23Mar-23May-23Jul-23Sep-23Nov-23Jan-24Mar-24May-24U.S.spreadEuro area spread2010-19 median2010-19 medianPercentage points010203040EMDEsEMDEpopulationEMDEGDPPercent024

266、6Jan-22Apr-22Aug-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Oct-23Feb-24May-24Sep-24Jan-25Apr-25Aug-25Dec-25Jun-22Jun-23Jan-24May-24Policy ratePercentCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 14 trend rate of 1.8 percent in 2025.Relative to previous projections,growth in 2024 has been revised up by 0.9 percentage poin

267、t,as data releases earlier this year surprised to the upside,particular-ly on the consumer spending side.The slowdown in 2025 is expected to be driven primarily by the cumulative effects of past monetary tightening and a contractionary fiscal stance.Elevated real borrowing rates are set to restrain

268、household spending on durable goods and residential investment.In line with the recent softening in high-frequency indicators,broader consumer spending is expected to slow due to moderating growth in household income as labor market tightness recedes and savings diminish.The boost to consumption gro

269、wth from house-hold wealth gains is likely to moderate owing to slowing increases in real estate net worth,which has historically had substantial effects on consum-er spending(Carroll,Otsuka,and Slacalek 2011).Increases in house prices tapered off toward the end of 2023 and are expected to remain we

270、ll below the strong pace seen over the past few years.As wealth gains slow,household income growth is also expected to ease sequentially throughout 2024,with the labor market continuing to soften and U.S.job openings declining(figure 1.7.A).Rising labor supply is expected to contribute to labor mark

271、et rebalancing,including from continued robust net migration(figure 1.7.B).On the fiscal side,with a relatively stable or slightly lower deficit expected over the next few years,fiscal policy is not expected to be a significant driver of growth.In 2026,growth is expected to remain at 1.8 percent,as

272、a further slowdown in fiscal spending offsets a modest pickup in consumer spending and business investment.By the end of 2026,borrowing rates are expected to have declined substantially as inflation returns close to target.In the euro area,growth slowed sharply in 2023,reflecting tight credit condit

273、ions,feeble exports,and elevated energy prices.Trade volumes declined in 2023 for the first time outside of an annual euro area contraction,in large part reflecting a loss of export competitiveness amid elevated energy prices.Growth appears to have bottomed out,however,though with key Major economie

274、s:Recent developments and outlook Advanced economies Growth in advanced economies slowed to 1.5 percent in 2023,with notable divergences.Growth in the United States strengthened to 2.5 percent last year,owing primarily to robust consumption,government spending,and significantly reduced imports of go

275、ods and services.Consumption was supported by contin-ued spending out of savings accumulated during the pandemic and a healthy expansion of household balance sheets as equity prices gained rapidly last year.A substantial widening of the U.S.budget deficit in 2023(fiscal year),to over 6 percent of GD

276、P at the federal level,also played a role in boosting growth(CBO 2024a).In contrast,euro area growth slowed sharply last year,driven by weak consumption growth,reflecting the impact of high energy prices on household budgets.Aggregate growth in advanced economies is projected to remain at 1.5 percen

277、t in 2024,with activity in key economies continuing to diverge.Weak activity in the euro area and Japan,in large part as a result of continued feeble domestic demand,will be accompanied by resilient growth in the United States.Next year,amid a projected slowdown in the United States,coupled with fir

278、ming growth in the euro area,the contrast in growth performance across major economies is likely to become less stark.The near-term outlook for monetary policy differs among advanced economies.The easing of monetary policy in the United States is expected to begin later than previously assumedgiven

279、resilient activity and above-target inflation.This lags the recent policy rate cut in the euro ar-ea,where the impacts of past supply shocks on inflation continue to fade.Meanwhile,fiscal policy is envisaged to tighten substantially in 2024 relative to 2023 for many advanced economies,exerting a dra

280、g on growth.In the United States,growth is forecast to average 2.5 percent this year,and moderate to a below-CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 15 differences across sectors and member countries.Services activity suggests incipient improvement in early 2024,but this has been offset by wea

281、ker-than-expected industrial activity,especially in the manufacturing sector in Germany.Growth is forecast to firm only slightly in 2024,to 0.7 percent,supported by an ongoing recovery in real incomes but dampened by still-subdued invest-ment and export growth.Consumer spending is expected to edge h

282、igher in 2024,as inflation declines and wages continue to rise,albeit at a more moderate pace(figure 1.7.C).Growth is forecast to pick up in 2025,to 1.4 percent,as the recovery in export and investment growth gathers pace,with the latter benefiting from lower policy rates and the absorption of EU fu

283、nds.In 2026,economic activity is projected to expand at a relatively stable pace of 1.3 percent,slightly above potential growth estimates as reforms under the European Unions NextGenera-tionEU plan start to bear fruit.In some large euro area members,national fiscal policy is expected to exert a drag

284、 on activity in the near term.In Japan,growth is expected to decelerate to 0.7 percent in 2024,due to a feeble expansion in consumption and slowing exports amid normaliz-ing auto production and stabilizing tourism demand.Output is projected to grow at an average rate of 1 percent in 2025 and 0.9 per

285、cent in 2026,on slight improvements in consumer spending and capital investment.The Bank of Japan discontinued major unconventional policy measuresyield curve control,negative interest rates,and some asset purchasesin March 2024,and raised the range for the short-term policy rate to 0-0.1 percent,wh

286、ile also signaling possible further monetary action if inflation risks rise,including in the context of rapid depreciation of the yen.China Growth in China edged up in early 2024,supported by a positive contribution from net exports that offset softening domestic demand.Following weakness last year,

287、exports and imports have both strengthened.Meanwhile,overall investment growth has remained tepid,with solid infrastructure and manufacturing investment set against declining real estate investment as the property sector downturnnow in its third yearcontinues(figure 1.7.D).Property prices and sales

288、have fallen further,and property developers have experienced renewed financing pressures.Amid weak consumer confidence,domestic consumption has also remained subdued,with retail sales growth below pre-pandemic averages.Headline consumer prices have increased modestly this year,after declining FIGURE

289、 1.7 Major economies:Recent developments and outlook U.S.labor market tightness has been receding,with the level of job openings declining since its mid-2022 peak.Rising labor supply,including that from robust net migration,is expected to continue to support the re-balancing in the U.S.labor market.

290、Euro area consumer spending is expected to edge higher in 2024,partly on the back of continued wage growth.In China,overall investment growth remained tepid in early 2024,with solid infrastructure and manufacturing investment set against continued declines in real estate investment.Sources:Congressi

291、onal Budget Office(2024b);Eurostat;Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis;Haver Analytics;National Bureau of Statistics of China;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;World Bank.A.Panel shows the level of total nonfarm job openings in millions,and the change in nonfarm payrolls in thousan

292、ds.Last observation is April 2024 for unemployment and March 2024 for job openings.B.Blue bars show the contribution to the annual change in population(in percentage points)from the natural increase(the difference between the number of births and deaths);red bars show the contribution from net migra

293、tion,which is the difference between immigration and emigration.Statistics for the euro area for 2023 are based on Eurostats baseline projections.C.Solid lines show year-on-year growth in wages:nonsupervisory average hourly wages in the United States and private sector earnings in the euro area.D.Ye

294、ar-on-year growth of year-to-date total fixed assets,manufacturing,real estate,and infrastructure investment.Last observation is April 2024.A.U.S.nonfarm payrolls and job openings B.Population increase C.Wage growth D.Fixed-asset investment growth in China -10-5051015Apr-22Oct-22Apr-23Oct-23Apr-24To

295、tal fixed assetsManufacturingReal estateInfrastructurePercent-0.50.00.51.01.52015-1920202021202220232015-192020202120222023United StatesEuro areaNaturalincreaseNetmigrationPercentage points-20246819Q320Q120Q321Q121Q322Q122Q323Q123Q324Q1Euro areaUnited StatesPercent67891011121302505007501,000Aug-21De

296、c-21Apr-22Aug-22Dec-22Apr-23Aug-23Dec-23Apr-24Change in nonfarm payrollsJob openings(RHS)ThousandsMillionsCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 16 late last year on the back of falling food prices,and core inflation has remained well below the target of about 3 percent.Producer prices have c

297、ontin-ued to decline,reflecting weak demand.To bolster demand,additional spending measures have been announcedincluding for infrastruc-ture projectsbuilding on a raft of policies implemented late last year.In tandem,the Peoples Bank of China cut interest rates and the reserve requirement ratio.As pr

298、operty-related bank lending declined,the government established a scheme to facilitate liquidity provision to real estate developers to support the completion of viable property projects,as well as to help promote confidence.Further measures were also introduced aimed at boosting property demand,inc

299、luding removing the residential mortgage rate floor and lowering down payment requirements for borrowers.With activity anticipated to soften in the second half of this year,growth is projected to slow to 4.8 percent in 2024,from 5.2 percent in 2023,as an expected uptick in goods exports and industri

300、al activity supported by the global trade recovery is offset by weaker consumption.Compared with January projections,growth has been revised up 0.3 percentage point,reflecting stronger-than-expected activity in early 2024,particularly exports.Investment is envisaged to remain subdued.While governmen

301、t spending will continue to prop up infrastructure investment,local government financing pressures will constrain fiscal support.The property sector is assumed to stabilize only toward the end of the year.Although inflation is set to pick up this year as the drag from falling food prices fades,it is

302、 anticipated to remain well below target amid slowing consumption and weak demand pressures.Producer price pressures are also set to remain weak in the context of subdued activity and softening prices for commodities,particularly energy and metals.Growth is projected to decline further in 2025 to 4.

303、1 percent0.2 percentage point lower than projected in January owing primarily to a weaker outlook for investmentand 4 percent in 2026,as slowing productivity growth and investment as well as mounting public and private debt weigh on activity.With the population falling for the second consecutive yea

304、r in 2023,and amid a low and declining fertility rate,demographic head-winds are expected to intensify,dragging potential growth lower.Emerging market and developing economies EMDE growth is projected to edge down from 4.2 percent in 2023 to 4 percent in 2024 and then remain broadly stable over the

305、forecast horizon.Decelerating activity in China is projected to be offset by firming growth in other EMDEs due to improvements in domestic demand and a recovery in trade.However,aggregate EMDE output is projected to remain on a path notably below its pre-pandemic trajectory,indicating sizable long-t

306、erm scarring from the crises of the past four years.After a sharp slowdown last year,growth in LICs is projected to pick up over the forecast horizon,although to an appreciably lesser degree than previously expected.Recent developments After softening in the second half of 2023,activity in EMDEs gen

307、erally stabilized in early 2024,with indicators of domestic demand,including retail sales and consumer confidence,firming somewhat(figures 1.8.A and 1.8.B).In early 2024,headline manufacturing and services sector PMIs broadly moved up,with a still greater improvement in headline manufacturing PMIs f

308、or EMDEs excluding China(figure 1.8.C).Economic conditions have nonetheless continued to diverge,with ongoing weakness among vulnerable EMDEs.Growth in countries with stronger credit ratings has so far outpaced growth in weaker-rated countries,including many grappling with high debt and financing co

309、sts,and in those facing acute challenges,such as elevated levels of domestic conflict and violence.EMDE goods trade growth has shown signs of improvement,with the manufacturing component of new export orders PMIs returning to expan-sionary territory in early 2024,for the first time since mid-2023(fi

310、gure 1.8.D).In contrast,CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 17 FIGURE 1.8 Recent developments in emerging market and developing economies Activity in EMDEs generally stabilized in early 2024,with consumer confidence and retail sales firming somewhat.Measures of headline manufacturing and s

311、ervices activity firmed across EMDEs,and leading indicators of new export orders pushed into expansionary territory,in line with an anticipated rebound in global trade.Sources:Haver Analytics;World Bank.Note:EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;PMI=purchasing managers index.A.Panel shows t

312、he standardized deviation of average consumer confidence from the 2015-19 average.Sample includes up to 12 EMDEs.Last observation is April 2024 B.Panel shows the percentage-point deviation of nominal monthly retail sales growth from pre-pandemic averages.Sample includes 15 EMDEs.Last observation is

313、March 2024.C.Panel shows the weighted average of a sample that includes 21 EMDEs.Readings above(below)zero indicate expansion(contraction).Monthly readings are centered on 50,the expansionary threshold.Last observation is April 2024.D.Panel shows the weighted average of a sample that includes 21 EMD

314、Es.Readings above(below)zero indicate expansion(contraction).Monthly readings are centered on 50,the expansionary threshold.Last observation is April 2024.A.Consumer confidence B.Nominal retail sales growth C.Headline PMIs:Manufacturing and services D.New export orders PMIs:Manufacturing services ex

315、ports decelerated in most EMDEs,reflecting an increasingly mature tourism recovery following the pandemic.However,countries that lifted pandemic-related restrictions later,mostly in East Asia and Pacific(EAP),continue to see a rebound in tourist flows.Activity in commodity exporters has continued to

316、 face headwinds in early 2024,amid sluggish global industrial production.In oil exporters,this has been somewhat offset by robust foreign direct investment(FDI)in the extractives sector.Still,activity,fiscal revenue,and export earnings in oil exporters have been dampened by subdued global demandgivi

317、ng rise to OPEC+oil production cutsas well as by infrastructure constraints related to aging oil fields in some cases.Activity in commodity importers excluding China has been robust.This mostly reflects resilience in some large economies,notably India,owing to continued strength in domestic demand.G

318、rowth has been more muted in other commodity importers so far this year.After goods export volumes contracted in 2023,the rebound seen in early 2024 has been somewhat limited,especially in economies with large export-oriented manufac-turing sectors,partly owing to lukewarm external demand from major

319、 trading partners.Further-more,elevated prices for food and energy remain a constraint on disposable incomes,dampening consumption growth.Growth in LICs decelerated by 1.2 percentage points to 3.8 percent in 2023 from a year earlier,mainly reflecting violent conflict in some countries.Pervasive viol

320、ence and political instability exacerbated challenging economic and humanitarian situations,particularly in the Sahel region of Africa and its adjacent countries.At the same time,activity in some major LICs continued to expand at a solid pacesuch as in the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo,on account of

321、 strong mining activity,and in Ethiopia,reflecting good harvests and steady services sector growth.Consumer price inflation in LICs has,on average,continued to decline in early 2024,providing some respite for consumption growth.Notably,food price inflation has slowed in many LICs.Food insecurity non

322、etheless remains elevated,with an estimated 127 million people in LICs suffering from food crisis or worse conditions in 2024(FSIN and GNAFC 2024).EMDE outlook Aggregate growth in EMDEs is forecast to edge down from 4.2 percent in 2023 to 4 percent in 2024 and remain broadly stable over 2025-26,near

323、 estimates of EMDE potential growth for the 2020s.However,these aggregates mask notable differences in regional trends,with the expected pace of growth falling short of the 2010-19 average in EAP,ECA,and South Asia(SAR),but-6-3036912Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Sep-23Dec-23M

324、ar-24Retail sales growth2015-19 averagePercentage points-20246810Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24Manufacturing-All EMDEsServices-All EMDEsManufacturing-EMDEs excl.ChinaServices-EMDEs excl.ChinaIndex,0+=expansion-4-3-2-10123Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24EMDEsEMDEs excl.ChinaIndex,0+=expansi

325、on-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.0Jan-20Apr-20Jul-20Oct-20Jan-21Apr-21Jul-21Oct-21Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24Consumer confidence2015-19 averageIndex,0+=optimisticCHAPTER 1 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS|JUNE 2024 18 In 2024,the contribution to growth from domestic demand in EMDEs is

326、 expected to soften relative to 2023,before firming over 2025-26.The weaker contribution from domestic demand this year,however,largely reflects idiosyncratic developments in some of the seven largest EMDEs(EM7),following strong performance in 2023(chapter 2).1 In most of these economies,consumption

327、 growth is anticipated to decelerate in 2024,as the boost from idiosyncratic factors fades,and then stabilize over 2025-26.In contrast,in other EMDEs,domestic demand is expected to gather pace over the forecast horizon(figure 1.9.A).Among these economies,private consump-tion is envisaged to rebound

328、in 2024 and further strengthen over 2025-26,with declining inflation and interest rates supporting real household incomes and consumer confidence.The rebound in consumption is expected to be broad-based across most regions.The profile of investment is projected to broadly mirror that of private cons

329、umption,with varying trends between the largest EMDEs and others.For the EM7 as a whole,investment growth is expected to decelerate this year,from 2023,and then proceed at a moderate rate over 2025-26.Notably,investment in China is anticipated to remain tepid,although this is envisaged to have a som

330、ewhat limited impact on other EMDEs,as declining commodity demand for real estate in China is counterbalanced by commodity-intensive infrastructure investments.Outside the largest economies,EMDE investment is expected to rebound in 2024,and accelerate further in 2025-26,in line with declining intere

331、st rates,improving business confidence,and firming manufacturing activity.Across EMDEs,trade growth is expected to pick up in 2024,but nonetheless remain below pre-pandemic averages,particularly for some large economies,including China.Trade growth is then projected to strengthen further in many EMD

332、Es in 2025-26,in line with increasing external returning close to pre-pandemic averages in other regions over 2025-26,partly owing to still-supportive commodity prices(box 1.1).Excluding China,EMDE growth is projected to inch up to a still subdued pace of 3.5 percent this year,before firming to abou

333、t 3.9 percent in 2025-26,reflecting a cyclical upswing as monetary policy becomes less restrictive and demand from advanced economies gathers pace.FIGURE 1.9 Outlook in emerging market and developing economies While domestic demand growth is expected to moderate in some large EMDEs due to idiosyncratic factors,it is projected to pick up in many other economies.In many EMDEs,trade growth is also ex