《聯合國非洲經濟委員會：2024年非洲經濟報告：投資非洲實現公正和可持續的轉型（英文版）（100頁）.pdf》由會員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關《聯合國非洲經濟委員會：2024年非洲經濟報告：投資非洲實現公正和可持續的轉型（英文版）（100頁）.pdf（100頁珍藏版）》請在三個皮匠報告上搜索。

1、PUBLICATIONSEconomic Commission for AfricaP.O.Box 3001Addis Ababa,EthiopiaTel:+251 11 544-9900Fax:+251 11 551-4416E-mail:ecainfouneca.orgWeb:www.uneca.org 2024 United NationsAddis Ababa,EthiopiaAll rights reservedFirst printing April 2024Title:ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024:INVESTING IN A JUST AND S

2、USTAINABLE TRANSITION IN AFRICA Language:EnglishSales no:E.24.II.K.2PRINT ISBN:9789210031295PDF ISBN:9789213589373EPUB ISBN:N/APrint ISSN:2411-8346Online ISSN:2411-8354Bar code:ean-9789210031295Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted.Acknowledgement is requested,together with

3、a copy of the publication.The designations employed in this publication and the material presented in it do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa concerning the legal status of any country,territory,city

4、 or area or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.Editing:Communications Development Incorporated,Design:Dilucidar,ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024CONTENT iiAbbreviations and acronyms .viiAcknowledgements.viiiForeword.1Executive summary.2Key messages.3Key pol

5、icy recommendations.4Structure of the report.5CHAPTER 1:RECENT ECONOMIC,SOCIAL,AND CLIMATE DEVELOPMENTS .6Key messages.6Africa has shown resilience against strong headwinds.7Investment and trade are key pillars for sustainable development.11Africa needs to turn the tide of poverty and structural une

6、mployment.16Policy challenges and recommendations.19Endnotes.21References.22CHAPTER 2:A JUST AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION FOR AN INCLUSIVE AND RESILIENT AFRICA.23Key messages.23Global sustainability transition is ongoingAfrica cannot be on the sidelines.23A just and sustainable transition in Africa mu

7、st reflect its priorities.24 but it must also consider global resource and carbon constraints.26Key dimensions of the framework for just and sustainable transition in Africa.30Endnotes.32References.33CHAPTER 3:DRIVERS OF A JUST AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION IN AFRICA.34Key messages.34Leveraging the glo

8、bal sustainability transition to leapfrog development.34The just energy transition in Africa needs to address energy poverty.36Avoiding the“resource curse”and leveraging critical minerals.41Multilevel,collaborative governance for a just and sustainable transition.44Harnessing frontier technology .46

9、International partnerships for a just and sustainable transition.47Endnotes.48References.49Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa iiiCHAPTER 4:STRATEGIC INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES.50Key messages.50Africa needs more and better investment,and the African Continental Free Trade Area can

10、 deliver it.50Advancing strategic investment opportunities for a JST.51Experiences from Gabon,Kenya,SouthAfrica,Senegal,and Morocco.60Endnotes.69References.70CHAPTER 5:FINANCING STRATEGY FOR A JUST AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION IN AFRICA .71Key messages.71Africa faces a wide funding gap in implementing

11、 a just and sustainable transition.71Enhancing existing and creating new climate finance mechanisms.75Reforming the global financial architecture for a just and sustainable transition in Africa.83Endnotes.87References.88ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 ivLIST OF FIGURESFigure 1.1 GDP growth in Africa

12、and other global regions,201825.7Figure 1.2 Component contribution to real GDP growth,202025.8Figure 1.3 Average inflation,by African subregion,202025.9Figure 1.4 The downs and ups of Africas sovereign debt,200023.9Figure 1.5 Distribution of Africas sovereign debt by country,2022.10Figure 1.6 Public

13、 and publicly guaranteed debt in Africa,by creditor group,200020.10Figure 1.7 Annual foreign direct investment inflows,by African subregion,200122.12Figure 1.8 African trade values and annual growth rates,201723.13Figure 1.9 Global and intra-Africa exports,200023In billions of USD and as%of total ex

14、ports.13Figure 1.10 Composition of Africas exports,2022.14Figure 1.11 Expected increase in intra-Africa trade from the African Continental Free Trade Area by 2045,overall and by main sectors.15Figure 1.12 Extreme poverty rate in Africa and globally,198121.16Figure 1.13 Projected African Continental

15、Free Trade Area contributions to reducing poverty by 2045.17Figure 1.14 Rising frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in Africa,197180 to 201120.18Figure 2.1 Main systemic shifts for a just and sustainable transition in Africa.25Figure 2.2 Material footprint,by world regions and by income

16、 group,2000 and 2020.27Figure 2.3 Key dimensions of the framework for a just and sustainable transition in Africa.29Figure 3.1 Greenfield foreign direct investment in Africa,by sector,200320.35Figure 3.2 Number of people with and without electricity access globally,199820.36Figure 3.3 Population in

17、Africa(excluding North Africa)without access to electricity,2021.36Figure 3.4 Electricity consumption and income per capita,2021.37Figure 3.5 Composition of primary energy demand in Africa,2019.38Figure 3.6 Renewables generation capacity in Africa,201120 and additions,201920.38Figure 3.7 Share of fo

18、ssil fuels in total exports,by African subregion,2019.39Figure 3.8 Africas top gas producers in the short term,202025.40Figure 3.9 Greenhouse gas emissions per capita in North Africa,2020.40Figure 3.10 Africas global share of selected critical-mineral reserves,2023.42Figure 3.11 Share of processing

19、volume for selected critical minerals,by country,2019.42Figure 3.12 Perceived impact of climate change in 39 African countries,202123.45Figure 4.1 Current capacity and capacity under construction of renewable projects in Africa,by region,2021.53Figure 4.2 Renewable energy investment,global and in Af

20、rica,200020.54Figure 4.3 Share of renewable energy investment across African countries,201020.55Figure 4.4 Renewable manufacturing opportunities relative to mineral resources in African countries.57Figure 4.5 Share of electricity generation renewable energy in Kenya,by source,2021.61Figure 5.1 Clima

21、te theme and sectoral split of climate finance provided in 201620.72Figure 5.2 Estimated cost of addressing climate change in Africa.72Figure 5.3 Regional distribution of projects funded through the Green Climate Fund,201522.76Box figure 2.1 Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios

22、and the emissions gap in 2030,201530.28Box figure 4.1 Composition of electricity production in Morocco,2022.52Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa vLIST OF TABLESTable 3.1 Policies to close governance gaps and enhance collaboration .46Table 4.1 Mitigation potential and comparativ

23、e advantages of Africa and the Middle East(million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year).59Table 4.2 Financing for implementing Gabons national investment framework,202127($).61Table 4.3 Early investment in geothermal energy development in Kenya .62Table 4.4 Financing mobilized for sustainab

24、le energy projects in Senegal.65Table 4.5 Share of renewable energy in Senegal(%).65Table 4.6 Sustainable investment in different sectors in Morocco.66Table 5.1 Instruments of catalytic capital and their application to a just and sustainable transition in Africa.74Table 5.2 Cumulative Global Environ

25、ment Fund projects and programmes on climate change mitigation,by region,as of 30 June 2023.76Table 5.3 Banking products that can contribute to implementation of a just and sustainable transition.82Table 5.4 Examples of insurance products supporting a just and sustainable transition.82Table 5.5 Key

26、reform initiatives for the global financial architecture.84Box table 1 Estimated global warming implications under different scenarios and likelihoods.29Box table 1 Selected country experiences in natural capital accounting.79ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 viLIST OF BOXESBox 1.1 Emerging investment

27、opportunities .12Box 1.2 The African Continental Free Trade Areaa key for boosting foreign direct investment.15Box 2.1 Global greenhouse gas emissions and warming scenarios.27Box 3.1 Just Energy Transition Partnerships.39Box 3.2 Preparing for asteroid mining.43Box 3.3 Sustainable corporate governanc

28、e in Africa.45Box 4.1 Investing in solar and wind energy in Morocco.52Box 4.2 De-risking investment in Africas renewable energy sector.55Box 4.3 Democratic Republic of the CongoZambia initiative.56Box 4.4 The Africa Carbon Markets Initiative.58Box 4.5 Geothermal energy development in Kenya.62Box 4.6

29、 Two types of green bond in Morocco.67Box 5.1 Enhancing fiscal space through natural capital accounting .78Box 5.2 Debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps.80Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa viiC degrees Celsius 4IR Fourth Industrial Revolution ACF African Climate Foundatio

30、nAFC African Finance CorporationAfCFTA African Continental Free Trade AreaAfDB African Development BankAMCEN African Ministerial Conference on the EnvironmentAU African UnionAUC African Union CommissionCEPII Centre dEtudes Prospectives et dInformations InternationalesCO2 carbon dioxideCOP Conference

31、 of the PartiesDBSA Development Bank of Southern AfricaDFIs development finance institutionsDRM domestic resource mobilizationECA United Nations Economic Commission for AfricaERA Economic Report on AfricaESG environmental,social,and corporate governanceFDI foreign direct investmentGCF Green Climate

32、FundGDP gross domestic productGEF Global Environment FundGEO Global Environmental Outlook Report on AfricaGFANZ Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net ZeroGW gigawattsICA Infrastructure Consortium for AfricaIEA International Energy AgencyIFIs international financial institutions IMF International Moneta

33、ry FundIRENA International Renewable Energy AgencyIRP International Resource PanelJST just and sustainable transitionLDCs least developed countriesMDBs multilateral development banksNDCs Nationally Determined ContributionsOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPPP publicprivate p

34、artnershipREIPPPP Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme,South AfricaRSF Resilience and Sustainability Facility of the IMFSDGs Sustainable Development GoalsUN United NationsUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDESA United Nations Department of Economi

35、c and Social AffairsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNEMG United Nations Environment Management GroupUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 viiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe 2024 ed

36、ition of the Economic Report on Africa was produced under the leadership of Claver Gatete,Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa(ECA),and Deputy Executive Secretaries,Hanan Morsy and Antonio Pedro.The preparation of an earlier version of

37、the report was supervised by Adam Elhiraika,former Director of Macroeconomics and Governance Division and its completion by Zuzana Schwidrowski,Director of Macroeconomics and Governance Division.The report team was coordinated by Lee Everts,and supported by Hopestone Chavula,Sidzanbnoma Nadia Denise

38、 Ouedraogo,Lerato Litsesane,Chaoyi Hu,and Mangu Kamara,as well as Farzana Sharmin,Jean-Marc Kilolo,Sophia Schneidewind,Jason McCormack,Andualem Goshu Mekonnen,Wafa Aidi,Gonzaque Andre Rosalie,Giuseppe Tesoriere,Saurabh Sinha,Jalal Abdel-Latif,Keiso Matashane-Marite,Amadou Diouf,Adama Ekberg Coulibal

39、y,Bineswaree Bolaky,Rodgers Mukwaya,Linus Mofor,Zoubir Benhamouche,Olayinka Lawal Bandele and other colleagues from ECA subregional offices.Special thanks go to the team for their substantive contributions,coordination,handiwork,diligence,and commitment in bringing the report to fruition.Emmanuel Mo

40、utondo,Malick Sane,Adel Ben Youssef,Ricardo Amansure and Evans Kituyi prepared country case studies on investing in sustainability transition.Acknowledgement is extended to government departments,UN RCO Offices,international organizations and others furnishing information for country case studies in

41、 Gabon,Kenya,Morocco,Senegal,and South Africa.Quality assurance of the report was facilitated by the Systems-Wide Coherence and Quality Assurance Section of the Strategic Planning,Oversight&Results Division,led by Inam Ullah and assisted by Afework Temtime and Getachew Rosina.Both the internal and e

42、xternal review meetings of the report were organized by the section.ECA expresses its appreciation for the internal review team which consisted of Zuzana Schwidrowski,Simon Mevel,Yohannes Hailu,Anjana Dube,Bakary Dosso,Mamusa Siyunyi and Oliver Maponga.The external review team included Ikechukwu Seb

43、astine Asogwa,Patrick Mwesigye,Mounir Dahmani,Jean-Francois Mercier,Dhesigen Naidoo,Yeboua Kouassi,Mxolisi Notshulwana,Nkiruka Avila,Yacob Mulugeta,Benjamin Mattondo Banda and Dorothy Maseke,as well as colleagues from the African Center for Economic Transformation,including Emmanuel Owusu-Sekyere an

44、d John Asafu Adjaye.ECA thanks them all for their critical views,comments,observations and recommendations for improving the quality of the report.Professor Desta Mebratu(Lead Author)and Professor Mark Swilling(Contributing Author),from the Centre for Sustainability Transition of Stellenbosch Univer

45、sity,provided substantive background papers for the previous version.Mr.Arega Hailu Teffera provided background research and review input during the drafting process.Thanks also go to a team at Communications Development Incorporatedled by Bruce Ross-Larson and including Meta deCoquereaumont,Joe Cap

46、onio,Michael Crumplar,and Christopher Trottfor editing the report.The ECA Publications and Conference Management team,led by Sarah Mokeira,Chief of the Unit,facilitated the reports translation,supported and driven by Kumaree Deerpalsing,Director Publications,Conference and Knowledge Management Divis

47、ion(PCKMD).And thanks to Carolina Rodriguez,Mandy Kabasa,Gretchen Reeves,Karen Knols and Julia Podevin of Dilucidar Pte.Ltd.for their design and layout.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa 1FOREWORDAfrica faces persistent hurdles to its inclusive and sustainable development.Despi

48、te several pockets of excellence in the continents progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs)and the African Unions Agenda 2063,the number of SDG targets that require acceleration or reversal exceeds those that are on course.To reverse this trajectory,Africa requires financing of about

49、$1.6 trillion through 2030.In a multipolar,geopolitically unstable world mired in polycrisis,Africa cannot continue with business-as-usual and be fit for purpose.The confluence of crises triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic,conflict,and climate-related disasters has reversed social and economic develo

50、pment gains of the past decades.Africas average real GDP growth in recent years,even when accounting for an acceleration anticipated in the medium term,is below its potential and the rate needed to achieve its socioeconomic goals.Poverty,inequality,food insecurity,and unemployment continue to be agg

51、ravated with 476 million people,or about one third of the continents population and 50 million more than in 2019,estimated to be in poverty in 2024.Moreover,the number of people vulnerable to poverty rose by 28%from 2019 to 2023.The continent needs to enhance its climate resilience and embark on a g

52、reener growth path to generate quality jobs and contribute to global efforts to combat climate change and preserve the biosphere.A just and sustainable transition(JST)promoting accelerated,inclusive,and sustainable growth,as well as diversification and green industrialization will help Africa reach

53、its potential.In this context,the Economic Report on Africa 2024 analyses the opportunities and policies for Africa to build a just and sustainable economic system.For this to materialize,however,African countries need holistic development plans and strategies that fundamentally redirect their produ

54、ction,consumption,governance,technology,human capital,and financial systems.The private sector will play a key role in both the design and implementation stages.Fostering investment in a JST on the continent will require African countries to mobilize the required financing both domestically and exte

55、rnally.Leveraging Africas potential for a JST would also hinge on transformational leadership guided by an African narrative,supported by multistakeholder coalitions at the national and regional levels.Finally,presenting united and amplified African voice at key global institutions will be critical.

56、The AUs gaining a seat at the G20 provides an opportunity to articulate Africas views on key issues for the continent.Africa is well positioned to successfully pursue a JST that best serves its people and strategic interests.The 2024 edition of the Economic Report on Africa lays the foundation for c

57、atalysing the required policy and institutional frameworks for doing so.Claver GateteUnder-Secretary General and Executive SecretaryUnited Nations Economic Commission for AfricaAfrica is well positioned to successfully pursue a JST that best serves its people and strategic interests.This year ECAs E

58、conomic Report for Africa lays the foundation for catalysing the required policy and institutional frameworks for doing so.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 2EXECUTIVE SUMMARYAmid the fragmented and conflict-prone world,Africa faces many economic,social,and environmental challenges.They are unprecedent

59、ed in scale,complexity,and interconnectedness,and they impede Africas attaining the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Unions Agenda 2063.These global challenges render business-as-usual strategies unsustainable.A new approach is required to accelerate wealth creation,reduce ine

60、quality,and achieve more equitable and sustainable development.The increased demand for renewable energy encourages African countries to transition to inclusive,low-carbon,and resource-efficient economies,while closing the energy gap.Transitioning to full energy access and sustainability will requir

61、e changes in interdependent societal systems across multiple levelsfrom more strategic participation in global supply chains to the behaviour of individual citizens.Industrializing Africa on fossil fuels only is not feasible given the planetary crisis.In the medium term,the continent will increasing

62、ly use renewables to close its energy gap.Progress will depend on how the African policymakers will approach the critical transition elements and drivers in the coming decades.The Economic Report on Africa(ERA)2024 presents the case for investing in a just and sustainable transition(JST)while achiev

63、ing energy access for all.Using country case studies,macro,sectoral and firm evidence,and the findings and recommendations of previous ERA editions,the 2024 report assesses the necessary conditions for a JST in Africa and how to catalyse the needed investment.The 2024 ERA proposes defining the JST f

64、rom an African perspective and highlights the opportunities and policy imperatives for African countries to achieve it.The report aims to:Contextualize and conceptualize the imperative for JSTs for Africa to achieve its economic,social,and environmental priorities.Highlight opportunities and assessi

65、ng the state of JSTs in Africa in terms of the three pillars of sustainability:environmental,social,and economic.Evaluate the opportunities for financing the JSTs in Africa based on country case studies.Recommend policies and frameworks for Africa to successfully undertake the JSTs.The report underl

66、ines the leapfrogging opportunities stemming from Africas early stage of development and generous endowment in natural resources.The latter is key for sustainability transition.The report underscores Africas other strengths such as arable land and youthful populations.Making the most of them will re

67、quire not only a fundamental shift in countries policy and planning processes,but also much greater and more effective involvement of the private sector and development partners.This report also highlights the policy and institutional mindset shifts required to catalyse JSTs in Africa.To reach its o

68、bjectives,the JST needs to reflect Africas specificities.An interpretation of a JST that serves Africa needs to be well defined as an economic system encompassing environmental sustainability,social mitigation,and green industrialization.The desired result is not only sustainable energy generation,e

69、nvironmental protection,and social mitigation,but also a wider green industrial transformation.The foundation for JSTs is the emerging business models and best practices that generate substantial resource savings through circular economies and leapfrogging technologies while driving development.Howe

70、ver,for Africa to rapidly exit from fossil fuels is not an option,given a rapidly growing population with about 600 million Africans lacking electricity.The shift to renewables thus needs to be gradual,while other sources will still play a key role over the medium term.Investing in a Just and Sustai

71、nable Transition in Africa 3KEY MESSAGESAfrican countries can achieve their development objectives by promoting low-carbon development paths driven by the regions abundant and diverse renewable energy resources,but the transition away from fossils needs to be gradual,as stated in the African Common

72、Position on Energy Access and Just Energy Transition,led by the African Union.Africa has window of opportunity to undertake impactful,just and sustainable transitions(JSTs)guided by African-informed narratives and needs.Factors such as its youthful population,arable land,renewable resource endowment

73、s,huge deposits of strategic minerals,and latecomer advantages from emerging technologies position Africa to shape the sustainability transition at the global level while closing its own gaps in energy availability.Despite Africas huge potential,investment in its sustainability transition,and in ren

74、ewable energy sources especially,remains negligible.The five country case studies of Gabon,Kenya,Morocco,Senegal,and South Africa in this report show that attracting investment into renewables is possible,but success so far has been limited to specific sectors in a handful of countries.Morocco has a

75、chieved notable progress in mobilizing resources for the transition.For the transition in Africa to be just,it needs to be embedded in African narratives,pursuing Africas best interests and relying on key enablers.Those enablers include renewable energy development,low-carbon industrialization,resou

76、rce-efficient technologies,collaborative governance,adequate public and private investment flow,closing energy gaps,enhancing well-being,and creating jobs.To succeed,the transition needs to be Africa-led.Achieving JSTs in Africa requires fundamental shifts in the economic,governance,and technology s

77、ystems.These shifts need to be driven by efficient natural resource use,sustainable infrastructure development,low-carbon industrialization,and resilient agroecological systems.Repositioning Africa in global value chains and creating green jobs for its young people will require transitioning from an

78、 extractive-economy to a value-adding,productive economy increasingly powered by clean energy.While pursuing JSTs,African policymakers should be guided by forward-looking visions and strategies that maximize the continents benefits from emerging economic and technological opportunities and use conti

79、nental mechanisms such as the African Continental Free Trade Area for implementation.Financing JSTs in Africa is crucial to ensure inclusive development of low-carbon resilient economies without compromising prosperity.Transitioning will require heavy resources to fund capital investment,financial i

80、nnovation,and social protection systems,and the continent will need to catalyse innovative approaches.To close the Africas financing gap fairly and attain JSTs,the international financial architecture requires a paradigm shift and major reform.African countries are well positioned to expand their fi

81、scal space by strategically leveraging their natural resources.This can be done by developing strategic minerals,integrating natural capital into national resource accounting and planning processes,curbing illicit financial flows,and leveraging the continents strategic role in the evolving geopoliti

82、cal landscape.An interpretation of a JST that serves Africas needs well defines it as an economic system encompassing environmental sustainability,social mitigation,and green industrialization.The desired result is not only sustainable energy transformation,environmental protection and social mitiga

83、tion,but also a wider green industrial transformation.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 4KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe overarching goal of a JST framework for Africa is to improve human well-being today without jeopardizing the well-being of future generations.This is to be achieved by fulfilling basic

84、 needs,creating productive jobs and sustainable livelihoods,and establishing a healthy ecosystem.Such a framework recognizesas the driving forces for a JSTlow-carbon industrialization that is inclusive,creates decent jobs,is environmentally sustainable while pursuing sustainable agroecosystems.Again

85、st this background,the main policy recommendations of the 2024 ERA are:Strengthen strategies and policies for JSTs in Africa with national development plans that integrate national priorities with the SDGs and Agenda 2063 and associated financing mechanisms.Development policies and strategies,champi

86、oned by transformative leadership,should help African countries seize the leapfrogging opportunities given Africas early stage of development,natural resources and human endowments,emerging technologies,and African Continental Free Trade Area.Facilitate the key role of the private sector,but JSTs sh

87、ould be prudently managed rather than solely relying on market mechanisms.This approach aims to reduce economic and social upheaval and support job creation,social inclusion,and poverty eradication.Balance growth and strategic public investment while maintaining fiscal sustainability.African governm

88、ents need to mobilize more domestic financial resources and improve tax-to-GDP ratios by strengthening tax structures(including environmental taxes),capacity-building,institutions,procurement systems,and digital technology use.Streamlining subsidies and targeting social protection can raise the effi

89、ciency of fiscal spending.Mobilize new financing and make smarter use of available financial resources to invest in Africas untapped opportunities for JSTs.The case studies reveal the steps that some African countries are taking to support investment in JSTs.Policy commitments and clear strategies s

90、upported by adaptable institutional mechanisms are key for achieving investment sustainability.They are also key for mobilizing capital through sustainable budgeting,private capital markets,green and blue bonds,and carbon credits.Establish a dedicated national mechanism for financing JSTs,backed by

91、the national bank or treasury,to facilitate more efficient use of available funding.African countries can leverage the global boom in“green”minerals and other natural resources to export premium carbon credits,generating additional financing for sustainable investment.Develop strategies for sustaina

92、bly managing natural capital to foster investment in JSTs.Incorporating natural capital in national development plans can expand fiscal space,providing a foundation for green fiscal policy instruments and for rebasing GDP.This effort should be underpinned by strategies for sustainable industrializat

93、ion.This shifts the development policy focus to“strategic minerals”and Africas enhanced role in processing,value addition,and global value chains.Support multilevel collaborative governance,human capital,and leapfrogging technologies essential for JSTs.Given the cross-border and cross-jurisdiction n

94、ature of climate change and ecological degradation,collaborative governance by all government levels,including international organizations,and other key stakeholders(firms,NGOs,citizens)is a precondition for successful JST implementation.Build effective multistakeholder partnerships and coalitions a

95、t national,regional and global levels.This includes multicountry frameworks such as the Climate Commission of African Island States to create synergies and improve coordination.The AU recent membership in the G-20 provides a platform for assertively voicing Africas perspectives and influencing globa

96、l decisions on the priority issues.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa 5STRUCTURE OF THE REPORTThe 2024 ERA is structured as follows.Chapter 1 reviews economic,social,and climate developments in Africa.Chapter 2 defines the JST from an African perspective and presents the analyt

97、ical framework for subsequent chapters.Chapter 3 analyses the drivers of JSTs,Chapter 4 discusses the strategic investment opportunities,and Chapter 5 presents financing strategies.6ChApTER 1:RECENT ECONOMIC,SOCIAL,AND CLIMATE DEVELOPMENTS KEY MESSAGES The global economy has avoided recession but fa

98、ces headwinds from multiple crises,including major conflicts and climate change.The outlook is mixed,with falling headline inflation and positive economic growth alongside continued challenges such as massive public debt,rising borrowing costs,weak global trade,and mounting geopolitical risks.Africa

99、 has shown remarkable resilience and remains the second-fastest-growing region globally.The regions challenges include weak global demand,tight global financial conditions,high debt levels,and high inflation,prompting further adjustments in economic policies and development strategies.Avoiding a deb

100、t crisis tops the policy agenda.The recent social and climate developments in Africa are alarming,with rising poverty,inequality,and unemployment,as well as more frequent and severe extreme weather events,exacerbating the continents challenges.Africa is projected to have 476 million people living in

101、 poverty in 2024,which is about one third of its population and about 50 million more than in 2019.Turning the tide on poverty,unemployment,and inequality in an equitable and sustainable way will require focusing on job-rich and green growth,including strengthening human capital(health and education

102、),leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA),and closing the food and energy gaps.Investing in a just and sustainable transition(JST)in Africa must be in line with the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs).1 In addition to tackling the impacts of climate change and declining biodiversi

103、ty,this includes building prosperity and enhancing peoples well-being by guaranteeing food security;creating good and equitable employment opportunities;establishing adequate,durable,and sustainable power sources accessible to all;and promoting effective energy utilization.1 Transitioning to a just

104、and sustainable economy is anticipated to positively affect GDP growth,social inclusion,and environmental sustainability.2 ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024Africa was the fastest-growing region after developing Asia in 2023.7AFRICA HAS SHOWN RESILIENCE AGAINST STRONG HEADWINDSAFRICAS GROWTH IS BELOW TH

105、E PRECOVID-19 PANDEMIC RATE BUT REMAINS THE SECOND HIGHEST GLOBALLYThe global economy maintained its resilience in 2023,but numerous factors will continue to weigh on global growth in the short to medium term.These include high debt levels,rising borrowing costs,persistently low investment,weak glob

106、al trade,and geopolitical risks.The 2023 growth was achieved thanks to declining energy and food prices,increased consumption in China,and improved economic growth in the United States,despite substantial monetary tightening and lingering policy uncertainties caused by multiple disruptions stemming

107、from,for instance,climate change and conflicts.Global growth is forecast to decelerate from an estimated 2.7%in 2023 to 2.4%in 2024 before improving moderately to 2.7%in 2025,remaining below the average pre-pandemic rate of 3.0%(figure 1.1).Africas growth slowdown is projected to bottom out in 2023

108、and growth to gradually accelerate in 2024 and 2025.The continents real GDP growth declined to 2.8%in 2023 but is projected to rise to 3.5%in 2024 and reach 4.1%in 2025.The external factors behind the 2023 slowdown included tighter monetary policy,constrained demand for African exports,and the war i

109、n Ukraine.These,in turn,impeded flows of development funds to the continent,constraining its fiscal space and the movement of commodities and services.Vast differences across subregions prevailed in 2023:15 countries(including Cte dIvoire,Ethiopia,and Rwanda)grew by more than 5%.3 The stronger and b

110、road-based projected growth reflects the efforts at diversification,strategic investment in key sectors,and fiscal consolidation that many countries have pursued(figure 1.2).Africa was the fastest-growing region after developing Asia in 2023.For 2024,the African Development Bank projects that 11 of

111、the 20 fastest-growing economies in the world will be in Africa.Still,the sluggish global recovery could reduce foreign direct investment(FDI)inflows and demand for Africas exports,thus lowering the continents growth.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa3.46.00.74.52.52.75.13.5-0.

112、7-3.3-2.60.5-7.3-1.36.05.27.16.66.83.03.13.73.83.92.72.85.02.24.12.43.54.71.64.02.74.14.72.34.2-10.0-8.0-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.08.0201820192020202120222023e2024f2025fWorldEast and South AsiaAfricaLatin America and the CaribbeanDeveloping countriesGDP growth(per cent)Figure 1.1 Annual Real GDP growth

113、 in Africa and other global regions,201825Note:e=estimate;f=forecast.Source:UNDESA 2024.8INFLATION REQUIRES POLICYMAKERS CONTINUED ATTENTION Even though inflation has subsided in other regions,in Africa it remains elevated,mainly because of weakening domestic currencies,elevated commodity prices,and

114、 supply disruptions,as well as entrenched inflationary expectations among the public.Consumer price inflation for Africa is estimated at 18.3%in 2023,up from 13.1%in 2022(figure 1.3).In some countries,including Sierra Leone,Sudan,and Zimbabwe,it remains stubbornly high,despite central bank efforts t

115、o raise policy rates,which,among other factors,reflects the low credibility of monetary policy and the slow and limited monetary policy transmission to the economy.High inflation has put additional pressure on policymakers to raise public spending to protect the most vulnerable population segments.W

116、ith many African currencies losing ground against the dollar,the continents inflationary pressures remain elevated.The South African rand depreciated by almost 11%against the dollar in 2022,making it one of the currencies weakening the most among developing markets4 and continuing the trend of the r

117、ands dramatic depreciation of 173%against the dollar over the past 20 years.Nigerias naira plunged 55%5 in 2023,and the Kenyan shilling posted its largest drop in 30 years,depreciating by 21%against the dollar.Even though several central banks aggressively tightened monetary policy,easing inflationa

118、ry expectations will require persistent and complementary monetary and fiscal policies.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 20242020202120222023e2024f2025f Private consumptionGross fxed investmentGovernment consumptionNet exportsGDP growth(%)-0.76.41.10.81.31.8-2.41.51.20.50.81.51.10.10.10.3-0.5-2.80.71.20.90.

119、45.23.12.83.54.1-6-4-202468Growth(percentage points)-2.6Figure 1.2 Component contribution to real GDP growth,202025Note:e=estimate;f=forecast.Source:UNDESA(2024)forecasts and Economic Commission for Africa(ECA)decomposition of contributions.9 AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CONDITIONS ARE ALARMING At 4.5%of GDP

120、in 2023,the continents fiscal deficit surpassed its 2019 rate and is projected to rise further,to 5.0%in 2024.The main drivers of widening fiscal deficits,especially in resource-intensive economies,are net capital outflows and subdued export revenue.Continued restrictive global financial conditions

121、are making the servicing of resulting public debt costlier,and regular catastrophic weather events are causing substantial losses and damage,further aggravating fiscal and other pressures.The situation is exacerbated by the average tax-to-GDP ratio remaining below its 2019 rate of 15.8%.Africas publ

122、ic debt increased by 183%in 201022,a rate roughly four times higher than its growth rate of GDP in dollar terms.While the need for official development assistance grew in this period,the flow has fallen and become less predictable.In terms of GDP,the debt burden has reached preMultilateral Debt Reli

123、ef Initiative levels(figure 1.4).The increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio since the initiative was caused by the countercyclical fiscal outlays during and after the 200708 global financial crisis,the commodity price shock of 2014,and rising infrastructure spending.The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated

124、the debt situation,as increased public financing has been required to counter the negative socioeconomic the pandemics consequences.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa0510152025302020202120222023e2024f2025fCentral AfricaEast AfricaNorth AfricaSouthern AfricaWest AfricaAfricaper

125、cent010203040506070200020022004200620082010201220142016201820202022General government debt as a share of GDP(%)Figure 1.3 Annual average inflation,by African subregion,202025Note:e=estimate;f=forecast.Source:UNDESA 2024.Figure 1.4 The downs and ups of Africas sovereign debt,200023General government

126、debt as a share of GDP(%)Source:ECA calculations based on International Monetary Fund data.10The distribution of public debt across the continent is uneven,with 40%held in North African countries,which have been disproportionately hit by the fallout from the war in Ukraine.The major debtors are larg

127、e,middle-income countries,pointing to the need for targeted debt-relief policies for this subgroup(figure 1.5).The structure of the debt has also changed,from concessional to non-concessional,as creditors have shifted from multilateral and Paris Club creditors to private and nonParis Club creditors,

128、and to China in particular(figure 1.6).The higher borrowing costs and shorter maturities associated with non-concessional loans have contributed to elevated refinancing risks.After sovereign debt defaults by Ethiopia,Ghana,and Zambia,African policymakers are concerned about the possibility of a debt

129、 crisis.The debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to be 65.2%in 2023,thus wiping out the benefits of past debt relief initiatives.The rapid rise has been driven by growing financing needs from food and energy import bills,high borrowing costs,and exchange rate depreciation.Forecasts indicate that the ratio

130、 will remain above the preCovid-19 pandemic rate of 61%in 202325.Despite a general stabilization in debt levels,according to the ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024AFRICA TOTAL1,883Egypt421South Africa288Nigeria181Algeria102Morocco95Rest of Africa745Multilateral creditorsBilateral creditorsOther private

131、creditorsCommercial banksBonds800,000600,000400,000200,000020002005201020152020$million Figure 1.6 External public and publicly guaranteed debt in Africa,by creditor group,200020$million Source:World Bank.Figure 1.5 Distribution of Africas sovereign debt by country,2022$billionSource:UNCTAD.11Intern

132、ational Monetary Fund(IMF),as of February 2024,seven African countries were in debt distress,and 13 were at high risk of debt distress.6 High borrowing costs and appreciation of the dollar have increased the debt servicing burden of foreign currencydenominated debt.With cumulative Eurobond repayment

133、s in 2024 and 2025 reaching about$6 billion,several African countries face heightened rollover risks for their sovereign debts.The heavy debt burdens have impeded African governments capacity to finance health,education,sustainable infrastructure,and the energy transition,among others.To turn the si

134、tuation around,countries that face solvency and liquidity constraints,such as Ethiopia,Ghana,Malawi,and Zambia,are pursuing or undergoing public debt restructuring.Other countries that face challenges in meeting their external financing needs,such as Egypt,have received support from IMF programs.Bey

135、ond general consolidation,some countries(Angola,the Gambia,Nigeria,and Zambia)have started to implement substantial energy-subsidy reforms to create space for development spending.Nevertheless,these piecemeal solutions are inadequatecomprehensive reform of the debt architecture is needed.INVESTMENT

136、AND TRADE ARE KEY PILLARS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTINVESTMENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS ARE STILL MIXED BUT GRADUALLY IMPROVINGIn 2022,FDI amounted to$45 billion,equivalent to less than 2%of the continents GDP and accounting for less than 4%of global FDI flows.North Africa has traditionally been a magn

137、et for FDI,as Egypt emerged as the top destination for capital investment in 2022,mainly because of large-scale projects in green hydrogen,But with conflicts in Gaza and Sudan,the countrys FDI prospects worsened.European investors remain the largest holders of FDI stock in Africa,led by the United K

138、ingdom,France,and the Netherlands.Africa saw a surge in FDI in 2021,with an inflow of$83 billion,but almost half resulted from a single intrafirm transaction in South Africa linked to a major corporate reconfiguration(figure 1.7).On a more positive note,the value of greenfield projects announced in

139、Africa surged to$195 billion in 2022,with the number of projects rising to 766.Africa housed 6 of the top 15 greenfield megaprojects(worth more than$410 billion)announced in 2022.The prospects for FDI flows to Africa for the next few years remain mixedalbeit gradually improvingand subject to downsid

140、e risks.The investment environment is marked by uncertainty,owing to geopolitical tensions,the war in Ukraine,the IsraelHamas conflict,and risks of global economic slowdown.On a more positive note,rebounding growth,falling interest rates in advanced economies,and natural resource endowments bode wel

141、l for investors interest in Africas opportunities.While resource-oriented industries continue to attract the largest share of greenfield announcements,recent trends show increasing diversification from raw materials into manufacturing and services(box 1.1).Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transit

142、ion in Africaheavy debt burdens have impeded African governments capacity to finance health,education,sustainable infrastructure,and the energy transition,among others.12Box 1.1 Emerging investment opportunities Africa is yet to tap the developmental potential of its critical minerals.The worldwide

143、drive towards a green transition and the fourth industrial revolution is boosting demand for products like batteries and semiconductors,which depend heavily on critical minerals.The demandsupply imbalance in critical minerals has been intensifying.In 2022,foreign investors committed over$92 billion

144、to electric vehicle manufacturing projects,while only$14.6 billion was directed towards greenfield foreign direct investment(FDI)in the mining industry.This disparity widens when one considers the different timelines for starting production.While mining projects may require up to 20 years from the d

145、iscovery of a deposit to the start of production,downstream operations,such as battery production,can begin production in as little as three years.The situation underscores a scenario of intensifying competition for securing essential minerals across industries.7Recognizing the importance of securin

146、g critical minerals reliably and affordably,companies are increasingly taking steps to shorten their supply chains.One strategy is vertical integration,where manufacturers control the mining and refining processes.For instance,Germanys Volkswagen is forming partnerships with mining companies to sour

147、ce raw materials directly.8 This increasing reliance on critical minerals places Africa in a favourable position to attract growth-oriented investment.Effectively leveraging this potential could spark industrial diversification and expand manufacturing capacities on the continent,as exemplified by t

148、he development of Democratic Republic of the CongoZambia battery special economic zone.Moreover,this landscape offers Africa a chance to bolster its presence in key profit-generating industries of the fourth industrial revolution.In 2022,the renewable energy sector achieved a record-breaking milesto

149、ne in global capital investment worldwide,with$343.6 billion invested across 527 projects.9 The surge in renewable energy investment is driven by global climate policies,technological advances that are making renewables more cost-effective,growing emphasis on sustainability among investors and consu

150、mers,and concerns for energy security.Investor interest in Africas rich yet underused renewable energy resources is evident.With only 1%of land suitable for energy development currently being tapped,potential capacities are immense.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024FDI infows by African subregions,2001-

151、2022-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000Northern AfricaEastern AfricaSouthern AfricaWestern AfricaCentral Africa2001-2005 Avg.2006-2010 Avg.2011-2015 Avg.2016201720182019202020212022Intra-frm transaction in South AfricaMillion USDFigure 1.7 Annual foreign direct investment

152、inflows,by African subregion,200122Source:https:/unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.FdiFlowsStock.13This investor interest is seen in recent FDI trends.Notable projects announced in 2022 include the South Africa Green Hydrogen Project($10 billion),the ReNew Suez Canal Economic Zone Green

153、 Hydrogen Plant Project in Egypt($8 billion),the 400 megawatt(MW)Egypt Solar-Powered Desalination Plant Project($1.5 billion),plans by Total Eren in Luxembourg to build a hydrogen and green ammonia production plant in Morocco($10 billion),and a project to construct a 936 MW solar power plant and a 4

154、43 MW-hour battery storage facility in Nigeria($1.8 billion).10 Niger,Egypt,Mauritania,Morocco,Namibia,and South Africa lead hydrogen production on the continent.11THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA PROTECTS AGAINST GLOBAL HEADWINDS AND IS KEY TO ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION In 2023,the African tra

155、de share of global trade remained at less than 3%,and its trade with the rest of the world declined from 2022(figure 1.8).The decline reflected subdued export revenue,mainly in resource-rich countries.12 Further,while Africas overall 2023 exports are estimated at$600 billion,intra-Africa exports wil

156、l reach only$110 billion,pointing to the need to fully implement the AfCFTA(figure 1.9).Similarly,Africas imports have continued to grow,reaching an all-time high of$698 billion in 2022 before falling slightly to an estimated$666 billion in 2023.Even so,Africas imports from within the continent rema

157、in low,exposing it to external shocks.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa-20%-10%0%10%20%30%40%02004006008001,0001,2001,4001,600BillionTotal African Trade Growth Rate YOY2017201820192020202120222023*Per centBillion0510152025200020102020 2023African Exports to ROWAfrica Exports t

158、o Africa(a)Value of African Exports to the World and to AfricaPer cent(b)Proportion of African Exports to Africa versus Total Global Exports 20052015$0$100$200$300$400$500$600$700$80020002005201020152020 2023Figure 1.8 African trade values and annual growth rates,201723Note:2023 values are estimated

159、 using data through August 2023.Total trade is the sum of imports and exports.Source:IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Database(2023).Figure 1.9 Global and intra-Africa exports,200023 In billions of USD and as%of total exportsNote:2023 values are estimated based on data available through August 2023

160、.Total trade is the sum of imports and exports.Source:IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Database.14The AfCFTA is poised to help Africa industrialize and reduce its dependence on energy and mining.While Africas total exports are concentrated in extractives,intra-Africa exports are concentrated in goo

161、ds higher along key value chains.In 2022,fuels,ores,metals,and foodstuffs came to 60%of Africas total exports,while manufactured goods accounted for 43%of intra-Africa exports(figure 1.10).The high share of commodity exports keeps Africa at the bottom of value chains and dependent on the rest of the

162、 world for imports of manufactured and finished products.Full implementation of the AfCFTA,however,will increase intra-Africa trade by an estimated 35%in 2045,benefiting all main sectors:agrifood(up by 54%),services(38%),industry(36%),and energy and mining(19%).The AfCFTA will reduce Africas depende

163、nce on manufactured imports,because agrifood and industry stand to benefit the most from it(figure 1.11).ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 202411%6%42%21%20%20%4%22%43%10%(a)Composition of Africas total exports.(per cent,2022)(b)Composition of exportswithin Africa.(per cent,2021)OtherManufactured goods(SITC

164、 5 to 8 less 667 and 68)Fuels(SITC 3)Ores and metals(SITC 27+28+68)All food items(SITC 0+1+22+4)Figure 1.10 Composition of Africas exports,2022Note:SITC=Standard Int.Trade Classification.Source:UNCTADStat Database,accessed 12 December 2023.15Fully implementing the AfCFTA is key also for promoting in

165、tra-Africa investment(box 1.2).The AfCFTAs dedicated investment protocol establishes uniform standards across the continent for promoting and facilitating investment and protecting investors,creating a consistent and predictable policy environment.Moreover,the AfCFTA introduces various mechanisms to

166、 enhance coherence.Clearly,creating a common market through the AfCFTA with a potential market of more than 1.4 billion people presents a more appealing prospect to investors than dealing with 54 countries individually.Box 1.2 The African Continental Free Trade Areaa key for boosting foreign direct

167、investmentDuring times of increased global uncertainty,attracting and retaining foreign direct investment(FDI)hinge on improving the predictability of investment environments and enhancing the bankability and profitability of investment opportunities.A key factor is to establish clear and predictabl

168、e policy and legal frameworks.Policy uncertainty can act as a tax on investment.13 Further,a study focusing on Uganda highlights that policy consistency and political stability are crucial,often outweighing the attractiveness of incentives for drawing FDI inflows.14The African Continental Free Trade

169、 Area(AfCFTA)provides such a stable and predictable framework:it contains a dedicated investment protocol for establishing uniform standards across the continent for promoting and facilitating investment,protecting investors,and creating a consistent and predictable policy environment,replacing the

170、current fragmented environment characterized by 852 bilateral investment treaties involving Africa.Moreover,the AfCFTA introduces several mechanisms to enhance coherence,such as a Pan-African trade and investment agency,one-stop shops,and national focal points,as well as the simplified and digitized

171、 registration processes under the AfCFTA,which could enhance transparency.Further,the AfCFTA presents a major boost for market-seeking investors,for whom market size is a key determinant in selecting a host country or subregion,as larger markets make investing more attractive thanks to economies of

172、scale and expanded sales avenues.In addition,an Africa integrated under the AfCFTA would help mitigate risks related to demand fluctuations and political or economic instability in individual countries or subregions.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in AfricaAgrifoodIndustryEnergy&Minin

173、gServices53.6%36.3%37.6%19.3%Figure 1.11 Expected increase in intra-Africa trade from the African Continental Free Trade Area by 2045,overall and by main sectorsNote:Percentage increase by 2045 from a baseline without the AfCFTA.Source:ECA and CEPII forthcoming.16AFRICA NEEDS TO TURN THE TIDE OF POV

174、ERTY AND STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENTThe confluence of crises triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic,conflicts,and climate-related disasters have reversed the social and economic development gains accrued over recent decades.Based on a recent study by ECA,476 million Africansabout one third of the population

175、 and 50 million more than in 2019will be in poverty in 2024.Moreover,the share of poor people living in Africa is almost seven times higher than that in the rest of the world(figure 1.12).A jump in the number of people vulnerable to poverty(measured as those living up to 20%above the poverty line)in

176、 201923 also causes concern.The capacity of African countries to tackle poverty and inequality is severely constrained by the low poverty-reducing effect of economic growth(with poverty elasticity of growth at 0.24 in 2023).This confirms that countries with low initial development(or high initial po

177、verty rates)and high inequality tend to have lower growthpoverty elasticities.The growth models of many African countries,where extractive sectors are the leading source of growth,are also a critical underlying factor of the low poverty elasticity of growth.Extractives are capital intensive,are non-

178、labour-intensive,and have few links with other sectors.Thus,growth originating from extractive industries is unlikely to create the many jobs needed to reduce poverty and income inequality.Compared with other ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024Sum of AfricaSum of the World Except Africa1002040305960$1.90

179、 poverty rate(per cent)198119861991199620012006201120162021Figure 1.12 Extreme poverty rate in Africa and globally,198121Note:The poverty rate is estimated using the$1.90 international poverty line.Source:ECA estimates based on the World Bank PIP Database(2023)and Institute for Security Studies(2022

180、).Based on a recent study by ECA,476 million Africans about one third of population and 50 million more than in 2019 will be in poverty in 2024.17developing regions that have a comparable economic growth rate,Africa has seen slow poverty reduction.It needs to sustainably transition its economy to en

181、sure more inclusive growth.Africas key challenge is to create decent jobs for its growing population.The continent now has 1.4 billion people,a figure projected to increase to 2.9 billion in 2050.15 The size of the African labour force will thus continue to grow in the next 25 years,with the working

182、-age population projected to increase from 224 million in 2030 to 730 million by 2050.Unemployment rates in Africa have been rising since 2020,and 13 million young people are currently unemployed.16 Labour markets are characterized by widespread informality,working poverty,underemployment,and low pr

183、oductivity.Per figures from the International Labour Organization,the informal economy now accounts for nearly 83%of employment.17 Africas population dividend may thus turn into a population bomb if poorly managedand the continents potential for a demographic dividend could turn into a demographic b

184、urden.Africa has structurally high unemployment rates,which are attributable largely to inefficient education policies that result in skill deficits18 and mismatches between skills provided by the education sector and those demanded by employers.19 New social contracts in African countries could hel

185、p address the mismatch and gaps in key skills while tackling poverty,inequality,and informal employment,achievable by,for example,improving the affordability,accessibility,and applicability of education.20Implementing the AfCFTA could stimulate creation of decent jobs and reduce poverty and inequali

186、ty for all countries in the sample21 of an ECA study,though with varying impacts across countries(figure 1.13).And estimates indicate that countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania could benefit from a high reduction in inequality.AfCFTA implementation is expected to benefit people living in urban are

187、as more than people living in rural areas,and men more than women.Hence,effective and specific measures to integrate rural populations,and women and young people,in trade is critical,starting with the AfCFTA Protocol on Women and Youth in Trade,formalizing women traders and facilitating womens acces

188、s to finance.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa?-11.5%-3.2%-1.3%-1.0%-0.9%-0.7%-0.7%-0.5%-0.4%-0.1%-20%-18%-16%-14%-12%-10%-8%-6%-4%-2%0%?-1.06-0.64-0.01-0.020.00-0.03-0.030.00-0.01 0.00-1.2-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.0?Figure 1.13 Projected African Continental Free Trade Area contri

189、butions to reducing poverty by 2045Source:ECA(forthcoming)18THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CLIMATE CHANGE ARE RAPIDLY RISINGDespite contributing only about 7%of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020,22 Africa is grappling with the adverse impacts of climate change,experiencing an annual temperature in

190、2019 that was 1C higher than the long-term mean over 19812010.23 Africa has been increasingly vulnerable to climate disasters in recent years,with changing weather patterns leading to a greater number and impact of adverse weather events,such as droughts and floods.These events in turn reduce agricu

191、ltural productivity and increase poverty and food insecurity.Climate-related disasters and extreme weather events have a major long-term impact on human welfare and economic development,including via migration.Global warming has caused an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather co

192、nditions globally,and Africa has been hit heavily.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts more frequent and intense rainfall in tropical Africa and increased droughts in parts of northern and southern Africa.As a result,the risk of floodings will rise further,even though rain-related

193、natural disasters in Africa have already increased exponentially over the last 50 years(figure 1.14a).24 With warming oceans,Africa has experienced four times as many storms and more than twice the number of cyclones as in the 1970s(figure 1.14b).25Africas share in the greenhouse gas emissions stock

194、 remains very low,but its share in new emissions has been rising.Specifically,Africas share of world greenhouse gas emissions is forecast to rise to 12%by 2045,up from 7%in 2020.26 With the AfCFTA seen as an unprecedented opportunity for Africa to industrialize,there are also concerns that it could

195、further increase in Africas greenhouse gas emissions.27 This scenario and other developments,such as locking in carbon-intensive infrastructure,would undermine efforts to pursue the sustainability transition and to achieve net zero by 2050.Enhanced energy efficiency would not only facilitate fewer E

196、CONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024?5004003002001000Events1971-19801981-19901991-20002001-20102011-2020FloodsStormsLandslidesEpidemicsStormsCyclones1008060402001971-19801981-19901991-20002001-20102011-2020Source:Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2022.Figure 1.14 Rising frequency and intensity of extreme

197、 weather events in Africa,197180 to 201120While Africa has contributed only marginally to the climate crisis,it must address the existential threat that the crisis presents and that impacts the continent disproportionally.19emissions but also create new,and greener,jobs,and thus contribute to leavin

198、g no one behind,which is the central,transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals.While Africa has contributed only marginally to the climate crisis,it must address the existential threat that the crisis presents and that impacts the con

199、tinent disproportionally.At the same time,the global pressure for decarbonizing the economy presents an opportunity for Africa,because it possesses minerals and other natural resources vital to this process.The ongoing megatrend thus positions Africa towards the path of prosperity,provided it implem

200、ents the proper policies and frameworks.POLICY CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONSAfrican policymakers face critical challenges in striking a balance between supporting growth and scaling up strategic public investments on the one hand and maintaining fiscal sustainability and rebuilding fiscal buffers o

201、n the other.Unless economic growth is accelerated substantially,achieving lasting fiscal consolidation and taming public debt will remain elusive.Similarly,without adequate fiscal space and a stable macroeconomic framework,the necessary investment in climate-proof infrastructure,health,and education

202、 will not be undertaken either,and the SDGs will remain aspirational.Though real GDP has been growing faster than population in the last two decades,that growth has been insufficient to prevent the number of people living in poverty from increasing by 30 million.Inadequate GDP growth is part of the

203、explanation because half the African population lives in countries that,in the past decade,grew more slowly than the continents average growth rate,including the big threeEgypt,Nigeria,and South Africa.Africas experience shows that growth will not be enough to lift its population out of poverty.Job-

204、rich growth,accompanied by effective redistribution policies,will be needed.Africa needs to achieve and sustain strong growth while making it inclusive and climate resilient.To strengthen productive capacities and accelerate the green energy transition,countries would benefit from well-designed and

205、adequately funded industrial policies.They should promote domestic research and development activities and support manufacturing and value addition,as well as investment in science and technology,while supporting carbon-reducing innovations and public and private investment.Strengthening innovation

206、systems and absorptive capacities will generate new and sustainable sources of growth and employment,diversify export structures,and accelerate sustainable transitions.Putting African economies on the path of high,inclusive,and sustainable growth requires mobilizing more domestic resources to suppor

207、t public goods and services.According to the IMF,numerous African countries have the capacity to boost their tax-to-GDP ratios by up to 9 percentage points through improved tax structures and more robust public institutions.28 Building capacity,strengthening institutions,and promoting reforms to imp

208、rove accountability,debt management,and national procurement systems will also be essential.Governments could also increase revenue with more progressive income and wealth taxes,while environmental taxation could broaden the tax base and spur technological innovation by promoting more environmentall

209、y friendly production.Non-tax revenue,including rents and royalties from sectors such as oil and mining,can be optimized through improved contractual arrangements with multinational firms.Finally,digital technologies can help reduce tax evasion and avoidance.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Trans

210、ition in AfricaInnovative financial mechanisms to deal with the debt burden,such as debt-for-climate swaps and debt-for-nature swaps,can help governments with limited access to traditional grants or debt relief.20Fiscal resources can be also gained from improved efficiency of government spending,esp

211、ecially through enhanced effectiveness of subsidies and better targeted social protection programmes.Climate change policies can guide public spending through green budgets and broader fiscal policies,including carbon pricing,and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies.Governments should also step up t

212、heir commitment to forging new social contracts to ensure equal opportunities for all while integrating employment and social protection.The education and health sectors can be a smart entry point for tackling all the SDGs.Illicit financial flows hinder African development by depleting foreign excha

213、nge,diminishing domestic resources,and reducing citizens trust in public institutions.These flows deprive the continent and its people of opportunities and exacerbate poverty and inequality.Initiatives to stem illicit financial flows involve,for example,enhancing African countries institutional and

214、regulatory ability to address them and advocating for policy changes at the national and continental levels.Halting illicit financial flows also requires cooperation from receiving financial centres across the globe.African countries capacity to manage future shocks or allocate resources for economi

215、c development is impeded by rising debt costs.Innovative financial mechanisms to deal with the debt burden,such as debt-for-climate swaps and debt-for-nature swaps,can help governments with limited access to traditional grants or debt relief.With the increasing number of countries at risk of debt di

216、stress,debt relief and restructuring measures are needed to avoid devastating debt crises with long-lasting threats to development.High and sustained growth will help attract investment and support countries debt-reduction efforts.The AfCFTA can be a vital conduit for this purpose.Despite the immedi

217、ate fiscal and political challenges that confront the continent,Africa should strengthen and accelerate implementation of the AfCFTA,which will be key to attracting investment and to boosting the continents development.A JST envisions a well-managed shift to a future where all job opportunities are

218、environmentally sustainable and of high quality,where poverty is eliminated,and where communities are prosperous and resilient.29 Africa must capitalize on the transition towards renewable energy and on the revitalized significance of critical minerals.These shifts present an opportunity for attract

219、ing FDI by harnessing the continents rich natural endowment to localize supply chains and processing and manufacturing capabilities,thus enhancing job opportunities and incomes.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024A JST envisions a well-managed shift to a future where all job opportunities are environmenta

220、lly sustainable and of high quality,where poverty is eliminated,and where communities are prosperous and resilient.21ENDNOTES1 AfDB 2022.2 European Parliament 2022;OECD,CAF,and European Union 2022.3 AfDB 2024.4 SARB 2024.5 Bloomberg 2023.6 IMF 2023a.7 Financial Times 2023.8 Financial Times 2023.9 Fi

221、nancial Times 2023.10 UNCTAD 2023.11 AUC and OECD 2023.12 ECA calculations based on data from IMF(2023b).13 Rodrik 1991.14 Obwona 2001.15 ECA calculation based on UN data.16 ILO 2023.17 ILO 2022.18 AfDB 2021.19 ILO 2020.20 ECA 2023.21 The countries were Cameroon,Ethiopia,Kenya,Morocco,Namibia,Rwanda

222、,Senegal,Tanzania,Uganda,and Zimbabwe.22 ECA and CEPII forthcoming.Carbon dioxide emissions account for about half of Africas share of greenhouse gas emissions.23 Bedair 2023.24 Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2022.25 Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2022.26 ECA and CEPII 2021.27 ECA 2012,201

223、8.28 Gaspar,Mansour,and Vellutini 2023.29 350Africa n.d.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa 22REFERENCES350Africa.n.d.“A Just Transition.”https:/350africa.org/just-transition-a-position-paper/.Accessed 12 April 2024.Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2022.Cyclones and More Freq

224、uent Storms Threaten Africa.https:/africacenter.org/spotlight/cyclones-more-frequent-storms-threaten-africa/AfDB(African Development Bank).2021.Reflections on Africas Youth Employment Problem.Abidjan,Cte dIvoire:AfDB.https:/www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/aeb_vol_12_issue_2_f

225、ields_reflections_on_africas_employment_problem_f.pdf.AfDB(African Development Bank).2022.Financing a Just Transition in Africa:Challenges and Opportunities.Abidjan,Cte dIvoire:AfDB.https:/www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2022/12/09/financing_a_just_transition_in_africa-challenges_and_opportunities_

226、final_1_2.pdf.AfDB 2024.Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook(MEO).Abidjan,Cte dIvoire:AfDB.https:/www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/africa-dominates-list-worlds-20-fastest-growing-economies-2024-african-development-bank-says-macroeconomic-report-68751 AUC(African Union Commission)and O

227、ECD(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).2023.Africas Development Dynamics 2023.Addis Ababa:AUC.Bedair,H.2023.“Global Warming Status in the African Continent:Sources,Challenges,Policies,and Future Direction.”International Journal of Environmental Research.https:/ Set for Worst Yea

228、r since 1999 with No Rebound in Sight.”29 December.https:/ 12 December 2023.ECA(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa).2012.Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V:Towards a Continental Free Trade Area,Customs Union and Common Market.Addis Ababa:ECA.https:/repository.uneca.org/bitstream/h

229、andle/10855/22110/Bib-32452.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.ECA(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa).2018.An Empirical Assessment of the African Continental Free Trade Area Modalities on Goods.Addis Ababa:ECA.https:/repository.uneca.org/handle/10855/41828.ECA(United Nations Economic Commission

230、for Africa).2023.“Building New Social Contracts:Ideas and Actions to Fulfill African Aspirations through Education.”Addis Ababa,23 November.https:/www.uneca.org/eca-events/sites/default/files/resources/documents/gender-poverty-social-policy/5session-committee-social-policy-poverty-gender/5th_session

231、_of_csppg._issues_paper.pdf.ECA(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa)and CEPII(Center for Prospective and International Information Studies).2021.Takeaways from the Expected Impact of AfCFTAs Implementation.Addis Ababa:ECA.https:/uneca.org/sites/default/files/keymessageanddocuments/en_afcft

232、a-infographics-11.pdf.ECA(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa)and CEPII(Center for Prospective and International Information Studies).Forthcoming.Greening the African Continental Free Trade Area.Addis Ababa:ECA.European Parliament.2022.Economic Impacts of the Green Transition.Brussels.http

233、s:/www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733623.Financial Times.2023.The fDi Report 2023:Global Greenfield Investment Trends.Gaspar,V.,M.Mansour,and C.Vellutini.2023.“Countries Can Tap Tax Potential to Finance Development Goals.”IMF Blog,19 September.https:/www.imf.org/en/Blogs/

234、Articles/2023/09/19/countries-can-tap-tax-potential-to-finance-development-goals.ILO(International Labour Organization).2020.Report on Employment in Africa(Re-Africa):Tackling the Youth Employment Challenge.Geneva:ILO.https:/www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-africa/-ro-abidjan/documents/publication/

235、wcms_753300.pdf.ILO(International Labour Organization).2022.Informal Economy in Africa:Which Way Forward?Making Policy Responsive,Inclusive and Sustainable.Geneva:ILO.https:/www.ilo.org/africa/events-and-meetings/WCMS_842674/lang-en/index.htm.ILO(International Labour Organization).2023.African Youth

236、 Face Pressing Challenges in the Transition from School to Work.Geneva:ILO.https:/ilostat.ilo.org/african-youth-face-pressing-challenges-in-the-transition-from-school-to-work/.IMF(International Monetary Fund).2023a.“Debt Sustainability Analysis List.”https:/www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist.p

237、df.Accessed 6 December 2023.IMF(International Monetary Fund).2023b.World Economic Outlook 2023.Washington,DC:IMF.Obwona,M.2001.“Determinants of FDI(Foreign Direct Investment)and Their Impact on Economic Growth in Uganda.”African Development Review 13(1):4681.OECD(Organisation for Economic Co-operati

238、on and Development),CAF(Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean),and European Union.2022.Latin American Economic Outlook 2022:Towards a Green and Just Transition.Paris:OECD Publishing.https:/doi.org/10.1787/3d5554fc-en.Rodrik,D.1991.“Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developin

239、g Countries.”Journal of Development Economics 36(2):229242.https:/doi.org/10.1016/0304-3878(91)90034-S.SARB(South African Reserve Bank).2024.“Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee.”https:/www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2024/january/Statemen

240、t%20of%20the%20Monetary%20Policy%20Committee%20January%202024.pdf.Accessed 12 December 2023.UNCTAD(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development).2023.2022 World Investment Report.Geneva:UNCTAD.UNDESA(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs).2024.World Economic Situation and Pr

241、ospects 2024.New York:UNDESA.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 23ChApTER 2:A JUST AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION FOR AN INCLUSIVE AND RESILIENT AFRICAKEY MESSAGES The triple planetary crises of climate change,biodiversity loss,and pollution pose unprecedented challenges and existential threats to humanity.

242、These threats have triggered the global sustainability transition,a shift in sociotechnical systems towards sustainable production,consumption,and lifestyles.African countries can achieve their development objectives through low-carbon development paths driven by their vast and diverse renewable ene

243、rgy resources,but the transition away from fossil fuels needs to be gradual,as stated in the African Common Position on Energy Access and Just Energy Transition,led by the African Union.Closing the energy gap is a priority,impacting all aspects of sustainable development.A just and sustainable trans

244、ition(JST)is a path for inclusive,low-carbon,and resource-efficient development where new technologies,infrastructure,and decisionmaking approaches replace the past and existing ones to address and correct their negative impacts.Because of the planetary crisis to which Africa only marginally contrib

245、uted,the continent faces multiple and enormous environmental challenges.AJST in Africa must prioritize prosperity and human development while respecting global resource and carbon constraints.Achieving a JST requires systemic shifts from a growth-centred to a well-being-focused economy,from an extra

246、ctive to a productive production system and circularity,from scarcity and excess to sufficiency,and from regulatory to collaborative governance.GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITION IS ONGOINGAFRICA CANNOT BE ON THE SIDELINESThe world faces a confluence of economic,social,and environmental crises with th

247、e potential to inflict unprecedented damage.Economic disparity has been growing within and between countries,leading to social unrest and conflict.Climate change and biodiversity loss pose existential threats to humanity.These challenges are far-reaching,requiring large-scale collective action and s

248、ocial solidarity.1 They have triggered the global sustainability transitiona move towards sustainable production,consumption,and lifestyles.This chapter presents the analytical framework for the JST used in the rest of the report.Given its complexity,a JST in any region needs to be approached from a

249、 multilevel perspective,with transitions viewed as interactions among landscape pressures(macro),change in regime structures(meso),and niche innovations(micro).Examples of landscape pressures are demographic trends,climate change,long-term macroeconomic trends,and changing land and water use pattern

250、s.Sociotechnical regimes,made up of core technologies evolving alongside social functions and market dynamics,are shaped by technologists,policymakers,businesses,consumers,and other stakeholders.Sociotechnical niches,operating at a micro level,represent spaces where new technologies and their uses a

251、re explored and advanced.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in AfricaJST in any region needs to be approached from a multilevel perspective,with transitions viewed as interactions among landscape pressures(macro),changes in regime structures(meso),and niche innovations(micro).24A JUST AN

252、D SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION IN AFRICA MUST REFLECT ITS PRIORITIESDefinitions of a JST that serves Africas interests build on the global approach but contain important distinctive features.UNDESA(2023)defines a JST as a“process of transitioning towards a more sustainable society,economy,and environment

253、in a fair and equitable manner.”The African Development Bank defines a JST in Africa as a process of improving the lives of the most vulnerable while building low-carbon,resilient economies.2 A broader interpretation of a JST that serves Africas needs well defines it as an economic system encompassi

254、ng environmental sustainability,social mitigation,and green industrialization.The desired result is not only sustainable energy generation,environmental protection,and social mitigation but also a wider green industrial transformation that will create decent jobs for young people and allow Africa to

255、 reap adequate payoffs on its natural resources.The JST in Africa will be a longer-term systemic change to a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy,resulting in marked poverty and inequality reduction.The sustainability part of the change will need to be driven by efficient natural resource use,su

256、stainable infrastructure development,low-carbon industrialization,and resilient agroecological systems.Broadly,a just transition aims to achieve a socially just world while preserving ecosystems,preventing excessive global warming,and disconnecting economic growth from rising resource extraction and

257、 consumption.Securing a fair share in global value chains and creating decent jobs for growing youth populations will require transitioning from an extractive-economy model characterized by rent maximization to a productive-economy model anchored in circularity.This aspect is a key part of a JST in

258、the context of the cascading impacts of climate change.Further,Africas JST must be Africa-led.A successful JST in Africa needs to reform governance and establish institutional environments to facilitate low-carbon investment and social justice.Specifically,the JSTs effective management will require

259、collaborative governance that would,in addition to the government,involve other community stakeholders,including the private sector and the media.Moreover,the JST will require African governments to pursue different industrialization paths from those undertaken in other industrialized world regions

260、with no carbon and natural resource constraints.As this report demonstrates,the innovations across all sectors that will support the JST could also become key drivers of the next phase of Africas development.A distinguishing feature of the JST concept specific to Africa is the emphasis on inclusive

261、and green industrialization.The JST approach adopted in this report combines upstream industrialization with social and environmental measures,focusing on sustainable energy generation and climate resilience.This is broader than the concept of the Just Energy Transition(see box 3.1 in chapter 3).Des

262、pite the numerous continental and national efforts to promote industrialization,Africas industrial performance and its share in global trade manufacturing value added is very low.A key reason is that developing a competitive manufacturing sector often requires targeted policy interventions,as the ex

263、perience of East Asia has illustrated.In Africa,however,successful industrial policy implementation has been hampered by weak administrative and technological capabilities,as well as poor incentive designs.The JST aims to overcome these challenges with a transition framework that places low-carbon i

264、ndustrialization and inclusive and efficient resource use at its core.While each countrys framework will vary,fundamental systemic shifts are expected in all countries.The analytical framework(figure 2.1)captures the fundamental systemic shifts,which are:From detailed to dynamic complexity.The socio

265、economic transformation in the 21st century needs to be approached through dynamic complexity rather than the detailed complexities of linear cause-and-effect chains.Managing dynamic complexity is therefore key to developing African narratives and to driving JSTs in Africa.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA

266、2024 25 From growth to well-being.Overemphasizing growth has led to numerous social and ecological challenges.Economic development policy for the JST needs to focus on a well-being economy,which reconciles growth with human and ecosystem well-being.From an extractive to a productive economy.Using an

267、d managing natural capital sustainably are crucial for JSTs.Many African countries have largely extractive economies,making them especially vulnerable to shocks.A transition to productive economies anchored in circularity would help countries gain resilience.From scarcity and affluence to security a

268、nd sufficiency.In Africa,many people lack basic services,while a small urban population mirrors the wasteful consumption patterns of industrialized countries.JSTs in Africa should prioritize securing basic services and achieving sufficiency for the majority,in order to raise overall societal well-be

269、ing.From regulatory to collaborative governance.As economies have become more complex and globalized,there has been a shift from a single nation-state regulatory authority to a relational state that facilitates multiple development partnerships.From deterministic innovation to sociotechnological reg

270、imes.This shift combines technological and socioinstitutional innovations.This is crucial for overcoming barriers to change,most of which are institutional rather than technological.Managing the above systemic transitions and their interactions effectively is vital for progress towards JSTs.A key st

271、ep is to overcome the prevailing institutional barriers,which often treat environmental and social factors as external add-ons to growth objectives.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa Systems dimensionBusiness as usualSustainabilityTechnology systemsDeterministic innovationSocio

272、-technologicalinnovationGovernance systemsCollaborative governanceRegulatory governanceConsumption systemsSecurity&sufciencyScarcity&afuenceProduction systemsExtractive economyProductive economyEconomic systemsGrowth economyWellbeing economyEpistemological shiftsDynamic complexityDetailed complexity

273、Figure 2.1 Main systemic shifts for a just and sustainable transition in AfricaSource:Based on Mebratu and Swilling 2019.26 BUT IT MUST ALSO CONSIDER GLOBAL RESOURCE AND CARBON CONSTRAINTSThe convergence of economic,social,environmental,and political crises in the 21st century has created unpreceden

274、ted challenges.African countries capacity to effectively address them is severely limited by global resource and carbon constraints.3 GLOBAL RESOURCE CONSTRAINTSThe 20th and 21st centuries have witnessed rapid economic growth and development linked to industrialization and globalization,coupled with

275、 much higher resource extraction and related environmental degradation.According to UN data,the global population more than doubled between 1970 and 2020,gross domestic product(GDP)quadrupled,and annual global material extraction tripledand without substantial change,it is projected to reach 190 bil

276、lion tonnes by 2060.This underscores the need for enhanced resource productivity and the decoupling of economic growth and well-being from resource use and pollution.The material footprint generated by various regions and subgroups is highly uneven,with Africa contributing the least.In 2020,high-inc

277、ome countries material footprint4 of around 24 tonnes per person was six times that of low-income countries.The same difference was recorded for North America relative to Africa.Upper-middle-income countries dominated the global material footprint,accounting for about half of the total in 2020.Per c

278、apita extraction also rose fastest for this group,more than doubling between 2000 and 2020(figure 2.2).This rise is driven by efforts to develop infrastructure in industrializing countries,as well as outsourcing of material-intensive production by higher-income countries to them.5 These dynamics are

279、 also expected to impact Africa in the coming years and decades.Because of the planetary crisis,to which Africa only marginally contributed,but also given Africas large dependance on natural resources,the continent faces enormous environmental challenges such as land degradation,desertification,and

280、deforestation.6 Per capita natural capital is declining,and current resource depletion rates could lead to a 10%drop in Africas GDP by 2030.By 2050,millions of people could face increased exposure to water pollution and food insecurity,and coastal erosion risks could affect millions more.Africas eco

281、nomies demand more freshwater,while water quantity and quality are diminishing owing to overexploitation,climate change,and pollution.Africas inland and marine fisheries are also threatened by overexploitation from illegal and unregulated fishing.Its rich biodiversity,essential for ecosystem service

282、s,is at risk from illegal wildlife trade,pollution,forest loss,climate change,and invasive species.In 2023 the continent hosted a quarter of the worlds animal and plant species but faced the highest extinction rate in the world.7Africa cannot industrialize using only fossil fuels,given the planetary

283、 crisis,but in the medium term,the continent will use both renewables and non-renewables to close its energy gap.Addressing global resource constraints requires decoupling economic development from disproportionate resource use and environmental impacts by deploying more resource-efficient and renew

284、able production technologies.8 Embracing circular-economy business models and leapfrogging technologies can generate large resource and economic savings,while driving the gradual transition to renewables and clean growth.GLOBAL CARBON CONSTRAINTS The International Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)has st

285、ated that human activity is the cause of the observed marked increase in greenhouse gas concentrations since 1750.9 Global warming has already adversely affected natural and human systems,leading to harmful changes in land and ocean ecosystems and the services they ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 27p

286、rovide.10 Box 2.1 discusses the various scenarios on greenhouse gas emissions and their implications for global warming.Africa is expected to face severe impacts from climate change,tied particularly to the availability of arable land and freshwater.The regions vulnerability is exacerbated by its li

287、mited adaptive capacity.11 In a global scenario with low mitigation efforts,Africa will have to grapple with the adverse effects of rapidly increasing temperatures and associated extreme events during a critical period for its development(see box 2.1).12 A future with high climate mitigation at the

288、global level could bring substantial benefits to,and justice for,Africa.13Although a marginal contributor to global emissions,Africa is under pressure to mitigate climate change risks while aspiring to rapidly accelerate its development.14 African countries can achieve their development objectives b

289、y promoting low-carbon development paths,driven by the regions abundant and diverse renewable energy resources,but the transition needs to be gradual,as stated in the African Common Position on Energy Access and Just Energy Transition.Over the longer term,the economic,social,and environmental appeal

290、 of Africas abundant renewable energy,which is becoming more affordable,15 makes it a compelling option for the continent.Box 2.1 Global greenhouse gas emissions and warming scenariosFully implementing the unconditional Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs)in the Paris Agreement would lead to a

291、projected 2.6C rise in the average global temperature over pre-industrial levels by 2100,a larger increase than the agreement aims for.16 Box figure 1 illustrates the remaining emissions gaps under scenarios related to the aim of limiting the increase in the average global temperature to 1.5C and 2.

292、0C through the fulfilment of conditional and unconditional NDCs.It reveals a remaining gap of 12 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent(GtCO2e)to stay within the 2.0C limit through the fulfilment of conditional NDCs,increasing to 15 GtCO2e through the fulfilment of unconditional NDCs.Similarly,stay

293、ing below the 1.5C limit through the fulfilment of conditional NDCs implies an emissions gap of 20 GtCO2e,rising to 23 GtCO2e under the unconditional NDC scenario.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in Africa5 20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000million tonnesa)World regions Africa Asia+Pacifi

294、c EECCA EuropeLatinAmerica+Caribbean NorthAmericaWestAsia413918191236139913301017753519240510152025303540LowincomeLowermiddleincomeUppermiddleincomeHighincomeWorldTonnes per capita27241995343b)Income groups20202000Per captiaFigure 2.2 Material footprint,by world regions and by income group,2000 and

295、2020Note:Material footprint is the total amount of raw materials extracted to meet final consumption demand.Source:UNEP 2024.28Box figure 2.1 Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030,20153020.030.040.050.060.070.0201520202025GtCO2e0.010.020.030.040.050.

296、060.070.020152020202520302035204020452050Current policies scenario2010 policies scenarioRemaining gapto stay within2C limitRemaining gapto stay within2C limitConditional NDC and pledge scenarioUnconditional NDC and pledge scenario13GtCO2e28GtCO2e25GtCO2eMedian estimate of level consistent with 2C:39

297、 GtCO2e(range 3349)Median estimate of level consistent with 1.5C:25 GtCO2e(range 1733)GtCO2e112C range1.8C range1.5C rangeEstimated global warming over 21st centuryCurrent policies scenario:2.8 C(66%chance)Unconditional NDC and pledge scenario with net-zero targets:2.2C(66%chance)Unconditional NDC a

298、nd pledge scenario:2.7 C(66%chance)GtCO2eTurquoise area shows pathways limiting global temperature increase to below 2C with about 66%chance.Green area shows pathwayslimiting global temperatureincrease to below 1.5C with a 66%chance by 2100 and minimum 33%chance over the course of the century.2C ran

299、ge1.8C range1.5C rangeNote:The emissions gap is the gap between the estimated total global greenhouse gas emissions resulting from full implementation of the NDCs and the total global greenhouse gas emissions from least-cost scenarios that keep global warming to 2.0C,1.8C,or 1.5C,with varying levels

300、 of likelihood(UNEP 2022).Source:UNEP 2023.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024 29Box table 1 Estimated global warming implications under different scenarios and likelihoodsScenarioEstimated likelihood of various temperature increases(median and range)66%50%90%Current policies2.8 C(range:1.9-3.3C)2.6C(ran

301、ge:1.7-3.0C)3.3C(range:2.3-3.9C)Unconditional NDCs2.6 C(range:1.9-3.1C)2.4C(range:1.7-2.9C)3.1C(range:2.3-3.7C)Conditional NDCs2.4 C(range:1.8-3.0C)2.2C(range:1.7-2.7C)2.8C(range:2.2-3.5C)Unconditional NDCs and long-term net-zero targets1.8 C(range:1.8-2.1C)1.7C(range:1.7-1.9C)2.1C(range:2.0-2.5C)Co

302、nditional NDCs and long-term net-zero targets1.8 C(range:1.7-1.9C)1.7C(range:1.6-1.8C)2.0C(range:2.0-2.3C)Box table 1 provides estimated global warming implications over the 21st century under different scenarios and likelihoods.If countries maintain current policies,there is a 90%likelihood of 3.3C

303、 warming.If all countries fulfil their unconditional NDCs,there is a 90%chance of 3.1C warming,and if countries also fulfil their conditional NDCs,there is a 90%chance of 2.8C warming.Together with long-term net-zero targets,meeting unconditional NDCs would offer a 90%chance of limiting global warmi

304、ng to 2.1C,while meeting conditional NDCs would offer a 90%chance of limiting global warming to 2.0C.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in AfricaENABLERSTECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE HUMAN CAPITALSOCIALLY JUSTECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLETRANSITION ECONOMIESHUMAN WELL-BEINGDe

305、cent jobsSustainable livelihoodsECOSYSTEM WELLBEINGEcological conservationEcosystem servicesLOW CARBON INDUSTRIALIZATIONResource efciencyCircular economyAGRO-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMSFood securityResilienceSUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURETransformativeInclusiveSUSTAINABLE RESOURCE USEDecouplingStrategic minerals

306、Figure 2.3 Key dimensions of the framework for a just and sustainable transition in AfricaSource:Mebratu and Swilling 2019.30KEY DIMENSIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR JUST AND SUSTAINABLE TRANSITION IN AFRICAAfrica has a unique opportunity to be at the centre of the ongoing global transformation by transi

307、tioning to inclusive,low-carbon,and resource-efficient continent.Major societal transformationsas with the ongoing oneentail replacing the existing parts of a societal system via technological,economic,political,and cultural restructuring.17 To gain a key place in this transformation,Africa must pro

308、actively seize emerging opportunities and leverage resource endowments.The main dimensions of the JST framework in Africa(figure 2.3)are:Human well-being.The framework prioritizes improving human well-beingthat is,improving the well-being of people today without jeopardizing the well-being of future

309、 generationsas the primary societal objective.This requires using alternative indicators of development progress while recognizing the role of GDP as a measure for economic productivity.18 Ecosystem well-being.The natural environment is connected to a wide range of social,political,and economic fact

310、ors and is thus key for human well-being and the JST.Low-carbon industrialization.Africa has the legitimate aspirationand needto industrialize its economy,19 while achieving a JST requires relatively low-carbon industrialization.20 Africas industrial transformation needs to balance these goals.21 Ag

311、roecological systems.Ensuring food security for every community is a key aspect of JSTs in Africa.The International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems calls for transitioning to agroecological production systems that provide nourishment while preserving the environment and ensuring its res

312、ilience.22 This requires a holistic approach to agriculture that incorporates agroecology,agroforestry,and conservation agriculture,while building on indigenous and traditional knowledge.23 Sustainable infrastructure.Developing sustainable infrastructure systems is crucial to a JST in any country,bu

313、t especially in Africa,given its vulnerability to the impact of climate change and the vast infrastructure gap.Sustainable resource use.African development that relies solely on raw material extraction and export depletes ecosystem services.Resource extraction activities,such as mining and forestry,

314、should be environmentally and socially responsible and linked with new value-adding manufacturing in Africa and plugged into global value chains.Effective implementation of the framework requires critical enablers,such as developing and transferring of low-carbon and resource-efficient technologies,

315、facilitating adequate public and private investment flows,developing human capital with the required skill sets,and adopting a transition governance system that ensures inclusive participation.JST implementation in Africa will depend on countries effective strategies for pursuing green technologies

316、and enhancing their frontier-technology readiness.As the fourth industrial revolution continues to spread across the globe,Africa is adapting to this new economic reality.New digital technologies and practices can lead to structural changes in sociotechnical systems,promoting more sustainable produc

317、tion and consumption patterns.For example,the joining of internet communication technology and renewable energy represents the latest convergence of communication technology and energy systems and could support Africas leapfrogging in this ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRICA 2024JST implementation in Africa w

318、ill depend on countries effective strategies for pursuing green technologies and enhancing their frontier-technology readiness.31critical area.At the same time,the continent will need to reduce the adverse effects of emerging disruptive technologies.For JST success,it will also be crucial to include

319、 social fairness,policy reform,and collaborative action alongside technological transition to attain a sustainable future.The success of efforts to implement the JST and to cope with climate change will also depend on closing the skill gaps in this area.In Africa,unlike in other regions,the size of

320、the working-age population and its share in the total population is still rising.The JST will need a population that is better educated,healthier,technologically savvy,and ready for the changing world of work,especially in energy and other strategic sectors.However,the overall gap in human capital b

321、etween Africa and the rest of the world has widened slightly over the years.Further,analysis of Africas skill landscape points to a fragmented system:pockets of excellence alongside more than 30%of the population ages 15 and older in Africa(excluding North Africa)lacking basic literacy.According to

322、the World Bank,high-skilled employment accounts for only 6%of the total,compared with 24%in the rest of the world.It is critical to treat all the foundational dimensions of the JST as interconnected systems of transformational change,paying attention to their dynamic interaction and cross-influences

323、.Effectively managing these interactions would result in transition economies that are becoming productive,ecologically sustainable,and socially just.Investing in a Just and Sustainable Transition in AfricaThe JST will need a population that is better educated,healthier,technologically savvy,and rea

324、dy for the changing world of work,especially in energy and other strategic sectors.32ENDNOTES1 Tong et al.2023.2 AfDB 2022.3 Mebratu and Swilling 2019,UNDP 2021.4 The total amount of raw materials extracted to meet final consumption demand.5 UNEP and IRP 2018.6 UNEP 2016.7 CSE 2023.8 IRP 2019.9 IPCC

325、 2021.10 IPCC 2018.11 Niang et al.2014;UNEP 2016.12 AUC 2015.13 UNEP 2016.14 AESA 2020.15 IRENA 2023.16 UNEP 2022.17 Genov 1999.18 Fioramonti 2017;UNDP 2020.19 APP 2016.20 Mebratu 2019.21 UN Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development 2023.22 Frison 2016.23 FAO 2017.ECONOMIC REPORT ON AFRIC

326、A 2024 33REFERENCESAESA(Alliance for Accelerating Excellence in Science in Africa).2020.Setting Priorities for Climate Change and Development in Africa,September 2020.Nairobi:AESA.AfDB(African Development Bank).2022.Just Transition Initiative to Address Climate Change in the African Context.https:/a

327、fdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/climate-investment-funds-cif/just-transition-initiative.APP(Africa Progress Panel).2016.Power,People and Planet:Seizing Africas Energy and Climate Opportunity.Geneva:APP.AUC(African Union Commission).2015.“Agenda 2063:The Africa We Want.”Framewo

328、rk document.Addis Ababa:AUC.CSE(Centre for Science and Environment).2023.State of Africas Environment 2023.https:/www.cseindia.org/cse-s-first-state-of-africa-s-environment-2023-report-officially-released-in-nairobi-11893.FAO(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).2017.The Future o

329、f Food and Agriculture:Trends and Challenges.Rome:FAO.Fioramonti,L.2017.Wellbeing Economy:Success in a World without Growth.Johannesburg,South Africa:Macmillan.Frison,A.2016.From Uniformity to Diversity:A Paradigm Shift from Industrial Agriculture to Diversified Agroecological Systems.Louvain-la-Neu

330、ve,Belgium:IPES.https:/doi.org/10.5958/0976-1926.2016.00033.4.Genov,N.1999.Managing Transformations in Eastern Europe.Paris:UNESCO-MOST.IPCC(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).2018.“Summary for Policymakers.”In Global Warming of 1.5C:An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of

331、 1.5C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways,in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change,Sustainable Development,and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty.Cambridge,UK and New York:Cambridge University Press.IPCC(Intergovernment

332、al Panel on Climate Change).2021.“Summary for Policymakers.”In Climate Change 2021:The Physical Science Basis.Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Cambridge,UK and New York:Cambridge University Press.IRENA(International Renew

333、able Energy Agency).2023.Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2022.Abu Dhabi,United Arab Emirates:IRENA.IRP(International Resource Panel).2019.Global Resources Outlook 2019:Natural Resources for the Future We Want.Nairobi:United Nations Environment Programme.Mebratu,D.2019.“Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development for Africa.”In D.Mebratu and M.Swilling(eds.),Transformational Infrastructure