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1、bp Energy Outlook2024 edition23bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionThe Energy Outlook is produced to inform bps views of the risks and opportunities posed by the energy transition and is published as a contribution to the wider debate about the factors shaping the future path

2、 of the global energy system.But the Outlook is only one source among many when considering the prospects for global energy markets and bp considers a wide range of other external scenarios,analysis and information when forming its long-term strategy.Energy Outlook 2024 explores the key trends and u

3、ncertainties surrounding the energy transition.This years Energy Outlook is focused on two main scenarios:Current Trajectory and Net Zero.These scenarios are not predictions of what is likely to happen or what bp would like to happen.Rather they explore the possible implications of different judgeme

4、nts and assumptions concerning the nature of the energy transition.The scenarios are based on existing technologies and do not consider the possible impact of entirely new or unknown technologies.The many uncertainties surrounding the possible speed and nature of the energy transition means the prob

5、ability of any one of these scenarios materialising exactly as described is negligible.Moreover,the two scenarios do not provide a comprehensive description of all possible outcomes.They do,however,span a wide range of possible outcomes and so might help to illustrate the key trends and uncertaintie

6、s surrounding the possible development of energy markets out to 2050.45bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionContentsCarbon mitigation and removals 66Carbon capture,use and storage 68Enablers 70Energy investment 72Demand for critical minerals 74What does it take to accelerate t

7、he energy transition?76Decomposition by sector 78 Power 80 Industry 82 Transport 84 Buildings 86Annex 88Data tables 90Comparing scenario emissions with IPCC carbon budgets 92From Current Trajectory to Net Zero 94Modelling approach for the Delayed Net Zero and fastest IPCC decarbonization pathways 96

8、Economic impact of climate change 98Investment methodology 100Carbon emissions definitionsand sources 102Other data definitions and sources 104Introduction Welcome to Energy Outlook 2024 6Recent developments and emerging trends 8Key insights 10Overview 12Two scenarios:Current Trajectory and Net Zero

9、 14Comparison with IPCC pathways 16From energy addition to energy substitution 18Cumulative emissions:Current Trajectory and Net Zero 20Delayed and disorderly scenario 22Energy demand 24Growth of primary energy 26Primary energy by fuel 28Oil demand 30 Road transport 32 Aviation and marine 34 Product

10、 demand and refining 36Oil supply 38Natural gas demand 40Imports of liquified natural gas 42Natural gas production 44Coal demand 46Modern bioenergy 48Power sector 50Electricity demand 52Electricity generation by fuel 54Wind and solar 56Increasing power sector resilience 58Low carbon hydrogen 60Low c

11、arbon hydrogen 62Regional low carbon hydrogen demand 6467bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionThe challenge posed by the energy transition is further complicated by the repercussions of the energy disruptions and shortages caused by the war in Ukraine.These disruptions,and the

12、 economic and social costs they entailed,served as a reminder to us all that the transition also needs to consider the security and affordability of energy.I realise that the concept of the energy trilemma the importance of energy systems providing energy which is secure and affordable as well as su

13、stainable has been discussed and used for many years.But its relevance has never been greater:any successful and enduring transition needs to address all three elements of the trilemma.These challenges,together with the broader implications of the shifts and trends underway in the global energy syst

14、em,are explored in this years Outlook using two main scenarios:Current Trajectory and Net Zero.Together these scenarios span a wide range of the possible outcomes for the global energy system over the next 25 years.It is possible to use these scenarios to identify energy trends that are common acros

15、s both scenarios and those that are more dependent on the pace of the transition.This can help inform judgements of how the energy system may evolve over coming decades.The two scenarios can also be compared to give a clearer sense of what needs to be done to shift the world from its current unsusta

16、inable emissions trajectory to a pathway consistent with the Paris climate goals.Spoiler alert:amongst other things,this suggests a need for greater electrification fuelled by even faster growth in wind and solar power,a significant acceleration in energy efficiency improvements,together with increa

17、sing use of a whole range of other low carbon energy sources and technologies,including biofuels,low carbon hydrogen,and carbon capture,use and storage(CCUS).I hope this years Energy Outlook is useful to everyone trying to tackle the challenges facing the global energy system and accelerate the tran

18、sition to global net zero.As always,any feedback of the Outlook and how it can be improved would be most welcome.Spencer Dale Chief economistGlobal developments and events in recent years have highlighted the considerable challenges facing the global energy system and those of us who work within it.

19、Despite marked increases in government climate ambitions and actions,and rapid growth in investment in low carbon energy,carbon emissions continue to rise.Indeed,other than the Covid-induced fall of 2020,carbon emissions have risen every year since the Paris climate goals were agreed in 2015.The car

20、bon budget is running out.The world is in an energy addition phase of the energy transition in which it is consuming increasing amounts of both low carbon energy and fossil fuels.The history of energy has seen several past phases of energy additions,for example the rapid increase in coal as the worl

21、d shifted from the use of wood as its primary energy source to coal,and later the sharp increases in oil as it displaced coal as the dominant energy form.But in each of these cases,the world continued to consume similar or greater amounts of all types of energy.The challenge is to move for the first

22、 time in history from the current energy addition phase of the energy transition to an energy substitution phase,in which low carbon energy increases sufficiently quickly to more than match the increase in global energy demand,allowing the consumption of fossil fuels,and with that carbon emissions,t

23、o decline.The longer it takes for the world to move to a rapid and sustained energy transition,the greater the risk of a costly and disorderly adjustment pathway in the future.Welcome to the 2024 edition of bps Energy Outlook.Introduction to Energy Outlook 2024Introduction89bp Energy Outlook:2024 ed

24、itionbp Energy Outlook:2024 edition Growth in oil demand since 2019 which has averaged around 0.5 Mb/d per year has been largely driven by increasing consumption in emerging economies and increased demand for petrochemical feedstocks.Oil consumption in developed economies continued to fall over much

25、 of the past two decades.In 2022 oil demand in developed economies was around 2 Mb/d lower than it was before the Covid-19 pandemic,and 5.5 Mb/d(around 10%)below its historic peak in 2005.Strong growth in natural gas demand in emerging Asian economies,combined with disruptions to Russian pipeline ex

26、ports to Europe,has increased the importance of liquified natural gas(LNG)within global gas markets.LNG demand has grown around eight times the rate of overall natural gas consumption over the past five years.Growth in electricity has continued to outpace total energy demand growth in recent years a

27、s the energy system has increasingly electrified.This has been driven by continued rapid growth in electricity use in emerging economies,spurred by improved accessibility and affordability.Nascent but growing demand from data centres to support the increasing adoption of generative AI applications l

28、ooks set to increase electricity demand materially in some markets in the coming years.The rapid growth in low carbon generation is putting increased pressure on the infrastructure and governance process supporting power markets,including planning and permitting and grids.For example,in the US the a

29、verage time between a request for grid connection and commercial operation increased from less than two years for projects built in 2000-07 to nearly five years for projects built in 2023.The number of electric vehicles has risen rapidly,with sales increasing from two million vehicles in 2019 to aro

30、und 14 million in 2023.This growth has been underpinned by vehicle emissions regulations,especially in China,the EU and the US.Sales of heat pumps also grew steadily,particularly in the EU and North America.Annual sales increased by around 75%in the EU between 2019 and 2023 to reach 2.6 million unit

31、s per year.Growth in less mature,higher cost,low carbon energy vectors and technologies including low carbon hydrogen,synthetic biofuels,and carbon capture and storage remains at a very early stage.As an example,at the beginning of 2024 less than 5 Mtpa low carbon hydrogen projects were operational

32、or under construction a small fraction of the existing use of unabated fossil-fuel-based hydrogen.Investment in critical minerals mining and exploration has increased in recent years in response to prospective increases in demand as the energy system transitions,but would need to accelerate further

33、to meet the needs of a rapid energy transition.The Energy Outlook scenarios are informed by recent trends and developments in the global energy system.Carbon emissions have continued to increase,growing at an average rate of 0.8%per year over the past four years(2019-23).If CO2 emissions were mainta

34、ined at close to recent levels,the carbon budget estimated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)to be consistent with a high probability of limiting average global temperature increases to 2C would be exhausted by the early 2040s.The war in Ukraine increased the attention on ensurin

35、g energy security and affordability as well as achieving the Paris climate goals.The recent disruptions in the Middle East have reinforced the importance of energy security.The increased focus on energy security could support greater emphasis on improving energy efficiency and growing domestic energ

36、y production.It may also prompt greater government involvement in the design and operation of energy markets,as illustrated by the growing role of green industrial policies,increasing attention on the security of energy supply chains and,where relevant,on the utilization of local fossil fuel resourc

37、es.Global energy demand has continued to grow,averaging around 1%per year between 2019 and 2023,weaker than its average rate of a little below 2%over the 10 years to 2019,driven by increasing prosperity and growth in emerging economies.Progress on improving energy efficiency has been disappointing.T

38、he amount of energy used per unit of economic activity has fallen by a little over 1%per year over the past four years on average.That is slower than the previous 10 years and much weaker than the 4%annual rate targeted in the energy efficiency pledge at COP28.Investment in low carbon energy is esti

39、mated to have grown very rapidly in recent years,up around 50%since 2019 at approximately$1.9 trillion in 2023.This investment is heavily concentrated in developed economies and China,with far lower investment levels in emerging economies where costs of capital are typically higher.Much of this inve

40、stment has been deployed in renewable power,with wind and solar power generation almost doubling between 2019 and 2023.This growth has been driven in particular by solar,supported by continuing falls in cost the costs of solar modules have fallen by around 60%over the past four years.The energy addi

41、tions from low carbon sources have not,however,been sufficient to meet the growth in total global energy demand,meaning the use of fossil fuels has continued to increase.Fossil fuel consumption reached a new high in 2023,driven primarily by rising oil consumption.Oil and gas upstream investment tota

42、lled$550 billion in 2023.Although upstream investment remains below its peak in the early 2010s,production has continued to grow steadily,supported by improving productivity of investment.Recent developments and emerging trendsIntroduction1011bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 edit

43、ionKey insights The decline in oil demand stems at first largely from the improving efficiency of the internal combustion engine(ICE)vehicle fleet,but then over time increasingly from the electrification of road transport.The number of electric vehicles grows rapidly,underpinned by regulatory standa

44、rds and increasing cost competitiveness.Transition-dependent trends Whether the demand for natural gas increases or falls over the next 25 years depends on the speed of the energy transition.Natural gas consumption rises in emerging economies as they grow and industrialize.But in accelerated transit

45、ion pathways this is offset by shifts away from natural gas to lower carbon energy.The use of biofuels and biomethane grows over the next 25 years.But the pace of that expansion in key sectors such as aviation is highly dependent on the extent of government policies and mandates supporting their use

46、.Low carbon hydrogen helps to decarbonize the energy system through its use in industry and transport for activities that are hard to electrify,and,to a lesser extent,in providing resilience in power systems.The high cost of low carbon hydrogen relative to incumbent unabated fossil fuels,however,mea

47、ns that its significance depends on the scale of policy support.Even in a faster transition pathway,much of the growth of low carbon hydrogen occurs after 2035.CCUS plays a critical role in enabling the transition to a low carbon energy system,but it requires government support and incentives to com

48、pensate for the additional costs its use involves.The deployment of CCUS complements a transition away from fossil fuels it does not act as an alternative.The scenarios in this years Energy Outlook can be used to help inform some key insights about how the energy system may evolve over the next 25 y

49、ears.Some of these insights stem from factors affecting the global environment and energy markets that are common across both scenarios and so may suggest an increased likelihood that they may also be apparent in pathways lying between these scenarios.Other insights are more dependent on the pace of

50、 transition.Global environment The carbon budget is running out.The longer the delay in taking decisive action to reduce emissions on a rapid and sustained basis,the greater the risk of a costly and disruptive adjustment pathway later.Government ambitions and provisions in support of the energy tran

51、sition have grown in recent years,but further global policy action is needed to achieve a Paris-consistent pathway.The disruptions to global energy supplies associated with the war in Ukraine have increased the importance attached to ensuring secure and affordable energy while also achieving the Par

52、is climate goals.This greater focus on safeguarding energy security includes many countries placing more weight on ensuring the security of their key low carbon energy value chains.Trends common across both scenarios Energy demand grows more strongly in emerging economies,driven by rising prosperity

53、 and living standards.But the magnitude and persistence of the growth in energy consumption depends critically on actions taken globally to accelerate improvements in energy efficiency.The structure of energy demand changes,with the importance of fossil fuels declining,replaced by a growing share of

54、 low carbon energy,led by wind and solar power.The world moves from the energy addition phase of the transition,in which more of both low carbon energy and fossil fuels are consumed,to an energy substitution phase,with declining consumption of fossil fuels.Wind and solar grow rapidly,supported by fa

55、lling costs and a steadily increasing electrification of the energy system.The rising share of variable renewable energy in power generation requires global power systems to bolster their resilience to fluctuations in generation,by upgrading grids,and increasing system flexibility,storage,and reliab

56、le spare(dispatchable)capacity.Oil demand declines over the outlook but continues to play a significant role in the global energy system for the next 10-15 years.This requires continuing investment in upstream oil(and natural gas).Introduction1213bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024

57、editionOverviewTwo scenarios to explore the speed and shape of the energy transition out to 2050Net Zero is in line with Paris consistent IPCC scenarios,while Current Trajectory suggests a significant temperature overshootProgressing the energy transition:from energy addition to energy substitutionT

58、he pathway along which the global energy system is currently travelling,if continued,is not consistent with a 2C carbon budgetDelaying the energy transition could lead to a costly and disorderly adjustment pathwayCurrent TrajectoryNet Zero2000201020202030204020500510152025303540451415bp Energy Outlo

59、ok:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsOverviewGt of CO2eCarbon emissionsCarbon emissions include CO2 emissions from energy use,industrial processes,natural gas flaring and methane emissions from energy production.Two scenarios to explore the speed and shape of the energy transition

60、out to 2050bps Energy Outlook 2024 uses two scenarios Current Trajectory and Net Zero to explore a range of possible outcomes for the global energy system out to 2050.The wide range of factors that are likely to shape the transition of the global energy system over the next 25 years for example,poli

61、cy,technology,societal pressures,financing and geopolitics mean it is not possible to make meaningful predictions of how the energy system will evolve.Instead,the Energy Outlook uses scenarios that span a wide range of possible outcomes out to 2050.In doing so,the scenarios inform an understanding o

62、f which trends in the energy system are more likely to occur across most plausible outcomes and which ones are more dependent on the speed and shape of the energy transition.That understanding can help shape strategic choices that are more resilient to the many uncertainties surrounding the future o

63、f the energy system.The scenarios consider carbon emissions from energy production and use,most non-energy related industrial processes,and natural gas flaring and methane emissions from the production,transportation,and distribution of fossil fuels and the incomplete combustion of traditional bioen

64、ergy(see pages 102-103 of the Annex for more details).The scenarios use data from 2022 as the base year.The considerable inertia in the energy system means that its evolution over the next few years is unlikely to vary significantly across scenarios.Current Trajectory is designed to capture the broa

65、d pathway along which the global energy system is currently travelling.It places weight on climate policies already in force and on global aims and pledges for future decarbonization.At the same time,it also recognizes the myriad challenges associated with meeting these aims.CO2 equivalent(CO2e)emis

66、sions in Current Trajectory peak in the mid-2020s and by 2050 are around 25%below 2022 levels.Net Zero explores how different elements of the energy system might change to achieve a substantial reduction in carbon emissions.In that sense,Net Zero can be viewed as a what if scenario:what elements of

67、the energy system might change,and how,if the world collectively acts for CO2e emissions to fall by around 95%by 2050.Net Zero assumes that there is a significant tightening in climate policies.It also embodies shifts in societal behaviour and preferences which further support gains in energy effici

68、ency and the adoption of low carbon energy.The carbon emissions remaining in Net Zero in 2050 could be eliminated by either additional changes to the energy system(including CCUS-enabled carbon dioxide removals(CDR)(see pages 68-69)or by the deployment of natural climate solutions(NCS).The use of NC

69、S to offset emissions from the energy system would depend on a range of factors including the costs of both NCS and the relative costs of abating greenhouse gas emissions inside and outside of the energy system.These costs are not explicitly considered in the Outlook.C1C2C3Net ZeroC5Current Trajecto

70、ry4006008001,0001,2001,4001,6001617bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsOverviewGt of CO2eCumulative carbon emissions in IPCC scenarios in 2015-2050C1-C5 represent the categories of IPCC scenarios using the 10%-90%percentile range for various temperature outcomes as

71、described in this section.See the Annex for an additional explanation on how cumulative emissions are calculated.Net Zero is in line with Paris consistent IPCC scenarios,while Current Trajectory suggests a significant temperature overshootThe pace and extent of decarbonization in Net Zero is broadly

72、 aligned with a range of IPCC scenarios consistent with meeting the Paris climate goals.In contrast,the emissions profile of Current Trajectory suggests a much greater likelihood of a significant overshoot relative to those climate goals.The Energy Outlook scenarios extend only to 2050 and do not mo

73、del all forms of greenhouse gases or all sectors of the economy.As such,it is not possible to directly infer the increase in global average temperatures in 2100 implied by Current Trajectory and Net Zero.However,it is possible to make an indirect inference by comparing the cumulative carbon emission

74、s in the two scenarios for the period 2015-50 with the ranges of corresponding carbon trajectories taken from the scenarios included in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report(Climate Change 2022:Impacts,Adaptation and Vulnerability).See pages 92-93 in the Annex for more details.It is not straightforward t

75、o compare Net Zero with the Paris climate goals.Cumulative CO2e emissions in Net Zero are broadly in the middle of the ranges of two categories of IPCC scenarios C2 and C3.IPCC C2 scenarios are consistent with a greater than 50%probability of returning global warming to 1.5C after a high overshoot,a

76、nd IPCC C3 scenarios are consistent with a greater than 67%probability of limiting average global temperature rises to 2C.On that basis,Net Zero might be considered to be broadly consistent with the Paris climate goals.In contrast,cumulative carbon emissions in Current Trajectory are above the mid-p

77、oint of the range of emissions from IPCC C5 scenarios,which are consistent with a greater than 50%probability of limiting average global temperature rises to 2.5C.This suggests Current Trajectory is not consistent with meeting the Paris climate goals.Energy substitutionEnergy addition 2000s2010s2020

78、s2030s2040s-25-20-15-10-5051015Primary energyUnabated fossil fuelsLow carbon fuelsEnergy substitutionEnergy addition 2000s2010s2020s2030s2040s-25-20-15-10-50510151819bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsOverviewAverage annual change in primary energy in Current Traje

79、ctoryAverage annual change in primary energy in Net ZeroEJEJCalculation does not include 2020 due to impact of Covid-19.Progressing the energy transition:from energy addition to energy substitution The global energy system faces the challenge of moving from the current phase of the energy transition

80、,in which low carbon energy is accelerating,to a second phase in which it is growing sufficiently quickly to reduce the need for fossil fuels.Low carbon energy has increased significantly in recent years,boosted in particular by growth in wind and solar power generation,which has more than doubled s

81、ince 2018.This accounted for a third of the growth in primary energy over that period.Despite this rapid growth,the global energy system remains in an energy addition phase of the transition.Low carbon energy is growing rapidly,increasing its share of the energy mix and helping to slow the pace at w

82、hich emissions are rising.But it is not increasing quickly enough to keep pace with the growth in total global energy demand.As a result,the absolute consumption of fossil fuels(and their associated carbon emissions)continues to increase,alongside the growth in low carbon energy.This energy addition

83、 phase has occurred in previous structural transitions of the energy system.For example,during the rapid growth in the use of coal as it displaced traditional biomass(including wood)to become the worlds primary energy source.And later,during the increases in oil demand,as it displaced coal as the do

84、minant energy form.It is striking that in both these previous energy transitions,the world continued to consume similar or growing amounts of the old form of energy(in these cases traditional biomass and,later,coal)even as it also adopted the new.The global energy system remained persistently in the

85、 energy addition phase.The challenge for the global energy system is,for the first time in history during an energy transition,to move from energy addition to energy substitution.This occurs only when the growth of the new energy this time low carbon energy exceeds the increase in total global energ

86、y demand,so that the use of the old energy in this case unabated fossil fuels declines in absolute terms.In Current Trajectory,the 2020s as a whole is another decade of energy addition.Low carbon energy increases by 40%,but fossil fuel consumption also grows.A combination of larger increases in low

87、carbon energy and slower growth in energy demand,aided by quickening gains in energy efficiency,causes a shift to the substitution phase of the energy transition in the 2030s and 2040s in Current Trajectory.But the extent of this transition is relatively limited:unabated fossil fuels still account f

88、or two-thirds of primary energy in 2050 in Current Trajectory.In Net Zero,however,larger increases in low carbon energy combined with an acceleration in energy efficiency cause the energy system to move into the energy substitution phase of the energy transition over the 2020s.This transition gather

89、s pace in the 2030s and 2040s,such that the share of unabated fossil fuels in primary energy declines to less than 20%by 2050 and net carbon emissions from the energy system are close to zero.The quicker pace of energy transition in Net Zero is driven both by larger increases in low carbon energy,en

90、abling more rapid substitution away from unabated fossil fuels,and by faster gains in energy efficiency,which cause total primary energy to peak in the second half of this decade and decline through the 2030s and 2040s.By 2050 primary energy in Net Zero is around a third lower than in Current Trajec

91、tory.The key drivers needed to move the energy system from Current Trajectory to Net Zero to an earlier and quicker energy transition are explored in pages 76-87.Current TrajectoryNet ZeroCurrent TrajectoryIPCC 2C carbon budgetNet Zero20102020203020402050051015202530354045202020302040205002004006008

92、001,0001,2001,4002021bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsOverviewa The IPCC estimates that if the probability of the carbon budget being consistent with 2C is reduced from 83%to 67%,the budget increases to 1150 GtCO2(since 2020).b See Table SPM.2|Estimates of histor

93、ical carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions and remaining carbon budgets.IPCC,2021:Summary for Policymakers.In:Climate Change 2021:The Physical Science Basis.Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Gt of CO2Gt of CO2CO2 emissionsCumulativ

94、e CO2 emissions,2020 onwardsThe pathway along which the global energy system is currently travelling,if continued,is not consistent with a 2C carbon budgetThe longer the global energy system remains on its current pathway,the harder it will be to remain within a 2C carbon budget,or indeed to meet th

95、e Paris climate goals.Climate science suggests that average global temperature rises depend on the cumulative amount of greenhouse gases that have been emitted.In that context,the IPCC provides estimates of carbon budgets consistent with limiting average global temperature rises to different levels.

96、The Paris climate goals are to limit average global temperature rises to well below 2C and pursue efforts to limit temperature rises to 1.5C.The IPCC does not produce estimates of carbon budgets which equate specifically to limiting average global temperature rises to well below 2C.But it does provi

97、de an estimate for a carbon budget consistent with there being a high probability(83%)of limiting temperature rises to 2C.For that reason,the remainder of this analysis is based around this 2C carbon budget.The IPCC estimates that the remaining 2C carbon budget is around 900 Gt CO2(measured from the

98、 beginning of 2020)a.This budget estimate includes anthropogenic CO2 emissions from agriculture,farming and other land use(AFOLU),but excludes the global warming effects from non-CO2 emissions(such as methane)whose global warming effects are accounted for separately when estimating the CO2 budgetb.T

99、o compare the carbon emissions implied by Current Trajectory and Net Zero with the IPCC 2C carbon budget,the emissions pathways implied by the scenarios are adjusted to include IPCC estimates of AFOLU-related emissions and to exclude estimates of methane emissions associated with the production,tran

100、sportation,and distribution of fossil fuels and from incomplete combustion of traditional biomass(see pages 96-97 in the Annex).These adjusted emissions pathways suggest that the emissions implied by Net Zero are within a 2C budget,whereas in Current Trajectory cumulative emissions exceed the budget

101、 in the early 2040s.The longer the world remains on a pathway like Current Trajectory,the harder it would be to stay within a 2C carbon budget.This raises the risk that an extended period of delay could increase the economic and social costs of remaining within a 2C budget.This risk is explored in a

102、n alternative Delayed and Disorderly scenario.20102020203020402050051015202530354045Current TrajectoryNet ZeroDelayed Net ZeroFastest IPCC decarbonization202020302040205002004006008001,0001,2001,400Current TrajectoryNet ZeroDelayed Net ZeroFastest IPCC decarbonizationIPCC 2C carbon budget2223bp Ener

103、gy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsOverviewGt of CO2Gt of CO2CO2 emissionsCumulative CO2 emissions,2020 onwardsFor more details,see the Annex on our modelling approach to Delayed Net Zero and the fastest IPCC decarbonization scenario.Delaying the energy transition could l

104、ead to a costly and disorderly adjustment pathwayBeyond a certain point,the cost and disruption associated with meeting a 2C carbon budget is likely to increase the longer the shift to a faster decarbonization pathway is delayed.The Delayed and Disorderly scenario assumes that the global energy syst

105、em moves in line with Current Trajectory for a period,after which sufficient policies and actions are undertaken to begin an accelerated fall in carbon emissions,consistent with meeting a 2C carbon budget.It also assumes that there are limits to the pace at which it is possible to decarbonize the gl

106、obal energy system in an orderly manner,i.e.without having to resort to policies and actions that have outsized economic and social costs.This maximum pace of orderly transition is uncertain and would depend on the specific triggers leading to the decision to pursue a faster transition pathway and o

107、n the technologies available to reduce emissions at the time that decision has been taken.There are different ways in which this maximum pace of orderly transition could be approximated:One possibility would be to assume that this fastest pace is broadly in line with the rate achieved in Net Zero.Th

108、is stylised assumption would imply that the latest date the energy system could continue along the Current Trajectory pathway before then moving to a rapid decarbonization while still achieving an orderly transition consistent with remaining within a 2C budget,would be around the beginning of the ne

109、xt decade.This delayed Net Zero pathway gets to net zero emissions by the mid-2050s and cumulative carbon emissions remain just within the 2C carbon budget.An alternative approximation would be to base it on the fastest pace of modelled decarbonization in the IPCC scenarios,which is somewhat more ra

110、pid than in Net Zero.This would imply a shift away from the Current Trajectory pathway to a rapid decarbonization pathway by the mid-2030s to remain within a 2C budget.These approximations suggest that,if the move to an accelerated transition pathway is delayed much beyond the early-to-mid 2030s,the

111、re would be an increasing likelihood that costly or disorderly measures would be needed to keep emissions within a 2C carbon budget.These measures could take many different forms,with the aim of reducing or curtailing the use of unabated fossil fuels and higher-emitting activities and so achieving a

112、n even more rapid pace of decarbonization than in Net Zero or the fastest decarbonization scenarios considered by the IPCC.If the world was still following the Current Trajectory pathway in the early 2040s it would have exceeded a 2C carbon budget.The Delayed and Disorderly scenario is highly stylis

113、ed,and other assumptions,for example in which the world moved away from Current Trajectory onto a decarbonization pathway that accelerated over time,would imply a different timeframe.2425bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionLNG demand depends on gas consumption in Europe and A

114、sia,which are reliant on LNG imports for supplies of gasThe global pattern of natural gas production is increasingly driven by developments in LNG tradeThe role of coal in the global energy system declines,driven by ChinaModern bioenergy increases rapidly,helping to decarbonize sectors and processes

115、 which are hard to electrifyGrowth in energy demand is led by increasing prosperity in emerging economies,offset by quickening gains in energy efficiency Primary energy demand gradually decarbonizes,driven by rapid growth in renewable energyOil demand falls over the outlook driven by falling use in

116、road transportOil is increasingly replaced by electricity as the main energy source for road transportAviation and marine transportation are increasingly decarbonized through a combination of hydrogen-derived fuels and biofuelsFalls in oil demand are reflected in shifting patterns of product demand

117、and refining activityThe pattern of global oil supplies shifts as oil demand declinesThe outlook for natural gas demand depends on the speed of the energy transitionEnergy demand203520502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero0100200300400500600700800Emergingex.ChinaDevelopedChinaGDPper

118、capitaPopulationEnergyintensityPrimaryenergy2022-20501995-2022CurrentTrajectoryNetZero-4%-3%-2%-1%0%1%2%3%4%GDPGDPGDP2627bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandPercentageEJAverage annual growth of primary energy demandPrimary energy by regionGrowth in ener

119、gy demand is led by increasing prosperity in emerging economies,offset by quickening gains in energy efficiency Growth in global energy demand is underpinned by increasing levels of prosperity in emerging economies.The extent and persistence of this growth depends on the pace of energy efficiency im

120、provements.Annual GDP growth averages 2.4%over the outlook in the two scenarios.This is slower than the average growth of almost 3.5%per year seen over the previous 25 years,reflecting both slower population growth and weaker gains in GDP per capita.Even so,the size of the world economy doubles by 2

121、050.The main driver of this increase is rising levels of prosperity in emerging economies,which account for around 70%of the increase in global activity.As in recent Energy Outlooks,the assumed trajectory for global GDP includes an estimate of the impact of climate change on economic growth.This imp

122、act includes the effects of both increasing temperatures on economic activity and the upfront costs associated with mitigation and adaptation.More details of the approach and its limitations can be found on pages 98-99.The extent to which increasing economic activity results in higher energy demand

123、depends on improvements in energy efficiency.Annual gains in energy efficiency average 2.1%in Current Trajectory and 3.4%in Net Zero,compared with 1.6%over the previous 25 years.These faster efficiency gains are supported by the increasing shift towards wind and solar power generation,which reduces

124、the energy losses associated with converting thermal energy into electricity,as well as by the broader pressures to decarbonize the energy system and enhance energy security.The combination of slower economic growth and faster gains in energy efficiency means the growth of global primary energy dema

125、nd is much weaker than in the past,and demand actually falls over the outlook in Net Zero.Over the past 25 years,primary energy has grown at an average annual rate of 1.8%:that compares to growth of 0.2%in Current Trajectory and an average annual decline of 1.1%in Net Zero.The main sources of increa

126、se in energy demand are emerging economies(excluding China),where demand grows over the first half of the outlook in both scenarios.After that,energy demand in these emerging economies depends on the pace of decarbonization.It continues to grow in Current Trajectory,increasing by around 45%over the

127、outlook.In contrast,in Net Zero,energy demand in emerging economies peaks in the early 2030s and falls thereafter,such that by 2050 it is around 10%below 2022 levels.Growth in energy consumption in China and developed economies is more muted,reflecting both slower economic growth and greater gains i

128、n energy efficiency.Demand in China peaks in the mid-to-late 2020s in both scenarios,before falling to around 15%and 35%below 2022 levels by 2050 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.Energy demand in developed economies continues the decline seen over much of the past 20 years,falling bet

129、ween 20-40%over the outlook in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.2000201020202030204020500100200300400500600700Current TrajectoryNet ZeroRenewablesNuclearand hydroCoalNatural gasOil20502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZero01002003004005006007008002829bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook

130、:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandEJEJPrimary energyPrimary energy by energy typePrimary energy demand gradually decarbonizes,driven by rapid growth in renewable energy Primary energy demand increases in the near term before plateauing or falling thereafter,with the fuel mix becoming increasingly

131、decarbonized.Primary energy demand in Current Trajectory increases out to the mid-2030s before broadly plateauing,as continuing increases in energy consumption in emerging economies(excluding China)are broadly offset by declines in developed economies and,eventually,in China.In contrast,energy deman

132、d peaks in the middle of the current decade in Net Zero before declining thereafter,as increasing efforts to decarbonize the energy system drive faster gains in energy efficiency.By 2050 primary energy demand in Current Trajectory is around 5%higher than in 2022 but is a little over 25%lower than 20

133、22 levels in Net Zero.The fastest growing source of primary energy is renewable energy,which includes wind and solar power,bioenergy and geothermal(but excludes hydropower).Renewable energy more than doubles by 2050 in Current Trajectory and increases more than three-fold in Net Zero.The share of re

134、newables in primary energy increases from a little over 10%in 2022 to more than a quarter by 2050 in Current Trajectory,and to more than half of all primary energy in Net Zero.The increasing importance of renewables is reflected in the declining share of fossil fuels,which falls from around 85%of pr

135、imary energy in 2022 to around two-thirds by 2050 in Current Trajectory and only a third in Net Zero.The largest falls occur in the share of coal,as the world shifts towards lower carbon fuels in industry and power.By 2050 coal consumption is between 35-85%lower in the two scenarios(see pages 46-47)

136、.Oil demand also declines in both scenarios,driven primarily by the falling use of oil in road transport(see pages 30-31).The share of oil in primary energy decreases from around a third in 2022 to around a quarter by 2050 in Current Trajectory and to a little over 10%in Net Zero.Whether demand for

137、natural gas rises or falls from its current level depends on the pace of decarbonization.In Current Trajectory,natural gas demand increases by close to a fifth as emerging economies increase their reliance on it.In contrast,the greater shift towards electrification and lower carbon energy sources in

138、 Net Zero means natural gas demand plateaus in the second half of this decade and by the end of the outlook is around half of its 2022 level(see pages 40-41).The definition of primary energy used in the 2024 Energy Outlook is based on the direct equivalent method,which is the approach used by the IP

139、CC.See pages 104-105 in the Annex for more detail.200020102020203020402050020406080100120Current TrajectoryNet Zero2022-352035-50CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero-60-50-40-30-20-100102022-352035-50CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero-60-50-40-30-20-10010DevelopedChinaEmerg

140、ing ex.ChinaTotalIndustryOtherFeedstocksOther transportRoad transportTotalBuildings and power3031bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandMb/dMb/dMb/dOil demandChange in oil demand by sectorChange in oil demand by regionOil demand falls over the outlook driv

141、en by falling use in road transport Global oil demand plateaus over the remainder of this decade before declining over the rest of the outlook,led by the falling use of oil in road transport.Oil continues to play a major role in the global energy system over the first half of the outlook,with the wo

142、rld consuming between 100-80 Mb/d of oil in 2035 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.In Current Trajectory,oil consumption gradually declines over the second half of the outlook to around 75 Mb/d in 2050.The contraction in oil use is more pronounced in Net Zero,with demand falling to bet

143、ween 25-30 Mb/d by 2050 around 70%below its 2022 level.The single biggest driver of the reduction in oil consumption is the declining use of oil in road transport as the efficiency of the vehicle fleet improves and alternative fuels are increasingly used,led by the electrification of cars and trucks

144、(see pages 32-33).In Current Trajectory,the declining use of oil in road transport over the first half of the outlook is offset by the increasing use of oil as a feedstock,especially in the petrochemicals sector as rising prosperity boosts consumption of plastics,textiles,and other oil-based materia

145、ls.Further out,broad-based declines in oil across all forms of transport dominate the continuing small increases in the use of oil as a feedstock,which plateaus at around 25 Mb/d in the 2040s.In Net Zero,the falls in oil demand across all forms of transport are more pronounced and the use of oil as

146、a feedstock peaks in the mid-2030s as the world limits the use of single-use plastic and encourages greater levels of recycling.The falling use of oil in industry seen in both scenarios by 2050 also reflects the decreasing use of diesel generators and the increasing use of alternative fuels in off-r

147、oad industrial vehicles.The falls in oil demand are concentrated in developed economies,continuing the long-term decline seen in these markets since the early 2000s.Oil consumption in developed economies falls from around 45 Mb/d in 2022 to between 20 and 7 Mb/d by 2050 in the two scenarios.In China

148、,oil demand edges slightly higher over the next few years before declining post-2030,driven in large part by the increasing electrification of road transport.In the other emerging economies,increasing levels of prosperity and rising living standards support more resilient oil demand.In Current Traje

149、ctory,emerging economies demand increases until the mid-2030s after which it broadly plateaus.The increased electrification of road transport in Net Zero leads to more pronounced falls in oil consumption across emerging economies in the second half of the outlook.ICE(Developed)EV(Developed)ICE(Emerg

150、ing)EV(Emerging)Oil productsBiofuelsGasElectricityLow carbonhydrogen203520502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero00.511.522.53203520502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero05101520253035403233bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy de

151、mandDemand for road transportation grows as prosperity and living standards in emerging markets improve,with the use of oil in road transport increasingly displaced by electricity.The global light duty vehicle parc increases from around 1.5 billion vehicles in 2022 to around 2.0 billion vehicles in

152、2035 and 2.5 billion in 2050 in both scenarios.This expansion in light duty vehicles is almost entirely accounted for by a growing number of light vehicles in emerging economies,as rising levels of prosperity facilitate increased levels of car ownership,and those vehicles are driven greater distance

153、s.In contrast,the market for light vehicles in developed economies is largely satiated,with the number of such vehicles stable at around 0.7-0.8 billion vehicles over the entire outlook.The fleet of light-duty vehicles is increasingly electrified over the outlook,led by changes in developed economie

154、s.This increasing electrification is driven by tightening policy and regulation standards,supported by increasing cost competitiveness of electric vehicles as battery costs continue to fall and the manufacturing of such vehicles is progressively scaled up.The share of electric vehicles in the global

155、 light vehicle parc increases from less than 2%in 2022 to between 20-30%by 2035 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero,growing to between 50 and 85%respectively by 2050.The global fleet of internal combustion engine(ICE)light vehicles is relatively unchanged in size over the first half of the outlook,wi

156、th declining numbers in developed economies offset by growth in emerging economies.But by 2050 the number of ICE vehicles is around 10%lower than 2022 levels in Current Trajectory and 75%lower in Net Zero.The smaller number of ICE vehicles,combined with their improving efficiency,means the amount of

157、 oil used in light vehicles falls from around 30 Mb/d in 2022 to 16 and four Mb/d by 2050 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.Similar trends are apparent in medium and heavy-duty(MHD)trucks,with the global fleet of MHD trucks increasing from around 65 million in 2022 to around 110 millio

158、n by 2050 in the two scenarios.Around 80%of the growth in demand for MHD trucking services stems from increasing transportation needs in emerging economies.As with light-duty vehicles,tightening regulation standards drive a shift away from the use of oil-based products towards lower carbon fuels.Inc

159、reasing electrification of trucks accounts for most of this shift,with hydrogen playing a supporting role,especially for long-distance heavy-duty trucks in Net Zero.Natural gas,including biomethane,also accounts for an increasing share,with its use concentrated in China and developing economies incl

160、uding India.The share of oil-based products in MHD trucks energy consumption falls from over 90%in 2022 to 60%by 2050 in Current Trajectory and 25%in Net Zero,causing oil consumption in MHD trucks to fall from 13 Mb/d in 2022 to 7 Mb/d in Current Trajectory and 2 Mb/d by 2050 in Net Zero.Oil is incr

161、easingly replaced by electricity as the main energy source for road transportBillionsEJLight duty vehicles by technology and regionMedium and heavy duty vehicles:energy use by fuelGas includes biomethane.Oil productsBiofuelsHydrogen-derivedfuelsOil productsBiofuelsGasHydrogen-derivedfuels20352050202

162、2CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero051015202530203520502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero0%20%40%60%80%100%3435bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandAviation and marine transportation both increase over the outlook as globa

163、l economic activity rises,with the use of oil-based products increasingly displaced by lower carbon alternatives.The growth in global activity,combined with the speed and convenience of flying,means the demand for air travel grows strongly over the outlook,increasing by 75%between 2025 and 2050 in C

164、urrent Trajectory.Tightening conservation measures and changing consumer behaviour dampen this growth in Net Zero,although passenger air kilometres still increase by 40%over that period.Continuing efficiency improvements in air travel mean that this increasing demand does not fully translate into in

165、creased energy demand,which grows by 35%between 2025 and 2050 in Current Trajectory and by only 10%in Net Zero.The incumbent aviation fleet and long-haul range requirements mean that liquid fuels remain the dominant energy source,with the decarbonization of aviation driven by the increasing use of l

166、iquid sustainable aviation fuel(SAF).In Current Trajectory,virtually all of this SAF is derived from bio-feedstocks,and this low carbon fuel accounts for between 5-10%of total aviation fuel by 2035 and close to 20%by 2050.Bio-derived SAF also provides most of the SAF used in the first half of the ou

167、tlook in Net Zero.But the increased use of SAF in that scenario,combined with limitations on the availability of bio-feedstocks,means there is a growing role for hydrogen-derived SAF by 2050 in Net Zero.The growing role played by SAF is underpinned by a significant increase in production capacity,wi

168、th between 15 and 30 world-scale facilities coming online every year between the 2030s and mid-2040s.Seaborne trade also increases over the outlook,as growth in the world economy increases the need for the shipping of goods and raw materials.Seaborne-based travel increases by 70%in Current Trajector

169、y and 30%in Net Zero over the outlook.Total energy use grows much less quickly due to significant efficiency gains,with energy demand broadly unchanged in Current Trajectory and 20%lower in Net Zero.The decarbonization of the marine sector requires the transition of the fleet away from oil-based fue

170、ls to lower carbon alternatives.Over the first half of the outlook,this transition is spread across liquefied natural gas(LNG),biofuels(bio-methanol and biodiesel),and hydrogen-derived fuels(ammonia and methanol).Further out,the marine sector transition accelerates in both scenarios as new ships com

171、e online and the existing fleet is retrofitted,allowing alternative fuels to be adopted more quickly.Hydrogen-derived fuels and biofuels take an increasingly large share of the marine energy mix.By 2050 in Net Zero,the share of oil products declines to around 10%,with hydrogen-derived fuels accounti

172、ng for 40%of marine energy and biofuels a further 30%.The growth in the use of alternative marine fuels is supported by significant development of bunkering facilities,including fuel storage and refuelling barges.Aviation and marine transportation are increasingly decarbonized through a combination

173、of hydrogen-derived fuels and biofuelsEJShareAviation:energy use by fuelMarine sector energy mixGas includes biomethane.OtherChinaMiddle EastEmerging Asiaex.ChinaOtherTotalAtlantic BasinJet/kerosenePetrochemicalfeedstocksGasolineGasoil/diesel203520502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZe

174、ro0204060801001202035-502022-35CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-5053637bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandMb/dMb/dProduct demandChange in refining throughput by regionProduct demand includes NGLs but excludes bio

175、fuels.Petrochemical feedstocks include naphtha,LPG and ethane.Atlantic Basin includes North America,the Caribbean,Central America,South America,Europe and Eurasia.Falls in oil demand are reflected in shifting patterns of product demand and refining activityThe changing level and composition of oil p

176、roduct demand leads to a marked rationalization in refining activity,with its global composition shifting over time.In Current Trajectory,even though overall oil demand is relatively unchanged over the first half of the outlook,gasoline and diesel demand both decline as the use of oil in road transp

177、ort falls.This is offset by increasing demand for petrochemical feedstocks(naphtha,ethane and LPG)and jet fuel.The fall in oil consumption in the second half of the outlook continues to be driven by gasoline and diesel,both of which decline by more than a third post-2035,with these falls centred in

178、North America,the EU and China.Similar to Current Trajectory,the large and sustained falls in oil demand in Net Zero are most pronounced in diesel and gasoline,both of which decline by over 20 Mb/d over the outlook.But the demand for petrochemical feedstocks also declines as the world limits its use

179、 of plastics and other manufactured materials.The falls in product demand are spread more evenly across the globe than in Current Trajectory,with declines in all of the main regional demand centres.The pressure on the refining sector is compounded by the increasing use of natural gas liquids(NGLs)an

180、d biofuels.This is especially the case in Net Zero,where the share of these non-refined products in total liquids consumption increases to almost 30%,from around 15%in 2022.The falls in aggregate product demand,together with the shifting mix of products and changing geographical composition,lead to

181、marked changes in the level and geographical spread of refining activity.Refineries adapt in different ways to increase their resilience to the changing scale and mix of product demand,including enhancing their yield flexibility,co-processing bio feedstocks,and reducing the carbon intensity of their

182、 process heat and hydrogen inputs.The ability of refineries to adapt successfully depends on their geographical exposure to the falls in demand,their existing configurations,and the local conditions and policies in which they operate.In Current Trajectory,the 20%fall in refining throughput over the

183、outlook is concentrated in the Atlantic Basin,where combined throughput declines by 40%,as the weight of refining activity shifts to the more resilient centres of product demand in emerging Asian economies,including China,India,and the Middle East.Rationalization of refining activity in the Atlantic

184、 Basin roughly offsets growth in the Eastern hemisphere in the first half of the outlook in Current Trajectory,and accounts for almost two-thirds of the decline post-2035.The sharper falls in refining throughput are more geographically dispersed in Net Zero,mirroring the broader-based declines in pr

185、oduct demand.The Atlantic Basin still accounts for around 60%of the fall in global refining runs over the outlook,with notable falls also in China,other parts of emerging Asia and the Middle East.2023Non-OPEC+OPEC+2035Non-OPEC+OPEC+20500204060801001202023Non-OPEC+OPEC+2035Non-OPEC+OPEC+2050020406080

186、1001203839bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandMb/dMb/dChange in oil supply in Current TrajectoryChange in oil supply in Net ZeroThe pattern of global oil supplies shifts as oil demand declinesThe composition of global oil production changes over time,wi

187、th the impact of falling oil demand borne largely by non-OPEC+producers.In Current Trajectory,aggregate oil demand and production are little changed over the first half of the outlook.That is also largely the case for the mix between non-OPEC+and OPEC+supplies,with OPEC+s share of global oil supplie

188、s remaining around 50%.The makeup of non-OPEC+output,however,does change out to 2035.US tight oil increases further in the near term,before peaking towards the end of this decade at around 16 Mb/d and gradually declining thereafter as the most advantaged sites begin to be exhausted.As the growth in

189、US tight oil slows over the next decade,non-OPEC+supply is augmented by robust production in Brazil and Guyana,where output reaches around 5 Mb/d and 1.5 Mb/d respectively during the mid-2030s.The combination of relatively flat demand and resilient non-OPEC+output means there is little scope for OPE

190、C+to increase its levels of production over the first half of the outlook in Current Trajectory.The decline in oil demand in the second half of the outlook in Current Trajectory is assumed to prompt OPEC+to increase its share to a little over 60%by 2050.As a result,almost all of the decline in oil d

191、emand post-2035 in Current Trajectory is borne by non-OPEC+producers,with US tight oil halving from its peak level to around 8 Mb/d by 2050.The earlier and deeper fall in oil demand in Net Zero leads to sustained falls in both non-OPEC+and OPEC+output.The higher cost structure of non-OPEC+production

192、,together with the assumption that OPEC+competes to maximise its share of diminishing global oil production,means that lower non-OPEC+production accounts for around 55%of the total reduction in global oil supplies.2035-502022-352035-502022-35CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTra

193、jectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero-2,000-2,500-1,500-1,000-50005001,000-2,500-2,000-1,500-1,000-50005001,00020002010202020302040205001,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,000Current TrajectoryNet ZeroOtherPowerBuildingsIndustryBluehydrogenTotalChinaEmergingex.ChinaDevelopedTotal4041bp Energy Outlook:2024 e

194、ditionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandBcmBcmBcmNatural gas demandChange in natural gas demandby regionChange in natural gas demandby sectorThe outlook for natural gas demand depends on the speed of the energy transitionThe prospects for natural gas are shaped by two significant

195、but opposing trends:increasing demand in emerging economies as they grow and industrialize,offset by a shift away from natural gas to greater electrification and lower carbon fuels as the world decarbonizes.The net impact of these two opposing forces depends on the speed of the energy transition.In

196、Current Trajectory,natural gas demand grows throughout the outlook,expanding by around a fifth by 2050,with its share of primary energy increasing to a little over 25%.In contrast,natural gas demand peaks around the turn of this decade in Net Zero and by 2050 is around half of its 2022 level.These c

197、ontrasting outlooks reflect the impact of two competing trends.The dominant trend in Current Trajectory is the increasing use of natural gas in emerging economies(excluding China)which rises by a little over 50%by 2050,more than accounting for the entire growth in global gas demand over the outlook.

198、The rise in emerging economies gas consumption is driven by increasing use in the power and industrial sectors as these economies grow and industrialize.Growth in global gas demand is also boosted by increasing consumption in China,again driven largely by increasing use within the industrial and pow

199、er sectors.Chinese gas demand broadly plateaus in the 2040s,and by 2050 is around a third higher than its level in 2022.Natural gas demand in developed economies is broadly unchanged over the first part of the outlook in Current Trajectory,as declining use in buildings is offset by gains in transpor

200、t,industry and its use as a feedstock to produce blue hydrogen.Natural gas used in the power sector declines only marginally as it supports the continued displacement of coal generation alongside growth in renewables.However,in the second half of the outlook,the use of natural gas in developed econo

201、mies falls by over 20%,reflecting a pronounced shift towards electrification and lower carbon energy sources in the power,industrial and buildings sectors.In contrast,in Net Zero this shift to alternative energy sources in developed economies happens earlier and with greater force.Natural gas demand

202、 in these markets peaks during the 2020s and by 2050 is over 55%below its 2022 level.These falls are driven by a combination of greater energy efficiency,increased electrification of buildings and light industry(supported by the increasing use of heat pumps),and the growing use of other low carbon e

203、nergy sources in heavy industry.Natural gas demand in emerging economies continues to rise over the first part of the outlook.But the shift to greater electrification and lower carbon fuels subsequently drives a broad-based decline in gas usage,with demand peaking in the early-2030s.By 2050 gas cons

204、umption in emerging economies is down over 50%from 2022 levels.In Net Zero around 80%of natural gas consumption is abated with CCUS by 2050,mainly in the industrial and power sectors and in the production of blue hydrogen(see pages 68-69).ChinaDevelopedAsiaand ANZEU and UKEmergingex.China20002010202

205、020302040205002004006008001,0001,200Current TrajectoryNet Zero2030204020502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero02004006008001,0001,2004243bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandBcmBcmLNG traded volumeLNG imports by re

206、gionIncludes all global LNG imports.Developed Asia comprises developed economies in Asia,and is dominated by Japan,South Korea and Singapore.LNG demand depends on gas consumption in Europe and Asia,which are reliant on LNG imports for supplies of gasLNG demand increases rapidly in the near term,but

207、the outlook post-2030 becomes increasingly dependent on the pace of the transition,especially in Europe and Asia,which rely on LNG imports to meet their incremental natural gas demand.LNG demand grows robustly in the first part of the outlook,driven by increasing demand in emerging economies includi

208、ng China,as the increasing use of natural gas in these economies is largely met by imported LNG.By 2030,LNG demand is 40%and 30%above 2022 levels in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.The main difference between the two scenarios out to 2030 reflects contrasting trends in the EU and UK.In

209、Current Trajectory,LNG demand in the EU and UK increases out to 2030 as they continue to adjust to the loss of Russian pipeline imports.In contrast,in Net Zero a greater shift to alternative energy sources combined with faster gains in energy efficiency means that by 2030,EU and UK LNG demand is bel

210、ow 2022 levels,although still above levels in 2021 prior to the war in Ukraine.The range of outcomes for LNG trade widens post-2030.In Current Trajectory,LNG demand increases by more than 25%over the subsequent 20 years.This demand growth requires 300 Bcma of additional liquefaction capacity to come

211、 online post-2030.In contrast,the gains in LNG demand out to 2030 in Net Zero are reversed over the following decade,and by 2050 global trade in LNG is around 40%below its 2022 level,implying that no additional liquefaction capacity beyond that already under construction is required.This widening ra

212、nge of outcomes adds to the uncertainty associated with investments in LNG facilities,which typically have an economic life of 15-20 years.The growth of LNG demand after 2030 in Current Trajectory is driven entirely by continuing strong growth in emerging economies(excluding China),with India accoun

213、ting for a third of this increase.The overall growth in global LNG trade is tempered by falling demand in Europe as the region transitions away from natural gas,and in China where growth in pipeline supplies from Russia reduces the need for LNG imports.LNG demand in emerging economies in Net Zero al

214、so continues to grow during the 2030s before peaking towards the end of the decade,but this growth is more than offset by sharp falls across the main demand centres in Europe and developed Asian economies,as the use of gas in these economies is crowded out by increasing electrification and a shift t

215、owards lower carbon energy sources.EuropeAfricaOtherPipelineto ChinaPipelineexcludingChinaLNGMiddleEastUSRussiaAsia2030204020502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0002030204020502021CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCu

216、rrentTrajectoryNetZero0501001502002503004445bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandBcmBcmNatural gas production by regionRussian natural gas exportsThe global pattern of natural gas production is increasingly driven by developments in LNG trade Global natu

217、ral gas production is driven initially by the need to support increasing demand for LNG exports,with the US and the Middle East gaining share relative to Russia.Further out,the pattern of global supply increasingly depends on the speed of the energy transition.The growth in US and Middle East gas pr

218、oduction seen in recent years continues over the remainder of the 2020s,mainly due to its pivotal role in LNG exports.In Current Trajectory,80%of the growth in global natural gas production comes from these two regions,with about three-quarters of this production growth used for LNG exports.In Net Z

219、ero,production grows in these two regions even as it declines in the rest of the world,mainly due to growth in LNG exports offsetting declines in domestic consumption.In contrast,Russian production largely stagnates as the impact of the war in Ukraine and continuing international sanctions limit gro

220、wth in domestic demand and stall any expansion in LNG exports.The outlook for global gas production post-2030 depends on the speed of the energy transition.In Current Trajectory,global gas supplies continue to grow post-2030,meeting the increasing demand in emerging economies.The growth in gas produ

221、ction is led by the Middle East,Africa and Russia as the impact of international sanctions gradually fades.US gas production peaks in the mid-2030s and declines modestly thereafter as reductions in domestic demand outweigh continued growth of LNG exports.In contrast,in Net Zero global gas production

222、 declines by around 55%in the final 20 years of the outlook as demand in the worlds major gas consuming centres declines.The majority of the reduction in gas demand is borne by the US,the Middle East and Russia,which account for almost half of the decline in global gas production.Gas production in A

223、sia declines by almost three-quarters,driven by falling production in China and Southeast Asia.In 2030 Russian gas exports are between 30-40%below pre-war levels in Current Trajectory and Net Zero.The sharp drop in pipeline exports to Europe following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine is sustained

224、and international sanctions limit any expansion in LNG exports.The loss of exports to Europe is only partially offset by increases in pipeline exports to China via the existing Power of Siberia pipeline and a new Far East line commencing later this decade.The scope for Russian gas exports to recover

225、 post-2030 depends on the speed of the transition.In Current Trajectory,the gradual expansion of LNG exports as the impact of international sanctions fades,combined with the growth of pipeline exports to countries outside of Europe,especially China following the commissioning of Power of Siberia 2 f

226、rom the mid-2030s,means Russian gas exports grow to a little above pre-Ukraine war levels by 2050.In contrast,the accelerating shift away from natural gas as the energy transition gathers pace in Net Zero means Russian gas exports never recover,with further declines in both pipeline and LNG exports.

227、200020102020203020402050020406080100120140160180Current TrajectoryNet ZeroDevelopedEmergingex.China and IndiaIndiaChinaTotal2035-502022-35CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero-100-80-60-40-200204647bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandEJEJCoal

228、 demandChange in coal demand by regionThe role of coal in the global energy system declines,driven by ChinaGlobal coal consumption peaks in the mid-2020s and then declines steadily throughout the remainder of the outlook.The diminishing role of coal in global energy is most pronounced in Net Zero,wi

229、th consumption falling by around 85%by 2050 and the share of coal in primary energy declining from 28%in 2022 to only around 5%.The decline in coal use is less pronounced in Current Trajectory,with consumption declining by a little over a third and still providing around 17%of the worlds energy need

230、s in 2050.The global fall in coal consumption is dominated by China as its economic growth slows and it transitions to a lower carbon fuel mix.Chinese coal consumption peaks before 2030 and falls thereafter:this decline accounts for almost 90%of the reduction in global coal consumption by 2050 in Cu

231、rrent Trajectory,and around 60%in Net Zero.The smaller fall in coal consumption in Current Trajectory partly reflects continued increases in coal consumption in India and other emerging economies to help meet the rapid expansion of domestic energy demands,especially for electricity use.Despite India

232、s wind and solar power generation increasing 15-fold in Current Trajectory,coal consumption nonetheless increases by 75%to help meet rising energy demands,with two-thirds of that increase deployed in the power sector.The declining use of coal globally is concentrated in the power sector as coal is d

233、isplaced by rapid growth in wind and solar power.The use of coal within industry also declines,especially in Net Zero,as industrial processes increasingly electrify or switch to other lower carbon alternatives such as low carbon hydrogen(see pages 60-61).In Net Zero,around three-quarters of the rema

234、ining use of coal in 2050 is used in conjunction with CCUS,concentrated in industry and the power sector.BiomethaneTransportHydrogenHeat andpowerBuildingsIndustryBiofuelsModern solidbiomass203520502022CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero01020304050607080Modernsolid biomass BiofuelsBiomet

235、haneCurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero01020304050604849bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsEnergy demandEJEJModern bioenergy by typeModern bioenergy demand in 2050Modern bioenergy increases rapidly,helping to decarbonize sectors

236、 and processes which are hard to electrifyThe use of modern bioenergy modern solid biomass,biofuels and biomethane increases significantly over the outlook,providing a source of low carbon energy to help decarbonize sectors and processes that are hard to electrify.Modern bioenergy use increases by a

237、round two-thirds by 2050 in Current Trajectory and more than doubles in Net Zero to a little over 70 EJ by 2050.This expansion is achieved without any increase in land use,with most of the modern bioenergy sourced regionally from residues and wastes.In Net Zero,the increase in the total use of bioen

238、ergy is partially offset by the declining role of traditional biomass,which is currently predominantly used for cooking and heating in Africa and some parts of Asia.The use of traditional biomass is almost eliminated by 2050 in Net Zero.Less progress is made in reducing reliance on traditional bioma

239、ss in Current Trajectory total consumption falls by only around 5%,as the impact of rising populations offsets average per person use falling by around a quarter.The largest source of growth of modern bioenergy is solid biomass(such as wood pellets,and forest and agricultural residues),which increas

240、es from a little over 25 EJ in 2022 to between 40 and 50 EJ by 2050 in the two scenarios,used mainly in the industrial and power sectors.In industry,solid biomass is used as a low carbon alternative to coal and natural gas to fuel high-temperature heat processes,especially in cement and steel manufa

241、cturing.It is also used in a range of other industrial sectors where the source of the biomass is closely connected to the industrial process,such as in food or paper production.In the power sector,biomass is used as an alternative to traditional forms of thermal power,especially coal and natural ga

242、s.Within emerging economies,biomass is predominantly used in new biomass cogeneration plants that produce heat and power,and in co-firing plants together with coal.The use of biomass in the power sector can be combined with CCS to provide a source of carbon dioxide removal(BECCS)(see pages 68-69).Th

243、e use of BECCS is most pronounced in Net Zero,reaching around 1 GtCO2e in 2050,of which around 50%is deployed in the power sector.The demand for biofuels expands rapidly over the first half of the outlook,increasing by around 60%in Current Trajectory and almost tripling in Net Zero.This growth is dr

244、iven by increasing use in transport in China and emerging economies as well as in the EU and US,supported by government policies to boost biofuel use.The pace of growth slows in the second half of the outlook as increasing electrification of road transport reduces the role of biofuels,with much of t

245、he additional growth in the second half of the outlook coming from use in aviation and marine(see pages 34-35).Biomethane grows rapidly over the outlook,blended into the natural gas grid or fed into industrial sites as a direct substitute for natural gas.By 2050 biomethane comprises around 3%of tota

246、l gas volumes in Current Trajectory and around 15%in Net Zero,compared with less than 1%in 2022.This growth is supported by increasing blending mandates,especially in Net Zero,where average blending rates are above 35%in many regions,including the US and EU.5051bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energ

247、y Outlook:2024 editionPower sectorElectricity demand grows significantly,as prosperity in emerging economies rises and the world increasingly electrifiesGrowth in power generation is dominated by a massive expansion of wind and solar powerRapid growth in wind and solar power is underpinned by furthe

248、r cost reductions and an acceleration in the deployment of new capacityPower systems need to be resilient to the increasing variability associated with the growing dominance of wind and solarBuildingsIndustryTransport0%20%40%60%80%100%Current TrajectoryNet Zero2000201020202030204020500%10%20%30%40%5

249、0%60%2022Current TrajectoryNet Zero5253bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsPower SectorShareShare of total final energy consumptionElectricity as a share of total final energy consumptionRange of electrification across end-use sectors in 2050Electricity demand grows

250、 significantly,as prosperity in emerging economies rises and the world increasingly electrifiesElectricity demand grows robustly over the outlook,driven by improving living standards in emerging economies and by increasing electrification of the global energy system.Final electricity demand increase

251、s by around 75%by 2050 in Current Trajectory and by 90%in Net Zero.Most of this growth around four-fifths in each scenario is driven by increasing demand in emerging economies,as rising prosperity improves access to electricity and enables the growing adoption of electrical appliances.India is the f

252、astest-growing electricity market over the outlook,with electricity consumption roughly doubling by 2035 and more than tripling by 2050 in both scenarios.In doing so,India overtakes the EU as the third largest power market globally by 2035 in Net Zero and 2040 in Current Trajectory,behind only China

253、 and the US.Despite that,electricity consumption per capita in India in 2050 in both scenarios is still less than half of that in the EU.Electricity consumption in developed economies accelerates,growing at an annual average rate of around 1.5%in the two scenarios,around three times faster than that

254、 seen over the past 20 years.This acceleration is underpinned by the increasing electrification of existing uses of energy and by the growing importance of new sources of demand,including rising demand from data centres to support the growing use of artificial intelligence applications.Even so,the a

255、verage pace of growth of electricity in developed economies in Net Zero is roughly half that in emerging economies.The share of electricity in the worlds total final consumption(TFC)of energy increases from a little over 20%in 2022 to around 35%by 2050 in Current Trajectory and to more than 50%in Ne

256、t Zero.The increasing electrification of the energy system is apparent across all end-use sectors.The greatest scope for electrification is in buildings,where between half and three-quarters of final energy demand is electrified by 2050,up from around a third of energy use in 2022.The higher level o

257、f electrification in Net Zero is driven by the greater adoption of heat pumps for space heating and more extensive phaseout of inefficient traditional biomass in emerging economies.Considerable scope exists to further electrify the industrial sector.The range of outcomes in 2050 with 40%and 60%of th

258、e industrial sector electrified in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively largely reflects differences in the degree of policy pressure and incentives to decarbonize industrial processes rather than technical constraints.The transport sector has the largest increase in the share of electrifica

259、tion relative to its current low level,as road transportation is increasingly electrified.However,the difficulty of electrifying long-distance transportation,including in aviation and marine,means the degree of electrification of transport in 2050 is less than in other end-use sectors.2022Wind andso

260、larCoalNaturalgasOther2050010,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,0002022Wind andsolarCoalNaturalgasOther2050010,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,0005455bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsPower SectorTWhTWhElectricity generation by source in Current

261、TrajectoryElectricity generation by source in Net ZeroGrowth in power generation is dominated by a massive expansion of wind and solar powerThe increase in power generation is broadly matched by a surge in wind and solar power,helping to decarbonize the global power system.In Current Trajectory,the

262、increase in total power generation of almost 25,000 TWh is largely matched by a roughly eight-fold increase in wind and solar power of 23,000 TWh(see pages 56-57 for more details on the growth in wind and solar power).Global coal-fired generation falls by around 40%out to 2050 in Current Trajectory,

263、reflecting a broad-based decline across most regions of the world,the main exceptions being India and emerging Asia.Coal generation in India increases by over 90%by 2050,driven by the need to meet rapid growth in electricity demand.In contrast to the decline in global coal generation,gas-fired gener

264、ation increases by more than 40%by 2050 in Current Trajectory,led by strong growth in emerging Asia,where it roughly triples by 2050.By 2050,coal and natural gas combined account for close to a third of global power generation in Current Trajectory.Other sources of low carbon power generation contin

265、ue to play a significant role in Current Trajectory.The share of global power generation from nuclear and hydropower increases slightly to reach 20%by 2050.Meanwhile,generation from bioenergy and geothermal power gradually grows in scale,while remaining a very small proportion of total power generat

266、ion.The increase in total power generation is even greater in Net Zero,with a rise of almost 40,000 TWh out to 2050,of which around 30%(11,500 TWh)is used to produce green hydrogen(see pages 62-63).The total growth in generation is more than matched by a huge expansion in wind and solar power,which

267、increases by around 45,000 TWh a 14-fold increase relative to 2022 levels.The surge in wind and solar power pushes out coal and natural gas from the global power sector.Coal generation is the biggest casualty,falling by over 90%by 2050,with its share in global power declining from close to 40%in 202

268、2 to around 1%in 2050.Gas-fired generation is a little more resilient,but its share in global power markets nonetheless falls by around 18 percentage points over the outlook,to close to 5%by 2050.The somewhat greater resilience of natural gas is helped by three quarters of gas-fired generation by 20

269、50 being produced in conjunction with CCUS.The technologies helping to balance the power sector as it increasingly decarbonizes over the outlook are discussed in pages 58-59.Other sources of low carbon power also grow significantly,with nuclear energy more than doubling by 2050 and hydropower growin

270、g by around three-quarters.The growth of new nuclear power takes place almost entirely in emerging economies led by China with developed economies mainly extending the life of existing reactors or replacing decommissioned capacity.By 2050,nuclear and hydropower together account for close to 20%of to

271、tal power generation in Net Zero.The massive expansion in wind and solar power,supported by increases in other sources of low carbon power,leads to a significant decarbonization of the power sector.The average carbon intensity of power generation in Current Trajectory declines by just over 60%over t

272、he outlook.In Net Zero,the almost complete elimination of unabated fossil fuel emissions combined with the deployment of bioenergy used with CCUS(BECCS)results in the power sector being a source of negative emissions by 2050.Current TrajectoryNet Zero20002010202020302040205005,00010,00015,00020,0002

273、5,00030,000EUUSChinaIndiaRestof world0501001502002503002019-2023 average annual build rateCurrent TrajectoryNet Zero5657bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsPower SectorInstalled wind and solar capacityWind and solar capacity:average annual build rates(2024-2035)GWGW

274、 per yearRapid growth in wind and solar power is underpinned by further cost reductions and an acceleration in the deployment of new capacityThe rapid growth in wind and solar power is underpinned by further gains in cost competitiveness and by the successful scaling of a number of enabling factors

275、that enable a sharp acceleration in the deployment of new wind and solar capacity.Wind and solar capacity increases around eight-fold by 2050 in Current Trajectory and by a factor of 14 in Net Zero.Over the first half of the outlook,this buildout of new capacity is concentrated in China and develope

276、d economies,each of which account for around 30-45%of the increase in new capacity across the two scenarios.Emerging economies other than China play an increasing role in the second half of the outlook,helped by improving access to finance,increased investment in transmission and distribution networ

277、ks,and more robust regulatory frameworks.Beyond 2035,these economies account for close to a third of the total buildout of new wind and solar capacity in Current Trajectory and over 60%in Net Zero,with China accounting for an additional 35%and 25%in the two scenarios respectively.The rapid expansion

278、 in wind and solar power is underpinned by further cost declines as technology and energy production costs continue to benefit from ever-increasing deployment levels.Solar costs are further reduced by increasing module efficiency,load factors and project scales.Likewise,the declines in wind power co

279、sts are helped by increasingly large turbines and lower operating costs.These cost reductions are most pronounced over the first 10-15 years of the outlook.Further out,the pace of reductions slows and costs eventually plateau as falling generation costs are offset by the growing expense of balancing

280、 systems with increasing shares of variable energy sources(see page 56-57).The expansion in installed capacity requires a significant increase in the pace at which new capacity is financed and built.The annual additions of installed wind and solar capacity out to 2035 average between 400-800 GW per

281、year in Current Trajectory and Net Zero,which is around 1.5-3 times faster than the average pace of additions seen in recent years,respectively.In addition to a significant increase in investment(see pages 72-73),the rapid acceleration in the deployment of wind and solar capacity in both scenarios d

282、epends on a number of enabling factors scaling at a corresponding pace.These include the upgrade and expansion of transmission and distribution infrastructure,higher social acceptance,expanding supply-and demand-side flexibility,and increasing the speed of planning and permitting.Challenges around t

283、hese enabling factors are a drag on even faster growth of solar and wind power in Current Trajectory.The expansion of wind and solar capacity also requires that supply chains develop and expand,safeguarding energy security by avoiding excessive dependence on individual countries and regions.WorldEUU

284、SChinaIndia0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%2022Current TrajectoryNet Zero20502023CurrentTrajectoryNetZero01,0002,0003,0004,0005,000DevelopedChinaEmergingex.China5859bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsPower SectorShareGWShare of wind and solar in power generation i

285、n 2050Stationary battery storage:installed capacityPower systems need to be resilient to the increasing variability associated with the growing dominance of wind and solar The huge expansion in wind and solar power means power systems need to adapt to ensure they are resilient to the increasing vari

286、ability of power generation.The share of wind and solar in global power generation increases from a little over 10%in 2022 to between 50-70%by 2050 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero.The penetration of wind and solar varies across different markets,reaching levels as high as 75-80%in the EU and Indi

287、a in Net Zero,which rely less on other forms of low carbon energy and abatement technologies such as nuclear,hydropower,and CCUS.The increasing penetration of wind and solar means power systems need to be resilient to the fluctuations in generation as the prevalence of wind and sunshine varies.These

288、 fluctuations can range in timescale,from the very short term(seconds to hours)to much longer(decades).The resilience of power systems to these types of fluctuations depends on four key elements:Overbuild of wind and solar capacity:The power generated by wind and solar capacity varies depending on t

289、he available wind and sunshine.For wind and solar to meet,on average,say 70%of power demand throughout the year,a degree of excess capacity(or overbuild)is required to ensure that sufficient wind and solar power is generated even on days with poor weather conditions.Flexibility:Power systems need th

290、e flexibility to respond to fluctuations in wind and solar power generation by modifying other forms of generation or demand.This can include the use of batteries,hydro pumped storage,interconnectors,and various mechanisms to incentivize demand to respond.Battery storage capacity increases to around

291、 2,200 GW by 2050 in Current Trajectory and to 4,200 GW in Net Zero,which is two orders of magnitude greater than current levels.As more and more renewables are added,batteries that can store and generate energy for longer periods are increasingly deployed.Overall,a majority(70-80%)of the increase i

292、n battery storage capacity is concentrated in emerging economies.These markets have the greatest concentration of solar generation,and battery storage is particularly suited to responding to the typical daily variation in solar power.Dispatchable capacity:This refers to generation capacity that is c

293、ontractually guaranteed to be available to produce power when it is required.Dispatchable power can include assets and technologies that also provide flexibility,such as battery storage and interconnectors.It also includes gas-and coal-fired power stations.As the role of wind and solar increases ove

294、r the outlook,the value associated with gas-and coal-fired power stations changes from providing power for a considerable amount of the time to providing capacity backup.In Net Zero,coal and natural gas account for only 1%and 5%of power generation by 2050,with 75-80%of this generation produced with

295、CCUS.Long duration energy storage(LDES):this is to mitigate variations in wind and sunshine for infrequent but pronounced episodes of renewables scarcity within a year,and also natural variations in wind and solar resources over longer periods.This is particularly important for wind-dominated energy

296、 systems,such as parts of Northern Europe and the US,that can experience relatively infrequent but significant episodes of energy scarcity.Although this need can be met by various forms of dispatchable capacity such as natural gas with CCS,it becomes increasingly expensive if these assets are utiliz

297、ed only infrequently.Low carbon hydrogen(together with hydrogen storage)can provide an alternative source of LDES.As with dispatchable thermal power,low carbon hydrogen accounts for only a small share of power generation in Net Zero less than 2%in 2050 but its value comes from the additional resilie

298、nce it provides.6061bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionLow carbon hydrogenThe role of low carbon hydrogen depends on the speed of the energy transitionGrowth of low carbon hydrogen is largely concentrated in regional markets,but with some global seaborne tradeTransport hydro

299、gen-derivedfuelsPowerBuildingsBlue hydrogenGreen hydrogenBiogenic hydrogenFeedstocksIndustryTransport direct use2035205020352050CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero050100150200250300350400CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero0501001502002503003504006263bp Energy Outlook:2024 e

300、ditionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsLow carbon hydrogenMtMtLow carbon hydrogen demand by sectorLow carbon hydrogen supplyThe role of low carbon hydrogen depends on the speed of the energy transitionLow carbon hydrogen complements the growing electrification of the energy system through its

301、 use in processes and activities in industry and transport that are hard to electrify and as a source of long-duration energy storage in power markets.The higher cost of low carbon hydrogen relative to fossil fuel alternatives means its significance in the global energy system depends on the pace of

302、 the energy transition.The role of low carbon hydrogen is most pronounced in Net Zero,where it is supported by policies spurring a faster decarbonization pathway.Even then,much of the growth occurs in the second half of the outlook after easier-to-abate processes have been decarbonized and the cost

303、of producing low carbon hydrogen has declined sufficiently from scaling up processes and manufacturing.The use of low carbon hydrogen grows to around 90 Mtpa by 2035 in Net Zero before accelerating to reach around 390 Mtpa by 2050.The role of low carbon hydrogen in Current Trajectory is more limited

304、,increasing to a little less than 20 Mtpa by 2035 and to around 85 Mtpa by 2050.The initial growth of low carbon hydrogen is concentrated in its use as a feedstock in refining and in the production of ammonia and methanol for fertiliser and petrochemicals,displacing the current hydrogen feedstock pr

305、oduced from unabated natural gas(grey hydrogen)and coal(black or brown hydrogen).Use also grows in transport,especially in the form of hydrogen-derived fuels(ammonia and methanol)for long-distance marine transportation.Demand accelerates in the second half of the outlook,especially in Net Zero,as th

306、e importance of low carbon hydrogen as an energy source in industry and transport increases and overtakes its role as an industrial feedstock.In industry,hydrogen is used in iron and steelmaking as both a reducing agent and an energy source,as well as to fuel high-temperature processes in other part

307、s of heavy industry.In transport,low carbon hydrogen plays an important role,alongside bioenergy feedstocks,in producing synthetic jet fuel to help decarbonize aviation,as well as hydrogen-derived marine fuels(ammonia and methanol).The production of these hydrogen-derived fuels requires carbon neutr

308、al CO2 sources.These can be derived from either biogenic sources or from direct air capture(see pages 68-69).Low carbon hydrogen,together with the buildout of hydrogen storage capacity,also plays a small but important role in helping to balance power systems in some regions,accounting for around 15%

309、of low carbon hydrogen use in Net Zero by 2050.(see pages 58-59).Low carbon hydrogen is produced primarily from a combination of green hydrogen made via electrolysis using renewable power and blue hydrogen made from natural gas(and coal)with the associated carbon emissions captured and stored.Blue h

310、ydrogen starts with a cost advantage relative to green hydrogen and this persists in many regions over the outlook,although it diminishes over time.But the relative costs of production vary significantly across different regions depending on access to natural gas(and coal)and suitable CO2 storage si

311、tes for blue hydrogen,and to sufficiently advantaged renewable resources for green hydrogen.Because hydrogen is costly to transport(see pages 64-65),particularly over longer distances,these relative cost and resource differences,along with policy variations,result in green hydrogen dominating in som

312、e regions while blue dominates in others.By 2050 around 60%of low carbon hydrogen in Net Zero takes the form of green hydrogen,which dominates production in both China and India.Much of the remainder is provided by blue hydrogen derived largely from natural gas,especially in the Middle East and the

313、US,which has a significant global footprint in the production of both blue and green hydrogen.Transport hydrogen-derived fuels include hydrogen used to produce methanol and ammonia in marine and synthetic jet and diesel fuel.Hydrogen-derived fuels transportHydrogenderivatives industryPure hydrogenHy

314、drogen-derived fuels transportHydrogenderivatives powerHydrogenderivatives industryPure hydrogen20352050CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero051015202530354020352050CurrentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero05101520253035406465bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 edi

315、tionKey pointsLow carbon hydrogenMtMtEU low carbon hydrogen demandDeveloped Asia low carbon hydrogen demandHydrogen-derived fuels-transport include hydrogen used to produce methanol and ammonia in marine and synthetic jet and diesel fuel.Hydrogen derivatives-industry include hydrogen used to produce

316、 methanol and ammonia in chemicals and direct reduced iron.Pure hydrogen includes use in refining,industry,power,buildings,and direct use in transport.Developed Asia comprises developed economies in Asia and is dominated by Japan,South Korea and Singapore.Growth of low carbon hydrogen is largely con

317、centrated in regional markets,but with some global seaborne tradeThe relatively high cost of transporting hydrogen,especially in its pure form,means that trade in low carbon hydrogen is concentrated in relatively localised,regional markets.But some global trade develops over the outlook,including to

318、 the key importing regions of the EU and developed Asian economies,dominated by Japan,South Korea and Singapore,with the major exporting regions including the US,the Middle East,and Australia.Hydrogen demand in the EU grows to around 5-10 Mtpa by 2035 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero,of which arou

319、nd half is used in the form of pure hydrogen.This pure hydrogen is used as a feedstock in refining,to fuel high-temperature heat processes in industry,in buildings,and in transport,in particular for heavy-duty trucking.The cost and difficulty of transporting hydrogen in its pure form,especially over

320、 longer distances,means this demand is met by a combination of domestic production and pipeline supplies from North Africa and parts of Northern Europe and the Nordic countries.The remaining EU hydrogen demand in 2035 takes the form of hydrogen derivatives,particularly ammonia,and to a lesser extent

321、 methanol,for use in chemicals and long-distance marine transportation.Demand for synthetic jet fuel accounts for much of the remaining demand for hydrogen derivatives,especially in Net Zero,along with hydrogen-based direct reduced iron(DRI),used in the production of low carbon steel.These derivativ

322、es are less costly to transport via seaborne transport than pure hydrogen,so some of this demand is met through imports.The EUs use of low carbon hydrogen accelerates to around 15 and 40 Mtpa by 2050 in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.The growing importance of hydrogen-derived fuels for

323、 transport,especially synthetic jet fuel in Net Zero,means that the share of EU hydrogen demand that is used in its pure form declines to between 40%and 25%in Current Trajectory and Net Zero respectively.As a result,by 2050 an increasing share of the EUs hydrogen demand is met via seaborne imports.T

324、he other key regional centre for hydrogen imports is developed Asian economies,which is dominated by Japan,Korea and Singapore.The increase in hydrogen demand in developed Asian economies in the two scenarios is broadly similar to that in the EU.However,the mix of hydrogen demand,particularly by 205

325、0 in Net Zero,is somewhat different from the EU,with a smaller role for synthetic jet fuel and greater demand for pure hydrogen,methanol and ammonia,the latter two driven by greater use in marine.Higher ammonia demand is also driven by use in the power sector.In contrast to the EU,Japan and Korea do

326、 not have access to pipeline imports of low carbon hydrogen.Some low carbon hydrogen is produced domestically,but most of the demand is met by seaborne imports of hydrogen derivatives,of which some are converted back for use as pure hydrogen.6667bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 e

327、ditionCarbon mitigation and removalsCarbon capture,use and storage plays an important role in supporting deep decarbonization pathwaysIndustrialprocessemissionsDACCSDACCUGasCoalBECCSGaswithCCUSCoalwithoutCCUSGaswithoutCCUSCoalwithCCUS20222050,Net ZeroGasCoalGasCoal02040608010012014016018020352050Cur

328、rentTrajectoryNetZeroCurrentTrajectoryNetZero0123456786869bp Energy Outlook:2024 editionbp Energy Outlook:2024 editionKey pointsCarbon mitigationand removalsGt of CO2EJCarbon capture,use and storage by emissions sourceGas and coal consumption,abated and unabatedBECCS:Bioenergy with carbon capture an

329、d storage.DACCS:Direct air carbon capture and storage.DACCU:Direct air carbon capture and use.This includes use as a source of carbon neutral CO2 for hydrogen-derived fuels such as synthetic jet fuel.Carbon capture,use and storage plays an important role in supporting deep decarbonization pathwaysCC

330、US plays a central role in enabling the transition to a low carbon energy system:capturing industrial process emissions,enabling energy-based carbon dioxide removal,and abating emissions from the use of natural gas and coal.The extra cost associated with adding CCUS to industrial and energy processe

331、s means it plays a more substantive role in Net Zero,where it is supported by a range of policies incentivising the energy transition.Even for Net Zero,long project lead times mean that most of the CCUS capacity is built out in the second half of the outlook.CCUS reaches a little over 1 GtCO2 by 203

332、5 in Net Zero,before accelerating to around 7 GtCO2 by 2050.Around 60%of total CCUS deployment in Net Zero in 2050 is in China,India,and other developing economies,which require a very rapid scale-up relative to current deployment levels and past experience in oil and natural gas production.The impo

333、rtance of CCUS in Net Zero stems partly from its ability to capture industrial process emissions and to enable energy-based CDR,neither of which can be replicated or achieved through other methods.These two functions account for around 40%of CCUS capacity by 2050.The use of CCUS in industry is particularly important for capturing process emissions from cement manufacturing.These emissions account