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1、World Energy Outlook Special ReportAccelerating Just Transitions for the Coal SectorStrategies for rapid,secure and people-centred changeINTERNATIONAL ENERGYAGENCYIEA member countries:Australia Austria BelgiumCanadaCzech Republic DenmarkEstoniaFinland France Germany Greece HungaryIreland ItalyJapanK

2、oreaLithuania Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand NorwayPoland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Republic of Trkiye United Kingdom United StatesThe European Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:Argentina BrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaKeny

3、aMoroccoSenegalSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraineThe IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advoc

4、ates policies that will enhance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries,13 association countries and beyond.This publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of inter

5、national frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.org Acknowledgements 3 Acknowledgements This study was prepared by the Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks and was designed and directed by Laura C

6、ozzi,Director for Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks.Daniel Wetzel,Head of the Tracking Sustainable Transitions Unit and Caleigh Andrews co-ordinated the production of the report.Principal authors of the report include:Yasmine Arsalane(economic outlook,power),Tanguy de Bienassis(investment and f

7、inance),Carlos Fernndez Alvarez(coal),Christophe McGlade(supply),Matthieu Prin(people-centred transitions),Thomas Spencer(climate and environment),Ryota Taniguchi(policy commitments,power),Brent Wanner(power),and Peter Zeniewski(investment).Reka Koczka and Marina Dos Santos provided essential suppor

8、t.Trevor Morgan provided writing support to the report and carried editorial responsibility.Other valuable contributions were made by:Yunyou Chen,Ekko Chua,Julie Dallard,Shobhan Dhir,Eric Fabozzi,Mathilde Fajardy,Bruno Idini,Nikolaos Papastefanakis,Alessio Pastore,Diana Perez Sanchez,Ryszard Popsiec

9、h,Arthur Roge,Rebecca Ruff,Gabriel Saive,Max Schoenfisch,Leonie Staas,Jun Takashiro and Cecilia Tam.Erin Crum was the copy-editor.Valuable comments and feedback were provided by other senior management and numerous colleagues within the IEA,in particular,Tim Gould,Keisuke Sadamori,Pablo Hevia-Koch,B

10、rian Motherway,Dennis Hesseling,and Timur Gl.Thanks go to the IEAs Communications and Digital Office for their help in producing the report and website materials,particularly Poeli Bojorquez,Curtis Brainard,Jon Custer,Hortense De Roffignac,Astrid Dumond,Merve Erdem,Grace Gordon,Jethro Mullen,Isabell

11、e Nonain-Semelin,Julie Puech,Clara Vallois and Therese Walsh.IEAs Office of the Legal Counsel,Office of Management and Administration and Energy Data Centre provided assistance throughout the preparation of the report.The work was supported by the Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry of the Govern

12、ment of Japan.A consultation workshop was held at the beginning of December 2023 with representatives from the governments of the G7,Colombia and Indonesia.Other participants included representatives from the International Labour Organization,the Powering Past Coal Alliance,and other non-governmenta

13、l organisations and academia.These participants offered valuable insights and feedback for this analysis and we are grateful for their input.The work reflects the views of the International Energy Agency Secretariat but does not necessarily reflect those of individual IEA member countries or of any

14、particular funder,supporter or collaborator.None of the IEA or any funder,supporter or collaborator that contributed to this work makes any representation or warranty,express or implied,in respect of the works contents(including its completeness or accuracy)and shall not be responsible for any use o

15、f,or reliance on,the work.IEA.CC BY 4.0.4 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any

16、territory,city or area.Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to:Laura Cozzi Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks International Energy Agency 9,rue de la Fdration 75739 Paris Cedex 15 France E-mail:weoiea.org Web:www.iea.org/weo.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Table of Contents 5

17、Table of Contents Acknowledgements.3 Executive summary.7 Introduction.11 The context 13 1.1 Trends in coal use,production and emissions.14 1.1.1 Historical trends.14 1.1.2 Outlook.16 1.2 Coal phase-out targets.19 1.3 Coal dependence.23 Managing the transition to low-emissions power 27 2.1 Policy app

18、roaches.28 2.2 Scaling up alternative low-emissions power sources.29 2.3 Tackling emissions from existing coal plants.31 2.3.1 Repurposing for flexibility.32 2.3.2 Retrofitting with CCUS.34 2.3.3 Co-firing with clean fuels.36 2.3.4 Retiring plants and converting sites.38 2.4 Ensuring electricity sec

19、urity.40 Financing the shift away from coal 43 3.1 Investment needs.44 3.1.1 Clean power sector investment.44 3.1.2 Unrecovered capital risks for coal plants.45 3.2 Sources and types of finance.47 3.3 Policies to restrict financing of coal plants.48 3.4 Policies to bring forward the retirement of co

20、al plants.51 3.4.1 Nationalise or buy out plants.52 3.4.2 Monetise emissions reductions through carbon pricing.53 3.4.3 Organise auctions.54 3.4.4 Customer-backed securitisation.54 3.4.5 Sustainability-linked bonds.55 3.4.6 Accelerated depreciation.56 3.4.7 Concessional debt and refinancing.56 1 2 3

21、 IEA.CC BY 4.0.6 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions Policies for people-centred and just transitions 57 4.1 Developing a framework for applying best practices.58 4.2 Addressing shifts in employment.60 4.2.1 Current and projected jobs.60 4.2.2 Labour policy measures.62 4.2.3 Su

22、pport for economic diversification.66 4.3 Making electricity affordable.67 4.3.1 Cost of supply.67 4.3.2 Impact on affordability for consumers.68 Annexes Annex A.Definitions.71 Annex C.References.91 4 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 7 Executive Summary In 2022,the IEA published its special report Co

23、al in Net Zero Transitions.Since then,the policy and technology landscape continues to evolve.At the end of 2023,the 28th Conference of the Parties(COP28)to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)called for“transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems,”including t

24、he specific call for parties to begin“accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power”.This report,developed at the request of the Japanese Group of Seven(G7)Presidency,presents an update to our 2022 report,building on the analysis developed in the original report and complementin

25、g it with the latest data and scenarios from the IEA.Net zero requires a rapid transition away from unabated coal-fired power Achieving the goal adopted at COP28 of net zero emissions of greenhouse gases from the energy sector by 2050 hinges critically on the rapid transition away from the unabated

26、use of coal for generating electricity.The scale of the task cannot be overstated:coal accounts for over one-third of global power supply,in many cases from recently built plants.As the most carbon-intensive fuel,coals role in emissions is even bigger:globally,coal is responsible for over 40%of all

27、energy sector CO2 emissions.If existing coal power plants and industries were to continue to operate as they do today,they would“lock in”emissions pushing the world well beyond the 1.5 C limit.Global coal demand grew in 2023,despite rapid growth in renewables-based power generation.The largest uptic

28、k was observed in the Peoples Republic of China(hereafter,“China”),followed by India and other emerging and developing economies.Growing use of coal,mainly for power,has accounted for nearly all the increase in global CO2 emissions since 2019.According to the latest IEA estimates,clean energy deploy

29、ment since 2019 has helped to avoid coal demand of around 580 million tonnes of coal equivalent per year on average equivalent to the coal demand for power generation of Indonesia and India combined.A growing number of countries have adopted net zero emissions pledges,which is tantamount to phasing

30、out completely the unabated use of coal and other fossil fuels.At the end of 2023,those pledges covered more than 85%of global energy sector emissions.More and more countries have also made specific commitments to phase down or out the use of unabated coal in power,covering 30%of current coal-fired

31、generation up from less than 20%in 2022.Coal transitions hinge upon a fast scale-up of low-emissions power sources Reducing reliance on unabated coal-fired power generation is possible only if alternative sources of power are developed quickly enough to meet rising electricity demand.In the Announce

32、d Pledges Scenario(APS),where all climate commitments made by governments worldwide are met in full and on time,nearly 75%of the drop in global coal-fired generation over 2022-2050 is compensated for by solar PV and wind power,followed by hydropower and other renewables and nuclear.At COP28,governme

33、nts committed to tripling renewable capacity by 2030 in line with the IEAs Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario,which if achieved,would be a crucial accelerant in the transition away from coal powered generation.The latest assessment of the announced pipeline of renewable power projects indicates tha

34、t if these IEA.CC BY 4.0.8 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions come to fruition,the world would already be nearly three-quarters of the way to the tripling target.However,critical investment gaps persist in many emerging market and developing economies.Shifting coal plants from

35、 baseload generation to more flexible operation will reduce coal use while supporting the integration of alternative sources of electricity generation.This would lower emissions while preserving electricity security and can reduce the near-term impacts on jobs and the local economy.In the APS,the ca

36、pacity factor of coal plants in emerging market and developing economies falls from around 55%in 2022 to around 45%in 2030,and around 40%in 2040.Alongside repurposing these plants towards providing grid support,countries should align their grid operation protocols and compensation schemes to encoura

37、ge coal plants to operate more flexibly,which can also help offset the revenue losses associated with lower capacity factors.Some plants are also retired before their technical lifetimes,while others are retrofitted with carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS)technology or co-fired with low-emi

38、ssions fuels such as ammonia or biomass.The potential for adopting these approaches varies by country,and could consider a blend of direct regulation,financial incentives and market-based measures.New approaches are needed to speed up the financing of coal transitions Favourable economics for renewa

39、bles will not,on their own,be sufficient to achieve the rapid transition away from coal power.In many regions,new renewables offer lower levelised costs of energy than the cost of operating existing coal plants.However,this is not the case everywhere,and in some regions coal plants have contract or

40、dispatch agreements which shield them from market competition.Addressing these barriers and incentivising investment in low-emissions power is imperative to unlock the transition away from unabated coal power and the full potential of renewables.Over 2023-2030 in the APS,USD 890 billion needs to be

41、invested annually in low-emissions power capacity and support,such as grids and battery storage,with around a third of new low-emissions power capacity additions dedicated to replacing coal generation,instead of meeting incremental demand.Mobilising this investment depends critically on bringing in

42、more private sector investment,and finding the right financing mechanisms that address the problems posed by todays high interest rate environment,particularly in emerging and developing economies.Policies to facilitate the financing of clean energy must go hand-in-hand with measures to end financin

43、g for new coal power and to finance the early retirement of some coal assets.Over 2023-2030,around 20 gigawatts of coal power plants operating today are retired before they reach 30 years in the APS.For many of these plants,especially in the emerging market and developing economies,large amounts of

44、capital invested in them have yet to be recovered.There is no single blueprint for phasing out coal-fired generation.A variety of innovative financing mechanisms are under development to help shorten payback periods,refinance and restructure debt,and adjust contract terms in ways that avoid undermin

45、ing investor confidence.In many regions,such policies must take account of the role currently played by coal in ensuring security of supply.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 9 Coal transitions can be achieved affordably Maintaining affordable electricity prices throughout the transition is paramount.I

46、n the APS,power sector investments climb steeply to 2030,but the costs of replacing coal generation and the system services it provides with low-emissions sources are more than offset by the fuel cost savings from reduced fossil fuel demand in the longer term.Appropriate policy frameworks can help e

47、nsure that the costs of these investments are recovered over a longer period,helping reduce the impact on the average cost per unit.In the APS,average electricity prices worldwide decline by over one-fifth between 2022 and 2050,though savings vary by region according to initial levels,carbon pricing

48、 and growth in electricity demand.Policies to transition away from coal power must be people-centred and just Accelerating coal transitions will impact workers and communities that depend on coal.For that reason,comprehensive stakeholder engagement and a set of policies to manage negative impacts,in

49、cluding on energy affordability,energy access and socioeconomic development,are essential.These need to cover the creation of decent work opportunities,support for workers affected by energy transitions and respect for fundamental labour principles and rights.Several countries,including Canada,the C

50、zech Republic,Germany,Spain and South Africa,have convened national task forces or commissions to evaluate the socio-economic effects of coal transitions.The IEA has established its Global Commission on People-Centred Clean Energy Transitions to codify best practices.National pledges to cut emission

51、s and decarbonise power generation,if fully implemented,would inevitably lead to job losses in the coal sector,especially in mining.In the APS,total coal employment declines from 7.8 million people worldwide today to 5.6 million in 2030.Just over half of those job losses result from a fall in coal p

52、roduction,with the remainder attributable to mechanisation,automation and other improvements in labour productivity.Declines in coal employment have been navigated in the past in parts of Europe and North America,and more recently in China.Managing the economic and social consequences of coal transi

53、tions is vital to enduring progress on reducing energy sector emissions.New policy approaches are proving effective,including short-term income support,education and training,and new career opportunities for coal workers who are made redundant.At the end of 2023,just 14%of coal workers in coal-depen

54、dent countries were covered by such just transition policies,though this represents an improvement of 10 percentage points over 2022.The social and economic impacts of transitioning away from the use of coal for power generation vary widely across and within countries,according to resource endowment

55、s,the structure of the economy,level of economic development,and the importance of the coal industry to local labour markets.National exposure to coal,as measured by our Coal Transition Exposure Index(CTEI),is highest in Indonesia,followed by Mongolia,China,Viet Nam,India and South Africa.Many coal

56、regions in those and other emerging economies are characterised by low levels of economic diversification,limiting opportunities for alternative activities and jobs.Coal transition policies must seek to cushion the impact of job losses while IEA.CC BY 4.0.10 International Energy Agency|Accelerating

57、coal transitions supporting economic development through measures such as industrialisation or environmental rehabilitation initiatives.Co-ordinated efforts are needed to accelerate coal transitions around the world Commitments to transition away from unabated coal use for power set a direction;conc

58、rete policies are needed to meet them.Reaching long-term net zero goals requires unambiguous policy settings and near-term targets,which should be reflected in upcoming NDCs.While each countrys circumstances vary,the global pledge to triple renewables and double efficiency by 2030 implies a coal tra

59、nsition,but this itself does not guarantee the reductions in coal emissions needed to be aligned with meeting national climate ambitions nor our collective target of limiting warming to 1.5o C,underscoring the enduring importance of a dedicated focus on facilitating the global transition away from c

60、oal.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Introduction 11 Introduction Coal,which is used mainly for generating electricity,is the most carbon-intensive major fossil fuel in use today and currently emits more CO2 globally than either oil or gas.Reaching net zero emissions therefore requires cutting emissions from coal in p

61、ower stations drastically in the near term.Achieving this will not be easy:coal remains a fundamental source of electricity generation in many regions,accounting for well over one-third of power supply and around one-quarter of total energy supply worldwide.Though coal demand has remained broadly st

62、able over the last decade,coal-fired generation rebounded to record highs in 2021,2022 and 2023 as the world economy recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic.Moreover,several countries have announced plans to expand the use of coal,at least temporarily,in response to concerns about the availability and

63、price of natural gas in the wake of the Russian Federations invasion of Ukraine.Policy action to bring about a rapid transition away from coal-fired power generation must be grounded in an understanding of the factors underpinning the continuing heavy reliance on this fuel.Although its price in glob

64、al markets rose sharply in 2022,it has since fallen back substantially.Coal has long been a relatively cheap fuel in many markets and its position in the electricity sector is often shielded from market competition by long-term power purchase agreements which have been used to rapidly expand power g

65、eneration capacity in many developing economies over the last two decades.In addition,many coal-reliant economies see coal as an important pillar of their energy security and independence because they possess substantial domestic coal resources but have historically lacked significant and easily acc

66、essible alternative energy sources,although that is now changing with the competitiveness and wide availability of solar PV and wind energy.As a result,the global fleet of coal power plants has grown rapidly in the last two decades.Several emerging market and developing economies now have very young

67、 fleets of coal-fired power stations.Large amounts of capital investment have yet to be recovered from their operations,so shutting them down early could have major financial repercussions.The broader social and economic impact of phasing out coal will also be substantial.An estimated 7.8 million pe

68、ople are now employed in coal production,processing,transport and power generation around the world.Phasing out coal use will have far-reaching effects on the welfare of communities where those activities form an important part of the economic and social fabric.In 2023 alone,significant progress was

69、 made in commitments to a transition away from coal.The Powering Past Coal Alliance gained 14 new members who committed to develop no new unabated coal-fired power plants and to phase out existing unabated plants,including the United States,which currently possesses the third-largest operational coa

70、l fleet by capacity.Japan also pledged to stop building unabated coal-fired power plants,and France announced that it will phase out all coal-fired plants by 2027 in addition to calling for a phase-out of unabated coal in Group of Seven(G7)countries by 2030.At the 28th Conference of the Parties(COP2

71、8)to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)in December 2023,around 130 parties joined the Global Pledge on Tripling Renewable Energy and Doubling Energy Efficiency,which also includes a commitment to stop building new unabated coal-fired power plants.Just Energy Transition

72、 Partnerships(JETP)also made some headway as Indonesia and the International Partners Group agreed to the Comprehensive IEA.CC BY 4.0.12 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions Investment and Policy Plan.But faster progress yet is needed to realise the rapid and drastic cut in coal

73、 emissions required to achieve net zero emissions by 2050.This report,which draws on the latest IEA scenarios and data,as well as on the analysis and framing of our Coal in Net Zero Transitions report released in 2022,was requested by the G7 Presidency of Japan and benefited from a workshop of indus

74、try stakeholders hosted by the IEA in December 2023.It identifies the main strategies and specific measures that governments around the world will need to consider putting in motion to bring about a rapid transition away from unabated coal-fired power generation while maintaining energy security and

75、 protecting local communities.The appropriate mix of measures in each country depends on national circumstances,notably the level of economic development.Several case studies are included to demonstrate successful policies to reduce reliance on coal for power and manage the socio-economic consequenc

76、es.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|The context 13 Chapter 1 The context Turning a tanker Global coal demand has been broadly flat over the last decade,with the fuelaccounting for about 25%of total energy supply in 2023.China dominates the market for coal,accounting for over 55%of world demand and more than

77、half of globaloutput,though growth in production slowed in 2023.India is also a notable user ofcoal with over 10%of all demand.Other emerging and developing economies(EMDE)account for 15%of global demand,with demand growth beginning to taper in recentyears.Demand from advanced economies is just 15%o

78、f the global total,down fromhalf in 2000 and continuing to drop.Coal is the largest source of electricity,and power generation is the biggest user of coal,making up twothirds of the market.Coal demand starts to fall back over the rest of the current decade in all threescenarios as countries reorient

79、 towards loweremissions power sources,though thepace of decline depends on the stringency of climate policies.In the Stated PoliciesScenario(STEPS),demand falls by over 15%over 20232030 and by 40%to 2050.Inthe Announced Policies Scenario(APS),it falls by around 25%to 2030 and by nearly75%to 2050 as

80、renewables drive down the use of coal in power.In the Net ZeroEmissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario,demand falls by 45%to 2030 and by 90%to 2050;by 2040,there is no unabated coal power anywhere in the world.A growing number of countries have adopted net zero emissions pledges,whichrequire very deep reducti

81、ons in the use of unabated coal and other fossil fuels.At the end of 2023,those pledges covered more than 85%of global energy sector emissions.Some countries have made specific commitments to phase down or out the use ofunabated coal,usually in the power sector.At the end of 2023,80 countries hadagr

82、eed to phase out coal or to develop no new unabated coal power,collectivelyaccounting for 30%of current coalfired generation,up from less than 20%in 2022.The nature and size of the effects of transitioning away from coal in power generation vary widely across and within countries,mainly according to

83、 indigenous resourceendowments,the share of coal in the fuel mix,the structure of the economy,andlabour markets.National exposure to coal is highest in Indonesia,followed byMongolia,China,Viet Nam,India and South Africa.The potential impact of falling coal production depends on the overall level ofe

84、conomic development,which affects opportunities for alternative activities andemployment.Today,many coal regions in emerging and developing economies arenot diversified.Transition policies have the dual task of cushioning the impact of thedeclining jobs while also supporting economic development in

85、coal communities.S U M M A R YIEA.CC BY 4.0.14 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 1.1 Trends in coal use,production and emissions 1.1.1 Historical trends Global demand for coal has been broadly stable for over a decade,with the fuel accounting for just over a quarter of the wo

86、rlds total energy supply in 2023 the secondlargest energy source after oil.Demand grew by just 0.3%per year between 2010 and 2020,compared with 4.7%over the previous decade.It fell sharply in 2020 because of the Covid19 pandemic but bounced back by 11.2%between 2020 and 2023 as the world economy rec

87、overed from the impact of the pandemic and the surge in gas prices following the Russian Federations(hereafter,“Russia”)invasion of Ukraine,which outstripped that in coal prices and boosted the competitiveness of coal in power generation(Figure 1.1).Prices subsequently fell back but remain above the

88、ir longterm level.Figure 1.1 Wholesale fossil energy prices in selected markets IEA.CC BY 4.0.Russias invasion of Ukraine exacerbated pre-existing tightness in energy markets,resulting in a full-blown global energy crisis,though coal prices generally rose less than those of gas Notes:MBtu=million Br

89、itish thermal units;t=tonne.The Peoples Republic of China(hereafter,“China”)dominates the global market for coal to a much greater degree than for any other fuel,accounting for 58%of world demand(Figure 1.2)and driving growth through the 2010s.Chinas electricity sector alone is responsible for over

90、onethird of global coal demand.China is also the largest coal producer by far,accounting for over half of global output,and is the largest coal importer.China has seen impressive deployment of clean energy technologies over the last decade or so.As a result,demand for coal is beginning to flatten in

91、 China,but coal still accounted for around 60%of its energy supply and electricity generation in 2023.India is the secondbiggest single coal consumer,accounting for 12%of world coal demand.Like China,India has a population of 40 80 120 160Jan2019Sept2023BrentOil(USD/barrel)20 40 60 80Jan2019Sept2023

92、EuropeUnited StatesNatural gas(USD/MBtu)100 200 300 400Jan2019Sept2023EuropeJapanCoal(USD/t)IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|The context 15 1 around 1.4 billion people,but its per capita energy demand is onequarter that of Chinas,reflecting lower GDP per capita.As in China,coal is the cornerstone of electric

93、ity generation in India,accounting for around threequarters of total generation.Together,China and India account for over twothirds of global coal demand.Figure 1.2 Coal demand in total and per capita by country/region IEA.CC BY 4.0.Emerging market and developing economies now account for 85%of glob

94、al coal demand,with China and India alone responsible for over two-thirds Notes:Mtce=million tonnes of coal equivalent;tce=tonne of coal equivalent.Other EMDE=emerging market and developing economies excluding China and India;Other AE=advanced economies excluding the United States and the European U

95、nion.Other emerging market and developing economies accounted for 15%of global demand in 2023,resulting in a total share for emerging and developing economies of 85%up from 52%in 2000.Coal demand in advanced economies has declined by almost half over the same period equivalent in absolute terms to a

96、lmost the total current coal demand of India.The United States accounts for about 5%of global coal use and the European Union for about 3%.Power generation remains the biggest driver of global coal demand,making up twothirds of the market.Although lowemissions sources of electricity generation as a

97、group have recently overtaken it,coal is still the single largest source of electricity,meeting 36%of total generation.The share of coal in the generation mix has been declining slowly in recent years,while the share of electricity in total energy has been steadily increasing:since 1980,global total

98、 energy supply has increased by less than 2%per year on average whereas electricity demand has risen by almost 4%per year.The decline in the share of coal in electricity generation has been slower than the increase in electricity generation,and the output of coalfired electricity has continued to in

99、crease.The global fleet of coalfired power plants is relatively young,particularly in developing Asia,following a surge of capacity additions since the beginning of the century.2 0004 0006 000200020102023MtceChinaIndiaOther EMDEUnited StatesEuropean UnionOther AECoal demand by region123200020102023t

100、ceDemand per capitaIEA.CC BY 4.0.16 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions Since 2010,advanced economies have witnessed a 40%decline in emissions from coalfired power generation.About half of this fall in emissions was achieved by retiring coalfired capacity,with the other half mo

101、stly due to reducing plant load factors(Figure 1.3).However,the decrease in emissions from advanced economies has been more than offset by an increase from emerging and developing economies,where soaring electricity demand and insufficient growth in clean energy supply have motivated additions of co

102、alfired capacity and limited the scope for reducing coal plant load factors.Figure 1.3 Changes in emissions from coal-fired power generation by region and causal factor,2010-2022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Reducing plant load factors and retiring coal-fired capacity have contributed equally to reduced emissions

103、from coal-fired power generation in advanced economies since 2010 Note:Gt=gigatonne.1.1.2 Outlook The projections of coal use,production and emissions presented here are based on the three main scenarios developed for the most recent World Energy Outlook(WEO),published in October 2023,and based on t

104、he IEA Global Energy and Climate Model(IEA,2023a):The Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS),which considers established and announcedpolicies and regulations.The Announced Pledges Scenario(APS),which assumes that all climate commitmentsmade by governments around the world,including nationally determined c

105、ontributions under the Paris Agreement and longterm net zero emissions pledges,are met in fulland on time,regardless of whether those commitments are currently underpinned bydetailed implementation laws,policies and regulations.As of the end of 2023,56 countries had pledged to phase out unabated coa

106、l use altogether,and another 28had pledged to stop building unabated coal power plants.1 2 3 420102022Advanced economiesGt CO2 2 4 6 820102022COl intensity ofcoalAverage plantefficiencyAverage loadfactorNet retirements ofcoalfired capacityNet additions ofcoalfired capacityEMDECO2IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapte

107、r 1|The context 17 1 The Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario,which sets out a narrow but achievable pathway for the global energy sector to achieve net zero CO2 emissions by 2050.In thisscenario,advanced economies take the lead,but all regions achieve very rapidreductions in emissions,with resid

108、ual global emissions in 2050 being offset by negativeemissions using carbon removal technologies.Each scenario sees a structural decline in coal demand over the rest of the current decade,though the pace of this decline varies according to the stringency and effectiveness of climate policies.In the

109、STEPS,global coal demand falls by just over 15%between 2023 and 2030 and by more than 40%to 2050(Figure 1.4).The reduction to 2030 occurs in the power sector and in advanced economies and China,while demand stays relatively stable in other emerging and developing economies and increases modestly in

110、industry.In the APS,total coal demand falls by a quarter to 2030 and by nearly 75%to 2050,driven mainly by declines in the electricity sector,where renewables and other lowemissions sources expand and displace coal.Coal use in electricity falls by almost 30%to 2030 and by 75%to 2050 in the APS,with

111、the drop steepest in advanced economies.In the NZE Scenario,global coal demand falls by 45%to 2030 and by 90%to 2050,again led by the electricity sector,where global coal use declines by over 50%between 2023 and 2030 as lowemissions sources of generation ramp up significantly.By 2040,there is no use

112、 of unabated coal for electricity generation anywhere in the world.Figure 1.4 Global coal demand by sector and scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Coal use falls in all scenarios to 2050 by over 70%in the APS and 90%in the NZE Scenario according to the stringency of climate policies,with the power sector leading

113、 the decline Notes:Other includes the small amounts of coal consumed in the buildings and transport sectors,and in other energy transformation.Power includes both electricity and heat production.The projected declines in global coal demand are matched by falls in production in all IEA scenarios.In t

114、he APS,no new coal mines are needed in aggregate to meet demand,though 1 0002 0003 0004 0005 0006 0002000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050Total coal demandMtceSTEPS APS NZE STEPS APS NZEOtherIndustryPowerCoal demand by sector202220302050STEPSAPSNZEIEA.CC BY 4.0.18 International Energy Agency|Accelerating co

115、al transitions existing mines need to be carefully managed to ensure timely supply(Figure 1.5).In advanced economies,coal consumption falls rapidly,with existing mines progressively shutting down as they reach the end of their economic lifetimes.In China,production peaks in the near term in response

116、 to current market conditions,then falls as demand for heavy industry output declines and as clean energy technologies are more widely deployed.In India,coal production increases by 3%between 2022 and 2030 but then drops by around 60%between 2030 and 2050.In the NZE Scenario,demand falls by 90%over

117、20232050,eliminating any need for new coal mines or mine lifetime extensions.Investment in coal supply in this scenario falls by over 70%from 20232030 and is focused on maintaining production and reducing emissions intensity as much as possible at existing mines as they wind down,including by cuttin

118、g fugitive coal mine methane emissions.Figure 1.5 Coal production by country/region and scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Coal demand declines rapidly in all regions in the APS and the NZE Scenario,such that no new coal mines are needed Global CO2 emissions from coal burning fall in all three scenarios,in line

119、 with declining coal use and,to a lesser extent,with the growing deployment of CCUS.Coal emissions exceeded 15 Gt,or 45%of total energy sector emissions,in 2023.China and India accounted for twothirds of those emissions,with the United States,the European Union,Russia,Japan,Indonesia,South Africa an

120、d Korea responsible for most of the remainder.In the STEPS,emissions from coal decline by around 2.6 Gt between 2023 and 2030(Figure 1.6).After 2030,coal emissions continue to decline,falling by an additional 4.2 Gt to 2050.In the APS,emissions from all fossil fuels decline to 2030,with coal leading

121、 the way.Coal emissions drop by nearly 30%between 2023 and 2030(around 4%per year on average compared with 2%in the STEPS),accounting for 70%of the fall in total energy sector emissions.The rate of decline accelerates to 6.5%per year over 20302050(compared with 2%in the STEPS).By 1 3002 6003 9005 20

122、06 500STEPSAPSNZEMtceAsia PacificNorth AmericaEuropeAfricaEurasiaOtherProduction in 2050 by scenario20102020203020402050Production in the APSIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|The context 19 1 2050 in the APS,emissions from coal are 80%lower than in 2023.In the NZE Scenario,emissions from all fossil fuels decl

123、ine even more rapidly.Emissions from coal drop by nearly half between 2023 and 2030,driven by the rapid rise of lowemissions sources of electricity generation,while emissions from oil and natural gas both fall by around onequarter.By 2050,there is no use of unabated coal in power generation,and only

124、 marginal use in industry,with emissions offset by removals elsewhere in the energy system.Figure 1.6 Global energy sector CO2 emissions by scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Emissions from coal burning fall in all three scenarios in line with declining coal use and,to a lesser extent,from the growing deploymen

125、t of CCUS 1.2 Coal phase-out targets A growing number of countries have adopted net zero emissions pledges,tantamount to phasing out completely the unabated use of coal and other fossil fuels.As of November 2023,93 countries and the European Union have submitted those pledges,covering more than 85%o

126、f global energyrelated emissions and nearly 90%of global GDP.Many countries have adopted a net zero target in national law,collectively accounting for about onefifth of global energy sector emissions.Advanced economies in Asia Pacific and Europe are responsible for many of these policies,with 100%of

127、 energyrelated emissions from advanced economies in Asia Pacific and about 80%in European advanced economies covered by net zero targets in national law.Most emissions in emerging and developing economies in North America,Central and South America,Eurasia and subSaharan Africa are also covered by ne

128、t zero emissions targets,but these pledges are generally verbal or otherwise not legally binding.More than 97%of global coal consumption in electricity generation occurs in countries that 100 10 20 30 402022203020502030205020302050Emissions by sourceCoalOilNatural gasOtherGt COSTEPSAPSNZE 4 8 12 16

129、2020102020203020402050Emissions by country/region in the APSChinaIndiaOther AsiaNorth AmericaEuropeRest of worldIEA.CC BY 4.0.20 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions have agreed to reduce coal use in the power sector,including those with net zero emissions pledges,albeit on diff

130、erent timescales and varying levels of legal status(Figure 1.7).Figure 1.7 Share of coal consumption covered by coal power phase-out commitments and net zero emissions pledges IEA.CC BY 4.0.Countries representing around 70%of coal consumption in power do not have specific commitments to decrease coa

131、l use,despite having net zero pledges In addition to aggregate net zero emissions pledges,an increasing number of countries,subnational regions and companies have made specific commitments to reduce or eliminate the use of unabated coal,usually in the power sector.In the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted

132、 at the 26th Conference of the Parties(COP)to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)in 2021,countries called for“accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power”.In December 2023,the central outcome of COP28 reiterated the goals of the Glasgow pact and in

133、cluded for the first time an agreement to transition away from fossil fuels,including coal.At the end of 2023,84 countries had agreed to phase out coal or to not to develop new unabated coal power plants,collectively accounting for around 30%of current coalfired generation(Figure 1.8).Several major

134、policy advances occurred in 2023,with 11 countries including the United States joining the Powering Past Coal Alliance and committing to phase out unabated coal use.Most of these countries have also adopted net zero targets.Another 12 countries have adopted net zero targets without any coalspecific

135、targets,though in practice they will need to virtually phase out unabated coal by the date of their net zero target.Together these 96 countries account for nearly all coalfired generation today,including the top five in the world(China,India,the United States,Japan and South Africa).0%20%40%60%80%10

136、0%2012 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023No commitmentNet zero emissions target but no coalcommitmentAgreed internationally to notdevelop new unabated coal powerAgreed internationally to phase outcoalNational plan to phase out coalIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|The context 21 1 Figure 1.8 Number

137、of countries with plans to phase down coal use and net zero emissions pledges IEA.CC BY 4.0.After years of growth in coal use,there are now 84 countries with explicit plans to move away from the fuel and another 12 countries that aim to reach net zero emissions Note:At endyear.Pledges to phase out c

138、oal use in power have taken the form of announcements,national plans and international initiatives.In 2017,Canada and the United Kingdom set up the Powering Past Coal Alliance(PPCA),the membership of which has since grown to 60 countries as well as 51 subnational governments and 71 global organisati

139、ons(PPCA,2024).Before its establishment,only six countries Austria,Belgium,Canada,Finland,France and the United Kingdom had pledged to phase out coal.The PPCA encourages all members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)and the European Union to phase out unabated coal by

140、 2030,and all other countries to do so by no later than 2040(PPCA,2024).Several countries also signed on to,in whole or in part,to the Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement(GCCPTS)at COP26 in November 2021(Government of the United Kingdom,2021).The GCCPTS calls for major economies to phase

141、 out coal in the 2030s(or as soon as possible thereafter)and for all other countries to do so in the 2040s(or as soon as possible thereafter),as well as stop issuing new permits for unabated coal plants and strengthen financial,technical and social support for affected communities.The Group of Seven

142、(G7)countries in 2023 also reaffirmed their commitment to phasing out unabated coalfired power in line with limiting temperature increase to 1.5 C(G7 Ministers Meeting on Climate,Energy and Environment,2023).20 40 60 80 1002012201520162017201820192020202120222023Net zero emissions target but nocoal

143、commitmentAgreed internationally to notdevelop new unabated coalpowerAgreed internationally to phaseout coalNational plan to phase out coalNumber of countriesIEA.CC BY 4.0.22 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions Figure 1.9 Share of coal in power generation and coal policies by c

144、ountry,2023 IEA.CC BY 4.0.13 of the 15 countries most reliant on coal-fired power for electricity have a national plan to phase it out,have agreed internationally to do so or have a net zero emissions target Note:Data on coal consumption is from 2021;the top 40 countries with the highest share of co

145、al in electricity generation that year are shown here.The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities.The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in th

146、e West Bank under the terms of international law.This designation is without prejudice to positions on status,and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovos declaration of independence.Other countries t

147、hat use coalfired power include(in descending order according to share of coal in the power mix):Pakistan,Madagascar,Romania,Russian Federation,the Netherlands,Denmark,Kyrgyzstan,Myanmar,Estonia,Greece,Croatia,Ireland,Hungary,Tajikistan,the Slovak Republic,Zambia,New Zealand,Senegal,Italy,Bangladesh

148、,Colombia,Canada,Finland,Mexico,Panama,Brazil,Austria,Uzbekistan,Namibia,the United Kingdom,Spain,Belgium,Argentina,Portugal,France,Singapore and Honduras.10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%BotswanaKosovoSouth AfricaMongoliaPolandIndiaMoroccoSerbiaChinaIndonesiaBosnia and HerzegovinaKazakhstanPhilippine

149、sAustraliaMalaysiaViet NamChinese TaipeiMauritiusCzechiaNorth MacedoniaMontenegroBulgariaCambodiaKoreaSri LankaJapanTrkiyeGermanyZimbabweChileDominican RepublicNigerLaosSloveniaGuatemalaUkraineIsraelUnited StatesBruneiThailandNo coalrelated commitmentsNet zero emissions target but no coal commitment

150、National plan to phase out coalAgreed Internationally to phase down coalAgreed internationally not to develop new unabatedcoal powerIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|The context 23 1 Countries that have made unabated coal phaseout commitments or have net zero emissions targets include those that have a high s

151、hare of coal in power generation today,notably Botswana(96%),India(72%),China(63%),the Philippines(58%)and Australia(53%)(Figure 1.9).As of November 2023,37 countries had incorporated coal phaseout targets with specified dates in national plans,mostly in Europe,including those with a high degree of

152、reliance on coalfired power such as Poland,the Czech Republic and Montenegro.They also include Germany,where the end date for the phaseout was recently brought forward from 2038 to 2030 for plants in the western state of North RhineWestphalia(Reuters,2022).By the end of 2023,four countries Austria,B

153、elgium,Portugal and Sweden had halted the use of coal in power generation(Beyond Fossil Fuels,2023).1.3 Coal dependence The nature and size of the effects of phasing out the use of coal for power generation vary widely between countries,mainly according to indigenous resource endowments,the share of

154、 coal in the fuel mix,the structure of the economy,and labour markets.Because of the relatively high cost of transportation,most of the coal produced around the world supplies domestic markets,so any fall in the amount of coal used within a country has a direct impact on the domestic coal industry,t

155、hough it may be economic in some present cases to export any surplus output.For example,South Africa exports a large share of its output,such that its coal industry is less affected by domestic demand.To help evaluate the magnitude of the task that countries face in achieving the transition away fro

156、m coal,the IEA has developed the Coal Transition Exposure Index(CTEI).The CTEI is made up of four components,each of which is measured using two indicators:Energy dependence on coal,quantified by its share in both total energy supply and electricity generation.This provides a broad indication of the

157、 overall impact of a phaseout of coal on the countrys energy system.The level of economic development,quantified by GDP per capita measured at PPP and total final energy consumption per capita.These indicators are proxies for a countrys future rate of energy demand growth and its financial and techn

158、ological capacities.For example,in countries with stable energy demand,the generation of 1 megawatthour(MWh)of clean energy would replace 1 MWh of fossil fuel electricity.In countries with rapidly rising energy demand,clean energy supply needs to expand as fast as demand to avoid increased coal use,

159、and even faster to reduce existing coal use.Economic dependence,measured by the share of coal in total goods exports and the share of coal produced domestically in total coal consumption.A country in which most coal needs are met through domestic production is more economically dependent on that fue

160、l than one that imports its coal for a given level of consumption.IEA.CC BY 4.0.24 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions The extent to which existing coalfired capacity is“locked in”,i.e.the amount of capacity that has not fully depreciated.This is measured by the capacityweighte

161、d age of acountrys coalfired power plants,as well as that of its integrated steel mills.To generate the index,the raw data for each of the eight indicators are normalised to assign a total score to each country.For each indicator,the country with the highest value is allocated a score of one,and the

162、 country with the lowest value receives zero.For example,Mongolia has the highest share of coal in its goods exports and therefore receives the highest score of one for this indicator,while Korea has the lowest and scores zero,with all the other countries receiving scores in between on a pro rata ba

163、sis.Normalised scores are then combined to give an aggregate score.We have calculated the CTEI for 21 countries,which together represent more than 90%of global coal production and consumption.They include the 15 largest coal producers and 15 largest coal consumers,as well as countries with particula

164、rly large energy needs and potential for growth in coal demand,such as Bangladesh and Pakistan,and countries with very large coal reserves,a high level of domestic dependency and low level of coal exports,such as Botswana and Zimbabwe.Indonesia scores highest,followed by Mongolia,China,Viet Nam,Indi

165、a and South Africa(Figure 1.10).The highestplaced OECD country is Trkiye,with a score of 3.5 compared with 5.7 for Indonesia.Figure 1.10 Coal Transitions Exposure scores,2022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Indonesia,Mongolia,China,Viet Nam,India and South Africa are most exposed to the effects of phasing out coal as

166、 part of clean energy transitions There are also substantial differences in the extent of exposure to a decline in coal demand across provinces,states and regions within countries.Coal mining is usually highly 123456CanadaUnited StatesJapanGermanyRussiaKoreaBangladeshAustraliaPolandTrkiyeKazakhstanP

167、akistanColombiaZimbabweBotswanaSouth AfricaIndiaViet NamChinaMongoliaIndonesiaNormalised CTEI scoreLockinEconomicdependenceDevelopmentgapEnergydependenceIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|The context 25 1 regionalised within a country,so the impact of phasing out the use of coal both domestically and,in the ca

168、se of exports,internationally will be much greater in mining communities.For example,the provinces of Kalimantan account for just 6%of Indonesias population,but around 90%of its coal production.Similar levels of regional concentration characterise several other major coalproducing countries,includin

169、g China and India.Mining seldom exceeds 3%of national GDP;the share is just 2%in South Africa and Indonesia two of the worlds biggest exporters and 0.6%in China.But at the regional level,it can account for a far higher share;for example,it is more than onethird in Cesar and La Guajira in Colombia.No

170、netheless,not all of the income and wealth generated remain in the region,as much of it normally accrues to the owners of the assets,which are not necessarily locally based,and to the central government as fiscal revenues.Because workers generally spend most if not all of their income locally,the sh

171、are of coal mining in local employment is a better metric to assess the importance of coal in regional economies.Coal mining typically accounts for less than 1%of national employment but can account for a much higher share in major coal mining regions.For example,the share is between 5%and 8%in Cesa

172、r in Colombia,East Kalimantan in Indonesia and Mpumalanga in South Africa.These shares are nonetheless much lower than those seen in the past in some mining regions,such as the United Kingdom(UK)and the United States,due to substantial improvements in labour productivity.For example,at its peak,coal

173、 mining accounted for 7%of total UK employment and far higher shares in the main producing regions.The potential impact of falling coal production depends on the overall level of economic development,which affects opportunities for alternative activities and employment.For example,the largescale los

174、s of coal mining jobs in Wales in the 1950s and 1960s was largely offset by rising employment in noncoal industrial sectors,such as steel and engineering.A similar trend was observed in mining regions in the United States and Germany after the Second World War.In most advanced economies,the importan

175、ce of industry in overall employment has diminished markedly over the last four decades,with a shift in employment towards services.Today,many coal mining regions in emerging and developing economies are economically underdeveloped,which is reflected in low levels of industrialisation,urbanisation a

176、nd labour productivity.For example,manufacturing employment accounts for around 8%of total employment in Jharkhand and around 5%in Chhattisgarh in India,while agriculture accounts for nearly 40%and 60%,respectively.At the district level in Korba,the most coalintensive district in Chhattisgarh,coal m

177、ining accounts for about 15%of employment,while manufacturing accounts for less than 4%.Total industry employment,including mining,manufacturing,construction and utilities,accounts for onequarter of employment in Korba,while agriculture accounts for more than onethird.The task of transition policies

178、 in these regions is not only to cushion the impact of the decline in mining on jobs,but also to support economic development broadly for coal miners and noncoal workers alike.IEA.CC BY 4.0.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 27 Chapter 2 Managing the transition to

179、 low-emissions power Everything,everywhere,all at once Governments need to introduce policies to ensure that public and private actors in the power sector invest in clean energy and reduce coal use in line with emissions targets while minimising economic and social costs.The most cost-effective mix

180、of direct regulation,financial incentives and market-based measures varies by country.Reducing reliance on unabated coal power calls for rapid growth in low-emissions fuels and technologies.Nearly 75%of the drop in global coal-fired generation over 2022-2050 in the APS is replaced by solar PV and wi

181、nd,followed by hydropower and other renewables with 13%and nuclear with 8%.This expansion of solar PV and wind hinges on strong policy incentives as well as carefully implemented measures to enable the integration of variable renewables into the electricity system.Emissions from existing coal-fired

182、plants can be cut by repurposing plants to provide load balancing services(adequacy and flexibility)rather than baseload power,retrofitting them with CCUS technology,retrofitting them to permit co-firing with low-emissions fuels such as ammonia or biomass,or retiring them early and converting existi

183、ng sites to other uses.Were all the coal assets in industry and power around the world to continue to operate as they do today through to the ends of their normal operating lives,they would“lock in”over 300 Gt of cumulative emissions between 2023 and 2050,by themselves tipping the world past the 1.5

184、 C limit.Repurposing coal plants for flexibility is widely adopted in the APS because it can limit losses of revenue and jobs while enabling the existing coal fleet to support the integration of renewables,yielding large emissions savings.As a result,the average annual capacity factor of unabated co

185、al plants declines from 52%in 2022 to just 24%by 2050 in the APS.Retrofitting coal plants with CCUS also provides a means to preserve existing assets and jobs,supply dispatchable electricity,and help maintain grid stability.Global capacity of coal with CCUS expands rapidly after 2030 in the APS,reac

186、hing nearly 150 GW by 2050.Co-firing low-emissions ammonia or bioenergy in conjunction with coal also offers valuable system benefits as a source of dispatchable power.Other coal plants will need to be retired early;this is most feasible in advanced economies where plants tend to be older,and costs

187、more easily absorbed.The system services provided by coal-fired power plants,as well as their electricity output,must be replaced as the transition progresses to ensure secure electricity supply.This is particularly important in emerging and developing economies,where electricity demand grows rapidl

188、y.In the APS,the global contribution of unabated coal-fired capacity to system adequacy declines by over 40 GW per year to 2050 and is replaced by a broad suite of technologies.S U M M A R Y IEA.CC BY 4.0.28 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 2.1 Policy approaches It is the

189、responsibility of governments to introduce new policies and reform existing ones to ensure that public and private actors in the power sector accelerate investments in clean energy and progressively reduce their use of coal in line with emissions targets,while minimising the economic and social cost

190、s.Broadly,there are three types of interventions available to policy makers that can be used alone or in combination to accelerate the transition away from coal-fired power generation by encouraging investment in clean energy,retiring coal assets early,repurposing coal plants from baseload operation

191、 to provide power system services and retrofitting existing plants with carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS):Direct regulation,including reduced operations,a ban on the construction of new coal plants or mines,and the forced closure of a plant.Direct regulation is widely used in some countri

192、es,notably the Peoples Republic of China(hereafter,“China”),that have broad powers to impose sweeping changes on the economy.For example,China launched a drive in the 2010s to retire old coal stations and build new,more efficient ones.Regulations can also curb the operations of coal plants indirectl

193、y by regulating air quality.Financial incentives for owners to relinquish coal power plants or change the way they operate.They typically involve low-cost government debt such as securitised loans,debt purchases or loan guarantees.They are usually asset-specific and depend on the extent to which the

194、 asset is already depreciated and whether the cost of investing in an alternative clean energy technology yields a net financial benefit over the cost of continuing to operate the coal assets under existing market conditions and contractual arrangements.The most attractive targets for incentives fro

195、m a policy perspective are assets which are not yet fully depreciated but for which replacement by a renewable energy alternative would immediately generate financial savings for consumers.In these cases,those savings can be used to pay back the upfront costs of the intervention,lowering the burden

196、on taxpayers or ratepayers.Financial measures can also be used to encourage investment in clean energy.Market-based measures that make it less financially attractive to the owners of coal plants to continue high levels of unabated operation and favour competing clean energy sources.These include car

197、bon pricing schemes and measures that reduce the revenues available beyond a limited number of operating hours through taxes,tenders or market rules.Auction-based capacity mechanisms,for example,can incentivise plant owners to reduce their operations in exchange for payments to remain online in case

198、 they are required by the system operator.Implementing electricity market reforms such as economic dispatch and must-run status for renewable energy projects can also boost the standing of low-emissions power sources in relation to coal.Most countries currently rely primarily on financial and market

199、-based measures to discourage coal-fired power generation and encourage investment in clean energy.In practice,the most cost-effective mix of policy approaches varies across countries depending on several factors,including the contribution of coal plants to overall electricity supply,ownership struc

200、tures,electricity market rules,the maturity of capital markets,and other policies and political priorities.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 29 2.2 Scaling up alternative low-emissions power sources It will be possible to reduce reliance on unabated coal-fired po

201、wer generation only if alternative sources of power are developed quickly enough to meet demand.In 2023,around 130 national governments including the European Union committed to collaborate to triple global installed renewable energy capacity by 2030,which would put renewable power capacity developm

202、ent in line with the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario.Even under existing policies and market conditions,global renewable capacity is on a trajectory to reach about 2.5 times its current level by 2030(IEA,2023b).In the Announced Pledges Scenario(APS),the construction of unabated coal plants s

203、lows but does not stop by 2050.By 2027,capacity additions are set to fall to just over 6 gigawatts(GW)annually far below that of any year over the last half a century(Figure 2.1).Beyond 2030,an average of 1.5 GW of new unabated coal plant capacity continues to be built each year through 2050 in the

204、APS in countries that have not committed to phase out its use,mainly to replace old coal plants.In the NZE Scenario,the plants currently under construction are completed,but there are no further additions.In both scenarios,rising demand for electricity in all regions is met largely by a sharp increa

205、se in output from renewables and nuclear power.Figure 2.1 Global coal-fired capacity additions in the APS IEA.CC BY 4.0.The construction of new coal plants,almost all of which are unabated,is set to slow rapidly in the late 2030s in all parts of the world under current policy pledges Note:AE=advance

206、d economies;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.Over three-quarters of the projected drop in global coal-fired generation between 2022 and 2030 in the APS is replaced by solar PV and wind,with another 11%replaced by hydropower and other renewables,8%by nuclear power,and just 1-2%each of un

207、abated natural gas,CCUS and hydrogen and ammonia.The limited role of unabated natural gas reflects the changing perceptions of that fuel following recent market volatility and supply concerns linked to Russias invasion of Ukraine.By 2050,generation from existing unabated coal-fired 20 40 60 80 10019

208、902000201020202030Other AEJapanEuropean UnionUnited StatesOther EMDESoutheast AsiaIndiaChinaDecade averageGWHistoricalProjectionsIEA.CC BY 4.0.30 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 power plants is less than 1 600 terawatt-hours(TWh),85%lower than in in 2022,with other techno

209、logies replacing it in roughly the same proportions as in 2030,though the share of fossil fuels with CCUS rises to almost 5%as the technology advances in maturity.The paths away from unabated coal differ between advanced economies and emerging and developing economies,but they share many elements.In

210、 the former,unabated coal-fired generation declines rapidly to 2030 in the APS and is replaced primarily by wind and solar PV,though a host of other sources also play a vital role.In the latter,it takes several years longer for the decline of unabated coal to take hold,with solar PV and wind emergin

211、g as the central replacements,with hydropower,nuclear power,other low-emissions sources and a small amount of unabated natural gas each also contributing.Figure 2.2 Global capacity additions of solar PV and wind power by scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Solar PV and wind capacity additions triple between 2022

212、 and 2030 in the APS to replace unabated coal and meet rising electricity demand Solar PV and wind power dominate the replacement of coal-fired power because of their low costs and strong policy support,with measures in place in 174 countries as of 2022(REN21,2023).Building on the rapid growth of th

213、e past decade,global capacity additions of solar PV almost triple by the end of the decade in the APS,with 640 GW added in 2030(compared with 220 GW in 2022),equivalent to more than half of all installed solar PV capacity today.Wind deployment also more than triples to add 240 GW in 2030(compared wi

214、th 75 GW in 2022)(Figure 2.2).Emerging and developing economies continue to account for the majority of solar PV and wind capacity additions,led by China,though Europe leads offshore wind deployment to 2030.The two technologies continue to scale up rapidly after 2030,with solar PV reaching 770 GW of

215、 additions and wind 310 GW in 2050.The NZE Scenario calls for a much faster scaling up by 2030,with additions reaching 820 GW for solar PV and 320 GW for wind power;that pace is broadly maintained through 2050.In both 250 500 7501 00020102022203020502010202220302050Advanced economiesEmerging market

216、anddeveloping economiesSTEPSNZEGWSolar PVAPS by regionWindAggregate by scenarioIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 31 scenarios,the rapid expansion of solar PV and wind hinges on strong policies to incentivise investment in the installation of new generating capaci

217、ty,as well as the development of robust supply chains with a diversity of market players at each stage(IEA,2023a).Rising penetration of wind and solar PV necessitates careful consideration of the effects of their variable output on the broader electricity system.In many cases,an increase in flexibil

218、ity resources,including stronger grids,interconnections,demand-side measures,and dispatchable power and storage,will be necessary to ensure the smooth integration of these power sources into the system.Existing coal-fired generation assets can play a role in supplying system adequacy and flexibility

219、 resources by remaining available to produce electricity when system needs are highest,even if they no longer serve as a source of baseload power.2.3 Tackling emissions from existing coal plants There are four main ways of reducing emissions from existing coal-fired power plants:repurposing them to

220、provide load balancing services rather than baseload power supply,retrofitting them with CCUS technology,retrofitting them to allow co-firing with low-emissions fuels such as ammonia or biomass,or retiring them early.In any case,the simultaneous development of sufficient alternative sources of power

221、 is a prerequisite to reducing emissions from coal plants.Were all the coal plants around the world to continue to operate as they do today until the ends of their normal operating lives,they would“lock in”cumulative emissions of nearly 250 gigatonnes(Gt)over 2023-2050.In the APS,they emit around 14

222、0 Gt,or 43%less,over the same period,with repurposing accounting for two-thirds of these reductions and early retirement for most of the rest(Figure 2.3).In the NZE Scenario,cumulative emissions level off at around 85 Gt soon after 2035 as all unabated coal plants are shuttered.Figure 2.3 Global cum

223、ulative CO2 emissions from existing coal-fired power plants by scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.The fleet of existing coal-fired power plants could emit up to 250 Gt CO2 by 2050,but there are several options to curb their emissions and keep the door open to 1.5 C Note:Existing refers to plants in operation at

224、 the end of 2022.Repurpose refers to reducing power plant operations to focus on providing system adequacy or flexibility services instead of baseload power.20%40%60%80%100%Cumulative savings to 2050Ammonia co-firingCCUS retrofitsRepurposeRetire earlyAPS by measure 50 100 150 200 2502020203020402050

225、GtIEA.CC BY 4.0.32 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 2.3.1 Repurposing for flexibility Repurposing coal-fired power plants reducing operations to focus on providing system adequacy(reserve capacity)or flexibility services means that an unabated coal plant produces less elec

226、tricity over a certain period but remains available for times when the system needs are highest,contributing to the reliability of power systems.By limiting the loss of revenue and jobs as well as the need for fresh investment,this may be an appealing alternative to outright closure for coal plant o

227、wners,the surrounding communities,electricity consumers and policy makers.Many plants are currently operated in a stable“baseload”mode,operating at close to full capacity most of the time,as coal is generally cheaper than gas or oil.In China,for example,the role of coal-fired power has shifted towar

228、ds providing flexibility,and the average utilisation rate of the coal fleet has accordingly been dropping for years(S&P Global,2023).Repurposing coal plants for flexibility usually requires minor equipment upgrades,changes to market designs and plant operations,and updates to contracts.Coal plants c

229、an generally run at partial load,producing a fraction of their maximum rated output,and can adjust output within minutes or hours.While repurposing for flexibility can lead to significant emissions savings,it can also generate financial challenges and accelerate the deterioration of plant equipment.

230、Electricity supply contracts and system service provisions in electricity markets may also need to be reshaped to provide incentives for plant operators to switch to offering system flexibility services.Adjusting contracts to ensure that asset owners are not obliged to generate coal-fired power when

231、 cheaper electricity is available from low-emissions sources would also help to reduce both emissions and costs.Larger targeted investments can further enhance the flexibility of coal plants.For example,retrofitting alternative boilers can lower the plants stable minimum load,while upgrades to contr

232、ol systems and plant components can increase ramping speeds and allow plants to be operated at levels higher than their rated capacity for brief periods of time,though this may require more active roles for on-site staff.Other retrofit options,such as coupling the plant with battery energy storage,c

233、an further boost flexibility.They can also allow the plant to provide ancillary services such as fast frequency response or supplementary spinning reserves without burning additional fuel.Heat storage can be added to make coal co-generation plants more flexible.There are several examples of repurpos

234、ing of coal plants for flexibility that have led to lower coal use and lower emissions in both advanced economies and emerging and developing economies.In Denmark,where the rapid penetration of wind power in the generation mix has increased the need for flexibility and cut the need for baseload coal

235、-fired generation,several co-generation plants have been repurposed through technical modifications to decouple output of heat and electricity by lowering minimum load and boosting maximum heat supply(Clean Energy Ministerial,2018).In 2016,China launched a large flexibility retrofit programme involv

236、ing 22 pilot projects(Liu et al.,2020).It doubled down on these efforts in the 14th Five-Year Plan for energy,increasing investments in flexibility from coal-fired power plants as well as battery storage and other dispatchable power sources and demonstrated ambition IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing

237、the transition to low-emissions power 33 of retrofitting more than 200 GW of existing coal power to be retrofitted for flexibility by 2025(National Development and Reform Commission of China,2021).Repurposing coal plants for flexibility is widely adopted in the APS because it enables the existing co

238、al fleet to support and facilitate the integration of increasing shares of variable renewables.As a result,the average annual capacity factor1 of the global unabated coal plant fleet declines from 52%in 2023 to below 40%by 2030 and 23%by 2050 in that scenario(Figure 2.4).In the NZE Scenario,unabated

239、 coal is phased down even more quickly,reducing the global capacity factor to less than 40%by 2030,under 20%by 2035 and zero by 2040.These reductions in operations yield large emissions savings,though they could create financial difficulties for plant owners depending on market design and the struct

240、ure of pre-existing contracts.Ultimately,increasing alternate sources of low-emissions power must be the greatest priority,indeed a precondition,of repurposing the existing coal fleet for flexibility.Figure 2.4 Low-emissions power generation by source and average capacity factor of coal-fired power

241、plants in the APS,2010-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.In the APS,the average capacity factor of the global coal fleet is more than halved by 2050 as clean power grows and coal-fired power plants reorient towards providing flexibility An important consideration in all countries is the impact of the transition aw

242、ay from coal in power generation,including repurposing coal plants for flexibility,on the financial viability of power companies and the implications for the security of electricity supplies.There is a large amount of sunk capital in existing coal-fired plants that has yet to be recovered,especially

243、 in emerging and developing economies.There is a risk that some of this capital may not be recovered given government pledges to reduce coal burning and emissions,putting the financial stability of power companies and their ability to meet electricity needs in jeopardy(see section 3.1.2).This consid

244、eration also reveals the financial risks associated with constructing new coal capacity.If all coal-fired power plants currently under development 1 Gross electricity generation divided by gross installed capacity.0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%10 00020 00030 00040 00050 00060 00070 00020102023203020402050S

245、olarWindOther renewablesNuclearCoal generationCoal capacity factor(right axis)TWhIEA.CC BY 4.0.34 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 are fully realised,these capacity additions will equal 20%of the existing fleet(Figure 2.5).However,less than one-third of this planned capaci

246、ty has begun construction as of 2023.Figure 2.5 Installed and planned capacity of coal-fired power generation by region,2015-2022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Planned coal-fired capacity additions around the world are equivalent to 20%of the existing fleet,but less than a third of this new capacity has begun const

247、ruction Notes:Under development includes planned capacity additions and capacity already under construction as of 2023.2.3.2 Retrofitting with CCUS Retrofitting coal plants with CCUS provides a means to preserve existing assets,supply dispatchable electricity and help maintain grid stability while d

248、ecarbonising coal use.CCUS technologies can be retrofitted to the entire facility or just part of it:the simplest form of retrofit involves rerouting the flue gas from a unit boiler through a CO2 capture facility powered by heat extracted from the steam cycle or provided by an external heat source.M

249、ore extensive modifications include conversion of the boiler to oxy-fuel combustion.In any case,plants selected for CCUS retrofits must have space available for additional on-site equipment,as well as solid transport links to manage captured CO2.Operating a plant with CO2 capture consumes a signific

250、ant amount of energy,reducing net electricity output of the plant on average by around 20-25%for a given input of coal.Only four commercial coal-fired power plants have been retrofitted with CCUS at a large scale to date:the Boundary Dam facility in Saskatchewan,Canada,the Petra Nova plant in Texas,

251、United States,and two China Energy coal plants in China.The Boundary Dam CCUS project has been operating since 2014 and has a capture capacity of around 1 million tonnes(Mt)of CO2 per year.The Petra Nova facility,which started operating in December 2016,has a capacity of 1.4 Mt CO2/year.2 In both ca

252、ses,the captured CO2 is used for enhanced oil recovery(EOR).3 China Energy commissioned a 0.15 Mt CO2/year demonstration plant at the Guohua Jinjie Power Plant in 2021.There are also plans for around 15 new projects at various 2 Capture operations at Petra Nova were suspended in May 2020 as a result

253、 of the low oil prices associated with the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic but restarted in September 2023.3 While most of the CO2 injected for EOR can be retained in the reservoir over the life of the project,additional monitoring and verification is required to confirm that the CO2 has be

254、en permanently stored.5001 0001 5002 0002 5002015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022Rest of worldAdvanced economiesIndiaChinaUnder constructionGWUnderdevelopmentIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 35 locations around the world.All but one of them are retrofits of e

255、xisting coal plants,of which almost three-quarters are located in China or the United States,with tax credits providing up to USD 85 per tonne of CO2 stored in the latter.If all planned projects proceed,global capture capacity from coal plants would reach around 28 Mt CO2 in 2030.The prospects for C

256、CUS depend critically on costs.Capital costs make up the bulk of the cost of the first-generation CCUS retrofits at coal plants in operation today.Those costs are expected to fall as deployment expands,to around USD 1 million-USD 3 million per megawatt(MW)in 2030,yielding a levelised cost of electri

257、city(LCOE)the average net present cost of electricity generation over the lifetime of the asset including capital,operating and maintenance costs of between USD 80 per megawatt-hour(MWh)and USD 160/MWh,including the efficiency penalty(Figure 2.6).4 At this cost,coal plants with CCUS could be competi

258、tive with other dispatchable low-emissions sources,such as bioenergy or nuclear,in many markets.CCUS retrofitting may be a particularly attractive option to keep plants close to active coal mines in operation,thereby maintaining mining jobs and supporting mining communities.In the case of recently b

259、uilt plants,retrofitting with CCUS may be a compromise to avoid the closure and near full write-off of a plant.Figure 2.6 Levelised cost of electricity for selected dispatchable low-emissions generating technologies in the APS,2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.The cost of retrofitting coal plants with CCUS is roug

260、hly on par with most other dispatchable low-emissions sources of electricity and can be cheaper than unabated coal Notes:MER=market exchange rate;CCGT=combined-cycle gas turbine.Technology costs include the cost of emissions,with CO2 prices reaching up to USD 135 per tonne in 2030.Retrofitted coal C

261、CUS includes the capital and operating costs of the unabated coal plant and the CCUS retrofit.4 The efficiency penalty depends on the capture technology used.Additional operating expenses relate to the use of solvents,chemical reagents and catalysts,the disposal of waste products,and the additional

262、staff needed to run the CCUS facilities.50 100 150 200 250UnabatedcoalRetrofittedcoal CCUSCCGT CCUSNuclearHydropowerBioenergyUSD per MWh(2022)IEA.CC BY 4.0.36 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 The total capacity of coal power plants with CCUS worldwide in the APS increases

263、marginally over the next five years and expands rapidly thereafter.By 2030,coal plants with CCUS provide 4 GW of capacity and generate around 22 TWh while capturing 22 Mt CO2(Figure 2.5).By 2050,over 150 GW of coal plants are equipped with CCUS,almost 75%in China,generating over 700 TWh and capturin

264、g about 700 Mt CO2.In the NZE Scenario,the deployment is faster,with 36 GW of coal plants equipped with CCUS by 2030,generating 156 TWh and capturing over 160 Mt CO2.By 2050,over 150 GW of coal-fired capacity is equipped with CCUS,generating about 640 TWh by 2050 and capturing 670 Mt CO2.The contrib

265、ution in 2050 is slightly lower in the NZE Scenario than in the APS due to a much shorter window of opportunity to deploy CCUS retrofits,as the electricity sector is fully decarbonised by 2040.Higher CO2 capture rates will become increasingly important in the transition to net zero emissions electri

266、city systems.CCUS power plants operating today capture around 90%of the CO2 from flue gas,but future plants could be designed to capture 99%or more.While there are no technical barriers to increasing capture rates beyond 90%for the most mature capture technologies,a better understanding of the modif

267、ications and associated costs is needed.Figure 2.7 Global coal-fired power generating capacity,output and CO2 capture by scenario IEA.CC BY 4.0.Coal capacity equipped with CCUS reaches over 150 GW in 2050 in the APS,generating over 700 TWh of electricity and capturing about 700 Mt of CO2 2.3.3 Co-fi

268、ring with clean fuels Co-firing low-emissions ammonia or biomass in conjunction with coal is another option to cut CO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants.In addition to lower emissions,co-firing offers valuable system benefits as a source of dispatchable power,which becomes 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.520

269、22APSNZEAPSNZEThousand GWCoal with CCUSUnabated coalInstalled capacity20502030 2 4 6 8 10 122022APSNZEAPSNZEThousand TWh20502030Electricity generation 150 300 450 600 750MtCO captured20502030IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 37 increasingly important for system s

270、tability as the share of variable renewables in the electricity generation mix increases.Traditional coal-fired power plants have been used for co-firing with biomass for decades,notably in India,the United Kingdom and the United States,but recent advances in fuel mixing allow for the blending of am

271、monia as an alternative secondary fuel.As with biomass,using ammonia can reduce emissions,provided it is made from low-emissions sources.Ammonia co-firing technology is at an early stage of development.The viability of 1%blending of ammonia has already been successfully demonstrated at a commercial

272、coal plant(Box 2.1).For blends of up to 20%ammonia,the retrofits required mainly involve modifications to the burners,as well as the installation of on-site ammonia storage tanks,vaporisers and injection systems(JERA,2021).Plants selected for ammonia co-firing need to have additional space available

273、 for added on-site equipment,access to a reliable supply of ammonia and good transport links.The high cost of transporting ammonia means that plants located near import terminals or inland transportation hubs are best suited for co-firing.Box 2.1 Co-firing with ammonia in Japan In 2017,Japanese util

274、ity Chugoku Electric Power successfully demonstrated the technical viability of blending 1%of ammonia into the coal inputs at its Mizushima power plant.Now,the Japanese power company JERA(a joint venture between Tokyo Electric Power and Chubu Electric Power),in partnership with the power technology

275、company IHI,plans to begin 20%blending at a 1 GW unit at the companys Hekinan coal plant have been brought forward to fiscal year 2023/24,marking the worlds first trial in which a large amount of ammonia will be co-fired with coal at a sizeable commercial plant.A sales agreement covering the supply

276、of ammonia with Mitsui was concluded in June 2023 to ensure adequate availability of the fuel.The Japanese governments sees co-firing and mono-firing of ammonia as a way of reducing emissions in pursuit of the national goal to achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050,while simultaneously ex

277、tending the lives of the countrys coal plants.However,as ammonia is anticipated to remain more expensive than coal as well as other sources of low-emissions power for the time being,generation is likely to be competitive only at the highest value times when renewables are least able to satisfy total

278、 electricity demand.As with ammonia,biomass co-firing involves substituting a portion of the coal with biomass.Much higher percentage blends are already technically possible than for ammonia,in some cases exceeding half of the fuel mix.The share of biomass blended with coal in power plants today is

279、mainly dependent on price and availability of sustainable biomass supply.Agricultural and forestry residues that may otherwise be burned without any benefit offer a pragmatic solution,but the size of a typical coal plant means that it can be difficult to find the quantities of sustainable biomass ne

280、arby needed for high blending rates or full conversion to biomass.For example,a 1 GW wood-fired power plant with a capacity factor IEA.CC BY 4.0.38 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 of 70%and conversion efficiency of 35%would require an annual harvest of plantation growth e

281、quivalent to approximately 3 300 square kilometres(Smil,2010).The Drax coal-fired power station in the United Kingdom,which began co-firing of biomass in 2003,is a leading example.The proportion of biomass in the fuel mix has increased over time,with coal burning halted entirely in 2023.Plans are in

282、 place to convert the plant into a bioenergy with carbon capture and storage(BECCS)facility to generate negative emissions by permanently removing CO2 from the atmosphere.The potential for co-firing inevitably depends largely on cost,which hinges in each case on carbon pricing,relative fuel costs an

283、d retrofit costs,as well as on the success of cost-reducing innovation.Ammonia and,in some cases,biomass can cost significantly more than coal,though carbon penalties may in some cases be high enough to offset the higher fuel cost and yield a return on investing in plant modifications.In practice,un

284、certainty about future fuel costs and carbon penalties may impede financing.2.3.4 Retiring plants and converting sites Another option to cut emissions from unabated coal-fired power plants is simply to retire them before they reach the end of their technical lifetimes,and potentially convert the sit

285、e to another use.The technical lifetime of a coal plant is generally 40-50 years,though its economic lifetime the period over which the capital invested is expected to be recovered is usually 20-30 years.As coal plants age,asset owners face decisions about whether to invest in refurbishments,creatin

286、g opportunities for policy makers and financial institutions to encourage early retirements.Of all the coal plants worldwide operating today,only one-quarter,or about 500 GW,will have reached 50 years of operations by 2040.If lifetimes were shortened to 40 years,another 240 GW of capacity would be r

287、etired by then,80%in Asia Pacific.This approaches the amount retired in the APS in line with planned phase-outs and early retirements of uneconomic units.If all coal plants were shut after 25 years of operations,then about 80%of the existing fleet would be retired by 2040,leaving just over 300 GW in

288、 operation in 2040.Continued coal capacity additions in recent years are responsible for the lingering operations,even with shortened lifespans:50 GW of new coal-fired generation capacity was added in 2022,with additions in 2023 likely to have surpassed this number.Early retirement is likely to be m

289、ore economically and politically feasible in advanced economies,where coal plants tend to be older,and the cost more easily absorbed.Since 2010,coal power plant retirements worldwide have averaged around 25 GW each year,largely as a result of the closure of ageing plants in Europe and the United Sta

290、tes in the face of declining competitiveness,increased regulation in the form of pollution limits and carbon taxes,and increased competition from renewable energy sources and natural gas.In some cases,retirement is a necessary consideration to limit the costs of keeping many coal plants online at lo

291、wer utilisation rates.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 39 A coal power plant contains a variety of useful assets,which can make the reconversion of the site for a variety of electricity-related or industrial applications an attractive option(Box 2.2).Those asset

292、s include the boiler,the water/steam and cooling systems,the turbine/generator and transformer,and equipment for handling materials.The land on which the plant is located and its grid connection are also valuable assets,as are a skilled workforce,auxiliary industry and services developed around the

293、plant,the licence to operate,and the support of the local community.For example,a coal boiler could be reused for thermal energy storage:when surplus variable renewables-based electricity supply is available,electricity can be converted to heat in the form of steam or hot water and stored,to provide

294、 ancillary services as and when required for grid stability.Another option is to reuse a former coal plant site as a brownfield site for alternative electricity generating technologies,such as nuclear power plants based on small modular reactor(SMR)technology.There is considerable potential for conv

295、erting existing coal-fired power plants to other energy uses,including electrical battery or thermal storage and SMRs.The possibility of converting such plants to other uses should be assessed before any decision to close them.The financial viability of doing so in each case hinges on the strength o

296、f policy support.For example,a number of projects are under way in the United States,including a plant in Illinois that is being converted to a battery storage facility for locally produced renewable power,one in Louisiana that closed in 2021 and is now being converted to a solar farm,and a huge bat

297、tery storage facility now being built with Tesla Megapack batteries near a former coal plant in Hawaii.All of these projects are benefiting from the provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,which extended existing tax credits for wind and solar power and introduced a new credit for batterie

298、s.The law also offers loans to reinvest in communities with old infrastructure,including support for the shift to clean energy.TerraPower and GE-Hitachi have selected the retiring Naughton coal power plant in Wyoming as the site for their Department of Energy-backed advanced nuclear reactor demonstr

299、ation project,citing the communitys skilled coal workforce and existing energy infrastructure as primary motivations for their site choice.Policy and regulatory support will be particularly crucial in the case of SMRs an emerging technology in order to stimulate innovation and their commercialisatio

300、n(IEA,2022).This support needs to go beyond funding of research and development and demonstration projects.Adapting and streamlining licensing and regulatory frameworks to take account of the unique safety features of SMRs is an important element.Enhancing regulatory processes,including the harmonis

301、ation of licensing processes across countries,could greatly improve the future competitiveness of SMRs by facilitating the emergence of a global market,which could take full advantage of the economies of scale of large-scale production of individual reactors.Policy makers also need to look at ways o

302、f mitigating risks for technology and project developers.As with large-scale nuclear projects,the cost of capital,which reflects risk allocation and mitigation decisions,is expected to remain a key driver of the IEA.CC BY 4.0.40 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 2 competitive

303、ness of SMRs.Both public and private financing will be required as SMRs move from the demonstration stage to commercial deployment.Box 2.2 Converting the site of a coal power plant to other energy uses A growing number of coal station sites around the world are being converted to alternative energy

304、uses.In South Africa,for example,the state-owned power company,Eskom,is converting its previously mothballed Komati power plant into a renewable generation site one of the worlds largest-ever coal-fired power plant repurposing projects involving the installation of 150 MW of solar,70 MW of wind and

305、150 MW of battery storage capacity.As part of the project,which is being implemented under the countrys Just Energy Transition Strategy,the Komati Retraining Facility is being developed to reskill,retrain and upskill Eskom employees and members of the local community(see Chapter 4).In Ontario,Canada

306、,a 44 MW solar facility has been built on the grounds of the retired Nanticoke coal plant,making use of the existing transmission switch yard to connect to the grid.2.4 Ensuring electricity security The system services provided by coal-fired power plants,as well as their electricity output,need to b

307、e replaced as the transition away from unabated coal progresses in order to ensure the security of electricity supply.Coal plants contribute to the adequacy of power systems by ensuring that electricity supply is sufficient to meet demand at all times throughout the year.This is particularly importa

308、nt in emerging and developing economies,where electricity demand continues to grow rapidly.They also contribute to system flexibility by being able to adjust output in hours or,in some cases,minutes to match supply and demand,and support grid stability by providing inertia the energy stored in large

309、 rotating generators and motors,as they continue to rotate or spin for a while after the energy input has ceased.In the APS,the global contribution of unabated coal-fired capacity to system adequacy declines by over 40 GW per year to 2050 and is replaced by contributions from a broad suite of techno

310、logies.Demand response encouraging customers to shift electricity demand to times when electricity is more plentiful or other demands are lower,typically through prices or monetary incentives,in order to balance the system becomes increasingly important in all scenarios to provide system flexibility

311、 and to reduce peak demand,thereby limiting system adequacy needs.To then meet those needs,battery storage is the primary replacement for coal,making up just under half of the total in 2050,followed by hydropower and other dispatchable renewables(15%),solar PV and wind(13%),nuclear,fossil fuels with

312、 CCUS,and hydrogen and ammonia(7-8%each)and new unabated natural gas-fired capacity(2%)(Figure 2.6).Solar PV and wind contribute IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2|Managing the transition to low-emissions power 41 less to replacing coal in terms of system adequacy and other system services than to replacing el

313、ectricity output from coal.Figure 2.8 Replacements for unabated coal-fired power capacitys contribution to system adequacy by region in the APS IEA.CC BY 4.0.Battery storage is the largest single replacement for coals contributions to system adequacy,flexibility and grid stability,complemented by ot

314、her dispatchable technologies Both advanced economies and emerging and developing economies rely heavily on batteries to replace coals contributions to system adequacy,as well as system flexibility and stability,in the APS.Global battery storage deployment grows more than ten-fold between 2022 and 2

315、030 to 70 GW,with most of the growth occurring in advanced economies.The market for batteries continues to expand after 2030 in all regions:it exceeds 160 GW in 2040(including replacements)and 200 GW in 2050.In the NZE Scenario,battery storage expands even faster to help replace system services from

316、 coal,with capacity additions reaching 140 GW in 2030 and close to 300 GW by 2040.This topic will be explored further in the IEAs upcoming special report on batteries.The relative importance of other dispatchable technologies to replace coal varies between advanced economies and emerging and develop

317、ing economies in both scenarios.The former rely more on blending hydrogen in gas-fired power plants,particularly in the United States,Japan and the European Union,while the emerging and developing economies rely more on blending ammonia in coal plants,hydropower and other renewable sources,and unaba

318、ted natural gas plants.CCUS retrofits of coal-fired power plants also play a significant role in those countries,notably China.Capacity&system adequacySolar PV and windOther renewablesNuclearFossil fuels with CCUSHydrogen and ammoniaUnabated natural gasBattery storageReplacements,2050Generation 0.2

319、0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.22022203020402050GenerationcapacityUnabated coal-fired powerIndex(1=2022 level)IEA.CC BY 4.0.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 3|Financing the shift away from coal 43 Chapter 3 Financing the shift away from coal Who will foot the bill?Clean energy investment must be scaled up massively and urg

320、ently to enable coal transitions.In the APS,global investment in low-emissions power averages around USD 960 billion per year from 2023 to 2030 around 30%of total energy investment,up from 25%the last few years.The substantial capital invested in existing coal plants that has yet to be recovered fro

321、m operation revenues is potentially a major barrier to coal transitions,especially in emerging and developing economies,as under-recovery presents risks to the financial stability of stakeholders.For many countries,raising debt and attracting the financing required to invest in clean energy,pay for

322、retrofits or retire coal assets early has become much harder in recent years due to cost inflation,rising borrowing costs and the dislocation of global supply chains.In emerging and developing economies,private finance will need to play a key role in decreasing coal power given constraints on public

323、 budgets.Phasing out older coal plants will be necessary to secure these investments,though honouring existing contracts remains important to avoid spooking the market.In the APS,over half of funding from 2023-2030 is from the private sector,35%from state-owned enterprises and 15%from other public f

324、unds.Policies to facilitate the financing of clean energy must go hand in hand with measures to restrict the financing of the construction of new coal plants,as well as investments in existing ones.New coal plants continue to be built in some countries,notably China.Several governments and financial

325、 institutions have announced policies to restrict or prohibit financing for coal power projects and investments in recent years,including Chinas halt to all financing for new overseas plants in 2021.However,any such policies must ensure that there is no disruption to security of electricity supply,w

326、hich remains the ultimate priority throughout the coal transition.Bringing forward the retirement of both existing and yet-to-be built coal-fired power plants and their replacement with clean generating technologies will need to play an increasingly important role in lowering emissions in those coun

327、tries where coal still accounts for a significant share of the generating mix.Over 2023-2030,around 20 GW of coal power plants operating today are retired before they reach 30 years,of which about 50%are retired before the age of 20,in the APS.There is no single blueprint to phase out coal-fired gen

328、eration;any action must be tailored to the age and type of coal plants,as well as to the varied market structures within which they operate.The many options include nationalising or buying out plants to retire them;creating mechanisms to monetise saved emissions;funds to compensate owners of retired

329、 plants;securitisation;accelerated depreciation;and concessional debt or refinancing mechanisms.S U M M A R Y IEA.CC BY 4.0.44 International Energy Agency|Accelerating coal transitions 3 3.1 Investment needs 3.1.1 Clean power sector investment Investment in clean power sector technologies needs to b

330、e scaled up massively and urgently to replace coal plants worldwide.In the Announced Pledges Scenario(APS),average annual clean power investment jumps from around USD 1 trillion(in 2022 dollars)in 2022 to USD 1.5 trillion in 2023-2030 and over USD 1.8 trillion in 2030-2050.Around half of the investm

331、ent over the rest of the current decade immediately yields zero-emissions reductions;the other half consists of contingent and incremental investment,mostly in grid infrastructure such as battery storage,that yields emissions reductions progressively as clean generating technologies are adopted.In b

332、oth the APS and the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario,the bulk of investment needs in clean generating technologies over 2023-2050 are in emerging market and developing economies(Figure 3.1).Figure 3.1 Average annual investment in clean power sector technologies by region and scenario IEA.CC B

333、Y 4.0.In both the APS and the NZE Scenario,the bulk of investment in clean power technologies over 2023-2050 is needed in emerging and developing economies Note:MER=market exchange rate;other emerging and developing economies=emerging and developing economies excluding China.The bulk of investment in clean power sector technologies in the APS is needed to meet new demand for electricity in emergin