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1、T H E STAT E O FSOUTHEAST ASIA2024SURVEY REPORTISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute(formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies)is an autonomous organisation established in 1968.It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political,security,and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia

2、 and its wider geostrategic and economic environment.The Institutes research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies(RES),Regional Social and Cultural Studies(RSCS)and Regional Strategic and Political Studies(RSPS).The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre(ASC),the Temase

3、k History Research Centre(THRC)and the Singapore APEC Study Centre.The ASEAN Studies Centre(ASC)was established in 2008 to research on issues pertaining to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)as an institution and a process.Through research,publications,conferences,media engagement and

4、outreach activities,ASC seeks to promote greater understanding of ASEAN and to contribute toward regional cooperation and integration.The Centre conducts studies and provides inputs to stakeholders on issues and matters that call for collective ASEAN actions and responses,especially those pertinent

5、to the ASEAN Community building process.The ASC is the first institutional Recipient of the 2020 ASEAN Prize,a prestigious award to honour outstanding achievements of individuals or organisations who have made meaningful contributions to ASEAN.The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Reportis publish

6、ed by the ASEAN Studies Centre atISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and available electronically at www.iseas.edu.sgIf you have any comments or enquiries about the survey,please email us at asciseas.edu.sgPublished on 2 April 2024Print ISSN:27375102Digital ISSN:27375110 REPORT COMPILED AND WRITTEN BY:Sharo

7、n SeahJoanne LinMelinda MartinusKristina Fong Indira AridatiPham Thi Phuong ThaoDamon Chee The report can be cited as:Seah,S.et al.,The State of Southeast Asia:2024 Survey Report (Singapore:ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute,2024)The authors are researchers at the ASEAN Studies Centre,ISEAS Yusof Ishak Ins

8、titute.ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace,Singapore 119614Tel:(65)6870 4509 Fax:(65)6778 1735All rights reserved.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20241CONTENTSABOUT THE SURVEYMETHODOLOGYSURVEY HIGHLIGHTS234SECTION ISECTION IISECTION IIISECTION IVSECTION VSECTION VIRespondents ProfileRegi

9、onal Outlook and Views of International Developments Major Powers Regional Influence and LeadershipUS-China Rivalry and its Impact on Southeast AsiaPerceptions of TrustSoft Power61133465568SURVEY REPORT2ABOUT THE SURVEYThe State of Southeast Asia survey,now in its 6th year,continues to gauge the vie

10、ws and perceptions of Southeast Asians on geopolitical developments affecting the region,key international affairs and how ASEAN Dialogue Partners have engaged with the region over the preceding year.The objective of The State of Southeast Asia survey is to present a snapshot of the prevailing attit

11、udes among those in a position to inform or influence policy on regional issues.The survey is not meant to present a definitive view of issues in the region.This years survey was conducted over a period of seven weeks from 3 January 2024 to 23 February 2024.The survey was offered in six language opt

12、ions English,Bahasa Indonesia,Burmese,Khmer,Thai,and Vietnamese.A total of 1,994 respondents from ten Southeast Asian countries took part in the survey.There are six sections in the survey.Section I covers the profile of the respondents by nationality,affiliation,age,and education.Section II explore

13、s the regional outlook and provides viewpoints on international affairs in the past year.Section III examines regional influence and leadership of major and middle powers.Section IV looks into ASEANs options in the changing regional political-security architecture.Section V measures perceptions of t

14、rust among Southeast Asians towards five countries China,US,Japan,the European Union,and India.Section VI gauges levels of soft power in the region based on travel and work relocation choices.The questions and results have been reorganised for optimal flow and reporting.Figures have been rounded up/

15、down to the nearest one decimal point,and may not add up to 100.0%exactly.SURVEY REPORT2THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20243METHODOLOGYWe have continued to make improvements in methodology.Eligibility criteria were tightened this year based on nationality,age,affiliation,and education.Respondents were

16、further screened on their general knowledge of ASEAN and level of interest in current affairs.Putting aside branching questions,the survey comprised 51 questions in total which took approximately 20 to 35 minutes to complete.It was conducted completely online using a mixed sampling method.A total of

17、 1,994 Southeast Asians completed the survey from both non-panel and panel provider.Respondents came from 5 affiliation categories:(a)academia,think-tankers or researchers;(b)private sector representatives;(c)civil society,NGO or media representatives;(d)government officials;and(e)regional or intern

18、ational organisations personnel.A 10%weighting average was applied to each countrys responses to calculate the average figures for ASEAN as a whole.This is to ensure that the responses of each country are represented by equal proportion,given that ASEANs decision-making processes are based on each c

19、ountry having equal say,regardless of geographical or population size.Final analysis of regional sentiment was conducted on the weighted data set.A strict set of criteria during the data cleaning process was applied to remove self-selection bias,speeders,and straight-liners in order to maintain data

20、 quality and integrity.Note:No weighting was applied to respondent profile Questions 1 to 4.A different statistical method was applied to Question 26.It was analysed using a rank-sum method.A 10%weightage was applied to each country to ensure proportionality of responses,followed by a calculation of

21、 survey-weighted mean ranks and scores for each of the Dialogue Partners.SURVEY REPORT439.9%Israel-Hamas conflict46.5%Russia-Ukraine War39.4%Aggressive behaviour in the South China SeaSCSGlobal scam operations39.4%SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS1Southeast Asia continues to face unprecedented challenges in the rap

22、idly changing global geopolitical and economic environment and the evolving dynamics between major powers.Unemployment and economic recession remain the regions most pressing concern(57.7%),followed by the impact of climate change(53.4%),and the intensifying economic tensions between major powers(47

23、.0%).Terrorism continues to rank last(10.0%).2Political divisions,territorial disputes,and spill-over effects from conflicts continue to be strategic uncertainties facing the region.Israel-Hamas conflict(46.5%)and aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea(39.9%)are the regions top geopolitical con

24、cerns followed by the Russia-Ukraine war(39.4%),and global scam operations(39.4%)tied at third place.Implications arising from the January 2024 Taiwan elections is ranked last(7.6%).3A large proportion of Southeast Asia respondents are concerned that Israels attack on Gaza has gone too far.Rise in e

25、xtremist activities(29.7%),diminished trust in international law and rules-based order(27.5%),and erosion of domestic social cohesion(17.5%)are the most serious impacts of the Israel-Hamas conflict on Southeast Asia.4China continues to be seen as the most influential economic(59.5%)and political-str

26、ategic(43.9%)power in the region,outpacing the US by significant margins in both domains.Among ASEANs eleven Dialogue Partners,China(mean score of 8.98 out of 11.0)tops the charts in terms of strategic relevance to ASEAN,followed by the US(8.79),and Japan(7.48).The partners of least strategic releva

27、nce are:India(5.04),Canada(3.81)and New Zealand(3.70).59.5%Most Influential Economic Power43.9%Most Influential Political and Strategic PowerMean Score:8.98Strategic Relevance to ASEAN$57.7%53.4%47.0%Unemployment and economic recessionClimate change and more extreme weather eventsIntensifying econom

28、ic tensions between major powersRise in extremist activities impacting domestic and regional security29.7%Diminished trust in international law and rules-based order27.5%Erosion of domestic social cohesion due to religious divisionsGreater ASEAN disunity due to differences in member states positions

29、17.5%Does not impact Southeast Asia15.4%9.9%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202455Touted as the worlds first regional digital economy agreement,38.0%of respondents feel that the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement(DEFA)would significantly contribute to raising digital capabilities and enhancing re

30、gional digital trade while 2.6%feel that it will not change the status quo.16.8%of the respondents are not aware of the existence of the agreement.6Singapore and Indonesia,two original ASEAN founding members,are acknowledged as having made the biggest contributions to ASEANs long-term development an

31、d progress.Singapore holds 66.0%whereas Indonesia holds 41.5%of the votes for regional leadership.7China has edged past the US to become the prevailing choice(50.5%)if the region were forced to align itself in the on-going US-China rivalry.The US as a choice dropped from 61.1%in the previous year to

32、 49.5%.Close to half of the respondents(46.8%)believe that ASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressures from the two major powers.8Japan remains the most trusted major power among Southeast Asians(58.9%).The US comes in a distant second(42.4%),outpacing the EU(41.5%)by a narro

33、w margin.Half of the respondents(50.1%)express distrust towards China with 45.5%of them fearing that China could use its economic and military power to threaten their countrys interest and sovereignty.Singapore66.0%Indonesia41.5%2023202449.5%50.5%ChinaUS61.1%38.9%ChinaUS51.0%29.1%54.2%26.1%54.5%25.5

34、%20232024TrustDistrust42.4%37.6%41.5%34.9%58.9%19.8%2023202420232024Enhance cooperation in digital trade integration initiatives38.0%25.1%Significantly contribute to raising digital capabilities and enhancing regional digital tradeHave a limited impact on raising digital trade flows due to regional

35、differences in standards and digital capabilitiesI have not heard of the DEFA17.6%16.8%2.6%Not change the statusquoSURVEY REPORT6SECTION IRespondents ProfileThis section features the background of the survey respondents,including their nationality,education,affiliation,and age distribution.No weight

36、ing is applied in this section.06-10SURVEY REPORT6THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20247NATIONALITYA total of 1,994 respondents from ten ASEAN member states participated in this survey.Singapore led with the highest number of respondents at 273(13.7%),followed by Indonesia at 265(13.3%)and Malaysia at 22

37、5(11.3%).The breakdown for the rest of the countries are as follows:The Philippines(10.8%),Thailand(10.1%),Vietnam(10.0%),Cambodia and Myanmar(both at 9.5%),Laos(8.0%),and Brunei(3.9%).Q1 What is your nationality?7.6%8.1%15.9%11.0%10.4%9.2%10.2%8.8%9.3%8.2%9.5%8.6%202320249.5%9.5%8.0%10.1%10.0%13.7%

38、10.8%11.3%13.3%3.9%SURVEY REPORT8EDUCATIONA majority of respondents(55.8%)hold a Bachelors degree,followed by 19.4%with post-secondary/non-tertiary qualification and another 18.3%with Masters level attainment.The smallest group are those with a Doctoral degree at 6.6%.The country with the highest nu

39、mbers of Bachelors degree qualifications is the Philippines(70.2%)whereas the country with the Q2 What is the highest education level that you have attained?most numbers of respondents with a Doctoral degree is Brunei(23.4%).Singapore respondents have the highest numbers of Masters degree holders(32

40、.6%)whereas the highest number of post-secondary/non-tertiary education respondents come from Myanmar(56.1%).55.8%Bachelors Degree19.4%Post-Secondary/Non-Tertiary18.3%Masters Degree6.6%Doctoral DegreeCountryPost-Secondary/Non-TertiaryBachelors DegreeMasters DegreeDoctoral DegreeASEAN19.4%55.8%18.3%6

41、.6%BN9.1%41.6%26.0%23.4%KH23.3%68.3%7.4%1.1%ID6.4%69.8%19.2%4.5%LA26.9%65.0%6.9%1.3%MY16.0%51.6%23.6%8.9%MM56.1%19.6%18.0%6.3%PH12.1%70.2%14.9%2.8%SG21.6%34.8%32.6%11.0%TH12.9%61.2%15.4%10.4%VN11.5%70.0%14.5%4.0%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20249AFFILIATIONThe largest affiliation group is from the pr

42、ivate sector(33.7%),followed by government(24.5%),and academia,think-tanks or research institutions(23.6%).Civil society,non-government organisations,or media Q3 What is your affiliation?5.6%12.7%24.5%23.6%33.7%Private Sector(Business or Finance)Academia,Think-Tanks,or Research InstitutionsCivil Soc

43、iety,Non-Government Organisations,or MediaGovernmentRegional or International Organisationswas presented by 12.7%of respondents.The smallest representation came from respondents affiliated with regional or international organisations(5.6%).CountryAcademia,Think-Thanks,or Research InstitutionsCivil S

44、ociety,Non-Government Organisations,or MediaGovernmentPrivate Sector(Business or Finance)Regional or International OrganisationsASEAN23.6%12.7%24.5%33.7%5.6%BN27.3%11.7%32.5%22.1%6.5%KH32.8%17.5%15.9%28.6%5.3%ID30.2%17.0%26.0%21.5%5.3%LA16.3%9.4%28.1%44.4%1.9%MY22.2%10.7%29.8%31.6%5.8%MM5.8%13.2%19.

45、0%58.7%3.2%PH25.1%14.0%30.7%26.0%4.2%SG24.2%12.5%23.8%29.3%10.3%TH24.4%4.5%28.9%35.8%6.5%VN25.5%14.5%13.5%41.5%5.0%SURVEY REPORT10AGEThere was minimal change in terms of age distribution with the largest age group being the 22-35 years old(43.3%).This is followed by the 36-45 years old group(24.5%).

46、These two groups are the most economically productive and intellectually engaged age groups in Southeast Asia.Q4 Which age group do you belong to?22-3536-4546-60Above 6018-2143.3%17.9%24.5%8.1%The third largest group is aged between 46-60 years old(17.9%),followed by those aged above 60 years old(8.

47、1%)and lastly,those between 18 to 21 years old(6.2%).6.2%Country18-2122-3536-4546-60Above 60ASEAN6.2%43.3%24.5%17.9%8.1%BN6.5%42.9%32.5%16.9%1.3%KH20.1%59.3%17.5%2.1%1.1%ID2.6%50.2%23.4%18.1%5.7%LA10.6%60.6%21.3%6.9%0.6%MY2.7%38.7%24.0%21.8%12.9%MM5.3%44.4%27.5%14.8%7.9%PH7.4%37.7%20.9%21.4%12.6%SG3

48、.7%23.8%20.1%33.3%19.0%TH1.0%38.3%32.3%22.9%5.5%VN6.5%47.5%31.5%10.5%4.0%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202411SECTION II This section examines the key challenges and main preoccupations.Weighting is applied from this section onwards.Regional Outlook and Views on International Developments11-32THE STATE

49、 OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202411SURVEY REPORT12TOP THREE CHALLENGES FACING SOUTHEAST ASIAThe region continues to express fears of bleak economic prospects with the global economy in the state that it is.A majority of Southeast Asians(57.7%)fear unemployment and economic recession.The Israel-Hamas conflict

50、in October 2023 and the subsequent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea may be geographically far away but the impacts are felt through supply chain disruptions which may directly impact energy and food prices.Chinas economic slow-down may have also driven such concerns.At the country level,Brunei(77.9%),C

51、ambodia(68.3%),and Vietnam(67.5%)are particularly concerned.Singapore is an outlier with only 27.8%of the respondents expressing such fears.The second-ranked challenge is more frequent and intense weather events as expressed by 53.4%of Southeast Asians.Vietnam respondents(75.0%)overtook the Philippi

52、nes as the country most concerned with climate change.Vietnam experienced over 1,100 climate disasters last year with record-breaking temperatures exceeding 44 degrees Celsius.Climate change takes the top spot in Singapore(64.8%),Indonesia(58.9%),and Thailand(55.7%).47.0%of regional respondents pick

53、ed intensifying economic tensions between major powers as their third-ranked challenge.This is especially pertinent for Laos(70.0%)who picked this as their top-ranked concern,and Cambodia whose two top challenges are tied(68.3%).Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity are ranked fou

54、rth(44.4%)followed by increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints in the South China Sea,Taiwan Strait,and Korean Peninsula in fifth place.For the Philippines(64.7%),increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints in the South China Sea overtook climate change as it

55、s top concern this year.With income inequality becoming more acute post-Covid,it is no surprise that countries like Thailand(53.7%)ranked rising income disparity as its second-ranked concern as it has one of the highest income inequality in the world,with the richest 10%of Thais earning over half of

56、 the total national income while the bottom half of the population earns about 10%of total income.At the country level,Myanmar continues to feel most acutely the impacts of its domestic political instability at 70.9%.SURVEY REPORT12$2024Unemployment and economic recession57.7%202359.5%2024Climate ch

57、ange and more extreme weather events53.4%202357.1%2024Intensifying economic tensions between major powers47.0%202341.9%Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity Increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20241320242023Q5 What are the top

58、 3 challenges facing Southeast Asia?(Check 3 responses)CountryIntensifying economic tensions between major powersUnemployment and economic recessionDomestic political instability(including ethnic and religious tensions)Terrorism and extremismIncreased military tensions arising from potential flashpo

59、ints(i.e.South China Sea,Taiwan Strait,Korean Peninsula)Climate change and more extreme weather events(droughts,floods,cyclones,rising sea levels,etc.)Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income inequalityDeteriorating human rights conditionsASEAN47.0%57.7%36.8%10.0%38.0%53.4%44.4%12.8%BN36.4%77.

60、9%26.0%3.9%28.6%64.9%54.5%7.8%KH68.3%68.3%25.4%7.4%28.0%43.4%35.4%23.8%ID32.5%57.4%42.3%10.9%36.6%58.9%47.9%13.6%LA70.0%66.9%35.6%9.4%20.0%35.6%52.5%10.0%MY39.6%52.9%51.1%7.6%40.4%49.8%48.9%9.8%MM37.0%51.3%70.9%18.5%31.7%23.8%31.7%34.9%PH46.0%57.7%14.9%11.2%64.7%61.9%34.4%9.3%SG52.7%27.8%36.3%15.8%5

61、7.5%64.8%42.5%2.6%TH52.7%49.3%44.3%9.5%21.4%55.7%53.7%13.4%VN34.5%67.5%21.0%5.5%51.5%75.0%42.0%3.0%CountryUS-China decouplingUnemployment and economic recessionDomestic political instability(including ethnic and religious tensions)Terrorism and extremismIncreased military tensions arising from poten

62、tial flashpoints(i.e.South China Sea,Taiwan Strait,Korean Peninsula)Climate change and more extreme weather events(droughts,floods,cyclones,rising sea levels,etc.)Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income inequalityDeteriorating human rights conditionsASEAN36.2%59.5%35.6%11.3%41.9%57.1%41.9%16.

63、5%BN23.3%49.2%33.3%10.8%75.0%74.2%25.8%8.3%KH38.8%69.4%14.9%0.7%41.0%52.2%61.9%20.9%ID30.6%70.2%38.0%15.7%31.4%60.3%36.4%17.4%LA47.7%61.7%47.7%11.2%38.3%50.5%19.6%23.4%MY35.5%63.7%50.8%4.8%25.8%61.3%47.6%10.5%MM20.9%59.1%51.3%41.7%18.3%29.6%47.0%32.2%PH25.3%60.6%20.2%12.1%50.5%76.8%38.4%16.2%SG58.2%

64、45.2%31.7%4.8%45.2%60.1%49.0%5.8%TH38.2%62.5%37.5%9.7%27.8%41.7%59.0%23.6%VN44.1%53.7%30.1%1.5%64.7%64.7%34.6%6.6%SURVEY REPORT142023TOP THREE CONCERNS ABOUT ASEANThe region continues to be concerned about a“slow and ineffective”ASEAN that is unable to cope with fluid political and economic developm

65、ents,albeit dropping from 82.6%last year to 77.0%this year.The sense that ASEAN is always caught on its backfoot and thus risks irrelevance in the international order is felt most acutely by five countries in ASEAN:Indonesia(86.4%),Myanmar(84.1%),Brunei(81.8%),Malaysia(81.3%),and Thailand(76.6%).The

66、 second top concern is the fear of ASEAN becoming an arena of major power competition and that its member states may become major power proxies by a very tight margin of 76.4%of regional respondents.The other five ASEAN member states Vietnam(84.5%),the Philippines(83.7%),Cambodia(82.0%),Singapore(81

67、.7%),and Laos(76.3%)chose this as their top concern for ASEAN.Interestingly,Laos being this years ASEAN Chair may feel the need to defend against such pressures jumping drastically from 40.2%in 2023 to 76.3%in 2024.With a sense of economic malaise still prevalent in the region,59.9%of the respondent

68、s fear that ASEAN may not be able to return to its pre-pandemic economic growth.This is an increase from 37.2%last year.This may pose challenges to ASEAN achieving the status of the worlds 4th largest economy by 2030.Perceptions of ASEAN disunity was not as bad this year,dropping from 60.7%in 2023 t

69、o 51.6%as the grouping managed to display a faade of unity over Myanmar,Russia-Ukraine,and the Israel-Hamas conflict.Successive leaders statements appear cognisant of some differences but in general,were able to land in a comfortable zone of calling for adherence to international law.Fears of ASEAN

70、elitism ranked last,dropping from 46.6%in 2023 to 35.1%as other more important issues threatening ASEANs survival take centre stage.2024ASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited59.9%60.7%2024ASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments,becoming irr

71、elevant in the new world order77.0%202382.6%2024ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxies 76.4%202373.0%SURVEY REPORT14ASEAN is unable to return to pre-pandemic economic growthTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:2024152023CountryASEAN is unabl

72、e to recover from the pandemicASEAN is becoming increasingly disunitedASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary peopleASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments,becoming irrelevant in the new world orderASEAN is becoming an arena of major

73、power competition and its member states may become major power proxiesASEAN37.2%60.7%46.6%82.6%73.0%BN51.7%42.5%37.5%88.3%80.0%KH40.3%59.7%44.8%70.9%84.3%ID25.6%54.5%59.5%86.8%73.6%LA59.8%63.6%66.4%70.1%40.2%MY33.1%60.5%53.2%80.6%72.6%MM35.7%72.2%59.1%77.4%55.7%PH41.4%57.6%39.4%84.8%76.8%SG25.0%70.2

74、%31.7%89.9%83.2%TH34.7%56.9%51.4%84.0%72.9%VN24.3%69.1%22.8%93.4%90.4%2024CountryASEAN is unable to return to pre-pandemic economic growthASEAN is becoming increasingly disunitedASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary peopleASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid politi

75、cal and economic developments,becoming irrelevant in the new world orderASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxiesASEAN59.9%51.6%35.1%77.0%76.4%BN42.9%44.2%55.8%81.8%75.3%KH76.7%33.9%29.1%78.3%82.0%ID53.2%38.9%50.9%86.4%70.6%LA71.9%51.3

76、%39.4%61.3%76.3%MY60.0%54.2%34.7%81.3%69.8%MM41.3%61.4%44.4%84.1%68.8%PH60.9%54.0%34.0%67.4%83.7%SG55.7%67.4%20.9%74.4%81.7%TH64.2%61.7%26.4%76.6%71.1%VN72.5%49.5%15.0%78.5%84.5%Q6 What are your top 3 concerns about ASEAN?(Check 3 responses)SURVEY REPORT16TOP THREE GEOPOLITICAL CONCERNSThe October 7

77、 attacks by Hamas on Israeli civilians and the ensuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza occupies the regions mindshare(46.5%).The second-ranked concern is aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea(39.9%),followed by concerns over the two-year long Russia-Ukraine war and global scam operations(39.4%)tie

78、d at third place.International drug smuggling operations came in at a close fourth place(37.2%)followed by concerns over the change of political leadership in the region(33.9%).Implications arising from the January 2024 Taiwan elections ranked last in the list of geopolitical concerns at 7.6%,right

79、after the worries over the DPRKs continued ballistic tests(10.6%).At the country level,it is no surprise that the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia ranked the Israel-Hamas conflict as their top geopolitical concern Malaysia(83.1%),Brunei(79.2%),and Indonesia(74.7%).Singapore also ranked th

80、e Israel-Hamas conflict as its top concern at 57.9%.The Russia-Ukraine war continues to be the top concern for Laos and Cambodia at 61.9%and 57.7%respectively,whereas global scam operations are Thailands top concern(58.2%).Aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea is the Philippines(90.2%)and Viet

81、nams(72.5%)top concern,the regions two frontline South China Sea claimant states.Although Brunei and Malaysia are also claimant states,not being at the frontlines of managing Chinas actions mean that for them,aggressive behaviour in the area is ranked second place.Unsurprisingly,Myanmar is most conc

82、erned about its own troubles at 89.9%with little mindshare for other issues elsewhere.Q7 Which of the following current geopolitical events are the top concerns for the government in your country?(Check 3 responses)CountryRussia-Ukraine WarIsrael-Hamas conflict2024 US presidential electionsImplicati

83、ons arising from 2024 Taiwan electionsAggressive behaviour in the South China SeaMyanmar crisisDPRKs contd ballistic missile testingGlobal scam operationsIntl drug smugglingChange of political leadership in the regionASEAN39.4%46.5%18.8%7.6%39.9%26.6%10.6%39.4%37.2%33.9%BN18.2%79.2%22.1%5.2%50.6%26.

84、0%7.8%35.1%20.8%35.1%KH57.7%41.8%21.2%5.3%17.5%16.9%13.2%34.9%51.9%39.7%ID36.6%74.7%9.8%3.0%43.0%27.9%10.6%23.0%35.5%35.8%LA61.9%32.5%10.6%6.3%9.4%11.9%18.8%51.9%55.6%41.3%MY24.9%83.1%4.9%4.9%47.6%24.0%4.9%43.6%20.0%42.2%MM36.0%12.7%16.4%4.8%10.1%89.9%4.2%38.1%44.4%43.4%PH23.7%24.2%12.1%12.6%90.2%2.

85、3%10.2%36.3%55.8%32.6%SG30.0%57.9%42.1%19.4%44.3%12.1%6.6%43.6%12.1%31.9%TH38.3%36.8%10.4%7.0%13.9%41.3%14.4%58.2%53.2%26.4%VN67.0%22.0%38.0%8.0%72.5%14.0%15.5%29.5%22.5%11.0%39.9%Israel-Hamas conflict46.5%Russia-Ukraine War39.4%Aggressive behaviour in the South China SeaSCSGlobal scam operationsTHE

86、 STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202417The situation in Myanmar continues to trouble ASEAN.With only the Five-Point Consensus(5PC)that was agreed by all ten ASEAN members in April 2021 to work on,the grouping has muddled through the last three years.Similar to 2023,the largest proportion of respondents rema

87、ined agnostic about the efficacy of the 5PC at 31.1%.With the exception of Myanmar and Thailand,all the other eight ASEAN countries hold neutral views of the 5PC.Despite having been the immediate past ASEAN Chair that was most actively engaged on the issue of Myanmar,Indonesia has shifted from pinni

88、ng the failure of the 5PC to the intransigence of the junta,declining from 28.1%in 2023 to 19.6%in 2024,to a more neutral view of the consensus document,increasing from 23.1%in 2023 to 35.1%this year.Indonesias change in stance may be indicative of a realisation of how complex the issues in the Myan

89、mar conflict are based on its experience.At the regional level,the sense that the 5PC will not work with the intransigence of the State Administration Council(Junta)continues to hold sway at 22.4%while a third group holds the view that it is fundamentally flawed in addressing complex issues to begin

90、 with(17.8%).Myanmar respondents squarely point to the SACs intransigence for ASEANs failure at 41.8%though another 20.1%appear to think that the strategy was flawed from the beginning.ASEANS FIVE-POINT CONSENSUS ON MYANMARQ8 Choose the statement that best reflects your view about ASEANs Five-Point

91、Consensus(5PC)on Myanmar:Of those who think that the 5PC remains the most suitable under present circumstances(15.8%),only Cambodia seems to hold more strongly to this view at 25.9%.On the other hand,Thailand holds the view that the 5PC has served to expose ASEAN disunity at 25.4%,double the regiona

92、l average of 12.9%.It is worth noting that Thailand was active in organising the Track 1.5 meetings involving China,Bangladesh,India,Myanmar,and Laos in 2023 under the Prayuth Chan O-Cha government.2024202322.4%12.9%31.1%17.8%21.7%13.7%31.4%19.6%13.5%15.8%CountryThe 5PC is fundamentally flawed in ad

93、dressing complex issuesThe 5PC exposes ASEAN disunity The 5PC will not work with the intransigence of the State Administration Council(Junta)The 5PC is the most suitable option under these circumstancesI am neutral about the 5PC2023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN19.6%17.8%13.7%12.9%21.7%22

94、.4%13.5%15.8%31.4%31.1%BN11.7%15.6%10.8%9.1%17.5%23.4%11.7%7.8%48.3%44.2%KH4.5%20.1%3.0%8.5%9.7%16.4%26.9%25.9%56.0%29.1%ID24.0%17.7%6.6%9.1%28.1%19.6%18.2%18.5%23.1%35.1%LA11.2%13.8%10.3%15.6%8.4%12.5%8.4%20.0%61.7%38.1%MY16.9%18.7%16.1%13.8%26.6%21.3%11.3%11.6%29.0%34.7%MM35.7%20.1%29.6%10.1%16.5%

95、41.8%9.6%10.1%8.7%18.0%PH22.2%23.3%11.1%12.1%23.2%14.9%15.2%17.7%28.3%32.1%SG14.4%14.7%8.7%12.1%41.8%29.3%11.1%10.6%24.0%33.3%TH27.1%15.9%23.6%25.4%26.4%23.4%6.3%15.9%16.7%19.4%VN28.7%18.5%17.6%13.0%18.4%21.5%16.9%20.0%18.4%27.0%SURVEY REPORT18202415.2%2023Not interfere12.7%Engage in independent dia

96、logue with all key stakeholders in Myanmar38.6%202438.1%2023202413.0%202315.1%202414.9%202318.0%Utilise harder methods to effectively curtail the SAC202312.5%202413.7%Downgrade/limit engagement with SAC Q9 To move the Myanmar issue forward,ASEAN should:MOVING THE MYANMAR ISSUE FORWARD Independent di

97、alogue with all key stakeholders,including with the National Unity Government and other entities,continues to be the regions most favoured approach at 38.6%.It is unanimously the top choice of all ten countries,including Myanmar.The second approach,if the region had to choose,would be to utilise har

98、der methods to increase the costs of non-compliance for the military junta at 14.9%.But the popularity of this choice has dropped by three percentage points compared to 2023.This may perhaps be indicative that the situation has evolved quite significantly since Operation 1027 whereby the juntas cont

99、rol is now questionable.The least popular option which is to reinstate the SACs involvement in ASEAN meetings to continue pushing for 5PC implementation(8.3%)had its strongest support from Cambodia at double the regional average(16.4%).Laos who is ASEAN Chair this year gave this option the lowest ra

100、ting(3.8%)among all the options.Equally unattractive options include mounting a coordinated response with international partners(13.0%),non-interference in Myanmars domestic politics(12.7%),and downgrading/limiting engagement with the SAC until the situation improves(12.5%).In many ways the regions

101、responses show that there is a greater appreciation of the multiple layers of complexities surrounding the Myanmar conflict,including the increasingly visible involvement of the Peoples Defense Force,the many ethnic armed organisations,and the demands of the Myanmar diaspora.Reinstate SACs involveme

102、nt in ASEAN meetings 20248.3%Mount a coordinated and unified response with international partnersCountryDowngrade/limit engagement with SAC until the situation in Myanmar improves towards political stability and a willingness to respond to ASEANs regional diplomacyEngage in independent dialogue with

103、 all key stakeholders,including the National Unity Government,in Myanmar to build trustMount a coordinated and unified response with international partnersNot interfere in Myanmars domestic politicsUtilise harder methods (e.g.,suspension,targeted sanctions)to increase the costs for SAC of its non-co

104、mpliance with the 5PCReinstate SACs involvement in ASEAN meetings to continue pushing for 5PC implementation20232024202320242023202420232024202320242024ASEAN13.7%12.5%38.1%38.6%15.1%13.0%15.2%12.7%18.0%14.9%8.3%BN22.5%16.9%34.2%31.2%15.0%7.8%5.0%11.7%23.3%20.8%11.7%KH13.4%13.2%17.2%40.2%9.0%10.6%47.

105、0%11.6%13.4%7.9%16.4%ID9.9%11.3%50.4%44.2%12.4%7.2%3.3%6.8%24.0%24.5%6.0%LA2.8%11.3%40.2%43.8%12.1%9.4%43.0%25.0%1.9%6.9%3.8%MY16.1%13.3%41.1%38.2%15.3%14.2%7.3%8.9%20.2%17.3%8.0%MM7.8%6.3%36.5%43.9%18.3%16.4%21.7%13.8%15.7%10.1%9.5%PH15.2%14.4%41.4%43.3%18.2%20.5%4.0%7.0%21.2%7.4%7.4%SG18.8%16.5%34

106、.6%28.9%19.7%17.2%6.7%15.0%20.2%18.3%4.0%TH20.1%16.4%34.7%36.3%18.1%10.0%5.6%12.9%21.5%19.9%4.5%VN10.3%5.5%50.7%36.0%12.5%16.5%8.1%14.5%18.4%16.0%11.5%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202419Q10 How would the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait affect the region?THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN TAI

107、WAN STRAITSoutheast Asians recognise that any hostilities in the Taiwan Strait would have significant implications for the region,given the geographical proximity and economic ties with both China and Taiwan.Economic interest prevails,with the largest group of respondents(44.2%)expressing concern th

108、at such a conflict scenario would severely disrupt supply chains between China,Taiwan,and Southeast Asia.This sentiment is particularly pronounced in Vietnam,where 59.0%of respondents share this concern.The second largest group of respondents(25.0%)fear that regional countries would be forced to cho

109、ose between the US and China,with Singapore(37.7%)and Thailand(32.3%)expressing the highest levels of concern.A smaller percentage of respondents(15.8%)believe that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would create a repatriation crisis for ASEAN member states,considering the presence of over 700,000 Sou

110、theast Asian migrant workers on the island.This concern is particularly notable among respondents from the Philippines(28.8%)and Indonesia(24.2%)two of the largest sources of migrant workers based in Taiwan.A minority of respondents(8.5%)are worried about ASEANs ineffectiveness in handling such a cr

111、isis,with Myanmar expressing the highest level of concern at 22.2%.The smallest group of respondents(6.5%)deny any potential effect on the region,with Laos respondents constituting the majority at 23.1%.44.2%25.0%15.8%8.5%6.5%Severely disrupt supply chains between China,Taiwan,and Southeast AsiaForc

112、e Southeast Asian countries to choose between the US and ChinaCreate a repatriation crisis for ASEAN member statesExpose ASEANs ineffectivenessNo effect on the regionCountryCreate a repatriation crisis for ASEAN member statesExpose ASEANs ineffectivenessForce Southeast Asian countries to choose betw

113、een the US and ChinaSeverely disrupt supply chains between China,Taiwan,and Southeast AsiaNo effect on the regionASEAN15.8%8.5%25.0%44.2%6.5%BN9.1%10.4%27.3%45.5%7.8%KH16.9%6.3%26.5%47.1%3.2%ID24.2%8.7%15.8%47.2%4.2%LA18.8%8.1%24.4%25.6%23.1%MY16.4%8.0%20.9%48.4%6.2%MM9.0%22.2%29.6%31.2%7.9%PH28.8%8

114、.8%18.6%39.5%4.2%SG5.1%3.7%37.7%50.5%2.9%TH11.4%4.5%32.3%48.3%3.5%VN18.5%4.0%17.0%59.0%1.5%CountryDowngrade/limit engagement with SAC until the situation in Myanmar improves towards political stability and a willingness to respond to ASEANs regional diplomacyEngage in independent dialogue with all k

115、ey stakeholders,including the National Unity Government,in Myanmar to build trustMount a coordinated and unified response with international partnersNot interfere in Myanmars domestic politicsUtilise harder methods (e.g.,suspension,targeted sanctions)to increase the costs for SAC of its non-complian

116、ce with the 5PCReinstate SACs involvement in ASEAN meetings to continue pushing for 5PC implementation20232024202320242023202420232024202320242024ASEAN13.7%12.5%38.1%38.6%15.1%13.0%15.2%12.7%18.0%14.9%8.3%BN22.5%16.9%34.2%31.2%15.0%7.8%5.0%11.7%23.3%20.8%11.7%KH13.4%13.2%17.2%40.2%9.0%10.6%47.0%11.6

117、%13.4%7.9%16.4%ID9.9%11.3%50.4%44.2%12.4%7.2%3.3%6.8%24.0%24.5%6.0%LA2.8%11.3%40.2%43.8%12.1%9.4%43.0%25.0%1.9%6.9%3.8%MY16.1%13.3%41.1%38.2%15.3%14.2%7.3%8.9%20.2%17.3%8.0%MM7.8%6.3%36.5%43.9%18.3%16.4%21.7%13.8%15.7%10.1%9.5%PH15.2%14.4%41.4%43.3%18.2%20.5%4.0%7.0%21.2%7.4%7.4%SG18.8%16.5%34.6%28.

118、9%19.7%17.2%6.7%15.0%20.2%18.3%4.0%TH20.1%16.4%34.7%36.3%18.1%10.0%5.6%12.9%21.5%19.9%4.5%VN10.3%5.5%50.7%36.0%12.5%16.5%8.1%14.5%18.4%16.0%11.5%SURVEY REPORT203.0%202445.6%2023RESPONSE TOWARDS CONFLICT IN TAIWAN STRAITIn the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait,most respondents(45.1%)advocate f

119、or the non-use of force and the pursuit of diplomatic measures instead.This preference is the top choice for most of ASEAN member states,with Vietnam registering the highest support at 60.0%while Laos and Thailand stand out for their preference to adopt a neutral position.Similar to last years findi

120、ngs,over a third of the respondents(36.5%)express a desire to maintain a neutral stance.There is limited support in the region for imposing sanctions on the aggressor(9.8%),facilitating military support for Taiwan(5.7%),or showing explicit support for China(3.0%).At the country level,the Philippines

121、 which has been strengthening its alliance with the US,demonstrates the highest percentage(14.9%)in favour of facilitating military support for Taiwan.This aligns with the Philippines recent expansion of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement(EDCA)with the US,granting access to four additional b

122、ases,three of which face Taiwan.Surprisingly,Cambodia leads among countries wanting to impose sanctions on the aggressor,with 17.5%of the respondents expressing support for this approach.On the other hand,Laos(8.1%)and Brunei(7.8%)emerge as the top two countries showing support for China.Q11 What sh

123、ould your country do if conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait?Oppose the use of force using diplomatic measures Adopt a neutral positionImpose sanctions on the aggressorFacilitate military support for TaiwanShow support for China33.5%202311.9%20236.3%20232.7%202345.1%202436.5%20249.8%20245.7%2024

124、CountryOppose the use of force using diplomatic measuresAdopt a neutral positionImpose sanctions on the aggressorFacilitate military support for TaiwanShow support for China2023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN45.6%45.1%33.5%36.5%11.9%9.8%6.3%5.7%2.7%3.0%BN21.7%42.9%52.5%37.7%12.5%3.9%12.5%7

125、.8%0.8%7.8%KH23.1%35.4%56.0%35.4%9.0%17.5%3.0%10.6%9.0%1.1%ID66.1%59.2%22.3%27.2%9.1%9.4%2.5%1.9%0.0%2.3%LA15.9%26.9%59.8%56.3%12.1%8.8%5.6%0.0%6.5%8.1%MY52.4%50.7%29.0%35.1%12.1%6.7%4.0%3.6%2.4%4.0%MM54.8%50.8%19.1%27.0%18.3%14.3%4.3%5.3%3.5%2.6%PH54.5%44.2%13.1%26.5%12.1%13.5%20.2%14.9%0.0%0.9%SG5

126、8.2%49.8%24.0%37.4%11.1%6.2%2.9%5.9%3.8%0.7%TH48.6%31.3%31.9%55.2%14.6%9.0%4.2%4.0%0.7%0.5%VN61.0%60.0%27.2%27.0%8.1%8.5%3.7%3.0%0.0%1.5%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202421TIMOR-LESTES ADMISSION INTO ASEANIn November 2022,after more than a decade of deliberations,ASEAN leaders finally reached a conse

127、nsus to admit Timor-Leste as the 11th member of ASEAN and grant it observer status to attend all meetings.The decision was positively welcomed by regional respondents in the 2023 survey report.This year,Southeast Asians continue to express optimism about Timor-Lestes membership,with 36.9%of the resp

128、ondents believing that it would enhance ASEANs unity and centrality.This sentiment is particularly strong among the respondents in Vietnam(65.0%),Cambodia(49.7%),and Laos(45.0%)the newer members of ASEAN.The second largest group of respondents(27.3%)believe that including Timor-Leste in ASEAN would

129、boost intra-regional trade and investment,a sentiment most pronounced among Malaysian respondents.A fifth of respondents(19.6%)believe that Timor-Lestes membership will not change anything in ASEAN.This perspective is primarily held by respondents from Indonesia(34.3%),Brunei(32.5%),and Singapore(26

130、.4%).There are smaller percentages of respondents expressing less optimistic views,such as concerns about Timor-Leste complicating ASEANs consensus-based decision-making process(6.8%),slowing down ASEANs economic integration(5.8%),and increasing disunity among ASEAN member states(3.6%).Q12 In my opi

131、nion,the admission of Timor-Leste into ASEAN will:Enhance ASEANs unity and centrality36.9%Increase intra-regional trade and investment27.3%Not change anything in ASEAN19.6%Complicate the consensus-based decision-making process6.8%Increase disunity among ASEAN member statesCountryComplicate the conse

132、nsus-based decision-making processEnhance ASEANs unity and centralityIncrease disunity among ASEAN member statesIncrease intra-regional trade and investmentSlow down ASEANs economic integrationNot change anything in ASEANASEAN6.8%36.9%3.6%27.3%5.8%19.6%BN6.5%22.1%1.3%29.9%7.8%32.5%KH3.2%49.7%3.7%31.

133、7%3.7%7.9%ID4.2%29.8%2.6%21.9%7.2%34.3%LA3.1%45.0%5.6%32.5%1.9%11.9%MY11.1%26.2%4.4%28.0%7.1%23.1%MM4.8%38.1%8.5%24.9%1.1%22.8%PH5.6%41.9%2.3%33.5%5.6%11.2%SG18.3%12.1%1.8%26.0%15.4%26.4%TH7.5%38.8%5.0%25.9%4.0%18.9%VN3.5%65.0%1.0%19.0%4.0%7.5%Slow down ASEANs economic integration5.8%Singapore respo

134、ndents,in particular,exhibit the least optimism,with a significant proportion believing that Timor-Leste will complicate decision-making(18.3%)and hinder ASEANs economic integration(15.4%).CountryOppose the use of force using diplomatic measuresAdopt a neutral positionImpose sanctions on the aggress

135、orFacilitate military support for TaiwanShow support for China2023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN45.6%45.1%33.5%36.5%11.9%9.8%6.3%5.7%2.7%3.0%BN21.7%42.9%52.5%37.7%12.5%3.9%12.5%7.8%0.8%7.8%KH23.1%35.4%56.0%35.4%9.0%17.5%3.0%10.6%9.0%1.1%ID66.1%59.2%22.3%27.2%9.1%9.4%2.5%1.9%0.0%2.3%LA15.9

136、%26.9%59.8%56.3%12.1%8.8%5.6%0.0%6.5%8.1%MY52.4%50.7%29.0%35.1%12.1%6.7%4.0%3.6%2.4%4.0%MM54.8%50.8%19.1%27.0%18.3%14.3%4.3%5.3%3.5%2.6%PH54.5%44.2%13.1%26.5%12.1%13.5%20.2%14.9%0.0%0.9%SG58.2%49.8%24.0%37.4%11.1%6.2%2.9%5.9%3.8%0.7%TH48.6%31.3%31.9%55.2%14.6%9.0%4.2%4.0%0.7%0.5%VN61.0%60.0%27.2%27.

137、0%8.1%8.5%3.7%3.0%0.0%1.5%3.6%SURVEY REPORT22MEMBER STATES CONTRIBUTION TO ASEANS DEVELOPMENTTwo of the original founding ASEAN members Singapore and Indonesia are acknowledged as having made the biggest contribution to ASEANs long-term development and progress.Singapore is the front-runner holding

138、66.0%of the regions votes while Indonesia stands at 41.5%.Apart from Indonesia and Vietnam respondents who voted for their own countries as ASEANs leader,the rest of the ASEAN members voted for Singapore as their top choice.Singapore is Indonesias and Vietnams second-ranked country at 61.9%and 55.5%

139、respectively.Indonesia is the second-ranked choice for four countries Singapore(63.4%),Malaysia(54.7%),Brunei(50.6%),and Cambodia(34.9%)whereas Thailand was second-ranked for two of its immediate neighbours Myanmar(40.7%)and Laos(39.4%).For Laos,first place regional leadership may belong to Singapor

140、e but second-place regional leadership position is a toss-up between Thailand at 39.4%and Vietnam at 31.9%.Q13 Which members have made the biggest contribution to ASEANs long-term development and progress?(Choose two responses)CountryBNKHIDLAMYMMPHSGTHVNASEAN12.4%4.5%41.5%2.3%18.5%1.9%7.8%66.0%29.9%

141、15.3%BN26.0%1.3%50.6%0.0%28.6%0.0%6.5%59.7%26.0%1.3%KH16.4%29.1%34.9%2.1%11.6%5.8%7.4%59.8%22.8%10.1%ID17.7%0.8%84.5%0.8%13.2%0.8%3.4%61.9%13.6%3.4%LA13.1%0.6%10.6%11.3%13.1%1.9%7.5%70.6%39.4%31.9%MY12.9%0.4%54.7%0.4%51.6%0.9%2.2%58.2%13.3%5.3%MM5.3%9.0%34.9%3.2%22.2%4.2%2.1%73.5%40.7%4.8%PH12.6%0.0

142、%33.0%0.5%14.9%2.3%33.5%70.7%24.7%7.9%SG6.2%0.7%63.4%0.4%15.0%0.7%1.8%82.4%19.4%9.9%TH11.4%1.5%24.9%1.5%10.4%1.5%7.5%67.2%63.2%10.9%VN2.5%2.0%23.0%2.5%4.5%1.0%6.0%55.5%35.5%67.5%Singapore66.0%Indonesia41.5%Brunei 12.4%Laos2.3%Vietnam15.3%Myanmar1.9%Thailand29.9%Malaysia18.5%Cambodia4.5%Philippines7.

143、8%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202423Increase in energy and food prices causing economic hardship 68.4%58.3%5.2%RUSSIAS INVASION OF UKRAINEWhile the Russia-Ukraine war may not command the primary focus of attention in Southeast Asia two years on,the region remains deeply concerned about the conflicts

144、 implications for global stability and economic security.Similar to last years finding,only a minority of 4.6%feel that the war does not affect Southeast Asia.Economic impact continues to be the predominant worry among respondents,with a substantial majority(68.4%)expressing concerns that the potent

145、ial increase in energy and food prices will lead to economic hardship.This concern ranks as the unchallenged top option for all countries in the region.In addition to economic worries,14.5%of respondents are concerned about the erosion of trust in a rules-based order and the violation of national so

146、vereignty.Notably,Singapore respondents top this category at 25.6%,reflecting Singapores principled stand based on international law which led to its unilateral imposition of sanctions on Russia.Smaller percentages of Southeast Asians believe that the war will worsen tensions between the US and Chin

147、a(8.2%)and exacerbate existing divisions within ASEAN(4.4%).Q14 What continues to be the most serious impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Southeast Asia?Worsening tensions between the US and ChinaIncrease in existing divisions within ASEANDoes not affect Southeast AsiaErosion of trust in a rules-bas

148、ed order and violation of national sovereigntyCountryErosion of trust in a rules-based order and violation of national sovereigntyIncrease in energy and food prices causing economic hardshipIncrease in existing divisions within ASEANWorsening tensions between the US and ChinaDoes not affect Southeas

149、t Asia2023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN25.9%14.5%58.3%68.4%7.4%4.4%5.2%8.2%3.2%4.6%BN19.2%15.6%38.3%58.4%24.2%7.8%9.2%10.4%9.2%7.8%KH27.6%14.8%61.2%68.8%3.0%2.6%5.2%9.5%3.0%4.2%ID20.7%13.2%73.6%68.7%0.8%4.9%4.1%7.9%0.8%5.3%LA31.8%2.5%52.3%86.3%8.4%3.1%1.9%4.4%5.6%3.8%MY16.9%17.8%62.1%65.

150、3%9.7%4.9%9.7%9.8%1.6%2.2%MM28.7%16.4%52.2%60.8%9.6%3.2%2.6%12.7%7.0%6.9%PH23.2%13.0%70.7%71.6%4.0%4.2%1.0%8.8%1.0%2.3%SG40.9%25.6%48.6%60.4%3.4%4.4%5.8%5.9%1.4%3.7%TH17.4%12.9%65.3%69.7%7.6%6.0%8.3%6.5%1.4%5.0%VN32.4%13.0%58.8%73.5%2.9%2.5%4.4%6.0%1.5%5.0%4.6%14.5%25.9%3.2%8.2%4.4%7.4%20242023SURVE

151、Y REPORT24Q15 What is the most likely impact of the Israel-Hamas conflict on Southeast Asia?IMPACT OF THE ISRAEL-HAMAS CONFLICT ON SOUTHEAST ASIAThe ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has emerged as a contentious issue in Southeast Asia,commanding significant attention in the regions domestic politics.De

152、spite its geographical distance,the conflict has reverberated strongly across this diverse multi-racial and multi-religious region.The largest group of respondents(29.7%)express concern that the conflict would catalyse the rise of extremist activities,thereby impacting domestic and regional security

153、.Notably,Singapore(41.0%),Cambodia(39.2%),and the Philippines(37.7%)top this perspective.Singapore and the Philippines,countries that view Hamas as a terrorist group,have condemned its attack on Israel,while Cambodia has denounced all acts of terrorism and violence against innocent civilians.The sec

154、ond top concern(27.5%)is the diminished trust in international law and rules-based order.This sentiment is particularly pronounced in Indonesia(47.5%)and CountryDiminished trust in international law and rules-based orderErosion of domestic social cohesion due to religious divisionsGreater ASEAN disu

155、nity due to differences in member states positionsRise in extremist activities impacting domestic and regional securityDoes not impact Southeast AsiaASEAN27.5%17.5%15.4%29.7%9.9%BN31.2%10.4%28.6%22.1%7.8%KH21.7%16.4%11.1%39.2%11.6%ID47.5%13.6%14.0%21.5%3.4%LA19.4%15.6%13.1%29.4%22.5%MY34.7%15.1%17.3

156、%28.9%4.0%MM32.8%22.8%9.0%19.6%15.9%PH21.9%15.8%17.2%37.7%7.4%SG19.4%20.9%15.0%41.0%3.7%TH14.4%31.8%19.4%24.9%9.5%VN32.5%12.5%9.0%32.5%13.5%Rise in extremist activities impacting domestic and regional securityMalaysia(34.7%),where there is strong support for the International Court of Justice(ICJ)ca

157、se against Israels occupation of Palestinian territories.A smaller proportion of respondents(17.5%)anticipate that the conflict would erode domestic social cohesion due to religious divisions.Interestingly,the Muslim-majority countries of Malaysia(15.1%),Indonesia(13.6%),and Brunei(10.4%)exhibit low

158、er levels of concern in this regard,viewing the conflict as a uniting force within their respective countries.Another 15.4%of the respondents fear that the conflict could exacerbate existing divisions within ASEAN,given differences in member states positions.This view has borne out in ASEANs joint s

159、tatement on the issue which made reference to the respective national statements.A minority(9.9%)believe that the conflict will have no impact on Southeast Asia,one-fifth of them hail from Laos.29.7%Diminished trust in international law and rules-based order27.5%Erosion of domestic social cohesion d

160、ue to religious divisionsGreater ASEAN disunity due to differences in member states positions17.5%Does not impact Southeast Asia15.4%9.9%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202425Q16 Choose the statement that best reflects your view of the Israel-Hamas conflict:VIEW OF THE ISRAEL-HAMAS CONFLICTThe sentiment

161、s of the large Muslim populations which account for 42%of the regions total population size have heavily influenced the perception of the Israel-Hamas conflict.41.8%of the respondents express concern that Israels attack on Gaza had gone too far.At the country level,Brunei(79.2%),Indonesia(77.7%),and

162、 Malaysia(64.4%)are particularly concerned.About a fifth(19.6%)of the respondents believe that Israel has the right to retaliate,subject to international law.This option is preferred by the Philippines(32.1%)and Vietnam(31.0%)while none of Brunei respondents,8.9%of Malaysia respondents and only 3.0%

163、of the respondents from Indonesia opted for this choice.The third largest group(16.5%)do not have a view on the issue.This option is popular amongst the respondents from Laos(43.1%)and Myanmar(28.6%).A minority of respondents chose extreme options,including the view that Israel has the right to reta

164、liate as it sees fit(8.8%).This view was supported primarily by respondents from Myanmar(20.6%)and Cambodia(18.5%).Similarly,a small percentage of respondents(7.5%)believe that Hamas attack on Israel cannot be justified while 5.8%feel the opposite.Israels attack on Gaza has gone too far41.8%Israel h

165、as the right to retaliate subject to international law19.6%I do not have a view16.5%Israel has the right to retaliate as it sees fitHamas attack on Israel cannot be justified7.5%8.8%5.8%Hamas was justified in attacking IsraelCountryHamas attack on Israel cannot be justifiedHamas was justified in att

166、acking IsraelIsrael has the right to retaliate as it sees fitIsrael has the right to retaliate subject to international lawIsraels attack on Gaza has gone too farI do not have a viewASEAN7.5%5.8%8.8%19.6%41.8%16.5%BN3.9%9.1%1.3%0.0%79.2%6.5%KH7.9%8.5%18.5%22.2%24.9%18.0%ID6.0%7.5%1.5%3.0%77.7%4.2%LA

167、5.6%5.0%10.6%20.0%15.6%43.1%MY4.4%12.4%1.3%8.9%64.4%8.4%MM6.9%3.7%20.6%25.4%14.8%28.6%PH17.7%4.2%11.2%32.1%26.5%8.4%SG8.1%2.9%4.8%26.7%46.2%11.4%TH7.5%1.5%13.9%26.9%30.3%19.9%VN6.5%3.0%4.5%31.0%38.5%16.5%SURVEY REPORT26Q17 Do you approve of your governments position on the Israel-Hamas conflict?APPR

168、OVAL OF GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE TO THE ISRAEL-HAMAS CONFLICT43.1%of ASEAN respondents hold a neutral opinion towards their governments position on the Israel-Hamas conflict,with Myanmar(72.0%)and Laos(64.4%)having the highest share.This can be attributed to the fact that Myanmar remains preoccupied wit

169、h its domestic political crisis while Laos is focused on its economic growth to overcome its debt crisis.On the other hand,42.9%of the respondents express approval of their governments position on the conflict.Respondents from Indonesia(78.2%),Brunei(65.0%),Malaysia(58.6%),and Singapore(57.2%)are th

170、e most supportive of their governments stance.Only 14.1%of regional respondents disapprove of their governments stance.Among those who express greater disapproval of their government,Cambodia(18.5%)and Thailand(18.4%)stand out.Strongly Disapprove or Disapprove 14.1%Neutral43.1%Strongly Approveor App

171、rove42.9%CountryApproveStrongly ApproveNeutralDisapproveStrongly DisapproveASEAN26.4%16.5%43.1%9.2%4.9%BN24.7%40.3%20.8%7.8%6.5%KH21.2%12.7%47.6%11.1%7.4%ID45.7%32.5%15.1%5.3%1.5%LA15.0%3.8%64.4%10.6%6.3%MY30.2%28.4%27.6%9.8%4.0%MM6.9%3.7%72.0%10.6%6.9%PH31.6%8.8%51.6%6.0%1.9%SG40.7%16.5%30.8%7.3%4.

172、8%TH24.4%7.5%49.8%13.9%4.5%VN23.5%10.5%51.5%9.5%5.0%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202427Q18 The international community shouldVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITYS RESPONSES TO THE ISRAEL-HAMAS CONFLICTIn line with ASEANs commitment on upholding the tenets of international humanitarian law,the non-use

173、of force,and peaceful resolution of disputes,Southeast Asians have demonstrated a strong embrace of these principles.The largest group of respondents(41.3%)advocated for international support for a ceasefire and the prioritisation of humanitarian aid.This sentiment is prevalent across all ASEAN coun

174、tries,except for Brunei whose primary viewpoint(42.9%)is in favour of international backing for the self-determination of the Palestinian people,which also represents the regions second most popular stance at 17.5%.The third prevalent perspective(16.2%)is the international endorsement of a two-state

175、 solution as the only solution for Israel and Palestine,notably championed by respondents from Singapore(24.9%)and Cambodia(22.2%),countries known for their principled stances in global affairs.This is followed closely by the viewpoint advocating for international facilitation of dialogues on potent

176、ial solutions for the conflict(14.6%),notably supported by respondents from Myanmar(22.8%)who are grappling with a multifaceted civil conflict.Conversely,outright backing for Israel(5.8%)found no favour in Brunei and received minimal support from Indonesia(0.8%)and Malaysia(0.4%).The least favoured

177、option(4.6%)is non-interference in the conflict,with most of the proponents hailing from Laos(18.1%).Support a ceasefire and prioritise the provision of humanitarian aid41.3%Support the right to self-determination of the Palestinian peopleSupport Israel unconditionally even if it exposes its own dou

178、ble standardsNot interfere in the conflictSupport a two-state solution as the only solution for Israel and PalestineFoster dialogue on potential solutions for the conflict17.5%16.2%14.6%5.8%4.6%CountryFoster dialogue on potential solutions for the conflictSupport a ceasefire and prioritise the provi

179、sion of humanitarian aidSupport a two-state solution as the only solution for Israel and PalestineSupport Israel unconditionally even if it exposes its own double standardsSupport the right to self-determination of the Palestinian peopleNot interfere in the conflictASEAN14.6%41.3%16.2%5.8%17.5%4.6%B

180、N6.5%37.7%11.7%0.0%42.9%1.3%KH17.5%31.2%22.2%14.3%11.1%3.7%ID9.8%36.2%18.1%0.8%35.1%0.0%LA16.9%35.6%10.0%11.9%7.5%18.1%MY6.2%43.1%19.6%0.4%29.3%1.3%MM22.8%36.5%12.7%9.0%12.2%6.9%PH19.1%50.7%15.8%7.4%5.6%1.4%SG12.8%46.9%24.9%2.6%10.3%2.6%TH19.9%43.8%12.9%7.5%10.0%6.0%VN14.5%51.0%14.5%4.5%11.0%4.5%SUR

181、VEY REPORT28VIEWS ON THE US-LED INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR PROSPERITYMore than a year on from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperitys(IPEF)launch in May 2022,sentiments surrounding its potential effectiveness and benefits have further waned.In the latest reading,positive sentime

182、nts about the IPEF declined from 46.5%last year to 40.4%this year,while 44.8%of Southeast Asians respondents are increasingly unsure about the impact and effectiveness of the IPEF,rising from a 41.8%share from a year before.Negative sentiments have also increased from 11.7%last year to 14.9%this yea

183、r.Of those who are positive about the IPEF,Vietnam(64.0%)and the Philippines(62.8%)stand out.Brunei(58.4%),Laos(56.9%),Malaysia(52.4%),and Myanmar(51.9%)display the most uncertainty over IPEFs impact,with notably two out of this group Brunei and Malaysia being founding IPEF members,whilst Laos and M

184、yanmar are not.Of those who are negative about the IPEF,Brunei(26.0%)and Indonesia(25.7%)express the highest levels.Whilst it may be intuitive to conclude why non-members may be unsure or neutral about its relative usefulness,the swing of positive sentiments to uncertainty is perplexing for countrie

185、s that were positive about IPEFs impact just a year before.Q19 The overall impact and effectiveness of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)is likely to be:CountryPositiveNegativeNot Sure202320242023202420232024ASEAN46.5%40.4%11.7%14.9%41.8%44.8%BN68.3%15.6%8.3%26.0%23.3%58

186、.4%KH31.3%39.7%18.7%17.5%50.0%42.9%ID34.7%32.5%13.2%25.7%52.1%41.9%LA35.5%33.1%8.4%10.0%56.1%56.9%MY40.3%26.7%15.3%20.9%44.4%52.4%MM60.9%41.8%11.3%6.3%27.8%51.9%PH58.6%62.8%8.1%10.7%33.3%26.5%SG37.5%37.7%16.8%14.3%45.7%48.0%TH41.7%49.8%11.8%11.9%46.5%38.3%VN55.9%64.0%5.1%5.5%39.0%30.5%40.4%44.8%14.9

187、%46.5%41.8%11.7%20232024Both the IPEF founding members Brunei and Malaysia demonstrate this said swing.Compared to 2023,only 15.6%of Brunei and 26.7%of Malaysia respondents view the IPEF favourably for their countries,a significant fall by 52.7 and 13.6 percentage points respectively.THE STATE OF SO

188、UTHEAST ASIA:202429REASONS FOR POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS IPEFQ20A I feel that Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)is positive because.831 respondents who chose the“Positive”option in Q19The positive sentiment can be mainly attributed to respondents feeling that the IPEF would be abl

189、e to complement existing ASEAN initiatives(30.0%)with respect to strengthening trade and investment capacities and external ties.Most of this sentiment is exhibited by Brunei(50.0%),Thailand(42.0%),and Laos(37.7%).Interestingly,Laos as a non-member also sees a framework such as IPEF potentially bene

190、fitting ASEAN as a whole.27.3%of respondents see the IPEF as a signal of ongoing US commitment and economic engagement in the region,most cited by Singapore(42.7%),Vietnam(39.1%),and Thailand(31.0%).The IPEF at its core is aimed at strengthening global trade governance,yet it does not come out stron

191、gly as the main driver of its positive impact for Southeast Asian economies(22.9%).It will complement existing ASEAN initiativesIt will signal US commitment to be economically engaged in the regionIt will strengthen global trade governanceIt will add value to my countrys relations with the US27.3%19

192、.8%30.0%22.9%CountryIt will add value to my countrys relations with the USIt will complement existing ASEAN initiativesIt will signal US commitment to be economically engaged in the regionIt will strengthen global trade governance20232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN24.3%19.8%30.4%30.0%31.3%27.3%14.

193、1%22.9%BN14.6%16.7%52.4%50.0%24.4%25.0%8.5%8.3%KH14.3%34.7%42.9%22.7%33.3%21.3%9.5%21.3%ID19.0%16.3%16.7%18.6%45.2%26.7%19.0%38.4%LA36.8%26.4%28.9%37.7%18.4%18.9%15.8%17.0%MY20.0%20.0%30.0%26.7%42.0%28.3%8.0%25.0%MM47.1%7.6%20.0%27.8%14.3%20.3%18.6%44.3%PH22.4%15.6%32.8%30.4%24.1%20.0%20.7%34.1%SG21

194、.8%18.4%30.8%24.3%30.8%42.7%16.7%14.6%TH23.3%18.0%33.3%42.0%36.7%31.0%6.7%9.0%VN23.7%24.2%15.8%19.5%43.4%39.1%17.1%17.2%SURVEY REPORT30Q20B I feel that Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)is negative because.293 respondents who chose the“Negative”option in Q19CountryIt will complicat

195、e my countrys relations with ChinaIt will hasten the US-China decoupling processIt will not offer greater market access for my country but impose adjustments and compliance costsIt will worsen US-China competition20232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN13.4%15.0%24.2%10.8%28.4%45.8%33.9%28.4%BN0.0%15.0

196、%40.0%5.0%30.0%70.0%30.0%10.0%KH8.0%12.1%12.0%15.2%64.0%39.4%16.0%33.3%ID6.3%11.8%18.8%8.8%31.3%39.7%43.8%39.7%LA22.2%18.8%11.1%0.0%33.3%50.0%33.3%31.3%MY0.0%4.3%26.3%10.6%10.5%46.8%63.2%38.3%MM15.4%16.7%23.1%16.7%30.8%25.0%30.8%41.7%PH25.0%26.1%25.0%8.7%0.0%39.1%50.0%26.1%SG17.1%2.6%25.7%7.7%20.0%5

197、6.4%37.1%33.3%TH11.8%25.0%17.6%16.7%35.3%45.8%35.3%12.5%VN28.6%18.2%42.9%18.2%28.6%45.5%0.0%18.2%In terms of perceptions regarding the negative impact of the IPEF on Southeast Asia,most respondents continue to be concerned about the lack of market access offered by the IPEF despite the additional ad

198、justment and compliance costs it would bring.45.8%of respondents cite this as the biggest reason for their negative sentiment towards the IPEFs impact,compared to 28.4%of respondents last year.This marks a significant rise of this viewpoint which is most strongly voiced by Brunei(70.0%),Singapore(56

199、.4%),and Laos(50.0%).Of these countries,Laos sentiment as a non-member may also indicate one of the strongest reasons for the lack of interest to participate in the IPEF.Fears of the IPEF contributing to the worsening of US-China competition declined from 33.9%last year to 28.4%this year.Perhaps giv

200、en the lack of momentum in the IPEF and from the other results indicative of a general lack of interest,the impact of US-China relations is now a downplayed concern.On the flipside,as negotiations progress and more details surface on the intricacies of the terms of the agreement,countries may be mor

201、e cognisant of the extent to which the IPEF could bring more costs than benefits.It will not offer greater market access for my country but impose adjustments and compliance costsIt will worsen US-China competitionIt will complicate my countrys relations with ChinaIt will hasten the US-China decoupl

202、ing process28.4%10.8%45.8%15.0%REASONS FOR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS IPEFTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202431REASONS FOR UNSURE ATTITUDE TOWARDS IPEFQ20C I am not sure about the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)because.870 respondents who chose the“Not Sure”option in Q19One third o

203、f the region(32.6%),IPEF members and non-members alike,show no interest in it.More than half of the respondents from Brunei(51.1%),Laos(50.5%),and Myanmar(50.0%)are not interested in it.Besides an apparent lack of interest,there is also perhaps a strategic element linked to the unsure responses,with

204、 the IPEFs impact closely tied to potential counter-actions by China with 27.9%of respondents citing this.Amongst the most concerned about this are Thailand(48.1%),the Philippines(33.3%),and Malaysia(28.8%),all being IPEF members and having strong trade links with China.As trade tensions continue to

205、 heighten and given ASEANs opportune,yet delicate position in the middle of these,being more sensitised to strategic responses and potential tit-for-tat actions by the major economic powers is a given.I am not interested It depends on Chinas acounter-actionsIt does not come with greater access to th

206、e US marketCosts appear to outweigh benefits27.9%18.9%32.6%20.6%CountryThere is little information availableIt depends on what emerges from the negotiationsIt depends on Chinas counter-actionsIt does not come with greater access to the US marketI am not interested Costs appear to outweigh benefits20

207、2320232023202420232024202320242024ASEAN27.2%35.5%12.5%27.9%9.0%20.6%15.8%32.6%18.9%BN17.9%28.6%17.9%20.0%17.9%15.6%17.9%51.1%13.3%KH28.4%23.9%6.0%24.7%4.5%22.2%37.3%34.6%18.5%ID25.4%34.9%7.9%21.6%14.3%23.4%17.5%22.5%32.4%LA23.3%33.3%11.7%22.0%1.7%13.2%30.0%50.5%14.3%MY30.9%38.2%14.5%28.8%12.7%22.9%3

208、.6%33.9%14.4%MM21.9%21.9%25.0%26.5%6.3%13.3%25.0%50.0%10.2%PH33.3%51.5%9.1%33.3%0.0%19.3%6.1%17.5%29.8%SG24.2%46.3%4.2%27.5%16.8%31.3%8.4%29.8%11.5%TH32.8%40.3%13.4%48.1%4.5%16.9%9.0%11.7%23.4%VN34.0%35.8%15.1%26.2%11.3%27.9%3.8%24.6%21.3%SURVEY REPORT32Enhance cooperation in digital trade integrati

209、on initiativesVIEWS ON THE ASEAN DIGITAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTThe ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement(DEFA)will be the first regional digital agreement of its kind in the world.It aims to offer a more integrated approach to ASEANs digital economy development through the use of rules-base

210、d mechanisms and standards.Negotiations were launched formally in September 2023,with a first round completed in December 2023.If successfully implemented,the DEFA has the potential to increase the value of ASEANs digital economy to US$2 trillion by 2030,amounting to an additional US$1 trillion on t

211、op of the current business-as-usual trajectory.There are some notable challenges ahead as the negotiations progress where meaningful digital economy integration will be sought whilst balancing the differing levels of digital capabilities,digital development approaches,and mindsets amongst the ASEAN

212、member states.To translate a broad-based regional agreement to a domestic setting will also be a key challenge in making the DEFA a reality.The largest group of regional respondents(38.0%)believe that the DEFA will be able to significantly contribute to raising digital capabilities and enhancing reg

213、ional digital trade.The most bullish countries with respect to this sentiment are Vietnam(59.0%),the Philippines(53.0%),Thailand(49.3%),and Indonesia(49.1%).The second largest group of respondents(25.1%)also notably expect the DEFA to enhance cooperation in digital trade integration initiatives.Q21

214、The ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement(DEFA)will:Singapore(38.5%),Malaysia(29.3%),Indonesia(27.5%),and Cambodia(27.5%)demonstrate their strong sentiments in this respect.To note,the countries showing the most optimistic stance are at different levels of digital development and hence,there is

215、no strong correlation with levels of digital maturity in this regard.However,17.6%of the regional respondents are less optimistic towards the DEFA and feel that it will have only limited impact on raising digital trade flows,mostly on account of regional differences in standards and digital capabili

216、ties.This sentiment is shared by Brunei(29.9%),Myanmar(27.5%),and Cambodia(19.0%).Only 16.8%of the respondents have not heard of the agreement at the point of the survey being conducted and 2.6%feel that it will not change the status quo.38.0%25.1%Significantly contribute to raising digital capabili

217、ties and enhancing regional digital tradeHave a limited impact on raising digital trade flows due to regional differences in standards and digital capabilitiesI have not heard of the DEFA17.6%16.8%2.6%Not change the status quoCountrySignificantly contribute to raising digital capabilities and enhanc

218、ing regional digital tradeEnhance cooperation in digital trade integration initiativesHave a limited impact on raising digital trade flows due to regional differences in standards and digital capabilitiesNot change the status quoI have not heard of the DEFAASEAN38.0%25.1%17.6%2.6%16.8%BN14.3%23.4%29

219、.9%3.9%28.6%KH36.0%27.5%19.0%1.6%15.9%ID49.1%27.5%11.7%3.4%8.3%LA38.1%16.3%15.6%3.8%26.3%MY33.3%29.3%17.8%2.7%16.9%MM22.2%13.8%27.5%3.7%32.8%PH53.0%27.0%10.7%0.5%8.8%SG26.0%38.5%16.5%1.5%17.6%TH49.3%21.4%18.4%4.0%7.0%VN59.0%26.0%8.5%1.0%5.5%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202433SECTION III Major Powers

220、Regional Influence and LeadershipThis section focuses on the strategic and economic influence of major powers in the region,the strategic relevance of ASEAN Dialogue Partners,and their leadership credibility on global issues such as free trade and upholding international law.33-45THE STATE OF SOUTHE

221、AST ASIA:202433SURVEY REPORT34MOST INFLUENTIAL ECONOMIC POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIAASEAN20242023China20242023The US20242023ASEANChinaThe United States20242023OthersPerceptions of China as the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia remain high with 59.5%of regional respondents sharing this vie

222、w.The strongest sentiments come from Laos(77.5%),Thailand(70.6%),and Malaysia(66.7%).As of 2023,China remains the largest foreign investor in Laos,as well as its top export market.The other significant economic players in the region ASEAN(16.8%)and the US(14.3%)remained in prime positions,moderately

223、 rising in positive perceptions from the previous year.This trend saw a lowering in perceptions of economic influence for numerous middle power countries and regional groupings such as Japan(3.7%),the EU(2.8%),the UK(0.8%)and Australia(0.5%).Even as the perception of Chinas economic influence remain

224、s steadfast and strong,the majority of regional respondents are worried about its growing regional economic influence(67.4%)as opposed to those who welcome it(32.6%).Most of this concern stems from Vietnam(87.7%),Myanmar(87.6%),and Thailand(80.3%),which is an interesting trend especially given the s

225、trong trade ties that Vietnam and Thailand enjoy with China.On the other hand,more than half of regional respondents(59.0%)welcome ASEANs growing economic influence although this optimism has been gradually waning.That said,countries that most welcome ASEANs growing economic influence are Brunei(85.

226、7%),Malaysia(78.9%),and Indonesia(78.7%),with Malaysia and Indonesia showing a credible uptick in positive sentiments from the previous year.The US remains the third highest ranked in terms of perceptions on economic influence in the region and this sentiment has been gradually on the rise.52.0%of t

227、he respondents welcome the US growing economic influence,but only marginally over those who are concerned about this trend at 48.0%.The proportion that welcome this positive sentiment has been moderating at 68.1%in 2022 and 65.7%in 2023.Amongst the countries that most welcome the US growing economic

228、 influence are Brunei(83.3%),the Philippines(81.7%),and Singapore(67.9%).202316.8%59.5%14.3%20249.4%14.6%59.9%10.5%15.0%65.7%39.1%60.9%34.3%100%I am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influence75%50%25%0%64.4%48.0%41.0%59.0%67.4%64.5%35.5%52.

229、0%32.6%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202435Q22 In your view,which country/regional organisation is the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia?Q23 What is your view of this economic powers influence on your country?345 respondents who chose the“ASEAN”option in Q22;1169 respondents who chose

230、the“China”option in Q22;296 respondents who chose the“The US”option in Q22CountryASEANChinaThe United StatesI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influenceI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regio

231、nal economic influenceI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influence202320242023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN39.1%41.0%60.9%59.0%64.5%67.4%35.5%32.6%34.3%48.0%65.7%52.0%BN16.7%14.3%83.3%85.7%13.2%49.0%86.8%51.0%12.5%16.7%87.5%8

232、3.3%KH53.8%76.2%46.2%23.8%50.5%59.3%49.5%40.7%66.7%60.5%33.3%39.5%ID56.5%21.3%43.5%78.7%50.0%46.2%50.0%53.8%50.0%57.1%50.0%42.9%LA31.3%92.3%68.8%7.7%72.7%77.4%27.3%22.6%50.0%92.3%50.0%7.7%MY40.0%21.1%60.0%78.9%61.7%48.0%38.3%52.0%35.3%47.6%64.7%52.4%MM20.0%30.8%80.0%69.2%79.5%87.6%20.5%12.4%18.8%43.

233、2%81.3%56.8%PH44.0%33.9%56.0%66.1%83.3%75.8%16.7%24.2%26.9%18.3%73.1%81.7%SG27.3%30.0%72.7%70.0%61.9%63.2%38.1%36.8%21.4%32.1%78.6%67.9%TH75.0%47.1%25.0%52.9%86.0%80.3%14.0%19.7%46.2%78.3%53.8%21.7%VN26.7%43.1%73.3%56.9%86.2%87.7%13.8%12.3%15.4%33.3%84.6%66.7%CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European U

234、nionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United StatesThe United Kingdom202320242023202420232024202320242023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN15.0%16.8%2.7%0.5%59.9%59.5%4.2%2.8%0.7%0.6%4.6%3.7%1.0%1.0%10.5%14.3%1.3%0.8%BN10.0%18.2%5.8%1.3%44.2%63.6%7.5%1.3%4.2%1.3%12.5%2.6%2.5%0.0%6.7%7.8%6.7%3.9%

235、KH19.4%11.1%0.7%0.5%75.4%59.8%1.5%4.8%0.0%1.1%0.0%1.1%0.0%0.0%2.2%20.1%0.7%1.6%ID19.0%28.3%0.0%1.1%71.1%54.0%1.7%1.1%0.0%0.0%3.3%5.3%0.0%2.3%5.0%7.9%0.0%0.0%LA29.9%8.1%16.8%0.0%20.6%77.5%16.8%4.4%0.0%0.0%6.5%0.6%1.9%1.3%5.6%8.1%1.9%0.0%MY12.1%16.9%0.8%0.0%65.3%66.7%2.4%0.4%0.0%1.3%2.4%4.4%1.6%0.4%13

236、.7%9.3%1.6%0.4%MM4.3%6.9%0.9%0.0%72.2%59.8%1.7%5.8%0.9%0.5%5.2%5.8%0.0%1.6%13.9%19.6%0.9%0.0%PH25.3%26.0%1.0%0.0%36.4%30.7%2.0%3.7%0.0%0.5%7.1%8.8%1.0%1.9%26.3%27.9%1.0%0.5%SG10.6%14.7%0.5%1.1%70.7%59.7%1.4%0.4%1.0%0.4%1.9%2.6%0.5%0.0%13.5%20.5%0.0%0.7%TH8.3%8.5%0.7%1.0%74.3%70.6%2.8%3.5%0.7%0.5%3.5

237、%2.5%0.0%1.5%9.0%11.4%0.7%0.5%VN11.0%29.0%0.0%0.0%69.1%53.0%4.4%3.0%0.0%0.5%3.7%3.0%2.2%1.0%9.6%10.5%0.0%0.0%SURVEY REPORT3640.3%MOST INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIAAs in previous years,China has maintained its position as the most influential and strategic power in South

238、east Asia(43.9%).It has seen a slight increase from 41.5%last year and remains the top choice among all ASEAN countries except for Indonesia and the Philippines.Laos respondents in particular viewed Chinas influence highly at 64.4%.Conversely,the influence of the US has diminished from 31.9%last yea

239、r to 25.8%this year although it remains the preferred choice among respondents from the Philippines.Interestingly,there is a growing acknowledgment of ASEANs influence,now standing at 20.0%,a notable surge from 13.1%last year.This signifies the increasing significance of the regional bloc in the reg

240、ional architecture.Notably,ASEAN emerged as the preferred option among Indonesia respondents(34.3%),reflecting the impact of Indonesias Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023.However,other middle powers experienced a decline in influence,except for Japan,whose influence nearly doubled from 1.9%to 3.7%followi

241、ng the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of dialogue relations between ASEAN and Japan last year.Despite Chinas strong influence in the region,concerns about China persist,with 73.5%of respondents expressing unease,up from 68.5%last year.Vietnam(95.7%)and Myanmar(95.1%)exhibited the highest leve

242、ls of apprehension,while Brunei registered a significant surge in concern,rising from 5.6%last year to 58.1%this year.Similarly,confidence in the US has waned.This could be attributed partly to the escalating rivalry between China and the US which led to an uptick in anxiety about the US growing str

243、ategic and political influence,rising from 44.2%to 59.0%this year.Although most ASEAN countries share this concern,exceptions include the Philippines(68.5%),Singapore(63.4%),and Vietnam(54.8%),which perceive US influence more positively than the region.On the other hand,the region generally welcomes

244、 ASEANs increasing influence with 58.4%of respondents expressing this.This sentiment is particularly strong among respondents from Brunei(76.2%)and Indonesia(74.7%).In contrast,Laos,Cambodia,and Thailand express greater apprehension towards ASEANs influence,with Laos exhibiting the highest level of

245、concern at 82.4%.ASEAN20242023China20242023The US2024202368.5%100%75%50%25%0%64.4%44.2%26.5%55.8%41.0%59.0%41.6%58.4%59.7%73.5%31.5%I am worried about growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influenceASEANChinaThe United States20242023

246、Others43.9%20.0%25.8%10.3%13.1%41.5%31.9%13.5%20232024THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202437Q25 What is your view of this political and strategic powers influence on your country?405 respondents who chose the“ASEAN”option in Q24;856 respondents who chose the“China”option in Q24;535 respondents who chose

247、 the“The US”option in Q24.Q24 In your view,which country/regional organisation has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia?CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United StatesThe United Kingdom20232024202320242023202420232024202320242023202420

248、2320242023202420232024ASEAN13.1%20.0%3.0%0.5%41.5%43.9%4.9%3.4%0.9%0.4%1.9%3.7%1.7%1.4%31.9%25.8%1.1%0.9%BN4.2%27.3%7.5%0.0%45.0%40.3%9.2%0.0%5.0%0.0%5.8%6.5%7.5%1.3%13.3%19.5%2.5%5.2%KH6.0%13.8%0.7%0.5%72.4%53.4%3.0%7.4%0.0%0.5%0.0%3.2%0.0%0.5%17.9%20.1%0.0%0.5%ID24.8%34.3%1.7%1.1%29.8%32.5%5.0%1.5

249、%0.8%0.0%1.7%5.3%0.8%1.9%35.5%23.4%0.0%0.0%LA17.8%10.6%14.0%0.6%30.8%64.4%17.8%5.6%0.9%0.6%0.0%1.3%2.8%1.9%13.1%15.0%2.8%0.0%MY21.8%24.4%3.2%0.9%35.5%42.7%0.8%0.4%0.0%0.9%1.6%2.7%0.8%3.6%33.9%23.6%2.4%0.9%MM4.3%10.1%0.9%0.5%40.0%43.4%1.7%5.8%0.0%0.5%1.7%4.2%0.0%2.6%49.6%32.8%1.7%0.0%PH18.2%26.5%0.0%

250、0.0%30.3%19.5%3.0%3.7%0.0%0.0%2.0%6.5%2.0%0.0%44.4%42.8%0.0%0.9%SG12.0%17.9%1.0%0.4%33.2%38.8%2.4%1.1%2.4%1.5%1.0%2.2%0.0%0.7%48.1%37.0%0.0%0.4%TH9.0%8.0%0.7%0.5%45.8%58.2%2.8%5.0%0.0%0.0%1.4%3.0%2.8%1.0%36.1%22.9%1.4%1.5%VN13.2%27.0%0.7%0.0%52.2%46.0%2.9%3.5%0.0%0.0%3.7%2.0%0.0%0.5%27.2%21.0%0.0%0.

251、0%CountryASEANChinaThe United StatesI am worried about growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influenceI am worried about growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influen

252、ceI am worried about growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influence202320242023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN40.3%41.6%59.7%58.4%68.5%73.5%31.5%26.5%44.2%59.0%55.8%41.0%BN0.0%23.8%100.0%76.2%5.6%58.1%94.4%41.9%31.3%73.3%6

253、8.8%26.7%KH37.5%61.5%62.5%38.5%52.6%66.3%47.4%33.7%58.3%57.9%41.7%42.1%ID33.3%25.3%66.7%74.7%61.1%57.0%38.9%43.0%67.4%72.6%32.6%27.4%LA42.1%82.4%57.9%17.6%63.6%68.0%36.4%32.0%42.9%79.2%57.1%20.8%MY33.3%27.3%66.7%72.7%72.7%56.3%27.3%43.8%57.1%67.9%42.9%32.1%MM60.0%42.1%40.0%57.9%84.8%95.1%15.2%4.9%28

254、.1%45.2%71.9%54.8%PH66.7%35.1%33.3%64.9%86.7%81.0%13.3%19.0%29.5%31.5%70.5%68.5%SG20.0%30.6%80.0%69.4%69.6%73.6%30.4%26.4%39.0%36.6%61.0%63.4%TH76.9%56.3%23.1%43.8%95.5%83.8%4.5%16.2%61.5%80.4%38.5%19.6%VN33.3%31.5%66.7%68.5%93.0%95.7%7.0%4.3%27.0%45.2%73.0%54.8%SURVEY REPORT38DIALOGUE PARTNERS STRA

255、TEGIC RELEVANCE TO ASEANQ26 Rank the following Dialogue Partners in order of strategic relevance to ASEAN:Southeast Asians have affirmed China as the most strategically significant partner to ASEAN with a mean score of 8.98 out of 11.Following closely are the US(8.79)and Japan(7.48).Notably,responde

256、nts from Brunei,Cambodia,Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,Singapore,and Thailand expressed strong support for China,while only a modest number of respondents from the Philippines made the same choice,ranking China fourth instead.Conversely,the US enjoys significant strategic confidence from respondents in th

257、e Philippines,Myanmar,and Vietnam as their top choice.While Japan may not lead the rankings as the most strategically relevant dialogue partner,it has secured third position across most ASEAN countries.Notably,Japan receives stronger support from Brunei and the Philippines,where it is their second c

258、hoice.The EU,occupying the fourth rank(6.38),garnered more positive views from respondents in the Philippines(3rd place)while it is less appealing to respondents from Brunei(8th place).South Korea(5.71),the United Kingdom(5.52),and Australia(5.51)emerged as middle-ranking countries by respondents,se

259、curing the 5th,6th,and 7th positions respectively.Although South Korea has been ranked as the 6th or 7th choice by most,it garnered more favourable rankings from respondents in Indonesia (4th place).Conversely,the UK received less favourable perceptions from Indonesian respondents(9th place),yet enj

260、oyed a more positive outlook from respondents in Cambodia,the Philippines,and Thailand(5th place).ASEAN AverageRankDialogue PartnerMean Score(Out of 11)1China8.982The United States8.793Japan7.484The European Union6.385Republic of Korea5.716The United Kingdom5.527Australia5.518Russian Federation5.089

261、India5.0410Canada3.8111New Zealand3.70New Zealand1011101011111091011This question was analysed using a rank-sum method.A 10%weightage was applied to each country to ensure proportionality of responses,followed by a calculation of survey-weighted mean ranks and scores for each of the Dialogue Partner

262、s.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202439*In the dataset for Thailand,both India and the Republic of Korea exhibited identical mean rank and mean score.The Republic of Korea was ranked ahead due to its lower standard deviation,indicating a greater proportion of respondents who ranked it closer to the mea

263、n rank of 7th place and mean score of 5,as compared to India.Ranking Order by ASEAN Member StatesBNKHIDLAMYMMPHSGTH*VNChina1111124112The United States3222211221Japan2334332333The European Union8455443544Republic of Korea5646668776The United Kingdom6597875857Australia4778586498Russian Federation98639

264、9111165India7989759689Canada1110111110107101110New Zealand1011101011111091011Australias ranking displayed the widest disparity among Southeast Asians,ranging from 4th to 9th place.It garnered stronger support from Brunei and Singapore respondents(4th place)while less from Thailand(9th place).While m

265、ost Southeast Asian countries enjoy positive relations with these three middle powers,the general perception varies depending on bilateral economic relations,cultural influence,and the security roles of these countries in the regional architecture.Despite its aggression on Ukraine,Russia has claimed

266、 the 8th place(5.08)ahead of India,Canada,and New Zealand.This demonstrates Russias perceived strategic relevance among ASEAN countries,particularly Laos(3rd place),Vietnam(5th place),Indonesia and Thailand(both at 6th place).Notably,Russia ranked last among respondents from the Philippines and Sing

267、apore,highlighting the importance of a rules-based order as a strategic asset for these two countries.Despite its proximity to Southeast Asia,India finds itself ranked ninth(5.04)on average.However,it enjoys more favourable perceptions from strategic partners like Myanmar(5th place)and Singapore(6th

268、 place).These positive views likely stem from the historical-cultural connections and robust economic ties with these countries.Conversely,countries such as Cambodia,Laos,the Philippines,and Vietnam(9th place)which maintain closer diplomatic ties with China,the US,and Russia respectively,perceive In

269、dia as less strategically significant.This reflects the influence of geopolitical alignments and regional dynamics on perceptions of Indias importance within Southeast Asia.Canada(3.81)and New Zealand(3.70)demonstrate a wider disparity in scores compared to countries in the 5th to 9th place.Despite

270、maintaining amicable relations with ASEAN,these two countries could be perceived to be less strategically relevant within the Southeast Asian context.This perception could stem from factors such as their smaller size and population,geographical distance and relatively weaker trade and people-to-peop

271、le ties with Southeast Asia as compared to other middle powers.Canada for instance is the last dialogue partner(apart from the UK)to attain a strategic partnership with ASEAN,coupled with its non-membership in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit(EAS)and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meet

272、ing Plus(ADMM-Plus)despite expressing interest.This may contribute to its perceived lower strategic relevance in Southeast Asia.Similarly,New Zealands limited engagement in regional security initiatives might also influence perceptions of its significance in the region.SURVEY REPORT40202429.7%ASEAN2

273、2.1%US18.5%ChinaAustralia 1.7%India 1.1%UK 1.4%New Zealand 1.2%ROK 1.3%9.0%Japan13.9%EU202323.5%ASEAN21.9%US17.6%EUUK 4.3%India 1.2%New Zealand 3.0%ROK 1.6%Australia 3.0%9.2%Japan14.8%ChinaLEADERSHIP IN CHAMPIONING GLOBAL FREE TRADEThe region continues to grapple with a myriad of challenges related

274、to global free trade,including trade protectionism,geopolitical tensions,and trade wars among major economies.Amidst these challenges,ASEAN has emerged as the regions foremost advocate for global free trade,with 29.7%of the respondents expressing confidence in its leadership.This marks an increase f

275、rom 23.5%last year,reaffirming the regions support for a robust multilateral trading system led by ASEAN.Notably,ASEAN enjoys the highest approval ratings among respondents from Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Vietnam.The US maintains its second-place position,garnering 22.1%

276、of the regions confidence.At the country level,it is the preferred choice among respondents from Myanmar(40.2%),and Thailand(27.9%).Meanwhile,China has ascended to the third position with 18.5%support,a modest increase from 14.8%last year,primarily backed by respondents from Laos(45.0%).Confidence i

277、n the EU has waned,declining from 17.6%to 13.9%relegating it to the fourth position from third place last year.Other middle powers including Australia,India,Japan,South Korea,and the UK also witnessed a decline in confidence levels among respondents.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20244120232024Q27 Who

278、do you have the most confidence in to champion the global free trade agenda?CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN29.7%1.7%18.5%13.9%1.1%9.0%1.2%1.3%1.4%22.1%BN41.6%3.9%20.8%11.7%2.6%9.1%2.6%2.6%0.0%5.2%KH21.7%0.0%21

279、.7%16.4%0.0%9.5%0.5%0.0%2.6%27.5%ID50.2%1.1%18.9%8.3%0.4%9.4%0.0%3.0%0.4%8.3%LA18.1%0.6%45.0%12.5%0.0%3.8%0.0%0.0%0.6%19.4%MY33.8%3.1%27.6%6.7%2.2%8.4%1.3%0.9%1.8%14.2%MM14.3%2.6%6.3%18.5%1.1%12.2%0.0%3.2%1.6%40.2%PH35.3%2.3%8.4%10.2%0.9%9.3%1.4%0.9%3.3%27.9%SG34.4%1.5%12.1%11.7%0.7%9.2%5.1%1.1%2.6%

280、21.6%TH12.4%1.5%18.4%23.9%2.0%10.0%1.5%1.0%1.5%27.9%VN35.5%0.5%5.5%19.5%1.0%9.0%0.0%0.5%0.0%28.5%CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN23.5%3.0%14.8%17.6%1.2%9.2%3.0%1.6%4.3%21.9%BN36.7%3.3%6.7%20.0%3.3%3.3%11.7%1.7%

281、5.8%7.5%KH5.2%1.5%35.8%18.7%0.0%5.2%0.0%0.0%0.7%32.8%ID43.0%2.5%18.2%10.7%0.8%10.7%2.5%3.3%5.8%2.5%LA26.2%10.3%14.0%25.2%0.0%4.7%2.8%0.0%2.8%14.0%MY28.2%5.6%16.9%15.3%0.0%8.9%4.0%4.0%1.6%15.3%MM8.7%0.0%9.6%7.0%3.5%13.9%0.9%0.9%2.6%53.0%PH27.3%1.0%5.1%17.2%0.0%15.2%0.0%2.0%2.0%30.3%SG25.5%3.8%17.3%17

282、.3%1.4%6.3%5.8%1.4%2.4%18.8%TH14.6%2.1%17.4%21.5%2.1%9.0%2.8%0.7%18.8%11.1%VN19.9%0.0%6.6%22.8%0.7%14.7%0.0%1.5%0.0%33.8%SURVEY REPORT42202427.9%US26.9%ASEAN16.9%EUUK 2.9%India 0.6%New Zealand 1.7%ROK 1.0%Australia 1.6%8.8%Japan11.5%China202327.1%US23.0%EU21.0%ASEANChina 5.3%ROK 0.8%Australia 3.4%In

283、dia 1.0%New Zealand 2.9%6.9%UK8.6%JapanLEADERSHIP IN MAINTAINING RULES-BASED ORDER AND UPHOLDING INTERNATIONAL LAWThe US maintains its status as the regions advocate for maintaining a rules-based order and upholding international law,with a steady approval rating of 27.9%,consistent with the previou

284、s year.It remains the preferred choice for several ASEAN countries including Cambodia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.Meanwhile,confidence in ASEANs leadership has seen a significant increase,rising from 21.0%to 26.9%this year,garnering robust backing from Indonesia(49.1%),Brunei(40.3

285、%)and Vietnam(35.5%).Chinas proactive diplomatic efforts in the region have contributed to a substantial increase in confidence from 5.3%to 11.5%,primarily supported by respondents from Laos(36.3%).However,confidence in the EU has declined from 23.0%to 16.9%,resulting in a drop in its ranking from s

286、econd to third place.Notably,Cambodia and Laos witnessed the most substantial decrease in confidence from 38.8%to 13.2%and from 29.0%to 10.6%,respectively,although the EU remains positively viewed by Singapore and Thailand.Moreover,confidence in middle powers namely Australia,India,and the UK has al

287、so experienced a decline,despite their strong advocacy for such principles.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20244320232024Q28 Who do you have the most confidence in to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law?CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanN

288、ew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN26.9%1.6%11.5%16.9%0.6%8.8%1.7%1.0%2.9%27.9%BN40.3%1.3%11.7%13.0%0.0%10.4%5.2%2.6%3.9%11.7%KH17.5%2.6%9.5%13.2%0.0%12.7%0.0%0.5%4.2%39.7%ID49.1%2.3%7.9%14.0%0.4%10.2%1.9%1.5%2.3%10.6%LA18.8%1.3%36.3%10.6%0.6%8.1%1.3%0.6%1.3%21.3%MY34

289、.2%2.2%15.6%14.7%0.4%8.0%2.2%1.3%4.0%17.3%MM15.3%2.1%3.2%17.5%2.1%10.1%0.5%2.6%2.1%44.4%PH27.9%1.4%4.7%16.7%0.0%5.1%1.9%0.0%4.7%37.7%SG20.9%1.1%7.3%22.7%1.1%7.0%2.9%0.4%2.6%34.1%TH10.0%1.0%14.4%26.4%0.5%10.9%1.0%0.5%4.0%31.3%VN35.5%1.0%4.5%20.5%1.0%6.0%0.0%0.0%0.5%31.0%CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe

290、European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN21.0%3.4%5.3%23.0%1.0%8.6%2.9%0.8%6.9%27.1%BN30.8%5.8%2.5%20.0%0.8%14.2%5.0%2.5%10.8%7.5%KH4.5%0.0%2.2%38.8%0.0%4.5%0.7%0.0%0.7%48.5%ID43.8%0.8%6.6%16.5%0.0%9.9%1.7%2.5%6.6%11.6%LA14.0%17.8%5.6%29.0%0.0%6.5%8

291、.4%0.0%11.2%7.5%MY26.6%4.8%6.5%19.4%0.0%10.5%3.2%0.8%4.0%24.2%MM12.2%0.0%7.0%6.1%6.1%11.3%2.6%0.0%2.6%52.2%PH27.3%0.0%2.0%16.2%0.0%10.1%3.0%1.0%4.0%36.4%SG15.9%2.9%10.6%24.5%1.4%5.8%2.4%0.5%4.8%31.3%TH12.5%1.4%9.0%32.6%0.0%6.9%2.1%0.7%22.9%11.8%VN22.1%0.7%1.5%26.5%1.5%6.6%0.0%0.0%1.5%39.7%SURVEY REP

292、ORT44Q29 Cooperation between ASEAN and the Quad will:The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(Quad)comprising the US,India,Japan,and Australia continues to build momentum in delivering public goods to Southeast Asia.The prevailing sense among 40.9%of the regions respondents is that cooperation with the Q

293、uad is likely to bring benefits,as compared to 31.0%in 2023.The countries that perceive a greater likelihood of benefits from potential ASEAN-Quad cooperation are Cambodia(53.4%),Laos and Vietnam(both at 52.5%).One third of the respondents(32.2%)view the Quad as being complementary to ASEANs efforts

294、,declining from 37.8%last year.The Philippines(42.3%)and Indonesia(40.4%)tend to be more sanguine in their views about potential cooperation with the Quad.Conversely,11.5%of the respondents say that cooperation with the Quad could threaten ASEAN centrality and compete with other ASEAN-led mechanisms

295、 such as the East Asia Summit(EAS),the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF),and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus(ADMM-Plus),albeit a drop from 13.9%last year.Fears of being forced to choose sides should ASEAN cooperate with the Quad appears to have eased from 10.4%in 2023 to 7.9%in 2024.However,these f

296、ears are at a higher level in Myanmar(13.2%),Thailand(12.4%),and Singapore(10.6%).COOPERATION WITH THE QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE The fear of provoking China through cooperation increased marginally from 6.8%to 7.4%.The fears of provocation appear elevated in Myanmar(13.8%),Singapore(12.1%),and

297、 Brunei(10.4%).30%20%10%0%7.9%40.9%31.0%32.2%37.8%6.8%40%2023202450%7.4%CountryBe beneficial to the regionBe complementary to ASEAN effortsForce countries to choose sidesProvoke ChinaThreaten ASEAN centrality and compete with ASEAN-led mechanisms2023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN31.0%40.9

298、%37.8%32.2%10.4%7.9%6.8%7.4%13.9%11.5%BN23.9%27.3%21.7%35.1%31.5%9.1%4.3%10.4%18.5%18.2%KH22.7%53.4%27.3%25.4%11.4%3.2%4.5%4.2%34.1%13.8%ID25.0%38.1%53.8%40.4%5.0%7.5%1.3%4.2%15.0%9.8%LA42.9%52.5%31.0%19.4%14.3%4.4%2.4%10.0%9.5%13.8%MY27.6%35.1%44.7%34.7%3.9%9.3%13.2%6.7%10.5%14.2%MM31.4%36.5%37.2%2

299、7.5%14.0%13.2%12.8%13.8%4.7%9.0%PH39.7%42.3%42.6%42.3%2.9%4.7%5.9%4.2%8.8%6.5%SG28.8%32.2%33.6%34.4%11.6%10.6%9.6%12.1%16.4%10.6%TH31.6%39.3%35.7%27.4%8.2%12.4%11.2%6.5%13.3%14.4%VN36.6%52.5%50.5%35.5%1.1%5.0%3.2%2.0%8.6%5.0%13.9%10.4%11.5%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202445The region is likely to em

300、brace Chinas multiple initiatives to create a common future.31.3%of the regional respondents say that Chinas vision of such a Community can be complementary to ASEANs efforts while another 30.1%view the vision as positive and beneficial for Southeast Asia.A small percentage of 18.6%of ASEAN responde

301、nts say that the vision could be divisive and force countries to choose sides and another 13.1%fear that Chinas vision could threaten ASEAN centrality.6.8%are deniers who say that Chinas initiatives are of no significance to their country.Q30 Choose the statement that best resonates with your view:“

302、Chinas Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.”VIEWS ON CHINAS COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKINDIn 2013,China proposed a vision of a“global community of common destiny”.Over the years,China added different global initiatives including the Belt and Road Initiative,the Global Development

303、Initiative,the Global Security Initiative,and the Global Civilisation Initiative.These multilateral initiatives are part of Chinas vision of building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.In January 2024,seven ASEAN member states(Cambodia,Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar,Thailand,and Vietnam)s

304、igned on to Chinas“community of a shared future”.Is positive and beneficial for Southeast AsiaIs a vision that can be complementary to ASEANs effortsCould threaten ASEAN centralityCould be a divisive vision and force countries to choose sidesIs of no significance to my country0%31.3%30.1%18.6%13.1%6

305、.8%10%20%30%CountryIs a vision that can be complementary to ASEANs effortsIs positive and beneficial for Southeast AsiaCould be a divisive vision and force countries to choose sidesCould threaten ASEAN centralityIs of no significance to my countryASEAN31.3%30.1%18.6%13.1%6.8%BN40.3%22.1%15.6%11.7%10

306、.4%KH31.2%40.2%13.2%12.2%3.2%ID36.2%34.0%12.5%14.3%3.0%LA18.8%51.2%13.8%8.8%7.5%MY48.4%25.3%12.9%9.8%3.6%MM14.8%29.1%18.5%15.9%21.7%PH23.3%16.3%33.0%22.3%5.1%SG39.9%17.2%24.5%13.6%4.8%TH26.4%35.8%22.4%12.4%3.0%VN33.5%30.0%20.0%10.5%6.0%SURVEY REPORT46SECTION IVThis section examines ASEANs sentiments

307、 and options in the unfolding power competition in the region,especially the deepening rivalry between China and the United States.US-China Rivalry and its Impact on Southeast Asia46-54SURVEY REPORT46THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202447ASSESSING ASEANS OPTIONSIn line with trends observed over the last

308、 three years,regional respondents continue to prioritise bolstering ASEANs resilience and unity to counter pressure from the US-China rivalry,with 46.8%expressing this preference,making a slight uptick from last years 45.5%.This inclination remains predominant across ASEAN countries,barring Myanmar.

309、Notably,Thailand(61.7%)and Vietnam(58.5%)strongly advocate for this approach.The second most favoured option is adhering to ASEANs traditional stance of non-alignment between China and the US,resonating with 29.1%of respondents.This stance is particularly favoured by respondents from Myanmar(40.7%)a

310、nd finds robust support from Malaysia(41.8%).This is followed by the option of ASEAN engaging“third parties”to broaden its strategic space and options(16.1%),notably championed by respondents from Cambodia(31.2%).Conversely,the least popular option regionally involves ASEAN choosing one of the two m

311、ajor powers(8.0%),as remaining neutral is impractical.This choice finds minimal backing from respondents in Singapore(2.6%)but garners relatively higher levels of support from Cambodia and Myanmar(both at 13.8%)and the Philippines(12.6%).Q31 ASEAN is caught in the crossfire as Beijing and Washington

312、 compete for influence and leadership in Southeast Asia.How should ASEAN best respond?2024202346.8%16.1%8.0%45.5%18.1%6.0%30.5%29.1%CountryASEAN has to choose between one of the two major powers as remaining neutral is impracticalASEAN has to seek out“third parties”to broaden its strategic space and

313、 optionsASEAN should continueits position of not siding with China or the USASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers20232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN6.0%8.0%18.1%16.1%30.5%29.1%45.5%46.8%BN8.3%7.8%21.7%14.3%32.5%36.4%37.5%41.6%KH10.4%13.8%32.1%

314、31.2%37.3%21.7%20.1%33.3%ID6.6%3.8%14.0%9.4%33.1%34.3%46.3%52.5%LA7.5%12.5%10.3%18.1%44.9%18.1%37.4%51.2%MY4.8%4.4%12.9%11.6%37.9%41.8%44.4%42.2%MM7.0%13.8%21.7%18.5%25.2%40.7%46.1%27.0%PH4.0%12.6%17.2%10.7%19.2%22.3%59.6%54.4%SG4.3%2.6%16.8%16.1%33.7%35.9%45.2%45.4%TH2.1%3.5%17.4%13.9%23.6%20.9%56.

315、9%61.7%VN4.4%5.5%16.9%17.0%17.6%19.0%61.0%58.5%SURVEY REPORT482023202449.5%50.5%ChinaUSASEANS FUTURE:CHINA OR THE UNITED STATES?In a notable shift in sentiments,China has experienced a surge in popularity among respondents from Southeast Asia,climbing from 38.9%last year to 50.5%this year,edging ahe

316、ad to become the preferred alignment choice in the region.This trend is particularly evident among respondents from Malaysia(75.1%),Indonesia(73.2%),Laos(70.6%),Brunei(70.1%),and Thailand(52.2%).Notably,Indonesia,Laos,and Malaysia which have benefitted significantly from Chinas Belt and Road Initiat

317、ive(BRI)and robust trade and investment relations,witnessed a remarkable increase of more than 20 percentage points in their preference for China compared to 2023.Q32 If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the strategic rivals,which should it choose?Conversely,the US has seen a decline in

318、its popularity dropping from 61.1%last year to 49.5%this year.However,it still commands majority support from the Philippines(83.3%),Vietnam(79.0%),Singapore(61.5%),Myanmar(57.7%),and Cambodia(55.0%).Its backing from these countries has generally waned,except for the Philippines,which experienced a

319、notable increase in confidence in the US,rising from 78.8%last year to an all-time high of 83.3%this year.This uptick follows the Philippines closer alliance with the US in addressing Chinas aggression in the South China Sea.61.1%38.9%ChinaUSCountryChinaThe United States2023202420232024ASEAN38.9%50.

320、5%61.1%49.5%BN55.0%70.1%45.0%29.9%KH26.9%45.0%73.1%55.0%ID53.7%73.2%46.3%26.8%LA41.1%70.6%58.9%29.4%MY54.8%75.1%45.2%24.9%MM32.2%42.3%67.8%57.7%PH21.2%16.7%78.8%83.3%SG38.9%38.5%61.1%61.5%TH43.1%52.2%56.9%47.8%VN22.1%21.0%77.9%79.0%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202449BROADENING ASEANS STRATEGIC OPTION

321、SConsistent with previous observations,the EU and Japan remain the primary options for the region in navigating the uncertainties stemming from the US-China strategic rivalry.The EU continues to hold its ground with 37.2%of the respondents opting for it,slightly down from 42.9%last year,while Japan

322、secures 27.7%of the vote.India maintains its position in third with 10.5%,closely trailed by Australia(9.5%),the UK(9.2%),and the Republic of Korea(5.9%).Indias rating has seen a slight dip from 11.3%last year while Australia,the UK,and the ROK have experienced an increase in support.At the country

323、level,the EUs dominance is acknowledged by all ASEAN countries except for Singapore(28.2%)and Brunei(20.8%).Notably,the EU receives particularly strong backing from Vietnam(61.5%)and Cambodia(45.0%).Conversely,Japan emerged as the preferred choice for respondents from Singapore(35.5%)and garnered fa

324、vour from respondents in the Philippines(35.8%)and Indonesia(34.3%).India,holding the third position,finds relatively higher support from Thailand(15.9%)and Malaysia(15.6%).Australia,on the other hand,gained significant backing from Brunei(19.5%)and Singapore(16.8%),while the UK and ROK received hig

325、her backing from Laos with 16.9%and 10.6%respectively.Q33 If ASEAN were to seek out“third parties”to hedge against the uncertainties of the US-China strategic rivalry,who is your preferred and trusted strategic partner for ASEAN?50%0%27.7%26.6%5.9%3.2%CountryAustraliaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepu

326、blic of KoreaThe United Kingdom202320242023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN9.3%9.5%42.9%37.2%11.3%10.5%26.6%27.7%3.2%5.9%6.8%9.2%BN8.3%19.5%54.2%20.8%6.7%7.8%19.2%31.2%6.7%6.5%5.0%14.3%KH1.5%9.5%79.9%45.0%6.0%7.4%9.0%23.3%0.0%3.7%3.7%11.1%ID7.4%8.3%38.8%34.3%9.9%10.2%36.4%34.3%4.1%9.4%3.3%3

327、.4%LA16.8%7.5%42.1%35.6%13.1%13.1%18.7%16.3%1.9%10.6%7.5%16.9%MY10.5%7.1%31.5%29.8%12.9%15.6%27.4%28.9%4.8%8.4%12.9%10.2%MM12.2%8.5%14.8%34.9%21.7%12.7%39.1%24.9%1.7%10.6%10.4%8.5%PH7.1%7.0%33.3%39.1%4.0%2.8%39.4%35.8%4.0%4.2%12.1%11.2%SG18.3%16.8%38.9%28.2%10.6%9.5%25.5%35.5%1.9%3.3%4.8%6.6%TH6.3%5

328、.0%42.4%43.3%16.0%15.9%21.5%26.4%6.9%2.0%6.9%7.5%VN4.4%5.5%52.9%61.5%11.8%9.5%29.4%20.5%0.0%0.5%1.5%2.5%AustraliaEUJapanKoreaUK30%20%10%40%9.2%6.8%10.5%11.3%India9.3%9.5%37.2%42.9%SURVEY REPORT50THE FUTURE OF CHINAS RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIESQ34 How do you see your countrys relations with Chi

329、na evolving in the next three years?There is a growing sense of optimism among Southeast Asians regarding their future relations with China.The proportion of respondents anticipating improvement has climbed from 38.7%to 51.4%this year.Notably,Indonesia(68.3%),Laos(68.2%),and Malaysia(65.3%)stand out

330、 as the most sanguine among all ASEAN countries,with a majority of their respondents anticipating enhanced relations with China.At the same time,the number of neutral respondents has dwindled from 44.2%to 30.5%this year.Among ASEAN countries,Singapore(46.5%)and Myanmar(46.0%)hold the most reserved s

331、tance on their relations with China,anticipating a continuation of the status quo.Meanwhile,the level of pessimism towards China(18.1%)remains relatively steady compared to the findings last year.The Philippines emerged as the most cautious,with a significant 61.0%expressing apprehension,particularl

332、y amidst tensions with China in the South China Sea,followed by 29.1%of Myanmar respondents expressing scepticism,likely influenced by Chinas significant sway over the country.CountryWorsen SignificantlyWorsenRemain the SameImproveImprove Significantly2023202420232024202320242023202420232024ASEAN5.2

333、%5.7%11.9%12.4%44.2%30.5%30.4%39.5%8.3%11.9%BN5.0%5.2%5.8%10.4%37.5%31.2%47.5%40.3%4.2%13.0%KH1.5%11.1%2.2%10.1%18.7%13.8%43.3%40.2%34.3%24.9%ID3.3%0.4%11.6%4.9%43.8%26.4%33.9%58.5%7.4%9.8%LA0.0%3.1%7.5%9.4%64.5%19.4%24.3%56.9%3.7%11.3%MY2.4%1.8%9.7%5.8%49.2%27.1%31.5%50.2%7.3%15.1%MM20.0%10.1%28.7%19.0%28.7%46.0%17.4%19.0%5.2%5.8%PH9.1%17.7%24.2%43.3%38.4%24.7%24.2%12.1%4.0%2.3%SG1.0%0.7%9.1%7.3%