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1、Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024Decent work,brighter futures20th anniversary editionGlobal Employment Trends for Youth 2024Decent work,brighter futuresInternational Labour Office Geneva International Labour Organization 2024 First published 2024Attribution 4.0 International(CC BY 4.0)This wor
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4、were made and must cite the work as follows:Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024.Decent work,brighter futures,Geneva:International Labour Office,2024.ILO.Translations In case of a translation of this work,the following disclaimer must be added along with the attribution:This is a trans-lation of
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10、 ILO Publishing Unit(Rights and Licensing)at rightsilo.org.Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at:www.ilo.org/publns.9789220406748 (print)9789220406755(web PDF)The designations employed in ILO publications and databases,which are in conformity with United Nations practi
11、ce,and the pres-entation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the ILO concerning the legal status of any country,area or territory or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.The opinions and views expressed
12、in this publication are those of the author(s)and do not necessarily reflect the opinions,views or policies of the ILO.Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the ILO,and any failure to mention a particular firm,commercial product or proc
13、ess is not a sign of disapproval.Printed in SwitzerlandProduced by the Publications Production and Publishing Management Unit of the ILO.Code:DESIGN/PPM/PMSERVPhoto creditsCover,p.63,p.77:Marcel Crozet/ILO Page iv:BMF Media/ILO Executive summary:ILO Chapter 1:UN Women/Joe Saade Chapter 2:ILO/Apex Im
14、age Chapter 3:L.Mitul/ILO Page 69:Berke Arakl/ILO Chapter 4:Marcel Crozet Annex,ILO Page 93:UN Women/Ryan Browniii XPreface1 Editions of the GET for Youth report were issued in 2004,2006,2008,2010,2011,2012,2013,2015,2017,2020 and 2022.It is a great pleasure to put before you the 2024 edition of the
15、 Global Employment Trends for Youth(GET forYouth)report.Since 2004,12 editions of the report have presented the latest available global and regional youth labour market indicators,and used the foundation of labour market analysis to advocate for more and better investments in policy areas that boost
16、 youth employment and ease their pathways to decent jobs and productive adulthood.1 Over the years,findings of the GET for Youth reports have raised the visibility of the many challenges that young people face in the world of work.Interest in the report and its findings has led to partnerships and p
17、rojects that have taken on-the-ground action to assist young people,strengthen relevant institutions and guide national policy formulation and implementation around youth employment objectives.In this edition,and in the many events planned over the course of the year,we celebrate 20 years of the GET
18、 for Youth report.The report has been a valuable input to social dialogue for setting and implementing a global agenda for youth employment.It has contributed to:Ximprovements in the measurement of the labour market situations of young people in all regions of the world;Xthe prioritization of youth
19、employment in national employment policies in crisis periods and boom times alike;Xthe increased inclusiveness of policymaking,with voices of young people captured and reflected;Xthe refinement of policy advice based on rigorous empirical evidence of“what works”;and Xthe global sharing of good pract
20、ices.Fortunately,in this edition,we can also celebrate some good news from the findings.The last two reports(in 2020 and 2022)centred on the harsh impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath.This report shows that the worst of the crisis is behind us.At the global level,young jobseekers today
21、 may find work more easily than in previous years,and youth employment rates have stabilized back to their pre-crisis trendlines.But this does not mean all is well.The report reminds us that there are still millions of young people primarily young women in NEET status,meaning they are not accessing
22、education or employment.It cautions us about the growing casualization of work for youth and about the widening gap in the supply of young graduates and the number of suitable jobs available to absorb them.It acknowledges that the mismatches between what is available and what is expected by young pe
23、ople in their labour market transitions can have important consequences,including costs to young peoples motivation levels and general well-being.Finally,the report stresses how inequalities of opportunity for young people based on where and to whom a child is born and the personal characteristics o
24、f birth,including gender,are still very real,if not worsening as a result of socio-economic,demographic and technological dichotomies.There is a clear message coming from the report on the urgency to do better to combat the circumstances of unequal access to opportunities and to effectively target a
25、ctions to bring transformative change to disadvantaged young people.There can be no social justice when millions of young people around the world are missing out on the opportunities of productive and decent employment and are thus denied a chance at upward mobility for themselves and their families
26、.Let us all do our parts,working individually and together,including in the realms of the United Nations Global Accelerator on Jobs and Social Protection for Just Transitions and the Global Coalition for Social Justice,to bring renewed hope to young people.This report is a call for all stakeholders
27、to intensify the focus on decent work to enable brighter futures for all young people and to take action with the meaningful engagement of young people.Readers,thank you for your support to the GET for Youth report over the years and for your engagement in promoting decent work for youth.We assure y
28、ou there will be many more editions to come.Mia Seppo Assistant-Director-General,Jobs and Social Protectionv XA message to young readersAs todays youth,your meaningful engagement in labour markets and the quality of work that you will have matters a great deal to the future of the global economy.The
29、 better educated you are,the better empowered you are to find your productive potential and dignity in work;the better supported you are to reach a state of economic security,the better the future will be for everyone.You are living in an era of rapid changes and uncertain circumstances that are not
30、 of your own making.This can be stressful.We at the ILO understand the challenges and concerns.We care and will strive to see you flourish.We will continue to use our platform to advocate for scaled-up,effective investments in and promotion of access to decent jobs for youth.We will also continue to
31、 support our partners in governments,workers organizations and employers organizations to do their utmost on your behalf through effective youth employment policymaking.As we advocate for action on your behalf,please make sure your voice is raised as well,through the venues you have at your disposal
32、.You have the possibility to influence policy and to advocate for decent work for all.Know your rights and continue investing in your skills.Remember that you are an example for other young people around the world.Be a part of the change that we all need to ensure a socially just and inclusive world
33、.viiTable of contentsPreface iiiA message to young readers vAcknowledgements xiiAcronyms and abbreviations xiiiExecutive summary xv1.Global and regional outlook for youth labour markets 11.1.Introduction 21.2.Is recovery from the COVID-19 crisis now fully secured?31.3.What is the progress in lowerin
34、g shares of youth not in education,employment or training?91.4.What is the latest in relation to youth gender gaps?121.5.Youth anxieties are on the rise 131.6.Outlook for 2024 and 2025 162.Then and now:A changing landscape of youth employment 212.1.Introduction 222.2.Decent work for youth:Any progre
35、ss?222.3.Comparing labour market outcomes of youth and adults 322.4.Where are jobs coming from?352.5.The value of education and training 402.6.Where are the youth of tomorrow?562.7.The world is increasingly conflict-ridden 583.Youth employment policies:An evolution in progress 653.1.Introduction 663
36、.2.Trends in youth employment policymaking 663.3.Evidence from youth employment impact evaluations 68viiiviii4.Moving ahead 714.1.Keep youth in the drivers seat(or at least the passengers seat)of policymaking 724.2.Amplify the policy focus on job creation 724.3.Scale up the supply-interventions with
37、 proven impact that aim to meet labour demand 744.4.Focus the international communitys attention on Africa and its youth bulge 754.5.Tackle global and country-level inequalities 75References 78Annex.Additional tables and figures 83List of figures1.1.Number of countries in 2023 with youth unemploymen
38、t rates above/below their 2019 rates,by subregion 31.2.Global youth unemployment(millions,right axis)and youth unemployment rate(percentage,left axis),by sex,200023 41.3.Global youth employment(millions,right axis)and youth employment-to-population ratio(percentage,left axis),by sex,200023 41.4.Annu
39、al growth rate in global youth population,labour force,employment and unemployment since 2000(percentage)51.5.Change in youth unemployment,youth labour force and youth unemployment rate,by subregion,201923 61.6.Youth unemployment rates(monthly,seasonally adjusted)in selected countries,record low per
40、iod since January 2000 and latest period(percentage)71.7.Global distribution of youth population by NEET status and sex,2000 and 2023(percentage)101.8.Change in youth employment-to-population ratio,by subregion and sex,200023(percentage points)131.9.Various perception surveys on economic or labour m
41、arket circumstances 141.10.Projected changes in youth unemployment rates and employment-to-population ratios,by subregion,202325(percentage points)192.1.Average share of total young adult employment(aged 25 to 29)in insecure categories of work,by subregion and country income group,2000 and 2023 or n
42、earest years(percentage)24Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024ixix2.2.Share of employed young adults(aged 25 to 29)in time-related underemployment,by subregion,latest year(percentage)262.3.Average real wage index for paid employees aged 25 to 29 and aged 30 and over in selected countries,201322(2
43、013=100)272.4.Average real wage index for women and men paid employees aged 25 to 29 in selected countries,201323(2013=100)282.5.Gender pay gap for young adult paid employees in selected countries,2010 and 2021 292.6.Share of young adults(aged 25 to 29)in low-paid employment,by subregion (2010 and 2
44、023,or nearest years)and by subregion and sex(2023 or nearest year)(percentage)302.7.Ratio of global youth-to-adult EPR and ratio of global youth-to-adult unemployment rate,200023 322.8.Average share of LinkedIn job postings that require at least one green skill,by subregion,201823(percentage)382.9.
45、Share of youth population(aged 15 to 24)and young adults(aged 25 to 29)attending school/training,by country income group,2000 and 2023(percentage)422.10.Total and non-student distribution of youth population by economic activity,by age cohort and country income group,2023(percentage)432.11.The NEET
46、educational attainment gap for young adults(aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,2023(percentage points)462.12.Change in the NEET educational attainment gap for young adults(aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,200313 and 201323(percentage points)462.13.The labour underutilizatio
47、neducational attainment gap for young adults (aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,2023(percentage points)472.14.Change in the LU2educational attainment gap for young adults(aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,200313 and 201323(percentage points)492.15.The informalityeducational
48、 attainment gap of young adults(aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,2023(percentage points)502.16.Change in the informalityeducational attainment gap of young adults (aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,201323(percentage points)512.17.The low payeducational attainment gap of yo
49、ung adult employees(aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,2023(percentage points)512.18.Change in the low payeducational attainment gap of young adult employees (aged 25 to 29),by sex and country income group,200313 and 201323 (percentage points)522.19.Share of young adults(aged 25 to 29)in
50、 employment who are in a situation of educational mismatch,by sex and country income group,2023(percentage)532.20.Change in share of young adults(aged 25 to 29)in situation of educational mismatch,by sex and country income group,200313 and 201323 (percentage points)532.21.Median age by country,2024
51、56Table of contentsx xList of tables1.1.General overview of progress towards SDG target 8.6 to reduce shares of youth in NEET status 91.2.Projected youth employment levels and employment-to-population ratios,by subregion and country income group,202325 161.3.Projected youth unemployment levels and r
52、ates,by subregion and country income group,202325 171.4.Projected youth NEET levels and rates,by subregion and country income group,202325 182.1.Share of employed young adults(aged 25 to 29)in a part-time working arrangement,by subregion,2000 and 2023 or nearest years(percentage)252.2.Sectoral share
53、 of youth employment in 2021(percentage)and change in sectoral share of youth employment between 2001 and 2021(percentage points),by subregion 362.3.Occupations that did not exist 20 years ago and potential new occupations of the future 39A1.Youth unemployment rate,by sex,subregion and country incom
54、e group,2000 and 201023(percentage)86A2.Youth employment-to-population ratio,by sex,subregion and country income group,2000 and 201023(percentage)88A3.Youth NEET rate,by sex,subregion and country income group,2005 and 201023(percentage)90A4.Ratio of youth-to-adult EPR and ratio of global youth-to-ad
55、ult unemployment rate,by subregion and country income group,2000 and 2023 922.22.Estimated cumulative change in youth labour force between 2023 and 2050,by subregion(millions)572.23.Global number of conflicts and conflict-related fatalities,200222 592.24.Estimated global youth population and youth e
56、mployment in areas affected by conflict,200222(millions)592.25.Share of young people concerned about the possibility of war involving their country,by subregion(percentage)61A1.Average annual growth rate in global adult population,labour force,employment and unemployment since 2000(percentage)84A2.D
57、istribution of global youth population by main economic activity and attendance in schooling/training,2000 and 2023(percentage)84A3.Average share of total young adult employment of women(aged 25 to 29)in insecure categories of work,by subregion and country income group,2000 and 2023 or nearest years
58、(percentage)85Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024xixiList of boxes1.Where are the worlds“missing”young workers?82.Multiple indicator analyses can strengthen policy targeting 333.School attendance significantly impacts labour market indicators for youth 444.Job matching is influenced by young peo
59、ples expectations and perceptions of job prestige 485.What are“new-collar jobs”?546.Measuring the impact of conflict on economic activity and the labour market 60Flashback box 1.Measurement of youth labour market outcomes has improved significantly since the first Global Employment Trends for Youth
60、report 11Flashback box 2.Why are youth unemployment rates higher than adult unemployment rates?34 Flashback box 3.Technological changes and jobs for youth evidence from previous GET for Youth reports 41Flashback box 4.Evolving policy perspectives in GET for Youth reports 67Table of contentsxiiAcknow
61、ledgementsThe 2024 edition of the Global Employment Trends for Youth was prepared by a team from the ILO Employment,Labour Markets and Youth Branch.The report was coordinated and drafted by Sara Elder with a team consisting of Matthieu Charpe,Huanyue Hu,Kee Beom Kim and Niall OHiggins.Additional con
62、tributions were received from external collaborators Kate Brockie,Richard Horne(Empstat Ltd)and Steven Tobin(LabourX Ltd).The report was edited by John Maloy.The conceptualization and design of the report benefited from the input of a task team consisting of Marcelo Cuautle Segovia,Chiara Curcio,Dib
63、yaudh Das,Maria Gabriela Espinosa Erazo,Daphne Lapourr Dames,Karina Levina,Eesha Moitra,Maria Prieto,Michael Watt and Lena Xinyu Yan.The team wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions on the draft provided by ILO colleagues Samuel Asfaha,Christina Behrendt,Patrick Daru,Elisanda Estr
64、uch Puertas,Valeria Esquivel,Mariangels Fortuny,Rosina Gammarano,Guido Heins,Mohammed Hossain,Phu Huynh,Steven Kapsos,Celine Peyron Bista,Susana Puerto,Gerhard Reinecke,Miguel Sanchez Martinez,David Mosler,Michael Mwasikakata,Roland Sarton,Lucie Servoz,Jean Jacobo Velasco,Christian Viegelahn,Felix W
65、eidenkaff and Ding Xu,and also from two anonymous external reviewers.The manuscript benefited greatly from the input and oversight of Sangheon Lee,Director of the Employment Policy Department,and Dorothea Schmidt-Klau,Chief of the Employment,Labour Markets and Youth Branch.The analysis provided in t
66、he Global Employment Trends for Youth series is only as good as the available input data.We take this opportunity to thank all institutions involved in the collection and dissemination of labour market information,including national statistical agencies and the ILO Department of Statistics.Finally,w
67、e would like to express our thanks to colleagues in the Publications Production Unit and to colleagues in the Department of Communication and Public Information for their support in producing and disseminating the report.Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024xiiiAcronyms and abbreviationsAI artific
68、ial intelligenceALMP active labour market policyEPR employment-to-population ratioGET for Youth report Global Employment Trends for Youth reportIMF International Monetary FundLMLIC lower-middle-and low-income countriesLU2 labour underutilization(unemployment+time-related underemployment)NEET not in
69、employment,education or trainingOLF outside the labour forceYUR youth unemployment rateAcronyms and abbreviationsGlobal youth unemployment rate in 2023Marks the lowest rate in 15 years and a decreasefrom the pre-pandemic times in all but three subregions13%Share of youth not in employment,education
70、or training(NEET)in 202320%2 in 3 young NEETs globally are women1 in 3 youth live in a country that is“off track”for SDG target 8.6,to reduce the share of young NEETsHigh-income countries4 in 5 young adult workers(aged 2529)are in a regular paid job63%of youth in school or trainingLow-income countri
71、es1 in 5 young adult workers(aged 2529)are in a regular paid job40%of youth in schoolor trainingLack of jobs1 in 3 youth in Arab States and North Africa are unemployedDemographic pressuresLack of decent jobs3 in 4 youth in sub-Saharan Africa lack secure work76 millionGrowth in youth labour force in
72、Africa by 2050,while all other regions face a contractionin young workersEducational mismatch2 in 3 young adult workers in developing economies hold qualifications that do not matchwell to their jobKey statisticsInequalities of opportunityGlobal challengesRising youth anxiety levels2 in 3 young peop
73、le worried about losing their jobGlobal Employment Trends for Youth 2024xv Executive summary1 Unless otherwise specified,“youth”in this report refers to young people aged 15 to 24.This report represents the 20th anniversary publication of the ILOs Global Employment Trends for Youth(hereafter“GET for
74、 Youth”).For two decades,the GET for Youth report has striven to provide timely and relevant information on how well young people are doing in their ambitions to attain decent work.In so doing the report has investigated the where,why and how of young peoples labour market vulnerabilities,and highli
75、ghted the policy measures and interventions that aim to support youth job creation and effectively set young people on the pathway to a bright future of work.As an anniversary edition,this edition of the GET for Youth looks back on what has been achieved since the dawn of the twenty-first century wh
76、ile also looking ahead to what may lay in store for youth employment in an era characterized by crises and uncertainties.Post-COVID-19 recovery and labour market outlook for youthYoung labour market entrants have benefited during the recovery period following the COVID-19 crisis.More than four years
77、 from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,the labour market outlook has improved considerably for young people aged 15 to 24.1 Resilient economic growth rates and a strong rebound in labour demand benefited young labour market entrants in the post-crisis setting.At 13 per cent,the global youth unempl
78、oyment rate in 2023 represented a 15-year low,and at 64.9 million,the total number of unemployed young people worldwide was the lowest seen since the start of the millennium.At the same time,2023 saw a rebound in the youth employment-to-population ratio(at 35 per cent),as many of the young persons w
79、ho had temporarily withdrawn from the labour force or had become unemployed during the pandemic returned to work(or started working for the first time).But recovery was not universal,by geography or by gender.Youth unemployment rates in 2023 had returned to their pre-crisis rates or fell below their
80、 pre-crisis rates in most but not all subregions.For young people in the Arab States,East Asia,and South-East Asia and the Pacific,the youth unemployment rate in 2023 was higher than that of 2019.For the Arab States,this represents a continuation of the pre-COVID-19 trend of rising youth unemploymen
81、t rates,but for the two Asian subregions,the rise represents a change of direction from the pre-crisis years,when economic growth rates and associated job creation for youth had been more robust.Young men have benefited from the recovery in the labour market more than young women.In the decade prece
82、ding the pandemic(200919),the youth unemployment rate of young men at the global level was higher than that of young women by an average of 0.7 percentage points.From the peak of the crisis and continuing through 2023,the unemployment rates for young men and women converged(resting at 12.9 per cent
83、for young women and 13 per cent for young men in 2023).Young women have thus experienced a double disadvantage.First,the youth unemployment rate jumped more sharply for women during the COVID-19 crisis and then,during the recovery period,the drop in the youth unemployment rate was smaller among wome
84、n.xviGlobal Employment Trends for Youth 2024Good news on youth unemployment trends,less so on trends of youth in NEET status.The trend of declining youth unemployment rates in most but not all regions is good news.But unemployment is not the only signal of headwinds against young peoples success in
85、the world of work.Only 6 per cent of the worlds youth population were unemployed in 2023,but a much larger share 20.4 per cent were not in employment,education or training(NEET).This gives a significantly broader picture of labour market exclusion among young people,while also signaling some missed
86、opportunities in human capital development.Progress on Sustainable Development Goal(SDG)target 8.6 to reduce the youth NEET rate has been mixed and skewed in favour of advanced economies.The report finds that one in three(33 per cent)of the worlds young people is living in a country that is“off trac
87、k”in its target to reduce the youth NEET rate.What is especially concerning is that the countries that follow a regressive trend are low-income countries and those situated in subregions where rates were already among the worlds highest(namely,the Arab States,North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa).Als
88、o concerning is the continuing female face of youth in NEET status at the global level.Not only are two out of every three youth in NEET status women,but the NEET rate among young women is also more than double that of young men(at 28.1 per cent and 13.1 per cent,respectively,in 2023).With uncertain
89、 times ahead,the well-being of youth is a growing concern.Moving forward,the global youth unemployment rate is expected to decrease further over the next two years to sit at 12.8 per cent in 2024 and 2025.Although expected to fall slightly from 2023,the rates in the Arab States,East Asia,and South-E
90、ast Asia and the Pacific are anticipated to remain above their pre-crisis levels.In the coming two years,the historically low youth unemployment rates in North America and in Northern,Southern and Western Europe are expected to creep up again.Despite the positive signals in global economic and labou
91、r market indicators,young people today show signs of growing levels of anxiety about their future.Surveys highlighted in this report indicate that many young people today feel stressed about job loss and job stability,the state of the economy,a lack of social mobility across generations,and their pr
92、ospects for eventual financial independence.Whether borne out by reality or not,young peoples perceptions about the future play a significant role in their personal well-being and motivation levels and in shaping their decisions about future educational,labour market and civic engagement.To help eas
93、e youth anxieties,institutions will need to guide young people through the complexities of the school-to-work and youth-to-adulthood transitions.Helping young people to keep their hopes alive must become a shared mission involving all segments of society.xviiExecutive summaryTwenty years of the GET
94、for Youth:What has changed in youth labour market prospects?In the spirit of the anniversary of this publication,the second chapter of the report presents the longer-term trends of youth employment since the beginning of the twenty-first century,addressing how the landscape that connects young peopl
95、es prospects to labour market outcomes has changed over time.Among the themes highlighted are the evolution(if any)towards attainment of decent jobs for youth,how the sectoral structure of jobs for youth has changed,shifts in educational attainment and the returns from education,the growing spectre
96、of conflicts,and the increasing influence of demographic shifts on the youth employment outlook.Young people in most regions are unable to find secure work,and their chances of doing so decrease as the income level of the country decreases.In low-income countries,only one in five young adults aged 2
97、5 to 29 manage to find a secure paid job(that is,a job with a paying employer and a contract greater than one year in duration).This picture has not changed much since the start of the millennium,beyond a slight decrease in the share of young people in self-employment and a concurrent increase in th
98、e share of youth working in temporary paid jobs essentially shifting from one form of precarious(and informal)work to another.The share of young adults working in a secure paid job is significantly higher in high-income countries(at 76 per cent in 2023),but even here the incidence of temporary work
99、among youth has risen.Depending on the subregion,from one fifth to one quarter of young adult workers are currently engaged in temporary paid work,a share that has increased over time.The global trend towards the casualization of labour serves as a source of increasing anxiety among young people str
100、iving to move towards financial independence and the next stages of adulthood.Young people in Africa and the Arab States are still not faring well.Youth unemployment rates remain critically high in the Arab States and North Africa.In both subregions,more than one in three economically active youth w
101、ere unemployed in 2023.While this represents an improvement since 2000 for North Africa,the youth unemployment rate in the Arab States has shown a steady increase over the two decades.At the same time,youth employment-to-population ratios remain critically low in the two subregions.Fewer than one in
102、 ten young women and fewer than one in three young men in the two subregions are working.The employment ratios of both young men and women especially the latter fall well below what is seen in other regions.As the two subregions also have the worlds highest youth NEET rates,it is clear that many of
103、the non-working youth are also not engaged in schooling.In sub-Saharan Africa,the main concern is not youth unemployment(which consistently shows rates that are among the worlds lowest 8.9 per cent in 2023)since still few young people can afford to forgo some form of income generation through work.I
104、n 2023,as in the early 2000s,nearly three in four working young adults in sub-Saharan Africa were in insecure forms of work;one in three paid workers earned less than the median wage;and more than one in two working youth eked out a living in the agricultural sector.Demographic pressures consume the
105、 continent:between 2023 and 2050,the cumulative growth in the youth labour force is estimated at 72.6 million(with an additional 3.3 million young labour market entrants in North Africa).How African countries will create decent jobs for so many young labour market entrants in the coming two decades
106、is a matter of global concern.On a more positive note,the youth bulge in Africa could prove to be the regions most valuable asset moving forward as other regions of the world grapple with population ageing and labour shortages.xviiiGlobal Employment Trends for Youth 2024Educational mismatches have i
107、ncreased as the supply of educated youth starts to outweigh the supply of jobs for the highly skilled in middle-income countries.Globally,young people today have more opportunities to stay in school.As of 2023,the share of the global youth population engaged in some form of schooling or training was
108、 48 per cent,a significant increase over the 38 per cent share seen in 2000.The increase in educational participation held for all but the low-income grouping of countries.With such results comes an increasing gap in the skills levels of young adults across country income groups.With the rise in acc
109、ess to education since the start of the millennium has come a slight overall waning in the returns on education,a situation that reflects in part slow progress in the structural transformation of economies in the process of development.The share of young workers in the industrial sector has grown sl
110、ightly over time,but the sectoral allocation of youth employment away from the agricultural sector has been predominantly towards non-manufacturing industry(mainly construction)and towards traditional services such as trade,transport,accommodation and food services.The structural adjustment of devel
111、oping economies to higher value-added sectors has been slow,which means that young people in developing countries are still primarily finding work in low-and intermediate-skilled occupations.With limited numbers of higher-skilled jobs available,the queue among educated young jobseekers grows.To offs
112、et the declining benefits of higher education,countries will need to pay increasing attention to policies and programmes that can boost job creation for youth and to policies that support the transition of young people into productive employment.And it is important to bear in mind that despite some
113、slowing of educational returns to higher education,educated youth still stand a much higher chance of transitioning out of the informal economy,earning higher wages and gaining some degree of job stability.In other words,the overall societal benefits of upping investments in the education and traini
114、ng of young people are as strong as ever.With the number of conflicts across the globe doubling since 2010,the future livelihoods(and lives)of 57 million young people are at risk.The world today is a more conflict-ridden place than 20 years ago,a situation that young people feel heavily,whether pers
115、onally affected or not.According to ILO estimates,the share of young people struggling to begin their primary productive years in conflict-afflicted areas has increased from 2.9 per cent to 4.6 per cent in the two decades since 2002.The lack of employment prospects in conflict areas can push young p
116、eople to migration or drive them towards extremism.Demographic trends take on greater weight as a driver of the future of work outcomes of young people.One shift of the past 20 years has been the polarization between countries and regions with respect to their demographic contexts.The struggle to cr
117、eate decent work for youth takes on a wholly different meaning in Africa,where the average age is 19 years,compared to North America,for instance,where the average age is between 30 and 49.The imminent“youthquake”in Africa means job creation and the transformation of jobs into decent jobs for young
118、Africans becomes a critical issue for social justice and for the future of the global economy.In the meantime,shrinking youth labour forces in ageing countries exert different pressures on economies and societies.Young workers in ageing societies might benefit in the short term from upward pressure
119、on wages and easier recruitment processes but may face longer-term risks as these economies struggle to maintain output growth by consequence of the rapidly shifting demographic changes.xixExecutive summaryDecent work,brighter futuresMoving forwardUncertainties abound in the global economic and geop
120、olitical outlook and in the future of work,including how these will impact todays and tomorrows youth.But what is certain is that the degree to which young people successfully engage with the world of work(and in civic engagement at large)will play a key role in determining the direction of global p
121、rogress.If young people are given the support they need to keep their hopes alive and to thrive through decent work,then productive and inclusive growth might prevail.The ultimate goals of decent work and brighter futures for youth will be difficult to achieve,but progress is possible.Individual cou
122、ntries and the international multilateral community have taken up the call to action for youth employment and have done much in the realm of youth employment policies during the first two decades of the twenty-first century.Yet much more work is needed,particularly on the following core policy areas
123、 for promoting youth employment and supporting youth labour market transitions:21.employment and economic policies to boost job creation and improve access to finance;2.education and training to ease the school-to-work transition and to prevent skills mismatches;3.labour market policies to target em
124、ployment of disadvantaged youth;4.entrepreneurship and self-employment promotion/policies to assist potential young entrepreneurs;and5.labour rights that are based on international labour standards to ensure that young people receive equal treatment and are afforded rights at work.The call for more
125、and better investments in these five policy areas through integrated youth employment policies continues,and the multilateral community is called upon to increase their level of assistance to low-income and middle-income countries that struggle to find the fiscal space to prioritize such investments
126、.The report identifies the main principles for policy action as follows:1.In all action areas,keep youth in the drivers seat of policymaking,and promote and strengthen the institutions of youth-inclusive social dialogue.2.Amplify the policy focus on job creation through gender-responsive macroeconom
127、ic and sectoral policies,and make sure that demand-side interventions target directly and with urgency the creation of jobs for young women.3.Scale up supply-side interventions with demonstrated impact that are oriented to meet labour demand,including through strengthened institutions,as well as int
128、erventions that strive to remove the entry barriers to education and skills development,especially for vulnerable groups,and in so doing,reducing the number of youth in NEET status.4.Tackle global inequalities through improved international cooperation,publicprivate partnerships and financing for de
129、velopment.Structure of the reportThis report addresses the context of global youth employment from both the short-term perspective of crisis recovery(in Chapter 1)and the longer-term perspective of the evolving landscape of youth employment during the 20 years of the GET for Youth reports existence(
130、in Chapter 2).Chapter 3 looks at the policy framework for youth employment with an eye on how the scope and institutional setting of such policies has changed over time.Finally,Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion on the policy areas needing heightened attention in the coming years to support young
131、 people through their labour market transitions and towards decent work and brighter futures.2 The five policy areas were first articulated in the resolution“The youth employment crisis:A call for action”,adopted by ILO constituents in 2012.1Global and regional outlook for youth labour markets2Globa
132、l Employment Trends for Youth 2024 1.1.IntroductionThis chapter provides a descriptive analysis of key labour market indicators for youth,based on ILO modelled estimates and available national labour market statistics.1 The term“youth”is typically considered to encompass the age group of 15 to 24 ye
133、ars old,with“adults”considered to be those aged 25 and over.However,when possible,the discussion is expanded to cover the broader age range of 15 to 29 years old.Data are presented by region and by country income group level and are disaggregated by sex.2Section 1.2 below focuses on recent trends in
134、 youth unemployment and employment rates,and investigates the degree of recovery in labour markets for young persons since the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic crisis.Section 1.3 focuses on trends in the shares of young people not in employment,education or training(NEET),and section 1.4 highl
135、ights the topic of gender gaps.Section 1.5 investigates the topic of youth anxieties presumably on the rise and the perception-borne connection of such anxieties to labour market prospects.Finally,section 1.6 examines the outlook for youth employment in the current and coming year(202425).A word of
136、caution on heterogeneity and aggregationThe challenge of putting forth findings on the state of youth employment at the global or even the regional level is that aggregation blurs the reality that youth populations are heterogeneous groups within the specific contexts of their countries of origin.La
137、rge countries in terms of population size often dominate aggregated results.Yet,each country comes with its own history,culture,social norms,geography,global ties,natural resources and political institutions that determine,as both cause and effect,the circumstances of national labour market outcomes
138、.Diversity prevails across subregions,across income levels,between sexes and elsewhere.To the extent possible,this report highlights the heterogeneity of young peoples labour market situations across contexts of geography,income level and sex.That said,caution is still advised in the interpretation
139、of aggregated results,which by their very nature mask the diversity happening at the national and subnational levels.As one demonstration of the heterogeneity within aggregated results,figure 1.1 showcases the number of countries within each subregion according to how their youth unemployment rate i
140、n 2023 compares to the rate in the pre-COVID-19 pandemic year of 2019.A considerable split is shown in the number of countries with higher youth unemployment rates in the post-pandemic period than the number of countries with lower rates.For example,of the 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa,27 count
141、ries(57 per cent)had higher youth unemployment rates in 2023 than in 2019,while 20 countries(43 per cent)had rates that were lower.1 The analysis throughout the report relies heavily on ILO modelled estimates of key labour market indicators.For information on the methodology for their production,rea
142、ders are invited to turn to Appendix B of ILO 2024a.2 ILO regions and subregions are defined in Appendix A of ILO 2024a,and country income groupings are defined according to the World Banks income classification.3Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour markets1.2.Is recovery from the
143、COVID-19 crisis now fully secured?Yes,at least at the global level and in terms of the youth unemployment rateIn 2023,64.9 million young people aged 15 to 24 were unemployed worldwide.This is the lowest number to date in the twenty-first century and nearly 4 million fewer than the number of unemploy
144、ed youth in 2019(before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic).Standing at 13 per cent in 2023,the global youth unemployment rate does not just reflect a full recovery from the COVID-19 peak;it is also at its lowest level in the past 15 years(figure 1.2).This is 0.8 percentage points below the pre-pand
145、emic rate(13.8 per cent),and well below the crisis peak of 15.6 per cent in 2020.Although this is an encouraging development,there are still 65 million youth around the world with an unmet explicit demand for paid work.By 2023,youth unemployment rates were lower than their pre-crisis levels for both
146、 sexes,but saw a larger drop for young men than young women(figure 1.2).The recovery period thus represents a shift in the gender dynamics of young peoples transition to employment,with a greater degree of disadvantage falling to young women.The higher male-to-female ratio in youth unemployment rate
147、s that persisted in the decade prior to the pandemic has effectively disappeared,as the unemployment rate of young men fell at a steeper rate than that of young women in the post-crisis period.From the peak of the crisis and continuing through 2023,the unemployment rates of young men and young women
148、 converged:in 2023,they reached 12.9 per cent for young women and 13 per cent for young men.33 The global trend here meaning the sharper decline in the male youth unemployment rate in 2023 over 2019 compared to young women was driven by Central and Western Asia,Eastern Europe,North America,South Asi
149、a and sub-Saharan Africa.See annex table A1.Number of countries with higher YUR in 2023Arab States(12)Central and Western Asia(11)East Asia(6)Eastern Europe(10)Latin America and the Caribbean(31)North Africa(7)North America(2)Northern,Southern and Western Europe(30)South Asia(9)South-Eastern Asia an
150、d the Pacific(22)Sub-Saharan Africa(47)84566811204313176310122720Number of countries with lower YUR in 20232220 Figure 1.1.Number of countries in 2023 with youth unemployment rates above/below their 2019 rates,by subregionNote:YUR=youth unemployment rate.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,Novembe
151、r 2023.4Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 and also in terms of the youth employment-to-population ratio.By 2023,youth employment had regained the COVID-19 losses and involved another 3.8 million young workers over the pre-pandemic level in 2019.There were 435 million employed young people glob
152、ally in 2023,a number not seen since 2016(figure 1.3).At 35 per cent,the global youth employment-to-population ratio(EPR)in 2023 also reflects the rebound from the pandemic-driven employment losses in 202022(figure 1.3).The male and female EPRs follow the same trend lines,which is not good news for
153、closing the gender gap.The gender gap in the youth EPR has narrowed by one percentage point per decade,with the male-to-female gap at 15.1 percentage points in 2003,14.1 points in 2013 and 13.1 points in 2023.If the current pace of change was to continue,the gender gap in youth EPR would not reach z
154、ero until well into the twenty-second century.MaleTotalFemaleEmployment(millions)25.030.035.040.045.050.055.0Employment-to-population ratio(%)Employment(millions)0100200300400500600200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023 Figure 1.3.Global yout
155、h employment(millions,right axis)and youth employment-to-population ratio(percentage,left axis),by sex,200023Note:Annex table A2 shows the youth EPR by sex,subregion and country income group.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.MaleTotal12.012.513.013.514.014.515.015.516.0Unemployment
156、 rate(%)Unemployment(millions)6466687072747678200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023FemaleUnemployment(millions)Figure 1.2.Global youth unemployment(millions,right axis)and youth unemployment rate(percentage,left axis),by sex,200023Note:Annex
157、 table A1 shows the youth unemployment rates by sex,subregion and country income group.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,May 2024.5Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsBut the recovery gains for youth and their labour market prospects are already ebbingIt is notable that
158、 the annual growth rate in youth employment seen in figure 1.4 was positive between 2021 and 2023,which marks the first such instance since the early 2000s.However,these positive rates are likely to be temporary.Much of the annual employment growth during the recovery period would have been due to t
159、hose young persons who had temporarily withdrawn from the labour force or become unemployed during the pandemic returning to(or finding)work.Once the pent-up young labour supply of the pandemic period settled into work in 2021,the youth employment growth rate though still positive is shown to have e
160、bbed in 202223.It will most likely fall below zero again in the next few years(see section 1.6).The scale of the annual decrease in the number of unemployed youth after 2021 had also moderated by 2023.and recovery has not been universal or even.Youth unemployment rates in 2023 had returned to their
161、pre-crisis rates or fell below their pre-crisis rates in most(but not all)subregions.The three subregions where the rates remained elevated over the 2019 pre-pandemic rates were the Arab States,East Asia,and South-East Asia and the Pacific(figure 1.5).The youth unemployment rate in East Asia increas
162、ed by as much as 4.3 percentage points between 2019 and 2023,with the components moving as follows:youth unemployment grew by 3.4 million people and the youth labour force shrank by 4.7 million people.4 Thus,both factors a rising numerator and shrinking denominator have influenced the rising youth u
163、nemployment rate in East Asia.The only other subregion with more unemployed youth in 2023 compared to 2019 as well as a shrinking youth labour force was South-East Asia and the Pacific.4 Mongolia and Republic of Korea are two East Asian economies that show a youth unemployment rate in their latest y
164、ear available(2022 in Mongolia and 2023 in Republic of Korea)that fell below the rate of 2019.Youth employment Youth populationYouth unemployment Youth labour force200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220236.04.02.00.02.04.06.08.08.010.012.0 Figure 1
165、.4.Annual growth rate in global youth population,labour force,employment and unemployment since 2000(percentage)Note:For comparison,the annual growth rate of the same variables for adults(aged 25 and over)is shown in annex figure A1.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.6Global Employm
166、ent Trends for Youth 2024 The subregions of Central and Western Asia,Eastern Europe,Latin America and the Caribbean,North America,Northern,Southern and Western Europe,and sub-Saharan Africa all experienced youth unemployment rates during the recovery period that were at a multi-decade low.5 The reas
167、ons behind these historic lows differ by subregion and cannot be generalized in and of themselves as a signal that young people in these six subregions are now thriving within their labour market transitions.Additional indicators beyond youth unemployment and assessments of contextual information ar
168、e required to go deeper on these subregional storylines.For instance,adding some qualitative employment indicators would show that,in sub-Saharan Africa,low rates of youth unemployment are not a cause for celebration,since most young people are still driven by economic necessity to take up whatever
169、low-quality job they can find(see section 2.2).At the same time,the subregions low youth unemployment rates are also heavily influenced by the scale of the increasing youth labour force(as the denominator;see figure 1.5).In Eastern Europe,additional data on youth employment,the youth EPR and youth i
170、nactivity rate would show that,regardless of declining youth unemployment rates,youth employment numbers were declining even as the youth population was growing,and that the youth inactivity rate was increasing well above the pre-crisis trendline(not shown).These signals together indicate a deterior
171、ating situation in regard to youth prospects in the subregion,as the Russian Federations war against Ukraine has permeated into the realms of diminished educational participation,mobilization of young soldiers and lost investment in job creation.In North America and Northern,Southern and Western Eur
172、ope the two regions consisting primarily of high-income countries the low youth unemployment rates during the recovery period were likely influenced by recent circumstances of“tight”labour markets(that is,with excess demand)as a result of slowing labour force growth(following demographic changes,but
173、 also for health reasons)and due to changes in workers preferences and skills mismatches(Duval et al.2022;ILO 2024a).Figure 1.6 shows a few countries in the two subregions plus Japan and the Republic of Korea,high-income countries of East Asia that had youth unemployment rates at record lows in the
174、past year or in recent months,although the rates in each country have since increased again by the latest period(as also seen in the 5 To be precise,Central and Western Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean had youth unemployment rates equivalent to the 2023 values in one or two years in the 2000
175、23 period.Arab StatesCentral and Western AsiaEast AsiaEastern EuropeLatin America and the CaribbeanNorth AfricaNorth AmericaNorthern,Southern and Western Europe South AsiaSouth-Eastern Asia and the PacificSub-Saharan AfricaWorldChange in youth unemployment(millions)0.20.510.50.33.93.44.74.30.21.20.4
176、2.62.74.300.61.70.10.50.500.80.44.44.84.40.22.910.410.50.53.65.80.9Change in youth labour force(millions)Change in youth unemployment rate(percentage points)Figure 1.5.Change in youth unemployment,youth labour force and youth unemployment rate,by subregion,201923Note:Youth unemployment rates from 20
177、00 are also shown in annex table A1(also by sex and country income group).Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.7Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsfigure).These increases are largely due to the effects of tighter monetary policies to fight inflation,among ot
178、her causes.The spike in unfulfilled vacancies in numerous advanced economies during the rebound period from the COVID-19 pandemic has applied to both high-skilled and low-skilled occupations(ILO 2024a).In the European Union,labour shortages were reported in science,technology,engineering and mathema
179、tics occupations but also in lower-skilled occupations,such as cleaners and personal care workers.These shortages are expected to continue on the heels of demographic changes and as the digital and green transitions advance(European Commission 2023).In Australia,unmet hiring demand was reported for
180、entry level workers in certain trades,such as machine operators and drivers,with this unmet demand leading to an increase in apprenticeship and traineeship completions(Australia,Jobs and Skills Australia 2023).Addressing labour shortages,including through supporting labour force participation,increa
181、sing traineeships and work-based learning programmes,and regularizing migration channels,can play an important role in addressing economic growth prospects,and thereby also improving youth unemployment.Beyond the issue of crisis recovery,there remains the long-standing challenges faced by young peop
182、le in the subregions of the Arab States and North Africa,where youth unemployment rates remain critically high.Knowing that the chances of working for pay or profit are slim(due to cultural and circumstantial constraints),few young women attempt to join the labour market in these two subregions,and
183、among those who do,more than one in three remain unemployed(female unemployment rates are 38.5 per cent in the Arab States and 34 per cent in North Africa in 2023 see box 1 on estimations of the“missing young workers”).But young men also do not have an easy time finding work,as is evident in the mal
184、e unemployment rates of 25.7 per cent in the Arab States and 18.8 per cent in North Africa.Record low(since 2000)LatestAustraliaBelgiumCanadaGermanyJapanRepublic of KoreaUnited KingdomUnited States024681012141618Youth unemployment rate(%)Figure 1.6.Youth unemployment rates(monthly,seasonally adjuste
185、d)in selected countries,record low period since January 2000 and latest period(percentage)Note:The record low periods are as follows:Australia:June 2022;Belgium:AprilJune 2023;Canada:JuneJuly 2022;Germany:FebruaryApril 2022;Japan:December 2023;Republic of Korea:August 2023;United Kingdom:July 2022;a
186、nd United States:April 2023.The latest periods are as follows:Australia:February 2024;Belgium:December 2023;Canada:March 2024;Germany:February 2024;Japan:February 2024;Republic of Korea:March 2024;United Kingdom:January 2024;and United States:March 2024.Source:OECD,Infra-annual Labour Statistics:Mon
187、thly Unemployment Rates(database).8Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 XBox 1.Where are the worlds“missing”young workers?Imagine a world where all young men and women have an equal opportunity to gain employment.In such a world,we could expect a default youth EPR for both men and women of around
188、 40 per cent(similar to the aggregate of high-income countries and the grouping of Northern,Southern and Western Europe).Taking this as an“ideal”,the table below identifies the extent of“missing young workers”when the ideal EPR is compared to the current realities of 2023.In total,there is a deficit
189、 of 79 million jobs for young workers when the ideal hypothetical EPR is compared to the“real”current employment ratios.The deficit is 91 per cent female that is,72 million of the global 79 million missing youth workforce are women.While the largest number of missing female workers are in South Asia
190、(45.3 million young women),it is in the Arab States and North Africa that the rates of change required to move the female youth EPR to match the 40 per cent ideal are the highest.In the Arab States,employment among young women would need to increase sixfold and in North Africa fivefold to reach a re
191、gional and gender-based state of equity.For young men,Eastern Europe shows the largest deficit,calling for a 0.42-fold increase in the number of employed young men for the subregion to reach an EPR of 40 per cent.North Africa is not far behind,with a need to“grow”opportunities for male young workers
192、 by a multiplier of 0.36.Note that this scenario does not identify any employment gaps in the subregions of North America and sub-Saharan Africa.This is because at the current rates of population growth in these subregions,employment growth is keeping pace at sufficient levels for both young men and
193、 young women(with resulting EPRs already sitting around 40 per cent),at least for the moment.This assessment does not,however,speak at all to the quality of employment available to youth.Qualitative deficits of youth employment are identified in Chapter 2.X Gap in number of young male and female wor
194、kers from a 40 per cent hypothetical EPR and multiplier to bring 2023 youth EPR to 40 per centSubregionNumber of“missing”young workers*(millions)Multiplier needed to bridge the gap of “missing”young workers*(%)Women MenWomenMenSouth Asia45.31.31.8North Africa7.12.44.80.4Arab States5.51.45.70.3South-
195、East Asia and the Pacific3.20.2Latin America and the Caribbean4.10.2Eastern Europe2.51.80.80.4Sub-Saharan Africa2.1Central and Western Asia1.90.5Northern,Southern and Western Europe0.50.1Note:=nil.*Missing youth are an estimation of a hypothetical employment number generated by applying a 40 per cen
196、t youth EPR to the subregional population in 2023 minus the given estimated youth employment number of 2023.The multiplier is the rate by which the estimated 2023 employment number would need to be multiplied to arrive to the hypothetical employment number based on a 40 per cent youth EPR.Source:ILO
197、STAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.9Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsThe search for work by young jobseekers is a challenge everywhere,but more so in middle-income countries.The 2023 youth unemployment rate in upper-middle-income countries remained above the pre-c
198、risis(2019)rate.6 As this was not the case in high-income countries,the gap in rates between the two income groupings has widened,with the youth unemployment rate in upper-middle-income countries being 1.5 times greater than in high-income countries in 2023 compared to 1.3 times greater in 2019(see
199、rates by country income groupings in annex table A1).The youth unemployment rate in lower-middle-income countries in 2023 was 1.2 times higher than in high-income countries,down from 1.5 times in 2019.Youth unemployment rates are lowest in the low-income country group(at 8.6 per cent in 2023),as few
200、 young people can afford to spend time in a job search,and therefore take whatever jobs they can,regardless of the quality of such work.The economic structures that drive where jobs are concentrated and the associated skills levels of available jobs play important roles in the resulting youth unempl
201、oyment rates found in the various country income groupings(see sections 2.4 and 2.5).1.3.What is the progress in lowering shares of youth not in education,employment or training?Sustainable Development Goal target 8.6 called on countries to:“By 2020,substantially reduce the proportion of youth not i
202、n employment,education or training”.With the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the unprecedented jump in youth NEET rates across the globe that resulted(ILO 2022b),few countries in the world could claim to have met that target.In 2023,the global youth NEET rate stood at 20.4 per cent,marginally better t
203、han the 21.3 per cent rate seen in 2015,when the 2030 Sustainable Agenda was adopted(table 1.1).What is more,in 2019,the global youth NEET rate was 21.4 per cent,conveying that progress in this regard had stalled even before the onset of the pandemic.However,the global figure masks the fact that you
204、th NEET rates have decreased since 2015 in most subregions.The subregions that are“on track”to meet the SDG commitment under target 8.6 are Central and Western Asia;East Asia;Eastern Europe;North America;Northern,Southern and Western Europe;South Asia;and South-East Asia and the Pacific(table 1.1).L
205、atin America and the Caribbean made some 6 The country listing for country income groups is available in Appendix A of ILO 2024a.The upper-middle-income group includes the populous countries of China and Brazil,and the lower-middle-income group includes large countries,such as Bangladesh,India and I
206、ndonesia.XTable 1.1.General overview of progress towards SDG target 8.6 to reduce shares of youth in NEET statusProgress trackingCountry countGlobal youth population share(%)SubregionCountry income groupOn track11055Central and Western Asia;East Asia;Eastern Europe;North America;Northern,Southern an
207、d Western Europe;South Asia;South-East Asia and the PacificHigh-income countriesLimited progress2712Latin America and the CaribbeanLower-and upper-middle-income countriesOff track5133Arab States;North Africa;sub-Saharan AfricaLow-income countriesNote:The country count and global share of youth popul
208、ation are calculated from the available country-level modelled estimates.Subregions and country income groups are based on the results of the aggregated modelled estimates.A country or subregion is considered“on track”if the youth NEET rate decreased by 2 percentage points or more between 2015 and 2
209、023,or if the 2023 rate is below 15 per cent.East Asia and North America are the two subregions that showed decreases of less than 2 per cent but with NEET rates below 15 per cent.“Limited progress”denotes a reduction of less than 2 percentage points in the youth NEET rate between 2015 and 2023,and
210、with a rate greater than 15 per cent in 2023.A country or subregion is considered“off track”if the youth NEET rate saw no change or increased between 2015 and 2023 and was higher than 15 per cent in 2023.Annex table A3 presents youth NEET rates from 2005 to 2023 by subregion and sex.Source:ILOSTAT,I
211、LO modelled estimates,August 2024.10Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 progress in reducing shares of youth in NEET status since 2015(by 1.3 percentage points)but the rate remained above 15 per cent.This leaves three subregions which have shown an increasing share of youth NEET rates over time(
212、North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa)or a decrease of less than 1 percentage point(the Arab States).This means that 33 per cent of the worlds youth live in a country that is“off track”in its progress to meet SDG target 8.6.What is most concerning is that the countries that are showing a regressive tr
213、end in reducing youth NEET rates are low-income countries and situated in subregions where rates were already among the worlds highest.In 2023,256 million young people aged 15 to 24(171 million women and 85 million men)globally were NEET.This represents one fifth(20.4 per cent)of the youth populatio
214、n 1 percentage point below the pre-pandemic year of 2019.For young men,the NEET rate was 13.1 per cent(0.5 points below 2019),while the rate for young women remained twice as high at 28.1 per cent(1.6 percentage points below the 2019 rate).In 2023,the Arab States had the highest youth NEET rate acro
215、ss subregions,with one in three young people being NEET(33.2 per cent).North Africa was close behind with a youth NEET rate of 31.2 per cent.Slightly more than one in four youth are NEET in South Asia,while in Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa,the ratio was about one in five.Onl
216、y in East Asia,Eastern Europe,North America,and Northern,Southern and Western Europe that is,in primarily high-income countries were youth NEET rates below 15 per cent.Although youth in NEET status include the unemployed(excluding unemployed students),the youth NEET rate is a broader concept than un
217、employment.A young person falls in the category of NEET if they are out of school and either:(i)unemployed(“unemployed NEET status”);or(ii)outside the labour force(OLF)neither working nor looking for work(the“OLF(inactive)NEET status”).As seen in figure 1.7,those with unemployed NEET status represen
218、t the smallest share among youth in NEET status,and those with OLF(inactive)NEET status represent the largest share.According to global estimates for 2023,26.7 per cent of the young female population had OLF(inactive)NEET status,while 3.3 per cent had unemployed NEET status(with the remaining 70 per
219、 cent being in non-NEET status).Compared to young women,the distribution of young men in NEET status was more evenly distributed between those who are unemployed and those who are OLF(inactive).OLF(inactive)NEETUnemployed NEETNon-NEETsTotalFemale20002023Male20002023200020237.96.130.287.286.876.478.4
220、26.765.84.070.03.36.65.35.118.517.34.3 Figure 1.7.Global distribution of youth population by NEET status and sex,2000 and 2023(percentage)Note:Non-NEET status includes young people who are in employment(whether in school or out of school),those who are unemployed and in school,and those who are OLF(
221、inactive)and in school.The shares in all categories shown were generated using available unweighted data for 92 countries with estimates available in 2000 and 2023 or nearest years(within a five-year band)and applied to the nominal estimates of labour market categories from the latest revisions of I
222、LO modelled estimates.Source:Calculations based on annual data in ILOSTAT,YouthSTATS database and ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.11Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour markets X Flashback box 1.Measurement of youth labour market outcomes has improved significantly since the f
223、irst Global Employment Trends for Youth reportMuch more is known about youth employment today than in 2004 when the first Global Employment Trends for Youth(GET for Youth)report was published.The following points summarize some of the measurement gains and quantitative lessons learned from 20 years
224、of data production and analysis of the labour market outcomes of young people:1.Defining youth.There is value in extending the age range of youth labour markets from ages 15 to 24 to ages 15 to 29.The reason is that many youth in the tighter 15 to 24 age bound are in the education/training system an
225、d thus not yet fully vested in their labour market transition.Adding in young adults aged 25 to 29 to any analysis provides a clearer portrait of labour market transitions.2.Introducing NEETs.The concept of youth in NEET status gained traction from around 2010 and quickly caught on as a more valued
226、measure of exclusion and vulnerability among the youth population than the youth unemployment rate.While care is required in interpreting the youth NEET rate,since it is an amalgamation of categories with diverging gender implications,1 it is nonetheless an important value-added to analyses of young
227、 people in labour markets.The youth NEET rate was subsequently adopted as one of the few youth-related targets in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.23.Modelled revisions.The ILOs global estimates on the number of unemployed youth(aged 15 to 24)have deflated over time.In GET for Youth 2006(
228、ILO 2006),85 million young unemployed people were estimated globally.According to the latest ILO modelled estimates(dated May 2024),the revised 2006 value for youth unemployment is now 73 million.The drop does not represent an improvement in the situation of youth in 2006,but rather improvements bot
229、h in data coverage and in the ILO methodology for global and regional estimation since 2006,as well as a shrinking youth labour force as educational attainment levels rose.34.Improved qualitative measures.Measures of the quality of employment remain a challenge in terms of both data availability and
230、 context.Many qualitative indicators have been examined in various editions of GET for Youth over time working poverty,vulnerable employment,permanent/temporary employment,low-wage workers and informal employment,to name a few.Rarely are sufficient data available to permit regional and global estima
231、tions(although Chapter 2 in this edition makes some attempts).Added to this is the challenge of context and interpretation.For instance,the ILO has invested heavily in examining informal employment,its determinants and the characteristics of young people in the formal and informal economies.But info
232、rmal employment is an indicator that is particularly relevant to developing economies and much less so to advanced economies.Informal employment can be supplemented with data on“status in employment”,which relates to the relationship of employment and how a worker can earn an income on their own thr
233、ough self-employment,be paid by an employer,work without pay in a family establishment,and more.4 The status in employment indicator provides information on the shares of young people in self-employment versus paid employment,the former being a category that remains a valuable means of income genera
234、tion for millions of youth even though paid employment is typically understood to offer higher quality outcomes.Yet,paid work when casual in nature(time-bound and typically without a written contract)rarely offers greater benefits in terms of stability/security than self-employment.Recent editions o
235、f GET for Youth thus examine an indicator of“stable employment”,which quantifies young workers in paid jobs that have a duration of 12 months or longer.The point is that there is no one perfect measure of decent work.A multitude of qualitative indicators should be examined together and caution shoul
236、d be taken against overgeneralizing in their interpretation.1.“OLF(inactive)NEET status”is a category dominated by young women,and,as demonstrated in this section,accounts for the largest share of youth in NEET status.“Unemployed NEET status”is the second category of youth in NEET status and is typi
237、cally more male than female,but accounts for a significantly smaller portion of overall youth in NEET status.Recent reports that disaggregate the youth in NEET status to aid in interpretation include ILO 2022a and OHiggins et al.2023b.2.Indicator 8.6.1 of SDG target 8.6:“By 2020,substantially reduce
238、 the proportion of youth not in employment,education or training”.Few countries have achieved this target.3.For the most recent description of the ILO methodology for production of global and regional labour market indicators,see Annex A of ILO 2024a.4.The International Classification on Status in E
239、mployment was last updated in 2018 to better capture the evolving circumstances of employment relationships,including to capture contract workers who work at a particular establishment but are contracted through a third party.However,countries are not yet applying this revision.12Global Employment T
240、rends for Youth 2024 Initially,national and international policy attention to the youth NEET rate as per SDG indicator 8.6.1 had been largely limited to high-income countries.However,recent ILO work now also examines some of the key characteristics and implications of being NEET in low-and middle-in
241、come countries(OHiggins et al.2023a;ILO 2022a).One of the more evident features of youth in NEET status especially in low-and middle-income countries is that they are predominantly young women.Globally,in 2023,two out of every three youth in NEET status are female,and young women are twice as likely
242、 as young men to be NEET.In South Asia,the rate of young women in NEET status in 2023(42.4 per cent)is nearly four times as high as that registered by their young male counterparts(11.5 per cent see annex table A3).Youth NEET rates tend to fall as the country income level rises.In 2023,the average N
243、EET rate in low-income countries was 28.7 per cent,compared to 10.4 per cent in high-income countries(annex table A.3).The gender gap in youth NEET rates also falls as income levels increase;the average percentage point difference between young men and young women NEET rates was less than 1 percenta
244、ge point in the high-income group,compared to 16 points in low-income countries.Moreover,youth NEET rates are higher in rural areas than in urban ones,and the chances of being NEET tend to fall as ones educational attainment level rises(see also section 2.5).Finally,and perhaps most importantly,NEET
245、 status is linked to cumulative deprivations,especially among young women.It scars young people.Being NEET today brings with it a big increase in the chances of being NEET tomorrow,since the reasons for being in NEET status are unlikely to change with time(OHiggins et al.2023a).Most young women in N
246、EET status are not looking for work due to personal reasons,which can include illness,disability,pregnancy,the presence of small children in the household,or being prohibited from doing so by their family.7 The disproportionate burden of unpaid domestic and care work placed on young women is a major
247、 factor that keeps them in NEET status.Not only are NEET rates significantly higher for young women than for young men more than double in some countries and regions but NEET status is also a much more permanent situation for young women than for young men.1.4.What is the latest in relation to youth
248、 gender gaps?It is a negative sign when the labour market outcomes of young women lag behind those of young men,since all evidence points to an accumulation of disadvantages to women over their lifespans and to a non-diminishing risk of perpetuating gender gaps across generations.Based on the summar
249、y gender analysis of youth labour market indicators presented in the previous sections,the additional disadvantages that young women face in the labour market still seem to be very much present,at least at the global level:XThe gender gap in the youth EPR has hardly diminished in the past two decade
250、s at the global level.Standing at 15 percentage points in 2000,the gap narrowed by only 2 points over the period through 2023(to 13 points).XYoung women make up 90 per cent of a“missing youth workforce”when global gender parity(and regional EPR parity)are modelled(see box 1).XThe global youth NEET r
251、ate of young women was double the male rate in 2023.As such,young women dominate the youth in NEET status category,and are much less likely than young men to transition out of NEET status into paid employment,given their disproportionate participation in unpaid work.In 5 of the 11 subregions,female
252、youth EPRs have decreased by a lesser degree than male EPRs since the year 2000,indicating some closing of the gender gap in employment,albeit slowly(figure 1.8).This includes two of the three subregions where the gender differences are the greatest namely,the Arab States and South Asia.In Northern,
253、Southern and Western Europe,the female youth EPR has actually increased over the period,while the male ratio has decreased.Still,there is no getting past the fact that young women are severely disadvantaged by the norms,cultures and practices that continue to place unpaid household responsibilities
254、on their shoulders,thus limiting their capacity to pursue their education and/or paid work to the same degree as young men.7 Statement is based on 126 countries with data from the ILO harmonized microdata collection.13Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsOther instances of p
255、rogress(or lack of progress)in overcoming the disadvantages faced by young women in labour markets for instance,on wages and sectors of employment will be discussed throughout Chapter 2.1.5.Youth anxieties are on the riseThe well-being of youth is a growing concernBy 2023,the world had shown an impr
256、essive rebound of economic growth.Youth employment and unemployment both in absolute numbers and shares have signalled recovery in many subregions.Regardless of these quantitative facts,various perception surveys are generating anecdotal evidence that many young people today feel anxious about the e
257、conomy and their job prospects.Some signs of an increased sense of anxiety or unease among youth include:XWorries about job loss.Data from the latest version of the World Value Survey(Wave 7,201722)reveal that 64 per cent of young people(aged 15 to 29)globally were worried about losing their job(fig
258、ure 1.9,panel A).Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest share of young people stressed about job loss;while youth in Northern,Southern and Western Europe have the smallest share.XWorries about job stability.An ILO COVID-19 impact survey run in 2021 and 2022 found that the region with the highest share o
259、f youth who were either“extremely”or“very concerned”about job stability over the next six months was Africa,at 35 per cent.This was followed by the Arab States(31 per cent of youth),the Americas(25 per cent),Asia and the Pacific(23 per cent)and Europe and Central Asia(just 18 per cent)(ILO,forthcomi
260、ng).XLack of social mobility across generations.While six to seven out of every ten young people(aged 15 to 29)in subregions of Asia feel their standards of living to be better than their parents(a signal of economic progress),only half of youth in sub-Saharan Africa and less than half in the remain
261、ing subregions felt the same(figure 1.9,panel B).This sort of“intergenerational angst”regarding social MaleFemaleNorthern,Southern and Western Europe Central and Western AsiaSub-Saharan AfricaNorth AfricaEastern EuropeLatin America and the CaribbeanSouth-Eastern Asia and the PacificNorth AmericaArab
262、 StatesSouth AsiaEast Asia25201510505Percentage points Figure 1.8.Change in youth employment-to-population ratio,by subregion and sex,200023(percentage points)Note:Sorted by change in male youth EPR.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.14Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 Panel A
263、.Share of young people(aged 15 to 29)worried about losing their job,by subregion,201722(percentage)Sub-Saharan AfricaSouth-Eastern Asia and the PacificLatin America and the CaribbeanSouth AsiaNorth AfricaArab StatesGlobal averageEastern AsiaCentral and Western AsiaNorthern AmericaEastern EuropeNorth
264、ern,Southern and Western Europe 83.377.375.971.168.164.664.364.060.652.448.442.1South AsiaEast AsiaSouth-East Asia and the PacificCentral and Western AsiaGlobal averageSub-Saharan AfricaNorth AmericaNorthern,Southern and Western Europe Eastern EuropeNorth AfricaLatin America and the CaribbeanArab St
265、ates70.462.261.359.553.453.147.947.747.046.845.240.1Panel B.Share of young people(aged 15 to 29)who consider their standard of living to be better than their parents,by subregion,201722(percentage)Panel C.Perceptions of economic opportunities by region,2022(percentage)SufficientInsufficientNo respon
266、seSub-Saharan AfricaLatin AmericaWest AsiaNon-EU EuropeMiddle East and North AfricaEU EastEast Asia+OceaniaEU(Total)EU WestSouth AsiaNorth America0102030405060708090100181820221025276339367418421146807978687267585751474410Question:And how about economic opportunities in your country today?Would you
267、say they are sufficient or insufficient?Figure 1.9.Various perception surveys on economic or labour market circumstancesNote:Results are the share of population per region by response group.Country groupings in the figure differ from the subregions used by the ILO.East Asia and Oceania include count
268、ries of South-East Asia.Source:Panels A and B,World Value Survey,Wave 7;Haerpfer et al.2022;Panel C,Gallup International,“75 Years Jubilee Poll”,AugustOctober 2022.15Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsmobility seems to be especially strong in regions consisting of higher-i
269、ncome countries,where young people may feel less empowered than their parents generation despite the abundance of jobs.XInsufficient economic opportunities.A recent Gallup International poll found that 64 per cent of respondents globally felt the economic opportunities in their country to be insuffi
270、cient in recent times.This low sense of economic optimism is particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean,and the Middle East and North Africa(MENA)regions(figure 1.9,panel C)(Gallup International 2023).XLimited financial independence.In the United States of America,64
271、per cent of young adults aged 25 years reported being financially independent from their parents in 2021,compared to 73 per cent of those the same age in 1980(Fry 2023).Likewise,the share of 25-year-olds living outside their parents home in 2021 was 68 per cent,compared with 84 per cent in 1980.Home
272、ownership among young adults aged 25 to 34 in the United States has also dropped significantly over time.Choi et al.(2018)show that the homeownership rate for millennials was 37 per cent in 2015,or about 8 percentage points lower than that of the two previous generations(Gen X and baby boomers)at th
273、e same age.XGeneral happiness levels among youth declining in some regions.The latest results of the World Happiness Survey 2024(Helliwell et al.2024)report a drop in the average life evaluations(that is,the happiness)of persons aged below 30 over time(comparing the periods of 200610 and 202123)in t
274、he following subregions and territories:North America,AustraliaNew Zealand,MENA,Western Europe and South Asia.On the positive side,happiness among youth has increased by a sizeable amount between these two periods in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Commonwealth of Independent States,and by a l
275、ess sizeable but still positive amount in South-East Asia,East Asia,Latin America and the Caribbean,and sub-Saharan Africa.Another measure provided in the World Happiness Survey is a measure of negative emotions.By this measure,there has been an especially large jump in negative emotions among youth
276、(less than 30 years)in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa over time.Such results are found to be linked to the high levels of inequality of happiness in the two subregions.8When supplementing labour market information with perception surveys and comparing across geographic regions,certain results are
277、 found to be complementary.For instance,the fact that young people in sub-Saharan Africa express a high degree of worry about job loss and job stability makes sense when the review of labour market information in section 2.2 shows that three in four young adults in the subregion work in self-employm
278、ent or in a temporary paid job.Likewise,the limited wage growth experienced by young adults in the United States seen also section 2.2(figure 2.3)supports the premise that many American youth feel less financially independent than previous generations.Young people today are interlinked through digit
279、al technologies and have unprecedented exposure to local and global concerns that can leave them feeling insecure and apprehensive about the future.Youth anxieties include concerns about future job prospects and livelihoods but are also much broader,extending to worries about climate change,digital
280、presence and image,violence,debt(household or student),inequalities,geopolitics,pandemics and more.Helping young people to navigate through the complexities of the school-to-work and youth-to-adulthood transitions should be a shared mission involving all segments of society.Clearly,these are trying
281、times for young people.But,at least when it comes to their labour market transitions,young people can be reassured that there are institutions like the ILO that strive to mobilize actions on their behalf,including through fostering youth skills development and meaningful labour market engagement and
282、 by working to expand access to the social protection measures that can support youth in times of need.8 People are found to be happier in those countries where the equality of happiness is greater.16Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 1.6.Outlook for 2024 and 2025Economic growth,as measured in
283、terms of GDP,has shown a post-crisis resilience that has surpassed expectations.The International Monetary Fund(IMF)has revised upwards its global GDP growth estimate for 2023 to 3.2 per cent(IMF 2024a).The world economy is also forecast to continue growing at the same pace during 2024 and 2025.Whil
284、e such growth marks a”soft landing”from the pandemic years,driven in part by easing deflation and better-than-expected employment growth in advanced economies and among some large emerging economies,it is still lower than the pre-crisis historical growth trend and there is some divergence across reg
285、ions and development levels.Resilient economic growth rates are reflected also in the youth employment growth predicted for the next two years.ILO modelled estimates project an increase in youth employment at the global level of 2.9 million between 2023 and 2025,following a slight dip in 2024.Positi
286、ve youth employment growth is projected for both young men and young women in the Arab States,Central and Western Asia,East Asia,Eastern Europe,North Africa,South-East Asia and the Pacific,and sub-Saharan Africa(table 1.2).Three quarters of the projected global youth employment gains through 2025 ar
287、e expected to come from sub-Saharan Africa.It should also be noted that in another two of these subregions Central and Western Asia and East Asia employment growth is projected to be outpaced by the youth population growth,which will lead to declining youth EPRs.XTable 1.2.Projected youth employment
288、 levels and employment-to-population ratios,by subregion and country income group,202325Subregion/country income groupEmployment-to-population ratio(%)Employment (millions)202320242025202320242025World35.034.634.6434.6434.3437.5Arab States19.319.319.46.46.66.8Central and Western Asia34.934.834.69.89
289、.99.9East Asia40.940.740.675.675.875.9Eastern Europe25.325.525.87.47.67.8Latin America and the Caribbean40.440.240.042.842.442.0North Africa18.318.418.58.08.28.5North America47.946.546.123.623.022.7Northern,Southern and Western Europe39.238.638.119.218.918.7South Asia27.326.426.599.996.997.2South-Ea
290、st Asia and the Pacific39.739.839.845.445.745.9Sub-Saharan Africa40.440.540.496.499.4102.2High-income countries41.140.540.259.358.257.6Upper-middle-income countries38.137.937.8142.4142.4142.4Lower-middle-income countries29.328.828.9169.6168.6170.6Low-income countries43.443.343.363.465.166.9Note:Data
291、 for 2023 are estimates and data for 2024 and 2025 are projections.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023.17Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsThe global youth unemployment rate is expected to decrease further over the next two years from 13 per cent in 2023 t
292、o 12.8 per cent in 2025(table 1.3).The largest projected decreases in the youth unemployment rate between 2023 and 2025 are expected to occur in Central and Western Asia and Eastern Europe.The expected decrease in rates in the Arab States and North Africa is good news,as these are subregions where y
293、outh unemployment rates are still excessively high.In both subregions,improvements in youth unemployment rates are projected for both young men and young women,although true success will only come if more young women and men are being engaged in good quality jobs.Only two subregions are expected to
294、experience an increase in the youth unemployment rate through 2025.These are North America and Northern,Southern and Western Europe.Although above the 2023 rates,the projected unemployment rates in 2025 in these two subregions would still be at historically low levels.XTable 1.3.Projected youth unem
295、ployment levels and rates,by subregion and country income group,202325Subregion/country income groupUnemployment rate (%)Unemployment(millions)202320242025202320242025World13.012.812.864.964.564.8Arab States28.028.627.72.52.62.6Central and Western Asia13.813.413.41.61.51.6East Asia14.514.314.312.912
296、.712.7Eastern Europe13.313.012.51.11.11.1Latin America and the Caribbean13.613.613.46.86.76.6North Africa22.322.522.32.42.52.5North America8.28.38.42.12.12.1Northern,Southern and Western Europe14.414.814.63.23.33.2South Asia9.99.89.718.017.417.6South-East Asia and the Pacific15.114.914.95.04.94.9Sub
297、-Saharan Africa8.98.98.99.59.79.9High-income countries10.610.810.77.07.06.9Upper-middle-income countries15.515.315.326.125.925.8Lower-middle-income countries13.112.912.925.825.425.8Low-income countries8.68.68.66.06.26.3Note:Data for 2023 are estimates and data for 2024 and 2025 are projections.Sourc
298、e:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,May 2024.18Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 The youth NEET rate is projected to remain at 20.4 per cent in 2024 and 2025(table 1.4).Youth NEET rates are expected to increase in three subregions where they have been relatively low:East Asia,Eastern Europe and N
299、orth America.In South Asia,where rates were already among the worlds highest,youth NEET rates are projected to show an increase,creeping up to 26.6 per cent in 2025.Slight improvements are expected for the other two subregions with particularly high NEET rates,the Arab States and North Africa.Yet,fa
300、r too many young women in these two subregions are still facing exclusion from schooling and labour market engagement.XTable 1.4.Projected youth NEET levels and rates,by subregion and country income group,202325Subregion/country income groupYouth NEET rate (%)Youth NEET (millions)2023202420252023202
301、42025World20.420.420.4256.3259.1261.9Arab States33.233.333.111.311.611.9Central and Western Asia18.618.618.55.35.35.3East Asia10.910.911.020.320.420.6Eastern Europe12.912.913.03.73.83.9Latin America and the Caribbean19.719.719.620.820.720.6North Africa31.231.131.014.314.414.7North America11.211.311.
302、35.65.65.7Northern,Southern and Western Europe9.99.99.94.95.05.0South Asia26.426.526.698.098.498.8South-East Asia and the Pacific16.316.316.318.919.119.2Sub-Saharan Africa21.921.921.853.254.756.2High-income countries10.410.410.415.115.215.3Upper-middle-income countries16.616.616.662.562.763.0Lower-m
303、iddle-income countries23.223.123.1135.9137.3138.7Low-income countries28.728.628.542.943.944.9Note:Data for 2023 are estimates and data for 2024 and 2025 are projections.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,August 2024.19Chapter 1|Global and regional outlook for youth labour marketsFigure 1.10 gives
304、 a summary of the anticipated changes in the youth unemployment rates and youth EPRs by subregion for 2023 to 2025.On the upside,the Arab States,North Africa,Eastern Europe,and South-East Asia and the Pacific are projected to see increases in the youth EPR and declines in the youth unemployment rate
305、.Interpretation of the projected results for the other subregions requires additional context.For instance,while it is positive to see expected decreases in youth unemployment rates in East Asia,Central and Western Asia,Latin America and the Caribbean,South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa,a declining yo
306、uth EPR can only be viewed as positive if driven by increasing school attendance and/or if starting from a high rate that signalled high incidences of working poverty.Conversely,the expected increases in youth unemployment rates and decreases in youth EPRs in North America and Northern,Southern and
307、Western Europe are not particularly problematic given that both subregions had both very low youth unemployment rates and comparatively high youth EPRs in 2023.Still,it will be important to keep an eye on developments in all subregions given the uncertainties in the global socio-economic and geopoli
308、tical settings ahead.Northern,Southern and Western EuropeEast AsiaCentral and Western AsiaNorth America0.80.60.4 0.2Eastern EuropeArab StatesSouth-East Asiaand the PacificNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaLatin America and the Caribbean21.510.500.5100.20.4Rising youth EPR,falling YURSouth AsiaYouth EPR
309、change(pp)YUR change(pp)Falling youth EPR,rising YUR Figure 1.10.Projected changes in youth unemployment rates and employment-to-population ratios,by subregion,202325(percentage points)Note:YUR=youth unemployment rate;pp=percentage points.Source:ILOSTAT,ILO modelled estimates,November 2023(EPR)and M
310、ay 2024(UR).2Then and now:A changing landscape of youth employment22Global Employment Trends for Youth 2024 2.1.IntroductionThis chapter brings new evidence to various topics of relevance to the current dialogue on youth employment.In the spirit of the anniversary of this publication,each topic is a
311、ddressed as a retrospective.To the extent possible,the aim is to highlight how the landscape that connects young peoples prospects to labour market outcomes has changed since the beginning of the millennium.The chapter starts in section 2.2 with an assessment of job quality seeking to understand if
312、there are changes in the qualitative outcomes of youth employment and looking for insight on who gets the few jobs that fall higher up on the decent work scale.Next,section 2.3 examines the long-standing question of whether youth are more vulnerable in their labour market outcomes and how this manif
313、ests in comparison to outcomes for adults.Section 2.4 updates the picture of where jobs for todays youth are coming from(which sectors and occupations),and how this compares to the demand-side picture from 20 years prior.Section 2.5 asks if the value of education and training have changed over time
314、in terms of both outcomes on labour attachment and the quality of jobs attained by higher-level graduates.Section 2.6 addresses the big question of how demographic trends are and will be influencing the increasing geographic imbalance of labour shortages and labour surpluses,and what this means for
315、the future of jobs for youth.Finally,section 2.7 delves into the issue of conflicts and examines how young people cope in an increasing conflict-afflicted global setting.2.2.Decent work for youth:Any progress?IntroductionCreating jobs for young women and men entering the labour market every year is
316、a critical component in the path towards economic growth,fairer societies and stronger democracies.Chapter 1 confirmed that,at least in COVID-19 recovery period,the pace of job creation has picked up and more young people are able to find jobs.Yet,it is not only the quantity but also the quality of
317、jobs that matters.Providing opportunities for young people to access decent jobs means more than just earning a living.It means getting youth into secure,decent and productive work in which an adequate income is generated,rights are protected,and appropriate social protection is provided.It is these
318、 quality components of the job that bring the confidence that enables young people to transition to the next steps of adulthood.The adulthood transition can entail meeting such markers as leaving the parental household,completing schooling,progressing towards career goals and gaining financial indep
319、endence(or contributing a substantial amount to household income if the tradition is to remain within a multigenerational household).Such“markers of adulthood”differ by culture and societal norms.For the majority of the worlds young people,conditions of poverty and insecurity are such that ascribed“
320、traditional”routes to adulthood rarely exist.For youth in urban sub-Saharan Africa,for instance,full-time work rarely follows schooling,and pathways to marriage and family formation are complicated by livelihood insecurity(Banks 2016).But even in such settings,“self-reliance”,which would normally ne
321、cessitate earning an income,is taken to be a principal marker of adulthood.There is a societal problem when employment does not pay enough or regularly enough to promote a sense of security and financial independence among young adults,or otherwise inhibits their achievement of other adulthood marke
322、rs.Is there evidence of“delayed adulthood”that can be attributed to a lack of decent jobs for youth?This section tests this idea using a few labour market variables that are common to labour force surveys:Xjob tenure(temporary versus permanent jobs)and status in employment,which together are used as
323、 an indication of job security;Xhours of work;and Xmedian wages.All indicators are examined for the age cohort of 25 to 29 years that is,young adulthood in order to best capture the conditions of work for young persons who are in the fledgling years of economic activity,and possibly family formation
324、.23Chapter 2|Then and now:A changing landscape of youth labour marketsIs there evidence of increasing job insecurity?Results are mixed when dissecting the aggregate shares of wage or salaried(hereafter“paid”)young workers with temporary contracts9 or in self-employment.10 Figure 2.1 shows the subreg
325、ional averages for the shares of young adults(aged 25 to 29)in temporary paid jobs and self-employed jobs(two elements of“insecure employment”).Some points of relevance from this data review follow:1.Incidences of temporary employment have risen in all but one subregion.Increases in the share of you
326、ng adults working in temporary jobs with a contract duration less than 12 months occurred in eight of the nine subregions with sufficient data over the last two decades(figure 2.1,panel A).Only Eastern Europe saw its share of young adult workers in temporary work declining.Temporary work among youth
327、 has increased most pronouncedly in East Asia,Latin America and the Caribbean,and South Asia.Temporary paid workers now make up about one fifth to one quarter of employment among young adult workers.2.There has been a shift away from self-employment and into temporary paid employment in nearly all s
328、ubregions and country income groups.Due to the limited availability of permanent jobs,it seems that many young workers who move away from self-employment are moving into temporary paid work.The reality is that many young people may be engaged in both casual paid employment and self-employment at the
329、 same time,using all opportunities available to them to earn an income(Conen 2020;Banks 2016).3.Insecure forms of work are the only option for most youth in developing regions.The likelihood that a young adult works in either self-employment or temporary paid employment is four times greater in a lo
330、w-income country than a high-income country(figure 2.1,panel B).The subregions where insecure work is the“norm”impacting more than half of young adult workers are the developing regions of South Asia,South-East Asia and the Pacific,and(especially)sub-Saharan Africa with Latin America and the Caribbe
331、an also sitting at 50 per cent.Among these subregions,self-employment is the dominant form of insecure work in South Asia and in sub-Saharan Africa.In South-East Asia and the Pacific,and Latin America and the Caribbean,shares are more evenly split between temporary paid work and self-employment,whic
332、h reflects,in part,the high share of work in the services sector(compared to the dominant agriculture sector of the other two subregions;see section 2.4).These are also subregions with low social protection coverage and even lower levels of unemployment protection,thus leaving young adult workers wi
333、th no support to navigate between temporary jobs or to complement their income(ILO 2021a).4.Young women are more likely than men to work in insecure forms of work in all subregions but Eastern Europe,although the gender gaps in this respect are not large in scale(see annex figure A3).Still,in almost all subregions,there is a higher share of young women than men in the category of contributing fami
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