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1、World EnergyOutlook 2024INTERNATIONAL ENERGYAGENCYIEA member countries:Australia Austria BelgiumCanadaCzech Republic DenmarkEstoniaFinland France Germany Greece HungaryIreland ItalyJapanKoreaLithuania Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand NorwayPoland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switze

2、rland Republic of Trkiye United Kingdom United StatesThe European Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:Argentina BrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaKenyaMoroccoSenegalSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraineThe IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including

3、oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advocates policies that will enhance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member count

4、ries,13 association countries and beyond.Please note that this publication is subject to specific restrictions that limit its use and distribution.The terms and conditions are available online at www.iea.org/termsThis publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or

5、sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.org Foreword 3 Foreword The world is facing perilous times.Escalating conflict in the Middle East and Russ

6、ias continued war in Ukraine have global attention sharply focused on some of the worlds most important energy-producing regions.While some of the acute impacts of the global energy crisis have receded,geopolitical uncertainty is exposing the underlying fragilities of the global energy system,regard

7、less of technology or geography.Energy infrastructure is also facing increasing risks from extreme weather events that are becoming an all too common aspect of life for people around the world.Too often,the worst impacts of these crises are reserved for the poorest in societies,especially in emergin

8、g and developing economies.Today,the greatest energy injustice is the hundreds of millions of people,mostly in Africa,who still lack access to basic energy services such as electricity or safe stoves for cooking.With all these issues front of mind,energy security is again a major theme of this years

9、 World Energy Outlook(WEO).In our fast-changing world,the concept of energy security goes well beyond safeguarding against traditional risks to oil and natural gas supplies,as important as that remains for the global economy.It also means ensuring access to affordable energy supplies;anticipating em

10、erging risks in the electricity sector;shoring up supply chains for clean energy technologies and the critical minerals required to make them;and tackling the rising threats that extreme weather events pose to energy systems.All these areas are key priorities for the IEAs day-to-day work.To advance

11、the global discussion on these issues,the IEA is convening a major International Summit on the Future of Energy Security in the second quarter of 2025,hosted in London by the UK Government,to build a common understanding of the importance of energy security and what it takes to truly deliver it in t

12、he context of clean energy transitions.The analysis in this years Outlook reinforces my long-held conviction that energy security and climate action go hand-in-hand:the world does not need to choose between ensuring reliable energy supplies and addressing the climate crisis.This is because deploying

13、 cost-competitive clean energy technologies represents a lasting solution not only for bringing down emissions,but also for reducing reliance on fuels that have been prone to volatility and disruption.The latest Outlook also confirms that the contours of a new,more electrified energy system are beco

14、ming increasingly evident,with major implications on how we meet rising demand for energy services.Clean electricity is the future,and one of the striking findings of this Outlook is how fast demand for electricity is set to rise,with the equivalent of the electricity use of the worlds ten largest c

15、ities being added to global demand each year.This WEO highlights,once again,the choices that can move the energy system in a safer and more sustainable direction.I urge decision makers around the world to use this analysis to understand how the energy landscape is changing,and how to accelerate this

16、 clean energy transformation in ways that benefit peoples lives and future prosperity.IEA.CC BY 4.0.4 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Finally,I would like to commend my IEA colleagues who worked so ably and with such commitment on this WEO alongside many other important IEA rep

17、orts,activities and events for all their efforts,under the outstanding leadership of my colleagues Laura Cozzi and Tim Gould.Dr Fatih Birol Executive Director International Energy Agency IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 5 Acknowledgements This study was prepared by the World Energy Outlook(WEO)team in

18、 the Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks(STO)in co-operation with other directorates and offices of the International Energy Agency(IEA).The study was designed and directed by Laura Cozzi,Director of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks,and Tim Gould,Chief Energy Economist.The mo

19、delling and analytical teams for the World Energy Outlook-2024 were led by Stphanie Bouckaert(demand),Christophe McGlade(lead on Chapters 2 and 5,supply)and Brent Wanner(lead on Chapter 3,co-lead on Chapter 4,power).Key contributions from across the WEO team were from:Oskaras Alauskas(transport),Yas

20、mine Arsalane(co-lead on Chapter 6,power),Eric Buisson(critical minerals),Olivia Chen(demand),Daniel Crow(lead on climate modelling,behaviour),Davide DAmbrosio(lead on data science,power),Julie Dallard(power,flexibility),Tanguy De Bienassis(investment and finance),Toms De Oliveira Bredariol(lead on

21、methane,coal),Musa Erdogan(investment and finance),Vctor Garca Tapia(buildings,data science),Jeanne-Marie Hays(fuels),Jrme Hilaire(lead on oil and gas supply modelling),Hugh Hopewell(co-lead on Chapter 4),Tae-Yoon Kim(energy security,critical minerals),Martin Kueppers(lead on industry,economic outlo

22、ok),Alex Martinos(buildings),Apostolos Petropoulos(lead on transport,end-use modelling),Ryszard Pospiech(lead on coal supply modelling,data management),Arthur Roge(affordability,data science),Gabriel Saive(policies),Siddharth Singh(co-lead on Chapter 6),Thomas Spencer(China),Ryota Taniguchi(policies

23、),Gianluca Tonolo(lead on access),Anthony Vautrin(buildings,demand-side response)and Peter Zeniewski(lead on Chapter 1,natural gas).Other contributions were from:Caleigh Andrews,Blandine Barreau,Yunyou Chen,Amrita Dasgupta,Shobhan Dhir,Nouhoun Diarra,Michael Drtil,Darlain Edeme,Eric Fabozzi,Roland G

24、ladushenko,Paul Grimal,Sangitha Harmsen,Alexandra Hegarty,Gyubin Hwang,Heeweon Hyun,Bruno Idini,Vincent Jacamon,Haneul Kim,Katarina Malmgren,Brieuc Nerincx,Vera ORiordan,Jonatan Olsen,Nikolaos Papastefanakis,Alessio Pastore,Diana Perez Sanchez,Mathieu Pierronne,Alana Rawlins Bilbao,Nicholas Salmon,M

25、ax Schoenfisch,Leonie Staas,Courtney Turich,Deniz Ugur,Adam Ward,Daniel Wetzel,Lena Wiest and Ryo Yamasaki.Marina Dos Santos,Reka Koczka and Eleni Tsoukala provided essential support.Edmund Hosker carried editorial responsibility.Debra Justus was the copy-editor.Colleagues from the Energy Technology

26、 Policy(ETP)Division led by Timur Gl,Chief Energy Technology Officer,contributed to modelling,with overall guidance from Araceli Fernandez Pales and Uwe Remme.Richard Simon,Tiffany Vass,Leonardo Collina,Alexandre Gouy contributed to the industry modelling.Elizabeth Connelly,Teo Lombardo,Jules Sery,L

27、aurence Cret,Hannes Gauch,Shane McDonagh contributed to the transport modelling.IEA.CC BY 4.0.6 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Mathilde Huismans contributed to the transport modelling and data management.Chiara Delmastro,Rafael Martnez-Gordn contributed to the buildings modell

28、ing.Stavroula Evangelopoulou and Francesco Pavan contributed to the hydrogen modelling.Quentin Minier contributed to the biofuels modelling.Faidon Papadimoulis contributed to the decomposition modelling and data management.Other key contributors from across the IEA were:Heymi Bahar,Eren am,Carlos Fe

29、rnndez Alvarez,Ciarn Healy,Jacob Messing,Jeremy Moorhouse and Wonjik Yang.Valuable comments and feedback were provided by members of senior management and numerous other colleagues within the IEA.In particular,Mary Warlick,Dan Dorner,Toril Bosoni,Joel Couse,Jason Elliot,Dennis Hesseling,Brian Mother

30、way,Hiroyasu Sakaguchi,Pablo Hevia-Koch and Michael Waldron.Thanks go to the IEAs Communications and Digital Office for their help in producing the report and website material.IEAs Office of the Legal Counsel,Office of Management and Administration and Energy Data Centre provided assistance througho

31、ut the preparation of the report.Valuable input to the analysis was provided by David Wilkinson(independent consultant).Support for the modelling of air pollution and associated health impacts was provided by Shaohui Zhang,Gregor Kiesewetter,Jessica Slater,Pallav Purohit,Younha Kim,Florian Lindl,Fab

32、ian Wagner,Lovisa Kuehnle-Nelson and Zbigniew Klimont(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis).Valuable input to the modelling and analysis of greenhouse gas emissions from land use,agriculture and bioenergy production was provided by Nicklas Forsell,Zuelclady Araujo Gutierrez and Mykol

33、a Gusti(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis).Advice related to the modelling of global climate impacts was provided by Jared Lewis,Zebedee Nicholls(Climate Resource)and Malte Meinshausen(Climate Resource and University of Melbourne).The work could not have been completed without the

34、 support and co-operation provided by many government bodies,organisations and companies worldwide,notably:Enel;Energy Market Authority,Singapore;European Commission(Directorate General for Climate and Directorate General for Energy);Hitachi Energy;Iberdrola;Japan(Ministry of Economy,Trade and Indus

35、try,and Ministry of Foreign Affairs);Panasonic;The Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth,Japan;and Schneider Electric.The IEA Clean Energy Transitions Programme,the IEA flagship initiative to transform the worlds energy system to achieve a secure and sustainable future for all,su

36、pported this analysis.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 7 Peer reviewers Many senior government officials and international experts provided input and reviewed preliminary drafts of the report.Their comments and suggestions were of great value.They include:Keigo Akimoto Research Institute of Innovative

37、 Technology for the Earth,Japan Abdullah Al-Abri SOHAR Port and Freezone,Oman Doug Arent National Renewable Energy Laboratory(NREL),United States Nicholas Austin ExxonMobil Marco Baroni Independent consultant Paul Baruya FutureCoal Harmeet Bawa Hitachi Energy Imene Ben Rejeb-Mzah BNP Paribas Jason B

38、ordoff Columbia University,United States Edward Borgstein The Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet(GEAPP)Roberta Boscolo World Meteorological Organization Sin Bradley Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance(BOGA)Mark Brownstein Environmental Defense Fund Nick Butler Kings College London Russell Conklin

39、US Department of Energy Anne-Sophie Corbeau Columbia University,United States Ian Cronshaw Independent consultant Helen Currie ConocoPhillips Giles Dickson WindEurope Jonathan Elkind Columbia University,United States Angelo Esdra Terna SpA Steve Eule US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resourc

40、es Claudio Farina SNAM Mike Fulwood Nexant Antonia Gawel Google Ricardo Gedra Chamber of Electric Energy Commercialization Pablo Gonzalez Iberdrola Francesca Gostinelli ENEL Michael Hackethal Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action,Germany Selwin Hart United Nations Sara Hastings-Si

41、mon University of Calgary Masazumi Hirono Tokyo Gas IEA.CC BY 4.0.8 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Ronan Hodge Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero(GFANZ)Takashi Hongo Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute,Japan Jan-Hein Jesse JOSCO Energy Finance and Strategy Consultan

42、cy Li Jiangtao State Grid Energy Research Institute,China Dave Jones Ember Shigeru Kimura Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia(ERIA)Robert Kleinberg Columbia University,United States Ken Koyama Institute of Energy Economics,Japan Atsuhito Kurozumi Kyoto University of Foreign Studies,J

43、apan Glada Lahn Chatham House Francisco Laveron Iberdrola Thomas-Olivier Leautier TotalEnergies Valerie Levkov International Finance Corporation(IFC)Giel Linthorst ING Juan Lucero Ministry of Environment(MiAMBIENTE),Panama Joan Macnaughton Clean Growth Leadership Network Abdulla Malek COP28 UAE Ritu

44、 Mathur National Institution for Transforming India(NITI Aayog)Antonio Merino Garcia Repsol Tatiana Mitrova Columbia University,United States Christopher Moghtader UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Julie Mulkerin Chevron Matteo Muratori National Renewable Energy Laboratory(NREL),United

45、States Isabel Murray Department of Natural Resources,Canada Steve Nicholls South African Presidential Climate Commission Claire Nicolas World Bank Sandeep Pai Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS),United States Yongduk Pak Korea Energy Economics Institute Julien Perez Oil and Gas Clim

46、ate Initiative Ignacio Prez-Arriaga Comillas Pontifical Universitys Institute for Research in Technology,Spain Glen Peters Center for International Climate Research(CICERO)Stephanie Pfeifer Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change Cdric Philibert French Institute of International Relations,Ce

47、ntre for Energy&Climate Renan Pinheiro Silverio Petrobras IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements 9 Vicky Pollard Directorate-General for Climate Action,European Commission Davide Puglielli ENEL Amornwan Mai Resanond United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)April Salas Microsoft Corporation Hans-Wilhelm Sch

48、iffer World Energy Council Adnan Shihab Eldin Independent consultant Toshiyuki Shirai Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,Japan Wilson Sierra Ministry of Industry,Energy and Mining,Uruguay Stephan Singer Climate Action Network International Jonathan Stern Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,Unite

49、d Kingdom Glen Sweetnam Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre(APERC)Tae Tamura Mizuho Financial Group Miguel Gil Tertre Directorate General for Energy,European Commission Wim Thomas Independent consultant Nikos Tsafos General Secretariat of the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic Hiroyuki Fukui To

50、yota Motor Adair Turner Energy Transitions Commission Fridtjof Fossum Unander Aker Horizons David Victor University of California,San Diego,United States Claire Wang US Department of State Charles Weymuller EDF Kelvin Wong DBS Bank Fareed Yasseen Climate Envoy of the Republic of Iraq Mel Ydreos Inte

51、rnational Gas Union Zulfikar Yurnaidi ASEAN Centre for Energy(ACE)Feng Zhao Global Wind Energy Council(GWEC)Christian Zinglersen European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators IEA.CC BY 4.0.10 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 The work reflects the views of the In

52、ternational Energy Agency Secretariat but does not necessarily reflect those of individual IEA member countries or of any particular funder,supporter or collaborator.None of the IEA or any funder,supporter or collaborator that contributed to this work makes any representation or warranty,express or

53、implied,in respect of the works contents(including its completeness or accuracy)and shall not be responsible for any use of,or reliance on,the work.This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international

54、frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to:Laura Cozzi and Tim Gould Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks International Energy Agency 9,rue de la Fdration 75739 Paris Cedex 15 France E-mail:weo

55、iea.org More information about the World Energy Outlook is available at www.iea.org/weo.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Table of Contents 11 Table of Contents Foreword.3 Acknowledgements.5 Executive summary.15 Overview and key findings 21 Introduction.23 1.1 Scenario overview.24 1.1.1 Energy demand.24 1.1.2 Total fin

56、al consumption.25 1.1.3 CO2 emissions.28 1.2 What do fractured geopolitics mean for the future of energy?.29 1.2.1 Fossil fuels.29 1.2.2 Clean energy supply chains and critical minerals.32 1.3 Are EV sales hitting speed limits?.34 1.3.1 Trends in the EV market.37 1.3.2 Implications of the transition

57、 to EVs for the energy sector.37 1.3.3 Key enablers to achieve net zero emissions milestones for EVs.38 1.4 How fast might demand for electricity increase?.39 1.4.1 Emerging market and developing economies lead demand growth in the STEPS.39 1.4.2 Exploring uncertainties in the STEPS.40 1.4.3 Clean e

58、nergy transitions are driving rapid electricity demand growth.42 1.5 Is clean power generation growing fast enough?.45 1.5.1 Clean power is not yet outrunning global electricity demand growth.45 1.5.2 Clean power gets up to speed in most markets by 2030.47 1.5.3 Clean power needs to scale up faster

59、to get on track for net zero emissions.48 1.6 There is a wave of new LNG coming:where will it go?.50 1.7 What will it take to achieve energy access goals by 2030?.55 1.7.1 Access to electricity.56 1.7.2 Access to clean cooking.58 1.7.3 Investment needs to ramp up quickly.59 1 IEA.CC BY 4.0.12 Intern

60、ational Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 1.8 How to scale up clean energy investment in emerging market and developing economies?.61 1.8.1 Breaking down investment requirements.63 1.8.2 Challenge of scale.66 Setting the scene 67 2.1 Context for the World Energy Outlook-2024.69 2.1.1 Recent tr

61、ends in energy demand and CO2 emissions.70 2.1.2 Macroeconomic context.73 2.1.3 Political and geopolitical uncertainties.75 2.2 WEO scenarios.78 2.2.1 Policies.79 2.2.2 GDP and population.87 2.2.3 Prices.90 2.2.4 Technology costs.93 Pathways for the energy mix 97 3.1 Introduction.99 3.2 Overview.100

62、 3.2.1 Energy efficiency.101 3.2.2 Renewables.103 3.3 Total final consumption.105 3.3.1 Transport.109 3.3.2 Buildings.113 3.3.3 Industry.118 3.4 Electricity.121 3.4.1 Electricity demand.122 3.4.2 Electricity supply.125 3.4.3 Power sector CO2 emissions.131 3.4.4 Power sector investment.132 3.5 Fuels.

63、135 3.5.1 Oil.137 3.5.2 Natural gas.143 3.5.3 Coal.149 3.5.4 Modern bioenergy.152 2 3 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Table of Contents 13 3.6 Key clean energy technologies.155 3.6.1 Solar PV.156 3.6.2 Wind.157 3.6.3 Nuclear.158 3.6.4 Electric vehicles.159 3.6.5 Heat pumps.160 3.6.6 Hydrogen.161 3.6.7 Carbon capture,

64、utilisation and storage.163 Exploring uncertainties in the Outlook 165 4.1 Introduction.167 4.2 Exploring the uncertainties.168 4.3 Sensitivity analyses relative to the STEPS trajectory.170 4.4 Uncertainties in oil demand.173 4.4.1 Electric vehicle pace of growth.173 4.4.2 PHEV in electric mode oper

65、ation.176 4.4.3 Oil-to-gas switching in the Middle East power sector.177 4.5 Uncertainties in natural gas demand.178 4.5.1 LNG oversupply.179 4.5.2 Higher natural gas demand uncertainties.181 4.5.3 Lower natural gas demand uncertainties.184 4.6 Uncertainties in electricity demand.185 4.6.1 Data cent

66、res.186 4.6.2 Heat waves.189 4.6.3 Appliance efficiency in emerging market and developing economies.191 4.6.4 Implications of changes in electricity demand.192 Security,affordability and sustainability 195 5.1 Introduction.197 5.2 Energy security.198 5.2.1 Fuel security.199 5.2.2 Electricity securit

67、y.207 5.2.3 Security of clean energy supply chains and critical minerals.213 5.3 Affordability and people-centred transitions.218 4 5 IEA.CC BY 4.0.14 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 5.3.1 Energy bills.218 5.3.2 Energy employment.222 5.3.3 Energy access.225 5.3.4 Behavioural ch

68、ange.228 5.4 Sustainability.231 5.4.1 Emissions trajectories and temperature outcomes.231 5.4.2 Methane abatement.234 5.4.3 Air pollution and public health.237 5.5 Investment and finance.238 5.5.1 Energy investment.238 5.5.2 Sources of finance.242 Regional insights 245 Introduction.247 6.1 United St

69、ates.248 6.2 Latin America and the Caribbean.252 6.3 European Union.256 6.4 Africa.260 6.5 Middle East.264 6.6 Eurasia.268 6.7 China.272 6.8 India.276 6.9 Japan and Korea.280 6.10 Southeast Asia.284 Annexes Annex A.Tables for scenario projections.291 Annex B.Design of the scenarios.327 Annex C.Defin

70、itions.355 Annex D.References.377 Annex E.Inputs to the Global Energy and Climate Model.389 6 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 15 Executive Summary Geopolitical tensions and fragmentation are major risks for energy security and for coordinated action on reducing emissions Escalating conflict in the M

71、iddle East and Russias ongoing war in Ukraine underscore the continued energy security risks that the world faces.Some of the immediate effects of the global energy crisis had started to recede in 2023,but the risk of further disruptions is now very high.The experience of the last few years shows ho

72、w quickly dependencies can turn into vulnerabilities;a lesson that applies also to clean energy supply chains that have high levels of market concentration.Markets for traditional fuels and for clean technologies are becoming more fragmented:since 2020,almost 200 trade measures affecting clean energ

73、y technologies most of them restrictive have been introduced around the world,compared with 40 in the preceding five-year period.Fragility in todays energy markets is a reminder of the abiding importance of energy security the foundational and central mission of the International Energy Agency(IEA)a

74、nd the ways that more efficient,cleaner energy systems can reduce energy security risks.The increasingly visible impacts of climate change,the momentum behind clean energy transitions,and the characteristics of clean energy technologies are all changing what it means to have secure energy systems.A

75、comprehensive approach to energy security therefore needs to extend beyond traditional fuels to cover the secure transformation of the electricity sector and the resilience of clean energy supply chains.Energy security and climate action are inextricably linked:extreme weather events,intensified by

76、decades of high emissions,are already posing profound energy security risks.Clean energy transitions have accelerated sharply in recent years,shaped by government policies and industrial strategies,but there is more near-term uncertainty than usual over how these policies and strategies will evolve.

77、Countries representing half of global energy demand are holding elections in 2024,and energy and climate issues have been prominent themes for voters that have been buffeted by high fuel and electricity prices,and by floods and heatwaves.Yet energy policies and climate targets,influential though the

78、y are,are not the only forces behind the continued rise of clean energy.There are strong cost drivers,as well as intense competition for leadership in clean energy sectors that are major sources of innovation,economic growth and employment.More than ever,the energy outlook is complex,multifaceted an

79、d defies a single view on how the future might unfold.Robust,independent analysis and data-driven insights are vital to navigate todays energy uncertainties Reflecting todays uncertainties,our three main scenarios are complemented by sensitivity cases for renewables,electric mobility,liquefied natur

80、al gas(LNG)and how heatwaves,efficiency policies and the rise of artificial intelligence(AI)might affect electricity demand.The scenarios and sensitivity cases illustrate different pathways that the energy sector could follow,the levers that decision-makers can use to reach them,and their implicatio

81、ns for energy markets,security and emissions,and for peoples lives and livelihoods.The Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS)provides a sense of the energy sectors direction of travel today,based on the latest market data,technology costs and in-depth analysis of the prevailing IEA.CC BY 4.0.16 Internation

82、al Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 policy settings in countries around the world.The STEPS also provides the backdrop for the upside and downside sensitivity cases.The Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)examines what would happen if all national energy and climate targets made by governments,inc

83、luding net zero goals,are met in full and on time.The Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario maps out an increasingly narrow path to reach net zero emissions by mid-century in a way that limits global warming to 1.5 C.Geopolitical risks abound but underlying market balances are easing,setting the s

84、tage for intense competition between different fuels and technologies The next phase in the journey to a safer and more sustainable energy system is set to take place in a new energy market context,marked by continued geopolitical hazards but also by relatively abundant supply of multiple fuels and

85、technologies.Our detailed analysis of market balances and supply chains brings an overhang of oil and LNG supply into view during the second half of the 2020s,alongside a large surfeit of manufacturing capacity for some key clean energy technologies,notably for solar PV and batteries.These provide s

86、omething of a buffer against further market disruptions,but also imply downward pressure on prices and a period of increased competition among suppliers.The rapid rise in clean energy deployment in recent years came during a period of price volatility for fossil fuels.Clean technology costs are comi

87、ng down,but maintaining and accelerating momentum behind their deployment in a lower fuel-price world is a different proposition.How consumer choices and government policies play out will have huge consequences for the future of the energy sector,and for tackling climate change.How fast will clean e

88、nergy transitions unfold?Clean energy is entering the energy system at an unprecedented rate,including more than 560 gigawatts(GW)of new renewables capacity added in 2023,but deployment is far from uniform across technologies and countries.Investment flows to clean energy projects are approaching US

89、D 2 trillion each year,almost double the combined amount spent on new oil,gas and coal supply and costs for most clean technologies are resuming a downward trend after rising in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.This helps renewable power generation capacity rise from 4 250 GW today to nearly 1

90、0 000 GW in 2030 in the STEPS,short of the tripling target set at COP28 but more than enough,in aggregate,to cover the growth in global electricity demand,and to push coal-fired generation into decline.Together with nuclear power,which is the subject of renewed interest in many countries,low-emissio

91、ns sources are set to generate more than half of the worlds electricity before 2030.China stands out:it accounted for 60%of the new renewable capacity added worldwide in 2023 and Chinas solar PV generation alone is on course to exceed,by the early 2030s,the total electricity demand of the United Sta

92、tes today.There are open questions,in China and elsewhere,about how quickly and efficiently new renewable capacity can be integrated into power systems,and whether grid expansions and permitting times keep pace.Policy uncertainty and a high cost of capital are holding back clean energy projects in m

93、any developing economies.Recent clean energy trends in advanced economies present a mixed picture,with accelerations in some areas accompanied by slowdowns in others,including a IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 17 large fall in heat pump sales in Europe in the first half of 2024.Progress on the other

94、 headline commitments from COP28 is lagging:the goal of doubling the global rate of energy efficiency improvements could provide larger emissions reductions by 2030 than anything else,but looks far out of reach under todays policy settings.Tried and tested policies and technologies are likewise avai

95、lable to deliver a major reduction in methane emissions from fossil fuel operations,but abatement efforts have been patchy and uneven.Clean energy momentum remains strong enough to bring a peak in demand for each of the fossil fuels by 2030 Demand for energy services is rising rapidly,led by emergin

96、g and developing economies,but the continued progress of transitions means that,by the end of the decade,the global economy can continue to grow without using additional amounts of oil,natural gas or coal.This has not been the case in recent years:despite record clean energy deployment,two-thirds of

97、 the increase in global energy demand in 2023 was met by fossil fuels,pushing energy-related CO2 emissions to another record high.In the STEPS,the largest sources of rising demand for energy are,in descending order,India,Southeast Asia,the Middle East and Africa.But growth in clean energy and struct

98、ural changes in the global economy,particularly in China,are starting to temper overall energy demand growth,not least because a more electrified,renewables-rich system is inherently more efficient than one dominated by fossil fuel combustion(in which a lot of the energy generated is lost as waste h

99、eat).Outcomes in individual years can vary in practice depending on broader economic or weather conditions,or in hydropower output,but the direction of travel under todays policy settings is clear.Continued growth in global energy demand post-2030 can be met solely with clean energy.The world has th

100、e need and the capacity to go much faster Ample clean energy manufacturing capacity creates scope for faster transitions that move towards alignment with national and global net zero goals,but this means addressing imbalances in todays investment flows and clean energy supply chains.Over the past fi

101、ve years,annual solar capacity additions quadrupled to 425 GW,but annual manufacturing capacity is set for a sixfold increase to more than 1 100 GW,a level that if deployed in full would be very close to the amounts needed in the NZE Scenario.There is a similar story of plentiful manufacturing capac

102、ity for lithium-ion batteries.Bringing these technologies at scale to developing economies would be transformative for the global outlook,helping rising demand to be met in a sustainable way and allowing global emissions not only to peak in the coming years,as they do in the STEPS,but also to enter

103、a meaningful decline,which they do not do in the STEPS.This requires concerted efforts to facilitate investment in developing economies by addressing risks that push up the cost of capital.Periods of ample supply make life difficult for new entrants,but improving the resilience and diversity of the

104、supply chains for clean energy technologies and for critical minerals remains an essential task.For the moment,these supply chains are heavily concentrated in China.Demand for electricity is taking off,but how high will it go?The contours of a new,more electrified energy system are coming into focus

105、 as global electricity demand soars.Electricity use has grown at twice the pace of overall energy IEA.CC BY 4.0.18 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 demand over the last decade,with two-thirds of the global increase in electricity demand over the last ten years coming from China.

106、Electricity demand growth is set to accelerate further in the years ahead,adding the equivalent of Japanese demand to global electricity use each year in the STEPS,and rising even more quickly in scenarios that meet national and global net zero goals.The projections for global electricity demand in

107、STEPS are 6%,or 2 200 terawatt-hours(TWh),higher in 2035 than in last years Outlook,driven by light industrial consumption,electric mobility,cooling,and data centres and AI.Rising data centre electricity use,linked in part to growing use of AI,is already having some strong local impacts,but the pote

108、ntial implications of AI for energy are broader and include improved systems coordination in the power sector and shorter innovation cycles.There are more than 11 000 data centres registered worldwide and they are often spatially concentrated,so local effects on electricity markets can be substantia

109、l.However,at a global level,data centres account for a relatively small share of overall electricity demand growth to 2030.More frequent and intense heatwaves than we assume in the STEPS,or higher performance standards applied to new appliances notably air conditioners both produce significantly gre

110、ater variations in projected electricity demand than an upside case for data centres.The combination of rising incomes and increasing global temperatures generate more than 1 200 TWh of extra global demand for cooling by 2035 in the STEPS,an amount greater than the entire Middle Easts electricity us

111、e today.The rise of electric mobility,led by China,is wrong-footing oil producers The slowdown in oil demand growth in the STEPS puts major resource owners in a bind as they face a significant overhang of supply.China has been the engine of oil market growth in recent decades,but that engine is now

112、switching over to electricity:the countrys oil use for road transport is projected to decline in the STEPS,although offset by a large increase in oil use as a petrochemical feedstock.India becomes the main source of oil demand growth,adding almost 2 million barrels per day(mb/d)to 2035.Cost-competit

113、ive EVs many of them from Chinese manufacturers are making inroads in a range of markets,although there is uncertainty over how fast their share will grow.EVs currently have a share of around 20%in new car sales worldwide,and this rises towards 50%by 2030 in the STEPS(a level already being achieved

114、in China this year),by which time EVs displace around 6 mb/d of oil demand.If the market share of electric cars were to rise more slowly,remaining below 40%by the end of the decade,this would add 1.2 mb/d to projected oil demand in 2030,but there would still be a visible flattening in the global tra

115、jectory.Additional near-term oil supply is coming mainly from the Americas the United States,Brazil,Guyana and Canada and this is putting pressure on the market management strategies of the OPEC+grouping.The STEPS sees prices around USD 75-80 per barrel,but this implies further production restraint

116、and an increase in spare capacity,which is already at record levels of around 6 mb/d.Who will ride the wave of new LNG?An increase of nearly 50%in global LNG export capacity is on the horizon,led by the United States and Qatar,but the prices that many suppliers need to recover their investments may

117、not entice developing economies to switch to natural gas at scale:something has to give.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary 19 Around 270 billion cubic metres(bcm)of annualised new LNG capacity has been approved and,if delivered according to announced schedules,is set to enter into operation over the pe

118、riod to 2030,a huge addition to global supply.In the STEPS,LNG demand grows by more than 2.5%per year to 2035,an upward revision from last years outlook and faster than the rise in overall gas demand.Europe and China have the import infrastructure to absorb significantly more gas,but their scope to

119、clear the market is constrained by their investments in clean energy.Gas-importing emerging and developing economies would generally need prices at around USD 3-5/MBtu to make gas attractive as a large-scale alternative to renewables and coal,but delivered costs for most new export projects need to

120、average around USD 8/MBtu to cover their investments and operation.If gas markets are to absorb all the prospective new LNG supply and to continue to grow past 2030,this would require some combination of even lower clearing prices,higher electricity demand and slower energy transitions with less win

121、d and solar,lower rates of building efficiency improvements,and fewer heat pumps than projected in the STEPS.However,any acceleration of global energy transitions towards the outcomes projected in the APS or NZE Scenario,or a wild card for supply like a large new Russia-China gas supply deal(which w

122、e do not include in the STEPS),would exacerbate the LNG glut.Lower fuel prices ease concerns about affordability and industrial competitiveness in fuel-importing economies The new market context may provide some breathing space for fuel-importing countries and regions such as Europe,and South and So

123、utheast Asia that have been hit hard by higher prices for fossil fuels and electricity in recent years.Consumers around the world spent nearly USD 10 trillion on energy in 2022 during the global energy crisis,around half of which ended up as record revenues for oil and gas producers.An easing of pri

124、ce levels promises some welcome relief,particularly in fuel-importing countries.Lower natural gas prices should lift some of Europes gloom about its industrial competitiveness,although Europe still faces a sizeable structural energy price disadvantage compared with the United States and China.The br

125、eathing space from fuel price pressures can provide policymakers with room to focus on stepping up investment in renewables,grids,storage and efficiency;facilitating the removal of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies;and allowing developing economies to regain the momentum that was lost in recent year

126、s behind the provision of access to electricity and clean cooking fuels.However,cheaper natural gas can also slow structural changes by diminishing the economic case for consumers to switch to cleaner technologies,and by making it more difficult to close the cost gap with alternatives like biomethan

127、e and low-emissions hydrogen.A sustainable energy system needs to be people-centred and resilient A new energy system needs to be built to last:this means prioritising security,resilience and flexibility,and ensuring that the benefits of the new energy economy are shared.The STEPS does not see tradi

128、tional energy security concerns diminishing,particularly for importers in Asia that face a long-term rise in their dependence on oil and gas imports to nearly 90%for oil and around 60%for gas by 2050.At the same time,faster clean energy transitions put the spotlight on electricity security,as growin

129、g electricity demand and more IEA.CC BY 4.0.20 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 variable generation increase the operational need for flexibility in power systems,both for short-term and seasonal needs.This also requires a rebalancing of power sector investment towards grids and

130、 battery storage,as proposed by the IEA in advance of the COP291 climate conference in Baku,Azerbaijan.At the moment,for every dollar spent on renewable power,60 cents are spent on grids and storage.By the 2040s,this reaches parity in all scenarios.Many power systems are vulnerable to an increase in

131、 extreme weather events and cyberattacks,putting a premium on adequate investments in resilience and digital security.Dividing lines are emerging on energy and climate,which can only be bridged if there is more help provided to poorer countries,communities and households to manage the upfront costs

132、of change,including much greater international support.High financing costs and project risks are limiting the spread of cost-competitive clean energy technologies to where they are needed most,especially in developing economies where they can deliver the biggest returns for sustainable development

133、and affordability.Lack of access to modern energy is the most fundamental inequity in todays energy system,with 750 million people predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa remaining without access to electricity and more than 2 billion without clean cooking fuels.The outlook for access projects is improv

134、ing thanks to cheaper technologies,new policies,the growing availability of digital payment options and pay-as-you-go business models,but more is needed,including a stronger focus on electrifying productive uses,which can improve project bankability.The climate finance discussions at COP29 and at th

135、e G20 will be a barometer of the prospects for scaling up clean energy investment in developing economies,which will also require strengthened national policy visions,policies and institutions,and a willingness to engage with the private sector.Choices and consequences Despite gathering momentum beh

136、ind transitions,the world is still a long way from a trajectory aligned with its climate goals.Decisions by governments,investors and consumers too often entrench the flaws in todays energy system,rather than pushing it towards a cleaner and safer path.There are some positive developments in the STE

137、PS,but todays policy settings still put the world on course for a rise of 2.4 C in global average temperatures by 2100,entailing ever more severe risks from a changing climate.Our scenario analysis highlights the prospect of buyers and consumers having the edge in energy markets for a time,with supp

138、liers competing for their attention as they make fuel and technology choices that have widely different implications for the energy sector and for its emissions.All parties need to recognise that locking in fossil fuel use has consequences.There may be downward pressure on fuel prices for a while,bu

139、t energy history tells us that one day the cycle will be reversed,and prices will rise.And the costs of climate inaction,meanwhile,grow higher by the day as emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and extreme weather imposes its own unpredictable price.By contrast,clean technologies that are increasi

140、ngly cost-effective today are set to remain so,with greatly reduced exposure to the vagaries of commodity markets and lasting benefits for people and planet.1 See IEA(2024)From Taking Stock to Taking Action:How to implement the COP28 energy goals.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 21

141、Chapter 1 Overview and key findings Where do we go from here?There are three overarching and inter-related themes for this years Outlook.The first is energy security,corresponding to the longstanding core of the IEAs mandate as well as the imperatives of the present given escalating risks in the Mid

142、dle East.The second relates to the prospects for clean energy transitions,which have accelerated rapidly in recent years,but which need to move much faster to meet climate goals.A third theme is uncertainty,an ever-present factor in any forward-looking analysis but particularly visible this year:our

143、 Outlook includes several sensitivity cases on key factors affecting oil,gas and electricity demand in the Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS).The potential for near-term disruption to oil and gas supply is high due to conflict in the Middle East.Around 20%of todays global oil and liquefied natural gas(

144、LNG)supplies flow through the Strait of Hormuz,a maritime chokepoint in the region.However,while geopolitical risks remain elevated,an easing in underlying market balances and prices is on the horizon as slowing oil demand growth in the STEPS sees spare crude oil production capacity rise to 8 millio

145、n barrels per day by 2030.A wave of new LNG projects is set to add almost 50%to available export capacity by 2030.In all our scenarios,growth in global energy demand slows thanks to efficiency gains,electrification and a rapid buildout of renewables.In the STEPS by 2030,nearly every other car sold i

146、n the world is electric,although delays in the roll-out of charging infrastructure or in policy implementation could lead to slower growth.Clean energy meets virtually all growth in energy demand in aggregate in the STEPS between 2023 and 2035,leading to an overall peak in demand for all three fossi

147、l fuels before 2030,although trends vary widely across countries at different stages of economic and energy development.Electricity demand grows much faster than overall energy demand,thanks to existing uses,notably cooling,and new ones such as electric mobility and data centres.Renewables lead the

148、expansion in electricity generation,with sufficient speed to meet in aggregate all the increases in demand.There is scope to go even faster:todays solar manufacturing capacity hovers around 1 100 GW per year,potentially allowing for deployment almost three-times higher than in 2023.The share of clea

149、n energy investment in emerging market and developing economies outside of China remains stuck at 15%of the total,even though these economies account for two-thirds of the global population and one-third of global GDP.A range of new business models and a policy push in some countries ensure that an

150、additional 550 million people gain access to clean cooking and nearly 200 million to electricity in the STEPS between 2023 and 2030.This still falls well short of universal access goals.S U M M A R Y IEA.CC BY 4.0.OPEC+crude oilspare capacityGlobal LNGliquefaction capacitySolar PV modulemanufacturin

151、g capacityHighMedianLowEmissions needto fall fastEmissions are set to peak soon,but have to decline rapidly:how consumer choices and government policies play out will have huge consequences for energy markets&for our planet.STEPSAPSNZEDubaiUnited ArabEmiratesOmanQatarIranSpotlight on globalchokepoin

152、tsAround 20%of todays global oil and LNG supplies flow through the Strait of Hormuz,a maritime chokepoint in the Middle East.A new marketcontextGeopolitical risks are set to remain high but underlying market balances for many fuels and technologies are easing,signalling a shift towards a buyers mark

153、et.Strait of HormuzCO2 emissionsOilLNG 4.34.25 mb/d1.517270.90.7212419 bcm2.7AfricaAmericasEuropeChinaIndiaJapan and KoreaOther Asia383838202320302040205036 Gt CO231 2925600.511.522.53 C32191220232030580 bcm8505 mb/d820231 150 GW20301 55020232030Temperature risein 2100IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overvie

154、w and key findings 23 1 Introduction After a period of extreme turbulence caused first by the Covid-19 pandemic and then the global energy crisis that was intensified by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation(herein after Russia)in 2022,this edition of the World Energy Outlook

155、again unfolds against a backdrop of acute geopolitical tensions.Russias war in Ukraine continues alongside the clear risk of escalating conflict in the Middle East.The range of possible outcomes and the risk of near-term oil price rises is large.As ever,energy security is a major theme of this years

156、 analysis.A second theme for this Outlook is the momentum behind clean energy transitions amid rising evidence of the risks to the global climate posed by emissions.Structural changes in energy production and consumption have gained speed over recent years,especially in advanced economies and the Pe

157、oples Republic of China(herein after China),raising hopes that the world can soon put global energy-related emissions into decline and accelerate the journey towards a net zero emissions system.We examine the state-of-play in detail,the implications for fossil fuels,and what it would take to align t

158、he trajectory with national and global energy and climate goals.A third theme is uncertainty.Voters in countries accounting for half of global energy demand went to the polls in 2024 in national or regional elections,with energy and climate issues prominent in many campaigns.The speed at which clean

159、 technologies make their way into the market is likewise subject to uncertainty,as is the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.This edition of the Outlook therefore includes a number of sensitivity cases,against the backdrop of the Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS),alongside the scenario

160、modelling of trajectories that meet national and global net zero emissions targets.After a brief overview of the main scenario results,the bulk of this chapter explores these themes through a series of questions,covering the following issues:Against a backdrop of heightened international tensions,wh

161、at do todays fractured geopolitics mean for the future of energy?What do market data and our projections tell us about the prospects for electric mobility:are electric vehicle sales hitting speed limits?Electricity demand growth is accelerating,but which factors including data centres and artificial

162、 intelligence will determine how fast it grows?Given the rise in electricity demand,can clean power generation expand fast enough to bring down emissions in the power sector?There is a wave of new liquefied natural gas coming to market:where will it go and what will be the implications for gas deman

163、d and prices?With hundreds of millions of people remaining without access to electricity and clean cooking fuels,what will it take to achieve access goals by 2030?How to correct the large imbalance and scale up clean energy investment in emerging market and developing economies?IEA.CC BY 4.0.24 Inte

164、rnational Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 1.1 Scenario overview 1.1.1 Energy demand The last decade has seen the share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix gradually come down from 82%in 2013 to 80%in 2023.Demand for energy has increased by 15%over this period and 40%of this growth has b

165、een met by clean energy,i.e.renewables in the power and end-use sectors,nuclear,and low-emissions fuels,including carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS).In advanced economies,overall energy demand declined on average by 0.5%per year over the past decade.Oil demand peaked in this grouping in 20

166、05,coal has been in structural decline since 2008 while natural gas,in aggregate,has ceased to grow.Nuclear has fallen around one-half percentage point per year,while renewables have increased by 3%per year since 2013.In emerging market and developing economies a grouping that includes almost 85%of

167、the worlds population energy demand increased at around 2.6%per year over the last decade.The underlying drivers are a rise in the population of more than 720 million people,a 50%rise in the size of the economy and a 40%increase in industrial output.Floorspace in buildings has increased by 40 000 sq

168、uare kilometres,enough to cover the entirety of the Netherlands.With this rapid rate of development,clean energy has to work harder to displace oil,gas and coal in emerging market and developing economies than in advanced economies.Figure 1.1 Global energy mix by scenario to 2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.STEPS

169、,a scenario based on current policy settings,sees clean energy poised for huge growth,while coal,oil and natural gas each reach a peak by 2030 and then start to decline Notes:EJ=exajoules;STEPS=Stated Policies Scenario;APS=Announced Pledges Scenario;NZE=Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.Oil,coal a

170、nd natural gas refer to unabated uses as well as non-energy use.Clean energy includes renewables,modern bioenergy,nuclear,abated fossil fuels,low-emissions hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels.Other includes traditional use of biomass and non-renewable waste.75 150 225 300195020002050Clean energyOilCoa

171、lNatural gasOtherEJSTEPS200400600800STEPS APSNZE205019752023IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 25 1 In the Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS),clean energy deployment accelerates as the pace of overall energy demand growth slows,leading to a peak in all three fossil fuels before 2030(Figu

172、re 1.1).Increasing reductions in coal demand means it is overtaken by natural gas in the global energy mix by 2030.Clean energy grows more than total energy demand between 2023 and 2035.Led by surging solar photovoltaic(PV)and wind power,clean energy becomes the largest source of energy in the mid-2

173、030s.Although the STEPS sees a threefold increase in renewables that brings fossil fuel use down from 80%of total energy demand in 2023 to 58%in 2050,this falls far short of the step change that occurs in the Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)and the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario,especially t

174、he latter.In both these scenarios,renewables begin to rapidly eat into the fossil fuel market share.By 2035,clean energy meets 40%of global energy demand in the APS,and this rises to nearly three-quarters by 2050.In the NZE Scenario,clean energy meets 90%of global energy demand in 2050.Around one-th

175、ird of the remaining fossil fuel demand in the NZE Scenario is fully abated,around half is used as a feedstock or in other non-energy use,and the remainder is offset by direct air capture,negative emissions from bioenergy or other forms of carbon removal.1.1.2 Total final consumption The energy inte

176、nsity of the global economy has been falling due to technological progress,efficiency improvements and changes in the structure of the global economy(Figure 1.2).Growth in renewables and increasing electrification of end-uses both play an important part to increase the efficiency of energy systems.F

177、igure 1.2 Total final consumption per capita and per unit of GDP by scenario,2000-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Falling energy use per unit of GDP has accompanied rising per capita energy use in developing economies,though this remains well below the level in advanced economies Note:GDP=gross domestic product;

178、GJ=gigajoule;PPP=purchasing power parity;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.30 60 90 12020002050STEPSAPSNZEAdvanced economiesEMDEGJ per capita 1 2 3 420002050GJ per thousand USD(2023,PPP)20232023IEA.CC BY 4.0.26 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Historically,the expans

179、ion of gross domestic product(GDP)growth has been faster than the rate of energy demand growth,reflecting improvements in the energy intensity of GDP.These improvements in energy intensity continue and even accelerate in our scenarios:global GDP continues to expand,but it takes steadily less energy

180、to fuel this growth(Box 1.1).Electric technologies such as heat pumps and electric vehicles deliver energy services more efficiently than those reliant on the direct combustion of fossil fuels,and efficiency gains and electrification also arrest further growth in per capita energy consumption in eme

181、rging market and developing economies,despite higher levels of ownership of vehicles and appliances such as air conditioners.Box 1.1 What factors explain slowing growth in global energy demand?Over the past decade,global energy demand increased at an annual average rate of 1.4%.In the STEPS,this slo

182、ws to around 0.5%per year on average between 2023 and 2035,three-times slower than in the past.This is not a result of slower economic growth:global GDP growth is expected to average 3%annually between 2023-2035,similar to the previous decade.Underlying energy services demand,such as for lighting,co

183、oling and mobility,is projected to continue to rise at least as fast as in the past,even though there is a distinct slowdown in global population growth:between 2023 and 2035,annual population growth is around 85%of the average level seen between 2013 and 2023.The slowdown in global energy demand in

184、 our scenarios is driven by a combination of three main factors.The first factor is improvements in the technical efficiency of energy use,via more efficient processes or equipment.These kinds of improvements and technological innovations are a longstanding feature of the global energy system and ar

185、e heavily influenced by policies that incentivise efficiency gains,like minimum energy performance standards or other forms of regulation.There is an uptick in the projected pace of technical efficiency improvements in our scenarios,but this is much more visible in the APS and in the NZE Scenario th

186、an in the STEPS.The second explanatory factor relates to changes in the structure of the global economy towards the provision of services,which require less energy,and away from energy-intensive sectors.Here we see an evolution in future trends compared with the past,as growth rates for energy-inten

187、sive materials such as steel and aluminium are projected to moderate compared with the rates seen in the last decade.This is due in part to structural changes in Chinas economy.The third factor,which is increasingly influential in our scenarios,relates to the effect on energy demand of introducing m

188、ore renewables and more electrified end-uses into the energy system,as these are inherently more efficient than processes based on fossil fuel combustion(which generates a lot of waste heat,also known as conversion losses).Unlike fossil fuels,most renewables are considered 100%efficient,i.e.conversi

189、on losses are not measured because the resources are directly harnessed from naturally occurring IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 27 1 sources of energy,such as sunlight,wind and water,without the need for extraction or combustion processes.As renewables take a larger share of elect

190、ricity generation,the total amount of primary energy inputs required to meet electricity demand from households,businesses and public services decreases.The rising share of electricity in total final consumption also has a dampening effect on energy demand growth because it displaces the direct use

191、of gas,coal and oil,all of which typically involve energy conversion losses.Global final energy consumption currently stands at 445 exajoules(EJ).In the STEPS,this rises steadily to over 530 EJ by 2050.In the APS and NZE Scenario,total final consumption starts to fall back(Figure 1.3).It is 3%lower

192、than current levels of demand by 2035 in the APS,and 15%lower in the NZE Scenario.In the APS,energy efficiency gains limit growth in consumption even as living standards continue to rise,thanks to additional retrofit targets,broader electrification,more stringent fuel economy standards in transport,

193、and more rapid efficiency gains in industry.In the NZE Scenario,year-on-year energy intensity improvements more than double by 2035:this reflects both faster electrification and a more rapid phase out of traditional use of biomass,which is largely replaced by more efficient sources such as electrici

194、ty and liquefied petroleum gas(LPG).Behavioural changes also play a role.Figure 1.3 Total final consumption by energy source in selected sectors by scenario,2023 and 2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Electricity increases its share of TFC in all sectors,while additional efficiency measures in the APS and NZE Scena

195、rio hold down overall demand growth,and in some cases reverse it Notes:EJ=exajoules.Other in buildings includes district heat,traditional use of biomass and non-renewable waste.Other in industry includes district heat,fossil fuel non-energy use and non-renewable waste.Low-emissions fuels include mod

196、ern bioenergy,fossil fuels with CCUS in industry,hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels.60 120 180 2402023STEPSAPS2050NZEElectricityUnabated fossil fuelsRenewables and low-emissions fuelsOtherEJBuildings2023STEPSAPS2050NZEIndustry2023STEPSAPS2050NZETransportIEA.CC BY 4.0.28 International Energy Agency|Wo

197、rld Energy Outlook 2024 Electrification accelerates across all scenarios and in all sectors,providing heating,cooling and mobility,powering motors and appliances,and producing onsite electrolytic hydrogen for heavy industry.By 2050,the share of electricity in total final consumption increases by hal

198、f in the STEPS,doubles in the APS and nearly triples in the NZE Scenario,where unabated fossil fuels are swiftly replaced by electricity generated by clean sources.Along with the direct use of renewables,including modern bioenergy,solar thermal and geothermal,and low-emissions hydrogen and hydrogen-

199、based fuels,the share of unabated fossil fuels by 2050 declines from todays level by 30%in the STEPS,over 65%in the APS and 95%in the NZE Scenario.In hard-to-abate sectors such as aviation and shipping,biofuels and low-emissions fuels displace around 50 EJ of fossil fuels by 2050 in the NZE Scenario

200、.1.1.3 CO2 emissions CO2 emissions peak in all scenarios before 2030,but the subsequent rate of decline varies considerably.In the STEPS,emissions fall 1%per year between 2030 and 2050,led by a 3%annual decline in emissions in China,where they end up at half of the current level by 2050(Figure 1.4).

201、In the APS,global emissions fall by 4%per year,and in the NZE Scenario they fall by 15%per year,three-times faster than the drop recorded in 2020 after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.The STEPS trajectory implies an average temperature increase of 2.4 degrees Celsius(C)by 2100.In the APS,the incr

202、ease is 1.7 C,while this World Energy Outlook-2024(WEO-2024)updated NZE Scenario shows an increasingly narrow but still achievable pathway to limiting the temperature rise to below 1.5 C.Figure 1.4 CO2 emissions and GDP per capita in selected countries/regions in the STEPS and APS IEA.CC BY 4.0.Glob

203、al CO2 emissions peak and gradually decline to 2050,led by sharp drops in China as well as in advanced economies Note:Gt CO2=gigatonnes of carbon dioxide.4 8 12020406080100120140Gt COUnited StatesEuropeChinaIndiaSoutheast AsiaJapanGDP per capita(thousand USD,2023 PPP)200020232050STEPS2050APSIEA.CC B

204、Y 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 29 1 An increasing number of emerging market and developing countries have announced targets or goals to achieve net zero CO2 or greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions.They include eight-out-of-ten Southeast Asian countries,plus India,which is targeting net zero emiss

205、ions by 2070.These targets are achieved in full in the APS,driving innovation and providing incentives for consumers and private sector actors to reduce emissions.As a result,CO2 emissions from India and Southeast Asia fall by half in the APS,dropping below 2010 levels by 2050.1.2 What do fractured

206、geopolitics mean for the future of energy?1.2.1 Fossil fuels The global energy crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the vulnerability of the current energy system to geopolitical events and underlined how much of an impact energy price rises can have on consumers.The immed

207、iate price shocks from the energy crisis have abated,but escalating hostilities in the Middle East and attacks on shipping in the Red Sea serve as reminders of the potential for wider world events to cause shocks to energy markets.Existing and planned fossil fuel infrastructure expansions set to com

208、e online over the next ten years should provide some buffer against potential outages,and imply downward pressure on prices(Box 1.2).Global spare crude oil production capacity,excluding Iran and Russia,which averaged less than 3 million barrels per day(mb/d)in 2019,stands today at around 6 mb/d.If a

209、nnounced capacity additions by members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC)proceed,the level of demand growth in the STEPS would mean spare capacity rising to 8 mb/d to 2030.For natural gas,a large new wave of LNG liquefaction projects is set to come online that is set to p

210、roduce a surplus of LNG supply over demand until 2040(section 1.6).Ample spare crude oil capacity and new LNG supplies provide buffers against the risk of sharp price shocks,but the security of fuel supplies is far from guaranteed,not least because the effectiveness of this capacity to address any s

211、hortfalls that may arise hinges on the ability of alternative sources of supply to reach an affected country or region quickly.Moreover,a general trend of increased supply concentration and rising import dependence means supply shocks if they occur have the potential to be more disruptive.Asia has b

212、ecome the focal point for global oil and gas trade:it now imports more than twice as much oil as Europe,the next-largest importing region,and it eclipsed Europe as the largest market for imported natural gas in 2022(Figure 1.5).In the STEPS,these trends continue.China the worlds largest importer see

213、s its dependence on oil imports rise from around 75%today to more than 80%by 2050.Similar trends are projected for India,where natural gas dependence rises from 50%today to nearly 75%.Meanwhile,Southeast Asia,which is currently a net exporter of natural gas,becomes a net importer before 2030.IEA.CC

214、BY 4.0.30 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Figure 1.5 Natural gas and crude oil imports to Asia and Europe in the STEPS and APS IEA.CC BY 4.0.Import dependence increases in both scenarios,especially in Asia,which accounts for 60-70%of global oil and gas imports by 2050 Notes:bcm

215、=billion cubic metres;mb/d=million barrels per day.Asia includes Japan,Korea and developing Asia.Key maritime trade routes remain vital to the well-being of global oil and gas markets.This includes the safe passage of ships through passages such as the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Hormuz.The Stra

216、it of Malacca is particularly important to oil and gas trade,and is set to become even more so in the future,with oil volumes increasing from 24 mb/d today(55%of global oil trade)to 28 mb/d in the STEPS,and LNG flows increasing from 70 billion cubic metres(bcm)in 2023(12%of global LNG trade)to 140 b

217、cm in 2050.Around 20%of global oil and LNG supplies also flow through the Strait of Hormuz today,a share that remains broadly constant in the STEPS.Any disruption in either of these straits could lead to supply shortages and price volatility.A complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz,while unlikely,

218、would be particularly damaging because there are limited alternative routes to market and because it would block off the vast majority of OPEC spare capacity.Box 1.2 Are oil and natural gas prices set to fall and what would this mean for producers?Oil and natural gas prices act as intermediaries bet

219、ween supply and demand in our scenarios to ensure that sources of supply meet changes in demand and hold the system in equilibrium.This balancing act means that prices in our scenarios follow a relatively smooth trajectory;we do not attempt to anticipate the fluctuations or price cycles that 400 800

220、20002050AsiaEuropeSTEPSAPSbcmNatural gas imports2023 20 4020002050Oil importsmb/d2023IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 31 1 characterise commodity markets.Oil prices are contingent on continued efforts by major oil producers to manage oil markets;there is no analogous arrangement for

221、 natural gas,but the increasing importance of global LNG trade means benchmark prices in different regional markets become increasingly interdependent.In practice,the potential for oil and gas price volatility is ever present,especially given the profound changes that are needed in todays energy sys

222、tem to meet the worlds climate goals.Figure 1.6 Oil and natural gas price by scenario,2010-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Relatively smooth trajectories for oil and gas prices belie historical volatility;the major variations arise between scenarios with different degrees of climate ambition Notes:MER=market exc

223、hange rate;MBtu=million British thermal units;US=United States,EU=European Union.The oil price in the STEPS remains broadly similar over the projection period to what it was in 2023(Figure 1.6),with technological improvements,continued efforts by the oil and gas industry to keep a lid on costs and d

224、ownward pressure from a slight decline in demand more or less offset by the need to tap into more remote and difficult-to-access resources.This trajectory rests on the assumption that market management efforts by major producers are pursued and are effective in putting a floor under prices;this cann

225、ot be taken for granted.In the APS,lower demand levels mean that prices fall to much lower levels then they are at today.In the NZE Scenario,the oil price drops to the operating costs of the marginal project required to meet falling demand.In both of these scenarios,policies need to be designed to e

226、nsure that lower prices do not result in a rebound in oil demand which would undercut overall emissions reduction efforts.For natural gas,the overhang in LNG capacity looks set to create a very competitive market at least until this is worked off,with prices in key importing regions averaging USD 6.

227、5-8 million British thermal units(MBtu)to 2035.The lowest cost existing LNG 40 80 120 160STEPSNZEAPSUSD per barrel(2023,MER)Global oil price2010 2050 10 20 30 40Gas price-US2010 2050USD per MBtu(2023,MER)Gas price-EU2010 2050Gas price-Japan2010 2050IEA.CC BY 4.0.32 International Energy Agency|World

228、Energy Outlook 2024 projects those that have paid off their initial invested capital and/or that benefit from low cost feedgas and low operating costs can make a profit at prices of USD 3-5/MBtu,but many under construction projects have break even costs above USD 8/MBtu.This poses major risks for th

229、e sponsors of these LNG projects or the offtakers,as some of the value of their assets might end up having to be written off.In the STEPS,the LNG overhang is worked off in the 2030s and prices paid by importers then rise.In the APS and NZE Scenario,demand for LNG remains well below the supply that i

230、s available and so prices around the world are much lower.Lower prices could stimulate additional demand for natural gas and LNG(a prospect further explored in Chapter 4);however,policy settings favouring renewables and energy efficiency may constrain a robust demand response.In the STEPS,net income

231、 to oil and gas producers remains largely flat at around USD 2 400 billion to 2035.It falls to USD 1 750 billion in the APS by 2035,or 30%less than the average levels over the past five years,and to USD 680 billion in the NZE Scenario by 2035,70%lower than recent levels.Many oil and gas producers wo

232、uld struggle to withstand the strains on their fiscal balances from lower income in this scenario.1.2.2 Clean energy supply chains and critical minerals New energy security hazards are emerging as the world moves towards a more electrified and renewables-rich energy system,highlighting the need for

233、policy makers to continually adjust and assess their approach to energy security.One issue of particular concern for many policy makers today is the concentration in a small number of countries of clean energy supply chains for manufacturing capacity and critical mineral mining and processing.China

234、has a very large proportion of existing manufacturing capacity for key clean energy technologies.This includes 85-95%of global manufacturing capacity for battery cathode and anode materials,more than 80%of global solar PV manufacturing capacity,and more than 75-90%of the global processing capacity f

235、or cobalt,graphite and rare earth elements.A wide range of countries are looking to bolster domestic clean energy manufacturing.Both the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net Zero Industry Act include major incentives for domestic manufacturing,and around 10%of the USD 2 trillion clean energy in

236、vestment earmarked by governments around the world since 2020 comes with conditions that require local content.Some countries are also taking steps in their trade policies to address concerns about aspects of current trade in clean energy manufacturing through tariff adjustments,antidumping duties a

237、nd countervailing measures.There are some signs of success in efforts to diversify supply chains.In battery cell manufacturing,for example,announced capacity additions in Europe and the United States should be sufficient to meet the 2030 domestic deployment needs associated with their climate goals,

238、provided that all planned projects come online as scheduled.In many other clean energy supply chains,however,a large portion of planned projects are being developed IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 33 1 in precisely the regions where most capacity is already located(Figure 1.7).For

239、example,some 50-95%of supply growth between 2023 and 2035 for refined copper,lithium,nickel and cobalt is projected to take place in todays largest producer,such as China or Indonesia.Figure 1.7 Share of top-three suppliers of selected critical minerals and clean technologies based on announced proj

240、ects,2023 and 2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Announced projects indicate that the geographic concentration of critical minerals and clean energy technology manufacturing is set to remain high through to 2030 Note:Critical minerals data are refined material production.Another concern is the level of critical min

241、eral supplies that are available.For a number of critical minerals,supply growth from the pipeline of confirmed and announced projects is set to be slower than expected growth in demand.The situation is most pressing for copper and lithium,highlighting some new risks to supply security and clean ene

242、rgy transitions.Market signals should lead to the development of new projects,although new mining projects tend to have very long lead times.On the demand side,changes in battery chemistries or enhanced efforts for recycling may succeed in reducing demand.Policy makers need to be alert to the new en

243、ergy security risks that are emerging in clean energy and look for ways to mitigate them.However,there are some important differences between the risks for consumers associated with clean energy and those that arise from traditional fuels.With traditional fuels,a shortage in supply means that consum

244、ers immediately face higher prices to continue operating existing equipment such as cars and boilers.With clean energy,a shortage in supplies would tend to increase the cost of new equipment but would have little immediate effect on the cost of using existing equipment.20%40%60%80%100%FirstSecondThi

245、rd2023 20302023 20302023 20302023 20302023 20302023 20302023 2030LithiumBatteries(cells)Wind(nacelles)Solar PV(modules)GraphiteCobaltNickelIEA.CC BY 4.0.34 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 1.3 Are EV sales hitting speed limits?Electric vehicles provide the main mechanism to deca

246、rbonise the road transport sector.Their prospects in recent years have been bolstered by ambitious plans from governments and the EV and battery industries(Table 1.1).However,the transition to mass market adoption is unlikely to be linear,and additional efforts are required to achieve the right bala

247、nce of incentives for broader consumer uptake,to ensure that adequate charging infrastructure is in place and to reinforce electricity grids.Over 7 million electric cars were sold in the first-half of 2024,which represents an increase of close to 25%compared to the same period a year ago.The share o

248、f EVs in the total global car fleet is likely to approach around 5%by the end of 2024.China accounts for nearly 80%of the increase,with sales rising from more than 3 million in the first-half of 2023 to over 4 million in the first-half of 2024.Even if China is set to one side,however,the overall per

249、centage rise in sales elsewhere in the global market is over 10%.While sales in the European Union remained flat,with a decline in Germany offsetting a rise elsewhere of around 3%on average,the United Kingdom saw a 15%rise,and the United States recorded an increase of nearly 10%.Large jumps in year-

250、on-year sales also occurred in nascent EV markets such as Brazil,Indonesia,Mexico,the Caspian region and the Middle East.One important trend is the rising share of plug-in hybrid electric vehicle(PHEV)sales,which accounted for over 35%of total EV sales in the first-half of 2024.In China,the PHEV sal

251、es increase was largely driven by range-extended electric vehicles(REEVs)which have longer driving ranges due to larger batteries.This provides an average electric range of around 130 kilometres(km),compared with 80 km for a standard PHEV(BNEF,2024a).Sales of PHEVs,including REEVs,surged by 70%in Ch

252、ina,while sales of battery electric vehicles(BEVs)rose by only 15%.Similarly,in the United States PHEV sales increased by 25%,compared to just 5%for BEVs.This highlights the need for an expansion of recharging infrastructure to ease range anxiety.EV sales are anticipated to be robust over the rest o

253、f 2024,with around 17 million electric cars being sold over the course of the year.China is expected to continue dominating global growth,with electric car sales topping over 10 million during 2024.It is worth noting in this context that the EV market in China has maintained strong momentum through

254、August,with monthly sales exceeding 1 million units(EV Volumes,2024).The continuing rise in EV sales is well above what was predicted by some analysts in 2022 when battery costs increased by 7%.In fact,this increase prompted the battery industry to adopt different chemistries that require less cobal

255、t and nickel,and this together with further developments in battery technology has led battery cell prices to drop below USD 80 per kilowatt-hour(kWh)during the first nine months of 2024.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 35 1 Table 1.1 Selected support policies for electric vehicles

256、Country/region Policy type Description Year Australia Target National Electric Vehicle Strategy includes details of state-level targets and incentives.2023 Canada Policy Electric Vehicle Availability Standard regulates annual zero emissions light-duty vehicle sales targets beginning in 2026 and reac

257、hing 100%in 2035.2023 China Policy Trade-in subsidies for replacing mainly used fossil fuel-powered vehicle with new energy or fuel-efficient vehicles.2024 European Union Policy 100%CO2 emissions reduction for new cars and vans by 2035.2023 India Policy Electric Mobility Promotion Scheme(April to Se

258、ptember 2024)and the PM E-DRIVE to incentivise and subsidise the uptake of electric two/three-wheelers,buses and freight vehicles.2024 Indonesia Target Target to have 2 million EVs in passenger light-duty vehicle stock and 13 million electric motorcycles in the fleet by 2030.2023 Japan Target 100%sa

259、les of EVs,fuel cell vehicles and hybrids for passenger cars by 2035 and for light commercial vehicles by 2040.2021 Korea Target 51%of new light-duty vehicles to be electric,fuel cell or hybrid by 2025 and 83%by 2030.2021 Mexico Target 100%of passenger car,two/three-wheeler and bus sales to be elect

260、ric and plug-in hybrids by 2040.2023 New Zealand Target 100%of new cars and van sales to be zero emissions by 2035.100%of urban bus sales to be zero emissions vehicles by 2025 and 100%of stock by 2035.Increase zero emissions vehicles to 30%of the light-duty vehicle fleet by 2035.2021 Pakistan Target

261、 30%of passenger light-duty vehicle sales to be electric by 2030.90%of truck sales to be electric by 2040;90%of urban bus sales to be electric by 2040;and 50%of electric two/three-wheeler sales to be electric by 2030.2019 United Kingdom Policy 80%of new cars and 70%of new vans to be zero emissions v

262、ehicles by 2030,increasing to 100%by 2035.2024 United States Policy Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act provides funding for EV charging infrastructure,battery-related projects and alternative fuels infrastructure.EPA Phase 3 GHG emissions standards target a nearly 50%emissions reduction for ligh

263、t-duty vehicles for model year 2032 compared to 2026,a 44%reduction for medium-duty vehicles and roughly 30-60%reductions for heavy-duty vehicles.2021 2024 Viet Nam Target Net zero GHG emissions in the transport sector by 2050,with a goal of 100%of road transport using electricity and green energy.2

264、022 IEA.CC BY 4.0.36 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Box 1.3 Future landscape for electric vehicles Around 30 countries have set zero emissions vehicle goals or timelines to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles.In the STEPS,electric car sales reach more than 40 million

265、 globally by 2030,which means that nearly one-in-two cars sold that year will be either a battery electric or a plug-in hybrid vehicle.The number of electric car sales in the STEPS is aligned with the plans of the automotive industry.Although some automakers have recently scaled back short-term EV p

266、roduction plans,their longer-term EV plans still point to the production of well over 40 million electric cars per year by 2030.The projections in the STEPS are also in line with those of other outlooks(Figure 1.8).Figure 1.8 Global electric light-duty vehicle sales in the STEPS compared with other

267、EV outlooks,2023-2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Projected sales of electric light-duty vehicles in the STEPS are broadly in the middle of the range of other outlooks Note:2024e=estimated values for 2024.Sources:IEA analysis based on data from Barclays,Boston Consulting Group,BloombergNEF,DNV,Energy Information

268、Administration,EV Volumes,ExxonMobil,Goldman Sachs,McKinsey,Morgan Stanley,OPEC,Rocky Mountain Institute and Shell.As there are inevitably uncertainties surrounding the future level of EV sales,we explore a range of potential shifts in EV trends.In our sensitivity analysis,the share of electric cars

269、 in new registrations ranges from less than 40%to 50%by 2030,with key differentiators being the scale of consumer adoption,the level of government support for EVs and the rate of expansion of charging infrastructure.Depending on the pace of EV uptake and the utilisation of the electric mode of PHEVs

270、,global oil demand could vary from 101 mb/d to 103 mb/d by 2030.Similarly,global electricity demand could differ between the high and low case by around 350 terawatt-hours(TWh),highlighting the far-reaching changes that EVs could bring across the whole energy sector(See Chapter 4).25%50%75%100%20232

271、024e203020352050Other outlooksSTEPSIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 37 1 1.3.1 Trends in the EV market Challenges and uncertainties are inevitable,but there are strong underlying reasons why EV sales are likely to continue to expand rapidly.One of the most important is that battery

272、prices are continuing to fall,prompting automakers to reduce EV sticker prices.Key automakers in the United States have reduced the price of their main models by more than USD 10 000,for example(IEA,2024a).Chinese automakers have also made price reductions of around USD 1 600 compared to 2022(BNEF,2

273、024b).European automakers are meanwhile planning to launch seven new models in 2025 priced at under USD 28 000(T&E,2024).While some automakers have adjusted their short-term targets and made slight changes to their longer term 2030 projections,their commitment to EVs remains robust across the board.

274、The same is true for the battery industry globally,which is currently experiencing consolidation rather than a reduction in plans.Although some incentive schemes have been revised,governments remain active in supporting EV uptake in a variety of ways(Table 1.1).China recently launched a new trade-in

275、 policy to encourage drivers to scrap less efficient vehicles and replace them with either electric or more efficient ones,and is looking at ways to speed development of charging infrastructure.In the European Union,stringent CO2 standards are prompting automakers to expand EV production.The United

276、States aims to increase EV uptake by providing subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act and to support the development of charging infrastructure under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.But there is much still to do,and delays in the roll-out of charging infrastructure or in policy imple

277、mentation could lead to the market share of electric cars in 2030 being about ten percentage points lower than projected in the STEPS,though this would still mean a big increase in EV shares from current levels(see Chapter 4).1.3.2 Implications of the transition to EVs for the energy sector In energ

278、y terms,the adoption of EVs means a shift from a fossil fuel-based mobility system to one that relies much more on critical minerals,and a linking of the transport and power sectors.There are clear synergies between manufacturing batteries for EVs and for energy storage,and processes from one indust

279、ry can benefit the other.For example,EV batteries could be repurposed for storage applications.They could also support grid flexibility through smart charging,helping to optimise grid load,and through bi-directional charging,supplying power to buildings or the grid(IEA,2024b).In the STEPS,electricit

280、y demand from EVs rises from 115 TWh today to around 1 000 TWh by 2030 an amount equivalent to todays electricity demand in Japan.This increase accounts for around 15%of total global electricity demand growth.Significant as this is,the impact of EVs on the oil market is even more significant(Figure

281、1.9).Over the past decade,road transport has increased oil demand by 4.2 mb/d,accounting for more than 45%of global oil demand growth.However,oil demand for passenger cars declines by 1 mb/d from todays levels by 2030,and this is largely responsible for global oil demand reaching a peak by the IEA.C

282、C BY 4.0.38 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 end of this decade in the STEPS.With renewables providing an ever-increasing share of power generation,electro-mobility helps to drive the world towards its climate commitments,and EVs displace nearly 10 billion barrels of oil from 20

283、20 to 2030,avoiding a total of over 4 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide(Gt CO2)emissions in the process.Figure 1.9 Oil demand in road transport in the STEPS and savings from EVs,2010-2035 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Without EVs,projected oil demand would be 13 mb/d higher in 2035 1.3.3 Key enablers to achieve net zero

284、 emissions milestones for EVs In the STEPS,nearly one-in-two cars sold are electric by 2030.In the NZE Scenario,electric cars account for over two-thirds of sales by 2030.Achieving this level requires further movement in a number of areas.One of the most pressing is cost differentials.Despite recent

285、 price reductions,on average an electric car is USD 10 000-15 000 more expensive than a comparable conventional internal combustion engine vehicle,though this is much less of an issue in China,where over 60%of electric cars are priced below their conventional counterparts(IEA,2024a).Another critical

286、 issue is the need for extensive charging infrastructure.To achieve a two-thirds market share of electric cars,investment of nearly USD 1000 billion will be required from now until 2030,which represents a 45%increase over levels in the STEPS.A third issue is meeting the demand for batteries.Annual E

287、V battery demand reaches around 5.5 TWh by 2030 in the NZE Scenario,up from 0.8 TWh in 2023.However,the battery industry seems well-positioned to meet this escalating demand,with recent announcements and developments indicating a robust capacity to scale up production and develop technology.20 40 60

288、2010202320302035mb/dRoad transport oil demandAvoided oil demand from EVsIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 39 1 1.4 How fast might demand for electricity increase?The global energy economy is increasingly electrifying.Since 2010,electricity demand has increased on average by 2.7%per y

289、ear,while overall energy demand has risen by 1.4%per year.Electricity is increasingly being used in place of fossil fuels to provide heat,mobility and industrial energy demand.Innovations such as smart grids and advances in the efficiency of electric motors and appliances have also boosted the appea

290、l of electricity.The share of electricity in total final consumption rises more rapidly than in the past in all three scenarios and across nearly all regions.This trend is a consequence of increased electrification in households and commercial buildings as well as in transport and industry.Most of t

291、his demand growth is from emerging market and developing economies.China dominates,but other countries make a significant contribution,especially after 2030.However,the pace of demand growth and the uncertainties surrounding it also pose challenges for ensuring a secure,affordable and sustainable el

292、ectricity supply.1.4.1 Emerging market and developing economies lead demand growth in the STEPS In the STEPS,global electricity demand nearly doubles by 2050,rising to 50 000 TWh from 26 000 TWh in 2023.From 2023 to 2035 alone,growth averages nearly 1 000 TWh per year,equivalent to adding another Ja

293、pan to global electricity consumption each year.Trends vary by sector.The transport sector has the lowest current rate of electrification in final consumption,but it also sees the fastest rate of projected demand growth as EVs account for a rising share of vehicle sales(section 1.3).Increased space

294、cooling and appliance ownership drive electricity demand growth in the buildings sector,underpinned by economic expansion.Electrification in industry is also a significant factor.Emerging market and developing economies are projected to contribute nearly 80%of growth in electricity demand to 2030 in

295、 the STEPS,with China alone making up over 45%of the global growth total(Figure 1.10).Chinas energy sector has electrified particularly fast,with electricity rising from 11%of final consumption in 2000 to 26%in 2023:a major cause was surging electricity use in the buildings sector,with growing incom

296、es leading to rapid increases in appliances and demand for space cooling,while space heating has also increasingly been electrified.Chinas demand rises further in the coming decades,with the rapid uptake of EVs being a key driver.The story in India is similar,though starting from a lower base:the sh

297、are of electricity in final consumption rose in India from 11%in 2000 to 18%in 2023,and half of the electricity demand growth to 2050 is projected in the STEPS to come in the buildings sector.After a period of slower growth,trends in advanced economies are changing.In the United States,the share of

298、electricity in final consumption was static from 2010 to 2023 at under 22%,but it rises to nearly 40%by 2050 in the STEPS,with an expanding EV fleet accounting for 65%of overall demand growth.After falling in recent years,electricity demand in the IEA.CC BY 4.0.40 International Energy Agency|World E

299、nergy Outlook 2024 European Union is also shifting back to growth,and the share of electricity in final consumption today more than doubles to 45%in 2050 in the STEPS.Rising demand from EVs is again one of the main causes,along with more electrification of space heating in the buildings sector.Figur

300、e 1.10 Electricity in total final consumption and demand growth in the STEPS to 2050 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Emerging market and developing economies,especially China,dominate the growth story in all sectors,while advanced economies see demand increase as transport electrifies Notes:TWh=terawatt-hours;AE=adva

301、nced economies;Other EMDE=emerging market and developing economies other than China and India.1.4.2 Exploring uncertainties in the STEPS Electricity demand is subject to major uncertainties,and could be higher or lower than projected.One key uncertainty revolves around possible variations in the out

302、look for the building sector,which in the STEPS is set to deliver nearly 45%of electricity demand growth in final consumption by 2035,mostly from increased cooling and appliance use.Demand for space cooling in buildings rises at an average annual rate of 3.7%to 2035 in the STEPS.Over 90%of this grow

303、th takes place in emerging market and developing economies,where economic growth and rising incomes drive air conditioner ownership,while a warming global climate boosts demand and leads to air conditioners having to work harder to provide cooling(see Chapter 3,section 3.3.2).As well as raising over

304、all demand,cooling is projected to lead to higher peaks in demand,putting additional strain on power grids.10%20%30%40%50%20002050Advanced economiesOther EMDEChinaIndiaShare of electricity in final consumption2023 100 200 300 400AEChinaIndiaOtherAEChinaIndiaOtherTWhIndustryBuildingsTransportAgricult

305、ureAverage annual growth in final consumption 2023-20302030-2050EMDEEMDEIEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 41 1 Demand growth from cooling could be even stronger than projected in the STEPS.Heat waves trigger increased demand for air conditioning,as seen in the prolonged recent heat w

306、ave in India,which reportedly doubled sales of cooling units(BBC,2024).A sensitivity analysis exploring the impact of more frequent,intense and lengthy heat waves on air conditioner ownership and usage finds that they could increase electricity demand for cooling in 2035 by as much as 700 TWh(20%)mo

307、re than projected in the STEPS(see section 4.6.2).About 80%of this additional increase occurs in emerging market and developing economies,mostly in developing Asia(Figure 1.11).Figure 1.11 Electricity demand growth by sector in the STEPS and selected buildings sector sensitivity analysis,2023-2035 I

308、EA.CC BY 4.0.In absolute terms,the buildings sector is set to see the most growth in electricity demand to 2035 in the STEPS;sensitivity analysis shows that this could increase further Note:EMDE=emerging market and developing economies.Energy efficiency improvements,supported by strong policy measur

309、es,are key to moderating the fast growth projected in appliance ownership,floorspace and overall living standards.But current trends indicate limited progress on efficiency in key markets,and highlight the risk that weak,disparate efficiency standards could lock in additional demand in fast-growing

310、regions.A sensitivity analysis indicates that lower efficiencies could cause electricity demand for appliances and cooling in emerging market and developing economies to be around 340 TWh(5%)higher than in the STEPS by 2035.By contrast,faster adoption of effective efficiency standards could result i

311、n electricity demand being almost 900 TWh lower in 2035 in these end-uses than in the STEPS,highlighting the value of action in these areas to temper future demand growth(see Chapter 4,section 4.6.3).1 2 3 4 5 6BuildingsHigh caseBuildingsLow caseAppliancesSpace coolingOther buildingsEMDE efficiencyH

312、eat wavesThousand TWhBuildings:Sensitivity analysis:Transport Industry BuildingsIEA.CC BY 4.0.42 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 Box 1.4 Data centre and artificial intelligence energy demand is set to expand Nascent sectors or trends add to uncertainties in projections.One exam

313、ple is data centres:not a new source of electricity demand,but now in a new phase of growth arising from both the increasing digitalisation of the economy and advances in technology,including artificial intelligence(AI).With established technology companies and AI start-ups making major investments,

314、a sharp rise in electricity consumption by data centres looks inevitable,but the relatively early stage of this new phase of growth and sparse data availability mean that any projections are bound to be tentative.Among other things,the pace of growth may be restricted by supply chain bottlenecks,par

315、ticularly for the chips that handle AI and other compute-intensive workloads.Challenges in building local grids and generation capacity may also constrain growth.Our assessment of uncertainties indicates that demand growth to 2030 could vary from the STEPS by as much as 170 TWh.It also suggests that

316、,while data centre electricity demand will grow,it is likely to account for a relatively small share of total global electricity demand growth to 2030,although the sector will be more significant at the national or regional level in major data centre markets(see Chapter 4,section 4.6.1).1.4.3 Clean

317、energy transitions are driving rapid electricity demand growth Clean energy transitions are a primary cause of fast-rising global electricity demand(Figure 1.12).Faster electrification of end-uses and the decarbonisation of power grids together play a vital role to improve efficiency and reduce emis

318、sions,as reflected in the APS and NZE Scenario.In 2050,total electricity demand reaches 60 000 TWh in the APS and 66 000 TWh in the NZE Scenario as much as a third higher than the 50 000 TWh projected in the STEPS.The pace and scale of the electrification of transport is a key differentiator of elec

319、tricity demand across the three World Energy Outlook(WEO)scenarios.The projected share of EV sales in total road vehicle sales reaches 70%in 2035 in the APS,compared with 55%in the STEPS,and this translates into a 465 TWh increase in electricity demand from road transport in the APS compared to the

320、STEPS.In the NZE Scenario,near universal adoption of EVs by 2035 means a 1 500 TWh increase compared to the STEPS.Faster uptake of heat pumps is central to efforts to boost energy efficiency and cut fossil fuel use in buildings.Although sales of heat pumps slowed in 2023 in some regions,and saw a ma

321、jor slowdown in Europe in the first half of 2024,their market share in space heating is still set to almost double by 2035 in the STEPS,and to reach approximately 30%in the APS and 40%in the NZE Scenario.Their high efficiency means the additional electricity demand from heat pumps is modest,adding o

322、nly around 325 TWh by 2035 in the STEPS,445 TWh in the APS and 425 TWh in the NZE Scenario.IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1|Overview and key findings 43 1 Figure 1.12 Electricity demand growth from selected clean energy technologies by region and scenario,2023-2035 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Electrification of road trans

323、port and electrolytic hydrogen production to tackle emissions in hard-to-abate sectors significantly boosts electricity demand in transition scenarios Notes:AE=advanced economies;Other EMDE=emerging market and developing economies other than China and India.Electricity demand for heat pumps represen

324、ts space heating in buildings.Electricity demand for hydrogen production includes onsite production for industry and refineries.The use of electricity to produce hydrogen,including onsite production for the steel,ammonia and refining industries,has the potential to increase demand for electricity ve

325、ry significantly.But the scale and timing are highly uncertain because they are contingent on how quickly different hydrogen production pathways and use develop.Electricity demand for hydrogen production increases from less than 5 TWh today to 9 000 TWh in the APS in 2050.In the NZE Scenario,electri

326、city demand for hydrogen production reaches nearly 15 000 TWh in 2050,equivalent to over 55%of global electricity demand today.As societies come to depend ever more on electricity,especially in rapid energy transitions,reliable supply becomes paramount(Box 1.5).Box 1.5 Electricity is at the heart of

327、 energy security Many of the new energy security challenges in a decarbonising world arise in the power sector as societies come to depend more on electricity for their energy needs.There are two core elements of electricity security:the ability to ensure sufficient capacity to meet peak demand(adeq

328、uacy),and the ability to manage fluctuations in both demand and renewable energy supply(flexibility).Peak demand is projected to rise faster than overall electricity demand in all scenarios,and up to 80%faster in emerging market and developing economies by 2035 in the STEPS(Figure 1.13).Efficiency m

329、easures like improved insulation and more efficient appliances 1 2 3 4 5 6STEPS APSNZESTEPS APSNZESTEPS APSNZEOther EMDEIndiaChinaAEThousand TWhHeat pumpsElectric vehiclesHydrogen productionIEA.CC BY 4.0.44 International Energy Agency|World Energy Outlook 2024 help avoid a bigger rise,along with mea

330、sures that enable demand-side flexibility such as smart meters and dynamic tariffs.Batteries become essential for dispatchable capacity,and over 1 700 gigawatts(GW)of battery capacity are added in the STEPS by 2035.Natural gas and coal plants continue to play a role to provide dispatchable capacity

331、in emerging market and developing economies,but the larger share of short-term flexibility is projected to be met by batteries and demand response,with seasonal needs met largely by hydropower and thermal plants.Figure 1.13 Peak electricity demand by driver and region in the STEPS,2023-2035 IEA.CC B

332、Y 4.0.Higher activity and end-use electrification are key drivers of peak demand growth,but efficiency gains and nascent demand-side flexibility mitigate some of the increase Notes:Other EMDE=emerging market and developing economies other than China.Peak demand is the average level of demand for the

333、 100 hours of the year with the highest demand.A larger share of variable renewables raises the potential for imbalances between available supply and demand.A good deal of seasonal energy demand is also transferred onto the power system through the increasing use of electric heating and cooling equipment.Electricity storage,stronger grids,demand-side response and dispatchable low-emissions sources