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1、August 2023202122Airport monitoring reportiiACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Ngunnawal 23 Marcus Clarke Street,Canberra,Australian Capital Territory,2601 Commonwealth of Australia 2023This work is copyright.In addition to any use permitted under the

2、 Copyright Act 1968,all material contained within this work is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Australia licence,with the exception of:the Commonwealth Coat of Arms the ACCC and AER logos any illustration,diagram,photograph or graphic over which the Australian Competition and Consu

3、mer Commission does not hold copyright,but which may be part of or contained within this publication.The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website,as is the full legal code for the CC BY 4.0 AU licence.Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and

4、rights should be addressed to the Director,Corporate Communications,ACCC,GPOBox 3131,Canberra ACT 2601.Important notice The information in this publication is for general guidance only.It does not constitute legal or other professional advice,and should not be relied on as a statement of the law in

5、any jurisdiction.Because it is intended only as a general guide,it may contain generalisations.You should obtain professional advice if you have any specific concern.The ACCC has made every reasonable effort to provide current and accurate information,but it does not make any guarantees regarding th

6、e accuracy,currency or completeness of that information.Parties who wish to re-publish or otherwise use the information in this publication must check this information for currency and accuracy prior to publication.This should be done prior to each publication edition,as ACCC guidance and relevant t

7、ransitional legislation frequently change.Any queries parties have should be addressed to the Director,Corporate Communications,ACCC,GPO Box 3131,Canberra ACT 2601.ACCC 08/23_23-01 www.accc.gov.auAcknowledgment of countryThe ACCC acknowledges the traditional owners and custodians of Country througho

8、ut Australia and recognises their continuing connection to the land,sea and community.We pay our respects tothem and their cultures;and to their Elders past,present and future.iiiACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122ContentsGlossary and abbreviations vSummary 1Monitored airports key results 202122 7

9、1.Introduction 101.1 Airports importance to the Australian economy 101.2 Services provided by airports 111.3 Airport market power 151.4 History of airport regulation in Australia 151.5 The ACCCs monitoring role 201.6 Consultation 251.7 Structure of the report 262.Advice to enhance the current price

10、monitoring regime 272.1 ACCCs advice on more detailed information on airport performance 282.2 ACCCs advice on airport quality indicators 333.Total performance 363.1 Passenger numbers began to recover in 202122,primarily due to a rebound in domestic travel 363.2 Most airports reported improved year

11、on year financial outcomes in 202122 404.Aeronautical services 444.1 Impact of changes in terminal leases on financial results 444.2 Despite some rebound,all monitored airports reported aeronautical losses in 202122 465.Car parking 505.1 Monitoring airports car parking prices 505.2 Car parking opera

12、tional and financial performance began to recover in 202122 but was still well below 201819 for most monitored airports 515.3 Car parking prices 56ivACCC|Airport monitoring report|2021226.Landside access 616.1 Monitoring airports landside access operations 626.2 Vehicle numbers began to recover in 2

13、02122 636.3 Landside access revenues rose but had not yet returned to pre pandemic levels 646.4 Compared against taxis,proportion of landside access revenue from rideshare continues to increase 667.Investments 687.1 Monitoring airports investments 687.2 Impact of COVID-19 on investment 697.3 Project

14、s completed in 202122 717.4 Projects underway in 202122 727.5 Planned projects 75Appendix A:Landside access options access,pricing and facilities 78Appendix B:Supplementary results 83Appendix C:Background information 99vACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Glossary and abbreviationsACCCAustralian Co

15、mpetition and Consumer CommissionActCompetition and Consumer Act 2010AerobridgeAllows passengers to board and disembark aeroplanes directly from/to the terminal gate lounge.Avoids need for passengers to go outside and use the apron.Aircraft related services and facilitiesServices and facilities prov

16、ided by airports that are specifically utilised by aircrafts(for example,runways,aircraft parking bays and taxiways).The full list of aircraft-related services and facilities for monitoring purposes are listed in the Airports Regulations 1997.Airline surveysEach year,the ACCC sends domestic and inte

17、rnational airlines a survey in which they are asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 the availability and standard of services and facilities provided by the monitored airports.Airports ActAirports Act 1996Airports RegulationsAirports Regulations 1997AirsideRefers to areas specifically in the airport th

18、at are dedicated to the provision of aircraft-related services and facilities and most passenger-related services and facilities for example,terminal buildings,runways and taxiways.Aeronautical services and facilitiesAs defined under the Airports Regulations 1997,services and facilities at an airpor

19、t that are necessary for the operation and maintenance of civil aviation at the airport(including both passenger-related and aircraft-related services and facilities).ApronAirport aprons are areas where planes park and are refuelled,passengers embark and disembark and/or where planes are loaded and

20、unloaded.At airport car parkA car park that is located on the airports land which could be either an at-distance or at-terminal car park.At distance car parkA car park that is located within the airport precinct but outside of reasonable walking distance to the terminal.Access to the terminal is via

21、 a shuttle that is operated by the airport.At terminal car parkA car park that is within walking distance of the terminal.BITREBureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research EconomicsCBDCentral business districtCompetition and Consumer ActCompetition and Consumer Act 2010COVID-19Coronavirus pandemi

22、c declared by the World Health Organisation on 11 March 2020.EBITEarnings before interest and taxes.EBITAEarnings before interest,taxes,and amortisation.viACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122EBITDAEarnings before interest,taxes,depreciation and amortisation.FACFederal Airports CorporationFIFOFly in

23、 fly outFYFinancial yearGeneral aviationAircraft operations that are not regular public transport,such as private charter and aircraft training flights,and Royal Flying Doctor Services.LandsideParts of an airport that are not airside areas for example,access roads and walkways within airport precinc

24、ts.Long-term parkingParking for a period of one or more days.Monitored airportsAirports which are subject to price and quality of service monitoring and are specified in Parts 7 and 8 of the Airports Regulations 1997;currently Brisbane,Melbourne,Perth and Sydney airports.MTOWMaximum take-off weightO

25、bjective indicatorsAirport services and facilities listed in the Airports Regulations 1997 to be monitored and evaluated by the ACCC and of which monitored airports are required to keep records.Includes both physical infrastructure(for example,the number of check-in desks and flight information disp

26、lay screens)and other measurements(for example,number of passengers during peak hour).Off airport car parkA car park that is located outside of the airport precinct and operated by a third party.Access to the terminals is provided by a shuttle bus that is provided by the off-airport car park operato

27、r.Operating profitMeasured by earnings(revenue less cost)before interest,taxation and amortisation.Operating profit marginsIn this report,this is the ratio of EBITA(earnings before interest,taxes,and amortisation)to total revenue.Passenger-related services and facilitiesServices and facilities provi

28、ded by airports that are specifically utilised by passengers(for example,check-in desks,aerobridges and gate lounges).The full list of passenger-related services and facilities for monitoring purposes are listed in the Airports Regulations 1997.Part IIIA Pricing PrinciplesPart IIIA Pricing Principle

29、s set out in section 44ZZCA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.2019 Productivity Commission inquiryProductivity Commission 2019,Economic Regulation of Airports,Report no.92,Canberra.Peak hourThe hour that,on average for each day in the financial year,has the highest number of(arriving/departin

30、g/total of both)passengers.Quality of aeronautical serviceA metric derived by aggregating the quality of aeronautical service monitoring results sourced from objective indicators and surveys of airlines and passengers on the quality of services and facilities provided by the monitored airports.Real

31、termsA value expressed in the money of a particular base time period(for example,202122 dollars).Values in real terms remove the impact of inflation and provide a better comparison of values over time.viiACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Return on assetsRatio of EBITA relative to average tangible

32、 non-current assets.The ACCC uses a line in the sand approach to valuing aeronautical assets(see Box 1.3 and Appendix C).Short term parkingParking for a period of up to one day.T1/T2/T3/T4Terminal 1/Terminal 2/Terminal 3/Terminal 4TaxiwayA road for aircraft that connects runways with airport facilit

33、ies including ramps,hangers and terminals.viiiACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122In May 2023,the ACCC advised the Australian Government of its recommendations to enhance the price monitoring regime by requiring the monitored airports to report more disaggregated information in relation to aeronaut

34、ical,car parking and landside access services,and updating reported measures of airport quality.The ACCC considers that these actions will improve transparency of airport performance for the benefit of airport users and inform analysis of whether the monitored airports are exercising their market po

35、wer in relation to specific services.In 202122,the financial performance of Brisbane,Melbourne and Perth airports improved,but declined further for Sydney Airport.Total operating profit margins for all 4 monitored airports remained below 201819 levels,ranging between 8%and 42%.Passenger numbers incr

36、eased across all 4 monitored airports following the reopening of domestic and international borders,largely due to a rebound in domestic travel.The rebound has continued in the first 3 quarters of 202223,with domestic travel reaching around 84%to 107%and international travel reaching around 61%to 71

37、%of 201819 levels,respectively.The 4 monitored airports indicated that they were conservative with their investment programs in 202122 due to uncertainties associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.Some advised that they prioritised progressing projects that would otherwise have disrupted air travel.Des

38、pite some improvement,all 4 monitored airports reported operating losses from aeronautical operations in 202122.Aeronautical services provide the primary source of revenue for the monitored airports.Airport monitoring report 2021221ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122SummaryThis report presents the

39、 Australian Competition and Consumer Commissions(ACCCs)analysis of monitoring the prices,costs and profits of Brisbane,Melbourne(Tullamarine),Perth and Sydney(Kingsford Smith)airports.Due to the continued significant impact of COVID-19 on the 4 monitored airports in 202122,the ACCC has largely confi

40、ned its observations in this report on monitored airports recovery from the pandemic.The ACCC did not collect data on quality of service for 202122 from the monitored airports.We have resumed collecting quality of service data from the monitored airports and will recommence full reporting in our nex

41、t monitoring report.Earlier this year,the ACCC provided advice to the Australian Government on an updated and enhanced price monitoring regime,as discussed below.If the Australian Government accepts our advice,we will start collecting and reporting new information in the future.Developments in 20212

42、2Overall performance of the 4 monitored airportsAs was the case in 202021,the COVID-19 pandemic continued to have a significant impact on the aviation industry in 202122.This section covers operational and financial results across the monitored airports overall operations.Passenger numbersWith the r

43、eopening of domestic and international borders in the latter part of 202122,the monitored airports benefitted from some rebound in passenger numbers from the lows of the previous financial year.As a percentage of 201819 levels,the total passenger numbers in 202122 reached 43%at Brisbane Airport,35%a

44、t Melbourne Airport,51%at Perth Airport and 30%at Sydney Airport,respectively.1The recovery in domestic passengers outpaced that for international passengers in 202122,as shown in table 1.Table 1:Domestic and international passengers in 202122 as a percentage of 201819 levelsAirportDomestic passenge

45、rsInternational passengersBrisbane Airport54%13%Melbourne Airport42%17%Perth Airport68%11%Sydney Airport39%17%Source:ACCC analysis of information from the monitored airports.1 Sydney Airport noted that its passenger numbers for the 6 months to 31 December 2021 were significantly lower than passenger

46、 numbers in the 6 months to 30 June 2022,hitting their lowest point in late 2021,at just 1%of 2019 levels.2ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122The rebound in both domestic and international travel has continued in 202223.As shown in Table 2,domestic travel has reached around 84%to 107%and internati

47、onal travel around 61%to 71%of 201819 levels,respectively.Table 2:Comparison of domestic and international passenger numbers in Q1Q3 of 20222023 to Q1Q3 of 201819 Number of domestic passengers in the first 3 quarters of 202223 as a percentage of number of domestic passengers in the first 3 quarters

48、of 201819Number of international passengers in the first 3 quarters of 202223 as a percentage of number of international passengers in the first 3 quarters of 201819Brisbane Airport90%61%Melbourne Airport86%67%Perth Airport107%71%Sydney Airport84%69%Source:ACCC analysis of information received from

49、monitored airports and the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics(BITRE).2Overall profitabilityRebound in passenger numbers led to some recovery in the financial performance of 3 of the 4 monitored airports,however,their financial performance was still below 201819 levels.This ref

50、lects the fact the pricing structure of the airports means that when passenger numbers are low,their revenues are also low.Table 3 compares operating profit margins3 in 202122 and 201819.Table 3:Total operating profit margin by airport,201819 and 202122Airport201819202122Brisbane Airport59%32%Melbou

51、rne Airport56.5%7.9%Perth Airport48%42%4 Sydney Airport59.5%11%Source:ACCC analysis of information from the monitored airports.InvestmentsBrisbane,Sydney and Perth airports reported that,in aggregate,they completed about$90 million to$117 million in major investments in aeronautical,car parking and

52、landside access facilities in 202122.Melbourne Airport did not report a figure to the ACCC.The monitored airports indicated to the ACCC that they remained relatively conservative with their investment programs in 202122 due 2 Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics,Airport Traffic

53、Data,released 16 June 2023,accessed July 2023.3 Earnings before interest,taxes and amortisation as a percentage of total airport revenue.4 Perth Airport reported that its profit metrics for 202121,as reported by the ACCC,have been favourably impacted by an inclusion of$73m in non-aeronautical fair v

54、alue adjustments(non-cash).3ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122to uncertainties associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.Some of the monitored reports advised that during COVID-19 they prioritised progressing projects that would otherwise have disrupted air travel.5 Performance of the 4 monitored air

55、ports across individual service segmentsThe monitored airports operations can be broadly split across 4 categories of services aeronautical,car parking,landside access and commercial.6 Table 4 shows the split in the revenue that the monitored airports derived from each of the categories in 201819 an

56、d 202122.Table 4:Revenue split by service categories,201819 and 202122Category201819202122Aeronautical 4556%3451%Car parking814%715%Landside access13%12%Commercial3442%3853%Source:ACCC analysis of information from the monitored airports.The ACCC focuses its reporting on aeronautical,car parking and

57、landside access services.Aeronautical servicesOf the 3 service segments monitored by the ACCC,the aeronautical services were the most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.Despite some improvement,all 4 monitored airports reported operating losses from these operations in 202122.7 The monitored airports

58、 aeronautical operating profit margins8 in 202122 were well below those they achieved in 201819,as shown in table 5.Table 5:Aeronautical operating profit margins,by airport,201819 and 202122Airport201819202122Brisbane Airport47%-5.9%Melbourne Airport40%-38.8%Perth Airport34%-0.05%Sydney Airport45%-2

59、7.4%Source:ACCC analysis of information from the monitored airports.Car parkingThe daily number of vehicles visiting car parks at all the monitored airports in 202122 was higher than in 202021,consistent with an increase in passenger numbers.While this led to improved car 5 Investments reported to t

60、he ACCC for 202122 included re-sheeting of taxiways and resurfacing of runways.6 Aeronautical:covers provision of aviation services including runways,aprons,aerobridges,departure lounges and baggage-handling equipment.Car parking:covers provision of at terminal and at distance parking and other rela

61、ted services.Landside access:covers services to parties seeking to access the airport to drop off or pick up passengers,including ground transport operators and independent car park providers.Commercial:covers services to retail outlets,car rental operators,hotels,corporate parks and factory outlets

62、 plus anything else that does not fall under the other 3 service segments.7 Aeronautical revenue minus aeronautical expenses.8 Aeronautical operating profit as a percentage of aeronautical revenue.4ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122parking financial performance for each of the monitored airports,

63、most monitored airports had not yet reached the car parking operating profit margins they achieved in 201819,as shown in table 6.Table 6:Car parking operating profit margins,by airport,201819 and 202122Airport201819202122Brisbane Airport67%58%Melbourne Airport53%40%Perth Airport58%58%Sydney Airport6

64、8%33%Source:ACCC analysis of information from the monitored airports.Landside accessIn 202122,all 4 monitored airports reported higher landside access revenues compared with the previous financial year,as more passengers used various forms of ground transport to access the monitored airports.9 Howev

65、er,when compared to 201819,landside access revenues in 202122 only reached 38%for Brisbane Airport,30%for Melbourne Airport,67%for Perth Airport and 29%for Sydney Airport.The ACCC advised the Australian Government on how to enhance the price monitoring regimeThe ACCC currently receives and publishes

66、 highly aggregated data on aeronautical and car parking services.Aggregated information does not allow analysis of individual services within these segments,such as international compared with domestic flights,or different types of car parking.Further,the information the ACCC currently collects on l

67、andside access services is incomplete and inconsistent,as there is currently no formal requirement on the monitored airports to provide this information to the ACCC.The lack of fulsome and consistent data:impedes the Airports Acts objective of facilitating the assessment and comparison of monitored

68、airports performance(for example,in provision of landside access services)limits the usefulness of published information to airport users(for example,domestic airlines cannot distil data pertaining to provision of domestic aeronautical services)impedes the ability of the ACCC and Productivity Commis

69、sion to assess whether the monitored airports are exercising their market power in relation to specific services(for example,at terminal car parking).In June 2022,the Australian Government requested the ACCC to provide advice on how to implement recommendations made by the Productivity Commission in

70、 a 2019 inquiry to enhance the price monitoring regime.9 Landside access revenue is derived from charges on landside transport operators such as taxis and rideshare.5ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Productivity Commission recommendationsIn 2019,the Productivity Commission completed its fourth r

71、eview of the Economic Regulation of Airports.Overall,the Productivity Commission found that the current light-handed approach to airport regulation remains fit for purpose.However,the Productivity Commission noted that some airport indicators could present cause for concern if considered in isolatio

72、n.In particular,the Productivity Commission stated that high international charges at Sydney and Brisbane airports,Sydney Airports relatively high returns,and high operating costs at Perth Airport show that there is reason to remain vigilant.10To strengthen the price monitoring regime,the Productivi

73、ty Commission recommended that:the monitored airports report more detailed information to the ACCC in relation to aeronautical,car parking and landside access services to enhance the transparency of airports operations and to detect the exercise of market power more readily(Recommendation 9.4)the AC

74、CC provide advice to the Australian Government on an updated set of quality of service indicators to improve their fit for purpose(Recommendation 9.5).11 The ACCC adviceThe ACCC consulted widely with industry stakeholders,including issuing several consultation papers and convening a joint consultati

75、on session with the monitored airports and the Australian Airports Association.In May 2023,the ACCC recommended that the Australian Government amend the Airports Regulations 1997 to require the monitored airports to report to the ACCC:systematically disaggregated data and detailed cost allocation me

76、thodologies for aeronautical,car parking and landside access servicesinformation relating to 53 quality of service matters to monitor the notional capacity or performance of particular airport services and facilities.12The ACCC considers that the publication of disaggregated information in relation

77、to specific services will strengthen the price monitoring regime by:enhancing transparency of performance of the monitored airports for the benefit of airport users,assisting those users:in negotiations with the monitored airports to assess the reasonableness of charges and other terms of access to

78、identify potential problems with specific services informing analysis of whether the monitored airports are exercising their market power in relation to those specific services.10 Productivity Commission,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),https:/www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/airports-

79、2019/report,2019,p 2,accessed 13 July 2023.11 Productivity Commission,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),https:/www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/airports-2019/report,2019,p 42,accessed 13 July 2023.12 See https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/more-deta

80、iled-information-on-financial-performance-of-airports and https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/airports-quality-of-service-review.6ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122For example,the ACCC expects that publication of disaggregated information will,amongst other t

81、hings:for aeronautical services:improve the information available to domestic and international airlines for the purpose of their negotiations with the monitored airports allow the comparison of the monitored airports performance in supplying international and domestic aeronautical servicesfor car p

82、arking services:allow the analysis of the monitored airports performance in provision of at terminal car parking services for which there is limited,if any,competitionfor landside access services:increase transparency on whether the monitored airports are using landside access charges to off-airport

83、 car parking operators to give themselves a competitive advantage in provision of at distance car parking services.These changes will support the objectives of the price monitoring regime and the Airports Act for the benefit of airport users and the Australian community more generally.7ACCC|Airport

84、monitoring report|202122Monitored airports key results 2021223.1m 417%10.6m 45.2%SYDNUMBER OF PASSENGERSInternationalDomesticCAR PARKING PROFIT MARGINS*AVERAGE DAILY CAR PARKING THROUGHPUTMONITORED AIRPORTS LOCATIONS AND TOTAL OPERATING PROFIT MARGINS*BNEMELSYD 58%0.7 pp40%63.6 pp58%14.1 pp33%18.9 p

85、pPER02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,000BNESYDMELPER32%21 pp7.9%41 pp42%31 pp11%8 pp01020304050Passengers(millions)MEL1.9m 850%11.0m 86.4%PER0.5m 0%6.9m 19.0%BNE0.9m 200%9.4m 23.7%BNEMELPERSYDBNEMELPERSYD201819201920202021202122201819201920202021202122AERONAUTICAL PROFIT MARGIN*BNESYDMELPER-5.9%54 pp-3

86、8.8%94 pp-0.05%38 pp-27.4%29 pp*Profit margin is measured as earnings before interest,taxes and amortisation(EBITA)as a percentage of revenue.Notes:Items as described qp are comparisons to 202021.pp means percentage point(s).8ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Key performance indicators for 202122

87、Table 7:Key total airport indicators for 202122AirportPassenger numbers(millions)Aircraft movement(thousands)Total airport revenue($millions)Total airport profit($millions)Total airport operating profit margin(%)Return on total airport assets13(%)Brisbane10.3141.3500.6158.9322.9Melbourne12.9126.6519

88、.741.37.90.7Perth7.4108.5428.5178.74214 6.1Sydney13.7138.6776.183.7111.6Table 8:Changes in key total airport indicators for 202021 to 202122 AirportPassenger numbers(%)Aircraft movement(%)Total airport revenue(%)Total airport profit(%)Total airport operating profit margin(percentage points)Return on

89、 total airport assets(percentage points)Brisbane31227216212Melbourne1105853137412.5Perth251158536315Sydney752-6-46-8-1Notes:Changes for financial data are presented in real terms(base year of 202122).Table 9:Key aeronautical indicators for 202122AirportAeronautical revenue($millions)Aeronautical rev

90、enue per passenger($)Aeronautical operating profit($millions)Aeronautical profit(EBITA)margin(%)Return on aeronautical assets15(%)Brisbane202.919.73-12.0-5.9-0.4Melbourne239.218.49-92.8-38.8-3.6Perth144.319.63-0.1-0.05-0.01Sydney394.628.76-108.1-27.4-3.513 This measure covers both aeronautical and n

91、on-aeronautical assets.The ACCC uses a line in the sand approach to valuing aeronautical assets(see Box 1.3 and Appendix C).14 Perth Airport reported that its profit metrics for 202122,as reported by the ACCC,have been favourably impacted by an inclusion of$73m in non-aeronautical fair value adjustm

92、ents(non-cash).15 This measure is based on aeronautical tangible non-current assets.The ACCC uses a line in the sand approach to valuing aeronautical assets(see Box 1.3 and Appendix C).9ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Table 10:Changes in key aeronautical indicators for 202021 to 202122 AirportA

93、ero revenue(%)Aero revenue per passenger(%)Aero operating loss(%)Aero profit(EBITA)margin(percentage points)Return on aero assets(percentage points)Brisbane375-86*542.3Melbourne80-14-48*942.9Perth4819-100*383.6Sydney39.5-20-32*291.5Notes:Changes for financial data are presented in real terms(base ye

94、ar of 202122).*aeronautical operating loss is showing the reduction in losses.Table 11:Key car parking indicators for 202122AirportRevenue($million)Operating profit($million)Profit margin(%)Car parking spacesRevenue per car park space($)Operating profit per car park space($)Revenue share of total ai

95、rport revenue(%)Brisbane6437.15819,961-13Melbourne7630.54026,6542,8531,14315Perth53.831.25819,3572,7781,61213Sydney56.318.83314,8924,7701,5937Table 12:Changes in key car parking indicators from 202021 to 202122AirportRevenue(%)Operating profit(%)Profit margin(percentage points)Car parking spaces(%)R

96、evenue per car park space(%)Operating profit per car park space(%)Revenue share of total airport revenue(percentage points)Brisbane3839.50.74.6-3Melbourne9643463.60964343.2Perth489614.166-1118-0.4Sydney6127218.91.259267-2.8Note:Changes for financial data are presented in real terms(base year of 2021

97、22).10ACCC|Airport monitoring report|2021221.Introduction 1.1 Airports importance to the Australian economyAirports perform a vital role in supporting economic activity across Australia.Air travel and transportation have become increasingly popular and essential to several industries over the last f

98、ew decades.Over the 20 years to 2019,prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,the number of passengers travelling through Australias airports more than doubled to over 160 million.16 The 4 monitored airports Brisbane,Melbourne,Perth and Sydney accounted for about 3 quarters of passenger movements

99、 across Australian airports in 201819.17 Apart from airports core activities,which employ a relatively small number of staff18,airport precincts support a much larger sphere of economic activity.This includes retail,office space,logistics and other aviation sector activity.19 Outside the airport pre

100、cinct,airports are essential in facilitating economic activity in other industries.One of the most notable is tourism,which(before COVID-19)contributed around 6%to Australias gross domestic product and was its fourth largest export industry.20 The overwhelming majority(some 97%)of international tour

101、ists arrive in Australia by plane.21 The mining,construction and oil and gas industries also rely heavily on airports to facilitate transport of their fly in fly out(FIFO)workforce to remote parts of Australia.22 Numerous other industries rely on airports to facilitate business related travel.Airpor

102、ts also facilitate air freight.While this only accounts for 0.1%of freight transported between Australia and the rest of the world in volume,it represents around 20%of trade by value.23 The majority of the goods transported by air are high value and time critical,such as eCommerce parcels,perishable

103、 goods(particularly seafood)and medical supplies.24As well as supporting economic activity,airports also play a role in connecting family,friends and communities throughout Australia.16 ACCC calculation based on BITRE Airport Traffic Data(198586 to 202021).17 ACCC calculation based on BITRE Airport

104、Traffic Data(198586 to 202021).Note that this share of total passenger movements decreased to 56%in 202021.18 IBISWorld estimated that airports directly employed some 12,593 in 201819 prior to the pandemic;see IBISWorld,Airport Operations in Australia I5220,IBISWorld website,2021,p 13,accessed 13 Ju

105、ly 2023.19 These accounted for an estimated 206,400 full-time equivalent staff in 201617:Deloitte,Connecting Australia The economic and social contribution of Australias airports,Deloitte website,2018,p ii,accessed 13 July 2023.20 Department of Infrastructure,Transport,Regional Development and Commu

106、nications(DITRDC),Future of Australias Aviation Sector,Issues paper,2020,p 5,accessed 13 July 2023.21 Deloitte,Connecting Australia,p 37.22 DITRDC,Future of Australias Aviation Sector,p 5.23 As above.24 Deloitte,Connecting Australia,p iii;DITRDC,Future of Australias Aviation Sector,p 5.11ACCC|Airpor

107、t monitoring report|2021221.2 Services provided by airportsAirports provide a range of services to various users,including:aeronautical services to airlinescar parking services to passengers,airport staff and employees of businesses located at the airportlandside access services to transport operato

108、rs,including taxis,rideshare services,private cars(including limousines),and public and private buses(including shuttle buses for off airport parking)commercial services(particularly leasing space)to retail outlets,car rental operators,hotels,corporate parks and factory outlets.The following section

109、s discuss these in more detail.Aeronautical services Broadly,aeronautical services are services and facilities that airports provide to airlines for the operation and maintenance of civil aviation at the airport.25 Airlines operate aircraft on scheduled routes domestically and internationally to tra

110、nsport both passengers and freight.Airports provide services and facilities to assist with airlines use of the aircraft,including:runways,taxiways,aprons,airside roads and airside grounds airfield and airside lighting aircraft parking sites ground handling(including equipment storage and refuelling)

111、airside freight handling and staging areas essential for aircraft loading and unloading.Airports also provide services and facilities to assist airlines passengers,including:terminals,including the necessary departure and holding lounges,and related facilities aerobridges and buses used in airside a

112、reas terminal access roads and facilities in landside areas(including lighting and covered walkways)baggage handling and reclaiming facilities.Airports and airlines engage in commercial negotiations to reach agreement on the terms and conditions of use of an airports aeronautical services and facili

113、ties,including charges and service levels.Under these agreements,aeronautical charges could be based on a variety of factors,such as the number of passengers,maximum take off weight,duration and time of day.While some airports levy charges for each aeronautical service component,other airports bundl

114、e some of those services into a single charge.Airports generally levy charges for access to terminals on the basis of the number of passengers per aircraft and type of flight.Many airports also have standard conditions of use or standard terms of service that apply to all airlines which use the airp

115、orts services and facilities,but which have not entered into a service agreement with the airport.25 Part 7 of the Airports Regulations.12ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Airport car parking servicesEach of the 4 monitored airports provide a range of on-site car parking facilities for the public

116、 and staff.Each airport offers at terminal and at distance parking on both a short term and long term basis as well as a range of products and services in-between.For some airports,they have broadened their offering to include premium services such as valet car parking and guaranteed space allocatio

117、ns.Many motorists choose to park near the terminal as they drop off or pick up friends and relatives.At distance car parking is generally not located within walking distance of the terminals and therefore requires shuttle bus access.Despite the lower level of convenience,at distance car parks are of

118、ten favoured by motorists parking for extended durations because of the cheaper parking rates.Airports charge the motorists directly for parking based on their choice of parking facilities and length of stay.Prices charged for parking near the terminal are typically higher than those for parking at

119、some distance from the terminal.Most airports offer promotions that motorists can access online,such as for off peak periods,providing discounts on the standard drive up rates.The following section provides a brief overview of each airports car parking service offerings.Brisbane AirportBrisbane Airp

120、ort has 3 separate car parking precincts,2 of which are within walking distance of the terminals.The third precinct is located at a distance from the terminals,with access provided via a free,regular shuttle bus service.The 2 facilities that are located at terminal are both multi-level car parks.One

121、 is located near the international terminal and one is located near the domestic terminal(comprising of P1 and P2 car parks):The International terminal offers short term(up to 4 hours of parking,also known as ParkShort),long term(over 4 hours of parking,also known as ParkLong)and valet parking servi

122、ces.P1 offers ParkShort,ParkLong,valet,premium parking and guaranteed space services.P2 offers long term and guaranteed space parking services.The car park that is located at a distance from the terminals(Airpark)provides open air and undercover parking for longer stays.A shuttle bus service picks u

123、p and drops off customers from 3 designated bus stops close to the entrance of both terminals.It is part of the central parking area that also includes staff car parking facilities as well as landside operator facilities and amenities.Melbourne AirportMelbourne Airport provides multiple car parking

124、facilities for both domestic and international passengers.There are 2 main multi-level car parks that are located at terminal:At Terminal T123(for access to Qantas,Virgin and international terminals)and At Terminal T4(for access to other domestic airlines,including Jetstar,Rex and Airnorth).While bo

125、th offer premium parking options,the T123 car park also offers valet parking services.The at distance Value car park provides open air parking for longer stays.It is serviced by a free shuttle bus that picks up and drops off customers at the entrance of all terminals.Perth AirportThere are 2 main ca

126、r parking precincts at Perth Airport:T1/T2 and T3/T4.T1/T2 are serviced by individual at terminal car parks and common at distance car parks,while T3/T4 are serviced by common at terminal and at distance car parks.The T3/T4 precinct also includes a premium,undercover Fast Track car park in front of

127、the terminals.13ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Perth Airports at distance parking areas are serviced by free shuttle buses.The airport also offers free parking for 10 minutes at the at terminal car parks and for the first hour in all at distance car parks.At terminal and at distance parking ca

128、n be booked online except for some short term durations.Sydney AirportSydney Airport provides a range of car parking services and facilities.There are 2 at terminal precincts that are located close to the domestic terminal and international terminal respectively.During 202122,the domestic precinct c

129、onsisted of 2 multi-level facilities(P1/P2 and P3)that provided both short term and longer term parking.In 202122 the P1/P2 car park was located closest to the domestic terminals and included a dedicated Guaranteed Space area,while the P3 car park is a longer walk away from the domestic terminals an

130、d offered discounted day rates as well as an express pick up area.The international precinct consists of a multi-level facility(P7)that provides both short and longer term parking,as well as the relatively new northern multi-level car park(P6)that provide short and longer term parking to the public

131、and to the staff who work in the airport precinct.There is also a third long term car park(Blu Emu)located at a short distance from the terminals.A free regular shuttle bus service transports users between the car park and the domestic terminal.Landside access servicesAirports provide landside acces

132、s services to a range of third parties seeking to access the airport to drop off or pick up passengers.These include various landside transport operators,as well as independent providers of car parking services.Landside transport operatorsApart from driving and parking on airport land,the public can

133、 access airports via a range of landside transport operators,including taxis,rideshare services,terminal pick up and drop off,private cars(for example,limousines),public and private buses,and(in some cases)trains.Airports provide access and facilities to all these landside transport operators such a

134、s forecourt and transport hubs,drop off and pick up bays,taxi stands,waiting areas and roads to facilitate movements around the airport.A table showing the alternative ground transport options and facilities available at the monitored airports can be found at Appendix A.Airports often charge landsid

135、e transport operators an access fee each time they drop off or collect passengers.Independent car parking service providersAt each monitored airport,the public also has access to a range of off airport parking options.Customers typically drop off their vehicles at the relevant off airport parking fa

136、cilities and are transported by a courtesy shuttle bus to their respective airport departure terminal,and later picked up from the relevant arrival terminal.The off airport parking operator may obtain airport access by way of a licence agreement granted by each airport operator.This permits the off

137、airport parking operator restricted airport precinct entry and usage rights.Off airport parking operators may also pay airports an access fee each time they enter the airport precinct to drop off or collect passengers.14ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Each of the monitored airports is serviced

138、by a varying number of off airport and independent parking operators:Brisbane:4 independent off airport car parking facilities are located near Brisbane Airport.Melbourne:at least 17 independent off airport car parking facilities are located near Melbourne Airport.Perth:6 off airport car parking fac

139、ilities are located near Perth Airport.Sydney:at least 8 independent off airport car parking facilities are located near Sydney Airport.Commercial servicesAirports derive revenue through their ownership of property on airport land,most notably through leasing airport premises and land to a variety o

140、f parties.These include car rental businesses,retail outlets and other commercial tenants.26 Car rentalCar rental businesses located at,or near,airports lease vehicles primarily to arriving international and domestic travellers.Car rental businesses negotiate and enter into lease agreements(sometime

141、s known as licence agreements)with airports to acquire facilities which allow them to operate their businesses.These include counter spaces at terminals and car parking bays,as well as signage providing directions to these facilities.Car rental businesses compete on convenience by locating themselve

142、s at,or in close proximity to,airports and require sufficient parking bays to accommodate their fleet.27Some car rental companies also partner with airlines and various tourism service operators.RetailRetail outlets operate within airport terminals,providing goods and services to passengers before o

143、r after boarding their plane.These include food and beverage vendors,newsagencies,fashion outlets,souvenirs,travel related goods,currency and phone services.All the monitored airports international terminals also have duty free shops.Retail outlets enter into lease agreements with airports to acquir

144、e the necessary facilities to operate their businesses.These primarily include the physical site within the airports terminal,although airports will also provide additional services such as storage space and promotional activities.Other commercial activities Monitored airports commercial activities

145、also include lease of terminal space,buildings and other space on the airports land for hotels,business parks,office space and industrial business operators.For example,various hotels are located at Melbourne Airport while its Business Park spans more than 430 hectares with various types of tenants

146、like a large plumbing supplies warehouse and many freight and logistics companies.28 Likewise,Perth Airport is home to a large supermarket and a shopping outlet.2926 Recognition of revenue from car rental operators varied between airports,with some including it as part of property,while some include

147、d it as part of landside access.As noted in Chapter 6 of this report,ACCC has historically analysed landside access excluding car rental data.27 IBISWorld,Car Rental in Australia OD5485,IBISWorld website,2021,p 34,accessed 13 July 2023.28 Australia Pacific Airports Corporation Limited(APAC),https:/.

148、au/corporate/annual-reports,pp 345,accessed 13 July 2023.29 Perth Airport,Perth Airport Annual Report 2020/21,Perth Airport Annual Report 2020/21,p 22,accessed 13 July 2023.15ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Airports typically enter into lease agreements with these parties to use airport premise

149、s and land.However,in some cases,airports themselves will own and derive revenue from these assets,such as hotels.301.3 Airport market power Many airports in Australia are regional natural monopolies.Due to economies of scale and scope there is usually only one airport in a certain region.These airp

150、orts typically have market power,as they do not face any effective competition from other airports for provision of air transportation services in the relevant region.The extent of that market power depends,in part,on how essential the airport is to those seeking to use it.Airports that act as a cri

151、tical hub for economic activity will typically have substantial market power.The Productivity Commission has found in its previous inquiries that at least the 4 monitored airports in Australia have significant market power.31Each airport,just as any other private business in Australia,seeks to maxim

152、ise its profits.As monopolies that are not constrained by competition,airports seek to achieve this by charging monopoly prices,while limiting output and service levels.Airports may also under or over invest in their infrastructure and lack incentives to operate efficiently or to adopt innovative te

153、chnologies and service models.Such actions hamper productivity and lead to efficiency losses to the detriment of consumers and the broader Australian economy.Key infrastructure service providers with natural monopoly characteristics,similar to those exhibited by the major airports,are typically regu

154、lated to ensure that they will not exploit their market power to the detriment of consumers.Since 2002,the Australian Government has adopted a light handed regulatory regime for Australian airports,discussed in the next section.1.4 History of airport regulation in AustraliaUntil the 1980s,Australias

155、 main airports were owned and operated by the Australian Government,through the Department of Aviation(and its forerunner,the Department of Civil Aviation).Following the recommendations in the 1984 Report of the Independent Inquiry into Aviation Cost Recovery(Bosch Report),the Australian Government

156、announced the corporatisation of the major Australian airports in 1985,with the goal of improving efficiency in airport operations,investment and pricing.This was part of a wide ranging program of microeconomic reform with a corporatisation model giving the management of airports greater commercial

157、freedom and intended to emulate governance,management,and incentive systems used in the private sector.A total of 23 Commonwealth Airports were transferred from the Department of Aviation to a statutory enterprise,the Federal Airports Corporation,32 that began operations on 1January 1988.In 1996,the

158、 Australian Government commenced the phased privatisation(through long term leasing arrangements)of 22 airports,previously owned and managed by the Federal Airports Corporation,30 For example,Melbourne Airport is constructing a 464-room hotel on airport land,which it intends to operate through a thi

159、rd-party manager:see M Bleby,As demand takes off,Melbourne Airport gets its first new hotel since 2002,https:/.au/news/as-demand-takes-off-melbourne-airport-gets-its-first-new-hotel-since-2002-51387/,17 April 2019,accessed 13 July 2023.Note that this project is currently on hold:see APAC,https:/.au/

160、corporate/annual-reports,p 34,accessed 13 July 2023.31 Productivity Commission,Inquiry report,Price Regulation of Airport Services(2002),2002,p 133,accessed 13 July 2023;Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2012),2012,p 63,accessed 13 July 2023 and Productiv

161、ity Commission,Inquiry report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),2019,p 89,accessed 13 July 2023.32 The Australian Government established the Federal Airports Corporation(FAC)in the 1980s to own and manage airports on a commercial basis.Initially the FAC was required to notify the relevan

162、t Minister prior to setting or varying aeronautical charges.16ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122to improve the efficiency of airport investment and operations,and to facilitate innovative management.33 The Airports Act sets out a number of public policy objectives for the corporatised FAC airport

163、s,that included the promotion of the efficient and economic development and operation of airports.Following the decision to privatise these airports,the Australian Government established a transitional price regulation regime,administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission(ACCC).3

164、4 This was designed to limit the potential for airports to exercise their market power,and included price notification,price monitoring,price cap arrangements and special provisions for necessary new investment.Some 12 airports were designated as core regulated airports under section 7 of the Airpor

165、ts Act and subject to price regulation(Adelaide,Alice Springs,Brisbane,Canberra,Coolangatta,Darwin,Hobart,Launceston,Melbourne,Perth,Sydney and Townsville).35 These airports were also subject to quality of service monitoring to ensure that airport assets were not allowed to run down at the expense o

166、f service standards.2002 Productivity Commission inquiryIn December 2000,the Australian Government directed the Productivity Commission to inquire into the price regulation of airport services,including the price cap regime.The Productivity Commission released its inquiry report in early 2002,which

167、concluded that many of the major airports did have substantial market power(particularly Sydney,Melbourne,Brisbane and Perth).36 It also concluded that the abuse of market power could manifest itself as one or more of:increasing prices above efficient costs deterioration in quality inefficient inves

168、tment selective denial of access to airport facilities.However,the Productivity Commission considered that,while major airports did have market power,it was either:not exercised was exercised but did not cause inefficiencywas exercised but offset by the countervailing power of airlines.Furthermore,i

169、t considered that factors such as the countervailing power of airlines and the threat of re-regulation would act as a constraint on the exercise of market power in commercial negotiations between airports and users in the future.37The Productivity Commission concluded that price caps distorted produ

170、ction and investment decisions due to the inability of regulators to set prices accurately.38 Consequently,it recommended that the price regulation regime be replaced with a more light handed price monitoring regime,which the ACCC would continue to administer.This would apply to 7 of the 12 core reg

171、ulated airports(Adelaide,Brisbane,Canberra,Darwin,Melbourne,Perth and Sydney),with the remainder no longer 33 Department of the Parliamentary Library Australia,Turbulent Times:Australian Airline Issues 2003 Research Paper No.10,2003,p 29,accessed 13 July 2023.34 This was under Part VIIA of the then

172、Trade Practices Act 1974.35 Productivity Commission,Price Regulation of Airport Services(2002),pp 23.36 As above,p 133.37 As above,p XLII.38 As above,pp 3078.17ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122subject to airport specific price regulation or quality monitoring.Additionally,a price cap regime woul

173、d apply only to Sydney Airport in respect of regional air services(within New South Wales).Later in 2002,the Australian Government accepted this inquiry recommendation and replaced the price regulation regime with a price monitoring regime.This was intended to facilitate investment and innovation.Th

174、e move also sought to promote transparency while retaining some oversight of the exercise of market power by airports in their dealings with airlines and other customers.2006 Productivity Commission inquiryIn 2006,the Australian Government requested the Productivity Commission conduct a second inqui

175、ry into the regulation of airports.The Productivity Commission found that the commercial constraints on airports market power it had identified in its 2002 inquiry were not as effective as originally supposed.39 The inquiry recommended that price monitoring be continued until 2013,with some adjustme

176、nts to the scope of monitoring.Darwin and Canberra airports were removed from the monitoring regime following the inquirys recommendations,based on the Productivity Commissions conclusion that these airports did not have a level of market power warranting regulation.Following this review,the Austral

177、ian Government set out the Aeronautical Pricing Principles,which build on the more general Part IIIA pricing principles in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010(the Act)for infrastructure of national significance(Box 1.1).39 Productivity Commission Inquiry report,Economic Regulation of Airport Servi

178、ces(2007),2006,p 39,accessed 13 July 2023.18ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Box 1.1:Aeronautical Pricing PrinciplesThe monitored airports together with the other FAC airports are required to follow the Aeronautical Pricing Principles in negotiating with airlines and setting aeronautical prices.

179、The Australian Government specified a number of overarching Review Principles when changing from a price regulation to a price monitoring regime following the initial Productivity Commission review in 2002.40 The principles specifically referred to:pricing to recover efficient long run costs,includi

180、ng an appropriate return on assetsthe scope for price discrimination and multi part pricing the use of efficient peak/off peak prices to deal with capacity constraintsquality of service outcomes consistent with users reasonable expectationsthe negotiation of commercial agreements between airports an

181、d airlines.The Review Principles were intended to provide guidance on appropriate outcomes under the new regulatory arrangements.They were later extended based on Part IIIA pricing principles and renamed the Aeronautical Pricing Principles.The Australian Government has promoted the Aeronautical Pric

182、ing Principles as an expression of its expectations on the pricing behaviour and outcomes that should apply to aeronautical services and facilities that are subject to significant market power.The Aeronautical Pricing Principles are not part of any legislative instrument and are therefore not enforc

183、eable by private entities.However,the Australian Government has made it clear that it expects all airports,whether monitored or not,to comply with the Aeronautical Pricing Principles.While not enforceable,the Productivity Commission also draws on the Aeronautical Pricing Principles in its assessment

184、 of whether airports have exercised their market power and in its assessment of parties conduct in commercial negotiations.41Additionally,in its response to the 2006 review,the Australian Government supported the Productivity Commissions recommendation for introducing a show cause mechanism.Under th

185、is,a persistent failure to comply with the Aeronautical Pricing Principles could lead to more detailed scrutiny.The Government would have regard to the ACCCs annual monitoring report and other relevant information in assessing the behaviour of the airport to determine whether to request the show cau

186、se.42In 2008,the Australian Government directed the ACCC to formally monitor prices,costs and profits relating to car parking at Australias 5 major airports.In addition to its prices monitoring role,schedule 2 of the Airports Regulations provided for the ACCC to monitor the quality of service of car

187、 parking at the 5 specified airports.2012 Productivity Commission inquiryIn 2012,the Productivity Commission released its third inquiry report on the economic regulation of airports,following a direction from the government in December 2010.The Productivity Commission considered evidence of airports

188、 misuse of market power and again recommended the continuation 40 Minister for Transport and Regional Services and Treasurer,Productivity Commission Report on Airport Price Regulation media release,Treasury website,13 May 2002,accessed 13 July 2023.41 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic

189、Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 298,accessed 13 July 2023.42 Treasurer(Peter Costello),Inquiry Report,Productivity Commission Report Review of Price Regulation of Airport Services media release,Peter Costello,30 April 2007,accessed 13 July 2023.19ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122of price

190、monitoring.Adelaide Airport was subsequently removed from the monitoring regime following recommendations from this inquiry.The Productivity Commission also recommended that the ACCC,as part of its annual monitoring reporting,should be able to request an airport to show cause why its conduct should

191、not be subject to a Part VIIA price inquiry.43 Where it is dissatisfied with an airports response,it should recommend to the relevant minister to invoke a Part VIIA inquiry,to be guided by the Aeronautical Pricing Principles.In its response,the Australian Government considered that the ACCC has the

192、power to seek additional information from airports where necessary,and it can make a recommendation to the minister responsible for competition policy for appropriate action under the Act.442019 Productivity Commission inquiryIn 2019,the Productivity Commission conducted its most recent inquiry into

193、 the economic regulation of Australian airports,following a direction from the government in June 2018.The Productivity Commission commented that the monitored airports have significant market power in supply of aeronautical services.45 The Productivity Commission also stated that airports have a mo

194、nopoly on access to terminals,which provides airport operators with market power in at terminal parking and landside access.46The Productivity Commission stated that airports could exercise their market power by:setting prices above an efficient leveloperating inefficiently and allowing costs to ris

195、erestricting competition from landside access operators,such as off airport car parking providers,by denying access or setting unreasonable terms of accessinadequate investment in infrastructure and operational aspects of services,which could affect service quality.47The Productivity Commission repo

196、rted that it had found that the existing reporting framework remained fit for purpose and that,on balance,most indicators of operational efficiency including costs and service quality,aeronautical revenue and charges,and profitability are within reasonable bounds.However,the Productivity Commission

197、noted that some airport indicators could present cause for concern if considered in isolation.In particular,the Productivity Commission stated that high international charges at Sydney and Brisbane airports,Sydney Airports relatively high returns,and high operating costs at Perth Airport show that t

198、here is reason to remain vigilant.48 In particular,the Productivity Commission observed that the high aeronautical charges at Sydney and Brisbane could be consistent with the airports exercising market power,or they could be explained by the costs of providing those services.However,the Productivity

199、 Commission stated that the ACCCs current monitoring reports do not contain the level of detail needed to make that assessment.4943 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2012),p 179,accessed 13 July 2023.44 Department of Treasury,Government Response to the Pr

200、oductivity Commission Inquiry into the Economic Regulation of Airport Services,Treasury website,30 March 2012,accessed 13 July 2023.45 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 37,accessed 13 July 2023.46 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Re

201、gulation of Airport Services(2019),p 194,accessed 13 July 2023.47 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 194,accessed 13 July 2023.48 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 2,accessed 13 July 2023.49 Prod

202、uctivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 308,accessed 13 July 2023.20ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122More broadly,the Productivity Commission stated that data currently collected for the ACCCs monitoring is insufficient to assess whether charges for aer

203、onautical,car parking and landside access services reflect the efficient cost of providing those services.50Accordingly,the Productivity Commission recommended that the current monitoring regime should be strengthened to enhance transparency over airports operations,enable greater scrutiny of airpor

204、t performance and to detect the exercise of market power more readily.51The Productivity Commission recommended improvements to the monitoring regime,which included the recommendation that the monitored airports report more detailed information to the ACCC in relation to aeronautical,car parking and

205、 landside access services.This also included a recommendation that the ACCC should undertake a review of quality of service indicators to ensure that quality of service monitoring has a greater focus on outcomes and more closely reflects the expectations of passengers,airlines and other airport user

206、s.The Australian Government accepted these views and supported the inquirys recommendations.52 In June 2022,the Australian Government sought the ACCCs advice on implementation of these recommendations.The ACCC widely consulted with the industry and provided its final advice to the Australian Governm

207、ent on 10 May 2023.The ACCCs advice is available on our website.53 See chapter 2 of this report for more details.In each of the 4 inquiries above,while the Productivity Commission has recommended various adjustments to the monitoring regime,it has consistently favoured continuing with the existing p

208、rice monitoring regime rather than reintroducing price controls or any other form of regulation.While the Australian Government has accepted the Productivity Commissions main recommendations from each inquiry,it has reserved the right to reconsider the existing light handed approach to regulation in

209、 the future.541.5 The ACCCs monitoring roleThe ACCCs monitoring functions originate from directions issued pursuant to section 95ZF of the Act as well as from the Airports Act and associated regulations.The ACCC monitors revenues,costs and profits of aeronautical services at the monitored airports,a

210、long with some non-aeronautical activities(car parking and landside access activities).We report this information annually under a dual till approach.This means that we separately report on aeronautical,car parking and landside access services.This allows us to assess trends in each of these segment

211、s.50 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 147,accessed 13 July 2023.51 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 2,accessed 13 July 2023.52 Treasury,Australian Government Response to the Productivity Commi

212、ssion Inquiry into the Economic Regulation of Airports,https:/treasury.gov.au/publication/p2019-41706,11 December 2019,accessed 13 July 2023.53 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/more-detailed-information-on-financial-performance-of-airports/accc-final-advi

213、ce-on-financial-information-may-2023 and https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/airports-quality-of-service-review/accc-final-advice-on-airport-quality-indicators.54 As above,p 8.21ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122The following sections describe these direction

214、s and how they relate to the ACCCs monitoring role in greater detail.55Prices,costs and profits monitoringAeronautical and car parking services monitoringUnder directions made pursuant to section 95ZF of the Act,the ACCC is required to monitor the prices,costs and profits related to the supply of ae

215、ronautical services and facilities and car parking services by Brisbane,Melbourne,Perth and Sydney airports.56 Subsection 95G(7)of the Act requires the ACCC to have particular regard to the following matters in performing this monitoring function:the need to maintain investment and employment,includ

216、ing the influence of profitability on investment and employment the need to discourage a person who is in a position to substantially influence a market for goods or services from taking advantage of that power in setting prices the need to discourage cost increases arising from increases in wages a

217、nd changes in conditions of employment inconsistent with principles established by relevant industrial tribunals.Financial accountsUnder Part 7 of the Airports Act and Part 7 of the Airports Regulations 1997,the ACCC collects and reports annual regulatory accounting statements,including an income st

218、atement,balance sheet and statement of cash flows,from the 4 monitored airports.Under Part 7 of the Airports Regulations,airports must:prepare a financial report which separately shows the financial details in relation to the provision of aeronautical and non-aeronautical services(regulation 7.03)lo

219、dge these accounts with the ACCC within 90 days of the end of the relevant accounting period(regulation 7.06).The ACCCs price monitoring and financial reporting information requirements for airport operators are outlined in our Airport prices monitoring and financial reporting guideline from June 20

220、09.57Box 1.2 explains the choice of profit measures used in ACCC monitoring.55 The ACCC has some responsibilities in relation to regional air services at Sydney Airport.Prices charged by Sydney Airport for aeronautical services and facilities provided to regional air services are regulated under the

221、 price notification regime in Part VIIA of the Act.A declaration issued under section 95X of the Act requires Sydney Airport to notify the ACCC if it intends to increase the prices for regional air services.This declaration commenced on 1July 2019 and ceased on 30 June 2023.A new declaration was iss

222、ued to commence on 1 July 2023 that will expire on 30 June 2026.The ACCC must assess any proposed price and either:not object to the increase;not object to an increase that is lower than the proposed increase;or object to the proposed increase.In undertaking its assessment of price notifications pro

223、vided by Sydney Airport,the ACCC is required by a direction made under section 95ZH of the Act to give special consideration to government policy.To facilitate continuing access to Sydney Airport by operators of regional air services,the direction requires that the total revenue weighted percentage

224、increase in prices over the relevant period should not exceed the total percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index over that same period.56 The ACCCs monitoring role for aeronautical services and facilities relates only to those terminals that are owned and operated by each of the monitored air

225、ports.For many years,some terminals at the monitored airports have been operated on an exclusive basis by a single airline under a domestic terminal lease.All terminals that previously operated under a domestic terminal lease have now reverted back to airport control.The implications of these change

226、s on the ACCCs reporting of aeronautical data are discussed further in box 4.1 in chapter 4.Table C.2 in Appendix C sets out the terminal configurations at the monitored airports.57 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/publications/airport-prices-monitoring-financial-reporting-guideline.22ACCC|Airport monitor

227、ing report|202122Box 1.2:Profit measures used in the Airports monitoring reportThe ACCC uses profitability to measure an airports financial performance.There are typically 3 ways to measure operating profit(as a dollar amount):earnings before interest and taxes(EBIT)earnings before interest,taxes an

228、d amortisation(EBITA)earnings before interest,taxes,depreciation and amortisation(EBITDA).As a measure of airport operating profit,each can be calculated using accounting data collected as part of the ACCCs monitoring activities.Historically,the ACCC used EBITA as the profit measure.Compared to EBIT

229、 and EBITDA,EBITA includes depreciation but excludes the associated financing costs and amortisation of any intangible assets.By excluding amortisation of externally acquired intangibles,EBITA provides a consistent profit estimate.In previous Airport monitoring reports,the ACCC typically reported 2

230、profitability measures:Operating profit margin EBITA as percentage of total revenue.This is the percentage of total revenue remaining after paying off the operating expenses and depreciation.Return on assets EBITA as a percentage of average tangible non-current assets.This shows the rate of return e

231、arned on the relevant assets.This measure looks at how effectively a business is using its resources to make a profit.The ACCC recognises that both EBIT and EBITA can be a more appropriate measure of operating profit in the utility sector than EBITDA,as they account for depreciation of tangible asse

232、ts in the overall cost.As a measure of post depreciation earnings,they cover gross earnings to equity holders and debt holders.The ACCC considers that measurement of the return on assets by means of EBIT is the accounting measure that most closely resembles the concept of weighted average cost of ca

233、pital.However,as the value of intangible assets(other than goodwill and leasehold land)is small or negligible for the monitored airports(other than Sydney Airport),the resulting difference in EBIT and EBITA is not material.Consequently,for airport monitoring reporting,the use of EBITA compared to EB

234、IT will not have a material difference in assessing profitability.To measure return on assets,we use EBITA as a percentage of average tangible non-current assets:average meaning the average value of asset balances at the start and end of the financial year,to smooth out to a degree the effects of ch

235、anges the airport has made to assets and asset values during the yeartangible meaning to exclude intangibles such as goodwill(for instance,a business reputation and its relations with its customers);and to focus on tangible assets such as property,plant and equipmentnon-current,similarly meaning to

236、exclude current assets such as cash;and to,again,focus on hard assets such as property,plant and equipment.The ACCC also uses the line in the sand approach to asset valuations.Box 1.3 explains the rationale behind this approach,while Appendix C sets out the methodology.23ACCC|Airport monitoring repo

237、rt|202122Box 1.3:The use of a line in the sand approach to aeronautical asset valuationsIn its 2006 report into the review of price regulation of airport services,the Productivity Commission noted that most of the monitored airports had revalued above ground assets since the major airports became pr

238、ivatised.The Productivity Commission noted that one possible effect of these revaluations was to justify higher charges over time.58 For instance,an upward revaluation of airports aeronautical assets usually results in a lower return on assets measure.The lower rate of return on average assets could

239、 be used to argue for the raising of airport charges.The Productivity Commission recommended that from 30 June 2005,the ACCC adopt a line in the sand approach for valuing tangible(non-current)aeronautical assets to remove the effect of revaluations of aeronautical assets by the monitored airports.Th

240、e Productivity Commission recommended that,for the purpose of the monitoring regime,among other things the value of an airports asset base should be rolled forward as follows:the value of tangible(non-current)aeronautical assets reported to the ACCC as at 30 June 2005plus new investmentless deprecia

241、tion and disposals.The Productivity Commission line in the sand approach removes the effect of revaluations of aeronautical assets by airports for monitoring purposes.Quality of service monitoringPart 8 of the Airports Act provides for the ACCC to monitor the quality of services and facilities at th

242、e specified airports.More specifically,Part 8 provides for:quality of service aspects to be specified in the Airport Regulationsthe ACCC to monitor and evaluate the quality of the aspects of airport services and facilities against criteria determined by the ACCC records to be kept and retained in re

243、lation to quality of service matters information to be provided to the ACCC by airport operators and other relevant parties,including airlines,relevant to quality of service matters the ACCC to publish reports relating to the monitoring or evaluation of the quality of aspects of airport services and

244、 facilities.The ACCCs approach to its quality of service monitoring role is outlined in its airport quality of service monitoring guideline from June 2014.59 The ACCC did not collect quality of service data in 202122,to reduce the reporting burden on airports following the onset of the COVID-19 pand

245、emic.58 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 12,accessed 13 July 2023.59 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/publications/guideline-for-quality-of-service-monitoring-at-airports.24ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Limitations of the ACCCs monitoring roleTh

246、ere are some limitations in monitoring.Typically,monitoring is limited in its ability to address behaviour that is detrimental to the market and consumers,particularly as a longer term measure where the threat of regulation is diminished.Monitoring does not directly restrict airports from increasing

247、 prices or allowing service quality to decline.It also does not provide the ACCC with the ability to intervene in airports setting of terms and conditions of access to airports infrastructure.Because airports approaches to valuing their assets may vary,it is difficult to meaningfully compare profita

248、bility between airports based on reported return on assets.The observations that the ACCC can make in relation to long term trends is further affected by the monitored airports applying various accounting treatments or changing their accounting methods in relation to revenue,expenses and/or asset va

249、lues from time to time.60 The ACCC also has a limited power in collecting information for the monitoring purpose.For example,information on landside access is provided by airports on a voluntary basis.The incomplete and inconsistent financial information received from the airports over time has limi

250、ted the scope of our analysis.Current monitoring information cannot be used to assess the appropriateness of the level of prices and profitsThe ACCCs monitoring of airports is limited in scope and does not enable us to assess in detail whether an airport has exercised market power to earn monopoly p

251、rofits.One of the key limitations of the existing monitoring regime is that the data collected does not allow the ACCC to make conclusive assessments about whether monitored airports are earning economic returns that are consistent with the degree of risks they face or whether monitored airports hav

252、e been operating efficiently.This is mainly because the various financial indicators and measures the ACCC reports are based on historical accounting data.As noted in box 1.2,we have typically used 2 profitability measures operating profit margin and return on assets.These measures reflect accountin

253、g rates of return,which rely on book values of investment,depreciation,and accounting profits.As they do not properly account for time value of money,the measured accounting rate of return does not coincide with the economic rate of return.The economic rate of return is most appropriate for analysin

254、g monopoly profits.This is because an economic rate of return is what provides signals to entry and exit for firms and resources,and therefore should be used and compared to an appropriate airport rate of return,over the long term,when assessing whether a firm is making excessive profits on a sustai

255、nable basis.However,the ACCC cannot estimate the economic rate of return because it currently does not obtain information needed to estimate economic valuation of airport assets or to assess the efficient long run costs of providing airport services.When assessing the level of prices and profits,it

256、is common regulatory practice to undertake an assessment of the firms economic returns against their efficient long run costs of providing services.This may involve a public process to rigorously determine an economic value of the firms asset base(that is,the regulatory asset base)and the required r

257、ate of return on capital(that is,the weighted average cost of capital).60 The ACCC does not have a role in assessing revaluations in non-aeronautical assets or cost allocation methodologies.25ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122In the case of airports,however,the benchmark for efficient long run co

258、sts has not been set.Instead,airports asset values under monitoring are based on their accounting values rather than their economic value.Importantly,the accounting value of assets may include revaluations that have been undertaken at airports discretion and that can distort assessments of airports

259、performance.For example,in some years,some airports have revalued their assets upwards,which lowers their return on assets.Consequently,airports asset values under monitoring do not provide a reliable indicator of an airports regulatory asset base,which is needed to make a meaningful assessment of w

260、hether airports are earning monopoly rents.As discussed in Box 1.3,the ACCC has adopted the line in the sand approach since 200708 to address the issues associated with airports revaluing their aeronautical assets.However,this approach only removes any aeronautical asset re-valuations that have occu

261、rred after 30 June 2005.Judgement about airports performance cannot be made based on trends in airports prices,profits and quality of service aloneAn airport that is already pricing at or near monopoly levels may only report gradual increases in prices and profitability over time.Therefore,trends in

262、 prices and profitability alone cannot tell us conclusively whether an airport is extracting monopoly profits.Further,monitoring cannot clearly distinguish between various factors that may contribute to increasing profitability,some of which may raise cause for concern about an airports performance

263、while others may not.For example,increasing profitability by increasing prices whilst lowering or holding constant quality of services over a sustained period of time may indicate an airport exercising market power,which may be a concern.In contrast,increasing profitability due to increased efficien

264、cy in operations or economies of scale may not necessarily raise concerns.1.6 ConsultationThe ACCC consulted with each of the monitored airports in preparing this report.We sought views from the monitored airports on major developments which affected their operations during 202122 as well as any fac

265、tors that impacted on their recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.We also consulted with each of the monitored airports on the confidentiality and accuracy of the information we proposed to publish.We thank participants for their time and contribution.26ACCC|Airport monitoring report|2021221.7 Structu

266、re of the reportThe structure of the remainder of the report is as follows:chapter 2 covers the ACCCs advice to the Australian Government to enhance the current price monitoring regimechapter 3 provides an overview of the operational and financial performance of the monitored airports chapter 4 cove

267、rs trends in aeronautical services at the monitored airportschapter 5 covers trends in car parking services at the monitored airportschapter 6 covers trends in landside access at the monitored airportschapter 7 covers trends in investments made by the monitored airportsthe appendices contain further

268、 information on landside access options,supplementary tables and charts presenting data gathered as part of the ACCC monitoring regime,as well as additional background information on our monitoring role and methodology.This and past Airport monitoring reports can be found on the ACCCs website at htt

269、ps:/www.accc.gov.au/regulated-infrastructure/airports-aviation/airports-monitoring.The webpage for each report includes links to supplementary information.This includes the regulatory accounts for the monitored airports for that year and the supplementary database containing financial and operationa

270、l data in relation to aeronautical,car parking and landside access services for each monitored airport.27ACCC|Airport monitoring report|2021222.Advice to enhance the current price monitoring regimeKey PointsIn May 2023,the ACCC recommended to the Australian Government that the Airports Regulations b

271、e amended to require the monitored airports to maintain records of,and report to us on,systematically disaggregated data and detailed cost allocation methodologies in relation to aeronautical,car parking and landside access services.We consider that this will:enhance transparency of performance of t

272、he monitored airports for the benefit of airport users,assisting those users:in negotiations with the monitored airports to assess the reasonableness of charges and other terms of access to identify potential problems with specific services inform analysis of whether the monitored airports are exerc

273、ising their market power in relation to those specific services.We also recommended to the government that the Airports Regulations be amended to require the monitored airports to report information relating to 53 quality of service matters,which materially contribute to the outcomes expected by air

274、port users.We consider that the actions set out in our advice will achieve the objectives of the price monitoring regime and the Airports Act for the benefit of airport users and the Australian community more generally.As discussed in section 1.4,in 2019,the Productivity Commission completed its fou

275、rth review of the Economic Regulation of Airports.The Productivity Commission found that the current light handed approach to airport regulation remains fit for purpose.However,the Productivity Commission recommended that:the monitored airports report more detailed information to the ACCC in relatio

276、n to aeronautical,car parking and landside access services to enhance the transparency of airports operations and to detect the exercise of market power more readily(Recommendation 9.4)the ACCC provide advice to the Australian Government on an updated set of quality of service indicators to improve

277、their fit for purpose(Recommendation 9.5).61 The Australian Government supported these recommendations in principle.In June 2022,the Department of Infrastructure,Transport,Regional Development,Communications and the Arts(Department of Infrastructure)requested the ACCC to review the current reporting

278、 requirements under Parts 7 and 8,and Schedule 2,of the Airports Regulations 1997,consult with industry stakeholders and to provide advice on amendments to these regulations.The ACCC consulted widely with industry stakeholders,including issuing several consultation papers and convening a joint consu

279、ltation session with the monitored airports and the Australian Airports Association.61 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 42,accessed 13 July 2023.28ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122On 10 May 2023,the ACCC provided its final advice to the Depar

280、tment of Infrastructure,which is available on our website.62 This chapter covers the ACCCs advice on more detailed information on airport performance and on airport quality indicators.2.1 ACCCs advice on more detailed information on airport performanceThis section presents a synopsis of the final ad

281、vice provided by the ACCC to the Australian Government on reporting and publication of more detailed information on airport performance.Our advice is available on our website.63 Productivity Commission recommendation 9.4The Productivity Commission recommended that the monitored airports be required

282、to provide the ACCC with more detailed information which will:show the number of passengers that depart from and arrive at each terminalseparately show the costs and revenues in relation to the provision and use of aeronautical services for domestic flights and for international flightsfor Sydney Ai

283、rport,show the costs and revenues in relation to the provision and use of aeronautical services for flights servicing regional New South Walesseparately show the number of users,costs and revenues in relation to the provision and use of at terminal and at distance car parking and the utilisation rat

284、es for each type of parkingseparately show the number of vehicles using different landside services,and the charges(and other terms of access),operating revenues and costs attributed to the provision of each landside servicereport any costs that are allocated to the provision of specific services,in

285、cluding:international and domestic aeronautical services;at terminal and at distance parking;and landside access servicesreport the methodologies that they use to allocate costs to specific services.64Key matters considered by the ACCCIn formulating its advice,the ACCC considered:the objectives of t

286、he Airports Act and our price monitoring regimethe limitations of the information and data provided under the current monitoring frameworkthe data required to meaningfully enhance transparency over airports operations for the benefit of airport users and to detect any exercise of market power more r

287、eadily62 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/more-detailed-information-on-financial-performance-of-airports and https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-industry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/airports-quality-of-service-review.63 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/by-indu

288、stry/travel-and-airports/airport-monitoring/more-detailed-information-on-financial-performance-of-airports/accc-final-advice-on-financial-information-may-2023.64 Productivity Commission,Inquiry Report,Economic Regulation of Airport Services(2019),p 314,accessed 13 July 2023.29ACCC|Airport monitoring

289、 report|202122the Governments objective that increasing the transparency of prices and performance will assist it to assess airports market power over time,for aeronautical,car parking and landside access and services.This will benefit users of airports,both passengers and commercial users,and the b

290、roader community in the long run.65 feedback from all stakeholders.The ACCC also sought to implement any additional reporting requirements in a way that balances the regulatory burden on airports.The downside of reporting highly aggregated dataThe ACCC currently receives and publishes highly aggrega

291、ted data,which has several implications for the efficacy of the current monitoring framework.First,the aggregated information is of limited utility to users of specific services.For example,domestic and international airlines negotiate with the monitored airports on terms and conditions of use of ai

292、rport services and facilities,including charges.For the purpose of these negotiations,the airlines need information that is specific to the provision of domestic and international services respectively.Therefore,publication of aggregated aeronautical information by the ACCC only assists the airlines

293、 in their negotiations to a very limited extent.Second,aggregated information does not allow analysis of individual services,such as international compared with domestic flights,or different types of car parking.As a result,where there is potential for airports to exercise market power in one servic

294、e,for example international aeronautical services,the current framework does not enable the ACCC or the Productivity Commission to effectively assess whether this is occurring or whether there are other explanations for identified differences in charges for certain services.Further,there is currentl

295、y no formal requirement on the monitored airports to provide information about landside access services to the ACCC.The information that the monitored airports currently provide,under the existing framework,is voluntary.As a result,the information is often inconsistent,or incomplete,which limits the

296、 realisation of the Governments identified goal of transparency of prices and performance to assess airports potential exercise of market power over time in respect of landside access.The lack of fulsome and consistent data impedes the Airports Acts objective of providing transparency of airport ope

297、rations and facilitating the assessment and comparison of monitored airports performance.65 Australian Government,Australian Government response to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Economic Regulation of Airports,https:/treasury.gov.au/publication/p2019-41706,11 December 2019 by the Depu

298、ty Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure,Transport and Regional Development,the Hon Michael McCormack MP,and the Treasurer,the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP,p 10,accessed 13 July 2023.30ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122The benefits of reporting disaggregated dataThe ACCCs advice to the Austral

299、ian Government,set out further below under the heading The ACCCs advice,would require the monitored airports to provide disaggregated information in relation to aeronautical,car parking and landside access services,which would have the benefits of:enhancing transparency of airport performance for th

300、e benefit of airport users,which would assist those users:in negotiations with the monitored airports,for example,by allowing the airlines to better assess whether the parameters of airports building block models are reasonable to assess the reasonableness of charges and other access terms and condi

301、tions to identify potential problems with specific services informing analysis of whether the monitored airports are exercising their market power in relation to those specific services.These benefits are discussed in more detail below.Disaggregating to enhance transparencyOne benefit of collecting

302、and publishing disaggregated data for individual services is that it would provide greater information transparency for users of those services and assist them in negotiations with the monitored airport,where applicable.Specifically,domestic and international airlines negotiate aeronautical services

303、 agreements with the monitored airports for provision of domestic and international services respectively.Domestic airlines individually negotiate the terms of their aeronautical services agreements with each of the monitored airports.International airlines individually negotiate the terms of airlin

304、e specific services(for example,access to lounges),while the Board of Airline Representatives of Australia bargains collectively on behalf of most major international airlines in relation to access to common-use services.As we discussed in 202021 Airport monitoring report,the monitored airports told

305、 the ACCC that they use a building block model in their negotiations with airlines.As part of this,some monitored airports provide their building block model(in its entirety or just the key parameters),and supporting information,to airlines,while others appear to use their building block models inte

306、rnally to arrive at price offers,but do not discuss the parameters that led to those offers during negotiations.66While the monitored airports consider that the level of information that they provide to airlines is sufficient,some airlines have raised concerns that many airports are not providing su

307、fficient information in a timely manner during their negotiations.67Specifically,some airlines have informed the ACCC that many airports are not providing adequate information for airlines to allow them to estimate various building block model parameters,such as asset bases and operating expenditure

308、.The airlines have said that this makes it hard for airlines to use the building block model to assess whether airports aeronautical price offers are set to recover long-term efficient costs of providing the aeronautical services.6866 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publicati

309、ons/airport-monitoring-reports/airport-monitoring-report-202021.67 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/airport-monitoring-reports/airport-monitoring-report-202021.68 See:https:/www.accc.gov.au/about-us/publications/serial-publications/airport-monitoring-reports/airpo

310、rt-monitoring-report-202021.31ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122Some airlines have also stated that airports provide limited transparency about their actual capital expenditure.The airlines have said that this means that they are unable to verify whether the charges they pay under the aeronautica

311、l services agreements to recover capital expenditure over time are reflective of the costs actually incurred by airports.Therefore,a benefit of collecting and publishing disaggregated information on costs and assets relating to domestic and international services is that this would complement the in

312、formation that airlines receive from airports during negotiations and allow the airlines to better assess whether the monitored airports building block model parameters are reasonable.Collecting and publishing further disaggregated data for car parking and landside access services would also improve

313、 information transparency relating to the monitored airports ground transport operation and pricing.This would assist relevant airport users to assess the reasonableness of landside access charges and other access terms and conditions,and thus facilitate airports consultations or commercial negotiat

314、ions with landside operators.More generally,collecting and publishing disaggregated data improves information transparency of airport provision of specific services.Operational and financial performance of individual services over time can be analysed by relevant stakeholders in order to identify po

315、tential problems with specific services.Disaggregating to assess the exercise of market powerAnother benefit in seeking disaggregated data for individual services is that this would allow analysis of whether the monitored airports are exercising their market power in relation to those specific servi

316、ces(which is not possible to do using aggregated data).There are a number of reasons why this benefit is likely to be material,including:The monitored airports have different degrees of market power in relation to individual services(for example,it is likely that airports have a greater degree of ma

317、rket power in relation to at-terminal car parking versus at-distance car parking).Being able to undertake analysis of the individual services is likely to provide a clearer indication of the sources where airports are exercising their market power in support of the analysis using aggregated data.Obt

318、aining disaggregated data would also allow comparison of the monitored airports performance across similar or related services,which may also give additional indications of whether airports are exercising their market power.For example,as the Productivity Commission noted in its 2019 review,obtainin

319、g disaggregated data in relation to international and domestic aeronautical services would allow an assessment of whether the difference in prices charged by the monitored airports for those services are due to a difference in costs of providing those services.The monitored airports have different i

320、ncentives in relation to different access seekers,particularly on the landside.For example,the monitored airports are likely to regard off-airport car parking operators as their most direct competitors in the provision of at-distance car parking.Obtaining disaggregated data will allow a better asses

321、sment of whether the monitored airports are exercising their market power in setting terms and conditions of access(including prices)to off-airport car parking operators.32ACCC|Airport monitoring report|202122The ACCCs adviceTo overcome the limitations of the current price monitoring regime(as set o

322、ut throughout this report)and to meet the objectives of the price monitoring regime and the Airports Act for the benefit of the airport users and the Australian community,the ACCC recommended that the Airports Regulations be amended to require the monitored airports to:disaggregate aeronautical fina

323、ncial statements69 and operational data by domestic and international passenger flights and other.Sydney Airport would also need to further disaggregate the data in relation to domestic passenger flights by regional and non-regional flightsdisaggregate non-aeronautical financial statements and opera

324、tional data,specifically for car parking and landside access and other.Further:car parking should be disaggregated by at terminal and at distance landside access should be disaggregated by taxi,rideshare,private car,private bus,public bus,off airport car parking shuttle bus and train(as relevant).br

325、eak down all expenses and assets into those which are:direct,which exclusively relate to a particular service shared but attributable,which are common amongst services but can be attributed to each of the shared services individually based on a clear causal relationship shared but unattributable,whi

326、ch are common amongst services but cannot be attributed to individual services based on a clear causal relationship.Instead,these should be allocated pro rata based on some high level proxy(for example,revenue share)describe the methodologies the airports use to allocate costs,assets and revenues ac

327、ross the different categories in preparing the above statements and provide those methodologies,together with underlying supporting data,to usstructure the disaggregation of service classification according to a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive principle.Throughout the consultation pro

328、cess,some monitored airports provided information to the ACCC about constraints they currently face in reporting certain disaggregated data,particularly in relation to landside access services.To address this,we advised the Australian Government:that the Airports Regulations should provide flexibili

329、ty for the ACCC to allow some monitored airports to report certain additional financial data in respect of landside access services at a higher level of aggregation where the airport is unable to disaggregate the financial data because it does not have reasonable means of collecting the underlying o

330、perational data necessary for allocation of common costs and assets to consider whether there is certain disaggregated financial data,particularly in relation to landside access services,that is less amenable to an audit,and if so,make appropriate adjustments to the requirements on airports to indep

331、endently verify the validity of that data.69 This includes the income statement,balance sheet,and schedule of assets.33ACCC|Airport monitoring report|2021222.2 ACCCs advice on airport quality indicatorsThis section presents a synopsis of the final advice provided by the ACCC to the Australian Govern

332、ment on quality of service indicators.Our advice is available on our website.70The ACCCs final advice relates to the objective indicators,being aspects71 and matters72 that are set out in Part 8 and Schedule 2 of the Airports Regulations.Separately to this advice,we intend to review other elements o

333、f its quality of service monitoring,including the subjective indicators(being airline and passenger surveys)and the ratings system(which we have used to convert all the objective and subjective indicators into a single rating).Productivity Commissions recommendation 9.5The Productivity Commission commented that the current set of airport quality indicators monitored by the ACCC that were determine