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1、COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION(EU)2024/2754 of 29 October 2024imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of new battery electric vehicles designed for the transport of persons originating in the Peoples Republic of China THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,Having regard to the Treaty on the Functi

2、oning of the European Union,Having regard to Regulation(EU)2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union(1)(the basic Regulation),and in particular Article 15 thereof,After consulting t

3、he Member States,Whereas:1.PROCEDURE1.1.Initiation(1)On 4 October 2023,the European Commission(the Commission)initiated on its own initiative an anti-subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of new battery electric vehicles(BEVs)designed for the transport of persons originating in

4、 the Peoples Republic of China(the country concerned,the PRC,or China)pursuant to Article 10(8)of the basic Regulation.It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union(2)(the Notice of Initiation).(2)The Commission initiated the investigation on the grounds that impo

5、rts of BEVs originating in the PRC are being subsidised and are thereby causing injury(3)to the Union industry.(3)After an in-depth analysis of recent market developments and considering the sensitivity of the electric vehicle sector and its strategic importance to the EU economy in terms of innovat

6、ion,value added and employment,the Commission collected market information from various independent sources.This information tended to show the existence of subsidisation by the PRC which negatively affects the situation of the Union BEV industry.(4)On the basis of readily available information,ther

7、e was sufficient evidence demonstrating that imports of the BEVs originating in the PRC benefit from countervailable subsidies provided by the Government of the Peoples Republic of China(the GOC).Those subsidies have allowed the subsidised imports to rapidly increase their market share in the Union

8、to the detriment of the Union industry.(5)The available evidence showed the likelihood of substantially increased subsidised low-priced imports that would pose an imminent threat of injury to an already vulnerable Union industry.Such a surge of low-priced imports,gaining significant market share in

9、a rapidly growing market in which a significant and sustained rate of investments is needed as the Union market transitions to full electrification,would lead the Union industry to incur heavy financial losses which could become rapidly unsustainable.Official Journal of the European Union EN L serie

10、s 2024/2754 29.10.2024ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 1/231(1)OJ L 176,30.6.2016,p.55.(2)Notice of initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding concerning imports of new battery electric vehicles designed for the transport of persons originating in the Peoples Republic of China(OJ C,C

11、/2023/160,4.10.2023,ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/160/oj).(3)The general term injury refers to material injury as well as to threat of material injury or material retardation of the establishment of an industry as set out in Article 2(d)of the basic Regulation.(6)In these special circumstances

12、,since the Commission was in possession of sufficient evidence tending to show the existence of subsidisation,threat of injury and causal link required for the initiation of an anti-subsidy investigation,it decided,in accordance with Article 10(8)of the basic Regulation,to proceed with such an initi

13、ation without having received a written complaint by or on behalf of the Union industry.(7)Prior to the initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation,the Commission notified the GOC that it had decided to initiate an ex officio proceeding concerning imports of new BEVs from the PRC and invited the GO

14、C for consultations in accordance with Article 10(7)of the basic Regulation.The GOC accepted the offer for consultations,which were held on 2 October 2023.During the consultations,due note was taken of the comments submitted by the GOC.However,no mutually agreed solution could be reached.1.2.Registr

15、ation(8)As set out in recital(8)of the Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2024/1866(4)(the provisional Regulation),the Commission,on its own initiative,made imports of new BEVs designed for the transport of persons,originating in China,subject to registration as of 7 March 2024 by Commission Impl

16、ementing Regulation(EU)2024/785(5)(the registration Regulation).1.3.Provisional measures(9)In accordance with Article 29a of the basic Regulation,on 12 June 2024,the Commission provided parties with a summary of the proposed provisional duties and details about the calculation of the subsidy rates.I

17、nterested parties were invited to comment on the accuracy of the calculations within three working days.Comments were received from the sampled Chinese producers BYD Group,SAIC Group,and Geely Group,and from exporting producers Great Wall Motor Co.Ltd.(GWM),Spotlight Automotive Co.Ltd.(Spotlight),an

18、d Volkswagen(Anhui)Automotive Co.Ltd.(Volkswagen(Anhui).(10)On 4 July 2024,the Commission imposed provisional countervailing measures on imports of BEVs originating in China by Implementing Regulation(EU)2024/1866.1.4.Subsequent procedure(11)Following the disclosure of the essential facts and consid

19、erations on the basis of which provisional countervailing measures were imposed(provisional disclosure),the BYD Group,SAIC Group,and Geely Groups subsidiaries Polestar Performance AB(Polestar)and Volvo Car Cooperation,exporting producers Dongfeng Group,GWM,NIO Holding(NIO),Spotlight,Tesla(Shanghai)C

20、o.Ltd.(Tesla(Shanghai),Volkswagen(Anhui),the Government of China(GOC),the China Chamber of Commerce for Import&Export of Machinery&Electronic Products(CCCME),the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers(CAAM),Union producers Company 18,Company 22 and Company 24,and the German association Verban

21、d der Automobilindustrie e.V.submitted comments.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 2/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(4)Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2024/1866 of 3 July 2024 imposing a provisional countervailing duty on imports of new battery electric vehicles designed for the transpo

22、rt of persons originating in the Peoples Republic of China(OJ L,2024/1866,4.7.2024,ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1866/oj).(5)Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2024/785 of 5 March 2024 making imports of new battery electric vehicles designed for the transport of persons originating i

23、n the Peoples Republic of China subject to registration(OJ L,2024/785,6.3.2024,ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/785/oj).(12)At the outset,the Commission noted that the CCCME and the GOC commented in detail on the assessments made by the Commission in the provisional Regulation on injury an

24、d causality,often without acknowledging the findings and their justification provided by the Commission in the provisional Regulation.The CCCME and the GOC likewise reiterated a large number of comments that were raised in its post-initiation submissions again without addressing the specific explana

25、tions and reference to the relevant evidence provided by the Commission in the provisional Regulation.The Commission also noted that the CCCME and the GOC mainly criticised the analysis made by the Commission without bringing new evidence in this regard or supporting the statements made with any evi

26、dence.In the sections below,the Commission addressed in detail the comments raised by the CCCME without,however,repeating identical comments raised in various sections.(13)The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard.Hearings took place with the BYD Group,the CCCME,the Geely

27、Group,the GOC,Polestar,the SAIC Group,Spotlight,Volkswagen(Anhui),Company 22,Company 24,and Company 27.(14)The Commission continued to seek and verify all the information it deemed necessary for its definitive findings.When reaching its definitive findings,the Commission considered the comments subm

28、itted by interested parties and revised its provisional conclusions when appropriate.In order to have at its disposal more comprehensive data on the Unions sales prices,cost of production,and profitability in the post-investigation period,the sampled Union producers were requested to provide additio

29、nal data.All sampled Union producers submitted the requested information.(15)On 20 August 2024 the Commission informed all interested parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive countervailing duty on imports of BEVs originating in the P

30、RC(definitive disclosure).All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the definitive disclosure.(16)Parties who so requested were also granted an opportunity to be heard following the definitive disclosure.Hearing took place with the SAIC Group,Company 27,the BYD Group

31、,the CCCME,the GOC,Tesla(Shanghai),the Geely Group,Company 22 and Polestar.(17)Comments following definitive disclosure were received from the BYD Group,CATL,the GOC,Tesla(Shanghai),GWM,the CCCME,the CAAM,the SAIC Group,the Geely Group,VDA,Eurofer,Company 27,Company 18,Company 24,Company 22,and Pole

32、star.(18)On the basis of these comments,the Commission revised some of its provisional findings,modified some of the considerations on the basis of which it intended to impose a definitive countervailing duty and informed all interested parties thereof(additional definitive disclosure)on 9 September

33、 2024.(19)Comments on the additional definitive disclosure were received from the GOC,the CCCME,BYD,Tesla,Smart and Company 18(only in confidential version).In addition,Company 18 also submitted comments,in confidential version,after the deadline for comments on the additional disclosure.Most of the

34、se comments were already addressed in the specific confidential disclosure addressed to the company.1.5.Sampling1.5.1.Sampling of Union producers(20)Following provisional disclosure,the CCCME and the GOC claimed,on one hand,that the sample of Union producers was unknown and unrepresentative and,on t

35、he other hand,that the interested parties could not assess the representativity of the sample.The CCCME and the GOC further claimed that it was not known if Union OEM producers were included in the sample,whether all the companies in the sample are the Union OEMs/companies OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:htt

36、p:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 3/231transitioning from the production of ICEs to BEVs or there were other BEV producers in the sample,as the Union producers transitioning from ICEs to BEVs may be in a worse economic position than other Union producers.The CCCME and the GOC also claimed

37、that the sample of Union producers was unrepresentative as the Commission did not apply the single economic entity principle to the Union producers that were sampled,even though it was applied with regard to the sampled exporting producers.The CCCME and the GOC further claimed that the single econom

38、ic entity principle was applied to the Union industry in previous trade defence investigation such as Silicon metal from China(6)where two production entities(FerroPem and FerroAtlantica)of the Union producer group,Ferroglobe group,were considered related parties and the Union producers production b

39、y both the production entities were considered together.The CCCME and the GOC also claimed that the single economic entity principle was relevant for the establishment of the Union industry sales prices which are compared with the export price for the undercutting and price suppression analysis.(21)

40、As it was explained in recital(12)of the provisional Regulation,anonymity was granted to the Union producers due to a risk of significantly adverse effect in the form of retaliatory actions.Therefore,the Commission cannot disclose the identity of the sampled Union producers.However,the anonymity gra

41、nted to the sampled Union producers does not make the sample unrepresentative.As explained in recital(26)of the provisional Regulation,the selection of the sample was based on the largest representative volume of sales and production in the Union of the like product during the investigation period(7

42、).The Commission also considered the geographical spread of Union producers within the Union as well as ensured the inclusion of a wide range of BEVs models.The sampled Union producers accounted for 38%of sales and 34%of total production volume of the Union industry in the investigation period.Furth

43、ermore,after the verification visit of the sampled Union producers,on 4 June 2024 the Commission added a Note to the file(8)and confirmed that the sampled Union producers amounted to 32%of sales in the Union and 30%of production in the Union in the investigation period.Furthermore,disclosing whether

44、 all sampled companies were OEMs that produced ICE vehicles and are producing BEVs,likewise,would inadvertently disclose the identity of certain Union producers and thus the Commission would breach its legal obligation to keep the anonymity granted to the Union producers.Therefore,the request to dis

45、close this information was rejected.(22)Finally,the CCCME confused the single economic entity principle with sampling at the level of the group.For the sake of clarity,the single economic entity principle is applied in certain conditions for the calculation of the export price at ex-works level(i.e.

46、at the factory gate of the producer)for dumping margin calculations.In the present anti-subsidy investigation,the Commission did not need to calculate an ex-works export price and therefore this principle is not applied in the current investigation.As concerns sampling of the Union producers,the Com

47、mission informed interested parties at the initiation of the investigation that it will be made at the production entity level and not at group level(9).This is the Commissions common practice for the sampling of Union producers and there was no information available that could suggest that a differ

48、ent approach was warranted in this investigation.The CCCME and the GOC did also not provide any evidence in this regard.Furthermore,in the Silicon metal from China investigation,contrary to CCCME and the GOCs claim,the Commission did not apply the single economic entity principle but investigated tw

49、o producers from the same group.Finally,in the current investigation the calculation of undercutting margin was made at the level of the price to the dealer in the Union as explained in recital(1023)of the provisional Regulation,which is different than the ex-works level.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 4/231 ELI

50、:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(6)Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2022/1394 of 11 August 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon originating in the Peoples Republic of China,as extended to imports of silicon consigned from the Republic of Korea and fr

51、om Taiwan,whether declared as originating in the Republic of Korea or Taiwan or not,following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2)of Regulation(EU)2016/1036 of the European Parliament and the Council(OJ L 211,12.8.2022,p.86).(7)As explained in recital(9)of the provisional Regulation,the invest

52、igation of subsidisation and injury covered the period from 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023(the investigation period or the IP).The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2020 to the end of the investigation period(the period considered).(8)

53、t24.004547.(9)This information was specified in the sampling form of the Union producers which was made available of the DG Trade website at the initiation of the investigation.(23)Therefore,the conclusions in recitals(24)to(45)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.1.5.2.Sampling of importers

54、(24)In the absence of any comments with respect to the sampling of importers,the conclusions set out in recitals(46)to(47)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.1.5.3.Sampling of exporting producers in the PRC(25)Following provisional disclosure,the BYD Group submitted that the selection of th

55、e sample distorted the resulting findings,as Tesla(Shanghai)was not sampled despite its large volume of exports of BEVs to the Union market,and that in almost every trade remedy investigation,the Commission selected the sample based on the volume of exports.The BYD Group also claimed that the Commis

56、sion did not provide a clear explanation for not sampling Tesla(Shanghai)and on what ground the Commission accepted Tesla(Shanghai)s request for individual examination.(26)Following definitive disclosure,the GOC and CCCME reiterated their claim that the sample of Chinese exporting producers selected

57、 was result-oriented,biased and inconsistent with Article 27(1)of the basic Regulation.Notably,the non-inclusion of Tesla(Shanghai)in the Chinese exporting producers sample ran counter to the very purpose of sampling,the basic Regulation,and reflected the Commissions discriminatory approach.Accordin

58、g to the GOC and CCCME,the non-inclusion of Tesla(Shanghai)made the sample unrepresentative,and Tesla(Shanghai)could be reasonably investigated within the time frame.Moreover,the Commission had the time and resources to verify this company and establish its subsidy rate and therefore it could have b

59、een included in the sample at the outset.By not including Tesla(Shanghai)in the sample,the Commission artificially increased the weighted average duty applicable to the cooperating non-sampled Chinese exporting producers,showing a targeted and selective approach.(27)The Commission highlighted that s

60、imilar allegations were already addressed in recitals(54)and(55)of the provisional Regulation.The selection of the sample fully complied with the provisions of Article 27 of the basic Regulation,taking into account the specificities of the case and was therefore considered to be representative for t

61、he Chinese exporting BEV sector.The Commission did not have a targeted and selective approach in establishing the sample.The reasons why the Commission accepted the individual examination request are explained in recital(30)of this Regulation.That the Commission could provide an individual subsidy r

62、ate to Tesla(Shanghai)does not mean that,at the time of the selection of the sample,the inclusion of this exporter was possible or appropriate.(28)Therefore,the conclusions in recitals(48)to(76)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.1.6.Individual examination(29)Tesla(Shanghai),an exporting pr

63、oducer in the PRC,requested and was granted an individual examination under Article 27(3)of the basic Regulation.(30)The Commission accepted the individual examination request of Tesla(Shanghai)given the simple corporate structure of the company,which allowed the Commission to have sufficient time a

64、nd resources to examine the company.No other individual examination requests were received.1.7.Claims on procedural issues and rights of defence(31)Following provisional disclosure,the BYD Group,the CAAM,the CCCME,the Geely Group,the GOC,the SAIC Group,and NIO commented on procedural issues.OJ L,29.

65、10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 5/231(32)Following definitive disclosure,the CCCME and the GOC commented on procedural issues.(33)Following provisional disclosure,the CAAM submitted that the Commission required companies to supply information,details and business secret

66、s beyond the scope of the investigation.(34)The Commission disagreed with the claim.The Commission considered the requested information from the sampled exporting producers and their related parties necessary to assess the existence of countervailable subsidies regarding BEVs and their parts and com

67、ponents.Moreover,as already stated in recital(284)of the provisional Regulation,it is for the Commission to determine what information is deemed necessary for the investigation,and not for a party to make that determination.The Commission also recalls that,pursuant to Article 29(6)of the basic Regul

68、ation,the information received within the framework of this investigation was used only for the purpose of assessing the existence of countervailable subsidisation in accordance with the basic Regulation and the SCM Agreement.Therefore,the claim was rejected.(35)Following provisional disclosure,the

69、BYD Group submitted that the ex officio initiation of the investigation was unwarranted.The BYD Group claimed that the wording of special circumstances contained in Article 10(8)of the basic Regulation must inform something more than what paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the basic Regulation provides fo

70、r,and that the explanations given in the Notice of Initiation describe a situation no different from an initiation of the investigation based on a written complaint.(36)The BYD Group added that the evidence on which the Commission initiated the investigation was a collection of alleged subsidies bas

71、ed on media reports,publicly available audited financial reports of certain holding companies of companies not only producing BEVs and a list of policies and references from previous investigations on imports of products involving different sectors of industry from China,and that a listing of a seri

72、es of policies and subsidies from previous cases could not be considered compliant with the provisions of Article 11(2)of the SCM Agreement and to meet the standard of sufficiency of evidence regarding the BEV sector.(37)Moreover,the BYD Group submitted that the allegations on threat of material inj

73、ury and in particular transition of production structures of the Union automobile industry could not justify an ex officio initiation of the investigation,since the overall economic performance of the Union industry showed quite strong forward momentum.(38)The Commission recalled that the Initiation

74、 document and the memorandum contained sufficient evidence tending to show the existence of subsidisation,threat of injury and causal link required for the initiation of an anti-subsidy investigation,pursuant to Article 10(8)of the basic Regulation,and that the special circumstances for the initiati

75、on of this proceeding have been spelled out in great detail both in the initiation document(10),and also in the Notice of Initiation(11).Moreover,as already addressed in recital(119)of the provisional Regulation,for all different schemes alleged in the Initiation document,the Commission provided the

76、 legal basis,the specificity of these subsidy schemes to the BEV sector,and,to the extent the Commission had access to it,detailed information from publicly available sources on amounts of subsidies provided by the GOC to the BEV exporting producers.Therefore,the Commission considered that it had su

77、fficient evidence of countervailable subsidisation in accordance with the basic Regulation and the WTO Agreement of Subsidised and Countervailing Measures(SCM Agreement).The Commission noted that the BYD Group does not dispute the existence of policies but only the extent to which they are binding f

78、or the BEV sector.The Commission further observed that the readily available information provided evidence indicating that the BEV sector is mentioned in several government documents.The BYD Group failed to produce any evidence showing that those documents would not be applicable to the product conc

79、erned.Therefore,the arguments were deemed moot.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 6/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(10)See Initiation document,pp.2-4.(11)OJ C,C/2023/160,4.10.2023,ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/160/oj,Section 1.(39)Furthermore,in recital(117)of the provisional Regulation

80、,it was explained that in the Initiation document the Commission justified sufficiently the ex officio initiation.In particular,the Commission considered the rapid market penetration by the Chinese low-priced and subsidised imports of BEVs,which threatens to irreparably damage the Union industry,to

81、be of a special nature justifying the initiation of an ex officio investigation.The subsidisation of the Chinese BEV sector caused a large and accelerating influx of imports of Chinese produced BEVs on the Union market at prices that depress prices or prevent price increases which otherwise would ha

82、ve occurred,threatening to cause material injury to the Union BEV industry,which might be irrevocable because of the technological development and level of R&D financing required.Therefore,the claims were rejected.(40)Following provisional disclosure,the SAIC Group and NIO claimed that since the Not

83、ice of Initiation of the ongoing investigation was published on 4 October 2023,under Article 12(1)of the basic Regulation,the Commission should have imposed provisional duties by 4 July 2024 and not 5 July 2024,i.e.no later than nine months from the initiation of the proceedings.(41)However,accordin

84、g to Article 3.1 of Regulation(EEC,Euratom)No 1182/71 of the Council(12)determining the rules applicable to periods,dates and time limits,where a period expressed in days,weeks,months or years is to be calculated from the moment at which an event occurs or an action takes place,the day during which

85、that event occurs or that action takes place shall not be considered as falling within the period in question.This means that the starting date for computing the nine months deadline was the day following the publication of the Notice of Initiation,i.e.5 October 2023,and lapsed on 5 July 2024,in acc

86、ordance with Article 3(2)(c)of Regulation(EEC,Euratom)No 1182/71.The Commission considered that it had complied with the relevant provisions of the basic Regulation and the claim was rejected.(42)Following provisional disclosure Geely Group claimed that the continuous stream of questionnaires and ad

87、ditional clarification requests of the Commission placed an unreasonable burden on the Group,violating its due process rights,namely,it was asked to provide large amount of information just one week after sampling,before the minimum 30-day period for sampled exporting producers to respond to the que

88、stionnaire,as required under the SCM Agreement and basic Regulation.(43)The Commission considered that its requests for information were reasonable,and it engaged with the Geely Group in full respect of its procedural rights.The Commission recognized the efforts made by the Geely Group in responding

89、 to the Commissions questionnaires and deficiency requests,which it considered proportional to the size and complexity of the Geely Group itself.It noted that all the replies provided by the Group were analysed and verified,where possible,thereby ensuring that the information provided by the Geely G

90、roup corresponded to the Groups efforts and resulted in findings that were closest to the situation of the Group during the IP.Therefore,the claim was rejected.(44)The Geely Group further claimed that after the questionnaire and sampling decision were published,the Commission expanded the scope of t

91、he responding entities(13).Geely Group compiled and submitted information for over 120 entities,even though many of these submissions were not directly relevant to the investigation.This unreasonable burden violated partys due process rights.(45)The Commission noted that the scope of responding enti

92、ties was not extended by the letter in the reference.The related companies in the group with the activities specified in the Commissions letter were critical in establishing the facts of subsidization of the group in any subsidy investigation,while the number of responding entities was proportional

93、to the size and complexity of any exporter group investigated.Therefore,the information provided by these related companies only enhanced the adequate findings of the Geely Group,which were closest to the situation of the group during the investigation period,thereby ensuring that the rights of the

94、Geely Group were respected.Therefore,the claim was rejected.OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 7/231(12)Regulation(EEC,Euratom)No 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods,dates and time limits(OJ L 124,8.6.1971,p.1).(13)The

95、Commission letter to sampled exporters Commission Letter to the sampled exporters AS689 of 25 October 2024,with TRON reference t23.005030.(46)The Geely Group further claimed that the investigation placed an extreme burden on the Group,namely it submitted over 280 responses,often meeting very short d

96、eadlines,managed 14 weeks of on-site verification across three locations,producing over 880 verification exhibits.Despite the repeated requests(14)under Article 12.11 of the SCM Agreement,these requests were rejected by the Commission.(47)The Commission observed that all requests submitted by the Ge

97、ely Group were duly considered throughout the course of the investigation.However,the missing elements necessary to complete the findings of the Group were required and used in accordance with Article 28 of the basic Regulation,as aligned with the standard procedures of the anti-subsidy investigatio

98、ns as stipulated in Article 10(8)of the basic Regulation.Therefore,the claim was rejected.(48)Following provisional disclosure,the Geely Group argued that due to the anonymity granted to Union producers,suppliers and importers(i)the Commission treated as confidential the data pertaining to the Union

99、 industry,thus materially affecting disclosure of the essential information about the injury assessment which violated the sound exercise of Geely Groups right of defence,(ii)it had little visibility into the information gathered from the Union industry by the Commission,and(iii)the Commission appli

100、ed very broad confidentiality to all submissions by Union parties.(49)The Commission did not treat all the information related to the Union industry as confidential,only the information that could disclose the identity of the Union industry.As it was explained in recital(16)of the provisional Regula

101、tion,because of the low number of groups manufacturing BEVs in the Union market and the significant amount of public and subscription-based information available about these groups,the Commission could not disclose certain information related to the sampled Union producers as such information could

102、reveal the identity of the sampled Union producers.In Section 4 of the provisional Regulation,the Commission analysed all injury indicators requested by the basic Regulation.Furthermore,the Commission added to the non-confidential file of the investigation,the non-confidential questionnaire replies

103、of the four sampled Union producers,the non-confidential pre-verification letters for the on-spot verification visit as well as the non-confidential mission reports such as in any other investigation.Despite the Geely Groups claim,the Commission did not apply a very broad confidentiality treatment t

104、o all submissions by Union parties.Proper non-confidential versions of such submissions were added to the non-confidential file of the investigation and the Geely Group did not mention what exactly was missing in these submissions.Therefore,these claims were rejected.(50)Following provisional disclo

105、sure,the CCCME,the GOC,the Geely Group and the SAIC Group claimed that,as regard the undercutting margin calculations,the Commission provided insufficient explanation and factual details for CCCME and the GOC and,therefore,they were not able to understand the calculations and make meaningful comment

106、s.In particular,the CCCME,the GOC and the SAIC Group argued that the Commission had not provided any reasoned explanations as to how the description of the Product Control Numbers(PCNs)and the PCN-level aggregate unit prices and volumes of the Union industry could result in the disclosure of the ide

107、ntities of the sampled Union producers because the data is aggregated for the four sampled producers.This claim was also reiterated by the CCCME and the GOC after definitive disclosure.(51)Therefore,the CCCME,the GOC and the SAIC Group requested the Commission to disclose:(i)the PCNs of the Chinese

108、exporting producers and the Union producers used for price comparability;(ii)the PCN-wise quantity and value of the seven PCNs of the Union industry used for the comparison.The CCCME and the GOC requested the Commission to disclose(i)the undercutting margin of the five comparable PCNs,i.e.,excluding

109、 the closely resembling PCNs,and the sales matching percentage of the Chinese sampled exporters and the Union sampled EN OJ L,29.10.2024 8/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(14)Geely Groups response to the Commissions letter on the use of facts available AS689 SENSITIVE Geely Gro

110、up Article 28 letter response of 30 April 2024,with TRON reference t24.003464.producers if the two close resembling PCNs were to be excluded;(ii)the difference in the PCN elements and whether adjustments were made to account for the differences.A similar request was also made by the SAIC Group.The S

111、AIC Group also requested the Commission to disclose:(i)how many PCNs were sold by the Union sampled producers,(ii)PCNs sold by the Union sampled producers during the investigation period in total and(iii)the quantity and value of the seven PCNs matched with the Chinese PCNs as a percentage of the to

112、tal Union sales of the sampled Union producers.Furthermore,the CCCME and the GOC argued that it was known that the Union BEV producers sales pertained mainly to the luxury/premium segments in which the Chinese producers have negligible sales if at all and therefore the quantum of Union sales compara

113、ble to the sampled Chinese exporting producers sales was necessary to understand the representativeness of the calculation.(52)The Commission disclosed the calculation of the weighted average undercutting margin to the three sampled Chinese exporting producers only.However,it appears that these comp

114、anies provided these files to the CCCME and the GOC although this information was not disclosed to the CCCME and the GOC.Furthermore,the CCCME was also representing Chinese exporting producers that were not sampled and therefore did not receive from the Commission the calculation of the weighted ave

115、rage undercutting margin.Furthermore,the three sampled Chinese exporting producers also received from the Commission their detailed calculations of the selling price to the dealer for each of their sale transaction.Therefore,it was reasonable to conclude that the sampled Chinese exporting producers

116、also provided to the CCCME and the GOC these files and therefore the CCCME and the GOC was able to calculate the volume and sales prices per PCN for the three Chinese sampled exporting producers.Furthermore,as the Commission also disclosed the total volume and value of the sales of the sampled Chine

117、se exporting producers,the CCCME and the GOC can verify these data accordingly.Moreover,the Commission disclosed the matching percentage for the sales of the Chinese exporting producers(i.e.the percentage of the sales of the sampled Chinese exporting producers that was matched with the sales of the

118、sampled Union producers).As the matching was very high overall and for each sampled Chinese exporting producer,and each PCN was sold in different volumes,the CCCME and the GOC can perfectly understand which PCNs of the Chinese exporting producers were used in the calculation of the undercutting marg

119、in.(53)Furthermore,in the individual disclosure sent to the sampled Chinese exporting producers,the Commission explained that the PCNs,quantity and prices of the Union industry at PCN level could not be disclosed as they could reveal the identity of the sampled Union producers.Moreover,in recital(95

120、)of the provisional Regulation,the Commission explained that the Union BEV market was made of a small number of groups of producers.There was a significant amount of public information as well as very detailed information available based on a paid subscription regarding the Union BEV industry that C

121、CCME,the GOC,the Geely Group and SAIC Group could have access to.For example,the technical descriptions of each BEVs sold by the Union industry was publicly available either in the catalogue/brochure of the Union producers or dealers as well as in certain databases such as Electric Vehicle Database(

122、15).Therefore,any interested party can create the PCNs for all the models of BEVs sold by the Union industry and the Chinese exporting producers on the Union market.Furthermore,based on public information published by European Environment Agency(EEA)or paid subscription from S&P Global Mobility,the

123、CCCME,the GOC,the SAIC Group and the Geely Group can understand the volume of sales of each model of BEVs on the Union market.It follows that by disclosing the PCNs of the Union industry and/or the volume of sales of the Union industry in the investigation period as well as the PCN-wise quantity and

124、 value of the seven PCNs of the Union industry used for the comparison,in view of the large information publicly and paid subscription available there is a very high risk that the identity of the sampled Union producers will be revealed.(54)As concerns the disclosure of the undercutting margin of th

125、e five comparable PCNs,the Commission noted that it disclosed the undercutting margin for each PCN that was matched with the Chinese PCNs(7 PCNs out of 17 PCNs exported by the Chinese exporting producers during the investigation period).However,the Commission did not see the point of disclosing such

126、 calculations,as the Chinese exporting producers clearly did not export only these five PCNs on the Union market in the investigation period.OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 9/231(15)https:/ev-database.org.(55)As concerns the difference in the PCN elements and wh

127、ether adjustments were made to account for these differences,the Commission hereby clarified that the difference in the PCN and the close resembling PCN concerned only the power of the BEVs,i.e.a more powerful Chinese BEVs was compared to a less powerful Union BEV.The Commission did not make any adj

128、ustment for the difference in power,as a more powerful BEV was more expensive than a less powerful BEV,all other characteristics of the PCNs being the same.(56)Furthermore,the number of PCNs sold by the Union industry is irrelevant for the undercutting calculation.Moreover,as explained in recital(53

129、)of this Regulation,the Commission cannot disclose the PCNs sold by the sampled Union producers during the investigation period.(57)As concerns the quantity and value of the seven PCNs matched with the Chinese PCNs as a percentage of the total Union sales of the sampled Union producers,in recital(10

130、44)of the provisional Regulation the Commission stated that the matching between the Chinese PCNs and the Union PCN was very high on average,and this matching corresponds to 88%of total sales of the sampled Union producers.The Commission noticed that there was a typo in recital(1044)of the provision

131、al Regulation,the matching corresponded to 83%instead of 88%of the sampled Union producers.If the closely resembling PCNs were excluding,the matching was 61%.This calculation was made for volume of sales.A calculation based on the value of sales is irrelevant in this regard as the prices of the PCNs

132、 are different and therefore the result would be misleading.(58)Moreover,as it was highlighted in recital(1042)of the provisional Regulation there was no universally accepted segmentation for passenger cars and it was not clear what entry,mid,premium and luxury brands meant as there was a wide margi

133、n of interpretation.Nevertheless,for the sake of clarification,it is not factually correct that the Union BEV producers sales pertained mainly to the luxury/premium segments in which the Chinese producers have negligible sales.For example,according to LMC Automotive or S&P Global Mobility,the Union

134、producers like e.Go Mobile,Hyundai,Renault,Stellantis,and Volkswagen sell brands than are not considered luxury/premium brands.Furthermore,Geely has sold in the Union the brand Polestar 2 which is considered a premium brand by LMC Automotive or S&P Global Mobility.(59)Finally,the Commission mitigate

135、d the impact of the less than full disclosure by providing a very detailed assessment of the methodology employed and an analysis of the various players,sales channels and sales models employed in the investigation period.As explained above,further details could not be disclosed because of the risk

136、that the identities of the Union producers would be revealed.This approach is justified because the Union BEV market is open and transparent and all players on the market have well developed marketing capabilities to examine the models of their competitors.It is for these reasons that further detail

137、s of the undercutting calculation such as PCNs cannot be disclosed.(60)Therefore,these requests were rejected.(61)Following provisional disclosure,the SAIC Group stated that it did not receive an individual undercutting margin calculation.(62)There is no legal obligation for the Commission to calcul

138、ate an undercutting margin per sampled exporting producers.The undercutting margin is an injury indicator and therefore the calculation of a weighted average undercutting margin is sufficient for the injury assessment.This is different than the injury margin(underselling margin)that must be calculat

139、ed per exporting producer when the duty is based on underselling margin.Therefore,this claim was rejected.(63)Following provisional disclosure,the Geely Group claimed that in the undercutting calculations the Commission used distinct PCNs from those that Geely Group was instructed to use by the Comm

140、ission and no explanation of the scope of the new PCNs was given by the Commission.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 10/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(64)However,the Commission did not use different PCNs for the calculation of the undercutting margin from the ones that it asked the sampled

141、exporting producers and sampled Union producers to use.The Commission simply replaced each PCN with PCN1,PCN2 etc.in order to not disclose the exact PCNs used in the calculation of undercutting as it could reveal the identity of the sample Union producers as explained in recital(53)of this Regulatio

142、n.Therefore,this claim was rejected.(65)Following definitive disclosure,the GOC and the CCCME argued that the definitive disclosure failed to provide the essential facts underpinning the Commissions findings of subsidisation and threat of injury caused thereby,especially regarding(i)the alleged pref

143、erential lending,(ii)the alleged provision of inputs and(iii)land use rights at less than adequate remuneration,(iv)the factual basis for the Commissions statement in recital(771)of this Regulation that the Union producers sales quantities would have been vastly different and large in the absence of

144、 Chinese BEV imports,(v)how the Commission filtered EEA data and split them into Chinese brand BEV imports and self-imports and assessed the origin of the BEVs;the basis for the segregation of the EEA data into product concerned and non-product concerned;the basis for the split of Teslas EU and non-

145、EU production of Model Y,(vi)the factual basis for the Commissions determination that the situation of the Union industry will get worst as the subsidised imports from China at undercutting prices will increase in the foreseeable future,(vii)the factual basis relied upon by the Commission in its non

146、-attribution analysis for dismissing(a)the self-imports by the Union industry,(b)the intra-Union industry competition,and(c)the Union industry transitioning from ICEs to BEVs as well as other known factors having a negative impact on the situation of the Union industry,and(viii)the factual basis for

147、 the Commissions conclusion that any increases in cost due to regulatory issues would have affected the Union industry merely in the past.(66)At definitive disclosure,the Commission informed all interested parties of its findings in a General Disclosure Document and provided detailed information on

148、the methodology and calculations done regarding the subsidy rates of the sampled and individually examined companies,including details on the choice of the sample,preferential lending,the provision of inputs and land use rights for less than adequate remuneration.A detailed overview of the comments

149、received regarding these subsidy schemes is set out in Sections 3.5 and 3.7 below.(67)Concerning point(iv),in recital(771)of this Regulation the Commission stated that it disagreed that price suppression would have occurred in the absence of Chinese imports and that clearly the Union market would ha

150、ve been vastly different had large quantities of subsidised Chinese imports not been present on the Union market at prices which undercut the Union prices.In fact,in the absence of unfair Chinese competition,the Union industry would have sold much more BEVs on the Union market(of note,the subsidised

151、 imports unfairly gained market share during the period considered at the expense of sales by the Union industry,the Chinese sold similar BEVs as the Union industry as the matching between the Chinese PCNs and the Union PCNs in the investigation period was above 90%for each of the exporting producer

152、s as explained in recital(1031)of the provisional Regulation),which would have allowed the Union industry to reduce unit costs taking advantage of a much better ability to spread its fixed costs over more sales.This would have enabled the Union producers to set prices at more profitable levels withi

153、n the context of the transition of the market from ICE vehicles to BEVs.(68)Concerning point(v),these have been addressed in recitals(716)and(717)of this Regulation.(69)Concerning point(vi),as explained in recital(1023)of this Regulation,the Commission concluded that the imports from China would inc

154、rease after assessing several measures indicating likelihood of further substantial increase in imports in recitals(1113)to(1118)of the provisional Regulation,the attractiveness of the Union industry in recitals(1119)to(1129)of the provisional Regulation,the likely evolution of market shares of Chin

155、ese imports on the Union market in recitals(1130)to(1137)of the provisional Regulation.Furthermore,the Commission concluded in recital(1138)of the provisional Regulation that it was likely that there would be OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 11/231an increase of

156、market shares mainly from Chinese brands in the foreseeable future by assessing the high number of announcements made by the Chinese exporting producers for launching new BEVs models on the Union market as explained in recitals(1126)and(1127)of the provisional Regulation,while the Union ICE OEMs tra

157、nsitioning to production of BEVs did not announce any major plans to import BEVs from China and most of them had one BEV model or brand that was imported from China in significant lower volumes as compared to their production in the Union.Moreover,the stocks of BEVs in the Union of Chinese BEVs as e

158、stablished in recitals(1157)to(1159)of the provisional Regulation are a relevant indicator for future pressure exercised by the Chinese BEVs on the Union industry as these quantities are clearly mainly intended for sale on the Union market.(70)Furthermore,an increase in market share of Chinese impor

159、ts resulted into a decrease in market share of the Union industry,which translates into lower production volume for the Union industry,and therefore higher unit costs.On the other hand,in order to be able to compete with the Chinese BEVs,the Union industry would have to decrease prices and therefore

160、 its financial losses would increase.Moreover,an industry that continuously loses market share and records increasing financial losses will not be able to continue to invest and also not able to launch new BEVs models on the Union market.Therefore,the situation of the Union industry will get worst a

161、s the subsidised imports from China at undercutting prices will increase in the foreseeable future.(71)Concerning point(vii),the self-imports of the Union industry as a factor causing a threat of injury to the Union industry was addressed in recital(1213)of the provisional Regulation and recital(121

162、8)of this Regulation.In particular,in recital(1218)of this Regulation,the Commission stated that it performed an analysis of the so-called self-imports in recitals(1212)to(1214)of the provisional Regulation and provided a breakdown of the market share of imports of(i)Chinese exporting producers rela

163、ted to the Union ICE OEMs transitioning to production of BEVs,(ii)Tesla and(iii)all other Chinese imports in Tables 12a and 12b of the provisional Regulation under recitals(1132)and(1134)respectively.The Commission further explained that this analysis should be considered together with the data in T

164、able 13 of this Regulation.Moreover,the Commission stated that the legal standard on causation requires that all imports originating in the country concerned should be assessed collectively.This is in fact what the Commission has done in Section 6.1 of the provisional Regulation.Additionally,the Com

165、mission,broke down Chinese imports,using,inter alia,Tables 12a and 12b of the provisional Regulation and Table 13 of this Regulation,in order to determine developments in the profile of Chinese imports.The Commission concluded that imports of Chinese brands were increasing in importance and that sal

166、es on the Union market were set to increase,due to the availability of stocks and announcements made concerning the increase of imports on the Union market in the post-IP and beyond in the coming years.This conclusion was also confirmed by the post-IP data that showed that the imports of Chinese bra

167、nds significantly increased to 14,1%in the second quarter of 2024,while all the other imports from China decreased as shown in Table 10 of this Regulation.Thus,the Commission properly carried out an analysis of the so-called self-imports and concluded that those imports were not likely to contribute

168、 to the threat of material injury.(72)Moreover,the intra-Union industry competition as a factor causing a threat of injury to the Union industry was addressed in recitals(1225)and(1227)of this Regulation.In particular,the Commission explained that while the CCCME and the GOC did not submit any evide

169、nce about how intra-Union industry competition was having or could have a negative effect on the Union producers,in any event,the purpose of the investigation was to assess whether the imports of BEVs from China were subsidised,were threating the Union industry and if it was in the Union interest to

170、 impose countervailing measures if the legal conditions were met.The Commission further explained that the investigation found that for the Union industry,its deteriorating situation was the result the unfair outside competition from subsidised Chinese imports that threaten it with material injury.T

171、his investigation did not assess the competition between the Union producers on the Union market as the findings concern the Union industry as a whole.Moreover,the Commission noted that the CCCME and the GOC had not submitted any evidence that the intra-Union industry competition was contributing to

172、 any harm to the Union industry,or in any event,attenuating the link between the subsidised imports from China and the threat of injury.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 12/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(73)Furthermore,the Union industry transitioning from ICEs to BEVs was explained in reci

173、tals(1232)to(1234)of this Regulation.In particular,the Commission stated that the transition from ICE vehicles to BEVs formed key background context to the whole threat of injury,causation and Union interest analysis.This transition is ongoing and is planned to continue up to 2035.The transition was

174、 a key part of the Commissions Green Deal in order to meet CO2 emission targets.Union producers have developed detailed strategies,involving the implementation of massive investment plans,in order to comply with the relevant legislation to meet these targets.The transition is therefore essential to

175、the future of the Union industry.Furthermore,the transition of the Union market from ICE vehicles to BEVs is part of the regulatory framework of the auto industry in the Union.The Union vehicles producers must comply with this regulatory framework as well as other legislations.Such regulatory framew

176、ork cannot be considered to cause threat of injury within the meaning of Article 8(8)of the basic Regulation.On the contrary,it constitutes the framework in which the assessment of the threat of injury within the meaning of Article 8(8)of the basic Regulation is carried out.In fact,the Commission fo

177、und that the imminent threat to the Union industry was not the transition itself,but the subsidised Chinese imports which threaten the achievement of the transition process.(74)Concerning point(viii),in recital(1229)of this Regulation the Commission stated that it considered that any increases in co

178、st due to regulatory issues would have affected the Union industry.No evidence was provided that this issue would be a threat of injury to the Union industry in the years following the investigation period.Furthermore,while some Union producers started to invest in production of BEVs before the peri

179、od considered as explained in recital(996)of the provisional Regulation,the largest investments in the BEV production started to materialise following the publication of Regulation(EU)2019/631 of the European Parliament and of the Council(16),which was later amended by Regulation(EU)2023/851 of the

180、European Parliament and of the Council(17).As showed in Table 1 of the provisional Regulation,at the beginning of the period considered(i.e.2020)only 5,4%of the Union passenger vehicles market transitioned to BEVs.The Regulation(EU)2019/631 demanded the Union passengers car manufacturers to increase

181、 the production of BEVs and decrease the production of ICE vehicles to be sold on the Union market.As stated in recital(1229)of this Regulation,whilst the transition to electrification is required by law,this in itself does not pose a threat to the Union industry within the meaning of Article 8(8)of

182、 the basic Regulation,as like any industry,the BEVs producers must adapt to the existing regulatory framework.In fact,the regulatory framework constitutes the framework in which the assessment of the threat of injury within the meaning of Article 8(8)of the basic Regulation is carried out.Furthermor

183、e,whilst compliance with various regulations continues post-IP,the CCCME and the GOC did not identify any new important regulations that threatens to cause injury to the Union industry within the meaning of Article 8(8)of the basic Regulation.Rather,the Commission established that it is the subsidis

184、ed imports which threatens the viability of the Union BEVs industry.Without fair market conditions,the Union producers will not be able to reach the necessary economies of scale.(75)Following definitive disclosure,the CCCME claimed that the Commission did not address the factual bases relied upon by

185、 the Commission for dismissing and/or not considering and addressing the two economic analyses prepared by the professors of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Centre of Economic Policy Research submitted by the CCCME on 20 December 2023 and 19 July 2024.(76)In recital(1252)of the provisiona

186、l Regulation the Commission explained that the report submitted on 20 December 2023 concluded that the Chinese BEV imports were indispensable for the Union BEV market,the Union BEV producers and consumers,and the Union as a whole because these imports are necessary to maintain competition and innova

187、tion in the Union and accelerate the availability of affordable BEVs for average consumers and to ensure that the Unions climate goals are met.Furthermore,in recital(1253)of the provisional Regulation,OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 13/231(16)Regulation(EU)2019/

188、631 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 setting CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and for new light commercial vehicles,and repealing Regulations(EC)No 443/2009 and(EU)No 510/2011(OJ L 111,25.4.2019,p.13).(17)Regulation(EU)2023/851 of the European P

189、arliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation(EU)2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Unions increased climate ambition(OJ L 110,25.4.2023,p.5).the Commission stated that

190、 regardless of the authoritative and objective value of the report submitted on 20 December 2023,the Commission noted that the purpose of the countervailing duties was not to stop the imports of BEVs from China,but to restore the level playing field on the Union market distorted by the subsidized im

191、ports from China at low prices.Therefore,the Commission addressed the core purpose of the report.Furthermore,the complete report was submitted in a sensitive version and only a summary of it was submitted in a non-confidential version.Finally,the report presents the opinion of the two professors and

192、 refers to several academic articles and books prepared in the period 1951 2020.Neither of these articles or books specifically refer to the BEV industry in the Union and China during the period considered.(77)The Commission considered that it had sufficiently examined and addressed the arguments co

193、ntained in those reports,even if in many instances those arguments were not substantiated with any evidence or did not refer to any relevant source.For the sake of clarity,at a more granular level,the report states that the import growth of Chinese BEVs into the Union is not due to alleged subsidies

194、 as(a)most imports of BEV into the EU are self-imports by firms active in the EU industry,(b)China has long-standing experience in batteries for consumer electronics,(c)the imports from China reflect the state in technology cycle,(d)the prominence of battery production for success in the BEV industr

195、y is temporary.(78)In Section 3 of the provisional Regulation and Section 3 of this Regulation,the Commission demonstrated that the BEVs from China are subsidised.Concerning point(a)the Commission explained in recital(998)of the provisional Regulation that some of the Union producers were importing

196、BEVs from China.Furthermore,the self-imports as a factor causing a threat of injury to the Union industry was addressed in recital(1213)of the provisional Regulation and recital(1183)of this Regulation.In particular,in recital(1183)of this Regulation,the Commission stated that it performed an analys

197、is of the so-called self-imports in recitals(1212)to(1214)of the provisional Regulation and provided a breakdown of the market share of imports of(i)Chinese exporting producers related to the Union ICE OEMs transitioning to production of BEVs,(ii)Tesla and(iii)all other Chinese imports in Tables 12a

198、 and 12b of the provisional Regulation under recitals(1132)and(1134)respectively.The Commission further explained that this analysis should be considered together with the data in Table 13 of this Regulation.Moreover,the Commission stated that the legal standard on causation requires that all import

199、s originating in the country concerned should be assessed collectively.This is in fact what the Commission has done in Section 6.1 of the provisional Regulation.Additionally,the Commission,broke down Chinese imports,using,inter alia,Tables 12a and 12b of the provisional Regulation and Table 13 of th

200、is Regulation,in order to determine developments in the profile of Chinese imports.The Commission concluded that imports of Chinese brands were increasing in importance and that sales on the Union market were set to increase,due to the availability of stocks and announcements made concerning the inc

201、rease of imports on the Union market in the post-IP and beyond in the coming years.This conclusion was also confirmed by the post-IP data that showed that the imports of Chinese brands significantly increased to 14,1%in the second quarter of 2024,while all the other imports from China decreased as s

202、hown in Table 10 of this Regulation.Thus,the Commission properly carried out an analysis of the so-called self-imports and concluded that those imports were not likely to contribute to the threat of material injury.(79)Concerning point(b),(c)and(d),it is irrelevant that China has long-standing exper

203、ience in batteries for consumer electronics.As explained in Section 3 of the provisional Regulation and this Regulation the batteries for BEVs have been subsidised by the GOC.(80)Furthermore,the report states that there was no threat of injury as(a)temporary instances of excess production are a natu

204、ral occurrence,(b)since BEV capacity is dynamic,it cannot be viewed in isolation from ICE capacity,(c)the presence of considerable market segmentation diminishes any competitive effect,(d)price differences between models are the result of a myriad of factors,but prices of BEV imported from China are

205、 not systematically lower than prices of BEV produced in the EU,(e)market penetration of BEV follows predictable patterns of new technologies and ultimately results in Chinese investments in Europe,(f)substantial network effects in charging infrastructure require fast BEV adoption,(g)because of glob

206、al value chains in NEV components,EU producers gain from a developed Chinese market.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 14/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(81)The Commission demonstrated in Section 5 of the provisional Regulation and Section 5 of this Regulation that actually there is a threat

207、of injury.This conclusion was reached by assessing the factors stipulated by Article 8(8),second subparagraph of the basic Regulation as explained in recital(1105)of the basic Regulation.(82)Furthermore,the Commission addressed the issue of capacity,segmentation,price difference(i.e.undercutting mar

208、gin)in the provisional Regulation and this Regulation.Furthermore,the Commission does not consider that the high spare capacity in China is temporary,and no evidence was submitted by the CCCME in this regard.Furthermore,the Commission did not see the BEV capacity in isolation from the ICE capacity a

209、s explained in recital(1142)of the provisional Regulation.Moreover,the future investments of Chinese exporting producers in the Union is not an aspect that is covered by this investigation as the purpose of this investigation is to level the playing field on the Union market.The Commission also addr

210、essed the issue of charging infrastructure in Section 7 of the provision Regulation.Finally,the imposition of the measures will not stop the imports from China either of the BEVs or parts needed by the Union industry.(83)Finally,the report states that the measures to limit imports of Chinese BEVs wo

211、uld not be in the Union interest as limiting BEV imports(a)foregoes important environmental benefits,(b)implies a reduction in static price competition,(c)implies a reduction in dynamic competition and(d)limits the incentives of firms to innovate.(84)As explained in recital(81)of this Regulation,the

212、 imposition of the countervailing measures will not stop the imports from China.It will only level the playing field on the Union market.(85)The report of 19 July 2024 commented on the findings of the provisional Regulation.The report quotes three references,i.e.the report of 20 December 2023 and tw

213、o academic articles prepared in 2016 and 2023 respectively.(86)The report states that the price gap was overstated and does not imply price undercutting because of(a)differences in observable characteristics,(b)different market segments,(c)brand value for Union firms,(d)value of legacy dealership fo

214、r Union firms,(e)introductory pricing by new market entrants,(f)differences in production cost,(g)selective sampling.(87)Point(a),(b),(c),(d)have been addressed in recitals(1022)to(1049)of the provisional Regulation and recitals(748)to(831)of this Regulation.Furthermore,regarding point(e)the fact th

215、at new entrants generally enter a market at lower prices than incumbents is irrelevant.The fact of the matter is that the BEVs from China are subsidised and are threating the Union market.Moreover,the fact that the Chinese have a lower production cost is also irrelevant as the lower cost seems to re

216、late to the subsidised received.Finally,there was no selective sampling applied to the Chinese exporting producers and this issue was already addressed repeatedly in the provisional Regulation and this Regulation.(88)The report also states that the import growth from China is overstated and will not

217、 continue to rise.The Commission disagreed this this claim.As it was explained in Table 13 of this Regulation,in the second quarter of 2024 the imports of Chinese brand BEVs already reached 14,1%market share.(89)Furthermore,the report states that the overcapacity argument is irrelevant as(a)both Uni

218、on and Chinese producers have spare capacity,but this does not influence pricing and export decisions,(b)for both Union and Chinese producers medium-term capacity,which combines ICE&BEV,is virtually unlimited relative to the size of the BEV market.(90)The Commission strongly disagreed that the overc

219、apacity of the Chinese exporting producers is irrelevant.Furthermore,the fact that the Union industry has an alleged overcapacity(a claim that was rejected by the Commission in recital(845)of this Regulation)is irrelevant as the Union industry is not threatening to injure the Chinese domestic indust

220、ry.The exports of the Union industry to China of BEVs are very low.Furthermore,as the investigation covers only BEVs,the Commission is legally obliged to investigate BEVs and not ICE vehicles.The Commission addressed the production capacity of ICE vehicles in China as an alternative calculation for

221、spare capacity of BEV(see recital(1142)in the provisional Regulation).OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 15/231(91)Moreover,the report also states that the(a)Chinese exports of BEV are not particularly high,(b)Union producers realize strong export growth,(c)Chinese

222、 producers are not targeting export markets.(92)The Commission disagreed with these claims.Clearly a market share of the Chinese imports in the investigation period of 25,0%as stated in Table 2a of the provisional Regulation is significant.The exports of the Union industry were addressed in Section

223、6.2.2 of the provisional Regulation.Furthermore,the fact that the Chinese are targeting export market have also been addressed in recitals(1114)to(1118)of the provisional Regulation and recitals(1031)to(1043)of this Regulation.(93)The report also states that(a)possible subsidies to Chinese firms sho

224、uld be compared with possible subsidies to Union firms and(b)the subsidies to Chinese BEV producers are likely overestimated.(94)Point(a)was addressed in recital(1262)of the provisional Regulation.Concerning point(b),the Commission explained in detail in Section 3 of the provisional Regulation and S

225、ection 3 of this Regulation how the subsidies were calculated,and the detailed calculations were disclosed to the sampled Chinese exporting producers which had the opportunity to submit comments.(95)In addition,the report reiterates the arguments on Union interest stated in recital(83)of this Regula

226、tion.(96)The CCCME did not highlight which particular points presented in these reports were not addressed directly or indirectly by the Commission either in the provisional Regulation or this Regulation.Therefore,in view of the explanations provided in recitals(76)to(95)of this Regulation,the Commi

227、ssion considered that the key points of the two reports have been addressed directly or indirectly either in the provisional Regulation and/or this Regulation.(97)Following definitive disclosure,the CCCME and the GOC also claimed that it was not clear how the Commission calculated the production vol

228、ume for the investigation period as the data in Prodcom was not reported on a monthly basis.Also the CCCME and the GOC claimed that no details as to the publicly available sources referred to by the Commission have been provided.(98)This claim was addressed in recital(689)of this Regulation.Furtherm

229、ore,the Commission could not disclose which Union producers website it used in this regard as it would disclose which Union producer cooperated in the investigation.Therefore,the claim was rejected.(99)Following definitive disclosure,the CCCME and the GOC also claimed that throughout the investigati

230、on,the Commission has failed to make information provided by interested parties available to other interested parties in a prompt and timely manner.(100)The Commission disagreed with this claim.Due to the anonymity granted to certain parties,the Commission needed to check carefully the information s

231、ubmitted by parties to make sure that the identity of the Union producers was not inadvertently disclosed.This process was significantly time consuming.Furthermore,by the time the Commission disclosed its findings,the non-confidential file of the investigation was fully updated and the CCCME and the

232、 GOC had plenty of time to submit comments.This can also be seen from the significantly large number of comments raised by the CCCME and the GOC following both provisional and definitive disclosures.(101)Following definitive disclosure,the CCCME and the GOC reiterated the claim that the Commission g

233、ranted excessive confidentiality to the Union producers.It further claimed that(i)the non-confidential summaries of the post-IP data submitted by the sampled Union producers are not available in the non-confidential file and(ii)instead,a consolidated non-confidential summary of the responses to the

234、post-IP questionnaires was prepared by the Commission.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 16/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(102)The post-IP questionnaire did not include a narrative questionnaire like the original questionnaire.Furthermore,in line with the excel tables of the non-confidential

235、 reply of the original questionnaire,in order to protect the anonymity of the identity of the sampled Union producers,the Commission decided to include in the non-confidential file of the investigation the non-confidential version of the main information requested in the excel tables of the question

236、naire on a consolidated basis(i.e.the data of all sampled Union producers was aggregated)by using indexes.(103)The CCCME and the GOC further argued that the Commission did not provide sufficient details and sufficiently detailed explanations on key material issues of fact and law concerning the find

237、ings of injurious subsidisation and did not respond to the comments of the CCCME or provide reasons for the rejection of arguments raised.According to the CCCME,the following issues were unaddressed or no sufficient evidence or explanations were provided:(i)the reasons for the decision not to includ

238、e Tesla(Shanghai)in the sample of the Chinese exporting producers and to accept its request for individual examination at a late stage of the proceeding,(ii)the composition of the Union BEV industry,the level of cooperation of the Union industry,what is meant by and the relevance of OEM producers in

239、 the context of the Union industry,as well as the degree of transition of the various Union producers from ICEs to BEVs,(iii)the role and relevance of the price undercutting analysis and the assessment of Chinese BEV prices being 30%below the Union industrys production cost in the determination of p

240、rice suppression.(104)The reasons for not including Tesla(Shanghai)in the sample and providing it individual examination is set out in Sections 1.5.3 and 1.6 above.(105)Points(ii)and(iii)were addressed in recitals(682)and(793)of this Regulation.(106)Following definitive disclosure,the GOC claimed th

241、at the rights of defence of interested parties had been disrespected.In particular,it claimed that the Commission had disregarded arguments and evidence submitted by the GOC and other parties.(107)The Commission noted that the allegation was not substantiated and constituted a general comment withou

242、t specific evidence.The Commission reiterated that it had addressed all comments made by the parties.The entire investigation was conducted in full transparency,with all parties having several opportunities to present data,arguments,and evidence throughout the procedure.The Commission requested the

243、necessary data,issued deficiency letters,carried out on-the-spot inspections at more than a hundred of companies and disclosed all relevant calculations.Comments from parties were taken into consideration and allowed the Commission to adjust its findings where duly justified.Therefore,the claim,whic

244、h was unsubstantiated,general and not in line with the reality of the proceeding,was rejected.(108)Following additional definitive disclosure,the GOC claimed that there was no evidence of any communication between the Commission and the Union industry in the open file with regard to the Commissions

245、renewed requests for and receipt of the Q1 2024 data.The GOC further argued that it was surprised that the Union industry had the privilege of providing information until the last minute and that their data was accepted at such a late stage in the investigation which was in sharp contrast to the Com

246、missions blunt and unexplained rejection of the GOCs well-substantiated request to schedule the hearing after the submission of the written comments and the strict imposition of the 10-day deadline on the GOC to comment on the 177-page General Disclosure Document,file the hearing presentation and ha

247、ve the hearing.The above facts further substantiate that interested parties on the Chinese side have been illegally and discriminatorily denied a full and proper opportunity to exercise their rights of defence in violation of Articles 12.1,12.1.2,12.3 and 12.4.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Cou

248、ntervailing Measures.OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 17/231(109)The respective information was submitted on 29 August 2024(18),namely as soon as all the requested data was available for the Commission.Furthermore,on 9 September 2024 in the non-confidential file

249、of the investigation the Commission updated the Note for the file with the quarterly data for the post-IP(19).(110)Moreover,the Commission was able to accept the missing data from the respective Union producer as the information did not impede the completion of the investigation within the legal dea

250、dlines.This was significantly different than agreeing to extend the period to hold the hearings.Moreover,although the GOC complained that the 10 days period for commenting on the General Disclosure Document was not sufficient,the Commission noted that the GOC managed to submit rather extensive comme

251、nts(the GOCs submission included 151 pages of comments).The GOC failed to show how providing its comments within the requested time period would have prevented it from exercising its right of defence.Therefore,the Commission disagreed that the Chinese interested parties have been illegally and discr

252、iminatorily denied a full and proper opportunity to exercise their rights of defence.2.PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION,PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT2.1.Product under investigation(111)Following provisional disclosure,the CCCME,the GOC and the Geely Group claimed that the product scope of the invest

253、igation was illegally and belatedly extended by including electric vehicles with an internal combustion range extender without giving interested parties notice or opportunity to comment on the intended modification,which affected the due process rights of the interested parties.The CCCME and the GOC

254、 further claimed that(i)there was no reference to a range extender in the Notice of Initiation or the Initiation document although there was a clear reference to the charging/recharging of the vehicles in the Initiation document,(ii)the BEVs with a range extender have a drive range comparable to tha

255、t of an internal combustion engine(ICE)vehicle while the BEVs without a range extender have a much lower drive range than the ICE vehicles,(iii)the product control number(PCN)and the product characteristics provided in the questionnaire for the Chinese exporters and the Union industry did not includ

256、e a reference to the range extender and did not take into account the specific characteristic of these vehicles,(iv)there is no information as to how the Commission obtained or estimated the data for these BEVs as none of the sampled Chinese exporting producers produced and exported these type of BE

257、Vs,as neither Prodcom nor S&P Mobility Data provide such information for these type of BEVs.Therefore,the CCCME and the GOC argued that BEVs with range extender should be excluded from the scope of the present investigation because,apart from the extremely limited exports of such vehicles from China

258、 to the EU,they are also completely different from standard BEVs in terms of physical and technical characteristics,production costs and prices,and consumer perception and are not in direct competition with standard BEVs.(112)The Commission noted that while the CCCME and the GOC simply explained the

259、se arguments they did not provide any underlying evidence in this regard.(113)In the Notice of Initiation,the product subject to this investigation was defined as new battery electric vehicles,principally designed for the transport of nine or less persons,including the driver,propelled solely by one

260、 or more electric motors.The Notice of Initiation also specified the CN code for the product subject to the investigation which was 8703 80 10.The description of the product subject to the investigation does not need to include all the characteristics of the product subject to the investigation.Furt

261、hermore,the Notice of Initiation did not specify that BEVs with a range extender were excluded from the scope of the investigation.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 18/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(18)t24.007656(confidential file that was visible to the interested parties in the list of co

262、nfidential documents).The Commission created a non-confidential version of the email showing the receipt of the document t24.007777.(19)t24.007652.(114)As to how the Commission obtained the data,since such BEVs are also imported through the CN code covered by the investigation,the imports of such BE

263、Vs from China or other third countries during the period considered,if any,were captured by the data covered by CN Code 8703 80 10.S&P Mobility Data and EEA reported such BEVs and during the IP no such BEVs from China were registered in the Union market.The only evidence in the file shows that after

264、 the investigation period the Chinese exporting producer Seres announced such BEVs for the Union market(Seres 7 with range extender(20)and an immaterial number of such BEVs were registered after the investigation period.(115)Moreover,as concerned the Union industry,evidence on the file shows that th

265、ere were immaterial sales of this product during the period considered.(116)To be noted that BEVs with a range extender are different than the plug-in electric vehicles(PHEVs).In the BEVs with a range extender,the internal combustion engine solely recharges the battery,while in a PHEV,the internal c

266、ombustion engine powers the wheels on its own.PHEVs are also imported via a different CN code than the CN code covered by the current investigation.Therefore,contrary to BEVs with a range extender,PHEV were indeed not covered by the scope of the investigation.(117)As concerns the PCN,while indeed th

267、e range extender was not specified in the PCN as such,the PCN specified the range of the vehicle,and the purpose of the range extender is to increase the range of the car.(118)Furthermore,while there were virtually no imports from China of BEVs with range extender during the period considered and vi

268、rtually no sales by the Union producers on the Union market,it cannot be ruled out that in the future this type of BEV will be exported in significant quantities and produced by the Union producers on the Union market,in view of the fact that BEVs are based on a technology that is continuously evolv

269、ing.In this respect,the Commission considered that BEVs without range extender and BEVs with a range extender are very similar BEVs,the main small technical difference being the range extender and the related components and thus they are clearly part of the same product covered by the scope of the i

270、nvestigation.(119)Therefore,the BEVs with range extender are covered by the scope of the investigation.(120)Furthermore,in the provisional Regulation,the Commission excluded from the scope of the investigation,L6 and L7 categories of vehicles according to Regulation(EU)No 168/2013 of the European Pa

271、rliament and of the Council(21).The Commission hereby clarifies that all L1 to L7 categories of vehicles according to Regulation(EU)No 168/2013 were excluded from the scope of the investigation.(121)In absence of any other comments with regard to the product under investigation,product concerned and

272、 like product,the findings in recitals(184)to(195)are confirmed.3.SUBSIDISATION(122)Following provisional disclosure,the BYD Group,the CAAM,the Geely Group,the Dongfeng Group,the GOC,NIO,the SAIC Group,and Tesla(Shanghai)commented on the provisional subsidy findings.Some comments raised by Tesla(Sha

273、nghai)were addressed in a separate sending due to their confidential nature.3.1.Introduction:Presentation of Government plans,projects and other documents(123)In absence of any comments on the existence of those plans,projects and documents,recitals(196)to(206)of the provisional Regulation were conf

274、irmed.OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 19/231(20)https:/ 168/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 on the approval and market surveillance of two-or three-wheel vehicles and quadricycles(OJ L 60,2.3.2013,p.52).3.2.Government plans

275、and policies to support the BEV industry(124)In absence of any comments on the existing government plans and policies to support the BEV industry,recitals(207)to(253)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.3.3.Partial non-cooperation and use of facts available3.3.1.Application of the provisions

276、 of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation in relation to the GOC3.3.1.1.Application of the provisions of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation in relation to preferential lending(125)Following provisional disclosure,the GOC objected to the Commissions application of facts available in relation to pref

277、erential financing materials arguing that,as the investigating authority,it is the duty of the Commission to investigate and forward the questionnaire to financial institutions requesting for cooperation.The GOC added that facts available could only be applied in the absence of certain necessary inf

278、ormation;i.e.information required by an authority to complete its determination(s)(22).More specifically,the GOC added that the information concerning the shareholding of the financial institutions is publicly available and that there was no basis for the Commission for the use of facts available.(1

279、26)Furthermore,the GOC added that the Commission had illegally reversed the investigatory burden and referred to Article 12 of the SCM Agreement and related jurisprudence whereby certain obligations are allegedly incumbent upon the investigating authority and cannot be transferred to the interested

280、Member(the GOC)(23).Consequently,the GOC considered that the resort to facts available was unlawful as the Commission had not properly notified the respondent of the information required from them.The GOC also commented that an authority cannot force the exporting government(the interested Member)to

281、 do the work for the investigating authority.(127)The GOC noted that there are distinct and non-fungible obligations imposed on the investigating authority and the interested Member.And,as well captured by the Panel in Mexico Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice:an investigating authority is not allowed to

282、 rely on the initiative of the interested parties for the fulfilment of obligations which are really its own.(128)The Commission,as described in recitals(266)to(268)of the provisional Regulation,noted that the information requested was available to the GOC for all entities where the GOC is the main

283、or major shareholder.Similarly,for non-State-owned financial institutions,the GOC as the regulatory body has the authority to require all financial institutions established in the Peoples Republic of China to submit information,as well as to instruct financial institutions to disclose information to

284、 the public.Subsequently,the Commission highlighted that the GOC cannot evade its responsibilities by withholding information that,by virtue of its authority and regulatory role,is effectively within its possession.(129)For administrative convenience,with a view to obtaining the information more eff

285、iciently,the Commission requested the GOC to forward specific questionnaires to all relevant financial institutions,which it did not do,while the GOC is the authority competent to request answers to the specific questions from the financial institutions that provided financing to the sampled exporti

286、ng producers.Additionally,it was found unreasonable to argue that it was for the Commission to contact the relevant financial institutions,particularly because the list of relevant financial institutions would only be known to the Commission after receipt of the questionnaire replies of the sampled

287、exporting producers.Moreover,the fact that EXIM bank informed the Commission on its EN OJ L,29.10.2024 20/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(22)Basic Regulation,Article 28(1);SCM Agreement,Article 12.7;Appellate Body Report,Mexico Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice,para.291;Appellate

288、Body Report,US Carbon Steel(India),para.4.416.(23)Panel Report,US Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties(China),para.15.23.own initiative and the fact that in previous anti-subsidy investigation questionnaire replies from various financial institutions were received,showed that the GOC was able to f

289、orward the questionnaire.The website provided by the GOC containing the shareholding of financial institutions did not contain all the necessary information requested by the Commission in the questionnaire reply in relation to preferential lending.Consequently,the Commission rejected the claim.(130)

290、In the absence of any other comments,recitals(255)to(273)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.3.3.1.2.Application of the provisions of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation in relation to input materials(131)Following provisional disclosure the GOC reiterated its claim regarding the Commissio

291、ns application of facts available in relation to input materials arguing that,as the investigating authority,it is the duty of the Commission to investigate and forward the questionnaire to input suppliers and request them to cooperate.The GOC added that it deemed the information requested and the i

292、nformation SAIC failed to provide as not necessary for the investigation and not required in a regular anti-subsidy investigation,and that the information on suppliers and market conditions could have been obtained from the sampled companies.(132)The Commission noted that the arguments were addresse

293、d in Section 3.3.1.2 of the provisional Regulation.First,the Commission reiterated its stance that it is for the Commission to determine what information is deemed necessary for the investigation and not for a party to make that determination.Furthermore,the Commission highlighted that,contrary to s

294、ome past investigations(24),the GOC did not forward the questionnaire to third parties.CATL was also requested,through the sampled companies to which it was related,to submit a questionnaire and did not do so.In addition,the GOC also has the necessary authority to interact with the input producers,w

295、hether they are state-owned or not.In addition,the GOC failed to provide relevant information concerning certain markets such as batteries and lithium.Hence,the Commission had to rely on facts available.With respect to the requested information,it is noted that the Commission only requested informat

296、ion that was necessary to assess the existence and level of subsidisation available to the product concerned.Therefore,the claims were rejected.(133)Following definitive disclosure,CATL submitted that the Commission could have obtained any information needed on battery purchases from the sampled com

297、pany groups,and that CATLs non-cooperation could not in any event provide a basis for unlimited inferences and conjecture relying on distorted facts.(134)The claims raised by CATL were general and unsubstantiated.The Commission highlighted that,as previously covered in recital(810)of the provisional

298、 Regulation,although contacted by two of the sampled groups with which it had joint ventures,CATL refused to provide a questionnaire reply so that the Commission did not have crucial information in order to assess the situation of CATL based on its own data.Moreover,facts available on the provision

299、of batteries were also applied to the SAIC Group(recitals(338)and(860)of the provisional Regulation),which is one of the companies with whom CATL has a joint venture with.Therefore,this claim was rejected.(135)In the absence of any other comments,recitals(274)to(286)of the provisional Regulation wer

300、e confirmed.OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 21/231(24)Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2018/1690 of 9 November 2018 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of certain pneumatic tyres,new or retreaded,of rubber,of a kind used for buses or lorrie

301、s and with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the Peoples Republic of China and amending Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2018/1579 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain pneumatic tyres,new or retreaded,of r

302、ubber,of a kind used for buses or lorries,with a load index exceeding 121 originating in the Peoples Republic of China and repealing Implementing Regulation(EU)2018/163(OJ L 283,12.11.2018,p.1),recitals(46)(48);Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2020/776 of 12 June 2020 imposing definitive counte

303、rvailing duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the Peoples Republic of China and Egypt and amending Commission Implementing Regulation(EU)2020/492 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics o

304、riginating in the Peoples Republic of China and Egypt(OJ L 189,15.6.2020,p.1),recitals(110)and(112).3.3.1.3.Application of the provisions of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation in relation to the Fiscal Subsidy Policy for the Promotion and Application of New Energy Vehicles(136)Following provisiona

305、l disclosure the GOC reiterated its claim regarding the non-existence of information on the preparation,monitoring,and implementation of the scheme,as well as statistics on the vehicles concerned.Consequently,the GOC could not provide information that it did not have,and any use of facts available w

306、ould be unjustified and illegal.(137)The Commission noted,as described in recitals(297)and(298)of the provisional Regulation,that information regarding the schemes preparation,monitoring,and implementation,as well as statistics on vehicles affected by a program that has been in place for several yea

307、rs and has involved significant financial resources from the central budget managed by the GOC,was relevant and necessary for the Commission to reach its conclusion.In the absence of this information,which was not provided by the GOC,the Commission was entitled,where appropriate,to use available fac

308、ts.Therefore,the claim was rejected.(138)In absence of any further comments,recitals(287)to(299)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.3.3.1.4.Application of the provisions of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation in relation to the grants/other subsidy programmes including state/regional/local

309、 government schemes(139)In the absence of comments,recitals(300)to(305)of the provisional Regulation were confirmed.3.3.1.5.Application of the provisions of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation in relation to the purchase tax exemption scheme(140)In the absence of comments recitals(306)to(317)of the

310、 provisional Regulation were confirmed.3.3.2.Application of the provisions of Article 28(1)of the basic Regulation concerning the SAIC Group3.3.2.1.SAIC Groups allegation that legal standards for applying Article 28 of the basic Regulation were not fulfilled(141)Following provisional disclosure,the

311、SAIC Group submitted that in general,the Commission has disregarded the information provided by the entities of the SAIC Group that it considered to be deficient in some respects and used instead,alternative information sources.The SAIC Group considered that the Commission should have undertaken a c

312、oncrete examination of the deficiencies for each company,assessing the extent of those deficiencies and used the information that it had on record for each company of the group.Furthermore,the SAIC Group argued that under WTO rules,the term facts available should in this context be interpreted as be

313、st facts available as the Appellate Body held in US Hot Rolled Steel,an investigating authority is entitled to reject information submitted by interested parties only where information is not(i)verifiable,(ii)appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficult

314、ies,(iii)supplied in a timely fashion,and(iv)supplied in a medium or computer language requested by authorities.Investigating authorities must not discard information that is not ideal in all respects if the interested party has acted to the best of its ability.Rather,where an investigating authorit

315、y is not satisfied with the information submitted by an interested party,the WTO Appellate Body has held that it must examine those elements of the information with which it is not satisfied.EN OJ L,29.10.2024 22/231 ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj(142)With regard to the alleged g

316、ood faith showed by the SAIC Group concerning its cooperation with this investigation,the Commission noted that in several instances,which were all duly recorded at the end of each verification visit by both the investigating team and the company representatives,companies belonging to the SAIC Group

317、 refused to submit or give access to crucial information to the investigation team although it was readily available and could have been provided,had the SAIC Group acted to the best of its ability.The Commission therefore decided to reject the partial information which was considered deficient or i

318、ncomplete and could not be fully verified.In line with the conditions set out in Article 28(3)of the basic Regulation this partial information was disregarded on the ground that the SAIC Group did deliberately not act to the best of its ability as shown by the above-mentioned uncontested annexes to

319、the on-spot verification reports listing those documents which the entities,part of the SAIC Group,refused to provide as a whole or for which certain relevant parts were redacted,although readily available.The claim was therefore rejected.3.3.2.2.Requests for information concerning related suppliers

320、(143)Following provisional disclosure the SAIC Group claimed that the provisional findings did not reflect the fact that it has at all times cooperated in good faith with the investigation and has consistently sought to facilitate the work of the Commission.Furthermore,the SAIC Group alleged that it

321、 could not compel legal entities being part of joint venture structures to cooperate to the investigation.(144)In this regard,the Commission refers to the two Article 28 letters sent to the SAIC Group upon receipt of its questionnaire reply and following the on-the-spot verification,which both liste

322、d the numerous areas where the SAIC Group had failed to provide crucial information requested in the framework of this investigation,thereby impeding the investigation.Furthermore,the Commission extensively informed the SAIC Group of the consequences of applying facts available with respect to the S

323、AIC Group,including for the related legal entities being part of the joint venture structures.The Commission reiterated that given the existing links in terms of shareholding and/or the nature of their activities they should have provided a questionnaire reply allowing the Commission to verify the i

324、nformation and eventually request further evidence.In the absence of cooperation by some of the related joint venture legal entities,the Commission was entitled,where appropriate,to use facts available.Therefore,the claim was rejected.3.3.2.3.Information not provided by the SAIC Group and other undi

325、sclosed documents before and during on-spot verification visits(145)Following provisional disclosure the SAIC Group argued that the Commission should not have applied Article 28 of the basic Regulation to some companies in the SAIC Group and finally to the SAIC Group.(146)As mentioned in recitals(31

326、8)to(371)of the provisional Regulation,the replies received from the different entities part of the SAIC Group were found to be highly deficient.Consequently,the provisional findings of the investigation had to be partly based on facts available,pursuant to Article 28 of the basic Regulation.Indeed,

327、the SAIC Group failed to either disclose the existence of related companies or to provide questionnaire replies for other related companies.Despite possible existing evidence of joint decisions taken by the three shareholders of one company in the SAIC Group,the SAIC Group alleged that one of the th

328、ree shareholders was not directly related to the SAIC Group,but solely to a foreign company and therefore could not exercise any control or compel this company to provide a questionnaire.This information seemed not to be correct based on publicly available financial reports and could not be verified

329、 as the company redacted some parts of the Board of Directors meeting minutes where representatives of its three shareholders could be present.(147)It remains that despite the requests addressed to the SAIC Group to provide a questionnaire reply regarding several of its related entities,this company

330、 chose not to cooperate and therefore exposed its related companies to the use of facts available in compliance with Article 28 of the basic Regulation.OJ L,29.10.2024 EN ELI:http:/data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2754/oj 23/231(148)The SAIC Group further argued that the Commission had used informat

331、ion regarding asset-backed securities issued by one related company for which it never requested the SAIC Group to provide a questionnaire reply.Indeed,this entity is one of the new companies mentioned in recital(329)of the provisional Regulation,which according to publicly available sources,were fo

332、und to be related and were involved in various key contractual relations involving activities such as the provision of input materials,capital,loans,guarantees and other types of financing within the SAIC Group.Since the SAIC Group did not provide any information regarding the existence of this comp

333、any,the Commission could not have been in the position to request a questionnaire reply.Had this company provided a questionnaire reply,the Commission could have established the existence,activities and precise links between the various related companies.In the absence of such questionnaire reply and relevant information,the Commission had to resort to facts available to establish its findings,whi