《亞洲開發銀行：2024年亞洲經濟一體化報告：全球價值鏈的去碳化（英文版）（246頁）.pdf》由會員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關《亞洲開發銀行：2024年亞洲經濟一體化報告：全球價值鏈的去碳化（英文版）（246頁）.pdf（246頁珍藏版）》請在三個皮匠報告上搜索。

1、ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANKAsian Economic Integration Report 2024Decarbonizing Global Value ChainsThis report explores how economic forces are affecting cross-border flows of goods and services and the movement of people in Asia and the Pacific.It looks at the extent to which various challenges are promp

2、ting deeper economic links.This years theme chapter focuses on decarbonizing global value chains,exploring how policymakers can minimize emissions while maximizing the economic advantages of global production networks.It evaluates the impact of initiatives like the European Unions Carbon Border Adju

3、stment Mechanism for Asian subregions,suggesting the use of carbon pricing,accounting mechanisms for embedded emissions,increased trade cooperation,upgraded technology,and international cooperation for technology transfer to reduce CO2 emissions.About the Asian Development BankADB is committed to ac

4、hieving a prosperous,inclusive,resilient,and sustainable Asia and the Pacific,while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty.Established in 1966,it is owned by 68 members 49 from the region.Its main instruments for helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue,loans,equity i

5、nvestments,guarantees,grants,and technical assistance.FEBRUARY 2024DECARBONIZING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINSASIAN ECONOMICINTEGRATIONREPORT 2024ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION REPORT 2024Decarbonizing Global Value ChainsASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK6 ADB Avenue,Mandaluyong City1550 Metro Manila,Philippineswww.adb.orgAS

6、IAN DEVELOPMENT BANKFEBRUARY 2024DECARBONIZING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINSASIAN ECONOMICINTEGRATIONREPORT 2024Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license(CC BY 3.0 IGO)2024 Asian Development Bank6 ADB Avenue,Mandaluyong City,1550 Metro Manila,PhilippinesTel+63 2 8632 4444;Fax+63 2 8636 2444www.adb.orgSome

7、rights reserved.Published in 2024.ISBN 978-92-9270-619-7(print);978-92-9270-620-3(electronic);978-92-9270-621-0(ebook)Publication Stock No.SGP240085-2DOI:http:/dx.doi.org/10.22617/SGP240085-2 The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views an

8、d policies ofthe Asian Development Bank(ADB)or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent.ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use.The mention of specific companies or products of manufac

9、turers does not imply that they are endorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area,or by using the term“country”inthis publication,ADB does not intend to make any

10、 judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.This publication is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license(CC BY 3.0 IGO)https:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/.By using the content of this publication,you agree to be bound bytheterms of this lic

11、ense.For attribution,translations,adaptations,and permissions,please read the provisions andterms of use at https:/www.adb.org/terms-use#openaccess.This CC license does not apply to non-ADB copyright materials in this publication.If the material is attributed toanother source,please contact the copy

12、right owner or publisher of that source for permission to reproduce it.ADB cannot be held liable for any claims that arise as a result of your use of the material.Please contact pubsmarketingadb.org if you have questions or comments with respect to content,or if you wish toobtain copyright permissio

13、n for your intended use that does not fall within these terms,or for permission to use theADB logo.Corrigenda to ADB publications may be found at http:/www.adb.org/publications/corrigenda.Notes:In this publication,“$”refers to United States dollars,“”refers to euros,“B”refers to baht,“NZ$”refers to

14、NewZealand dollars,“SLRs”refers to Sri Lanka rupees,“SUM”refers to sum,and“Tk”refers to taka.ADB recognizes“Brunei”as Brunei Darussalam;“China”as the Peoples Republic of China;“Hong Kong”as HongKong,China;“Korea”as the Republic of Korea;“Laos”as the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic;“Russia”as the Rus

15、sian Federation;and“Vietnam”as Viet Nam.Cover design by Erickson Mercado.All masthead photos are from ADB.Printed on recycled paperiiiCONTENTSTables,Figures,and Boxes.vForeword.xAcknowledgments.xiAbbreviations.xiiHighlights.xiv1.THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 1Shared Risks.1Regional Integr

16、ation in Asia Is Progressing Steadily,Though Variations Remain.4Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Asia.7Southeast Asia.9The Pacific.11South Asia.13Central and West Asia,East Asia,and the Caucasus.16Common Regional Cooperation Challenges.17Policy Recommendations.19References.212.TRADE AND GLOBAL VA

17、LUE CHAINS 25Introduction.25Recent Growth Trends in Asias Trade.26Slow Growth in Asias Trade for 2023 Amid Lingering Pressures.28Trade Structure Changes.28Asias Global Value Chain Growth Reinforces Downstream Role.30Developments in the Structure of Asias Global Value Chain Participation.32Trade Poli

18、cy Developments.35Building Resilience in Asias Food Sector.37Resilient Food Supply Chains Are Crucial to Ensure a Steady Stock of Food.38Diversity in Trading Partners Is Key to Food Trade Resilience.41Restrictive Trade Policies Are Roadblocks to Resilience.47References.503.CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT 53

19、Overview.53Investment Policy.61A Changing Landscape:From Efficiency to Market-Seeking.66Policy Recommendations.74References.76Annex 3a:Analytical and Broad Sector Classification.78Annex 3b:Efficiency-Seeking and Market-Seeking Investment by Subregion.80Contentsiv4.FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 83Opportuniti

20、es and Risks of Financial Integration.83Drivers of Capital Flow Volatility in Asia.91Risks of Entrenched US Dollar Dependence.95References.101Annex 4a:Currency Composition by International Currency Use(%).104Annex 4b:Currency Composition by International Currency Use and by World Region(%).106Annex

21、4c:Regression CoefficientsInternational Debt Share and Federal Funds Rate.1075.MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 108Migration.108Remittances.113International Tourism.121Policy Recommendations.130 References.1326.THEME CHAPTER:DECARBONIZING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 138Introduction.138Climate Change and Global Value Chai

22、ns.140The Contribution of Global Value Chains to Carbon Dioxide Emissions.145The Production and Use of Embodied Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Global Value Chains.151Sectoral Contributions to the Production and Use of Embodied Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Global Value Chains.152The Relationship between

23、Global Value Chain Activity and Carbon Dioxide Emissions.152Global Value Chains and Policies to Decarbonize Production.158Embedded Emissions Accounting Frameworks.181Trade Policy,Preferential Trade Agreements,and the Decarbonization of Global Value Chains.186Beyond Trade PolicyAdditional Ways to Dec

24、arbonize Global Value Chains.191References.1967.STATISTICAL APPENDIX 206 Regional Groupings.206 Table Descriptions.206vTABLES,FIGURES,AND BOXESTABLES 1.1 Restrictive Export Measures by Selected Asian Economies,January 2022November 2023 3 1.2 Selected Projects in Greater Mekong Subregion,IndonesiaMal

25、aysiaThailand Growth Triangle,10 and Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippines East ASEAN Growth Area 1.3 Selected Projects in the Pacific,20202023 12 1.4 Selected Projects in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,Bay of Bengal Initiative for 14 Multisectoral Technical and Economic Co

26、operation,and South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation,20202023 1.5 Selected Projects and Initiatives in Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation,20202023 17 2.1 New Regional Trade Agreements in Asia and the Pacific,January 2023December 2023 36 2.2 Recently Upgraded/Expanded Trade AgreementsAsi

27、a and the Pacific,JanuaryDecember 2023 37 2.3 Newer Forms of Cooperation and PartnershipsAsia and the Pacific,JanuaryDecember 2023 37 2.4 List of Top 20 Consumed HS4 Food Commodities in Asia and the Pacific,by Quantity,2021 40(Arranged by HS Code)2.5 Share of Domestic Production to Consumption and t

28、he Diversification Index,by Asian Economy 43 2.6 Import Shares(%Regional Average)of Highly Consumed HS4 Commodities in Selected 44 Asian Economies,2021 2.7 List of Alternative Regional Suppliers for Selected Products,2021 45 2.8 Trade Partnerships and Trade Policy Restrictions between Top Importers

29、and Top Regional 46 Exporters of Selected Food Products in 2021 5.1 Definition of Digital Remittances,by Institution 116 5.2 Digital Economy Agreements of Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 130 6.1 Value-Added Tax Equivalent of a Carbon Price of 100 per metric ton of CO2 167 6.

30、2 Trade and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Rates across Exporters 170 6.3 Modeling Scenarios to Consider the Impact of the European Unions Carbon Border 170 Adjustment Mechanism on Asian Economies 6.4 Change in Carbon Dioxide Emissions under Different European Union Climate 173 Policy Scenarios

31、6.5 Percentage Change in Export Quantities of ETS and non-ETS Exports to the European Union 174 under Different European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Policy Scenarios 6.6 Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product under Different European Union Carbon 176 Border Adjustment Mechanism Mod

32、eling Scenarios 6.7 Percentage Change in European Union Production by Sector 177 6.8 Scenarios to Consider the Impact of an Extended Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 178 on Asian Economies 6.9 Change in Carbon Dioxide Emissions under Different European Union 179 Climate Policy ScenariosTables,Figu

33、res,and Boxesvi 6.10 Percentage Change in Gross Domestic Product under Different European Union Carbon 180 Border Adjustment Mechanism Modeling Scenarios 6.11 Predicted Changes in Macroeconomic Variables in Response to Carbon Dioxide Emissions Intensity 194 A1 Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and I

34、ntegration Index 209 A2 Regional Integration IndicatorsAsia and the Pacific 211 A3 Trade SharesAsia and the Pacific,2022 212 A4 Free Trade Agreement StatusAsia and the Pacific,as of November 2023 213 A5 Cross-Border Portfolio Equity HoldingsAsia and the Pacific,2022 214 A6 Cross-Border Portfolio Deb

35、t HoldingsAsia and the Pacific,2022 215 A7 Foreign Direct Investment Inflow ShareAsia and the Pacific,2022 216 A8 Remittance Inflows ShareAsia and the Pacific,2021 217 A9 Outbound Migration ShareAsia and the Pacific,2020 218 A10a Inbound Tourism ShareAsia and the Pacific,2021 219 A10b Outbound Touri

36、sm ShareAsia and the Pacific,2021 220FIGURES 1.1 Number of Nontariff MeasuresAsia and the Pacific 1 1.2 Services Trade Restrictiveness IndexWorld and Asia and the Pacific 2 1.3 Services Trade Restrictiveness Index by SectorWorld Average,2022 2 1.4 Overall Intraregional Integration,by Region 4 1.5 In

37、traregional Integration by Dimension,2021 5 1.6 Intraregional Integration in Asia and the Pacific,by Dimension 5 1.7 Subregional Integration EstimatesAsia and the Pacific 6 1.8 Subregional Integration Estimates by DimensionAsia and the Pacific,2021 6 1.9 Subregional Integration Estimates The Pacific

38、 7 1.10 Subregional InitiativesSoutheast Asia,20062021 8 1.11 Subregional InitiativesSouth Asia,20062021 8 1.12 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program Integration,20062021 9 1.13 ADB Regional Investment in the Pacific:Loans and Grants,20102023 13 1.14 South Asia Subregional Economic Coop

39、eration Investments 15 1.15 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Investment Projects,by Sector 16 2.1 Merchandise and Services Trade Volume and Real Output GrowthAsia and the Pacific,and the World 27 2.2 Monthly Trade by Value and VolumeAsia and Pacific 28 2.3 Merchandise and Services Trade of

40、 Asia and the Pacific,by Partner 29 2.4 Overall,Backward,and Forward Global Value Chain Participation Rates 30 2.5 Global Value Chain Position Index 31 2.6 Global Value Chain of Asia and the Pacific,by Selected Sectors 31 2.7 Global Value Chain of Asia and the Pacific,by Partner 32 2.8 Diversificati

41、on Index by Region and Asian SubregionsBackward Global Value Chain Linkages 33 2.9 Diversification Index,by Region and Asian SubregionsForward Global Value Chain Linkages 33 2.10 Reshoring Indexes by Region and Asian Subregion 34 2.11 Newly Effective Free Trade AgreementsAsia and the Pacific 36 2.12

42、 Share of World Food Products Exports and Imports,by Asian Subregion 38 2.13 Trade Balance of Food Products(Exports/Imports)by Asian Subregion 38 2.14 Shares of Domestic Food Production to Domestic Food ConsumptionAsia and the Pacific,41 20102022 AverageTables,Figures,and Boxesvii 2.15 Shares of Foo

43、d Trade Affected by Trade Interventions,by Region 48 2.16 Shares of Trade Affected by Trade Interventions,by Asian Subregion 48 3.1 Global Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Outflows,Balance of Payments 54 3.2 Investment Flows for Asia and the Pacific by Mode of Entry 55 3.3 Sectoral Composition

44、of Firm-Level Investment in Asia and the PacificGlobal Investments,55 by Mode of Entry 3.4 Investment in Asia and the Pacific by Mode of Entry and Destination,2022 56 3.5 Intraregional Linkages in Asia and the Pacific by Mode of Entry and Subregion,2022 57 3.6 Greenfield Investment in Asia and the P

45、acific,by Activity and Subsector 58 3.7 Restrictive and Facilitative Investment Measures in Asia and the Pacific 63 3.8 Average Foreign Investment in Strategic SectorsTotal Firm-Level Activity,Greenfield Investments 63 and M&As 3.9 Total Firm Investment in Strategic Sectorsby Asian Subregion 64 3.10

46、 Efficiency-Seeking Investment in Asia and the PacificTotal Firm-Level Investment 66 3.11 Efficiency-Seeking Investment in Selected Asian EconomiesTotal Firm-Level Investment 67 3.12 Market-Seeking Investment in Asia and the PacificTotal Firm-Level Investment 71 3.13 Market-Seeking Investment in Sel

47、ected Asian EconomiesTotal Firm-Level Investment 72 3.14 Sectoral Concentration of Efficiency-Seeking and Market-Seeking FDI 73 4.1 Monetary Policy Rates and InflationSelected Advanced Economies 84 4.2 Nonresident Capital FlowsSelected Asian Economies 85 4.3 Nonresident Capital Flows by TypeSelected

48、 Asian Economies 85 4.4 Year-to-Date ChangeSelected Asian Economies 86 4.5 Variance Decomposition of Equity and Bond Returns 87 4.6 Cross-Border AssetsAsia and the Pacific,by Type 87 4.7 Cross-Border LiabilitiesAsia and the Pacific,by Type 88 4.8 Cross-Border InvestmentAsia and the Pacific,by Type 8

49、9 4.9 Inward Portfolio Debt Investment from Top 10 Sources(%of destination economy GDP)90 4.10 Inward Portfolio Equity Investment from Top 10 Sources(%of destination economy GDP)91 4.11 Aggregate Capital Inflows TimelineAsia and the Pacific 92 4.12 Policy Rate Differential with the US Policy RateSel

50、ected Asian Economies 92 4.13 Number of Economies Introducing National Security-Related Investment Screening 93 4.14 Global Uncertainty MeasureAsia and the Pacific 93 4.15 US Dollar 1-Year Euro Credit Default SwapUnited States 94 4.16 Regression Coefficients of Capital Inflow Determinants 98 4.17 Re

51、gression CoefficientsInternational Debt Share and US Dollar Funding Costs 99 5.1 Outflow of Migrant Workers from Selected Asian Economies 108 5.2 Job Vacancies in the United States and Canada,by Sector 109 5.3 Work Visas Issued by Migrant Host Economy 110 5.4 Employment Distribution of Migrants in H

52、ost Economies 111 5.5 Labor Mobility Scheme Workers in Australia and New Zealand 112 5.6 Remittance Inflows to Asia and the Pacific,and the World 113 5.7 Inflows to Asia and the Pacific,by Subregion(2019=100)113 5.8 Top 10 Remittance Recipient Economies in Asia and the Pacific 114 5.9 Intraregional

53、Remittance ShareAsia and the Pacific 114 5.10 Intraregional Profile of Remittance Sources of Asian Economies 115 5.11 Average Total Cost of Remitting$200,as of Q1 2023 116Tables,Figures,and Boxesviii 5.12 Share of Digital Remittances in Total Remittances 117 5.13 Global Usage of Mobile Money Service

54、s,2021 117 5.14 Share of Other Digital Remittances by Sending Region,2022 118 5.15 Digital Remittances and Their CorrelatesAsia and the Pacific,2022 118 5.16 Trends of Pick-Up Methods for Remittances Sent Through Digital-Only Money Transfer Operators,120 Global Share 5.17 Global Initiatives to Lower

55、 Remittance Costs and Enhance Cross-Border Payment Systems 122 5.18 International Tourist Arrivals 122 5.19 International Tourism Receipts by Region 123 5.20 International Tourist Arrivals by Asian Subregion 126 5.21 International Tourism Receipts by Asian Subregion 126 5.22 Source Markets for Touri

56、sm in Asia and the Pacific 126 5.23 Barriers to the Recovery of Global Tourism 127 5.24 Application of Smart Tools across Tourism Value Chain 128 6.1 Global Annual Emissions of Carbon Dioxide 139 6.2 Decomposition of Carbon Dioxide Emissions Production 147 6.3 Carbon Dioxide Emissions Production for

57、 Global Value Chain Trade by Region 148 6.4 Production Emissions per Capita by Source and Region 151 6.5 Regional Carbon Dioxide Emissions Production and Regional Carbon Dioxide Emissions 151 Destinations in Global Value Chains,2018 6.6 Production and Use of Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Global Value

58、Chains by Sector,2018 152 6.7 Growth Rate and Decomposition of the Growth of Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Production,19952018 153 6.8 Scatterplot of Global Value Chain Shares in Value-Added and in Carbon Dioxide Emissions Production,2018 154 6.9 Association between Global Value Chain Production and C

59、arbon Dioxide Emissions Production,2018 155 6.10 Association between Global Value Chain Positioning and Carbon Dioxide Emissions 155 in Global Value Chains,2018 6.11 Ratio of Carbon Dioxide Production to Total Value-Added,and Carbon Dioxide Production 156 in Global Value Chains to Value-Added due to

60、 Global Value Chains,2018 6.12 Log Ratio of Carbon Dioxide Emissions to Value-Added by Sector 157 6.13 Association Between the Share of Value-Added Due to Global Value Chain Production 158 and Carbon Dioxide Emissions Intensities,19952018 6.14 Rate of Change of Carbon Dioxide Emissions Intensities w

61、ithin Global Value Chains and the Contributions of Structural Change and Intra-Sectoral Emissions Intensities 159 6.15 Developments in Carbon Price under Various Carbon Pricing Initiatives 162 6.16 Carbon Intensity of Production in Selected Sectors by Economy and Region,2017 166 6.17 Share of Total

62、Exports of a Region Covered by the European Unions Carbon Border 168 Adjustment Mechanism,2017 6.18 Percentage Change in Export Values to the European Union under Different European 173 Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Policy Scenarios 6.19 Percentage Change in Exports to Non-European Union

63、Regions under Different European Union 175 Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Policy Scenarios 6.20 Extent of Labor Displacement under Different European Union Carbon Border Adjustment 177 Mechanism Policy Scenarios 6.21 Percentage Change in Asian Exports with an Expanded Carbon Border Adjustment Me

64、chanism 180Tables,Figures,and Boxesix 6.22 Extent of Labor Displacement under Different European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism 181 Modeling Scenarios 6.23 World Trade Organization Members Environment-Related Notifications and Measures 188 6.24 Number of Climate Change Objectives by Type 1

65、88 6.25 Number and Breadth of Preferential Trade Agreements 189 6.26 Environmental Provisions in Trade Agreements 189 6.27 Estimated Impact of a Preferential Trade Agreement on Global Value Chain Trade 191 6.28 Levelized Cost of Energy of Alternative Renewable Energy Sources 193BOXES 3.1 Recent Deve

66、lopments in International Investment Agreements 59 3.2 Green InvestmentRecent Trends in Asia and the Pacific 65 3.3 Identifying Efficiency-Seeking and Market-Seeking Investment in Asia and the Pacific 69 4.1 Methodological Note on the Determinants of Capital Inflows 99 5.1 Post-Pandemic Outbound Tou

67、rism from the Peoples Republic of China Implications for 124 Asian Destinations 5.2 Digital Tools and Smart Tourism in Asian Economies 129 6.1 Understanding the Complex Relationship between Global Value Chains and Climate Change 141 6.2 The Role and Impact of Transportation in Carbon Dioxide Emissio

68、ns 144 6.3 Methodology for Measuring Emissions in Global Value Chains 146 6.4 The Contribution of Multinational Enterprises to Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Global Value Chains 149 6.5 Climate Clubs as Global Cooperation 160 6.6 Modeling the Effects of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Using Computab

69、le General 171 Equilibrium Models 6.7 Principles of Public Embedded Emissions Accounting Frameworks 182xFOREWORDAsia and the Pacific continues its recovery from the disruptions caused by the coronavirus disease(COVID-19)pandemic and other recent global economic headwinds.Growthand the drivers behind

70、 that growthvary by economy and subregion.Overall,domestic demand has been healthy.Inward remittances have seen a strong rebound.And industries such as tourism are recovering to close to their pre-pandemic levels.Inflation has largely moderated.Nonetheless,the impact from higher global interest rate

71、s,increasing geopolitical tensions,selected supply disruptionsincluding food suppliesand softer demand from advanced economies create a challenging backdrop for sustaining the regions relatively strong growth trajectory.The Asian Economic Integration Report(AEIR)2024 analyzes how these economic forc

72、es are affecting cross-border flows of goods and services and the movement of people,and the extent to which regional economies are responding to economic and geopolitical challenges by deepening economic interrelationships across Asia and the Pacific and its subregions.Economic integration in Asia

73、and the Pacific now ranks close to that of the European Union(EU)in terms of regional value chains and social integration.One major driver has been the ongoing rapid digital transformation in many economies,particularly since the pandemic.Digitalization boosts connectivity and makes cross-border eco

74、nomic activity more efficient.Still,rising protectionism and the risks of global fragmentation mean cooperation through regional and subregional dialogues must deepen to help mitigate problems and find solutions that benefit all.This years AEIR theme chapter tackles the growing challenge of decarbon

75、izing global value chains(GVCs).At each stage of the value chain,from raw material extraction to production of intermediate goods to assembly and ultimate market distribution,carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions are produced and embedded in the process.GVCs increasing share in total CO2 emissions calls for

76、renewed attention and commitment by policymakers to minimize the carbon footprints of GVC activities while realizing the economic benefits of globalization and global production networks.CO2 emissions in developing Asia have increased despite a rapid reduction in CO2 intensity during production thro

77、ugh better technology and improved efficiencydue to rapid economic growth and industrialization.The chapter analyzes the many forces at play and estimates the economic and environmental effects of new initiatives like the EUs Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for Asian subregions.It suggests that d

78、omestic and global efforts to minimize environmental damage from GVCs use carbon pricing,accounting mechanisms for embedded emissions,increased trade cooperation,upgraded technology,and international cooperation for technology transfer to reduce CO2 emissions.I hope this report will encourage more d

79、ialogue and discussion on how deeper regional cooperation and economic integration and sound policy choices can limit climate damage from GVCs;make production,trade,and investment more efficient and cleaner;and help promote green,more inclusive,and sustainable development.Albert ParkChief Economist

80、and Director GeneralEconomic Research and Development Impact DepartmentAsian Development BankThe Asian Economic Integration Report(AEIR)2024 was prepared by the Regional Cooperation and Integration Division(ERCI)of the Asian Development Banks(ADB)Economic Research and Development Impact Department(E

81、RDI),under the overall supervision of ERCI Director Jong Woo Kang.Kijin Kim coordinated the overall production,assisted by Mara Tayag.ERCI consultants under Technical Assistance 10136:Asian Economic Integration:Building Knowledge for Policy Dialogue,20232025(Subproject 3)contributed to data compilat

82、ion,research,and analysis.Contributing authors include Sanchita Basu-Das,Rolando Avendano,Lovely Ann Tolin,and Rainiel Aquino(Chapter1:The Crucial Role of Regional Cooperation);Neil Foster-McGregor,Pramila Crivelli,Joshua Anthony Gapay,Carlos Cabaero,Pia Medrano,and Gerald Gracius Yee Pascua(Chapter

83、 2:Trade and the Global Value Chains);Rolando Avendano,Clemence Fatima Cruz,and Lovely Ann Tolin(Chapter 3:Cross-Border Investment);Alexander Raabe and Ana Kristel Lapid,with data support from Marie Ann Cagas and Clemence Fatima Cruz(Chapter 4:Financial Integration);and Kijin Kim,Sanchita Basu-Das,M

84、a.Concepcion Latoja,and Ma.Veronica Domingo with data support from Pilar Dayag and Zemma Ardaniel(Chapter 5:Movement of People).The section on Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Asia in Chapter 1 was consolidated by Paulo Rodelio Halili based on contributions by regional departments in ADB:Lyaziza

85、G.Sabyrova,Xinglan Hu,Dorothea Lazaro,and Reneli Gloria(consultant)of the Central and West Asia Department;Thiam Hee Ng,Kanya Sasradipoera,Pia Reyes,Esnerjames Fernandez,and Leticia De Leon(consultant)of the South Asia Department;Alfredo Perdiguero,Maria Josephine Duque-Comia,Gary Krishnan,Jason Rus

86、h,Asadullah Sumbal,and Pamela C.Asis-Layugan(consultant)of the Southeast Asia Department;and Rosalind Mckenzie,Maria Carina Tinio,and Remrick Patagan(former staff)of the Pacific Department.Neil Foster-McGregor coordinated and contributed to the production of the theme chapter,Decarbonizing Global Va

87、lue Chains,with support from Rainiel Aquino,Joshua Anthony Gapay,Pia Medrano,and Mara Tayag.Background papers were provided by Emma Aisbett,Rolando Avendano,Justin Borevitz,Saule Burkitbayeva,Joseph Francois,Christopher Jackson,Jinerva McQueen,Oscar Pearce,Lovely Ann Tolin,and Lee White.The theme ch

88、apter benefited from comments and suggestions provided by the participants of the following workshops and seminars:AEIR 2024 Workshop:Decarbonizing Global Value Chains held on 1617 October 2023 and Economists Forum Session 1A:Greening Global Value Chains held on 18 January 2024.Helpful comments were

89、 also provided by ADBs regional departments.The overall guidance and comments of ADB Chief Economist Albert Park on the theme chapter are gratefully acknowledged.Guy Sacerdoti and James Unwin edited the manuscript.Joseph Manglicmot typeset and produced the layout.Erickson Mercado created the cover d

90、esign and assisted in typesetting.Tuesday Soriano proofread the report.Clemence Fatima Cruz,Carlos Cabaero,Clarisa Flaminiano,Rainiel Aquino,Pia Medrano,and Carol Ongchangco assisted in proofreading and page proof checking.Support for AEIR 2024 printing and publishing was provided by the Printing Se

91、rvices Unit of ADBs Corporate Services Department and by the Publishing and Dissemination Unit of the Department of Communications and Knowledge Management.Carol Ongchangco,Amiel Bryan Esperanza,Angel Love Roque,and Nanette Lozano provided administrative and secretarial support and helped organize t

92、he AEIR workshops,launch events,and other AEIR-related webinars and briefings.Terje Langeland,with support from Lean Alfred Santos,of the Department of Communications and Knowledge Management coordinated the dissemination of AEIR 2024.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSxiiADB Asian Development BankARCII Asia-Pacific Re

93、gional Cooperation and Integration IndexASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations(Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Viet Nam)BCA border carbon adjustmentBIMP-EAGA Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhili

94、ppines East ASEAN Growth AreaBIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic CooperationCAREC Central Asia Regional Economic CooperationCBAM Carbon Border Adjustment MechanismCBDR common but differentiated responsibilitiesCGE computable general equilibriumCMIM Chiang Mai In

95、itiative MultilateralizationCOVID-19 coronavirus diseaseCO2 carbon dioxideDI Diversification IndexEEF embedded emissions accounting frameworkETS emissions trading systemEU European Union(Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Croatia,Cyprus,Czech Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Irel

96、and,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,the Netherlands,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovak Republic,Slovenia,Spain,and Sweden)EVI Economic Vulnerability IndexFAO Food and Agriculture OrganizationFDI foreign direct investmentFTA free trade agreementGDP gross domestic productGHG greenhouse gasGMS Grea

97、ter Mekong SubregionGVC global value chainHS Harmonized SystemIMT-GT IndonesiaMalaysiaThailand Growth TriangleABBREVIATIONSAbbreviationsxiiiIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeIPEF Indo-Pacific Economic FrameworkIRA Inflation Reduction ActOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Dev

98、elopmentPIF Pacific Islands ForumPRC Peoples Republic of ChinaPTA preferential trade agreementRVC regional value chainSAARC South Asian Association for Regional CooperationSASEC South Asia Subregional Economic CooperationSMEs small and medium-sized enterprisesUK United KingdomUNFCCC United Nations F

99、ramework Convention on Climate ChangeUS United StatesWTO World Trade OrganizationxivHIGHLIGHTS Regional integration has grown steadily since the mid-2000s with variations across dimensions and subregions Based on the Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index(ARCII),the region shows int

100、egration comparable to the European Union(EU)in regional value chains,along with people and social integration.The most significant progress is observed in Asia and the Pacifics technology and digital connectivity dimension,driven by adoption of digital transformation policies by many economies,the

101、pace of which went up during the coronavirus disease(COVID-19)pandemic.However,integration in trade and investment has slowed somewhat since 2019.While intrasubregional integration grew faster than intersubregional integration in Southeast Asia,East Asia,and Central Asia,South Asia showed deeper int

102、egration with other subregions within Asia as of 2021.Regional integration has become a crucial buffer against global shocks and helps mitigate their negative effects.While rising protectionism and the risks of global fragmentation compound economic challenges,increased cooperation and investment in

103、 connectivityboth“soft”(regulatory)and“hard”infrastructurecan strengthen economic resilience and provide mutual benefits.Closer dialogue and discussion on regional policies will help Asian economies better meet the challenges and risks of supply chain vulnerability and climate change.Trade and Globa

104、l Value Chains A drop in external demand and the risk of global fragmentation have weakened Asias trade environment After a strong rebound in global demand in 2021,Asias trade began losing steam in 2022,with merchandise trade volume falling by 0.3%.Stagnant trade growth persisted in 2023 with tighte

105、r global monetary policy to contain inflation,geopolitical tensions,and a downturn in the semiconductor cycle.Nevertheless,the overall picture masks divergent trends across economies.For example,negative trade growth in 2022 came largely from the Peoples Republic of China(PRC)and Hong Kong,China;whi

106、le the economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN),Japan,and the Republic of Korea saw trade expand.Given the lackluster growth forecast for the world economy in 2024,the regions economies must try to reinvigorate trade growth momentum through more liberal and freer trade regimes

107、while forging economic cooperation with trade partners both within and outside the region.Developing new trading partners and diversifying the range of imported products can boost an economys resilience to local shocks and intraregional and international supply disruptions,allowing greater flexibili

108、ty in sourcing raw materials and intermediate goods.Asias participation in global value chains(GVCs)rebounded relatively strongly,with a reorientation toward more regional value chains In 2020,as the COVID-19 pandemic spread,Asia experienced a larger decline in GVC activity(5.8%)than the rest of the

109、 world(4.8%),with backward linkages more strongly affected.While the 2021 recovery was similar for Asia and the world generally,GVC activity in 2022 grew more strongly in Asia(10.7%)than the rest of the world(7.7%),with backward GVC linkages growing stronger.Historically,Asias backward GVC linkages

110、outpaced forward linkages,given the regions prominent role as an assembler along the supply chain,particularly in medium-to high-tech sectors.However,with Asias backward linkages less diversified than in other regionswith diversification levels falling since the pandemicthere is the risk that any di

111、sruption in upstream supply chains could hamper GVC production and resilience.Conversely,Asias forward GVC linkages have Highlightsxvdiversified since the pandemic.Recently,Asias GVC integration has become more regional,especially in forward linkages.On the other hand,there are few signs of reshorin

112、g in the region.There is little evidence of increased sourcing of intermediates domestically or an increasing share of domestic value-added serving domestic demand.Asias trade policy landscape is evolving rapidly,embracing broad,modern trade and digital agreements,although trade restrictions persist

113、 In 2023,the region saw five agreements entering into force and 17 new agreements signed.These included strategic trade partnerships and initiatives reflecting the changing dynamics of international trade cooperation.Nonetheless,restrictive measures in response to global events,particularly those af

114、fecting energy and food,remain a concern.Asia plays a significant role in global agricultural and food trade,accounting for nearly 25%of world exports and 27%of world imports.However,economic uncertainties and geopolitical tensions continue to threaten food security in the region.Economies heavily r

115、eliant on food imports and lacking diversity in trading partners and imported food products are particularly vulnerable to external and global shocks.This supply chain vulnerability extends to several of Asias least developed economies,especially in critical commodities such as sugar,rice,milk,onion

116、s,garlic,and pork,among others.Trade cooperation between importing economies and prospective regional exporters remains limited,and restrictive trade measuresincluding tariffs,quotas,and bansled by regional economies affect approximately 2.7%of all food trade in Asia from 2021 to 2023.Efforts to dee

117、pen trade relationships and enhance regional cooperation on food security should be accompanied by measures aiming to eliminate these restrictions.Cross-Border Investment Despite sluggish global investment in 2022,foreign direct investment(FDI)inflows to Asia were relatively robust Global cross-bord

118、er investment inflows slid by 12%from$1.5 trillion in 2021 to$1.3 trillion in 2022,with a similar decline in global outflows.Geopolitical tensions,high interest rates,and inward-looking industrial policies in strategic sectors weighed on cross-border investment.Despite weaker global trends,FDI to an

119、d from Asia remained resilient,as inflows grew by 8%with outflows rising by 18%.Firm-level data show a mixed landscape,with greenfield investment expanding almost 80%driven by megaproject investments above$1 billionin semiconductors and renewable energywhile mergers and acquisitions(M&As)fell by 30%

120、.By sector,tertiary industries attracted almost three-fifths of Asias total inbound FDI.Significant greenfield outlays for renewable energy projectsincluding solar,electric power,and e-transporthighlight the dynamism of climate-related investments in Asia.Information and communication technology-rel

121、ated sectors,such as data processing and hosting services,were prominent for M&As.Meanwhile,as the network of investment treaties gradually modernizes,international investment agreements signed in Asia since 2020 featured stronger provisions to safeguard an economys right to regulate issues on the e

122、nvironment and labor standards,and transparency in investorstate arbitration.More fragmented FDI poses both risks and opportunities for Asian economies Global investment activity is showing signs of fragmentation,as the pandemic highlighted the need for more diversified and resilient supply chains a

123、nd production bases.Ambitious industrial policies in developed economies have also contributed to the relocation of foreign investment,notably in strategic sectorsincluding semiconductors,telecommunications and 5G,equipment for green energy transition,pharmaceutical ingredients,and critical minerals

124、.Globally and in Asia,the average FDI in strategic sectors from 20102014 to 20202022 doubled,with target destinations expanding from East Asia to Southeast Asia,South Asia,and the Pacific and Oceania.Decarbonization policies are driving investments supporting the green energy transition,while semico

125、nductor investments have become prominent in the region and tripled over the same period.Efficiency-seeking FDI in Asia,mostly concentrated in medium-and high-tech manufacturing,has been key to the regions GVC participation,contributing to job creation Highlightsxviand knowledge transfer.To maximize

126、 the potential for industrial development,economies should adopt market-friendly FDI policies that enforce investment protection,support technology transfer and innovation,and target high productivity sectors,particularly in technology-related manufacturing and services.While the risk of global frag

127、mentation cloud the FDI landscape,the region can improve the environment for market-seeking FDI by building on its growing purchasing power,strengthened by rising income levels and an expanding middle class.Financial Integration Asias global financial integration has advanced steadily,increasing its

128、 exposure to financial shocks The regions financial integration with the world economy increased access to foreign capital,supplemented domestic investment,and smoothed consumption.It also improved finance sector competitiveness and the development of regional capital markets.However,the regions fin

129、ancial openness also makes the region prone to external shocks and capital flow volatility,notably emanating from the United States(US)and the EU.In 2022,the start of monetary policy tightening led to an increase in capital outflows from the region,partially recovering in 2023.Over 20142022,cross-bo

130、rder assets and liabilities as a share of regional gross domestic product increased by 16 and 5 percentage points,respectively.Asias equity and bond markets are already more sensitive to global financial factors than regional ones,with regional bond market sensitivity to global factors on the rise s

131、ince 2021.Regional financial integration also advanced,with the share of the intraregional inward portfolio debt stock rising from 28%in 2021 to 30%in 2022,while the inward equity ratio rose from 21%to 22%over the same period.US dollar funding shocks are behind much of Asias capital flow volatility

132、Asias rising global financial integration makes the region prone to spillovers from the US financial systemin particular centered around the US dollars key role as the leading global currency.Asia is especially susceptible to US dollar funding shocks due to its high US dollar dependence.About four-f

133、ifths of Asias exports and imports,over half of bank assets and liabilities,half of issued debt,and two-thirds of foreign exchange reserves are denominated in US dollars.It is an exchange rate anchor for 18 Asian economies.Also,the US dollar dominates global payment and currency trades.High US dolla

134、r dependence puts capital flows to the region at risk,as it amplifies any reversals driven by US dollar funding shocks.An empirical analysis covering a broad sample of developing economies and emerging markets in Asia shows that a one standard deviation increase in US dollar funding costs raises med

135、ium-term portfolio debt outflows from the region as a share of gross domestic product by up to 0.25%.In addition,an economy with a one standard deviation higher US dollar dependence is likely to experience outflows up to 0.3 of a percentage point higher.Policies that help mitigate risks from Asias e

136、xposure to US dollar funding shocks include(i)strengthening bank balance sheet resilience,(ii)developing local currency bond markets,(iii)implementing macroprudential policies and temporary capital flow management measures,and(iv)reinforcing the regional financial safety net.HighlightsxviiMovement o

137、f People Migration outflows from Asia are recovering as major host economies seek greater access to skilled labor in the wake of worker shortages The rebound in migrant outflows is also due in part to changes in migration policies of host economies such as Australia,Canada,Japan,New Zealand,the Unit

138、ed Kingdom,and the US.They are designed to attract skilled workers to fill labor shortages and fuel the post-pandemic recovery.Increasing investment in human capital and strengthening international skills partnershipsalong with bilateral labor arrangementscould help meet the growing needs of host ec

139、onomies,while ensuring long-term continuity of labor market access.Remittance inflows to Asia remained strong In 2022,remittances totaled$356.0 billion,10.7%higher than in 2021,and are estimated to rise by 4.4%to$371.5 billion in 2023.Except for East Asia,inflows to all subregions increased in 2022w

140、ith notable growth in Central Asia(69.4%)and a robust rise in inflows that continued well into 2023 for Oceania(17.4%and 21.2%)and South Asia(12.2%and 7.2%).They stemmed from large transfers out of the Russian Federation,higher oil incomes in major host economies in the Middle East,and a robust job

141、market in the US.The average cost of sending$200 to Asia was 5.2%as of the first quarter(Q1)of 2023,down from 6.1%in Q1 2020 but still above the Sustainable Development Goal target of 3.0%by 2030.Digital remittances have accelerated since the pandemic,but remain less than 20%of the total,even though

142、 digital remittance channels cost just 4.4%in Asia and globally.Policies that would help expand migrant worker access to banking services and digital infrastructure include adopting mobile services,standardizing data collection and reporting,and removing barriers to cross-border payments such as non

143、-interoperable payment systems and regulations.Such policies could help the region achieve higher digital remittance uptake and deepen financial inclusion.International tourism in Asia is recovering,yet still lags when compared to other regions In 2023,Asia reached 73.2%of its pre-pandemic(2019)arri

144、vals and 77.1%of its receipts.The recovery was much faster than in 2022,when tourist arrivals reached 28.8%and receipts 36.5%of 2019 levels.Yet,Asias tourism recovery remains slower than other regionsthe Middle East recovered 108.7%of its tourist arrivals while Europe earned 117.6%of pre-pandemic to

145、urism receipts in 2023.There are several reasons for the gap:Asian economies implemented some of the tightest travel restrictions from 2020 to 2022;and high airfares along with global macroeconomic and political conditions made potential tourists think twice before traveling.Also,the anticipated boo

146、st in tourists from the PRC has,so far,only been partially realized.Digital technology could help the tourism industry build back better;the region needs to embrace policies that unlock the great potential of the digital economy Governments in Asia have been setting policies that support digital tec

147、hnology useto entice investments and induce behavioral changes that build resilience against future shocks.For example,the Philippines began using its eTravel system to digitize arrival cards in May 2023,Malaysia launched its Malaysia Digital Arrival Card,and Singapore now uses a biometrics system i

148、n place of traditional passports for its citizens to clear immigration.Some Asian economies formed partnerships with digital platforms to facilitate transactions between local merchants and international tourists.For instance,Malaysia and the PRC collaborated to allow Alipay+supported wallets from s

149、even economies to use PayNets DuitNow QR codes in Malaysia.As Asia continues to leverage digital technology,closer regional cooperation can help narrow gaps in information and communication technology infrastructure and digital regulations.Enhancing digital skills among people and firms could ensure

150、 safe,seamless cross-border travel while helping make the regions tourism industry smarter,more resilient,and sustainable.Theme Chapter:Decarbonizing Global Value Chains The impact of human-induced climate change on the natural environment,economies,and societies will likely be wide and far-reaching

151、,with Asian economies highly affected The list is longhigher temperatures,drought,water scarcity,severe fires,rising sea levels,ocean warming and acidification,flooding,storms,and declining biodiversity,among others.These will all have severe consequences for human health,food production,access to f

152、resh water and ocean resources,productivity,and critical infrastructure.Developing economies in Asia and the Pacific are particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change,despite having contributed less historically to greenhouse gas emissions.Climate change is expected to disproportionately a

153、ffect the regions economies due to their exposure to natural hazards,extreme weather events,and limited resources for mitigation and adaptation.Despite a slowdown in the rate of growth,anthropogenic greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions continue to rise,with Asian economies contributing substantially to the

154、increase The primary cause of human-induced climate change is the burning of fossil fuels,which increases GHG concentrations in the atmosphere.Carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions from fossil fuels and industry cause most of the increase.Developing Asia accounts for a large and growing share of CO2 emission

155、s as global production structures are influenced by the rise of GVCs,population dynamics,and technological change.Mitigating climate change requires a fundamental shift in human behavior and rapid decarbonization of production.Reducing CO2 emissions associated with GVCs raises specific challenges,wi

156、th the global nature of emissions making them difficult to regulate through domestic policies alone.CO2 emissions can be considered to reflect both a scale and an intensity effect,with developments in these two effects working in opposite directions in recent years CO2 emissions in developing Asia i

157、ncreased rapidly during 19952018,with emissions increasing by 114%over the period.This was despite a significant reduction in CO2 intensity of production,which was not large enough to offset the increase in CO2 emissions resulting from the rapid expansion in the scale of production.CO2 intensities v

158、ary widely across both economies and sectors.Across a broad range of sectors they fell rapidly during 19952018,reflecting technological advances,improved efficiency,and a reallocation of production within sectors through GVCs.Within developing Asia,structural change has played a limited role in lowe

159、ring aggregate emissions intensities,with reductions primarily driven by changes within sectors rather than shifts toward less emissions-intensive sectors.GVCs have an important impact on both the scale and intensity of producing CO2 emissions.While increases in the level of GVC production are assoc

160、iated with similar increases in CO2 emissions,the share of CO2 emissions due to GVCs tends to be larger than their share in value addedindicating that GVC activity plays an outsized role in emissions production.Sectors involved in GVCs tend to be relatively emissions-intensive,with a higher share of

161、 GVC activity shown to be positively associated with higher aggregate emissions intensities.These associations differ between developed and developing economies,with GVC activity in developing economies tending to be more emissions-intensive than in developed economies.There is an intricate relation

162、ship between international trade,GVCs,and GHG emissions While international trade remains both an essential conduit linking global production networks and a significant source of GHG emissions,it also holds the potential to contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptationby facilitating the ex

163、change of low-emission goods,green technologies,and increasing production efficiency.Expanding GVCs are generally considered to offer opportunities for developing economies to integrate into the global economy and industrialize.But it also creates challenges for mitigating climate change.The decoupl

164、ing of consumption from production within GVCs raises concerns about firms relocating production to areas with weaker environmental regulations(the pollution haven hypothesis),potentially leading to higher emissions.Policymakers are increasingly concerned over GVCs carbon footprint and potential car

165、bon leakage to regions with weaker regulations.Climate Highlightsxviiichange mitigation requires a shift away from carbon-based production,posing a potential risk to the existing GVC model that has contributed to economic development in many economies,but also increased energy consumption,emissions,

166、and waste.The production of CO2 emissions continues to grow rapidly,with GVCs in developing Asian economies responsible for an increasing share During 19952018,global CO2 emissions increased by an average of 2.1%per year.While the growth rate after 2010(1.8%)was lower than before(2.2%),emissions con

167、tinue to grow rapidly.Domestic production for domestic consumption remains the largest contributor to emissions,accounting for almost two-thirds of emissions productionGVCs accounted for 14%of CO2 emissions in 2018,up from 12%in 1995.While playing a relatively small role in overall emissions product

168、ion,GVCs increasing contribution to aggregate CO2 emissions come from the rapid growth in their emissions production.The share of developing Asia in global GVC-related emissions significantly increased over 19952018,reaching 42%in 2018.While population growth is a factor,CO2 emissions per capita hav

169、e also increased across developing Asia,in contrast with other regions.The increasing role developing Asia plays in GVC-related emissions is partly due to GVC positioning,sectoral structure,and the technological level of its GVC integration.Developing Asia is now a net supplier,exporting more CO2 em

170、issions embodied in intermediates than it imports.In contrast,developed regions like North America,the EU plus the United Kingdom,and developed Asia import more embodied CO2 emissions through intermediates than they export in GVCs.International cooperation is crucial to effectively address the chall

171、enge of climate change Despite national and subnational efforts to implement carbon pricing,the climate crisis worldwide and increased economic interdependence call for increased global coordination.Enhanced global cooperation can create a more coherent and predictable policy environment,increase tr

172、ansparency,and mobilize financial and technical resources to overcome capacity constraints and promote the spread of green technologies,especially to developing and emerging economies.Nonetheless,global coordination in climate mitigation remains weak.Major challenges to global coordination in carbon

173、 pricing arise from issues of free-riding and fairness.The possibility of free-riding makes coordination difficult,as economies may choose not to participate in carbon pricing while still reaping the benefits of carbon production.The fairness issue stems from historical contributions to global emiss

174、ions,with developed economies historically emitting more.The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities recognizes these differences but complicates finding a common global carbon price.Carbon pricing is generally considered the key mechanism for addressing the problem of CO2 and GHG em

175、issions during production Carbon pricing,through either carbon taxes or emissions trading system(ETS),aims to internalize the social costs of emissions,encouraging firms to reduce carbon intensity and transition to cleaner production methods.Despite efforts in various jurisdictions to implement carb

176、on pricing policies,concerns remain over the speed and extent of the global response to the climate crisis.While numerous carbon pricing policies have been adopted globally,just a small percentage of emissions are covered at levels deemed necessary to prevent a 2C temperature increase,the upper end

177、of the limit in the Paris Agreement.The fragmented nature of carbon pricing across different jurisdictions raises the risk of carbon leakage.To address this,border carbon adjustment(BCA)mechanism have been suggested as a way of leveling the playing field,ensuring that foreign producers face equivale

178、nt carbon prices in export markets.However,BCAs raise concerns over fairness and equity,potentially impacting exporters,particularly in GVC supplier economies and developing economies.Highlightsxix The EUs Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism(CBAM)should reduce carbon leakage,but it will have a limite

179、d impact on global emission reductions while significantly reducing exports into the EU from some Asian subregions Concerns over competitiveness,carbon leakage,and shortcomings of the EUs ETS led to CBAM,the first border adjustment mechanism.Initially targeting carbon-intensive products like cement,

180、steel,and aluminum,the EU sees CBAM as a tool to align global carbon prices and accelerate emission reductions worldwide.For developing Asian economies,with high CO2 intensities in sectors like ferrous metals,CBAM can create challengesfor example,the value-added tax equivalent of a 100 per metric to

181、n of CO2 price ranges between 3%and 12%.Estimations using computable general equilibrium(CGE)modeling suggest CBAM might reduce carbon leakage by around half compared to an ETS scheme with a similar carbon price.While the EUs ETS and CBAM may have a limited direct impact on emissionsreducing emissio

182、ns globally by around 1.3%at 100 per metric ton of CO2 and by 2.2%at 200 per metric ton of CO2it could significantly affect exports to the EU.A shift to a 100 per metric ton of CO2 price could lead to significant declines in exports for some Asian regions,particularly Central and West Asia,which has

183、 a relatively high share of CBAM-covered exports to the EU.At the same time,reductions in EU production from CBAM could spread to many sectors,such as computer,electric and optical equipment,and motor vehicles and parts within the EU through industrial inputoutput linkages.Extending CBAM to regions

184、outside the EU could significantly reduce CO2 emissions Considering scenarios where other economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)and regional members of the Asian Development Bank(ADB)implement both ETS and BCA,modeling suggests that global CO2 emissions could b

185、e reduced by around 8.7%at 100 per metric ton of CO2 and by 15%at 200 per metric ton of CO2.How much emissions are reduced depends on coverage and carbon price,emphasizing the need to carefully consider these factors in designing and implementing these mechanisms.Extending these policies is also pre

186、dicted to lead to a significant decline in global trade,highlighting the potential trade-off between emissions reduction and global integration.Extending CBAM to cover other OECD economies,for example,is estimated to reduce average developing Asian exports by 1.9%at a 100 per metric ton of CO2 price

187、 and by 3.7%at 200 per metric ton of CO2.The expected distributional and negative economic impact on ADB developing members in the extended model(OECD plus ADB regional members)suggests the need for proper compensation mechanisms internationally to draw ADB developing members into carbon pricing and

188、 BCA structures.Existing accounting frameworks that measure embodied emissions are underdeveloped,limiting the effectiveness of climate policies Accurately measuring emissions embodied in goods and services is crucial for an effective approach to the net-zero transition,such as carbon pricing and BC

189、As.Yet existing frameworks are underdeveloped,with the measurement challenge more pronounced when considering indirect emissions,such as Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions.While estimates of an economys CO2 emissions are generally reliable,measuring emissions embedded in products is more complex and vari

190、es across economies,firms,and time.Public embedded emissions accounting frameworks(EEFs)can play a vital role in decarbonizing GVCs in both developed and developing economies.They facilitate measurement,reporting,verification,and regulation,and support efforts to avoid carbon leakage globally and do

191、mestically in the context of trade-related climate policies.To be successful,EEFs need to be carefully designed to align with domestic and international frameworks and those of major trading partners,as global cooperation is crucial to establish a basic,common approach.In doing this,it is important

192、to avoid an overly complex regime that disadvantages smaller producers and resource-constrained economies.Trade policies can play a crucial role in climate change mitigation and adaptation Trade and trade policy hold the potential to be a force for CO2 emissions reductions.It can influence the globa

193、l movement of climate-friendly products and services,facilitate the transfer of green technologies,encourage higher environmental standards,and act as an external force for regulatory enhancement.Current trade policies,however,often favor carbon-intensive Highlightsxxxxiimports,with lower barriers o

194、n high carbon-intensive goods.This bias,largely influenced by factors unrelated to trade policy,has been estimated to be equivalent to a negative carbon price of$90 per ton of CO2,potentially hindering efforts to reduce global emissions.Preferential trade agreements(PTAs)can also help decarbonize GV

195、Cs,with the number and breadth of PTAs and the number of PTAs with environmental provisions increasing rapidly in recent years.Evidence suggests that the breadth of a PTA between economies is associated with slightly lower CO2 emissions intensity traded in GVCs,while the scale effect of a PTA leads

196、to greater overall CO2 emissions.Including environmental provisions in PTAs,especially provisions restricting trade in dirty goods,can lower emissions traded in PTAs.A one standard deviation increase in the share of trade restricting environmental provisions in PTAs is associated with a reduction in

197、 CO2 emissions in GVCs of 1.2%,with the scale effect accounting for 0.34 percentage points and the intensity effect 0.90 percentage points.Beyond carbon pricing and regional integration,a variety of other steps can be taken to decarbonize GVCs The decreasing cost of green technologies,especially in

198、energy production,can promote their widespread adoption.With recent policy initiatives,including the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EUs mission-oriented approach to innovation,further encouraging research and development in renewable energy,opportunities for enhanced competition in green technol

199、ogies and for providing new climate-related technologies are strong.For maximum impact on emissions reductions,these technologies need to be diffused widely,especially from developed to developing economies.Technology diffusion to developing economies can be facilitated by GVCs and multinational ent

200、erprises,potentially enabling these economies to leapfrog into green technologies while avoiding carbon-based production.Technology and technology diffusion can potentially remove any trade-off that exists between CO2 reduction efforts and GVC production,reducing emissions while encouraging producti

201、on,trade,and GVCs.Multilateral development banks can play an important role by supporting green infrastructure and technology diffusion while facilitating sustainable investments along value chains,and ensuring transparency and traceability of CO2 emissions in GVCs.Highlightsxxi1The Crucial Role of

202、Regional Cooperation1Shared Risks Amid growing protectionism and risks of global fragmentation,regional cooperation and integration remain crucial to address shared challenges and to foster growth across the economies of Asia and the Pacific.1 Merchandise trade has been adversely affected by growing

203、 nontariff measures over the past 10 years.About 40%of the total nontariff measures in the region are related to sanitary and phytosanitary measures,while 43%are technical barriers to trade(Figure 1.1).Other notable measures such as antidumping and quantitative restrictions have recorded significant

204、 increases,ranging from 500 to 1,000 per year since 2012.Services trade barriers have marginally increased,both globally and in Asia,since 2014.According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)Services Trade Restrictiveness Index,most of the barriers are restrictions on f

205、oreign entry(Figure 1.2).Cross-border movement of persons also remains regulated,with restrictions taking the form of limitations on stay,nationality or residency requirements,and lack of recognition of professional qualifications across borders.Air transport,legal,and accounting services were the m

206、ost restrictive sectors in 2022(Figure 1.3).1 Asia and the Pacific,or Asia,consists of the 49 regional member economies of the Asian Development Bank(ADB).The composition of economies for Central Asia,East Asia,the Pacific and Oceania,South Asia,and Southeast Asia are outlined in ADB.Asia Regional I

207、ntegration Center.Economy Groupings.https:/aric.adb.org/integrationindicators/groupings.Figure 11:Number of Nontariff MeasuresAsia and the Pacific(000)012345678024681012141618201220142016201820202022Number of nontariff measuresTotal nontariff measuresTotal nontariff measures(left)Sanitary and phytos

208、anitaryTechnical barriers to tradeAntidumpingCountervailing dutySafeguardsSpecial safeguardsQuantitative restrictionsTariff-rate quotasExport subsidiesNote:Based on the cumulative number of measures in force at the end of each year.Source:ADB calculations using data from the World Trade Organization

209、.Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal.http:/i-tip.wto.org(accessed May 2023).Geopolitical risks are prompting policymakers to adopt nationalistic strategies for building resilient supply chains.Major disruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have underscored the vu

210、lnerabilities associated with supply chain disruption,which in turn have encouraged economies to diversify and reevaluate markets for exports and imports.2Asian Economic Integration Report 2024Figure 12:Services Trade Restrictiveness IndexWorld and Asia and the Pacific(average)0.000.020.040.060.080.

211、100.120.140.160.180.20Barriers to competitionOther discriminatory measuresRegulatory transparencyRestrictions on foreign entryRestrictions to movement of peopleBarriers to competitionOther discriminatory measuresRegulatory transparencyRestrictions on foreign entryRestrictions to movement of peopleBa

212、rriers to competitionOther discriminatory measuresRegulatory transparencyRestrictions on foreign entryRestrictions to movement of peopleBarriers to competitionOther discriminatory measuresRegulatory transparencyRestrictions on foreign entryRestrictions to movement of peopleBarriers to competitionOth

213、er discriminatory measuresRegulatory transparencyRestrictions on foreign entryRestrictions to movement of people20142016201820202022WorldAsia and the PacificNotes:The index takes the value from 0(completely open)to 1(completely closed).The sample includes 50 economies,12 of which are in Asia and the

214、 Pacific:Australia,India,Indonesia,Japan,Kazakhstan,Malaysia,New Zealand,the Peoples Republic of China,the Republic of Korea,Singapore,Thailand,and Viet Nam.Source:ADB calculations using data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.OECDStat:Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.ht

215、tps:/stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STRI(accessed May 2023).Figure 13:Services Trade Restrictiveness Index by SectorWorld Average,2022 0.000.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.09DistributionSound recordingArchitectureMotion picturesComputerLogistics freight forwardingEngineeringInsuranceLogistic

216、s customs brokerageRoad freight transportConstructionCommercial bankingLogistics storage and warehouseTelecomLogistics cargo-handlingMaritime transportCourierRail freight transportBroadcastingAccountingLegalAir transportNotes:The index takes the value from 0(completely open)to 1(completely closed).T

217、he sample includes 50 economies,12 of which are in Asia and the Pacific:Australia,India,Indonesia,Japan,Kazakhstan,Malaysia,New Zealand,the Peoples Republic of China,the Republic of Korea,Singapore,Thailand,and Viet Nam.Source:ADB calculations using data from Organisation for Economic Co-operation a

218、nd Development.OECDStat:Services Trade Restrictiveness Index.https:/stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=STRI(accessed May 2023).The Crucial Role of Regional Cooperation3Excessive dependence on a single market make importing economies susceptible to external shocks.To improve resilience across supp

219、ly chains,economies follow policies that strengthen domestic manufacturing,particularly in strategic sectors,while maintaining technological advantage.For instance,the United States(US)in 2022 and the European Union(EU)in 2023 signed laws institutionalizing efforts to bolster their semiconductor ind

220、ustries.The US is investing$280 billion over 10 years while EU support features a$47 billion plan to boost the semiconductor supply chain.Accordingly,multinational corporations interest in moving production back home(reshoring)or to economies with aligned strategic interests(friend-shoring)has incre

221、ased sharply in recent years(IMF 2023,also refer to Chapter 2:Trade and Global Value Chains).Meanwhile,restrictive trade interventions in Asian economies include import and export restrictions,additional licensing requirements,and nontariff measures,particularly on essential raw materials and goods(

222、Table 1.1).Table 11:Restrictive Export Measures by Selected Asian Economies,January 2022November 2023 EconomyType of InterventionAffected JurisdictionBangladeshExport restriction on rice bran oil1 economyImport restriction on onions3 economiesBhutanImport restriction on vehicles2 economiesGeorgiaExp

223、ort restriction on wheat and barley Not listedIndiaExport restriction on broken rice40 economiesExport restriction on wheat14 economiesTemporary export control in de-oiled rice bran15 economiesExport restriction on non-basmati white rice96 economies Export control on wheat flour20 economiesTemporary

224、 export restriction on sugar49 economies IndonesiaExport restriction on cooking oil and its raw materials106 economiesExport ban on bauxite1 economyMalaysiaExport restriction on chicken5 economiesImport restriction on mixed waste and scraps of miscellaneous paper or paperboard19 economiesNepalTempor

225、ary import restriction on more motorcycles and mobile phones4 economiesPakistanExport restriction on sugarNot listedPRCExport and import control on basic organic chemicals94 economiesExport control measures for gallium and germanium44 economiesThailandTemporary export restriction on live swine4 econ

226、omiesViet NamImport restriction for reexport of medical masks,gloves,and protective suits55 economiesPRC=Peoples Republic of China.Source:ADB compilation based on Global Trade Alert Database.https:/www.globaltradealert.org/data_extraction(accessed November 2023).Many existing international cooperati

227、on measures need to be advanced to address new issues and improve efforts for implementation.The multilateral World Trade Organization(WTO)system,for example,needs significant reform to strengthen its rules to reduce risks from rising protectionism and geoeconomic fragmentation(IMF 2023).Meantime,tw

228、o megaregional trade agreements,the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership,have provided ways to strengthen supply chains within Asia and need to ensure effective implementation.The proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework provides

229、opportunities to enhance international cooperation in areas of trade;supply chains;clean energy,infrastructure and decarbonization;and tax and anti-corruption.The framework needs to expedite negotiation and lay out action plans for participating economies to undertake domestic reforms.The 14 economi

230、es recently 4Asian Economic Integration Report 2024Figure 14:Overall Intraregional Integration,by Region0.300.350.400.450.500.550.602006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021Asia and the PacificEULatin AmericaAfricaMiddle EastEU=European Union(27 members).Notes:Based on ADBs As

231、ia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).announced substantial completion of negoti

232、ations to strengthen supply chain resilience for critical goods such as semiconductors and medicines,marking the initiatives first tangible outcome since its May 2022 inception.2Despite the challenges,regional cooperation among Asian economies will remain relevant to tackle global risks and common p

233、roblems to deliver improved outcomes for people.Trade and investment promotion will continue to remain a key agenda of regional cooperation,though greater attention will be paid on people-centric initiatives.Cooperation initiatives will be driven by expanding the range of beneficiaries to address de

234、ep inequities exposed by the pandemic.Hence,cooperation measures will be discussed for improved health care services,skills development or education,and food security to improve accessibility for low-income households and vulnerable populations.Given that regional cooperation will be sought to reap

235、the benefits of digital transformation,it will become more important for economies to address key regulatory,infrastructural,and capacity challenges across borders.Finally,regional cooperation is vital to tackle climate change risks.Collective action,especially on a regional basis,is necessary for e

236、stablishing a climate change strategy to curb coal utilization,encourage power sector decarbonization,and scale up renewable energy resources.Further,international cooperation remains essential in securing financial assistance for climate change adaptation in the regions vulnerable emerging markets.

237、Regional Integration in Asia Is Progressing Steadily,Though Variations Remain The Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index(ARCII)remained relatively stable between 2006 and 2021(ADB 2022a).ADBs ARCII,a multidimensional index to measure the pace and nature of regional integration,which

238、 tracks how Asia fares against other regions,shows the EU continues to lead(Figure 1.4).Across eight ARCII dimensionstrade and investment,money and finance,regional value chain(RVC),infrastructure and connectivity,people and social integration,institutional arrangements,technology and digital connec

239、tivity,and environmental cooperationresults reveal variation among regions.While the EU excels in the intensity of cross-border flows in some dimensions,Asia is not far behind.In fact,Asia stands at the same level of integration for RVC and people and social integration and leads in technology and d

240、igital connectivity.Asias digital connectivity is driven by dynamic trade in information and communication technology goods and enhanced access and quality of internet services throughout the region(Figure 1.5).2 The 14 economies are Australia,Brunei Darussalam,Fiji,India,Indonesia,Japan,Malaysia,Ne

241、w Zealand,the Philippines,the Republic of Korea,Singapore,Thailand,the United States,and Viet Nam.The Crucial Role of Regional Cooperation5Figure 15:Intraregional Integration by Dimension,20210.00.20.40.60.81.0Trade andInvestmentMoney andfinanceRegional value chainAsia and the PacificEULatin America

242、AfricaMiddle EastEnvironmentalcooperationTechnologyand digitalconnectivityInstitutionalarrangementsPeople and socialintegrationInfrastructure andconnectivityEU=European Union(27 members).Notes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index estimates deno

243、te greater regional integration.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).Figure 16:Intraregional Integration in Asia and the Pacific,by Dimension0.00.10.20.30.40.50.60.72006200720082009201020112012201320142

244、015201620172018201920202021Trade and investmentMoney and financeRegional value chainInfrastructure and connectivityPeople and social integrationInstitutional arrangementsTechnology anddigital connectivityEnvironmental cooperationNotes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration I

245、ndex estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).ARCII dimensions show a varied pace and level of integration for the Asian region.While the

246、 people and social integration dimension shows a lot of cross-border activity and is driven by international tourism(though this came to a halt during the pandemic),technology and digital connectivity experienced a rapid surge with economies embracing digital transformation initiatives over the past

247、 decade and the pace accelerating during the pandemic.Trade and investment integration in Asia,however,slowed from 2019 amid the US and the Peoples Republic of China(PRC)trade dispute and supply chain disruptions.This trend is also reflected in the RVC dimension,which showed modest improvement(Figur

248、e 1.6).Most subregions showed stronger integration among their members between 2006 and 2021,with varying trends by dimension.In 2021,East Asia led estimates for intraregional integration for five dimensions,including infrastructure and connectivity,RVC,trade and investment,environmental cooperation

249、,and technology(Figure1.8a).Southeast Asia and Central Asia followed(Figure 1.7 a-d).Southeast Asia has achieved notable integration in various areas of connectivity(institution and infrastructure),RVC,and money and finance.In terms of intersubregional integrationan economys integration with Asian e

250、conomies outside its own subregionSouth Asia has performed strongly.In 2021,estimates for South Asia exhibited the deepest integration in RVC,infrastructure,and technology(Figure1.8b).For economies in the Southeast Asia subregion,their own integration overtook their integration with the rest of Asia

251、 around RVC and trade and investment.This reflected the subregions growing emphasis on establishing the ASEAN Economic Community(AEC)in 2015.The subregion particularly showed greater cross-border activities in people and social integration across Asia,driven by international tourism and technology a

252、nd digital connectivity.Intersubregional 6Asian Economic Integration Report 2024Figure 17:Subregional Integration EstimatesAsia and the Pacific0.360.370.380.390.400.410.420.430.440.452006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021IntrasubregionalIntersubregional0.000.050.100.150.200

253、.250.300.350.400.452006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021(a)Southeast Asia(b)Central AsiaIntrasubregionalIntersubregional(c)South Asia(d)East Asia0.000.050.100.150.200.250.300.350.400.4520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210.000.100.200.300.400.50

254、0.602006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021Notes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Intrasubregional integration is measured within members of the same subregion.Intersubr

255、egional integration is measured with other Asian economies outside each subregion.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).Figure 18:Subregional Integration Estimates by DimensionAsia and the Pacific,2021(a

256、)Intrasubregional(b)Intersubregional0.00.20.40.60.8Central AsiaEast AsiaSoutheast AsiaSouth Asia0.00.20.40.60.8EnvironmentalcooperationTechnologyand digitalconnectivityInstitutionalarrangementsPeople and socialintegrationInfrastructure andconnectivityRegionalvalue chainMoney andfinanceTrade andinves

257、tmentEnvironmentalcooperationTechnologyand digitalconnectivityInstitutionalarrangementsPeople and socialintegrationInfrastructure andconnectivityRegionalvalue chainMoney andfinanceTrade andinvestmentNotes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index es

258、timates denote greater regional integration.Intrasubregional integration is measured within members of the same subregion.Intersubregional integration is measured with other Asian economies outside each subregion.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric

259、.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).The Crucial Role of Regional Cooperation7Figure 19:Subregional Integration EstimatesThe Pacific0.00.10.20.30.40.50.62006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021IntrasubregionalIntersubregionalNotes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regiona

260、l Cooperation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Intrasubregional integration is measured within members of the same subregion.Intersubregional integration is measured with other Asian economies outside each subregion.Results are at a prelimina

261、ry stage.A more comprehensive analysis for the Pacific region is currently under development.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).cooperation in East Asia and Central Asia progressed well in parallel wi

262、th intrasubregional activities.In 2021,while East Asia showed greater intersubregional integration in institution building and connectivity,reflecting economic cooperation through connectivity initiatives and regional trade agreements,Central Asia was ahead in RVC(Figure 1.8b).Integration within the

263、 Pacific economies remains low.While data availability is a challenge to measure the pace of integration among the Pacific economies,preliminary estimates suggest intrasubregional integration has slightly improved and peaked in 2018(Figure 1.9).The subregion consists of small island developing state

264、s that have gradually integrated with economies outside their subregion,especially with developed markets such as Australia and New Zealand.From 2006 to 2021,the Pacific has become more integrated in infrastructure and connectivity,and in trade and investment.Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Asia

265、 Regional initiatives have made progress,though challenges remain limiting the capacity to implement them.ADB takes a three-pillar approach to regional initiatives:(i)greater and higher quality connectivity between economies;(ii)expanded global and regional trade and investment opportunities;and(iii

266、)increased and diversified regional public goodsto support economies in their efforts of regional cooperation(ADB 2019).Using the same pillars,this section looks at cooperation initiatives in the Asian subregions.It highlights their progress,outlines ADB support,and discusses challenges.Policy recom

267、mendations are provided as a way forward.It should be noted that the discussion in this section does not reflect progress in the ARCII,which assesses regional cooperation in a way that goes beyond ADB-supported subregional initiatives.ARCII estimates for subregional initiatives showed steady progres

268、s over time,though the pace varies based on a subregions macroeconomic and social context,available resources,and capabilities.Figures 1.10 to 1.12 show cross-border activities among the members of the subregional initiatives and between the subregional initiative and the rest of Asia.Looking at Sou

269、theast Asian initiatives,constituent members of the Greater Mekong Subregion(GMS)achieved greater integration with each other than with the rest of Asia,though the pace of this intrasubregional integration has been consistent in recent years.In the South Asia subregion,the Bay of Bengal Initiative f

270、or Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation(BIMSTEC)shows greater integration through 20062021 than South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation(SASEC),for both intrasubregional and intersubregional activities.The gap between the two initiatives has narrowed for intersubregional 8Asian Econom

271、ic Integration Report 2024Figure 110:Subregional InitiativesSoutheast Asia,200620210.00.10.20.30.40.52006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021GMSIMT-GTBIMP-EAGA0.00.10.20.30.40.50.62006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021(a)Intrasubregional(b)Intersubre

272、gionalBIMP-EAGA=Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippines East ASEAN Growth Area,BIMSTEC=Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation,GMS=Greater Mekong Subregion,IMT-GT=Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle.Notes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooper

273、ation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Intrasubregional integration is measured within members of the same subregional initiative.Intersubregional integration is measured with other Asian economies outside each subregional initiative.Source:A

274、DB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).Figure 111:Subregional InitiativesSouth Asia,200620210.00.10.20.30.42006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021SASECBIMSTEC0.00.10.20.30.40.520062007200

275、82009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021(a)Intrasubregional(b)IntersubregionalBIMSTEC=Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation,SASEC=South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation.Notes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration In

276、dex estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Intrasubregional integration is measured within members of the same subregional initiative.Intersubregional integration is measured with other Asian economies outside each subregional initiative.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional

277、 Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).cross-border activities in recent years.For the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation(CAREC)initiative,higher intrasubregional integration is driven by institutional arrangements and people an

278、d social integration,underscoring potential for member economies to deepen integration based on these pillars.The Crucial Role of Regional Cooperation9Figure 112 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program Integration,200620210.00.10.20.30.40.52006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172

279、018201920202021IntrasubregionalIntersubregionalNotes:Based on ADBs Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index estimates.Higher index estimates denote greater regional integration.Intrasubregional integration is measured within members of the same subregional initiative.Intersubregional

280、integration is measured with other Asian economies outside each subregional initiative.Source:ADB.Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation and Integration Index Database.https:/aric.adb.org/database/arcii(accessed November 2023).Southeast AsiaSoutheast Asian economies regional cooperation is discussed thro

281、ugh their participation in three ADB-supported subregional initiatives:the GMS,IndonesiaMalaysiaThailand Growth Triangle(IMT-GT),and the Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippines East ASEAN Growth Area(BIMP-EAGA).3 These programs complement each other and aim to strengthen the regional cooperati

282、on agenda of the bigger Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)regional initiative.GMS,BIMP-EAGA,and IMT-GT have made notable progress over the years.A summary of developments in each initiative is provided in Table 1.2.3 The GMS was initiated in 1992 among six economies including Cambodia,the

283、 PRC(specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region),the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic(Lao PDR),Myanmar,Thailand,and Viet Nam.Established in 1994,BIMP-EAGA aimed to accelerate socioeconomic development of BruneiDarussalam,Indonesia,Malaysia,and the Philippines through regional c

284、ooperation.IMT-GT was created to improve welfare and economic growth in less developed states and provinces in Indonesia,Malaysia,and Thailand.4 GMS Secretariat figures.ADB provides broad-based support to all three subregional programs.It provides overall secretariat support to the GMS program while

285、 serving as a Regional Development Advisor to BIMP-EAGA and Regional Development Partner to IMT-GT.ADB supports these subregional programs in promoting cross-border infrastructure and economic integration,and in strengthening climate action and other regional public goods(ADB 2023a).Greater Mekong S

286、ubregionIn recent years,the GMS program has achieved notable progress,particularly in preparing subregion-wide guiding documents.These include(i)the new GMS Economic Cooperation Program Strategic Framework 2030(GMS-2030),which sets the strategic directions and priorities of the program in the medium

287、 term and beyond;(ii)the GMS COVID-19 Response and Recovery Plan 20212023,which identifies some achievable initiatives to support the subregions economy during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond,facilitate economic recovery,and help prepare the GMS for any further similar health crises;and(iii)the GMS

288、 Gender Strategy,which provides entry points to mainstream gender across GMS operations,while complementing and adding value to GMS-2030,GMS sector strategies,and GMS economy-level efforts to achieve gender equality.Altogether,during 20202023,the GMS program mobilized$5.9 billion for 21 projects acr

289、oss sectors including agriculture and natural resources,wind power,health,industry and trade,tourism,and transportation.Of this,ADB provided$4.2 billion of the financing and mobilized$1.2 billion from development partners/private sector while GMS governments contributed$500million for these projects

290、.4 10Asian Economic Integration Report 2024Table 12:Selected Projects in Greater Mekong Subregion,IndonesiaMalaysiaThailand Growth Triangle,and Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippines East ASEAN Growth Area ConnectivityTradeRegional Public GoodsMakassar-Parepare railwayconnects two major port

291、cities and serves five districts in South Sulawesi province of Indonesia(BIMP-EAGA 2023a).ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Air Transport Agreementfirst region-to-region air transport agreement which aims to strengthen air transport services,connecting people,cultures,and businesses across continents(BIMP-EAGA

292、 2022a).The PRCLao PDR railway freight transit yardaims to bolster the transport of goods and further improve the efficiency of international transportation between the PRC and ASEAN economies(GMS 2022a).Some of the completed infrastructure projects in economic corridors are the following(BIMP-EAGA

293、2019):Expansion of the Adi Soemarmo International Airport in Indonesia;Construction of the Pan Borneo Highway Sarawak Package 1 from Teluk Melano to Sematan in Malaysia;Upgrade of the General Santos City International Airport in the Philippines;Expansion of the Zamboanga Port in the Philippines;and

294、Construction of roads in the Western Mindanao Development Corridor in the Philippines.Tourism Recovery Communications Plan and Toolkit 20222024jointly prepared by BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT to boost the tourism industry in the subregion(BIMP-EAGA 2022c).The Lao PDRThailandMalaysiaSingapore Power Integrati

295、on Projectserves as ASEANs pilot project in addressing technical,legal,and financial issues of multilateral electricity trade(BIMP-EAGA 2022b).Trans-Borneo Power Grid SarawakWest Kalimantan Interconnection Projecta flagship project that provides interconnection for the transmission and sale of elect

296、ricity between Indonesia and Malaysia(BIMP-EAGA 2022b).Two-way energy trade between the PRC and the Lao PDRaims to facilitate the power trade agreement between the two economies(GMS 2022b).Monsoon Wind Power Projecta 600-megawatt wind-power project in the Lao PDR that will export and sell electricit

297、y to Viet Nam.It will be the first cross-border wind power project in the Lao PDR and the largest in Southeast Asia.It will provide a substantial source of clean renewable energy supply to Viet Nam.aNuclear Technology for Controlling Plastic Pollution Projectaims to increase the volume of recycled p

298、lastic and convert more plastic waste into reusable resources,particularly for the production of industrial goods(BIMP-EAGA 2023b).ASEAN Regional Action Plan for Combating Marine Debris in the ASEAN Member States(20212025)provides a scalable,solution-focused joint strategy to tackle marine plastic p

299、ollution(BIMP-EAGA 2021).GMS Cross-Border Livestock Health and Value Chains Improvement Projectaims to enhance productivity and resilience of the livestock subsector by reducing risks from transboundary animal diseases,zoonoses,and antimicrobial resistance;expanding animal health monitoring and serv

300、ice delivery;enhancing food safety;and promoting subregional cooperation in GMS.bGreen City Action Plan(GCAP)under the IMT-GT program,the GCAPs of Medan and Batam Island in Indonesia,Melaka in Malaysia and Hat Yai and Songkhla in Thailand develop sustainable and equitable urban development plans for

301、 cities through a pipeline of immediate,mid-term,and long-term infrastructure projects.GCAPs were also prepared for Kendari,Kota Kinabalu,and General Santos under BIMP-EAGA(IMT-GT;BIMP-EAGA).ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations,BIMP-EAGA=Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippines East ASE

302、AN Growth Area,GMS=Greater Mekong Subregion,IMT-GT=IndonesiaMalaysiaThailand Growth Triangle,Lao PDR=Lao Peoples Democratic Republic,PRC=Peoples Republic of China.a ADB.Lao Peoples Democratic Republic:Monsoon Wind Power Project.https:/www.adb.org/projects/55205-001/main.b ADB.Cambodia:Greater Mekong

303、 Subregion Cross-Border Livestock Health and Value Chains Improvement Project.https:/www.adb.org/projects/53240-003/main.Sources:ADB compilation based on the ADB,BIMP-EAGA,and GMS websites.The GMS programs notable achievements in select sectors include the following:Completion of major transport inf

304、rastructure projects such as the PRCLao PDR(KunmingVientiane)Highspeed Rail Project,the Thailand GMS Highway Expansion Phase 2 Project,and Cambodia Phnom PenhSihanoukville Expressway Project.Other key projects are in advanced stages of construction,including the Viet Nam Ha NoiLang Son Expressway Pr

305、oject.In trade and investment,a GMS Task Force on Trade and Investment was established to explore,identify,and initiate collaborative actions and programs to boost trade and investment in the GMS.In energy,the GMS Energy Transition Task Force replaced the GMS Regional Power Trade Coordination Commit

306、tee to effectively address the need for sustainable energy.The task force will facilitate the ongoing energy transition in the GMS,with the strong promotion of renewable energy,energy efficiency,and green financing for energy projects.The Crucial Role of Regional Cooperation11 In the health sector,t

307、he“One Health”approach was adopted and pursued under the GMS COVID-19 Response and Recovery Plan 20212023.One Health provides an integrated,unifying approach that aims to sustainably balance and optimize the health of people,animals,and ecosystems.This approach established a Regional One Health Work

308、ing Group and continued to support regional technical assistance linked to existing One Health networks and resources.Brunei DarussalamIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippines East ASEAN Growth Area As of 2023,ADB approved over$3.5 billion worth of loan to invest in 14 projects in BIMP-EAGA.Amid the COVID-19 pa

309、ndemic,ADB helped prepare the Joint BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT Tourism Recovery Communications Plan and Toolkit 20222024 as well as capacity-building support.ADB also prepared special economic zone studies for BIMP-EAGA and IMT-GT,proposing strategic measures to make the zones more competitive.A joint BIM

310、P-EAGA and IMT-GT blue economy strategy is underway to help bolster enabling conditions for blue economy growth,particularly in terms of attracting greater investments.A study on BIMP-EAGA economic corridors expansion and reconfiguration is ongoing,which provides strategic approaches for enhanced tr

311、ade,tourism,and investments flows in the subregion.In the Philippines alone,about$380 million is allocated to improving 280 kilometers of sustainable roads and bridges in Mindanao to enhance commerce and connectivity.The loan also includes provision for knowledge support.Meanwhile,a green city actio

312、n plan has been developed for General Santos City.Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle Integrated solutions to sustain regional cooperation and integration(RCI)projects in IMT-GT include developing knowledge products such as green city action plans and integrated green transportation plans.Po

313、tential“green projects”are being structured,and innovative financing models will be piloted under the ASEAN Catalytic Green Finance Facility financed by ASEAN Infrastructure Fund.As of 2023,ADB has supported 16 technical assistance projects amounting$33.98 million(with co-funding)to develop smart an

314、d livable cities,improve transport connectivity,enhance urban planning,build capacities of the developing member economies in managing RCI,support trade facilitation aligned with ASEAN agreements,promote health security,and encourage clean energy transition.Of these,seven remaining active technical

315、assistance projects are providing support to(i)strengthen institutional capacities;(ii)transition to a cleaner energy future;(iii)help developing member economies to prepare and/or implement COVID-19 vaccination roll out and expand in the delivery of ADB procured vaccines;(iv)support sustainable tou

316、rism facility initiatives;(v)enhance trade facilitation in IMT-GT;(vi)promote action on plastic pollution;and(vii)support plans to develop livable cities that are smart,inclusive,environmentally sustainable,resilient,and competitive.The PacificADB contributes substantial and comprehensive support to

317、 the Pacific Islands Forum(PIF),a key regional cooperation initiative of the Pacific economies.5 The PIF is guided by the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent which outlines the following thematic areas:(i)political leadership and regionalism;(ii)people-centered development;(iii)peace and se

318、curity;(iv)resource and economic development;(v)climate change and disasters;(vi)ocean and environment;and(vii)technology and connectivity.The strategy guides PIF economies in navigating challenges in these thematic areas,leveraging their collective strengths in creating a sustainable future in the

319、region(PIFS 2022).A sample of ADB-and non-ADB-supported projects that focused on enhancing connectivity,boosting trade in goods and services,and strengthening adaptation and resilience to climate change in the Pacific are found in Table 1.3.5 The Pacific Islands Forum comprises 18 economies:Australi

320、a,Cook Islands,the Federated States of Micronesia,Fiji,French Polynesia,Kiribati,the Marshall Islands,Nauru,New Caledonia,New Zealand,Niue,Palau,Papua New Guinea,Samoa,Solomon Islands,Tonga,Tuvalu,and Vanuatu.12Asian Economic Integration Report 2024Table 13:Selected Projects in the Pacific,20202023C

321、onnectivityTradeRegional Public GoodsSmart Islands Projectadopts an innovative approach to deliver connectivity and sustainable services to disadvantaged island communities(ITU 2021).East Micronesia Cable Projectaims to provide faster,higher quality,and more reliable communications to more than 100,

322、000 people across the Federated States of Micronesia,Kiribati,and Nauru(AIFFP).Pacific Regional E-commerce Strategy and Roadmapoutlines the Pacific consensus on the priority regional measures to boost e-commerce readiness in the region(UNCTAD 2022).Pacific Quality Infrastructureaims to strengthen a

323、demand-oriented quality infrastructure and access to services that enhance trade competitiveness in the Pacific region(PIFS 2020a).Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacificprovides a strategic guidance on how to enhance resilience to climate change and disasters(SPC 2016).Declaration on Pre

324、serving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-related Sea-level Risesets out the regions collective position on the rules on maritime zones with regard to climate change-related sea-level rise(PIFS 2021).Nauru airport upgradeincludes resurfacing of the runway and upgrade of some critical air

325、traffic control equipment to ensure the airport continues to operate safely and meet international standards(AIFFP 2022b).Papua New Guinea maritime port infrastructure upgradeaims to increase the capacity of critical maritime infrastructure to accommodate larger ships,which will improve trade and co

326、nnectivity(AIFFP 2022a).Pacific Ecotourism Recovery Initiativeaims to assess the potential of ecotourism experiences as a diversification strategy for the regions tourism sector(SPTO 2022).Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobilityaims to guide governments in addressing legal,policy,and practica

327、l issues that arise on climate mobility(PIFS 2023).Pacific Climate Change Finance Assessment Frameworkprovides guidance on the assessment of the Pacific economies ability to access and manage climate change resources(PIFS 2013).Pacific Humanitarian Pathway on COVID-19COVID-19 pandemic emergency resp

328、onse that enabled the movement of medical and humanitarian supplies across the region(PIFS 2020b).Sources:ADB compilation based on information from the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific,International Telecommunication Union,Secretariat of the Pacific Community,Pacific Isla

329、nds Forum Secretariat,South Pacific Tourism Organization,and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.ADB takes a systematic approach to support the integration of Pacific economies,guiding investments and technical assistance in connectivity infrastructure,regional public goods,and capaci

330、ty-building.The Pacific Approach 20212025 lays down ADBs operational regional strategy in the Pacific and focuses on three critical development challenges:vulnerability to shocks,weak service delivery,and slow growth.ADBs regional investments in the Pacific,which increased by 45.3%(year-on-year)in 2

331、023,seek to support connectivity,trade facilitation,and resilience to shocks(Figure 1.13).For instance,the rehabilitation and expansion of Nukualofa Port in Tonga involves strengthening its operations and management,and so promotes resilient connectivity and merchandise trade.Other ADB efforts to en

332、hance trade promotion and facilitation in Tonga include establishment of an authorized economic operator program to streamline procedures for accredited exporters and the implementation of an electronic phytosanitary certification system to facilitate agricultural exports.ADB is also helping to enha

333、nce digital connectivity in Samoa by establishing policies on digital identification and providing digital financial services;and domestic shipping in Tuvalu,which will also benefit intraregional connectivity by providing safe and reliable transport for people and trade to other subregional destinations such as Fiji and Kiribati.In addition,a national reference laboratory is being built in Papua N