《國際貨幣基金組織：2024西半球國家經濟展望報告：政策再平衡與深化改革（英文版）（44頁）.pdf》由會員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關《國際貨幣基金組織：2024西半球國家經濟展望報告：政策再平衡與深化改革（英文版）（44頁）.pdf（44頁珍藏版）》請在三個皮匠報告上搜索。

1、WESTERN HEMISPHEREREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDRebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms2024OCTInternational Monetary Fund.Not for Redistribution2024 International Monetary FundCataloging-in-Publication DataIMF LibraryNames:International Monetary Fund,publisher.Title:R

2、egional economic outlook.Western Hemisphere:rebalancing policies and pressing on with reforms.Other titles:Western Hemisphere:rebalancing policies and pressing on with reforms.|Rebalancing policies and pressing on with reforms.|Regional economic outlook:Western Hemisphere.Description:Washington,DC:I

3、nternational Monetary Fund,2024.|Oct.2024.|Includes bibliographical references.Identifiers:ISBN:9798400287633(paper)9798400292750 (ePub)9798400292736 (Web PDF)Subjects:LCSH:Economic forecastingWestern Hemisphere.|Economic developmentWestern Hemisphere.|Western HemisphereEconomic conditions.Classific

4、ation:LCC HC95.R44 2024The Regional Economic Outlook:Western Hemisphere is published once a year,in the fall,to review developments in Latin America and the Caribbean.Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMFstaff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF,its Execut

5、ive Board,or IMF Management.Publication orders may be placed online,by fax,or through the mail:International Monetary Fund,Publication ServicesP.O.Box 92780,Washington,DC 20090(USA)T.+(1)202.623.7430F.+(1)202.623.7201publicationsIMF.orgwww.IMFbookstore.orgwww.elibrary.IMF.orgInternational Monetary F

6、und.Not for RedistributionContentsAcknowledgments.vCountry Groupings.viRebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms.1Global Economic Environment .1Steady Global Growth but Slow Disinflation.1Latin America and the Caribbean:Recent Economic Developments .2Operating Near Potential.2Mostly on the S

7、idelines of Global Geopolitical Tensions.4Inflation within Target Ranges but Showing Stickiness.6Healthy Balance Sheets.7Outlook and Risks.7Slowing Growth and Sticky Inflation.7Downside Risks to Growth,Upside Risks to Inflation.9Lackluster Medium-Term Growth Prospects .9Policy Recommendations.11The

8、Case for Growth-Friendly Fiscal Consolidation.11The Final Stretch in Unwinding Monetary Policy.13Pressing on with Structural Reforms to Boost Potential Growth .13Background Paper 1 Summary.Closing the Gap:Labor Market Participation in Latin America.28Labor Force Participation Patterns.29Obstacles an

9、d Opportunities for Increasing Participation.29Background Paper 2 Summary.Public Debt Dynamics in Latin America:Time to Rebuild Buffers and Strengthen Fiscal Frameworks.30Understanding the Debt Buildup.30Public Debt Outlook and Vulnerabilities.30Country Notes.34References.37BOXES1.Central America,Pa

10、nama,and the Dominican Republic:GDP Convergence and Differences.192.The Caribbean:Fostering Higher,Sustainable,and More Inclusive Growth.223.Latin America 7 and Other South American Countries:Country Focus.25ContentsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDiiiInternational Monetary Fund.Not for Redis

11、tributionFIGURESFigure1.Global Economic Environment.2Figure2.Recent Economic Developments.3Figure3.Trade Patterns amid Global Geopolitical Tensions.5Figure4.LA7:Net Capital Inflows.4Figure5.Inflation.6Figure6.LA7:Financial Soundness Indicators.7Figure7.Growth and Inflation Risks.9Figure8.Medium-Term

12、 Growth.10Figure9.Fiscal Policy.12Figure10.Monetary Policy.14Figure11.Technological Classification of Exports.15Figure12.Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender.15Figure13.Structural Reforms for Growth .16Box Figure 1.1.GDP per Capita.19Box Figure 1.2.GDP per Capita Convergence and Its Contributor

13、s.19Box Figure 1.3.Per Capita Consumption and Investment.20Box Figure 1.4.FDI Inflows per Capita and GDP per Capita.20Box Figure 1.5.Remittances per Capita and GDP per Capita.21Box Figure 2.1.Real GDP Growth and Inflation.22Box Figure 2.2.Tourist Arrivals.22Box Figure 2.3.Change in General Governmen

14、t Gross Debt.23Box Figure 2.4.Real GDP Growth.23Background Paper Figure 1.1.Labor Force Participation Rate by Gender and Age,2023.28Background Paper Figure 1.2.Reported Reasons for Inactivity.29Background Paper Figure 2.1.LA7:Decomposition of Changes in Public Debt.30Background Paper Figure 2.2.LA7:

15、Evolution of Fiscal Rules.31TABLESTable 1.Latin America and the Caribbean:Real GDP Growth and End-of-Period Inflation.8Table 2.LA7:Pro-Growth Reform Priorities and Reforms Underway.17Appendix Table 1.Western Hemisphere:Main Economic Indicators.32Appendix Table 2.Western Hemisphere:Main Fiscal Indica

16、tors.33REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 2024ivInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionAcknowledgmentsThe October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Western Hemisphere was prepared by Armine Khachatryan with contributions from Lusine Lusinyan,Diego

17、Calderon,and Olusegun Akanbi,under the supervision and guidance from Gustavo Adler and Lusine Lusinyan.Rodrigo Valds and Ana Corbacho provided overall direction.Genevieve Lindow delivered outstanding research support and coordinated the excellent research assistance of Nicols Gmez Parra,Carlos Gueva

18、ra,and Kenji Moreno.Contributions for boxes and online annexes were provided by Zamid Aligishiev,Francisco Arizala,Bas Bakker,Sophia Chen,Damaris Garza Escamilla,Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov,Spencer Siegel,Ilya Stepanov,Camilo E.Tovar,Hugo Tuesta,Dmitry Vasilyev,and country teams(all Western Hemisphere Depa

19、rtment),Tomohide Mineyama(European Department),Oliver Exton,Adam Jakubik,Sergio L.Rodriguez,and Lorenzo Rotunno(all Strategy,Policy,and Review Department),and Lorena Corso,Bright Richard Kimuli,and Michael Stanger(all Statistics Department).The report includes content from two background papers avai

20、lable online.Background Paper 1,“Closing the Gap:Labor Market Participation in Latin America,”was prepared by Camila Casas(co-lead)and Flavien Moreau(co-lead).Background Paper 2,“Public Debt Dynamics in Latin America:Time to Rebuild Buffers and Strengthen Fiscal Frameworks,”was prepared by Juan Trev

21、io(co-lead),Juan Passadore(co-lead),Santiago Acosta Ormaechea,Luiza Antoun de Almeda,Chao He,and Roberto Perrelli.Both background papers were prepared under the guidance of Gustavo Adler and Lusine Lusinyan.Joan Thangaraj provided outstanding production support.The report also benefited from the exc

22、ellent coor-dination of editing and production by Cheryl Toksoz from the Communications Department.Translations to other languages(Spanish and Portuguese)were led by Vanesa Demko,Eric Fernandes Macedo,Carlos Viel,Maria Celeste Braschi,and Emilia Soto Galindo with review from Camila Casas,Juan Passad

23、ore,Joana Pereira,Roberto Perrelli,and Juan Trevio.This report reflects developments and staff projections available through October 7,2024.AcknowledgmentsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDvInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionCountry GroupingsCountry GroupsCaribbean:Commodity Exp

24、orters(CARCE)Caribbean:Non-Tourism Dependent(CARNT)Caribbean:Tourism Dependent(CARTD)Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic(CAPDR)Eastern Caribbean Currency Union(ECCU)Latin America7(LA7)Other South America(OTSA)South America(SA)GuyanaSurinameTrinidad and TobagoGuyanaHaitiSurinameTrinidad

25、 and TobagoAntigua and BarbudaArubaThe BahamasBarbadosBelizeDominicaGrenadaJamaicaSt.Kitts and NevisSt.LuciaSt.Vincent and the GrenadinesCosta RicaDominican RepublicEl SalvadorGuatemalaHondurasNicaraguaPanamaAnguillaAntigua and BarbudaDominicaGrenadaMontserratSt.Kitts and NevisSt.LuciaSt.Vincent and

26、 the GrenadinesBrazilChileColombiaMexicoParaguayPeruUruguayArgentinaBoliviaEcuadorVenezuelaArgentinaBoliviaBrazilChileColombiaEcuadorParaguayPeruUruguayVenezuelaList of Country AbbreviationsATG Antigua and Barbuda GUYGuyana ARG Argentina HTIHaiti ABW Aruba HNDHonduras BHS The Bahamas JAMJamaica BRB

27、Barbados MEXMexico BLZ Belize NICNicaragua BOL Bolivia PANPanama BRA Brazil PRYParaguay CAN Canada PERPeru CHL Chile PRIPuerto Rico COL Colombia KNASt.Kitts and Nevis CRI Costa Rica LCASt.Lucia DMA Dominica VCTSt.Vincent and the Grenadines DOM Dominican Republic SURSuriname ECU Ecuador TTOTrinidad a

28、nd Tobago SLV El Salvador USAUnited States GRD Grenada URYUruguay GTM Guatemala VENVenezuela REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 2024viInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionRebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsAfter successfully weat

29、hering a series of shocks,most countries in the region are converging to their(tepid)potential,although from different cyclical positions.Growth has been increasingly reliant on consumption as investment has generally stalled.Inflation has fallen considerably and is near target in most countries,but

30、 it is showing stickiness due mainly to still-strong domestic labor markets.Growth is expected to moderate in late 2024 and 2025,with risks around the baseline mostly tilted to the downside.Meanwhile,inflation is projected to continue easing,although gradually,and converge to central banks targets b

31、y 2026 in most cases.Risks to inflation remain tilted to the upside and stem from tight labor markets,persistent services inflation,incomplete re-anchoring of inflation expectations,and fiscal slippages.With output and inflation gaps mostly closed but monetary policy still contractionary and public

32、finances in need of strengthening,a further rebalancing of the policy mix is necessary.Fiscal consolidation,with emphasis on revenue mobilization,should advance without delay to rebuild buffers while protecting priority public investment and social spending.This would support the normalization of mo

33、netary policy and strengthen credibility and resilience of policy frameworks.Most central banks are well placed to proceed with monetary easing,striking a balance between fending off the risk of reemerging price pressures and avoiding an undue economic contraction.A durable return of inflation to th

34、e target will,in turn,help public debt dynamics.Medium-term growth is expected to remain close to its low historical average,reflecting long-standing,unresolved challengesincluding low investment and productivity growthand shifting demographics.Worrisomely,the ongoing reform agenda is thin and could

35、 lead to a vicious circle of low growth,social discontent,and populist policies.Avoiding this requires pressing on with reforms to foster all drivers of growth.Improving governanceby strengthening the rule of law,enhancing government effectiveness,and tackling crimeis a priority that cuts across all

36、 areas of growth.Boosting capital accumulation requires improving the business environment,fostering competition,and increasing international trade.Greater and more effective public investment is also needed.Maintaining a dynamic labor force and increasing productivity requires tackling informality

37、and making formal labor markets more flexible,including to adapt to new technologies.Increasing female labor participation can also help boost the labor force and offset demographic shifts.Policies to address climate change and embrace the green transition are increasingly important,although harness

38、ing the benefits of the green transformation requires strengthening investment frameworks to attract capital while raising natural-resource revenues to attend social and public investment needs.Global Economic Environment Steady Global Growth but Slow DisinflationDespite expectations of a slowdown,t

39、he external environment has remained broadly unchanged since last year.The global economy expanded by 3.3 percent in 2023 and is expected to grow at a similar pace in 2024 and 2025(Figure1,panel1).In the United States,growth is expected to remain strong at 2.8 percent in 2024 considerably outperform

40、ing the October 2023 projections(1.5 percent)but slow to 2.2 percent in 2025,reflecting a moderation in consumption and exports.In the euro area,while remaining tepid,growth is expected to accelerate to 0.8 percent in 2024(from 0.4 percent in 2023)on the back of improving services activityand increa

41、se further to 1.2 percent in 2025.Meanwhile,growth in China has proven to be more resilient than expected,although still projected to slow from 5.2 percent in 2023 to 4.8 percent and 4.5 percent in 2024 and 2025,respectively.Medium-term global growth prospects remain low by historical standards,with

42、 the world economy projected to expand by 3.2percent annually during 202529.Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND1International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionGlobal disinflation continues,with inflation in advanced economies(United States,eur

43、o area)currently running near targets,helped by disin-flation in core goods prices,whereas services inflation continues running high.Amid incipient signs of labor market weakening and the start of the easing cycle by the US Federal Reserve,US long-term yields have recently declined,although remainin

44、g elevated(Figure 1,panel 2).Despite high US interest rates,broad financial conditions remain accommodative on account of buoyant corporate valuations in the United States.Amid some volatility,prices of key commodities for the Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC)region have softened over the last ye

45、ar,helping the disinflation process but also reducing support to economic activity in the region(Figure1,panel3).Latin America and the Caribbean:Recent Economic Developments Operating Near PotentialFollowing a strong post-pandemic rebound,growth in LAC(excluding Argentina and Venezuela)has moderated

46、,from 4.0 percent in 2022 to 2.6percent in 2023,and a similar pace in early 2024 as most economies are now operating near potential although converging from different cyclical positions(Figure2,panels1 and2).Within the region,growth in the Latin America 7(LA7)group slowed from 3.6percent in 2022 to

47、about 2.4 percent in 2023 and 2.0 in the first half of 2024,albeit with notable heterogeneity.In Mexico,growth moderated,amid a positive output gap,partly because of weak external demand and tight policies to combat inflation.In Brazil,growth remained robust,while operating above potential,mainly re

48、flecting strong labor markets and smaller-than-anticipated disrup-tions from the floods.In Chile and Colombia,growth strengthened after the post-overheating decline,which helped close the positive output gaps.In Peru and Uruguay,economic activity is rebounding after the normalization of weather cond

49、itions(excep-tional rainfalls in Peru and droughts in Uruguay),helping to close negative output gaps.Meanwhile,in Paraguay,growth remained robust continuing with the rebound from the 2022 drought,helping close the negative output gap.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern Hemisphere2INTERNATIONAL MONETARY

50、 FUND October 2024Core goodsCore services,excluding USUS core servicesFinancial condition indexTen-year bond yield(percent;right scale)OilCopperIron oreSoybeansFigure 1.Global Economic EnvironmentGlobal growth has been steady,while disinflation continued despite elevated services inflation.US long-t

51、erm yields remain elevated,whereas financial conditions are loose.Key commodity prices have weakened.Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;Haver Analytics;IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Aggregates are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.CPI=consumer price inde

52、x;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean.1Trading partners growth is weighted by exports.2Sample of 11 advanced and 9 emerging market and developing economies(accounting for about 55 percent of 2021 world output).3For methodology and variables included in the financial conditions index,see October 2018

53、 Global Financial Stability Report.1.LAC Trading Partners:Real GDP Growth and InflationReal GDP Growth1(Year-over-year percentchange)Inflation2(Three-month-over-three-monthpercent change;annualized)2.United States:Financial Conditions Index and 10-YearGovernment Bond Yield3(0=neutral;+/=tight/loose;

54、unless otherwise noted)3.Commodity Prices Deflated by US CPI(Index:January 2020=100;12-month moving average)864202468102024681012201519averages1.00.50.00.51.01.52.001234562020:Q120:Q321:Q121:Q322:Q122:Q323:Q123:Q324:Q124:Q3Jan.2018Jan.19Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.242017:Q118:Q119:Q120:Q121:Q122:Q12

55、3:Q124:Q15075100125150175Jan.2020July20Jan.21July21Jan.22July22Jan.23July23Jan.24July24International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionRebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms3October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDLA7Other South AmericaCAPDRCaribbean(excluding Guyana)ActualPotentialPriv

56、ate consumptionInventoriesPublic consumptionExportsReal GDP growthInvestmentImportsMexicoLA7(excluding Mexico)2024Minmax(200019)Average(200019)Real wageProductivityUnit labor costFigure 2.Recent Economic DevelopmentsGrowth has moderated across the region.1.Real GDP Growth1(Year-over-year percent cha

57、nge)12128404820192021222324.albeit with some heterogeneity across countries,.2.LA7:Actual and Potential Real GDP(Index:2029=100)Brazil,Mexico957075808590201618202224Chile,Colombia201618202224Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay201618202224.and driven primarily by domestic consumption,.3.LA7:Contributions to Real G

58、DP Growth2(Year-over-year percent change;seasonally adjusted)84202462021:Q422:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q424:Q124:Q2.as investment has stalled,except in Mexico.4.LA7:Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation(Index:2019:Q4=100)130607080901001101202019:Q420:Q220:Q421:Q221:Q422:Q222:Q423:Q223:Q424:Q2

59、Unemployment is at historically low levels,.5.Unemployment Rate(Percent)200481216BrazilChileColombia Mexico ParaguayPeruUruguay.and real wages have outpaced productivity.6.LA7:Real Wage,Productivity,and Unit Labor Cost3(Index:2019:Q4=100)11590951001051102019:Q420:Q220:Q421:Q221:Q422:Q222:Q423:Q223:Q

60、424:Q2Sources:Haver Analytics;IMF,Direction of Trade Statistics database;IMF,World Economic Outlook database;national authorities;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Aggregates are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.CAPDR=Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic;LA7=Latin America 7(B

61、razil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).1Caribbean excludes Guyana because it has very high growth rates since the end of 2019,when oil production started.In 2024,Guyanas growth is expected to accelerate to 44 percent because of ramping up oil production.2Inventories include statistical d

62、iscrepancies.3Excludes Paraguay and Uruguay because of data limitations.International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionOverall,LA7 growth has been increasingly reliant on consumption amid stagnant investment,except in Mexico,and flat export volumes(Figure2,panels3 and4).Underpinning the resilienc

63、e of consumption is a strong labor market,as employment is back to its pre-pandemic trend,unemployment is at historically low levels,especially in Brazil and Mexico,and real wage growth has remained strong,outpacing productivity and contributing to price pressures,especially in services(Figure2,pane

64、ls5 and6).Growth in Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic(CAPDR)remained robust in early 2024thanks to strong remittance-fueled consumption(El Salvador,Guatemala,Honduras)and robust exports(Costa Rica,the Dominican Republic,and Panama)(Box1).1 Meanwhile,growth in the Caribbean(excluding

65、Guyana)is slowing as the post-pandemic tourism rebound is fading after reaching pre-pandemic levels(Box2).Mostly on the Sidelines of Global Geopolitical TensionsDespite growing global geopolitical tensions and increasing harmful(trade-distorting)trade interventions by systemic economies since 2017,i

66、ncluding measures affecting LAC economies,the regions structure of trade flows and trade policies have not materially changed.The United States remains the main export destination,with a broadly stable share of about half of all LA7 exports(over 80percent in the case of Mexico).2 Meanwhile,Chinas sh

67、are has grown from about 10percent pre-2017 to about 15percent in recent years(Figure3,panel1),going beyond the expected effect of Chinas growing size in the world economy and its demand for commodities(Figure3,panel2).However,this increase is not a new phenomenon but a continuation of a long-term t

68、rend of increasing intensity of the regions trade with China(Figure3,panel3).Despite the rise of harmful trade interventions by systemic economies until recently,comparable policy actions by LAC countries have been limited(Figure3,panel4),contributing also to a lower prevalence of trade-distortive p

69、olicies in LAC relative to other emerging market or advanced economies.3 Geopolitical tensions do not appear to have affected capital flows to Latin America either.The United States and advanced European countries continue to be the main counterparts in foreign direct investment(FDI),the dominant fo

70、rm of capital flows to the region in recent yearsalthough data on Chinas investments in the region are incomplete(Figure4).Overall,the regions external positions have generally strengthened(after deteriorating in the aftermath of the pandemic),with current account deficits declining to below 1 perce

71、nt of GDP and international reserves remaining at comfortable levels in most countries.1 See also Online Annex 1,“Leaving but Sending Money Back Home:The Joint Effect of Migration and Remittances on Growth and Labor Force.”2 See Online Annex 2,“Relocation of Global Value Chains:The Role of Mexico.”3

72、 See Online Annex 3,“Industrial Policy in Latin America.”INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 2024REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern Hemisphere4FDIPortfolioOtherFigure 4.LA7:Net Capital Inflows(Percent of GDP;four-quarter moving average)Capital flows patterns,dominated by FDI,have remained broadly unch

73、anged.321012342019:Q119:Q320:Q120:Q321:Q121:Q322:Q122:Q323:Q123:Q324:Q1Sources:IMF,Balance of Payments Statistics database;IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:FDI=foreign direct investment;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).Interna

74、tional Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionRebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND5Advanced AsiaEMDE EuropeChinaAdvanced EuropeLACRest of the worldEMDE AsiaUnited StatesChinaUnited StatesAdvanced EuropeOthersBy United StatesBy ChinaBy rest of the wor

75、ldChinaUnited StatesIntroducedRemovedBy LAC(affecting the world,net)By the world(affecting LAC,net)BRACHLCOLMEXPRYPERURYLA7BRACHLCOLMEXPRYPERURYLA7Figure 3.Trade Patterns amid Global Geopolitical TensionsThe regions trade structure has not changed materially despite global geopolitical tensions,.1.L

76、A7:Share of Merchandise Trade1(Percent of world)although trade with China has risen beyond what can be explained by Chinas increased share in the global economy,2.Export Intensity Index2(Points)7000100200300400500600.continuing its long-term trend.3.LA7:Exports Intensity Index by Trading Partner2(Po

77、ints)035050100150200250300Despite harmful trade measures by systemic economies,trade interventions by LAC countries remain limited.4.Harmful Trade Interventions3(Number of interventions)5002,00005001,0001,500Sources:Global Trade Alerts database;IMF,Direction of Trade Statistics database;World Bank,W

78、orld Integrated Trade Solution database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.EMDE=emerging market and developing economies;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay);LAC=Latin Ameri

79、ca and the Caribbean.1Average for 201823 excludes 2020.2Export intensity indexmeasured as a trade intensity index based on the World Integrated Trade Solution databaseindicates if a country exports more,as a percentage,to a partner than the world does.The index shows the relative importance of a giv

80、en exporter for a given partner country.A value greater than 100 indicates a relationship more intense than the world average for the partner.Aggregates are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.3Includes introduced and removed discriminatory measures.Bars represent interventions by China,th

81、e United States,and rest of the world affecting LAC.“By rest of the world”may include measures from LAC countries affecting other LAC countries.The data aggregates unique policy measures to avoid multiple counting in case an intervention affects more than one country.Data for 2024 are annualized.LA7

82、 ExportLA7 Import201317201317201823201823020406080100201822(excluding 2020)20131701002003004005006007002000020406081012141618202220081012141618202224International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionInflation within Target Ranges but Showing StickinessAccompanying more moderate economic activity,and

83、 in line with other emerging market economies,headline and core inflation have been receding in the region since mid/end of 2022(Figure5),with headline inflation running within the target range in recent months(except in Colombia and Mexico)although not yet at the mid-point of the range.The disinfla

84、tion process has been driven mainly by the unwinding of the earlier rise of noncore goods prices(food and energy)and appreciating domestic currencies(although some of this trend has reversed more recently).Core inflation,especially services inflation,has remained elevated partly because of still-hig

85、h wage growth,amid a yet-incomplete re-anchoring of inflation expectations.INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 2024LA7EM AsiaEM EuropeBrazilChileColombiaMexicoParaguayPeruUruguayLA7Core goodsCore servicesEnergyFoodHeadlineImport price index(US dollars)Exchange rateImport price index(local currency)D

86、omestic PPIFigure 5.InflationInflation has been receding globally.1.Headline and Core Inflation(Year-over-year percent change;solid line:headline;dashed line:core)048121620Jan.2020July20Jan.21July21Jan.22July22Jan.23July23Jan.24July24.and across the region.2.LA7:Headline Consumer Price Inflation(Dev

87、iation from inflation target;percentage points)Jan.2020July20Jan.21July21Jan.22July22Jan.23July23Jan.24July24404812.as goods inflation slowed.3.LA7:Contributions to Headline Inflation1(Deviation from inflation target;year-over-year percent change)202468Jan.2020July20Jan.21July21Jan.22July22Jan.23Jul

88、y23Jan.24July24.helped by global disinflation and,until recently,domestic currency appreciation.4.LA7:Imported Inflation and Producer Price Inflation2(Year-over-year percent change)Jan.2020July20Jan.21July21Jan.22July22Jan.23July23Jan.24July24302010010203040Sources:Haver Analytics;national authoriti

89、es;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Aggregates are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.EM=emerging markets;EM Asia=India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,Vietnam;EM Europe=Hungary,Poland,Romania,Serbia;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay);PPI=pr

90、oducer price inflation.1Core services inflation is defined as headline inflation less food,energy,and core goods.LA7 excludes Paraguay and Uruguay because of data limitations.2LA7 excludes Chile and Paraguay because of data limitations.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern Hemisphere6International Moneta

91、ry Fund.Not for RedistributionHealthy Balance SheetsReflecting contractionary monetary policy to combat inflation,domestic financial conditions have remained tight since 2022.Yet,the regions banks have generally remained liquid,well capitalized,and with low levels of nonperforming loans(Figure6,pane

92、l1)amid resilient,consumer-driven,credit growth.While banks prof-itability indicators have remained broadly stable on averagesupported by the rise of net interest margins,as lending rates have responded more markedly to policy rates than deposit ratesthe dispersion of profitability indicators has wi

93、dened,pointing to potential pockets of balance sheet weakness.Corporate profitability has generally remained in line with pre-pandemic levels(Figure6,panel2).Outlook and RisksSlowing Growth and Sticky InflationGrowth in LAC(excluding Argentina and Venezuela)is expected to moderatefrom 2.6 percent in

94、 202324 to 2.2percent in 2025amid mostly closed output gaps and a broadly unchanged external environment(Table1;Box3).Within the LA7 group,Mexico is projected to decelerate markedly in 2024 and 2025 partly reflecting capacity constraints,fiscal consolidation,and lower growth in the United States.Bra

95、zils growth is projected to remain broadly unchanged in 2024,on the back of strong consumptionand so is Paraguaysbefore slowing in 2025.Meanwhile,growth in Chile,Colombia,Peru,and Uruguay is expected to accelerate somewhat in 2024 and 2025 after aweak 2023.Economic activity in other South American e

96、conomies(Argentina,Bolivia,Ecuador,and Venezuela),as a group,is projected to contract in 2024,but rebound significantly in some of these countries in 2025,mainly reflecting important ongoing stabilization efforts.Figure 6.LA7:Financial Soundness Indicators(Percent)1.Deposit Takers Financial Indicato

97、rs12010121416182.Corporations Financial Indicators210002040608070102030405060820246255051015205012342500501001502004012324061218100405060708090Sources:Haver Analytics;IMF,Financial Soundness Indicators database;national authorities;and IMF staff calculations.Note:CAR=capital adequacy ratio;LA7=Latin

98、 America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay);NIM=net interest margin to gross income;NPL=nonperforming loans;ROA=return on assets;ROE=return on equity.1Markers are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages;whiskers indicate min-max range across LA7 countries.“Liquidity”refers t

99、o the ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities.Chile is excluded from“liquidity”because of data limitations.2Markers are medians across corporations of Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,and Peru.Whiskers indicate 25th/75th percentile range.“Liquidity”is the ratio of cash and short-term investment

100、s to short-term liabilities.“Indebtedness”is the ratio of total debt to total capital.Bank balance sheets have remained healthy despite high interest rates.and so have corporate balance sheets.CARNPLLiquidityROAROENIMJan.2020LatestJan.2020LatestJan.2020LatestJan.2020LatestLiquidityIndebt-ednessROARO

101、E2019:Q423:Q42019:Q423:Q4Jan.2020LatestJan.2020Latest2019:Q423:Q42019:Q423:Q4Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms7October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionTable 1.Latin America and the Caribbean:Real GDP Growth and End-of-Period Inflation

102、(Year-over-year percent change)Real GDP GrowthEnd-of-period InflationProjectionsDifference from April 2024 WEOProjectionsDifference from April 2024 WEO202220232024202520242025202220232024202520242025Latin America and the Caribbean4.22.22.12.50.10.014.917.213.26.90.50.4LA73.62.42.42.00.20.07.95.04.43

103、.30.60.3Other South America5.60.11.84.00.60.068.6139.195.533.55.50.0CAPDR5.44.13.83.80.10.07.52.73.03.30.30.0Caribbean13.17.511.95.52.21.415.58.97.26.10.70.6 Tourism dependent9.13.02.82.40.30.37.34.33.53.10.10.2 Non-tourism dependent15.410.016.57.12.92.220.611.59.17.61.00.9 Of which:Commodity export

104、ers22.714.322.78.73.92.813.74.83.84.80.30.0MemorandumLAC excluding Argentina/Venezuela4.02.62.62.20.20.17.84.74.33.30.60.2Sources:IMF,World Economic Outlook(WEO)database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Difference based on rounded figures for the current and April 2024 WEO forecasts.For country group

105、 information,see page vi.CAPDR=Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay);LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;Other South America=Argentina,Bolivia,Ecuador,Venezuela.1Regional aggregates for real GDP growth are purchasing

106、-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.2End-of-period inflation refers to December-over-December inflation.Regional aggregates are geometric purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.Venezuela is excluded from all inflation aggregates.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETAR

107、Y FUND October 20248International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionWhile still growing generally faster than the rest of the region,Caribbean economies are expected to slow in 2024 and 2025,on the back of decel-eration in tourism.By contrast,growth in the CAPDR region is expected to remain relati

108、vely robust,reflecting strong private consumption buoyed by sustained remittances inflows.Inflation in LAC(excluding Argentina and Venezuela)is projected to gradually decline from 4.7 percent at the end of 2023 to 4.3 and 3.3 percent by the end of 2024 and 2025,respec-tively(Table1).While inflation

109、is already within the target range in most LA7 economies,it will take time for it to reach the targetin most cases,until 2026partly because of the lagged effect of tight policies,the gradual process of global disinflation,and the delayed normalization of administered prices in some countries.Inflati

110、on is also projected to moderate in the Caribbean,from 8.9 percent in 2023 to 6.1 percent by 2025,while in CAPDR it is expected to remain low,although rising somewhat from its 2.7 percent level in 2023 to 3.3percent by 2025.Downside Risks to Growth,Upside Risks to InflationRisks to near-term growth

111、are generally tilted to the downside,especially in the Caribbean where downside risks largely dominate because of the possibility of climate-related shocks and weaker tourism demand(Figure7).Throughout the region,external downside risks to growth relate mainly to tighter-than-expected US monetary po

112、licy and greater commodity price volatility.Policy uncertainty and social tensions are key domestic downside risks as these could hinder the implementation of economic policies and reforms.On the upside,stronger trading partner growth and a more benign global environment could boost exports and capi

113、tal inflows.A pick-up in investmentreflecting greater interest in green minerals and energy as well as nearshoring projectsis also an upside risk to growth.Risks to inflation are mostly tilted to the upside,although with heterogeneity across subregions,and stem from persistent services inflation,sti

114、ll-tight labor markets,and risk of fiscal slippages in some countries.Also,the relative price of core goods vis-vis services is yet to converge to its pre-pandemic trend,adding to the risk of further inflationary pressures if the adjustment takes place through rising services prices.Pronounced US do

115、llar appreciation,higher commodity prices,and an escalation of global trade tensions are key external upside risks to inflation in the region.Lackluster Medium-Term Growth Prospects Despite resilience to recent shocks,the medium-term growth outlook for LAC(excluding Argentina and Venezuela)remains l

116、ackluster,as output is projected to expand at about 2 percent per year over the next five years,in line with the regions low historical average and low compared to other emerging market economies(Figure8,panel1).Average income per capita in the region would rise only marginally,implying limited prog

117、ress in reducing the income gap with advanced economies(Figure8,panel2).Underlying these projections,potential growth in Tilted to the upsideTilted to the downsideBalancedFigure 7.Growth and Inflation Risks(Percent of LAC countries)Risks to growth are tilted to the downside,whereas upside risks to i

118、nflation prevail but with heterogeneity across subregions.Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:CAPDR=Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic;CARIB=Caribbean;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay);LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean.GrowthInflationLA7CAPDRCARI

119、BLA7CAPDRCARIBLACGrowthInflation0204060801000201040305060Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms9October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionTotal factor productivityCapital stockLaborReal GDP growthUnited StatesLatin America and the CaribbeanE

120、M AsiaEM EuropePopulationLabor force participationDemographicsEmployment rateLabor growthLA7EM AsiaEM EuropeLA7EM AsiaEM EuropeLA7EM AsiaEM EuropeAgricultureManufacturing industriesConstructionMining and extractionElectricity,gas,and waterServicesTotal plus MexicoTotalFigure 8.Medium-Term Growth1.Co

121、ntributions to Real GDP Growth1(Year-over-year percent change)2.Real GDP per Capita(Log of thousands of PPP 2017 international dollars)701234565101234Sources:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;Penn World Table 10.0 database;World Bank,Population Estimates and Projections database;and IMF staff calc

122、ulations.Note:Aggregates are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.Shaded areas refer to projection years.EM=emerging markets;EM Asia=India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,Vietnam;EM Europe=Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria,Hungary,Poland,Romania,Serbia;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,C

123、hile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay;Peru,Uruguay);PPP=purchasing power parity.1LA7 excludes Paraguay because of data limitations.2LA7 excludes Uruguay because of data limitations.3Includes Brazil,Chile,Colombia,and Peru.Data for the COVID-19 years(202021)are not shown.“Construction”activity includes resid

124、ential construction.3.LA7:Contributions to Labor Growth1(Year-over-year percent change)4.Real Capital Stock and Public InvestmentReal Capital Stock Growth1(Percent)Public Gross Fixed CapitalFormation2(Percent of GDP;three-yearmoving average)310128024662345The growth of the labor force will slow as p

125、opulation growth decelerates and the“demographic dividend”fades.Prospects for capital accumulation are also tepid.5.Total Factor Productivity Relative to the United States1(Percent)6.Selected LA7 Economies:Contributions to Private GrossFixed Capital Formation Growth by Economic Activity3(Year-over-y

126、ear percent change)100304050607080906642024Total factor productivity is expected to stagnate,unlike in peers.partly reflecting the concentration of investment in lower-productivity sectors.Medium-term growth is expected to remain low because of stagnant productivity and slow capital accumulation.per

127、petuating the regions income gap with advanced economies.200019202429LA7EM EuropeEM AsiaLA7EM EuropeEM Asia1960657075808590952000051015202520000405091014151920232429200004081216202428200004081216202428200004081216202428201718192223Pre-COVID-19REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL

128、MONETARY FUND October 202410International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionColombia and Peru has declined toward the regional average,mainly reflecting a weaker business environment and increased policy uncertainty.At the same time,Brazils potential growth estimates have been revised upwards on a

129、ccount of the expected impact of structural reforms and the acceleration of hydrocarbon production.A factor underlying the regions tepid medium-term outlook is the shift in demographics as the expansion of the labor force seen in past decadesreflecting a“demographic dividend”from population growth a

130、nd a rising share of working-age populationis projected to slow markedly and offset only partially by the rising labor force partici-pation(Figure8,panel3;Background Paper1 Summary).The prospects for capital accumulation are also tepid,as investment is expected to remain near historic low levelsand

131、lower than in other emerging market economiespartly reflecting low public investment(Figure8,panel4).Finally,despite a slight improvement relative to past decadesreflecting recent reforms,such as Brazils landmark value-added tax overhaul,and some prospective reformstotal factor productivity growth i

132、s projected to remain stagnant and low relative to peers(Figure8,panel5),partly reflecting the increased concentration of investment in lower productivity sectors(Figure8,panel6).4 Policy RecommendationsRebalancing the policy mixtoward strengthening public finances and normalizing monetary policywou

133、ld help rebuild policy buffers and strengthen macroeconomic resilience.Pressing on with structural reforms will be key to raise living standards.The Case for Growth-Friendly Fiscal ConsolidationSupported by the timely withdrawal of the stimulus,the regions public finances withstood the impact of the

134、 pandemic better than expected,but public debt remains high and will increase further in the absence of addi-tional fiscal consolidation(Figure9,panel1).Most countries have ambitious plans for strengthening public finances and stabilizing debt at current levels(Figure9,panel2).These plans should be

135、implemented without further delays(Figure9,panel3)and should be underpinned with identified fiscal measures.Timely fiscal consolidation will support the normalization of monetary policy and further strengthen credibility and resilience of policy frameworks,including by lowering inflation expectation

136、s and country risk.Greater and more durable efforts would be needed to firmly put debt on a downward path given the unfavorable interest rate-growth differential that the region faces(Background Paper Summary 2).While addressing spending inefficiencies could help strengthen public finances,especiall

137、y in the near term,successful consolidation will require growth-friendly revenue mobilizationwith a focus on increasing personal income tax collectionfrom currently low tax ratios(Figure9,panel4;IMF 2021).These efforts are critical to ensure that growth-enhancing public investment and key social spe

138、nding are protected while creating fiscal space for front-loaded spending on climate policies and for lowering the regions relatively high corporate income tax rates.More generally,implementing the planned fiscal consolidations will require stronger discipline and institutional frameworks.The region

139、s fiscal rules and compliance record provide a basis for delivering on consolidation objectives,but frameworks should be enhanced to prevent a repeat of the pre-pandemic debt buildup under the umbrella of fiscal rules(Figure9,panels5 and6).Strengthening the link between stricter fiscal rules,operati

140、onal targets,and medium-term budget frameworks,including to prevent frequent relaxation of fiscal targets,and introducing debt anchors would give consolidation plans greater credibility and reduce high financing costs.4 See Online Annex 4,“Investment by Economic Activity in Latin America:Closing the

141、 Data Gaps.”Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND11International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionLACLA7Historical(201319)Baseline(202529)October 2024 WEOOctober 2023 WEOBrazilChileColombiaParaguayPeru200313201419PERBRACOLMEXCHLCAPDREMDELACLA5OE

142、CDBRACHLCOLMEXPERAEEMDEsBRACHLCOLMEXPERPRYURYAEEMDEFigure 9.Fiscal PolicyFollowing the prepandemic buildup,public debt is projected to remain elevated,.1.General Government Gross Debt1(Percent of GDP).despite fiscal plans that are ambitious relative to history and plans of peer economies.2.General G

143、overnment Primary Balance1(Percent of GDP).and have already faced implementation delays.3.LA7:General Government Structural Primary Balance1,2(Percent of potential GDP)Revenue mobilization will be key as tax revenues remain low.4.Tax Revenue Collection3(Percent of GDP).and so will be strengthening f

144、iscal frameworks,as high compliance with fiscal rules did not prevent the debt buildup.5.Changes in Debt and Compliance with Fiscal Rules4(X-axis:percent;Y-axis:percent of GDP).due to fiscal targets being repeatedly relaxed.6.Fiscal Targets for Budget Balance Rules5(Percent of GDP)Sources:Acosta-Orm

145、aechea,Sola,and Yoo(2019);Davoodi and others(2022);Larch and others(2023);IMF,World Economic Outlook database;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Tax Revenue Statistics database;Ulloa-Suarez and Valencia(2022);and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use Internati

146、onal Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AE=advanced economies;CAPDR=Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic;CARIB=Caribbean;EM=emerging markets;EM Asia=India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,Vietnam;EM Europe=Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria,Hungary,Poland,Romania

147、,Serbia;EMDE=emerging market and developing economies;LA5=Latin America 5(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Peru);LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay);LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean(excluding Argentina and Venezuela);OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

148、Development;PPP=purchasing power parity;WEO=World Economic Outlook.1Aggregates are medians.2Chile refers to the central governments structural non-mining primary balance.Colombia refers to the consolidated public sectors structural non-oil primary balance.Peru refers to the nonfinancial public secto

149、rs structural primary balance.3See details in IMF(2021).4See Background Paper 2.Debt refers to general government gross concept.Average compliance across all fiscal rules is reported for LA7 countries,and compliance with budget balance rules is reported for AE and EMDE groups.Aggregates are simple a

150、verages.5Reflects ultimate fiscal target set for each given year.EMEuropeEMAsiaLACLA7CAPDRCARIBURYBRAPERCOLCHLPRYMEX20131517192123252729354045505560657021012Pandemic202324252627282951525354555Real GDP(PPP)per capita,2017(thousands of US dollars)2005072009111315171930405060708090100Compliance with fi

151、scal rule2.01.51.00.50.00.51.01020304050Change in debt30201001020304321012345REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202412International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionThe Final Stretch in Unwinding Monetary PolicyAlthough the regions central banks have mo

152、ved forward with monetary easingahead of other countries,partic-ularly the United States(Figure10,panel1)policy rates have remained restrictive compared to past disinflation episodes(Figure10,panel2),reflecting lingering inflation risks including from yet-to-be fully anchored inflation expectations(

153、Figure10,panel3).Moreover,current policy rates stand above the levels implied by standard Taylor-rule estimates(Figure10,panel4),reflecting a tracking of the US policy rate by the central banks on account of concerns over narrower interest rate differentials affecting capital flows and domestic curr

154、encies.Exchange rates have not shown material directional effects associated with current narrowing differentials,partly as expectations of future policy rates in the region have co-moved with those of the United States,dampening exchange rate movements.Uncertainty about the neutral rate also condit

155、ions the path of monetary policy.Market expectations point to terminal rates for this easing cycle that would be higher than historical averages,while neutral rate estimates also suggest an increase over time,although associated with greater estimation uncertainty(Calderon,Dhungana,and Wales,forthco

156、ming)(Figure10,panels5 and6).Uncertainty about domestic neutral rates in LAC is amplified by the uncertainty about the neutral rate in the United States(IMF 2024),which is likely to affect emerging market economies(IMF 2023a),and possibly face upward pressures from persistently large fiscal deficits

157、,expected productivity gains from artificial intelligence,higher investment needs for infrastructure and energy transition,and global financial fragmentation(which could wane the flow of savings from surplus economies).Notwithstanding these factors,with inflation generally within the target range,in

158、 most countries,monetary policy should continue easing while remaining on guard given elevated uncertainty and upside inflation risks.Future policy actions should strike a balance between fending off the risk of reemerging price pressuresfrom still-tight labor markets,yet-to-be fully anchored inflat

159、ion expectations,and slippages in fiscal consolidation effortsand avoiding an undue economic contraction.Pressing on with Structural Reforms to Boost Potential Growth With output gaps mostly closed and inflation near targets,authorities focus should shift from cyclical to structural policies aimed a

160、t lifting potential growth,which should target all drivers of growth(capital,labor,and productivity).Unfortunately,the ongoing reform agenda is thin.Improving governance is a key priority that cuts across all areas of growth and tops the reform priorities in many countries in the region(Table2).This

161、 includes strengthening the rule of law,tackling corruption and crime(IMF 2023b),and enhancing government effectiveness.Boosting capital accumulation requires improving the business environment and fostering competition,including by reducing the administrative burden and entry costs for firms,streng

162、thening contract enforcement,and addressing delays in the judicial system.Fostering international trade and developing higher-tech sectors can also help boost investment(and productivity),as there is significant scope for increasing the regions degree of trade integration(IMF 2023c)and diversifying

163、away from commodities and low-tech products(Figure11).Although industrial policies could help in this regard,they should be time-bound,cost effective,transparent,and consistent with preserving macro-economic stability and avoiding negative cross-border spillovers.5 The region also needs higher and m

164、ore effective public investment,which can catalyze private investment.Achieving this requires strengthening public investment management to ensure more transparent and competitive project selection processes,with clear funding mecha-nisms and high economic and social returns.There is also a need to

165、align the relatively high corporate statutory rates with those observed in other regions to attract investment,mindful of fiscal implications(IMF 2021).Meanwhile,maintaining a dynamic labor force and increasing productivityincluding to mitigate the demographic headwindsrequires tackling informality

166、and making labor markets more flexible and inclusive.This agenda should include revising tax policies and employment protection legislation to strengthen firms and workers 5 See Online Annex 3,“Industrial Policy in Latin America.”Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNAT

167、IONAL MONETARY FUND13International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionHistorical episodes:InflationHistorical episodes:Policy rateCurrent episode:InflationCurrent episode:Policy rateChileMexicoPeruUnitedStatesBrazilColombiaParaguayUruguayStandard Taylor RuleIncluding US inflationIncluding US inflat

168、ion and US policy rateHistoricalPrepandemicCurrent(August 2024)End of 2025 marketexpectationEnd of 2026 marketexpectationFigure 10.Monetary PolicyCentral banks in the region have generally been easing.1.Monetary Policy Rates(Nominal;percent).although real interest rates remain high,.2.LA7:Headline I

169、nflation and Real Monetary Policy Rateacross Inflation Episodes1(Percentage points).reflecting in part not-yet-fully re-anchored inflation expectations.3.LA7:Distribution of One-Year-Ahead InflationExpectations by Forecasters2(Percentage points;deviation from inflation target).and the mirroring of t

170、he US policy rate.4.LA7:Policy Rates Relative to Taylor Rule Predictions3(Percentage points;deviation from predicted Taylor Rule)Market expectations for terminal policy rates are higher than those prevailing before the pandemic.5.Real Ex Ante Monetary Policy Rates and“Terminal”Rates4(Percent).and so

171、 are most neutral rate estimates.6.Real Neutral Rates Estimates5(Percent)Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;Calderon,Dhungana,and Wales(forthcoming);Consensus Economics;Haver Analytics;IMF,World Economic Outlook database;national authorities;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use

172、International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).1Inflation is deviation from inflation target.Ex ante real policy rate(difference between nominal policy rate and one-year-ahead inflation expectations)is reported

173、.Historical episodes are defined as periods when headline inflation rises above the target by 2 percentage points and returns within 2 percentage points in under two years,since the adoption of inflation targeting.Current episodes exclude Colombia.Aggregates are medians.2Density plots of one-year-ah

174、ead(December-over-December)inflation forecast deviation from inflation targets by Consensus Forecasts vintage.Excludes Paraguay and Uruguay because of data limitations.3Median deviation of actual real interest rates from(Taylor-type policy rule)prediction.4Historical(200119)and prepandemic(201719)re

175、fer to the average real ex ante monetary policy rates when headline inflation was within 1 percentage point of the inflation target during those periods.The end of 2025 and the end of 2026 reflect market expectations of monetary policy rates.Paraguay and Uruguay are not shown because of data limitat

176、ions.5Markers are the sample averages of the median of estimates across 13 model specifications;whiskers are interquartile range.Prepandemic refers to 2017:Q119:Q1.Latest refers to 2023:Q124:Q2.420462821012345241861201261824Months since peak inflation32101234202468101012345603691215Jan.2019July19Jan

177、.20July20Jan.21July21Jan.22July22Jan.23July23Jan.24July24Dec.22Dec.23Dec.18June 23June 24Sep.2024June 18Dec.19June 19Dec.20June 20Dec.21June 21June 222021:Q121:Q221:Q321:Q422:Q122:Q222:Q322:Q423:Q123:Q223:Q323:Q424:Q124:Q2PrepandemicLatestPrepandemicLatestPrepandemicLatestPrepandemicLatestPrepandemi

178、cLatestPrepandemicLatestPrepandemicLatestBRACHLCOLMEXPRYPERURYBrazilChileColombiaMexicoPeruREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202414International Monetary Fund.Not for Redistributionincentives to be formal and to provide greater flexibility for the labor m

179、arket to adapt to rapid changes,including from new information technologies.6 The latter will also require tackling skill mismatches through improved vocational training and youth education.Increasing female labor participation(Figure12)by improving the availability and affordability of childcare,el

180、iminating asymmetries in parental benefits,and allowing for more flexible work schedulescan also help mitigate the demographic headwinds on the labor force.Alleviating the most binding constraints on growth could yield sizable output gains(Budina and others 2023).For example,closing the regions stru

181、ctural reform gaps by half in the areas of governance,business regulation,and external sectorwhere the region has some of the largest gaps relative to best-practice countriescould lift output by up to 8 percent in the short term and 12percent in the medium term(Figure13,panels1 and2).Policies to man

182、age climate changerelated risks and embrace opportunities from the green transition are also critical in the current juncture.Mitigation policies can bring substantial environmental and health benefits,whereas investment in adaptation and fostering green energy innovation could generate positive spi

183、llovers on other sectors of the economy.Adaptation policies will also be key to limit economic losses from climate change,which could be sizable if global mitigation goals are not met.7 With its rich endowment of green minerals,the region is in a unique position to harness the benefits of global gre

184、en transformation,although doing so requires strengthening investment frameworks to attract capital while raising natural-resource revenues to attend social and public invest-ment needs.6 See Online Annex 5,“Artificial Intelligence:Risks and Opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean.”7 See O

185、nline Annex 6,“On Economic Losses from Climate Change in Latin America and the Caribbean.”High techLow techMedium techPrimary/resource basedFigure 11.Technological Classification of Exports(Percent)The regions exports remain concentrated in primary products.EM EuropeEM AsiaLA720131720212220131720212

186、2201317202122020406080100Sources:World Bank,World Integrated Trade Solution database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:EM=emerging markets;EM Asia=India,Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Thailand,Vietnam;EM Europe=Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria,Hungary,Poland,Romania,Serbia;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Ch

187、ile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).ArgentinaBrazilChileColombiaMexicoParaguayPeruUruguayFigure 12.Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender(Percent of prime working-age population)Despite progress,female labor force participation remains low.401005060708090Sources:ILOSTAT;and IMF staff calcu

188、lations.Note:Participation rates are based on prime working-age population(2554).Moving averages are reported.TotalWomenMen200005101520200005101520200005101520Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND15International Monetary Fund.Not for Redistribution

189、Finally,although reforms are critical to boost growth,appetite for them is limited in most cases,and prospects are constrained by limited implementation capacity in some countries.Making progress will require building technical capacity and consensus around priorities,and allowing for reasonable tra

190、nsition periods and compen-sating mechanisms to ensure reform acceptability and durability.To avoid falling into a trap of low growth,social discontent,and growth-damaging populist policies,countries need to press on with reforms.LA7Average impact for all EMDEsFigure 13.Structural Reforms for Growth

191、Scope for reform is large in some areas,.1.LA7:Macrostructural Reform Gaps,2021221(Distance to emerging market frontier;percent)50010203040GovernanceBusinessregulationLaborCreditmarketExternalsector.and could yield sizable payoffs.2.Output Impact of First-Generation Reforms2(Cumulative percent chang

192、e)14024681012Short-term outputMedium-term outputSources:Budina and others(2023);and IMF staff calculations.Note:EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).1Structural gaps are calculated as the deviation of each reform area

193、from its frontier(best performer in the same year).Each reform indicator is normalized between 0 and 1 based on the sample.Governance refers to 2022,others are 2021.Markers indicate medians and whiskers interquartile ranges.2Impact from reducing first-generation reform gaps relative to global fronti

194、er by half.Purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages are reported.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202416International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionTable 2.LA7:Pro-Growth Reform Priorities and Reforms UnderwayFirst PrioritySecond PriorityThird

195、 PriorityReform PrioritiesReforms UnderwayFiscal Structural ReformsGovernance and Economic SecurityLabor Market ReformsProduct and Credit Market ReformsTrade LiberalizationBrazil yImplement value-added tax reform and simplify tax system yEnhance fiscal framework,building on the fiscal rule yImplemen

196、t ecological transformation plan to boost green growth Facilitate skill upgrade Increase female labor force participation(for example,increase daycare services,implement pay transparency measures)Reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to trade Implementation of value-added tax reform enacted in 2023Ch

197、ile Strengthen tax compliance Strengthen public investment management Streamline the process of investment permit application Strengthen security Continue to increase female labor participation(for example,by improving childcare)Strengthening tax compliance Reforming pension Improving access to chil

198、dcare Streamlining investment permit processColombia Strengthen enforcement of legal frameworks on governance and transparency Reduce non-wage labor costs(employers social security contributions,payroll taxes,severance payments,and paid leave)Reduce administrative burden on startups,ease regulations

199、 to promote firm entry/exit and a level playing field for private and public companies Eliminate barriers in service and network sectors and barriers to trade and investment Ease small and medium-sized enterprises access to credit Reduce nontariff barriers to trade Strengthen trade infrastructure Pe

200、nsion reform Tax reform to incentivize investments and green transition Health care reform Reducing informality Granting greater remuneration and protection to formal employeesMexico Non-oil revenue mobilization to finance infrastructure,health,and education spending needs Strengthen public investme

201、nt management Improve targeting of social protection programs Strengthen rule of law and control of corruption Enhance private participation in water and energy sectors Deepen financial development and inclusion Paraguay Reform tax policies(personal income tax)Institutional reforms to raise tax coll

202、ection efficiency Strengthen climate-public investment management and multiyear budgeting Improve government effectiveness in provision of public services Strengthen control of corruption and rule of law Enhance benefits and better explanation of benefits(health care and unemployment)can make formal

203、 employment more attractive Strengthen employment protection policies Public-private partnerships law to encourage private investment in infrastructure Public sector retirement Investment framework of pension funds Electricity tariffs and operational/financial capacities of public electricity compan

204、y Bankruptcy framework allowing firms swifter exitRebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND17International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionTable 2.(Continued)Reform PrioritiesReforms UnderwayFiscal Structural ReformsGovernance and Economic Security

205、Labor Market ReformsProduct and Credit Market ReformsTrade LiberalizationPeru Strengthen public investment management Revise tax code to eliminate incentives for informality/firms to stay small Enhance coverage and the funding of social spending Reduce political instability and violence/terrorism Im

206、prove government effectiveness especially at the local level Strengthen control of corruption and law enforcement Liberalize employment protection Reduce non-wage labor costs Reduce labor informality Revamping income tax regime for small companies to incentivize formalizationUruguay Differentiate wa

207、ge negotiation across sectors Improve education to mitigate skills mismatch Liberalize labor mobility and migration restrictions Ease access to credit,develop financial market Reduce public ownership (state-owned enterprises)Strengthen competition policies/agency Eliminate nontariff barriers and enh

208、ance nontraditional services trade inside Mercosur Strengthen port infrastructure and quality of roads Reduce tariff on trade outside Mercosur Public expenditure efficiency reform Refining fiscal rules Continuing dedollarizaiton program Modernizing payment systemSource:IMF staff.Note:For further cou

209、ntry details,see latest Article IV Consultation Staff Reports at https:/www.imf.org/en/Countries.First PrioritySecond PriorityThird PriorityREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202418International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 1.Central America,Pan

210、ama,and the Dominican Republic:GDP Convergence and DifferencesIn the past 25 years,there have been stark differ-ences among the Central America,Panama,and the Dominican Republic(CAPDR)countries in convergence of GDP per capita with the United States(BoxFigure1.1).Costa Rica,Panama,and the Dominican

211、Republic(CPD)saw rapid convergence,comparable to East Asia and Central Europe and the Baltics,whereas convergence of the Northern Triangle(El Salvador,Guatemala,and Honduras)and Nicaragua(NTN)was very modest(Box Figure1.2,panel1).These differences do not reflect varying patterns of employment creati

212、on as both regions saw a rapid rise in employment-to-population ratios on account of the rising share of working-age population and female labor force participation.Rather,differences in convergence are the result of diverging paths in labor productivity growth.In CPD,labor productivity increased re

213、lative to the United States,whereas it declined in NTN(Box Figure1.2,panel2).The author of this box is Bas Bakker based on Bakker(forthcoming).19972022Box Figure 1.1.GDP per Capita(Ratio to US GDP per capita)0.00.30.50.20.10.4CRIDOMSLVGTMHNDNICPANSources:World Bank,World Development Indicators datab

214、ase;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.CEBEASLAC excluding CAPDRCPDNTNCEBEASLAC excluding CAPDRCPDNTNBox Figure 1.2.GDP per Capita Convergence and Its Contributors(Ratio to US GDP)1.GDP per Capita in PPP Term

215、s0.00.30.70.50.60.20.10.40.00.30.70.50.60.20.10.4199799200103050709111315171921232.GDP per Worker19979920010305070911131517192123Sources:World Bank,World Development Indicators database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:CAPDR=Central America,Panama,and Dominican Republic;CEB=Central Europe and the Bal

216、tics;CPD=Costa Rica,Panama,and the Dominican Republic;EAS=East Asia;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;NTN=Northern Triangle and Nicaragua;PPP=purchasing power parity.Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms19October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDInternational Monetary Fund.Not for Redis

217、tributionBox 1.(continued)These diverging productivity paths are linked to different growth drivers.In NTN,growth has been mainly driven by consumption,whereas in CPD investments(and exports)have also played an important role.Per capita invest-ment in NTN is no higher now than it was in the 1970s,wh

218、ereas per capita investment in CPD has quadrupled(Box Figure1.3).The contrast between the two growth models is also visible in the balance-of-payments inflows.CPD saw a sharp rise in foreign direct investment(FDI)inflows,whereas FDI inflows in NTN remained flat.FDI inflows boosted investment and bro

219、ught new technology,increasing labor productivity and GDP per capita.There is a clear positive link between cumulative FDI inflows and GDP per capita levels(Box Figure1.4).By contrast,remittances grew more strongly in NTN,helping to support consumption despite limited per capita output growth.For ex

220、ample,in Honduras,the average annual growth rate of consumption per capita between 1997 and 2022 has been one full percentage point higher than the growth of GDP per capita and only slightly below the consumption growth rate in Panama.Similarly,whereas the GDP per capita levels in Panama are more th

221、an five times as high as in Honduras,consumptionInvestmentConsumptionInvestmentConsumptionBox Figure 1.3.Per Capita Consumption and Investment(Index:1970=100)1.Northern Triangle and Nicaragua 02006004005001003000200600400500100300197075808590952000150510202.Costa Rica,Panama,and the DominicanRepubli

222、c19707580859095200015051020Sources:World Bank,World Development Indicators database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Northern Triangle=El Salvador,Guatemala,Honduras.LACCPDNTNARGBOLBRACHLCOLECUHTIJAMMEXPRYURYCRIDOMPANGTMHNDNICSLVPERBox Figure 1.4.FDI Inflows per Capita and GDP per Capita(Thousands of

223、 US dollars)015211296318GDP per capita,20220369121518Cumulative FDI inflows,19972022(per 2022 capita)Sources:World Bank,World Development Indicators database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.CPD=Costa Rica,

224、Panama,and the Dominican Republic;FDI=foreign direct investment;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;NTN=Northern Triangle and Nicaragua.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202420International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 1.(continued)per capita i

225、s only three times as high.Although remittances boosted consumption,they did not boost GDP in NTN,as stronger remittances mostly translated into higher consumption and larger imports,rather than goods and services produced domestically.Indeed,higher remittances are not associated with higher GDP(Box

226、 Figure1.5)if anything,the link is negative.1 This negative link between remittances and GDP growth likely reflects that the same factors that boost emigra-tion(high crime and low governance)also reduce GDP growth.Why did CPD receive more FDI whereas NTN received more remittances?While the explanati

227、on is likely to be multi-faceted,both governance and insecurity likely played a key role.Better governance is associated with higher FDI inflows,while more crime is associated with larger emigration and remittances.Compared with CPD,in the past 25 years,NTN has had weaker governance and more crime(t

228、he latter with the notable exception of Nicaragua).Causality also went the other way:low growth boosted emigration and remittances,whereas high growth induced more FDI inflows.To grow faster,NTN needs to attract more FDI,notably by improving the business climate,security,and governance.1 Online Anne

229、x 1 shows that although remittances support economic activity by boosting demand,they only partially offset the adverse effects of emigration,leading to a net negative impact on output growth.LACCPDNTNCRIDOMPANARGBOLBRACHLCOLECUHTIJAMMEXPERPRYURYGTMHNDNICSLVBox Figure 1.5.Remittances per Capita and

230、GDP per Capita(Thousands of US dollars)015211296318GDP per capita,2022036912152118Remittances inflows,19972022(per 2022 capita)Sources:World Bank,World Development Indicators database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)cou

231、ntry codes.CPD=Costa Rica,Panama,and the Dominican Republic;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;NTN=Northern Triangle and Nicaragua.Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms21October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 2.The Caribbean:Fosteri

232、ng Higher,Sustainable,and More Inclusive GrowthEconomic momentum in the Caribbean slowed in 2023 compared to 2022.Real GDP growth in the region(excluding Guyana)is estimated to have been 1.4 percent in 2023,declining from 4.2 percent in 2022.1 In tourism-dependent countries,tourism growth slowed as

233、tourist arrivals approached pre-pandemic levels,partially supported by efforts to improve connectivity and expand hotel capacity(Box Figures2.1 and2.2).In commodity-exporting countries,headwinds in the energy sector were offset by strong performance in the non-energy sector,which benefited from poli

234、cy support.Inflation moderated significantly in 202324 compared to 202122 and has recently returned to prepandemic levels,mainly driven by global factors,including lower commodity prices and the reversal of supply-chain disruptions.In Haiti,however,the supply-side shock caused by the security crisis

235、 has fed inflation pressures since February 2024.The region(excluding Guyana)is projected to grow 1.1 percent in 2024 and 2.2 percent in 2025,while inflation is expected to remain low.Risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside.In addition to natural disasters,a key risk for tourism-depen

236、dent countries is an economic slowdown in tourism-source countries.Countries reliant on citi-zenship-by-investment programs may see lower fiscal revenueswhich have supported spending and activity in recent yearsamid greater international scrutiny.2 For commodity-exporting countries,commodity priceTh

237、e authors of this box are Sophia Chen and Camilo E.Tovar,with research analysis from Spencer Siegel.1 Guyana had one of the worlds highest real GDP growth rates in 2023(33 percent)because of ramping up of oil production.2 Citizenship-by-investment revenues vary significantly,ranging from less than 1

238、 percent of GDP in St.Lucia to 30 percent in Dominica in 2023.Stayover CaribbeanStayover comparatorCruise CaribbeanCruise comparatorBox Figure 2.2.Tourist Arrivals(Percent of 2019 levels)01251007550175251500125100755017525150Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Sources:Car

239、ibbean Tourism Organization;Eastern Caribbean Central Bank;national authorities;Tourism Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Caribbean sample includes Antigua and Barbuda,Aruba,The Bahamas,Barbados,Belize,Dominica,Grenada,Jamaica,St.Kitts and Nevis,St.Lucia,and St.Vincent and the Grenadines.Com

240、parator sample includes Costa Rica,the Dominican Republic,and Mexico for stayover arrivals,and the Dominican Republic and Mexico for cruise ship arrivals.Commodity exporters(excluding Guyana)Tourism-dependentFloat(excluding Guyana)PegBox Figure 2.1.Real GDP Growth and Inflation(Percent)0612392022232

241、4Real GDP growth20222324InflationSources:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Aggregates are purchasing-power-parity GDP-weighted averages.Year average is reported for inflation.IMF staff forecasts for 2024.Haiti is a fragile and conflict-affected state and is not clas

242、sified as a tourism-de-pendent or commodity-exporting country.Because of idiosyncratic factors,Haiti had negative growth rates over the period of analysis.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern Hemisphere22INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 2024International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 2.(con

243、tinued)volatility and a global slowdown could create uncertainty in export demand.However,new energy projects and structural reforms under discussion provide an upside potential over the medium term.In Haiti,a further deterioration of security could undermine recent efforts toward normalization of e

244、conomic activity led by the deployment of the Multicountry-Security Support Mission.The region remains exposed to commodity price shocks,which could see a return of inflationary pressures.The region also remains highly vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters,as powerfully demonstrated by

245、Hurricane Beryl,which caused fatalities and extensive physical destruction in early July,particularly in Grenada and St.Vincent and the Grenadines(and to a lesser extent in Barbados and Jamaica).While a detailed assessment of the full scale of damages is still ongoing,initial reports indicate that d

246、amages and losses for the region may well exceed US$0.5billion.Despite the progress made,a key policy priority is to continue building fiscal buffers while protecting the most vulnerable.Government debt-to-GDP ratios are projected to continue declining in 2024 in most countries,mainly supported by e

247、conomic growth and primary surpluses in some countries.But in many countries,debt remains above the already high 2019 levels,averaging in these countries 74 percent of GDP in 2023(Box Figure2.3).Mobilizing revenue and enhancing spending efficiency are crucial for debt sustainability.Another priority

248、 is to achieve higher and more inclusive growth.The regions subdued medium-term growth outlook(Box Figure2.4)is insufficient to materially reduce public debt ratios and support income conver-gence.Caribbean per capita income levels have remained stagnant at about 40 percent of the US level since the

249、 turn of the century.Evidence indicates that low aggregate productivity growth and insufficient human capital largely explain this low potential growth.Key impediments to productivity growth include the inefficient allocation of productive resourcesin both the goods and services sectorsand structura

250、l obstacles to firm-level productivity,such as regulatory burdens and the lack of financing.Latest versus 2019201921202123202325Box Figure 2.3.Change in General Government Gross Debt(Percentage points of GDP)504030201001020304050JAMGUYBLZATGDMAKNAHTIBRBSURABWTTOLCAGRDVCTBHSSources:IMF,World Economic

251、 Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)county codes.198089199099201019202023202429200009Box Figure 2.4.Real GDP Growth(Percent;period average)4248026Tourism-dependentCommodity exporters(excluding Guyana)Sourc

252、es:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Tourism-dependent includes Antigua and Barbuda,Aruba,The Bahamas,Barbados,Belize,Dominica,Grenada,Jamaica,St.Kitts and Nevis,St.Lucia,and St.Vincent and the Grenadines.Commodity exporters include Guyana,Suriname,and Trinidad and

253、Tobago.Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with Reforms23October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 2.(continued)Boosting growth and inclusion requires sound,credible,and sustainable macroeconomic policies to strengthen human capital and measures t

254、o address the impediments to productivity growth.Specifically,this includes improving resource allocation(for example,product market reforms),expanding financial access(for example,centralized credit systems and financial sector reforms to increase competition),main-taining a sound and stable financ

255、ial sector with adequate supervision and regulation,addressing structural and youth unemployment(for example,labor market reforms,education,and training programs),improving the efficiency of government services(for example,developing digital infrastructure,streamlining business registration and tax

256、administration),and fostering integration within and outside the region in transporta-tion and trade.Finally,the region needs to accelerate investment in climate resilience and green energy transition.Policies should focus on integrating adaptation and mitigation strategies into public investment ma

257、nagement,strengthening publicprivate partnerships for investment,improving the efficiency of energy systems while reducing domestic fossil fuel consumption through electrification,and lowering the carbon intensity of fossil fuel production in commodity-exporting countries.Mobilizing private climate

258、financing and drawing on official financing,including the IMFs Resilience and Sustainability Facility(as Barbados and Jamaica have done)can help address external financing needs by catalyzing additional funding,including from the private sector.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONA

259、L MONETARY FUND October 202424International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 3.Latin America 7 and Other South American Countries:Country FocusIn Argentina,firm program implementation is helping restore macroeconomic stability.Through the first half of 2024,the authorities have achieved a fis

260、cal surplus(the first in 16years),rebuilt reserves,and brought down inflation more quickly than anticipated.Signs of economic stabilization are emerging,with economic activity expanding after April,although the pace of recovery remains uncertain and uneven across sectors.Sustaining gains will requir

261、e that policies continue to evolve,including on the monetary,foreign exchange,and structural fronts.Under baseline policies,after contracting by about 3.5percent this year,the economy is projected to expand by about 5percent in 2025.Meanwhile,annual inflation is projected to end the year below 140pe

262、rcent before dropping to about 45 percent by the end of 2025.In Brazil,growth is projected to remain robust at 3.0 percent in 2024,underpinned by resilient private consumption aided by fiscal transfers and strong labor marketsrising investment,and smaller-than-anticipated disruptions from the floods

263、,before moderating to 2.2 percent because of smaller statistical carryover effects,a still restrictive monetary policy,and the expected cooling of the labor market.Over the medium term,growth is expected to strengthen to 2.5percentan upward revision of 0.5percentage point since the 2023 Article IV C

264、onsultationreflecting supportive structural factors,including the efficiency-enhancing value-added tax reform and the acceleration in hydrocarbon production.Given Brazils stronger-than-expected economic growth,tight labor market,and above-target inflation expectations,maintaining flexibility on futu

265、re interest rate changes is prudent.The authorities commitment to improve the fiscal position is welcome.To put public debt on a firmly downward path,staff recommends a sustained and more ambitious fiscal effort.Bolivias economy is facing significant challenges.Acute fiscal and external imbalancesam

266、id declining natural gas production,constraints on external financing,the ongoing monetization of the fiscal deficit,and an overvalued exchange ratehave depleted international reserves.The lack of foreign exchange,low agricultural production because of El Nio,and sociopolitical tensions are expected

267、 to drive a decelera-tion in growth from 3.1 in 2023 to 1.6 percent in 2024.After a prolonged period of low inflation,inflation is expected to reach 6 percent in the end of 2024 and average of about 4 percent thereafter.Preventing a more disorderly unwinding of these imbalances will require a credib

268、le multiyear fiscal consolidation plan that incorporates a phasing out of fuel subsidies,supported by strengthened social safety nets,a realignment of the exchange rate,and improving the environment for private sector-led investment and job creation.Chiles economy is on track to grow around trend as

269、 imbalances built during the pandemic have been largely resolved.The near-term outlook has also improved because of higher copper prices and a pick-up in mining exports,with growth projected at 2.5and 2.4 percent in 2024 and 2025,respectively.Inflation picked up in the third quarter,and the converge

270、nce to the central banks 3 percent target is now expected only by the first half of 2026 because of one-off factors,particularly,the increase in electricity tariffs.Because of the weaker-than-expected revenue growth,additional efforts are needed to meet the fiscal deficit target of 1.9 percent of GD

271、P in 2024.Medium-term fiscal policy remains appropriately targeted at a broadly balanced fiscal position by 2026 guided by the structural balance rule and the(45 percent of GDP)debt anchor.In Colombia,economic growth is expected to pick up to 1.6percent in 2024 and 2.5in 2025,as macro-economic polic

272、ies normalize,while inflation continues falling despite headwinds from supply shocks and resilient consumption.Monetary policy is expected to normalize gradually while remaining tight to bring inflation to below 6percent by the end of 2024 and inside the 2-to 4-percent target band by the end of 2025

273、.Staff recommends cautious and backloaded cuts aiming to return inflation firmly to the 3 percent target during 2025.Fiscal policy remains bounded by the fiscal rule,though the planned increases in headlineThe authors of this box are the Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uru

274、guay)and other South American country teams.Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND25International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 3.(continued)deficits and debt pose risks.Lower deficits and debt levels than those implied by the fiscal rule

275、and reori-enting expenditure toward investment would safeguard fiscal sustainability and support potential growth.Ecuadors growth is projected to slow to 0.3percent in 2024 and 1.2percent in 2025,as the economy faces significant headwinds,including from a challenging security situation and power out

276、ages.Over the medium term,growth is expected to gradually rise to 2percent as macroeconomic stability takes hold and reforms are implemented under the IMF-supported program.Inflation is projected to reach 2.8percent by the end of 2024,partly driven by a value-added tax rate hike and lower fuel subsi

277、dies,before declining to 1.7percent in 2025.Significant fiscal effort is needed to put public finances on a sound footing,while protecting vulnerable groups and preserving space for priority spending on security,social protection,and public investment.Rebuilding liquidity buffers remains key to enha

278、nce resilience.In Mexico,after robust growth in 2023,activity has slowed in recent quarters.Notwithstanding expan-sionary fiscal policy,slowing exports to the United States and the restrictive monetary stance are expected to limit growth in 2024 to about 1.5percent.A further slowdown to 1.3percent i

279、s expected for 2025 reflecting the planned fiscal tightening and a weaker external environment.The gradual easing of the restrictive monetary stance,alongside a narrowing output gap and slower credit growth,is expected to help inflation return to Banxicos target by the end of 2025.The 2025 budget,ex

280、pected in mid-No-vember,needs to provide a credible consolidation plan to meet medium-term fiscal targets and maintain fiscal sustainability.In Paraguay,economic growth was among the fastest in the region(4.7percent)in 2023,and medi-um-term prospects are strongly supported by projected large green p

281、rojects and underpinned by two IMF programs(Policy Consultation Instrument and Resilience and Sustainability Facility).Headline inflation dropped sharply in 2023 and has recently stabilized around the 4-percent central bank target.While the fiscal deficit for the budgetary central government rose to

282、 4.1percent of GDP in 2023,as a result of the recognition of unrecorded expenditures during the pandemic,fiscal consolidation is underway to bring the deficit back into compliance with the 1.5percent of GDP limit under the Fiscal Responsibility Law by 2026.Public debt has increased because of recent

283、 external shocks but remains relatively low at about 40percent of GDP.Moodys upgraded the countrys credit rating to investment grade for the first time in July 2024.Perus economy is rebounding,after contracting in 2023 as a result of consecutive climate-related shocks and social turmoil,led by a str

284、ong recovery in primary sectors as supply shocks have dissipated.From the demand side,growth is mostly driven by public investment,while the recovery in private consumption and investment is still modest as political uncertainty continues to weigh on confidence.With headline inflation already at the

285、 midpoint of the 1 to 3 percent target range,conditions allow for further monetary policy easing.The fiscal consolidation was delayed to avoid endangering the incipient recovery given available fiscal space,but fiscal policy guidance could be improved to enhance credibility,especially as the revised

286、 2024 fiscal deficit target could be at risk if revenue recovery takes longer than envisaged.Over the medium term,fiscal consolidation is necessary to preserve fiscal sustainability while structural reforms are essential to lift potential growth.Uruguays economic growth is expected to rebound to 3.2

287、percent in 2024 and 3percent in 2025,reflecting the recovery from a once-in-a-century drought,increased cellulose production,easing of financial condi-tions,and the normalization of price differentials with Argentina.Inflation is projected to pick up in the second half of 2024 but stay within the 3-

288、to 6-percent target range,following a gradual easing of monetaryREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202426International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBox 3.(continued)policy and robust wage growth.The projected non-financial public sector deficit of 3

289、percent of GDP in 2024 balances deficit reduction with safeguarding social spending,while the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to remain broadly stable,aligned with the net indebtedness target of the fiscal rule.Venezuelas economy is expected to grow at 3 percent in 2024 as oil production continues to

290、 recover even if PDVSAs own production has remained relatively constant.Political uncertainty ahead of the pres-idential election weighed on domestic demand,which has remained flat.Inflation has been decelerating faster than initially anticipated and is now projected at 60 percent by the end of 2024

291、.Two main factors explain the deceleration of inflation:exchange rate stability as the central bank has increased foreign exchange interventions,and a moderate increase in fiscal spending in the lead-up to the election.Despite the improved outlook in recent years brought by the end of hyperinflation

292、 and the easing of sanctions,the country continues to be immersed in a deep economic,political,and humanitarian crisis,which has resulted in about 7.8million people(25percent of the population)leaving the country since 2014.Rebalancing Policies and Pressing on with ReformsOctober 2024 INTERNATIONAL

293、MONETARY FUND27International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBackground Paper 1 Summary.Closing the Gap:Labor Market Participation in Latin America1The expanding labor force has been an important driver of economic growth in Latin America over the last decades.However,as population growth decele

294、rates and population ages,the contribution from demographics to growth will diminish.Increasing labor force participation can mitigate these demographic headwinds.Using microdata from several Latin American household surveys,this paper documents key patterns in labor market participation and identif

295、ies demographic groups with the potential to boost the labor force going forward.There is significant scope to offset the demographic shift by increasing female participation,although household responsibilities remain a crucial obstacle.Implementing policies that improve the availability and afforda

296、bility of childcare,eliminate asymmetries in parental benefits,and make work schedules more flexible can relax constraints to womens labor force participation.Incentivizing older adults to remain active longer and more effectively inte-grating the youth into the workforce can provide an additional b

297、oost to the labor force.Labor Force Participation PatternsLatin America witnessed a remarkable surge in labor force participation in the decades preceding 2010.Led by women joining the labor force,total participation rates increased from less than 60percent to about 80percent between 1951 and 2010.H

298、owever,with male participation already at relatively high levels,total labor force participation rates in the region have plateaued since 2010.Despite the important gains made over time,gender disparities in participation rates persist,and female participation is still relatively low across the regi

299、on.Latin Americas average partic-ipation gender gap is now close to 20 percentage points,comparable to those of peer economies but twice as large as the average gap in advanced economies.This average,however,masks a significant heterogeneity in prime working-age(2554)female labor force participation

300、 across the countries in the sample,from less than 60percent in Mexico to more than 80percent in Uruguay,where participation is as high as in advanced economies(Background Paper Figure1.1).Participation rates are also uneven across age groups.Although a decline with age is expected,female participat

301、ion rates notably start declining from a relatively early age.Women in Latin America exit the labor force sooner than men,and sooner than women in advanced economiesin some cases,even while still in their prime working 1 See October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Western Hemisphere,“Closing the Gap:

302、Labor Market Participation in Latin America”(Background Paper1)prepared by Camila Casas(co-lead)and Flavien Moreau(co-lead),with support from Nicols Gmez Parra and Kenji Moreno,under the guidance of Gustavo Adler and Lusine Lusinyan.ArgentinaBrazilChileColombiaMexicoParaguayPeruUruguayAdvancedeconom

303、iesBackground Paper Figure 1.1.Labor Force Participation Rate by Gender and Age,2023(Percent of working-age population)010020406080WomenMen202425293034353940444549505455596064202425293034353940444549505455596064Sources:ILOSTAT;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Advanced economies is simple average.Data

304、 labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202428International Monetary Fund.Not for Redistributionage.At the opposite end of the age spectrum,a significant share of youth,r

305、anging from 17 to 27percent in the region,is neither employed,nor enrolled in education or training,which is also largely explained by young women not entering the labor force upon the completion of their education.Obstacles and Opportunities for Increasing ParticipationWomen face numerous obstacles

306、 to labor force participation,with household responsi-bilities being a key reason for staying outside the labor force and the main driver of the gender participation gap(Background Paper Figure 1.2),especially among women with lower educational attainment.Although these include chores and caring for

307、 other relatives,tending to children plays a crucial role as participation gaps broaden after parenthood.While many women exit(at times,permanently)the labor force around the arrival of their first child,mens participation is largely unaffected.Hence,policies that improve the availability and afford

308、ability of childcare,and that address the disparities in parental benefits between men and women,could help reduce constraints for some women.More flexible work arrangements that allow work patterns to adapt to family needs would also facilitate participation.Reforms to tax systems that reduce fisca

309、l costs for second earners within households,such as individualizing taxation and increasing progressivity,can further strengthen womens incentives to work.Beyond gender,additional strategies targeting age groups outside prime working age can also raise labor force participation.Increasing statutory

310、 retirement ages and/or generating incentives to work after retirement,for instance,by allowing workers to improve their pension by working past a minimum retirement age,can boost participation among older adults.For the youth,providing vocational training or other short-cycle programs can help inte

311、grate both inactive and unemployed into the labor force by equipping them with job-ready skills in a short time,hence reducing skills mismatches.The demographic clock is ticking for Latin American economies to better prepare for the impending shifts.Policies to make labor markets more inclusive by c

312、losing participation gaps across gender and age groups could go a long way in boosting the labor force and long-term growth prospects.Closing gender participation gaps to levels comparable to those of advance economies can increase annual GDP growth rates by around half a percentage point per year,m

313、ore than offsetting the negative effect of the population shift on growth for several countries in the region.Household responsibilitiesStudentOther reasonsBackground Paper Figure 1.2.Reported Reasons for Inactivity(Share of working-age population not in the labor force)010020406080ARGBRACHLCOLMEXPE

314、RPRYURYARGBRACHLCOLMEXPERPRYURYWomenMenSources:EPH(INDEC);PNADC(IBGE);ENE(INE);GEIH(DANE);ENOE(INEGI);ENAHO(INEI);ECH(INE);and IMF staff calculations.Note:Self-reported by working-age population not in the labor force.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)c

315、ountry codes.October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND29Background Paper 1 Summary.Closing the Gap:Labor Market Participation in Latin AmericaInternational Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionBackground Paper 2 Summary.Public Debt Dynamics in Latin America:Time to Rebuild Buffers and Strengthen Fisca

316、l Frameworks11Understanding the drivers of public debt is paramount to assessing fiscal sustainability risks.This paper studies Latin Americas debt dynamics over the last two decades,the factors behind the buildup of debt preceding the pandemic,and their possible role going forward.Drivers of debt c

317、hanged substantially,with forces that drove debt down during the commodity price boom reversing once it came to an end,growth decelerated,and public finances weakened substantially despite compliance with fiscal rules.With many of these forces still at play,and an unfavorable interest rate-growth(r-

318、g)differential,maintaining debt on a sustainable path will require strong fiscal discipline.Strengthening fiscal frameworks will also be of paramount importance.Understanding the Debt BuildupThe drivers of public debt dynamics in Latin America have shifted markedly over the last two decades(Backgrou

319、nd Paper Figure2.1).22During the commodity price boom(200413),indebtedness fell considerably(from 45 to 34 percent of GDP),supported by strong growth,positive primary balances,and appreciating domestic currencies.In the decade following the boom(201423),however,these forces reversed,and primary surp

320、luses turned into deficits,curren-cies weakened,and growth slowed.The result was a buildup of debt,to about 47 percent of GDP in 2019 despite the prevalence of fiscal rules(Background Paper Figure 2.2)as they were met by frequently modifying and relaxing targets over time.The pandemic shock further

321、increased debt ratios to about 56 percent in 2020,falling back to about 53 percent in 2023.Public Debt Outlook and VulnerabilitiesPublic debt is projected to remain around current levels over the next five years,but this largely hinges on ambitious fiscal consolidation plans,which will require susta

322、ining considerably higher primary balances than in the past and those of other emerging markets,while continuing to face an unfavorable interest-growth differential because of high financing costs and low growth.Implementation of these consolidation plans 1 See the October 2024 Regional Economic Out

323、look:Western Hemisphere,“Public Debt Dynamics in Latin America:Time to Rebuild Buffers and Strengthen Fiscal Frameworks”(Background Paper2),prepared by Juan Passadore(co-lead),Juan Trevio(co-lead),Santiago Acosta Ormaechea,Luiza Antoun de Almeda,Chao He,and Roberto Perrelli,with support from Nicols

324、Gmez Parra,Genevieve Lindow,and Kenji Moreno,under the guidance of Gustavo Adler and Lusine Lusinyan.2 In this study,Latin America refers to Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,and Uruguay(LA7).Real GDP growthPrimary deficitResidualReal interest rateExchange rateChange inpublic debtBackground

325、 Paper Figure 2.1.LA7:Decomposition of Changes in Public Debt(Annual average;percentage points of GDP)534321012Sources:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staffcalculations.Note:Simple average.LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).200413201423202429REGIONAL

326、ECONOMIC OUTLOOKWestern HemisphereINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND October 202430International Monetary Fund.Not for Redistributioncould be challenging as efforts have already been subject to delays,with changes to fiscal targets within existing fiscal rules,as in the past.Moreover,in some cases,consolid

327、ation plans rely on measures yet to be identified.Improvements in debt management strategies over the last decade have helped increase the average debt maturity and reduce the share of foreign currency debt,mitigating the regions vulnerability to shocks.Yet,public finances remain vulnerable to large

328、 commodity price fluctuations and changes in external financing conditions,which could jeopardize ongoing efforts to stabilize debt-to-GDP ratios.The rising frequency and severity of natural disasters also pose a risk to public finances,requiring careful monitoring and rebuilding fiscal buffers.Ensu

329、ring debt sustainability requires advancing fiscal consolidation without further delay.To improve debt dynamics,it is also essential to address the regions high financing costs,including by further strengthening medium-term fiscal frameworks to enhance credibility,along with careful monitoring of po

330、tential risks.The addition of meaningful debt anchorsa common feature of fiscal rules in other regionscould also help to ensure that debt remains in check.ExpenditureBudget balanceDebtBackground Paper Figure 2.2.LA7:Evolution of Fiscal Rules(Number of rules)018246810121416Sources:Davoodi and others(

331、2022);and IMF staff calculations.Note:Each bar denotes the number of countries in a region that has a particular fiscal rule(budget balance,debt,expenditure,revenue).LA7=Latin America 7(Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Mexico,Paraguay,Peru,Uruguay).2004060810121416182022Background Paper 2 Summary.Public Debt D

332、ynamics in Latin America:Time to Rebuild Buffers and Strengthen Fiscal Frameworks1October 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND31International Monetary Fund.Not for RedistributionAppendix Table 1.Western Hemisphere:Main Economic IndicatorsReal GDP Growth(Year-over-year percent change)Inflation(End of per

333、iod;percent)External Current Account Balance(Percent of GDP)ProjectionsProjectionsProjections202120222023202420252021202220232024202520212022202320242025North America6.02.72.82.52.17.26.63.42.52.13.23.52.92.92.8Canada5.33.81.21.32.44.76.63.22.01.90.00.40.71.01.3Mexico6.03.73.21.51.37.47.84.74.53.20.31.20.30.70.9United States6.12.52.92.82.27.46.43.22.31.93.73.93.33.33.1Puerto Rico30.43.60.61.00.84.