《羅蘭貝格：2050年全球趨勢綱要報告之趨勢四：經濟與商業（2024版）（英文版）（91頁）.pdf》由會員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關《羅蘭貝格：2050年全球趨勢綱要報告之趨勢四：經濟與商業（2024版）（英文版）（91頁）.pdf（91頁珍藏版）》請在三個皮匠報告上搜索。

1、1Roland Berger|Megatrend 4Economics&BusinessTrend Compendium 20502024 Edition2Roland Berger|The Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050 focuses on stable,long-term developments The Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050 is a global trend study compiled by Roland Berger Institute(RBI),the think tank of Rola

2、nd Berger.Our Trend Compendium 2050 describes the most important megatrends shaping the world between now and 2050 Our trend views are based on most recent studies,data and analyses.We critically examine the results for relevance,plausibility and reliability We deliberately use publicly available so

3、urces to make our analyses verifiable To incorporate todays uncertainties into strategic planning,we recommend combining the megatrends of the Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050 with the Roland Berger scenario planning approach2050Is it worth dealing with megatrends when globally impactful events s

4、uch as the COVID-19 pandemic or the war in Ukraine are taking place?Of course!The coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine had far-reaching consequences and deeply affected people,economies,and politics but neither event has derailed the megatrends analyzed herein such is the inherent nature of m

5、egatrends:climate change,societal aging,or technological innovations do not lose their momentum,their direction,or their importance.To cope with such challenges and to master resulting opportunities,our awareness and our understanding of megatrends is vital not least to develop sustainable answers.2

6、Roland Berger|3Roland Berger|and covers six megatrends that shape the future development of our world to 20501People&Society2Politics&Governance3Environment&Resources4Economics&Business5Technology&Innovation6Health&CarePopulationGlobal RisksClimate Change&PollutionGlobal EconomicsValue of Innovation

7、Global Health ChallengesMigrationGeopoliticsBiodiversityPower Shifts Frontier TechnologiesHealthcare of the FutureEducation&LaborFuture of DemocracyWaterEnergy TransformationHumans&MachinesCaregiving3Roland Berger|ValuesDebt ChallengeResources&Raw Materials4Roland Berger|Trends in economics&business

8、 need to be viewed through global lenses considering power shifts,the energy transformation and the debt challengeSubtrends of megatrend Economics&Business4Debt Challenge4.1Global EconomicsEconomics&BusinessEnergyTrans-formation4.3Debt Challenge4.4Power Shifts 4.21Global Economics3EnergyTransformati

9、on2Power Shifts5Roland Berger|Trade,foreign direct investments,and global value chains are interconnected and influenced by politics,technology,society,and the environment Analyzing trends in economics&business needs to start by looking at developments in global economics Global economics are charac

10、terized by the interplay of three key elements,namely international trade,foreign direct investments(FDIs),and global value chains International trade concerns the cross-border exchange of goods and services on all stages of processing,ranging from raw materials and intermediate products to end prod

11、ucts.Functioning international trade is a prerequisite of efficient global value chains A foreign direct investment is defined as an investment reflecting a lasting interest and control by a foreign direct investor,resident in one economy,in an enterprise located in another economy(foreign affiliate

12、).FDIs enable production abroad and are a common way to lower cost and/or be present in a key market,avoid certain transaction costs(e.g.import duties),and get access to technology and/or manpower Global value chains include all activities of a companys value chain that are distributed among multipl

13、e entities across a variety of geographical locations to bring a product from its inception to its end users These three key elements of global economics are driven by fundamental factors of the economic sphere:international politics(e.g.restricting trade through protectionism),technological evoluti

14、on(e.g.digitalization),societal developments(e.g.changing values that increase demand for regional/local products),and environmental developments(e.g.climate change driving the need for FDIs in renewable energy)Global economics:Key elements and influencing factorsSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger4.1Global

15、 EconomicsEconomics&BusinessGlobal value chainsFDIsInter-national trade6Roland Berger|Economic growth and trade display a clear correlation:Countries with high rates of export growth tend to have higher GDP growth rates-20246810-4-20246810121416182022CambodiaChinaIndiaIrelandUkraineUnited StatesVene

16、zuelaVietnamAverage real change in exports of goods&servicesAverage change in real GDP Looking at more than three decades of country-level data,there is a notable correlation between economic growth and trade:countries with higher export growth rates also tend to have higher GDP growth rates Althoug

17、h correlations shown here do not establish causality,current economic opinion indicates that trade has a positive impact on GDP growth Research describes a positive relationship between trade and growth via three mechanisms.First,access to foreign markets enables countries to acquire new technologie

18、s.Second,openness to international trade provides opportunities to exploit economies of scale by expanding outputs,while innovations resulting from international trade allow workers to acquire new skills.This increases both productivity growth and the variety of goods produced and consumed.Third,the

19、 competitive pressures arising from trade encourage innovation and factor reallocationAverage growth rate of real GDP and trade,1990-2023%Source:Oxford Economics;World Bank;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics7Roland Berger|0510152025303540455055606570187019141945198020082022Since the

20、global financial crisis,globalization appears to be slowing down on an uneven plateau Its future direction is dividing expectationsKlasing and MilionisPenn World TablesWorld Bank1870-1914Industrializationand integration1914-1945Interwar era1945-1980Postwar rebound1980-2008Liberalization2009 onwardsS

21、lowbalization The term globalization describes the increasing interconnectedness of the worlds economies,populations and cultures caused by cross-border trade in goods and services,tech-nology and flows of investment,people,and information The status of globalization is often measured by global trad

22、e openness,an indicator composed of the sum of global exports and imports as a percentage of global GDP Over the past 150 years,globalization has mostly gone through burgeoning phases except for the interwar period,when globalization was in decline for several decades The global financial crisis of

23、2007-2009 marks a turning point for flourishing phases of postwar re-bound followed by trade liberalization;since then,a period of so-called slowbalization can be observed.Expectations about its future path are mixed:globalization is expected to grow at a comparatively subdued pace,some even see a p

24、eriod of renewed decline in globalizationGlobal trade openness,1870-20221)%1)Sum of global exports and imports divided by global GDPSource:Our World In Data;Klasing and Milionis;Penn World Tables;World Bank;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics8Roland Berger|In the early 2000s global tr

25、ade grew significantly faster than GDP but following the global financial crisis their growth rates have converged-12-10-8-6-4-20246810121420002005201020152020202520302024-2029 forecastAverage trade growth:3.3%Average GDP growth:3.1%2007-2009Global financial crisis,rebound in 20102020Outbreak of COV

26、ID-19,rebound in 20212001-20029/11 and burst of dotcom bubble,rebound in 20032004-2007 Average trade growth:9.1%Average GDP growth:5.3%2011-2019Average trade growth:3.7%Average GDP growth:3.5%Growth of global trade volumeGrowth of global GDP2022Begin of war in Ukraine and sanctions policy9.1%5.3%3.7

27、%3.5%3.3%3.1%Growth of global trade volume and global GDP(real),yoy,2000-20291)%The speed of globalization(measured as the difference between growth of GDP and trade)reached its maximum in the mid-2000s:between 2004 and 2007,global trade grew,on average,by 9.1%p.a.(compared to 4.6%between 1980-1989

28、and 6.7%between 1990-1999)Since the global financial crisis(GFC)trade growth has declined.Between 2011 and 2019,global trade at 3.7%p.a.grew only slightly stronger than GDP(3.5%).Forecasts for 2024-2029 expect global trade growth of 3.3%p.a.and global annual GDP growth of 3.1%One reason for this dev

29、elopment is clear:globalization is already at a high level.Therefore,growth rates of global trade are closer to the growth rates of global GDP Other reasons include Chinas increased production of intermediate goods replacing imports,the slowdown of global economic activity following the GFC,and the

30、increase in trade barriers and protectionist measures due to rising geopolitical tensions1)Trade volume of goods and services(exports and imports)Source:IMF;BBVA;ECB;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics9Roland Berger|Global trade is increasingly burdened by harmful trade interventions

31、and policies,as countries seek to reduce dependenciesGeopolitical tensionsTrade wars and sanction policies:impacting global trade.Former US President Trump started imposing steep tariffs on goods from the EU,Canada,Mexico,and China,prompting retaliatory tariffs from these countries.This trade war in

32、volved countries using taxes and quotas against each other,escalating tensions while harming economies.In addition,it led to strategic sovereignty policies and subsidies described belowStrategic sovereignty policies Chinas Dual Circulation Strategy:putting a stronger focus on domestic consumption.Bu

33、ilding on the Made in China 2025 strategy,China launched the China Standards 2035 strategy in 2018,which aims to enable the Chinese government and leading tech companies to set global standards for emerging technologies such as 5G,IoT,and AI US Chips&Science Act:aimed at keeping manufacturing and re

34、search of semiconductors in the domestic market,lowering strategic dependence EU Chips Act:directed at strengthening domestic EU semiconductor market by reducing strategic vulnerabilities from third country importsRace for green subsidies EU carbon levy:promoting greener industry by levying a carbon

35、 price tariff on polluting imports,disincentivizing imports from less developed countries US Inflation Reduction Act:promoting a greener economy by falling back on protectionist levers to boost domestic industry and energy transitionSelected policies and interventions placing a burden on free global

36、 trade2,85518,57136,61453,0335143,3576,6489,7842010201520202023HarmfulLiberalizingCumulative number of harmful and liberalizing trade interventions,globally 2010-2023Source:Global Trade Alert;BBC;China Briefing;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics10Roland Berger|Multilateral economic a

37、greements serve as a counterbalance to harmful trade interventions and increased protectionismEconomic and political unionCustom unionMultilateral free trade areaRCEP8)Population9):2,318 mGDP10):USD 29,615 bnExports:USD 8,022 bnImports:USD 7,412 bnGAFTA6)Population9):449 mGDP10):USD 3,471 bnExports:

38、USD 1,708 bnImports:USD 1,473 bnUSMCA1)Population9):503 mGDP10):USD 31,298 bnExports:USD 4,388 bnImports:USD 5,218 bnMERCOSUR5)Population9):272 mGDP10):USD 2,965 bnExports:USD 519 bnImports:USD 473 bnEU2)Population9):450 mGDP10):USD 18,344 bnExports:USD 8,974 bnImports:USD 8,327 bn AfCFTA7)Populatio

39、n9):1,302 mGDP10):USD 2,660 bnExports:USD 619 bnImports:USD 682 bnCPTPP4)Population9):517 mGDP10):USD 12,099 bnExports:USD 4,495 bnImports:USD 4,275 bnGCC3)Population9):61 mGDP10):USD 2,114 bnExports:USD 1,257 bnImports:USD 988 bn1)United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement:Canada,Mexico,United States;2)

40、European Union:Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Croatia,Cyprus,Czech Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,Netherlands,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden;3)Gulf Cooperation Council:Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Ar

41、abia,United Arab Emirates;4)Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership:Australia,Brunei,Canada,Chile,Japan,Malaysia,Mexico,New Zealand,Peru,Singapore,Viet Nam;5)Mercado Comn del Sur:Argentina,Brazil,Paraguay,Uruguay;6)Greater Arab Free Trade Area:Algeria,Bahrain,Egypt,Iraq

42、,Jordan,Kuwait,Lebanon,Libya,Morocco,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Sudan,Syria,Tunisia,United Arab Emirates,West Bank&Gaza,Yemen;7)African Continental Free Trade Area(only countries having ratified the agreement as of July 2024):Algeria,Angola,Egypt,Burkina Faso,Cameroon,Cape Verde,Central African Republi

43、c,Chad,Comoros,Congo,Cte dIvoire,Dem.Rep.of Congo,Djibouti,Equatorial Guinea,Eswatini,Ethiopia,Gabon,Ghana,Guinea,Kenya,Lesotho,Malawi,Mali,Mauritania,Mauritius,Morocco,Mozambique,Namibia,Niger,Nigeria,Rwanda,So Tom and Prncipe,Senegal,Sierra Leone,South Africa,Tanzania,Gambia,Togo,Tunisia,Uganda,We

44、stern Sahara,Zambia,Zimbabwe;8)Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership:Australia,Brunei,Cambodia,China,Indonesia,Japan,Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar,New Zealand,Philippines,Singapore,South Korea,Thailand,Viet Nam;9)As of 2023;10)Nominal GDP 2023Source:Oxford Economics;Desk Research;Roland BergerImportan

45、t multilateral economic agreementsEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics11Roland Berger|While multilateral economic agreements in Asia/Pacific and Africa cover more people,USMCA,RCEP,and EU lead in GDP and tradeRCEPAfCFTACPTPPUSMCAEUGAFTAGCCMERCOSUR28.8%16.2%6.4%6.2%5.6%5.6%4.0%3.4%Population%EURCEPU

46、SMCACPTPPGCCGAFTAAfCFTAMERCOSUR28.3%25.3%15.7%12.0%10.0%5.2%2.1%1.6%Trade(exports+imports)%GDP%USMCARCEPEUCPTPPGCCGAFTAMERCOSURAfCFTA29.9%28.3%17.5%11.5%4.0%3.3%2.8%2.5%Economic and political unionCustom unionMultilateral free trade areaGlobal shares of selected multilateral economic agreements,2023

47、1)%1)RCEP:Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership;AfCFTA:African Continental Free Trade Area(data includes only countries that ratified the agreement);CPTPP:Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership;USMCA:United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement;EU:European Union,GAFTA:G

48、reater Arab Free Trade Area;GCC:Gulf Cooperation Council;MERCOSUR:Mercado Comn del Sur or Southern Common Market(data excluding Bolivia);overlapping countries between RCEP and CPTPP,CPTPP and USMCA,AfCFTA and GAFTA,and GAFTA and GCCSource:Oxford Economics;Roland Berger Economics&Business4.1Global Ec

49、onomics12Roland Berger|On January 1st,2022,the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP)came into force,creating the biggest trade bloc in history RCEP is a free trade agreement between 15 Asia-Pacific nations(including all ASEAN members):Australia,Brunei,Cambodia,China,Indonesia,Japan,Lao P

50、DR,Malaysia,Myanmar,New Zealand,Philippines,Singapore,South Korea,Thailand,Viet Nam Members aim to benefit from lower or complete removal of tariffs within the next 20 years RCEP surpassed existing Asia-Pacific trade agreements in population and economic numbers As a result of the tariff reduction,C

51、hinese companies saved about USD 330 m out of USD 13 bn of imports under the RCEP in 2023What is RCEP?RCEP does not includeIn 2019,India withdrew from the RCEP negotia-tions over concerns about the trade blocs impact on its industrial and agricultural sectors;it still has the option to rejoin in the

52、 futureImplicationsRCEP will establish common rules in areas ofLabor union provisionsEnvironmental protectionGovernment subsidiesInvestmentIntellectual propertyCompetitionTelecommunicatione-commerceRCEP membersSummary of the RCEP trade agreementSource:Visual Capitalist;Khmer Times;Roland Berger Econ

53、omics&Business4.1Global Economics13Roland Berger|Countries of the Global North have been trading with each other for a long time,while trading relationships of poorer countries began much later Historically,world trade has displayed uneven relationships among trading partners:the graph shows the sha

54、re of exports between different groups of countries,classified according to their income levels During the period of industriali-zation,poorer countries were almost cut off from global trade and were,at best,supplied by richer countries Now as globalization loses momentum,the structure of global tra

55、de flows also seems to change fundamentally While countries of the so-called Global North continue their decline in share of global exports,South-South trade has surpassed North-North trade around the time of the global financial crisis These developments indicate a shift in the economic balance of

56、power:countries in the Global South are catching up,with China leading the wayShare of global exports by income level of trade partners,1840-20221)%1)According to the source,rich countries include Australia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Cyprus,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Iceland,Ireland,Israel,It

57、aly,Japan,Luxembourg,Netherlands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,United Kingdom,United States.Non-rich countries are all the other countries in the world for which data is availableSource:Brookings;Roland Berger0204060801001840186018801900192019401960198020002020SouthSouthSouthNorthNorthNor

58、thNorthSouthGlobal financialcrisisEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics14Roland Berger|05001,0001,5002,0002,50019901995200020052010201520202025As global trade slows,so does foreign direct investment A trend toward more regional value chains is emerging Global FDI inflowsGlobal financial crisisCOVID-

59、19 pandemicBurst of dotcom bubble One facet of rising globalization is an increase in foreign direct investment(FDI).FDIs are investments by foreign firms abroad,either through the establishment of new operations or the(partial)acquisition of an existing business.As such,FDIs are long-term investmen

60、ts and involve elements of corporate control During the liberalization period,global FDI flows increased greatly.After the dotcom bubble and the global financial crisis,sharp declines in FDI followed.Especially after the latter,FDI flows were much more volatile and settled at lower levels compared t

61、o the pre-crisis peak In 2023,global FDI flows reached USD 1.33 trillion,down 2%from 2022,but excluding the impact of European conduit economies,inflows fell by more than 10%.FDIs to developing economies declined by 7%,while flows to developed economies decreased by 15%The decline in FDIs to develop

62、ed economies was driven by corporate financial restructuring,partly due to the imminent global minimum tax on multinationals,and a significant drop in the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitionsGlobal foreign direct investment 1990-2023,inflows1)USD bn1)Due to different calculation methods,FD

63、I data from different sources differ,sometimes considerablySource:UNCTAD;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics15Roland Berger|Overall,foreign direct investment(FDI)flows have seen a slight decrease,but greenfield investments,a significant component of FDIs,have experienced a notable inc

64、rease of 69%from 2016 to 2023 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions(M&A)have dropped by 57%due to increased geopolitical risks,regulatory scrutiny,and rising interest rates To mitigate these risks and to diversify their supply chains,companies are turning to greenfield investments Chinese firms are

65、increasingly investing in Southeast Asia and Mexico to capitalize on lower labor costs and advantageous trade agreements-a strategy known as geopolitical arbitrage These underlying FDI trends show that globalization is evolving,rather than reversing,despite indications to the contrary based on globa

66、l trade openness Greenfield investments have surged,offsetting the decline in overall FDI and cross-border M&A amid rising geopolitical risks20022004200620082010201220142016201820202022202402004006008001,0001,2001,4001,600+69%Net cross-border M&A sales1)Greenfield projects2)Value of net cross-border

67、 M&A sales and announced greenfield FDIs globally,2003-2023 USD bn1)Net cross-border M&As are calculated considering sales of companies in a host economy to foreign MNEs.They exclude sales of foreign affiliates(already owned by foreign MNEs)to other foreign MNEs.Divestments(sales of foreign affiliat

68、es to domestic firms)are subtracted from the value(number).Totals exclude the financial centers in the Caribbean;2)Greenfield investment projects refer to a form of FDI whereby a company establishes entirely new operational facilities in a foreign country from the ground upSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berge

69、r-57%Economics&Business4.1Global Economics16Roland Berger|Historically,FDI flows of the US and the EU have been highly volatile China demonstrates a consistent pattern of growth in FDI inflows and outflows-200,0000200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,0001990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025United Sta

70、tesChinaEU1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025FDI inflows,1990-2023 USD bnFDI outflows,1990-2023 USD bn It is not uncommon for FDI flows to experience notable fluctua-tions.Inflows and outflows are subject to significant volatility,with the potential for negative values.For example,investors in t

71、he EU have demonstrated cau-tion due to geopolitical instability,weak economic performance,and high inflation in the wake of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine However,on average over past decades,FDI inflows remain at a much higher level in developed countries compared to developing countries Star

72、ting from a low level,China has seen a significant and continuous increase in FDI inflows and outflows since 2005.The rise in outflows has been supported by investments related to the Belt and Road Initiative.Increased investment by Chinese MNEs in overseas production facilities to circumvent trade

73、barriers could further accelerate this trend in the futureFDI in-and outflows in selected economies,1990-2023Source:UNCTAD;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics17Roland Berger|UNCTAD identifies five major FDI trends Factors other than economic determinants are playing a more important r

74、ole in investment decisionsFive major FDI trends according to UNCTADSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger The growth of foreign direct investment(FDI)and global value chains(GVC)is no longer in sync with GDP and trade expansion This divergence points to a substantial transformation in the global economic land

75、scape In the period of 2004 to 2023,cross-border greenfield projects in services rose from 66%to 81%Investment in services within the manufacturing sector almost doubled,reaching approximately 70%,a development fueled by technological progress Due to rising geo-political tensions,greenfield invest-m

76、ents are shifting away from geo-politically distant to more aligned countries Trade wars have reduced cross-border greenfield projects between geopolitically distant countries from 23%in 2013 to 13%in 2022 Cross-border green-field environmental technology projects in non-service sectors as a percent

77、age of total greenfield projects increased from 1%to 20%over the past 20 years FDI in manufacturing electric vehicles and batteries has grown by 27%per year from 2016 to 2023 The share of green-field FDI projects in least developed countries(LDCs),measured as a percentage of all greenfield FDI proje

78、cts in developing countries,has fallen from 3%in the mid-2010s to 1%Over the past two decades,FDI in LDCs and lower-middle-income developing countries has decreased by 13 percentage pointsForeign investment struggles to keep up with production and tradeServices increase their weight in foreign direc

79、t investmentGeopolitics plays a growing role in investment decisionsSeeing green:Foreign investment in environmental technologies soarsForeign investments in LDCs are being marginalized Economics&Business4.1Global Economics18Roland Berger|FDI growth is trailing behind production and trade,indicating

80、 a major shift in the global economic landscape Foreign direct investment(FDI)and global value chain(GVC)growth are no longer in sync with GDP growth and trade expansion signaling a substantial transformation of the global economic landscape This trend shows that investors are becoming more cautious

81、 due to the interconnected shifts in global production and supply chains,the increase in protectionist policies,and heightened geopolitical conflicts GVCs have seen significant changes,moving away from offshoring and fragmentation trends toward more localized production and reintegration of previous

82、ly outsourced processes This shift is driven by technological advancements such as robotics,supply chain digitalization,and additive manufacturing,alongside policy changes and sustainability concerns These technologies are reshaping production,while new policies,including protectionism and sustainab

83、ility initiatives,are adding to the transformation of the FDI landscape In the future,developing countries are especially at risk of falling further behind due to their heavy reliance on FDIs for economic growthFDI,GDP,and trade trends(index,2010=100)1)The GVC share of trade is proxied by the share

84、of foreign value added in exportsSource:UNCTAD;Roland BergerUnderlying FDI trend020406080100120140160180199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201219902014201520162017201320192020202120222018GVC share of trade%35302520GVCs1)TradeGDP1990s2000s2010s2020s(po

85、st COVID-19)FDI:16%Trade:6%GDP:4%8%9%7%0%3%3%2%8%5%CAGREconomics&Business4.1Global Economics19Roland Berger|While greenfield investments have traditionally focused on manufacturing sites,investment abroad is now also aimed at service functions High value added2)Low value added2)Manu-facturing+1)The

86、smile curve depicts the shift in global investments from manu-facturing to services with increa-sing focus on high value activities at either end of the curve both upstream(pre-production)and downstream(post-production)Low-value,efficiency-seeking FDI projects,which used to serve as common entry poi

87、nts for developing countries into global value chains(GVCs),are now on the decline Higher-value,service-oriented,and more knowledge-intensive stages of production at the upper ends of the smile curve are becoming the focus of investment,with access largely limited to advanced and emerging economies

88、Due to this shift,low-income countries-still at an early point in their global value chain develop-ment-face significant challengesDistribution of cross-border greenfield projects across stages of production%1)Manufacturing+includes Manufacturing and Other non-services activities.The latter group co

89、mprises the following categories:construction,electricity,extraction,and infrastructure;2)Value added in non-manufacturing stages;3)Figures for Supply chain also cover Packaging&DistributionSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger111313226519341014252100Concept/R&D/Management(+67%)High-level support functions(+1

90、53%)Low-level support functions(-9%)Supply chain3)(+59%)Manufacturing+(-23%)Packaging&Distribution3)Sales/After-Sales(-1%)Marketing(+62%)Recycling(+98%)25Share in total number of projects 2004-2007Share in total number of projects 2020-2023Growth rate,number of projects(%)Economics&Business4.1Global

91、 Economics20Roland Berger|Geopolitics is increasingly important in FDI decision making,as the share of investment between geopolitically aligned countries appears to be a trend Over the past decade,with the increase in global conflicts and political crises,traditional investment patterns began to we

92、aken,resulting in unsteady investment relationships and reduced opportunities for strategic diversification today According to UNCTAD data,geopolitical alignment is becoming ever more important compared to physical proximity when it comes to FDI decision making:the share of greenfield investment flo

93、ws between geopolitically aligned countries increased from 54%in 2013 to 64%in 2022 distinctly outpacing the increase between geographically close countries Data for 2023,although lower regarding the former,still supports this decade-long trend overall Manufacturing investment projects were particul

94、arly affected in the late 2010s,when trade tensions between China and the US escalated during the Trump administrationCross-border greenfield projects between countries that are geopolitically aligned vs countries within the same region,2013-20231)%1)The assessment of geopolitical alignment is based

95、 on United Nations voting patternsSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger30354045505560657020132014201520162017201820192020202120222023343738Countries within same regionManufacturing605445All sectors646154Geopolitically aligned countriesEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics21Roland Berger|As concerns about clim

96、ate change increase,FDI in environmental technologies are growing,particularly in battery and vehicle manufacturing3317120162023+418%36070620162023+96%Batteries and electrical vehicles With concerns about climate change on the rise,foreign direct investment(FDI)in environment-tal technologies has be

97、come the fastest-growing sector outside of services,almost doubling in the short period from 2016 to 2023 Over the past two decades,the share of greenfield projects in non-services sectors involving these technologies has risen from 1%to 20%Cross-border greenfield invest-ment projects in manufacturi

98、ng of batteries and electrical vehicles rose more than 400%from 2016 to 2023 But increasing FDIs in environ-mental technologies only partially compensates for the decline in other manufacturing sectors The emphasis on high-tech industries primarily advantages developed economies while smaller and le

99、ss-developed economies face ongoing challenges with declining FDI in traditional sectorsNumber of cross-border greenfield projects in environmental technologies and manufacturing of batteries and EVs,2016 and 20231)1)Excluding service activitiesSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger Environmental technologiesE

100、conomics&Business4.1Global Economics22Roland Berger|As global investment flows in developing countries favor high income nations,foreign investment in low income countries is being sidelined21%34%42%2%2004-200723%38%35%3%2008-201123%40%34%3%2012-201522%40%36%2%2016-201933%35%30%1%2020-2023High incom

101、eUpper-middle incomeLower-middle incomeLow income Global investment flows to developing countries are gradually directed more toward high income developing countries The proportion of overall green-field foreign direct investment(FDI)projects in least developed countries(LDCs,i.e.the lowest income s

102、egment of developing countries)has declined from 3%in the mid-2010s to just 1%FDI in low income and lower-middle income countries have decreased by roughly a third over the past two decades The focus of FDI on high income developing countries leaves less developed countries more vulnerable,impeding

103、their growth and development goalsProjects in developing countries as share of total(excl.China)35%41%39%35%35%Share of cross-border greenfield investments in developing countries by income level of recipient nations,2004-20231)%1)Due to rounding,sum of shares does not always total 100%;income categ

104、ories based on World Bank classification.Analysis excludes cross-border greenfield projects in China to net the effects of the declining share of China as FDI recipientSource:UNCTAD;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics23Roland Berger|The term international production refers to the glob

105、al production networks of multinational enterprises(MNEs)which generate and coordinate global value chain(GVC)trade Multinational enterprises lead the coordination of GVCs as 80%of global trade is linked to inter-national production networks of MNEs The key dimensions include the length of GVCs(numb

106、er of production stages),the geo-graphical spread of value added(number of countries involved),and the governance structure(control and management of GVCs)The length of GVCs is dependent on the ease of dividing production stages and the benefits of specialization while the geographical spread indica

107、tes how value is distributed across countriesTrade and investment trends unfold in three key dimensions of international productionKey dimensions of international productionSource:UNCTAD;Roland BergerGeographic distribution of value added(Number of countries)Governance of GVCs(Level of control)Inter

108、nalization(As opposed to outsourcing)Trade NEMs-FDIOffshoringFine-slicing/unbundlingLength of GVCs(Number of steps)Economics&Business4.1Global Economics24Roland Berger|G20 emerging markets have expanded their role in global value chains,both as producers and consumers01234519952000200520102015202020

109、25Input linkagesOutput linkages As G20 emerging markets become more integrated into global value chains,their development increasingly impacts businesses elsewhere Increased demand from emerging G20 countries can drive revenue growth for foreign firms in sectors like electrical equipment,machinery,a

110、nd metal products Accelerated growth in such emerging markets can also provide foreign firms with cheaper inputs for production However,this growth can also lead to increased competition,as these emerging markets expand their productive capacity downstream and export goods that directly compete with

111、 those from foreign firmsG20 emerging markets in-and output linkages,1999-20211)2)%,median across countries1)Input linkages=share of total inputs supplied by G20 EMs industries;Output linkages=share of global demand from G20 EMs consumer and firms;2)The G20 emerging market countries include Argentin

112、a,Brazil,China,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,and TrkiyeSource:IMF;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics25Roland Berger|Three megatrends shape the future of international production Megatrends shaping the future of international productionSource:UNCTAD;Roland Be

113、rgerTechnology/New Industrial RevolutionSustainabilityPolicy and economic governanceKey elements Industrial automation,AI-enabled systems(white collar robots)Platforms,cloud,IoT,blockchain Distributed manufacturing,mass customization,commodification of production Major green plans(and varying implem

114、entation timelines),carbon border adjustments Increased reputational risks and demand for sustainably produced goods and services Supply chain resilience measures,changing sources of agricultural inputs Industrial policies,competition policy,fiscal policy Tariffs and non-tariff measures,shielding of

115、 strategic/sensitive industries Trade deals among select groups and on common-ground issues De-risking strategies or friend-and reshoring attempts Sustainability policies and regulations Market-driven changes in products and processes Physical supply chain impactsTrends Advanced robotics and AI Digi

116、talization in the supply chain Additive manufacturing(3D printing)More interventionism in national policies More protectionism in trade and investment More regional,bilateral and ad hoc economic cooperationEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics26Roland Berger|Mirroring global trade developments,globa

117、l supply chains also weakened while domestic production gained prominence2011202088.292.5+4.3 PP2011202079.884.2+4.4 PP2011202083.584.2+0.7 PP2011202075.578.6+3.1 PP The COVID-19 crisis has exposed key weaknesses in the principles of the international division of labor:a massive supply and de-mand s

118、hock at the beginning of 2020 brought many economies to a standstill However,the decline of the impor-tance of global value chains had already begun a decade earlier Chinas economy moved up the value chain and replaced imports of intermediate products with domestic production In the US,the EU,and Ge

119、rmany,this kind of substitutional shift is also evident although less pronounced in the EU The trend toward regionalization or even reshoring of production is due to different factors including the reduction of wage differentials,a higher importance of transport cost,the pursuit of domestic producti

120、on for essential goods,and/or the aim of a more sustainable production with shorter transport routesDomestic share of value added as a proportion of a countrys/regions total exports,2011 and 2020%Source:OECD;Roland BergerEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics27Roland Berger|In April 2022,the US Secre

121、tary of the Treasury,Janet Yellen,emphasized her countrys strategic objective of free but secure trade termed friend-shoring to shift supply chains from China to trusted partners such as Taiwan,India,Vietnam,and Mexico Progress in reducing Chinas share of US imports has been slow,with some sectors a

122、gain experiencing slightly increased imports from China,for example regarding energy goods Early effects of friend-shoring are visible,but challenges remain for the US,particularly in green energy and critical minerals While the strategy is starting to have an impact,the transition is complex and on

123、goingEarly results of friend-shoring strategy reveal complex transition as US seeks to shift supply chains from China to trusted partnersChinas share of US imports(12 month rolling average)%1)Overall Goods Import Share tracks Chinas share of all goods the US importsSource:Atlantic Council;Roland Ber

124、ger01020304050Jan-18Jan-20Jan-22Jan-24ICT GoodsOverall Goods Import Share1)Friend-shored GoodsPublic Health GoodsEnergy GoodsCritical Minerals and MaterialsYellens friend-shoring speechUS-China trade war beginsEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics28Roland Berger|Friend-and reshoring strategies negat

125、ively impact global economic performance and value chains in the long term In a reshoring scenario,in which countries focus on increasing domestic production and decreasing imports from both allied and rivaling countries,China faces a 6.9%long-term GDP loss due to reduced demand from OECD regions.Ot

126、her Southeast Asian countries,particularly those with strong trade links to China and the OECD,experience significant losses exceeding 9%of GDP OECD regions see GDP losses ranging from 3.8%to 10.2%,with larger losses in open economies with strong connections to China,such as South Korea The friend-s

127、horing scenario involves shifting imports from rivals to allies without reducing overall foreign dependence.In this approach,China and OECD members impose non-tariff barriers(NTBs)3)on each other,China and South Korea face the largest GDP losses,while the rest of the world experiences minor effects

128、due to trade diversion Under the tax-and-subsidy approach4),China incurs significant losses,while Southeast Asia sees gains through subsidies,and the US benefits slightly from improved trade terms1)EU+=European Union plus Switzerland;2)SE=southeast;3)Non-tariff barriers(just like tariffs)affect trad

129、e decisions but generate deadweight losses for exporters rather than fiscal revenues for importers;4)In the tax-and-subsidy approach,two countries that tax each others exports use the tax revenue to boost exports from other regions Source:IMF;Roland BergerLong-term GDP losses from reshoring1)2)Long-

130、term GDP changes from friend-shoring1)2)Real GDP,percent deviation from baseline%-12-10-8-6-4-202ChinaUSEU+JapanSouth KoreaOECDIndiaIndonesiaOther SE Asia-12-10-8-6-4-202ChinaUSEU+JapanSouth KoreaOECDIndiaIndonesiaOther SE AsiaNTB approachTax-and-subsidy approachEconomics&Business4.1Global Economics

131、29Roland Berger|Global economic power shift:Major drivers and indicators In recent decades,globalization and related factors have driven not only global growth but also an economic power shift towards developing economies Developing economies characterized mainly by a lower GDP per capita compared t

132、o developed nations-increased their share of global GDP,trade,and FDIs Furthermore,several of these countries developed into manufacturing power houses,rapidly catching up in terms of technological know-how and/or became globally relevant as key sources of critical raw materials necessary for the gr

133、een energy transformation and economic sustainability This enhanced economic influence is not just reflected in statistics,but also in the fact that developing countries constitute major players in important economic groups,such as the G20,BRICS or RCEP.International treaties on global challenges,fo

134、r example the Paris Agreement,are significantly shaped by developing countries This group of developing countries is not a homogeneous entity.Some countries,such as China and India,experienced significantly higher rates of economic growth than others and have become economic powerhouses.In contrast,

135、other countries,including some in Africa,have been less successful in catching up Since the 2010s,growing geopolitical tensions have led to an increase in protectionism and slowbalization.This decelerated but never halted-the power shift towards developing economies,as evidenced in the continued inc

136、rease of their global share of FDI inflowsSource:Roland BergerDeveloped countriesDeveloping countriesMain indicators Global share of GDP Global share of trade Global share of FDIsFurther indicators Manufacturing dominance Technological catch-up Ownership of critical raw materialsPower Shifts 4.2Econ

137、omics&Business Globalization,integration of developing countries into global value chains Technological catch-up of developing countries Opening of economies Different patterns of population growth Build up/enlargement of economic trade zones/custom unions/currency units Transformation of economies

138、shifting supply and demand,e.g.from traditional to new critical raw materials Geopolitics,protectionismThe evolution of global economics led to a power shift from developed to developing countries30Roland Berger|1)Aggregate compiled by IMF(see IMF World Economic Outlook database).Some countries cate

139、gorized as developing economy or EM belong to developed economies in aggregations from other international organizations.E.g.,according to the IMF,countries from Eastern Europe like Poland or Hungary belong to developing economies and EMs,while they are classified as developed economies according to

140、 UNCTADSource:IMF;Roland BergerGlobal share of GDP based on PPP data,2000-2023%43.6%50.2%55.8%58.8%56.4%49.8%44.2%41.2%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%200020102023Advanced economiesDeveloping economies and EMs1)Since the turn of the century,developing economies and emerging markets(EMs)increased th

141、eir share of global GDP from around 44%to nearly 60%(measured in PPP terms).A significant part stems from China which increased its share of global GDP from 11.1%in 2000 to 19.5%in 2023 A particular strong increase took place between 2000 and 2012,when globalization was on a high:developing economie

142、s and EMs have been integrated into global value chains shifting the creation of value added from advanced economies to developing economies and EMs A sectoral shift from agriculture to industry and then to services took place,while a know-how transfer in the later stages of globalization led to an

143、increase in the skill levels of the workforce Population growth is another factor underpinning this shift from advanced to developing and EMs.While population growth in advanced economies has been subdued in recent decades,it has been strong in developing economies and EMs.The ready availability of

144、working-age people for their labor markets is a key driver of GDP growth in these regions Yet,in the period from 2012 to 2023,the increase of the global GDP share of developing economies and EMs was only small-reflecting the slowbalization in this period2007200720122012Since 2000,developing and emer

145、ging markets have seen a notable increase in their global share of GDP In fact,since 2007,their share is more than 50%Power Shifts 4.2Economics&Business31Roland Berger|Avg.advanced economiesAvg.developing economiesSince 2000,GDP per capita in emerging economies grew faster than in advanced economies

146、 Developing economies struggle to catch upSource:Oxford Economics;Roland Berger36,34281,74320002023+125%26,82958,35920002023+118%27,37052,48720002023+92%2,88123,84920002023+728%4,58317,08920002023+273%5,61815,71820002023+180%USAEurozoneChinaAvg.emerging economiesEgyptJapan27,11157,29320002023+111%16

147、,87556,39220002023+234%29,39266,16820002023+125%UKSouth Korea2,8906,76120002023+134%9,09119,34720002023+113%Brazil1,2567,52620002023+499%7551,50320002023+99%CambodiaNiger2,2133,55620002023+61%HaitiSelected emerging economiesSelected developing economiesSelected advanced economies Emerging markets ha

148、ve strongly increased their GDP per capita,which has narrowed the gap in relative prosperity between EMs and advanced economies.However,the absolute difference has increased Poorer countries,on average,did not narrow the gap.Nevertheless,they also contributed to the overall economic power shift due

149、to their high population growth Within the country groups,the range of GDP per capita growth is large.Since 2000,a few countries,e.g.Venezuela and Sudan,have even been faced with a decreasing GDP per capitaGDP per capita p.a.based on nominal PPP data,2000 and 2023 USD,%Power Shifts 4.2Economics&Busi

150、ness32Roland Berger|Global share of imports and exports based on nominal data,2000-2023%0%20%40%60%80%100%20002010202378.7%21.3%63.2%36.8%62.3%37.7%For more than 20 years,the global share of imports and exports by developing economies and emerging markets(EMs)has been rising.The increase was notably

151、 high between 2000 and 2010,after which it became more marginal Like GDP,the share of China in global trade is high:in 2023,it was 10.5%for imports and 14.2%for exports A major reason for the increase is the growing integration of developing economies and EMs into global value chains In addition,the

152、 product offerings from developing economies and EMs for final use have demonstrated a sustained global demand,with notable examples including fashion goods,consumer electronics,and IT/telco equipment In many of these markets,growth in population and purchasing power raised additional import demand

153、Finally,the growing working age population enabled companies to expand and thus to increase exportsAdvanced economiesDeveloping economies and EMs1)0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%20002010202377.0%23.0%62.3%37.7%61.7%38.3%ImportsExports1)Aggregate compiled based on IMF classification of countries(se

154、e IMF World Economic Outlook database).Country classifications differ depending on international organizations;according to the IMF,for example,countries from Eastern Europe like Poland or Hungary are categorized as developing economies and EMs,while they are classed as developed economies according

155、 to UNCTAD Source:IMF;UNCTAD;Roland Berger2013201320132013Power shifts in trade reflect the integration of developing and emerging markets into global value chains Demand for their end products is growingPower Shifts 4.2Economics&Business33Roland Berger|More than 70%of global FDI is directed toward

156、developing countries Their growing investment abroad is expanding their global economic footprintSource:UNCTAD;Roland BergerGlobal share of FDI inflows,outflows,inward stocks and outward stocks based on nominal data,2000-2022%16.4%71.2%83.6%28.8%0%20%40%60%80%100%200020102022 The development of FDI

157、flows shows a strong power shift from developed countries to developing countries The global share of FDI inflows of developing countries increased from 16.4%in 2000 to 71.2%in 2022(China 2022:14.4%).Outsourcing of production to developing countries is a major reason for this trend Global share of F

158、DI outflows from developing countries grew from a mere 7.2%in 2000 to 37.1%in 2022(China 2022:9.8%)demonstrating the growing financial power and strategic will of these countries to expand their economic footprint abroad-be it for cost reasons or to gain access to markets and know-how The evolution

159、of FDI stocks reflects the development of flows,but as yearly inflows and outflows are much smaller than current stocks,power shifts in stocks are less dynamic Nevertheless,global share of FDI inward stocks in developing countries increased from 20.6%in 2000 to 34.2%in 2022,while FDI outward stocks

160、held by developing countries rose from 9.0%in 2000 to 22.9%in 2022Developed economiesDeveloping economiesFDI inflows37.1%92.8%62.9%0%20%40%60%80%100%7.2%200020102022FDI outflows20.6%34.2%79.4%65.8%0%20%40%60%80%100%200020102022FDI inward stocks22.9%91.0%77.1%0%20%40%60%80%100%9.0%200020102022FDI out

161、ward stocksPower Shifts 4.2Economics&Business34Roland Berger|It is important to recognize that advanced economies,developing economies,and EMs are all highly diverse country groupsSelected economic indicators of advanced economies and developing economies and emerging markets:Range within the groups

162、1)For average real GDP growth p.a.2014-2023 the number of advanced economies is 39,and for developing economies and emerging markets it is 153Source:Oxford Economics;Roland BergerAdvanced economies Number of economies:40Developing economies and emerging markets Number of economies:162GDP nominal PPP

163、 2023 USD bnAverage real GDP growth p.a.2014-20231)%Ireland:8.2Puerto Rico:-0.7Guyana:18.3 Venezuela:-10.6GDP nominal PPP per capita 2023 USD 000Luxembourg:140Greece:40Bermuda:134South Sudan:1USA:27,361Andorra:5China:32,931Anguilla:4001.5)High levels of debt financing for real estate purchases can f

164、uel property bubbles by driving up demand and prices through easy credit availability In 2023,the real estate market experienced a notable decline in property values,particularly in cities previously identified as vulnerable to housing bubbles.On average,these cities saw a 10%reduction in property v

165、alues.Thus,only Zurich and Tokyo remain in the bubble risk category,while cities such as Toronto,Frankfurt,and Munich have shifted to the overvalued category The inflationary environment has exerted a dual impact on the real estate market.On the one hand,it has exerted downward pressure on house pri

166、ces due to higher interest rates.On the other hand,it has provided support to income and rental growth,particularly in markets outside the US,where rental growth has acceleratedbubble risksMiami:1.38Sa Paulo:0.091)The UBS Global Real Estate Bubble Index traces the fundamental valuation of housing ma

167、rkets and the valuation of cities in relation both to their country and to economic distortions.The index score is a weighted average of the following five standardized city sub-indexes:price-to-income and price-to-rent(fundamental valuation),change in mortgage-to-GDP ratio and change in constructio

168、n-to-GDP ratio(economic distortion),and relative price-city-to-country indicatorSource:UBS;Roland BergerReal estate bubble risks in 20231)Economics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.478Roland Berger|Number of developing countries with net interest payments exceeding 10%of government revenues1)1)The government

169、s net interest payments relate to the total amount of domestic and foreign interest paid on loans and other forms of borrowing less interest received;government revenue is money the state earns mainly from taxes,social contributions,and sometimes from state-owned enterprises or resourcesSource:UNCTA

170、D;OECD;Roland Berger The number of developing countries with interest payments exceeding 10%of their government revenues has increased from 30 in 2014 to a record 54 in 2023.Nearly half of these countries are in Africa,where the number has risen from 9 to 25,partly due to high interest rates and les

171、s favorable credit conditions By contrast,the eurozone has an average interest payment of 3%of revenues,while the United States is at 14%.The higher US interest payments are due to a numerous factors,including lower government revenue relative to GDP,a larger deficit relative to GDP,and the cost of

172、new debt being higher than in the eurozone The pandemic has resulted in a reduction in government revenues in numerous developing countries,coupled with an expansion of government balance sheets.This had a significant impact on the capacity to service the debt,including interest payments In periods

173、of economic pressure,debtors in developing countries often provide higher levels of collateral to gain access to financing or to reduce the cost of borrowing.However,this can result in a significant increase in a countrys long-term debt and interest burden12121515141415151314911121112121514141591416

174、17192123212325201420152016201720182019202020212022202330374343454753505054AfricaAsia and OceaniaLatin America and the CaribbeanIn many developing countries,a considerable proportion of revenue is allocated to interest payments,particularly in AfricaEconomics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.479Roland Berger|

175、Rising interest payments present a major challenge to debt management in developing countriesSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger In developing countries,interest payments are not only growing rapidly,they are also outpacing growth of key public expenditures such as health and education.While spending on edu

176、cation has risen by 38%from the period 2010-2012 to the period 2020-2022,interest payments have risen by 73%The high interest payments are partly due to high cost of borrowing.Developing countries pay 2-4 times higher interest rates than the US and up to 12 times higher than Germany In both Africa a

177、nd Asia&Oceania(excluding China),per capita payments for interest exceed the per capita expenditure on health,and in Africa,they are also higher than the expenditure on education In total,there are 48 developing countries spending more on servicing the interest payments on their public debt than on

178、education and healthcare-affecting 3.3.billion people High interest payments also pose a major barrier to investing in climate protection.These investments are essential for reaching climate goals and reducing the negative impacts of climate change,which are hitting developing countries especially h

179、ardPublic expenditure per capita on net interest,education and health in developing countries,2020-2022 USDInterestHealthEducation+73%+58%+38%7084280396232360110364AfricaAsia and Oceania(excl.China)Latin America and the CaribbeanInterestHealthEducationNominal change of public expenditure in developi

180、ng countries between 2010-2012 and 2020-2022%Economics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.480Roland Berger|Unfavorable creditor structures complicate debt management in developing countries even furtherExternal and internal public debt of selected regions1)USD bn1)Internal debt was calculated as the difference

181、 between total public debt and external public debtSource:UNCTAD;Roland Berger There is a significant regional discre-pancy in the proportion of internal and external public debt.Internal debt,owed to domestic creditors,contrasts with external debt,which is owed to foreign creditors In Africa,extern

182、al debt accounts for nearly 35%,while in Asia and Oceania it was just 8%in 2022.Since 2010,the share of external debt in Asia and Oceania has almost halved,while remaining largely constant in other regions External public debt entails the risk that currency devaluations may increase repayment costs

183、and thus lead to economic instability Private creditors hold the majority share of public debt across all regions considered.Private credit has the disadvantage of being particularly volatile and can flow out quickly in times of crisis This was particularly evident in 2022,when private credit withdr

184、awals caused nearly USD 50 billion in outflows in developing countriesAfricaAsia and OceaniaLatin America and the Caribbean65105001,0001,5002,000201020221,224External debtInternal debt05,00010,00015,00020,00025,000201019,2131,613202290301,0002,0003,0004,000201020223,072External public debt,shares by

185、 type of creditor,2022 USD bn,%34%23%44%651Private creditorsBilateral creditorsMultilateral creditors23%15%61%1,61323%73%4%903AfricaAsia and OceaniaLatin America and the CaribbeanEconomics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.481Roland Berger|Following the 2007 financial crisis,the vulnerability of financial mar

186、kets prompted the implementation of a robust financial safety net1)The values of the international reserves represent the figures for the fourth quarter of each yearSource:IMF;Roland Berger In the event of an economic crisis,countries have several financial resources at their disposal,both internal

187、and external.The global financial safety net is a set of institutions and mechanisms that provide assurance against crises and financing to mitigate their impact This safety net has four main layers:a countries own international reserves;bilateral swap arrangements whereby central banks exchange cur

188、rencies to provide liquidity to financial markets;regional financial arrangements by which countries pool resources to leverage financing in a crisis,and the IMF International reserves serve as a nations primary defense in a crisis,though they are expensive to maintain and are predominantly held by

189、advanced and large emerging economies.Unlike these reserves,other mechanisms rely on cooperative efforts across countries Post 2007,the total stock of international reserve holdings nearly doubled,reaching around USD 12 trillion by end-2022.Other layers of the safety net increased nearly tenfold,to

190、around USD 3.5 trillion This enhanced insurance effectively cushioned the shock during the first year of the COVID-19 crisis in 2020.The increased bilateral swap arrangements primarily US Federal Reserve swaps provided prompt liquidity support,helping to stabilize the global financial markets and ca

191、pital flows to emerging market economies.This surge in support measures,however,subsided somewhat after the initial crisis peakDevelopment of the global financial safety net,1998-2022 USD trillion01234567891112130.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.51020002005201020152020International reserves(right axis)Bi

192、lateral swap arrangementsRegional swap arrangementsIMF-borrowed and quota resourcesSwap arrangements and IMF borrowed and quota resourcesInternational reserves1)Economics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.482Roland Berger|Rising debt,especially at the state level,often triggers debate about intergenerational

193、equity The subject of high levels of public debt and its consequences has the potential to give rise to a vigorous debate on the issue of intergenerational equity The generational aspect can be illustrated by the observation that the higher the average age of a governments cabinet officials the high

194、er the government debt per person under 20 years of age for OECD countries in 2022 at least However,there is room for discussion whether higher debts are causing an inter-or intragenerational issue From an intergenerational perspective,it is argued that the older generation is placing a burden on th

195、e younger generation as the latter must repay this debt in future years,while the former is reaping the benefits from the debt taken on by government in the first place.Yet,this idea lacks empirical proof However,empirical evidence exists on the issue of intragenerational injustice:people who are ab

196、le to invest in government bonds can pass these on to the next generation-while people who cannot are unable to leave such a bequest.Yet,the latter group still contributes to the servicing of todays public debt through general taxation of their income-which ultimately benefits government bond holder

197、s,i.e.their wealthier contemporaries4550556065050100150200250300350400450500550CANDNKESTFRADEUGRCITAJPNMEXPOLESPCHEUKUSAverage age of cabinet officials,2022 yearsGovernment debt per person 20 years of age,2022 USD 000Correlation between Cabinet age and government debt per person aged younger than 20

198、,OECD countries,20221)USD 000,years1)The proportion of the population under 20 years of age was multiplied by the nominal government debt to calculate the debt per person under 20 years of ageSource:OECD;Roland BergerEconomics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.483Roland Berger|History offers several lessons r

199、egarding the handling of high levels of public debt In most cases,debt reduction is accompanied by cutbacksSource:World Bank;Roland BergerHistoric efforts to reduce public debt:Orthodox policy optionsEnhancing growthHigher growth in excess of interest rate levels has facilitated the reduction of deb

200、t levels in some countries(relative to GDP).However,when relying solely on growth to reduce burden of debt,several factors warrant caution:for example,favorable past differentials regarding interest rates and growth rates may dissipate over the next decade because of declining productivity.Also,inte

201、rest rates may begin to rise if inflationary pressures build upPrivatizationProceeds from the privatization of public assets have also been employed to raise debt service levels.While privatization can facilitate debt reduction,certain prerequisites(e.g.agree-ments on market entry conditions,etc.)ar

202、e not yet in place in all indebted countriesFiscal consolidationFiscal consolidation can lead to primary fiscal surpluses to pay down debt by cutting expenditures or raising revenues.The real or potential loss of access to financial markets has,on occasion,forced countries into strict fiscal consoli

203、dation.However,such consolidation is usually accompanied by lower growthWealth taxationSince the global financial crisis,wealth taxes are again in the spotlight,largely due to heightened perceptions of wealth inequality.However,governments are confronted with numerous challenges,including procedural

204、 risks and complexities associated with existing taxation systems,as well as lobbying efforts by the ultra-rich and the potential of capital flight.Moreover,wealth tax revenues may not be as sizable as they first appear.For example,in Germany,wealth tax plans failed when it became clear that the cos

205、t to determine the tax base would have consumed nearly one-third of the projected wealth tax revenue Economics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.484Roland Berger|In the past,more controversial methods of debt reduction have been used-in some cases with negative social consequencesSource:World Bank;Roland Berg

206、erHistoric efforts to reduce public debt:Heterodox policy optionsInflationInflation reduces the real debt burden when the rise in nominal government income(e.g.tax payments)outpaces nominal interest payments.However,inflation as a debt reduction strategy also has drawbacks:for example,inflation is u

207、sually accompanied by an exchange rate depreciation,which increases debt if the share of short-term debt or debt denominated in foreign currency is large.If high debt is the result of persistent spending pressures or revenue weakness,unexpected inflation may also fail to reduce debt sustainably.More

208、over,inflation can spiral out of control and undermine the economic stability of a countryDebt restructuringDefault and restructuring may sometimes be the only way for a country to deal with foreign-owned sovereign debt denominated in a foreign currency and adjudicated by foreign courts.While defaul

209、t and debt restructuring can provide immediate debt reduction,they also come with long-term costs.Protracted debt rescheduling negotiations prolong the loss of market access,can weaken financial institutions balance sheets,and undermine financial stabilityFinancial repressionFinancial repression,inc

210、luding capital controls and specific measures to regulate the financial sector,are options to reduce the differentials between growth rates and real interest rates by locking up savings in special instruments.However,this strategy is a high-cost approach to reduce debt because it discourages a more

211、productive use of savings.Moreover,decades of financial and capital account liberalization have reduced a governments room for financial controlDomestic debt defaultDomestic debt default differs from external debt default and includes forced conversions,lower coupon rates,unilateral principal reduct

212、ions(at times with currency conversion),and payment suspensions.However,governments that default on their domestic debt are still vulnerable to inflation risk and the risk of interest rate spikes if inflation expectations become unmooredEconomics&BusinessDebt Challenge4.485Roland Berger|Companies ne

213、ed to reassess their value chains and sales markets.This not only affects companies with foreign subsidiaries but all companies that have(directly or through other suppliers)foreign suppliers in their value chain,export to markets abroad,or have other relationships with overseas markets(e.g.in R&D o

214、r sourcing labor)Adaptations of the value chain or sales markets require a reassessment and possibly an adjustment to the entire business model.If certain supplies cannot be sourced from another country and there is no viable substitute,it may be that a certain product will no longer be produced.In

215、this case,the product-market approach must be adapted Companies should seek to diversify their business model to reduce their vulnerability to change.They should adopt a multi-sourcing approach,diversify their global production footprint,develop a varied product portfolio,and sell to different marke

216、ts The degree of diversification needs to be balanced.Sourcing large supplies from a limited number of suppliers drives down prices,and a focused product portfolio allows companies to achieve economies of scale and become more attractive to customersSource:Roland BergerCorporate actions Lets talk ab

217、out challenges and opportunities arising from megatrends regarding economics&business(1/3)Impact:Rising protectionism is changing the environment in which companies operate,affecting both value chains and sales marketsImpact:Rapid and unpredictable changes in the international business environment a

218、re the new normal Companies need to be robust to copeLearn how Roland Berger can help you to create corporate impactActionsActionsRBI Quarterly:A New Phase of GlobalizationNavigating Geopolitical UncertaintyConclusion and corporate impacts4.1Global EconomicsEconomics&BusinessEnergyTrans-formation4.3

219、Debt Challenge4.4Power Shifts 4.286Roland Berger|Companies need to evaluate the current and future potential of emerging and developing markets compared to advanced economies.Economic criteria should include not only current and projected GDP growth but also the overall size of the market,the state

220、of manufacturing and technology,the availability of skilled labor,labor costs,the purchasing power of the population,the quality of the infrastructure,access to resources,and the ease of doing business in the country In addition to economic considerations,it is essential to evaluate political and le

221、gal factors,such as political stability,the level of corruption,legal frameworks,and environmental standards Companies should increase investment in energy efficiency by upgrading equipment and optimizing processes to maximize efficiency and to reduce both operational costs and emissions.Additionall

222、y,investing in renewable energy assets,such as solar,can increase energy independence as well as reduce exposure to market price fluctuations Setting clear targets for carbon neutrality goals,adopting frameworks such as Science-Based Targets(SBT),and actively participating in carbon trading or offse

223、tting programs is vitalSource:Roland BergerCorporate actions Lets talk about challenges and opportunities arising from megatrends regarding economics&business(2/3)Impact:Power shifts create new business opportunities in emerging and developing marketsImpact:The transition to renewable energy is inev

224、itable Companies should adapt and view this change as a strategic opportunity to gain a competitive edgeLearn how Roland Berger can help you to create corporate impactActionsActionsRBI Quarterly:Beyond BRICSGlobal Carbon Restructuring PlanConclusion and corporate impacts4.1Global EconomicsEconomics&

225、BusinessEnergyTrans-formation4.3Debt Challenge4.4Power Shifts 4.287Roland Berger|It is in a companys best interest to enhance its ESG performance and obtain ESG certification to secure more favorable financing conditions.Green bonds typically offer a lower spread than conventional bonds In addition,

226、green bonds promote sustainable financing,helping mitigate the risk of future exposure to stricter ESG regulations,while also enhancing the companys reputation as a responsible corporate citizen It is advisable for companies to review and diversify their supply chains to mitigate risks such as deliv

227、ery failures,non-payment,and rising procurement costs In developing countries,particularly in parts of Africa,high interest rates and unfavorable credit structures often lead to financial instability.However,it would be unwise for companies to ignore developing countries entirely,as not all regions

228、are affected equally.Instead,companies should consider alternative sources of supply and maintain a presence in more economically stable areasSource:Roland BergerCorporate actions Lets talk about challenges and opportunities arising from megatrends regarding economics&business(3/3)Impact:Rising inte

229、rest costs and unfavorable debt structures in developing countries are becoming an increasing challenge for global supply chainsLearn how Roland Berger can help you to create corporate impactActionsActionsFrom Gray to GreenConclusion and corporate impactsImpact:The expansion of the green bond market

230、 lowers the cost of financing,provides long-term access to capital,and enables the participation of new investor groupsRBI Quarterly:Beyond BRICS4.1Global EconomicsEconomics&BusinessEnergyTrans-formation4.3Debt Challenge4.4Power Shifts 4.288Roland Berger|Main sourcesMegatrend-Economics&Business UNCT

231、AD:World Investment Report 2024.https:/unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2024 IMF:IMF Working Papers.https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2024/06/20/The-Price-of-De-Risking-Reshoring-Friend-Shoring-and-Quality-Downgrading-545774 UNCTAD:Statistics/Data Centre.https:/unctadstat.un

232、ctad.org/datacentre/UNIDO:Industrial Statistics Yearbook 2023.https:/stat.unido.org/sites/default/files/publication/yearbook/2023/UNIDO_IndustrialStatistics_Yearbook_2023.pdf Leruth,L.,Mazarei,A.,Rgibeau,P.,Renneboog,L.:Green Energy Depends on Critical Minerals.Who Controls the Supply Chains?Peterso

233、n Institute for International Economics.August 2022.https:/ IEA:World Energy Outlook 2023.https:/ IRENA,Decarbonizing Shipping,2021.https:/www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Oct/IRENA_Decarbonising_Shipping_2021.pdf IMF:World Economic Outlook Database.World Economic Outlook Da

234、tabase,April 2024(imf.org)FRED:Economic Data.Federal Reserve Economic Data|FRED|St.Louis Fed(stlouisfed.org)UNCTAD:A World of Debt 2024.A world of debt 2024|UNCTADSource:Roland Berger4.1Global EconomicsEconomics&BusinessEnergyTrans-formation4.3Debt Challenge4.4Power Shifts 4.289Roland Berger|Authors

235、Dr.Christian KrysSenior ExpertRoland Berger Institute+49(211)4389-Dr.David BornManagerRoland Berger Institute+49(69)29924-Steffen GeeringSenior SpecialistRoland Berger Institute+49(211)4389-8990Roland Berger|Photo creditPage 1 Leonid/Adobe StockPage 4 ake1150/Adobe Stock;Frank Jr/Adobe Stock;Frank Fennema/Adobe Stock;weyo/Adobe StockPage 89 Stock 9091Roland Berger|