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1、EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2024The IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advocates policies that

2、will enhance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries,13 association countries and beyond.This publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers

3、and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.orgIEA member countries:AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzech RepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLithuaniaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNew ZealandN

4、orwayPolandPortugalSlovak RepublicSpainSwedenSwitzerlandRepublic of TrkiyeUnited KingdomUnited StatesThe European Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:Argentina BrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaKenyaMoroccoSenegalSingapore South Africa Thailand UkraineINTERNATION

5、AL ENERGYAGENCYEnergy Technology Perspectives 2024 Foreword PAGE|1 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Foreword In July 2021,the International Energy Agency(IEA)declared that a new global energy economy was emerging one based on clean and modern technologies such as solar,wind,electric cars and others.This was a trend t

6、hat had become clear in our data and analysis,which covers all fuels and all technologies across the global energy system.Our work has continued to chart the rise of this new energy economy and its implications for the world.Much of this has focused on what the changes mean for energy security,econo

7、mic development and international efforts to bring down greenhouse gas emissions.But as the adoption of clean energy technologies has surged in many countries across the globe,other factors have increasingly come into play.As a new energy economy takes shape,access to a range of components and input

8、s for clean technologies many of which are produced in vast factories is rising in importance.More and more countries are enacting bold new industrial strategies to bolster the security of clean energy supply chains and to gain an economic edge as demand grows.The result is that manufacturing and tr

9、ade are emerging as crucial variables that will determine how our energy system develops and how quickly emissions from it will decline.The deepening connections between energy,trade,manufacturing and climate are the focus of this latest edition of Energy Technology Perspectives(ETP),the IEAs flagsh

10、ip technology publication.Building on the comprehensive assessment of clean energy technology supply chains set out in ETP-2023,this years edition offers cutting-edge analysis based on rich and detailed new data,granular surveys of industry,and a bottom-up approach to fresh modelling.Its significanc

11、e is amplified by what has been,until now,a dearth of information in this space,and it will provide policymakers with an in-depth,quantified basis to inform their deliberations for years to come.One point to emphasise:the IEA does not aim to prescribe trade policy,which is not our Agencys role.Inste

12、ad,this report is intended to provide detailed insights that are relevant to the conversations and considerations facing governments around the world today,in line with our longstanding practice.As major economies have introduced new industrial strategies to stake out their places in the growing cle

13、an energy economy,the manufacturing of clean technologies has boomed.This report homes in on the six major ones:solar PV,wind,electric vehicles,batteries,electrolysers and heat pumps,whose market size and trade value is set to soar over the next decade.It also looks at key components of these techno

14、logies,as well as industries that provide important building blocks for them,such as steel,aluminium and ammonia.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Foreword PAGE|2 I EA.CC BY 4.0.The remarkable growth in clean energy technologies can offer many benefits and opportunities,including new manufacturing

15、 industries,job creation,lower energy bills,improved energy security,cleaner air and emissions reductions.In the case of trade,as clean energy technologies reshape a landscape that has historically been dominated by fossil fuels,resilience could improve.Fossil fuels tend to be quickly consumed,which

16、 can lead to a reliance on certain exporters for recurring supplies.Clean energy technologies operate over longer time frames.That could result in less exposure to short-term supply disruptions and market volatility,shielding countries from the destabilising boom-and-bust cycles seen in some energy

17、markets in recent decades.However,there can also be tensions and trade-offs.We already see the intense competition among major economies to gain advantage in the new energy economy.As countries race to reap the maximum economic benefits,what are the broader implications?Does it risk making clean ene

18、rgy transitions less cost-effective if too many trade barriers go up?Will it result in inefficient government subsidies?Could smaller and less developed economies be sidelined?This report aims to explore these vital questions and highlight the most promising pathways forward.ETP-2024 lays out the st

19、ate of play and the outlook for the key economies that are the major manufacturers of clean energy technologies today.But it also finds,on the basis of 60 indicators,that the door remains open for emerging and developing economies to play to their strengths and move up the value chain in manufacturi

20、ng as the clean energy transition gathers speed.While the top fossil fuel producers are countries with ample natural resources,many more countries could build up strong clean energy manufacturing bases if they can ensure the right enabling conditions.Yet even as countries have a chance to tap the be

21、nefits of clean energy transitions for their citizens,ETP-2024 finds a need for global perspective and cooperation in pursuit of industrial and trade strategies that can ensure widespread prosperity and help keep international energy and climate goals within reach.Here,the IEA stands ready to provid

22、e support.Amid a complex environment,collaboration remains essential.I would like to thank the hardworking members on the ETP team who wrote this groundbreaking report under the excellent leadership of the IEAs Chief Energy Technology Officer Timur Gl.The efforts to assemble the data and develop the

23、 analysis presented here have been a major undertaking,and they represent a vital contribution to the global energy dialogue.I hope this ETP supports the work of decision-makers as they strive to build a more secure and sustainable energy system for all.Dr Fatih Birol Executive Director Internationa

24、l Energy Agency Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Acknowledgements PAGE|3 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements This study was prepared by the Energy Technology Policy(ETP)Division of the Directorate of Sustainability,Technology and Outlooks(STO),with input from other divisions of the International Ener

25、gy Agency(IEA).The study was designed and directed by Timur Gl,IEA Chief Energy Technology Officer.The modelling and analytical teams of Energy Technology Perspectives 2024(ETP-2024)were co-ordinated and supervised by Araceli Fernandez(Head of the Technology Innovation Unit)and Uwe Remme(Head of the

26、 Hydrogen and Alternative Fuels Unit).Peter Levi(materials and competitiveness)and Leonardo Paoli(clean energy technology manufacturing and trade routes)were responsible for the analysis of cross-cutting topics throughout the report.Simon Bennett led on strategic considerations and policy.The princi

27、pal authors and contributors from the ETP division were(in alphabetical order):Giovanni Andrean(trade routes,ports),Jose Miguel Bermudez(emerging markets),Sara Budinis(strategic considerations),Leonardo Collina(steel,ammonia,trade model design),Elizabeth Connelly(emerging markets),Laurence Cret(ship

28、ping decarbonisation),Chiara Delmastro(heat pumps,investments),Hannes Gauch(shipping decarbonisation),Alexandre Gouy(commodity prices,materials),Johannes Hampp(data management,shipping activity),Mathilde Huismans(wind,data management,investments),Jean-Baptiste Le Marois(status of manufacturing),Teo

29、Lombardo(batteries,trade model design),Rafael Martnez Gordn(heat pumps),Jennifer Ortiz(emerging markets),Faidon Papadimoulis(solar PV,data management,trade model design),Francesco Pavan(electrolysers),Amalia Pizarro Alonso(industrial strategies,trade policy),Jules Sery(electric cars)and Richard Simo

30、n(aluminium,investments).Other key contributors from across the IEA were Caleigh Andrews,Heymi Bahar,Blandine Barreau,Piotr Bojek,Jianlan Dou,Mathilde Fajardy,Carl Greenfield,Jack Jaensch,Megumi Kotani,Martin Kueppers,Maija Lehtonen,Shane McDonagh,Quentin Minier,Luis Munuera(external),Soyoung Oh,Dia

31、na Marcela Perez Sanchez,Hiroyasu Sakagushi,Mirko Uliano,Agrata Verma,Fabian Voswinkel,Brent Wanner,Daniel Wetzel and Biqing Yang.Special thanks to Frank van Tongeren(former Head of OECDs SMART Data and Modelling unit within the Directorate on Trade and Agriculture),who provided Energy Technology Pe

32、rspectives 2024 Acknowledgements PAGE|4 I EA.CC BY 4.0.strategic advice on trade modelling and policy throughout the project;and Jasper Verschuur(Assistant Professor at University of Technology Delft),who advised on trade routes and ports activity.Valuable comments and feedback were provided by seni

33、or management and other colleagues within the IEA,in particular,Keisuke Sadamori,Laura Cozzi,Alessandro Blasi,Dan Dorner,Tim Gould,Brian Motherway,Paolo Frankl,Dennis Hesseling and Yang Jun.Trevor Morgan provided writing support and holds editorial responsibility;Lizzie Sayer supported the editing o

34、f the manuscript.Charlotte Bracke,Anna Kalista,Mao Takeuchi and Per-Anders Widell provided essential support throughout the process.Thanks also to the IEA Communications and Digital Office for their help in producing the report,particularly to Jethro Mullen,Poeli Bojorquez,Curtis Brainard,Gaelle Bru

35、neau,Jon Custer,Grace Gordon,Julia Horowitz,Oliver Joy,Isabelle NonainSemelin,Robert Stone,Sam Tarling Clara Vallois,Lucile Wall,and Wonjik Yang.The work could not have been achieved without the financial support provided by the Governments of Canada,Germany and Japan.Several senior government offic

36、ials and experts provided essential input and feedback to improve the quality of the report.They include:Dries Acke SolarPower Europe Prasoon Agarwal Clean Energy Ministerial Secretariat Bentley Allan Johns Hopkins University,United States Takahiro Asahi Daikin Ben Backwell Global Wind Energy Counci

37、l Thomas Becker BMW Hassiba Benamara UN Trade and Development Marlen Bertram International Aluminium Institute Vincent Berrutto Directorate-General for Energy,European Commission Reed Blakemore Atlantic Council Roberto Bocca World Economic Forum Rina Bohle Zeller Vestas Camille Bourgeon Internationa

38、l Maritime Organization Anne Sophie Castelnau ING Jon Creyts Rocky Mountain Institute Ilka von Dalwigk Recharge Laurent Daniel Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Faustine Delasalle Mission Possible Partnership Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Acknowledgements PAGE|5 I EA.CC BY

39、 4.0.Rebecca Dell ClimateWorks Foundation Martin Forsen NIBE Patrick Graichen Independent Michael Hackethal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action,Germany Caroline Haglund Stignor Heat Pump Centre David Hart George Mason University,United States Jan Hoffmann UN Trade and Development No van

40、 Hulst Gasunie Tsutomu Ishihara Panasonic Corporation Rishabh Jain Council on Energy Environment and Water,India Andreas Klein Northvolt Leif Christian Krger thyssenkrupp nucera Thomas Le Vaillant Directorate-General for Trade,European Commission Pascal Lavoie Alcoa Benjamin Lechaptois Bureau Verita

41、s Marine&Offshore Jon Lezamiz Cortazar Siemens Gamesa James Mabbutt Department for Energy Security and Net Zero,United Kingdom Stefan Martin Bosch Dennis Mesina Department of Energy,United States Cortney Mittelsteadt Plug Power Rafqana Mousuf Department for Energy Security and Net Zero,United Kingdo

42、m Daniel Mugnier Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme TCP Gustavo Naciff de Andrade Energy Research Office,Brazil Kei Nomura Kawasaki Heavy Industries Takashi Nomura Toyota Motor Torben Nrgaard Mrsk Mc-Kinney Mller Center for Zero Carbon Shipping Thomas Nowak Qvantum International Kenneth Pang Marit

43、ime and Port Authority of Singapore Stephanie Pfeifer Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change Gaurav Pundir Department of Commerce,India Andrew Purvis worldsteel Lizet Ramirez WindEurope Julia Reinaud Breakthrough Energy David Reiner University of Cambridge,United Kingdom Stephan Renz Heat P

44、ump Technologies TCP David Robin ko-Recherche Agustn Rodrguez Riccio Topsoe Nicola Rossi Enel Ana-Maria Ruz Chiles Economic Development Agency Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Acknowledgements PAGE|6 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Tim Sahay Johns Hopkins University,United States Toshiyuki Sakamoto Institute of E

45、nergy Economics,Japan Christopher Saldaa Department of Energy,United States Javier Sanz European Solar Alliance A K Saxena The Energy and Resources Institute,India Fu Sha Energy Foundation China Toshiyuki Shirai Ministry of Economy,Trade and Industry,Japan Kay Normann Sjursen Hydro Energi AS Sandro

46、Starita European Aluminium Association Bernhard Stormyr Yara Ulrik Stridbk rsted Bert Stuij Netherlands Enterprise Agency Narayan Subramanian National Security Council,White House,United States Simona Sulikova World Bank Trevor Sutton Columbia University,United States Elena Talalasova Global Maritim

47、e Forum Jacopo Tattini Directorate-General for Internal Market,Industry,Entrepreneurship and SMEs,European Commission Peter Taylor Leeds University,United Kingdom Fridtjof Unander Aker Horizons Naomi van den Berg Port of Rotterdam Authority Anne van Ysendyck ArcelorMittal David Victor University of

48、California San Diego,United States Shoichiro Watanabe Panasonic Energy Daniel Weaver Department for Energy Security and Net Zero,United Kingdom Hans-Jrn Weddige thyssenkrupp Amanda Wilson Department of Natural Resources,Canada Liane Wong Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Markus Wrke Swedish E

49、nergy Research Centre Akiyuki Yonekaw Honda Motor Liu Ziyu CATL Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|7 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Table of contents Executive Summary.19 Introduction.26 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade.28 Highlights.28 1.1 Manufacturing.29 1.2 Trade.51 1.3 Com

50、petitiveness.60 1.4 Industrial strategies and policies.85 References.108 Chapter 2:Global outlook.113 Highlights.113 2.1 Methodological approach.114 2.2 Demand.119 2.3 Manufacturing.135 2.4 Inter-regional trade.161 2.5 CO2 emissions.170 References.173 Chapter 3:Outlook in major markets.175 Highlight

51、s.175 3.1 United States.177 3.2 European Union.198 3.3 China.232 3.4 India.252 References.269 Chapter 4:Opportunities in emerging markets.280 Highlights.280 4.1 Enabling factors for manufacturing investment.281 4.2 The prospects for manufacturing.291 References.348 Chapter 5:International shipping.3

52、58 Highlights.358 5.1 Role of shipping today.359 5.2 Impact of clean energy transitions on shipping.379 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|8 I EA.CC BY 4.0.5.3 Decarbonising shipping.392 References.417 Chapter 6:Strategic considerations.421 Highlights.421 6.1 Policy dimension

53、s.422 6.2 Secure and resilient supply chains.425 6.3 Affordable technologies and materials.439 6.4 People-centred transitions.457 6.5 Overarching strategic policy responses.467 References.490 Annex A IEAs Manufacturing and Trade model.499 Methodology.499 Inputs.503 Results.514 Constraints.515 Additi

54、onal technical details.516 Trade shipping routes modelling.520 Data sources.521 Current and future trade flows by clean energy technology.525 Annex B Manufacturing analysis.533 Industrial survey methodology.533 Enabling indicators for manufacturing investments.535 Annex C Shipping decarbonisation.54

55、1 Technologies for shipping decarbonisation.541 Ports for alternative fuels exports.546 Annex D Definitions.548 Glossary.548 Abbreviations and acronyms.555 Units of measure.558 Currency conversions.559 Regional groupings.560 Annex E References.563 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of content

56、s PAGE|9 I EA.CC BY 4.0.List of figures Global economic value added in manufacturing industry.30 Manufacturing sector investment by country/region,2005-2023.33 Global investment in clean energy technology and materials manufacturing,2022-2023.34 Global investment in clean energy manufacturing associ

57、ated with announced projects,2022-2030.35 Manufacturing capacity and additions associated with announced projects for selected clean technologies.36 Net manufacturing capacity additions for selected clean energy technologies by country/region,2020-2023.37 Net manufacturing capacity additions for sol

58、ar PV,wind and battery components by country/region,2022-2023.39 Global demand and manufacturing capacity by country/region for selected clean energy technologies based on announced projects,2023-2030.42 Global net manufacturing capacity additions for selected materials,2020-2023.44 Global installed

59、 manufacturing capacity and announced capacity additions for selected materials,2023-2030.45 Installed manufacturing capacity by country/region,2023.46 Production of selected clean energy technologies and materials relative to domestic demand by country/region,2023.48 Energy employment in selected t

60、echnology areas,2022.50 Energy employment in selected energy technologies by region,2022.51 Shares of physical goods in global trade,2023.52 Global fossil fuel exports,1973-2023 and share of exports in total energy supply,2023.53 Global exports of selected clean technologies and materials,2010-2023.

61、55 Global exports of selected non-energy goods,2010-2023.56 Export shares by mass for selected products and materials for major exporters,2010-2023.57 Global shipping capacity by type of cargo vessel,1980-2023.58 IEA industry survey of the importance of upfront and operational cost considerations fo

62、r decisions about investing in manufacturing projects.61 Indicative capital costs for selected clean energy technologies by country/region,2023.63 Indicative capital costs for selected materials production processes,2023.66 Global average levelised cost of production by cost factor for selected clea

63、n energy technologies and regional variation,2023.69 Levelised cost of production for heat pumps and retail price in selected countries/regions by type,2023.71 Sensitivity of the levelised cost of production to the costs of energy and materials for selected clean energy technologies,2023.72 Levelise

64、d cost of production for selected materials by technology.74 Levelised cost of production for selected clean energy technologies and materials by country/region,2023.75 Levelised cost of production for batteries and solar PV modules by origin of components in the United States and the European Union

65、,2023.76 Figure 1.30 IEA industry survey of the importance of selected considerations for investment decisions on manufacturing.77 Market size for selected clean energy technologies and associated materials,2010-2023.78 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|10 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Mar

66、ket size for selected clean energy technologies and associated materials by country or region,2010-2023.79 Shares of selected clean energy technologies and materials in total market,2023.80 Sectoral composition of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP for the top ten manufacturing countries,20

67、23.81 Geographic distribution of value added in key sectors of relevance to clean technology manufacturing,2023.83 Domestic value added and exports for the steel and automobile industries in selected countries,2021.84 Industrial strategy policy instruments.86 Impact of Inflation Reduction Act financ

68、ial support for production on the manufacturing cost of solar PV modules and battery cells,2025.89 Estimated rate of financial support provided by governments across selected manufacturing sub-sectors,2005-2022.92 Key factors influencing the trade of manufactured goods.98 Weighted average global imp

69、ort tariffs on selected energy technologies and related materials.100 Ad valorem tariffs applied to the global trade flows of selected materials and clean energy technologies,2022.101 Estimated ad valorem equivalents of non-tariff measures for key energy technologies and products.102 Global trade co

70、st of selected clean energy technologies and materials.103 Global weighted average share of import tariffs and non-tariff measures on import prices of solar PV modules,aluminium and wind nacelles,2023.103 Spending on R&D in selected countries/regions,2015-2023.106 Market size of key clean energy tec

71、hnologies and components by region and scenario,2023-2050.121 Global demand for EVs,batteries and components by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2050.122 Global demand for solar PV components by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Sce

72、narios,2023-2050.124 Global demand for wind turbines by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2050.126 Global demand for heat pumps by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2050.127 Selected destinations of air conditioners ma

73、nufactured in China by energy efficiency class,2021.128 Global demand for electrolysers by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenario,2023-2050.129 Market size of selected materials by country/region and scenario,2023-2050.132 Global demand for ammonia by application and sc

74、enario,2010-2050.134 Global demand for steel and aluminium for clean technology manufacturing by scenario,2023-2050.135 Announced annual manufacturing capacity as share of deployment in 2035 by technology and scenario.136 Announced annual capacity for near-zero emissions production of iron,primary a

75、luminium and ammonia as share of deployment in 2035 by technology and scenario.140 Annual manufacturing capacity for EVs,batteries and components by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.142 Annual manufacturing capacity for solar PV components by country/re

76、gion in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.144 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|11 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Annual manufacturing capacity for wind turbine components by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.146 Annu

77、al manufacturing capacity for heat pumps by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.147 Share of heat pump sales by technology in selected countries,2023.149 Annual manufacturing capacity for electrolysers by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced

78、 Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.151 Production of key materials by country/region in 2023,and in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2035.152 Global materials production with near-zero emissions and conventional technologies by scenario,2023-2035.153 Indicative levelised cost of product

79、ion for selected near-zero emissions materials production routes by country/region in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.154 Average annual investment in manufacturing of key clean energy technologies and near-zero emissions materials production by scenario,2023-2050.157 Average annual investments

80、in manufacturing of key clean technologies by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.159 Average annual investment in near-zero emissions production of key materials by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.161 Global

81、 energy demand by fuel type in the Announced Pledges Scenario and share of demand provided by fossil fuel imports by scenario,2023-2050.162 Inter-regional trade value of fossil fuels and key clean energy technologies by scenario,2023-2050.163 Inter-regional trade value for key clean energy technolog

82、ies by type and scenario,2023-2050.164 Trade flows for key clean energy technologies between countries/regions in 2023 and in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.166 Net trade in key clean energy technologies and fossil fuels by selected country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Sc

83、enarios,2023-2050.168 Net trade volumes for key materials by country/region in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2050.169 Global CO2 emissions along manufacturing supply chains in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario,2023-2050.172 Net trade balances for key clean energy tec

84、hnologies by market and scenario,2023-2035.176 Share of announced investments in clean technology manufacturing in the United States by quarter,Q1 2018-Q2 2024.178 Share of announced investments in clean technology manufacturing in the United States and per capita income by region.179 US market and

85、import-export balance for EVs,batteries and selected components in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.182 Total production cost of EVs and batteries in the United States compared with imports and US import costs by contributing factor in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035

86、.183 US EV and battery manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.184 Cost breakdown of domestically produced and imported EVs in the United States.186 US market and import-export balance for solar PV modules and components in the Stated Po

87、licies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.189 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|12 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Total production cost of solar PV in the United States compared with imports and US import costs by contributing factor in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.190 US sola

88、r PV manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.191 US market and import-export balance for wind turbine nacelles and blades in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.193 Total production cost of wind turbine nacelles

89、 and blades in the United States compared with imports and US import costs by contributing factor in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.194 US wind turbine component manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.195 Demand for and production

90、of key materials and intermediate commodities in the United States,historically and in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2015-2035.196 Scrap as a share of metallic inputs for steel and aluminium production in selected countries/regions,historical and in the Announced Pledges Scenar

91、io,2000-2035.197 Impact of the Inflation Reduction Act production tax credit for hydrogen on the levelised cost of production of iron and ammonia by technology in the Stated Policies Scenario,2030.198 Car sales in emerging markets and developing economies by manufacturer headquarters location,2023.2

92、03 Impact of provisional EU duties on the price of a compact electric SUV imported from China,2023.206 Production of cars in the European Union by market segment in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.207 EU market and import-export balance for EVs,batteries and selected co

93、mponents in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.208 Total production cost of EVs and batteries in the European Union compared with imports and EU import costs in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2030.209 Global average battery levelised cost of production per cost factor and

94、potential impact of innovation on battery costs in the European Union,2023.213 EU EV and battery manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.214 EU market and import-export balance for solar PV in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Sc

95、enario,2023-2035.216 EU solar PV module and component manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.217 Total production cost of solar PV in the European Union compared with imports and EU import costs in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.21

96、8 EU market and import-export balance for wind turbine components in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.220 Total production cost of wind turbine components in the European Union compared with imports and EU import costs in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.221 EU wind t

97、urbine component manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.222 EU market and import-export balance for heat pumps in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.224 Raw material costs for making a heat pump using HFC R-41

98、0A F-gas and propane following the current EU F-Gas quota allocation,2023.226 Ammonia and urea production and trade in the European Union,2011-2023.227 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|13 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Materials demand and production in the European Union,historical and in

99、 the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2015-2035.228 Average age of steelmaking facilities by country/region.229 Indicative range of the levelised cost of production of steel in the European Union and costs of imports from Brazil in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.231 Value added b

100、y manufacturing and industry in China.234 Net exports and imports by product categories in China,2023.235 Utilisation rate for manufacturing selected clean technologies and materials in China and the rest of the world,2023.236 Chinese exports of EVs and batteries by destination in the Stated Policie

101、s and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.238 Opportunities to exploit the potential production from announced battery cell manufacturing facilities in China,2030.240 Chinese exports of solar PV modules and cells by destination in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.241 O

102、pportunities to exploit the potential output from announced solar PV module manufacturing facilities in China,2030.243 Chinese exports of wind nacelles and blades by destination in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.245 Chinese exports of heat pumps and electrolysers by de

103、stination in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.246 Production and trade in the steel supply chain in China,historical and in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2010-2035.249 Production and trade in the aluminium supply chain in China,historical and in the

104、 Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2010-2035.251 Indian market for EVs,batteries and components in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.255 Total production cost of electric cars,batteries and components in India compared with imports and Indian import costs in

105、 the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.256 Indian electric car,battery and component manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.257 Indian market and import-export balance for solar PV modules and components in the Stated Policies and Announc

106、ed Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.259 Total production cost of solar PV modules and components in India compared with imports and Indian import costs in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.260 Indian solar PV and component manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledg

107、es Scenarios,2023-2035.261 Indian market and import-export balance for electrolysers in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2030-2035.263 Total production cost of electrolysers in India compared with imports and Indian import costs in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.264 Indian el

108、ectrolyser manufacturing investment and capacity in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2023-2035.265 Demand and production for key materials in India,historically and in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2015-2035.266 Average annual investment in near-zero emission

109、s materials production in India,China and the rest of the world in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2024-2050.268 Enabling factors for establishing clean energy technology and material supply chains.282 Current status of enabling factors for business environment by country/region.288 Energy Technology

110、 Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|14 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Current status of enabling factors for energy and transport infrastructure by country/region.289 Status of transport infrastructure in Latin America,Africa and Southeast Asia.290 Regional/country shares in clean technology production in the

111、 Stated Policies Scenario,Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2023-2035.294 Current status of enabling factors for resource availability and domestic markets for solar PV manufacturing by country/region.296 Top three scoring countries for enabling factors for solar PV polysilicon and

112、wafer manufacturing in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia.297 Key enabling factors and indicators for PV supply chains in Southeast Asia.298 Market for PV modules and components in Southeast Asia in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2035-2050.300 Existing port infrastructur

113、e and wind resource potential in Latin America,Africa and Southeast Asia.302 Relative magnitude of crude steel production in Latin America,Africa and Southeast Asia,2023.303 Current status of enabling factors for resource availability and domestic markets for wind manufacturing by country/region.304

114、 Top three scoring countries for enabling factors for wind turbine manufacturing in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia.305 Market for wind blades in Brazil and other Latin American countries in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2035-2050.307 Lithium,nickel and cobalt reserv

115、es in Latin America,Africa,and Southeast Asia,2023.308 Current status of enabling factors related to resources and domestic markets for EV manufacturing.309 Top three scoring countries for enabling factors for EV and battery manufacturing in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia.310 Southeast Asia

116、n market and import-export balance for EVs,batteries and components in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2035-2050.315 North African market and import-export balance for EVs,batteries and components in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2035-2050.318 Enabling

117、 factors for battery and EV supply chains in Latin America.320 Latin America market and import-export balance for batteries and components in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2035-2050.321 Import and export value of air conditioners in selected cooling markets,2022.323 Regional

118、 production and apparent consumption of crude steel,2023.324 Raw material availability for steel production in selected countries,2022.325 Global port throughput of dry bulk carriers,2023.326 Current status of enabling factors for iron and steel production by country/region.328 Top three scoring cou

119、ntries for enabling factors for iron and steel production in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia.329 Enabling factors for the iron and steel supply chain in Africa.331 Iron and steel net trade in Africa,historical and in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2010-2050.333 Larges

120、t users of fertilisers in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia and in selected major markets,and global ammonia production by country,2023.334 Water stress levels in Latin America,Africa and Southeast Asia,2023.335 Current status of enabling factors for near-zero emissions ammonia production by c

121、ountry/region.336 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|15 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Top three scoring countries for enabling factors for ammonia production in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia.337 Near-zero emissions ammonia trade by operational date and status based on announced ex

122、port-oriented projects in Africa,2023.339 Ammonia production and net trade in Africa,historical and in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2010-2050.341 Ammonia production and trade in Latin America,historical and in the Announced Pledges Scenario and High Potential Case,2010-2050

123、.344 Bioenergy supply potential.345 Relative cost of synthetic fuels production based on solar and wind resources in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario,2030.346 Global maritime trade in value and in mass,1980-2023,and shares by cargo type,2023.359 Country shares of shipbuilding,ownership and sc

124、rappage,2023.360 Global energy-related CO2 emissions in shipping,2005-2023,and energy use and international activity by ship type,2023.361 Main ports by cargo type and throughput,2023.365 Major container shipping routes,2022.366 Major tanker shipping routes,2022.367 Major dry bulk shipping routes,20

125、22.368 Shares of types of goods in global international maritime trade by value and mass,2023.369 Trade flows of clean energy technologies between regions in value terms,2023 370 Trade flows of fossil fuels between regions in value terms,2023.371 Trade flows of selected materials between regions in

126、value terms,2023.372 Shares of global traded mass and value for clean energy technologies,associated materials and fossil fuels,2023.373 Shipping freight rates for container,and charter rates for bulk and tanker,2023.374 Container freight rates and cost components for the Shanghai-Rotterdam route,20

127、20-2024.375 International maritime trade of goods in mass and value terms compared to GDP by scenario.380 Changes to international shipping activity by product category in the Stated Policies Scenario,2023-2050.381 Changes in total international shipping activity in the Announced Pledges Scenario an

128、d the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario versus the Stated Policies Scenario,by product category,2035 and 2050.382 International shipping activity by type of vessel and scenario,2015-2050.383 Global oil tanker fleet and new commissions by scenario,2023-2050.385 Share of global seaborne trade transi

129、ting selected chokepoints,2023.386 Share of global trade by value passing through selected chokepoints by commodity and location,2023.388 Main inter-regional trade flows for key clean energy technologies in the Stated Policies Scenario,2035.389 Share of total maritime trade value passing through sel

130、ected chokepoints by product category in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2035.390 Utilisation rate of container ports in selected countries/regions,2023.391 Total lifetime cost of ownership of a representative new bulk carrier and cheapest alternative propulsion option in the Ann

131、ounced Pledges Scenario,2035.396 Global energy-related CO2 emissions in international shipping and drivers of change in the Stated Policies Scenario,2023-2050.399 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|16 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Global energy-related CO2 emissions in international shippin

132、g by scenario and reductions in the Announced Pledges Scenario relative to the Stated Policies Scenario by mitigation measure.400 Global energy consumption and energy-related CO2 emissions in international shipping in the Stated Policies Scenario and Announced Pledges Scenario,2023-2050.401 Running

133、costs of a container ship powered by fuel oil and ammonia and global average cost for near-zero emissions ammonia production in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2023-2050.404 Change of average international shipping running costs for container ships and bulk carriers in the Stated Policies and Announc

134、ed Pledges Scenarios,2023-2050.405 Indicative levelised production cost of electrolytic methanol and ammonia by component in selected regions in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2030.407 Maritime biofuel production pathways.408 Global demand for bioenergy and waste by sector in the Announced Pledges S

135、cenario,2023-2050.409 Production costs for selected biofuels in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2035.410 Vessel count and average heavy fuel oil price at selected ports,2023.411 Major existing methanol and ammonia terminals and ports with bunkering or exporting ambition.413 Cost of producing electrol

136、ytic ammonia and maritime traffic at selected ports in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2030.414 Production and transport costs at selected major ports for ammonia and methanol by local or imported source in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2030.415 Indicative levelised cost of supplying electrolytic am

137、monia for bunkering at major US ports with and without financial support from the Inflation Reduction Act in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2030.416 Figure 6.1 Policy dimensions of clean energy manufacturing and trade.423 Figure 6.2 Global net energy sector CO2 emissions in the Net Zero Emissions by

138、 2050 Scenario and in a Delayed Deployment Case,2020-2050.425 Figure 6.3 Shares of the value of exports of clean energy technologies,materials and fossil fuels by country/region in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2023 and 2035.427 Figure 6.4 Change in global market concentration of exports for select

139、ed commodities between the period 1999-2008 and the period 2009-2018.428 Figure 6.5 Global liquefied natural gas liquefaction capacity additions and EU liquefied natural gas import prices.435 Figure 6.6 Project lead times for selected global clean energy technology value chains.436 Figure 6.7 Averag

140、e annual investment in selected clean technologies and near-zero emissions materials production by scenario,2023-2035.437 Figure 6.8 Positive feedbacks between innovation and market growth in the early stages of technology deployment.447 Figure 6.9 Global average production cost by number of doublin

141、gs of cumulative deployment of selected technologies by scenario.448 Figure 6.10 Global public energy RD&D,energy-related venture capital and clean energy patents by country/region and type of energy,2015-2023.449 Figure 6.11 Global average aluminium intensity of solar PV manufacturing in the Net Ze

142、ro Emissions by 2050 Scenario,2023-2050.453 Figure 6.12 Global car sales per capita,historical and by scenario,2000-2050.453 Figure 6.13 Avoidance of primary critical mineral demand through battery re-use and recycling in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario compared with the Stated Policies Scen

143、ario,2023-2040.454 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|17 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Figure 6.14 EMDEs share of global investment in clean technology manufacturing and near-zero emissions materials production by scenario,2023-2050.460 Figure 6.15 Change in employment in selected energy-re

144、lated sectors in the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges Scenarios,2022 to 2030.465 Figure 6.16 European chemical exports by mass and share of global trade value,2000-2022.474 Figure 6.17 Chemical industry expenditure by type in selected regions,2011-2023.475 Figure 6.18 Average R&D spending as sh

145、are of total revenue for the largest automotive parts manufacturers in selected regions,2011-2023.476 Figure 6.19 Ammonia demand by use and region in the Announced Pledges Scenario,2023-2050.486 List of boxes Box 1.1 Near-zero emissions technologies for materials production.31 Box 1.2 Recent dynamic

146、s in solar PV and battery manufacturing.43 Box 1.3 What do we mean by EVs and electric cars?.49 Box 1.4 IEA industry survey on factors influencing firms investment decisions.62 Box 1.5 Cost competitiveness of heat pump manufacturing across regions.70 Box 1.6 World Trade Organization(WTO)trade rules.

147、96 Box 2.1 Clean energy technology manufacturing and near-zero emissions materials in the NZE Scenario.119 Box 2.2 The impact of standards and labels on heat pump production.127 Box 2.3 Anodes for batteries and wafers for solar PV:blind spots for the diversification of clean energy technology supply

148、 chains?.138 Box 2.4 Heat pumps:an industry of differentiated markets and specialisation.148 Box 2.5 Modelling of trade flows between countries and of investments in manufacturing facilities.165 Box 3.1 Impact of new US import tariffs on Chinese EVs.185 Box 3.2 The Net-Zero Industry Act in the IEAs

149、Manufacturing and Trade model.200 Box 3.3 The struggles of the EU car industry in competing in emerging markets.202 Box 3.4 Impact of proposed EU duties on imported Chinese EVs.205 Box 3.5 The role of innovation in increasing the competitiveness of the battery industry outside China.211 Box 3.6 Oppo

150、rtunities to switch from F-Gases to hydrocarbon refrigerants in heat pumps and air conditioners in the European Union.224 Box 3.7 Potential impact of the EU CBAM on steel production costs and import opportunities.230 Box 3.8 The utilisation rate of manufacturing capacity in China.235 Box 4.1 Methodo

151、logy for assessing enabling conditions for investment in the manufacturing of clean technologies and materials.285 Box 4.2 Synergies between air conditioners and heat pumps in EMDEs with large cooling demand.322 Box 4.3 Water consumption in near-zero emissions steelmaking.327 Box 4.4 Opportunities f

152、or low-emissions fuel production in emerging markets.345 Box 5.1 The effects of increasing trade in clean energy technologies on port infrastructure.391 Box 5.2 Maritime shipping regulations.398 Box 5.3 International co-operation on CO2 shipping.403 Box 5.4 The use of biofuels in different sectors.4

153、09 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Table of contents PAGE|18 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Box 5.5 The impact of the Inflation Reduction Act on the cost of supplying ammonia for bunkering in the United States.416 Box 6.1 Climate and security risks.424 Box 6.2 Local content requirements in Brazil.431 Box 6.3 In

154、novation and learning curves for clean technology manufacturing.446 Box 6.4 European chemical industry competitiveness.474 Box 6.5 Resilience of automotive industry clusters to supply disruptions.479 Box 6.6 Managing the interactions between ammonia markets for food and fuel.485 List of tables Selec

155、ted industrial strategies and policy packages targeting clean energy technologies or materials manufacturing.87 Forms of direct support to producers that can be components of industrial strategies.90 Trade policy measures that can be components of industrial strategies.99 Selected industrial strateg

156、ies and policy packages targeting clean energy technologies or materials manufacturing by scenario.117 Selected US industrial and trade policies relevant to clean energy technology and materials manufacturing.177 Tariffs on imports of Chinese-origin EV-related goods.185 Selected domestic and trade p

157、olicies in the European Union relevant to clean energy technology and materials manufacturing.199 Summary of EU proposed duties on EV imports from China.205 Selected domestic and trade policies in China relevant to clean energy technology and materials manufacturing.232 Selected domestic and trade p

158、olicies in India relevant to clean energy technology and materials manufacturing.252 Relative importance of enabling factors for manufacturing selected clean technologies and materials.284 EV manufacturing policies and goals in selected Southeast Asian countries.314 Major port operators,2022.363 Ind

159、icative maximum carrying capacity of a large vessel in energy terms for selected clean energy technologies and fossil fuels.376 Indicative transport costs for selected clean energy technologies.377 Typical transport costs as share of product value for raw and bulk materials by ship type,2023.378 Sum

160、mary of the status of selected technologies to decarbonise shipping.394 Comparison of average transport costs(absolute and as share of price)and energy density for selected marine fuels,2023.412 Table 6.1 Ways in which prices can be influenced by supply curves.441 Table 6.2 Priority policy actions f

161、or promoting investment in clean energy manufacturing and trade.468 Table 6.3 Six principles for strategic partnerships in support of clean manufacturing investment in EMDEs.481 Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|19 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Executive Summary Three strategic areas of pu

162、blic policy energy,industry and trade are increasingly interwoven.Tensions and trade-offs arise in each of these areas as governments seek to reconcile their commitment to well-functioning markets and cost-effective clean energy transitions,on the one hand,with the need to establish secure,resilient

163、 clean technology supply chains,on the other.This involves tough decisions around choosing which industries to support,collaboration with trading partners,and how to prioritise innovation efforts.This 2024 edition of Energy Technology Perspectives(ETP)the“worlds clean energy technology guidebook”is

164、designed to support decision-making in these areas.ETP-2024 is the first analysis of its kind to explore the future of manufacturing and trade of clean energy technologies,with granular sectoral detail across supply chains,built on a unique bottom-up dataset and a quantitative assessment of countrie

165、s industrial strategies.Manufacturing and trade are foundational for the new clean energy economy The sizeable economic opportunities associated with manufacturing clean energy technologies are a top priority for government and industry.The global market size for six of the main clean energy technol

166、ogies solar PV,wind,electric vehicles(EVs),batteries,electrolysers and heat pumps has grown nearly fourfold since 2015 to exceed USD 700 billion in 2023,which is around half the value of all the natural gas produced globally that year.Growth has been driven by surging clean technology deployment,par

167、ticularly for EVs,solar PV and wind.Under todays policy settings,the market for key clean technologies is set to nearly triple by 2035,to more than USD 2 trillion.This is close to the average value of the global crude oil market in recent years.International trade is essential to the proper function

168、ing of the global economy including the energy system.Global goods trade comprising vital supplies of everything from food and clothing to smart phones and semiconductors amounted to around USD 24 trillion in 2023 in value terms.Fossil fuels accounted for around 10%of this,while bulk materials and c

169、hemicals including steel,aluminium and ammonia accounted for around 20%.Clean energy technology trade today accounts for a comparatively small share relative to these established industries,at around 1%,but it is growing fast.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|20 I EA.CC BY 4

170、.0.At around USD 200 billion,the value of trade in clean technologies is nearly 30%of their global market value.The biggest element is trade in electric cars,which has doubled since 2020,reaching around one-fifth of trade in all cars in 2023 in value terms.Solar PV is the second-most traded technolo

171、gy in value terms.Under todays policy settings,overall clean technology trade is on track to reach USD 575 billion by 2035,or around 50%more than the value of global trade in natural gas today.Investments in manufacturing are surging in response to rapidly growing demand for clean technologies A maj

172、or wave of manufacturing investment in clean technologies is underway,with many new factories being built across the world.Global investment in clean technology manufacturing rose by 50%in 2023,reaching USD 235 billion.This is equal to nearly 10%of the growth in investment across the entire world ec

173、onomy,and around 3%of global GDP growth.Four-fifths of the clean technology manufacturing investment in 2023 went to solar PV and battery manufacturing,with EV plants accounting for a further 15%.The amount of manufacturing capacity being added has been comfortably outpacing current deployment level

174、s.Despite some recent cancellations and postponements of solar PV and battery manufacturing projects,investment in clean technology manufacturing facilities is set to remain close to its recent record levels,at around USD 200 billion in 2024.Cost competitiveness is an important driver of manufacturi

175、ng investment but not the only one.China is currently the cheapest location for manufacturing all the major clean energy technologies considered in this report,without taking into account explicit financial support from governments.Compared with China,it costs up to 40%more on average to produce sol

176、ar PV modules,wind turbines and battery technologies in the United States,up to 45%more in the European Union,and up to 25%more in India.Cost competitiveness is a key factor explaining Chinas outsized role in clean technology manufacturing today:it accounts for between 40%and 98%of global manufactur

177、ing capacity for the key clean technologies and components we examine,depending on the case.Relative to other countries,China has greater economies of scale,a larger domestic market and highly integrated firms and facilities along the supply chain for these technologies.An IEA survey of more than 50

178、 major manufacturers across clean technology and material supply chains reveals other factors,besides costs,that influence investment decisions.These include various forms of policy support,access to markets,skills and knowledge in the industrial base,and infrastructure.Energy Technology Perspective

179、s 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|21 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Trade can help countries play to their economic strengths Moving energy-related trade towards clean technologies is part of a broader shift in the energy sector that has long-term implications for trade volumes.Fossil fuels provide recurring flows of e

180、nergy trade,whereas clean technology trade results in a long-lived stocks of energy generation and transformation equipment.For example,based on todays policy settings,the European Unions net imports of fossil fuels and clean energy technologies reach around USD 400 billion in 2035.But the blocs tot

181、al import bill tilts towards a higher share of clean energy technologies,from less than 10%in 2023 to 35%in 2035,at the expense of fossil fuels.This has positive impacts on energy resilience:a single journey by a large container ship filled with solar PV modules can provide the means to generate ele

182、ctricity equivalent to the amount generated from the natural gas onboard more than 50 large LNG tankers,or the coal onboard 100 large ships.Industrial strategies in Europe and the United States are set to alter the outlook for manufacturing and trade In the European Union,the future of clean technol

183、ogy manufacturing will be shaped by how successfully the targets of the Net Zero Industry Act(NZIA)can be achieved.While the NZIA targets are readily achievable for some technologies like the final steps of wind component and heat pump manufacturing,the task facing the automotive industry is much la

184、rger.More than 40%of the internal combustion engine(ICE)vehicles produced in the European Union today are destined for export and facing competition from EV manufacturers in China,as are domestically produced EVs for the EU market.For the EU car industry to compete in the growing EV market,manufactu

185、ring cost reductions for electric cars and full integration of supply chains,including batteries,will be essential.In 2023,imports from China accounted for around 20%of EV sales in the European Union.Under todays policy settings,this share roughly doubles to 40%by 2035 despite recently announced imp

186、ort duties that will be in effect for 5 years.If the goals of the NZIA are achieved,a fully integrated EV and battery supply chain would help bring the share down to 20%.In the United States,the Inflation Reduction Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law are bearing fruit.They have already mobilised U

187、SD 230 billion of investment in clean technology manufacturing through to 2030.Based on current policy settings and driven by the incentives provided under these pieces of legislation US demand for solar PV modules and polysilicon could be met almost entirely by domestic production by 2035,while som

188、e demand for cells and wafers would still be met by imports.Existing trading relationships also provide a strong Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|22 I EA.CC BY 4.0.foundation:Mexico is well placed to become a hub for EV manufacturing for the North American market(as it is t

189、oday for ICE cars),with Southeast Asia,Korea and Japan being other potential key suppliers.China remains the worlds manufacturing powerhouse and India makes major strides,becoming a net exporter Chinas share of global manufacturing for all six key clean technologies in value terms is around 70%today

190、.Chinas largest solar PV manufacturing facility currently under construction,located in Shanxi province,could alone produce enough modules to cover virtually all EU demand today.Despite the ongoing implementation of industrial strategies in other countries,the value of Chinas clean technology export

191、s is on track to exceed USD 340 billion in 2035,based on todays policy settings.This is roughly equivalent to the projected oil export revenue of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates combined in 2024.Chinas fossil fuel import bill is currently the highest of any country in the world.Under

192、todays policy settings,the net import bill accounting for fossil fuel imports and clean technology exports is cut by around 70%between now and 2035.If markets for clean technologies grow more quickly than projected under todays policy settings,then Chinas exports of clean technologies would,in value

193、 terms,entirely offset its imports of fossil fuels,before 2035.India pivots from being a net importer of clean technologies today to a net exporter in 2035,if the clean energy transition accelerates.Under todays policy settings,India remains a net importer of clean technologies in value terms in 203

194、5,but with modestly growing production and exports of solar PV modules,EVs and batteries incentivised under the Production Linked Incentive Scheme.In contrast,if the clean energy transition proceeds more quickly in India and around the world,the countrys net exports of clean energy technologies coul

195、d grow rapidly to reach USD 30 billion in 2035,after supplying a large portion of its own rapidly increasing demand.This offsets around 20%of its remaining fossil fuel import bill of around USD 170 billion,reducing Indias energy-related trade deficit to around USD 140 billion.The door of the new cle

196、an energy economy is still open to emerging markets Emerging and developing economies in Latin America,Africa and Southeast Asia account for less than 5%of the value generated from producing clean technologies today.A fair and just transition requires enabling more regions to reap the economic benef

197、its from growing supply chains for clean and modern energy technologies.A faster clean energy transition and larger overall market for clean energy technologies will be foundational for this.Other factors that presently deter investment in emerging markets also need to be overcome,including politica

198、l and currency risks,a lack of skilled workers and poor infrastructure.But the Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|23 I EA.CC BY 4.0.opportunities exist:beyond the mining and processing of critical minerals,countries in Africa,Latin America and Southeast Asia all have prospect

199、s to boost their competitive advantages and move up the value chain.We collected country-by-country data across over 60 indicators,assessing the business environment,infrastructure for energy and transport(such as electricity grids,gas pipelines and ports),resource availability and domestic market s

200、ize,to identify opportunities for each country.Southeast Asia is already an important player in clean technology supply chains,and several countries can take a step up the value chain.The region could be among the cheapest places to produce polysilicon and wafers for solar PV modules by 2035.Several

201、 countries there can build on existing manufacturing strengths for electronic and electrical equipment,competitive labour and energy prices,and government policies that are supportive for export-oriented industries.If the region can fully exploit these competitive advantages,and policy action worldw

202、ide is compatible with reaching net zero emissions globally by 2050,Southeast Asia could produce over 8 million EVs by 2035(up from about 40 000 today),of which almost half would be exported.Latin America,and Brazil in particular,has favourable starting conditions for wind turbine manufacturing,but

203、significant investments in infrastructure and logistics are required to capitalise on this.Today,Brazil produces over 5%of wind turbine blades globally.If the country is able to take advantage of its favourable enabling conditions,in a scenario compatible with net zero emissions by 2050,exports of t

204、hese components increase sixfold by 2035 compared with current levels,assuming long-lead-time investments in port infrastructure bear fruit.Brazil among other Latin American countries is also endowed with abundant renewable energy resources,which form a good basis for exports of near-zero emissions

205、ammonia,iron and steel to markets where these commodities are more costly to produce,such as Europe and Japan.North Africa could become an EV manufacturing hub.Investment is already underway,and if the region is able to achieve its potential in line with achieving net zero emissions by 2050 globally

206、,North Africa in 2035 exports almost half of the 3.7 million EVs it produces by then,mostly to the European Union.This would build on the existing project pipeline in countries such as Morocco.Elsewhere in Africa,countries have the potential to leverage iron ore and renewable energy resources,for ex

207、ample,to move up the value chain and produce iron with electrolytic hydrogen.Such exports to Europe and Japan could be worth more than four times the value of the same tonnage of iron ore exports at todays prices,if the world pursues climate targets compatible with reaching net zero emissions by 205

208、0,and the barriers to investment in African countries are overcome.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|24 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Supply chain concentration puts pressure on the busiest maritime shipping routes Traffic through some of the busiest maritime chokepoints increases,despite

209、growth in overall shipping activity slowing down.Based on todays policy settings,global maritime goods trade increases by 1%per year by weight over the coming decade significantly more slowly than over the past two decades,due to slower growth in fossil fuel and steel demand.However,traffic through

210、certain chokepoints intensifies.Around 50%of all maritime trade in clean technologies trade passes through the Strait of Malacca today.Based on todays policy settings,clean technology shipments through Malacca are set to rise substantially,though their share in total maritime trade remains very smal

211、l.This dependency on maritime chokepoints poses risks to supply chain resilience,especially as the average clean technology cargo is more than ten times the value of the average fossil fuel cargo per tonne.Well-designed industrial strategies will be crucial for clean energy transitions to continue g

212、athering pace The tensions and trade-offs between the goals of energy and industrial policies mean that getting trade policy measures right is essential for clean energy transitions.In some cases,the clean energy dividends of trade would be higher if barriers to trade were lower.Today,tariffs on ren

213、ewable energy systems and components,for example,are more than twice those applied to fossil fuels,on average.Trade measures including both tariffs and non-tariff measures already increase the cost of clean technologies.For example,a 100%tariff on solar PV modules today would cancel out the decline

214、in technology costs seen over the past 5 years.The knock-on impact on electricity generation costs would be more limited,as the solar PV modules themselves make up 20-30%of the total installation cost.But for consumer goods,such as electric cars,the impact is likely to be more direct and risks slowi

215、ng down adoption.Well-designed industrial strategies can help companies address competitiveness gaps or reach the innovation frontier sooner,but their interplay with trade policy measures needs careful consideration.Industrial policy deployed with a specific,measurable and time-bound goal can suppor

216、t the achievement of energy policy and climate goals.For example,battery production in the European Union is around 50%more expensive than in China today.Innovative battery technologies currently under development could help reduce the cost gap by up to 40%at which point,the advantages of manufactur

217、ing being located in the European Union may outweigh the remaining cost difference.To cultivate and maintain competitiveness and innovation,industrial policies must be closely monitored and amenable to course correction.Trade policy must be Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Executive Summary PAGE|

218、25 I EA.CC BY 4.0.designed carefully if it is to support such goals broad-based protectionism or blanket financial support are very unlikely to make for a winning industrial strategy.Industrial strategies must take into account the new parameters and objectives of international trade in clean techno

219、logy supply chains.To balance efforts to reach climate goals with energy and industrial policy objectives,trade policies will need to be designed with a view to their role in the new clean energy economy,and what it means for industrial competitiveness today.There is no single recipe to follow for t

220、hese policies,but the analysis presented in ETP-2024 is designed to help move the debate in this area forward.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Introduction PAGE|26 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Introduction The International Energy Agency(IEA)Energy Technology Perspectives(ETP)flagship series of reports has bee

221、n providing critical insights into key technological aspects of the energy sector since 2006.It was revamped in 2020 to serve as the IEAs guidebook for clean energy technologies,with a focus on themes that are particularly pertinent for policy makers in view of the vital importance of clean energy t

222、echnologies and innovation in meeting the policy goals of energy security,economic development and environmental sustainability.Efforts to achieve these goals cut across different dimensions of industrial,energy and trade policies seeking positive synergies between them and managing any trade-offs w

223、ill be key to success.Based on granular sectoral data and innovative analysis,Energy Technology Perspectives 2024(ETP-2024)is the first report of its kind to analyse the future of manufacturing and international trade of clean energy technologies and related materials.It aims to provide policy maker

224、s with a quantitative assessment of the opportunities and complexities associated with the manufacturing and trade of such technologies and materials across the world in order to support decision-making on these topics.The analysis covers six key clean energy technologies electric vehicles(EVs),batt

225、eries,solar photovoltaics(PV),wind turbines,heat pumps and electrolysers which together account for around half of global clean energy investment spending and have a combined market size of more than USD 700 billion.The analysis also covers the manufacturing and trade of the main components of these

226、 technologies,alongside three categories of materials steel,aluminium and ammonia(both for industrial and fuel-related applications)with a focus on near-zero emissions manufacturing processes.The analysis of ETP-2024 takes into account the need to build secure and resilient supply chains for the cle

227、an energy transition.It assesses the economic opportunities that the clean,modern energy economy is generating and how investment in the manufacturing of clean energy technologies and materials is reshaping global trade flows.Clean energy technologies have come to the fore in new industrial strategi

228、es that are being devised by governments around the world to boost domestic manufacturing,create jobs and enhance resilience,while also supporting decarbonisation efforts.Policy has a vital role to play in these areas:each country needs to devise its own clean energy industrial strategy,reflecting i

229、ts inherent strengths and weakness,including access to low-cost mineral and energy resources,a skilled workforce and synergies with existing industries.Policy makers need to balance the goals of supply security and resilience,Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Introduction PAGE|27 I EA.CC BY 4.0.af

230、fordability and equity in designing effective policies and strategies to get to net zero emissions of GHGs as quickly as possible.ETP-2024 explores various ways of navigating trade-offs in meeting these goals.This report greatly expands on the analysis contained in ETP-2023,which focused on clean en

231、ergy technology supply chains and their importance in the energy transition,finding that manufacturing of key technologies was heavily concentrated in a few major markets.ETP-2024 provides a deeper look into the factors shaping the current status and outlook for manufacturing and trade of these key

232、clean energy technologies and materials,informed by a unique,richly detailed dataset.Chapter 1 reviews the current status of manufacturing supply chains and assesses the drivers of investment decisions in the manufacturing industry,notably cost competitiveness.Chapter 2 analyses the outlook for clea

233、n energy manufacturing capacity and production,as well as inter-regional trade,using projections based on policy scenarios,while Chapter 3 looks in detail at prospects in four main markets:the United States,the European Union,China and India.Chapter 4 provides a detailed assessment of opportunities

234、for emerging markets and developing economies to move up the value chain and reap the benefits of investment in manufacturing and material production.Chapter 5 identifies the main shipping routes and chokepoints associated with the trade of clean energy technologies,as well as the role of ports and

235、ships for decarbonising international trade.Finally,Chapter 6 discusses strategic considerations for policy makers.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|28 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade Highlights Global manufacturing

236、capacity for clean energy technologies is expanding quickly.Between 2021 and 2023 alone,production capacity increased from just over 450 GW to 1.2 TW for solar PV modules,125 GW to 180 GW for wind,10.5 to 22.2 million units for EVs,1.1 TWh to 2.5 TWh for batteries,and tripled to 25 GW for electrolys

237、ers.Announced expansions could lead to a manufacturing capacity of 1.6 TW for solar in 2030,260 GW for wind,9.3 TWh for batteries and 165 GW for electrolysers.China is by far the largest producer of clean energy technologies and related materials,including steel,aluminium and ammonia.Based on announ

238、ced projects,geographic concentration in manufacturing is expected to persist to 2030,with China,the European Union and the United States accounting for over 80%of production capacity for the six clean technology supply chains solar PV,wind,electric vehicles,batteries,electrolysers and heat pumps co

239、nsidered in this report.Investment in manufacturing capacity for the six clean energy technology supply chains reached USD 235 billion in 2023,up from USD 160 billion in 2022.Based on announced projects,investments in these facilities are expected to remain around USD 200 billion in 2024,with an ave

240、rage of USD 180 billion per year due to be invested through to 2030,around 35%of which is committed.Trade in clean technologies is increasing rapidly.Global exports of solar PV modules have increased more than tenfold since 2015;those of electric cars have increased nearly twentyfold.The trade route

241、s for bulk carriers are more congested than those for oil tankers and container ships,and more concentrated in Asia.The clean energy transition is changing the landscape of trade economies rely less on fossil fuels,which are consumed,and more on manufactured technologies,which are added to installed

242、 capacity and operated for years at a time.This is changing the nature of supply chain risks.Cost is the main determinant of the level and location of investments in manufacturing.Variable operating costs,including materials,components and energy,make up more than three-quarters of the levelised cos

243、t of producing the technologies considered,when factories are utilised intensively.For materials production,the share of energy is generally much higher.Producing these commodities with near-zero emissions technologies is currently much more expensive than with conventional technologies,but the prem

244、ium could fall significantly once they reach commercial scale.An IEA industry survey of more than 50 companies highlights the importance of other factors besides cost,notably the size of the domestic market.In China,where manufacturing capacity has expanded most rapidly in recent years,the size of t

245、he market for clean technologies has grown from USD 25 billion in 2010 to more than USD 400 billion in 2023 in real terms.A large existing industrial base and co-location with suppliers and customers are also strong pull factors.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturin

246、g and trade PAGE|29 I EA.CC BY 4.0.This chapter starts with an overview of the current state of play with respect to manufacturing of and international trade in clean energy technologies and related materials,including investment trends in the sector.This includes analysis of trends in demand for th

247、e six key technologies considered in this report solar PV,wind,electric vehicles(including batteries),electrolysers and heat pumps1 together with the latest developments in three strategic upstream industries steel,aluminium and ammonia.We then assess the drivers of competitiveness in manufacturing

248、these technologies and materials,including regional differences in capital and operating costs,and then conclude with an overview of the various policies and instruments comprised by government industrial strategies.1.1 Manufacturing The importance of manufacturing Manufacturing a vital economic act

249、ivity,accounting for nearly one-fifth of global gross domestic product(GDP)is central to the clean energy transition.The United States,the European Union,Japan and the Peoples Republic of China(hereafter,“China”)collectively accounted for around 65%of manufacturing value added in 2023,a share that h

250、as remained almost constant over the past two decades.China has emerged as the worlds manufacturing powerhouse,nearly tripling its share of global manufacturing value added between 2005 and 2023 to one-third and increasing its output fivefold in absolute terms to over USD 6 trillion in 2023 prices(F

251、igure 1.1).This was driven by highly supportive government policies and a massive increase in investment.Manufacturing in other major economies has grown less rapidly.Despite services accounting for around 60%of value added in the global economy in 2023,the manufacturing sector remains significant.M

252、anufacturing contributes just under 20%of global value added,which is roughly equivalent to several core service sub-sectors combined,including retail(10%),finance(7%)and information and communications(5%).Other sub-sectors such as health and construction(5%each),transport(4%),and fossil fuel extrac

253、tion,metals mining,and agriculture and fishing(1-2%each),account for much less value added in the global economy than manufacturing.For this reason,this report takes a closer look at manufacturing while excluding critical minerals and installation of clean energy technologies from the immediate scop

254、e.Manufacturing also generates important productivity gains and spillovers across other sectors.Within 1 Heat pumps in this report refer to those that deliver heat directly to households and residential or commercial buildings for space heating and/or domestic hot water provision.They include natura

255、l source heat pumps,including reversible air conditioners used as primary heating equipment.They exclude reversible air conditioners used only for cooling,or used as a complement to other heating equipment,such as a boiler.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and

256、trade PAGE|30 I EA.CC BY 4.0.manufacturing,chemicals,electronics,metals,machinery and motor vehicles combined account for 60%of global economic value added.Global economic value added in manufacturing industry IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:RoW=Rest of World.The middle chart refers to the share of each technol

257、ogy area within the value added of manufacturing.The right-hand side chart refers to the share of each sectors value added in the value added of the whole economy.Data for retail,finance and agriculture are the result of a weighted average over 2019-2021 in major advanced economies.Fossil fuels refe

258、r to fossil fuel extraction.Source:IEA analysis based on IEA(2024a);OECD(2024a);and Oxford Economics Limited(2024a).Manufacturing accounts for nearly one-fifth of global GDP,with China the leading producer,followed by the United States and the European Union.The energy transition calls for a massive

259、 deployment of clean technologies and the transformation of the processes to manufacture them.In many cases,clean energy technologies are still emerging,in the sense that their deployment rate is still low relative to that of incumbent technologies,or that it is concentrated in a few countries or re

260、gions.Manufacturing of all types of clean energy technology needs to ramp up rapidly,sometimes from scratch,in order to meet climate goals(see Chapter 2).Recent success stories,such as for solar PV,wind power and electric vehicles(EVs)demonstrate the critical role of policy in developing manufacturi

261、ng capacity and fostering demand for emerging clean energy technologies.There is also a need to transform existing manufacturing activities to make them compatible with net zero emissions,including near-zero emissions materials required as inputs for making clean technologies and other products(Box

262、1.1);materials production is highly energy-intensive and responsible today for a large share of carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions worldwide.For example,in 2023,CO2 emissions from global production of iron and steel and aluminium accounted for over 3 gigatonnes(Gt)of CO2,or 8%of global emissions.0 5 10 15

263、 2020052023Trillion USD(2023,MER)By regionChemicalsMetalsElectronicsMachineryMotor vehiclesOther 0%20%40%60%80%100%2023Share of manufacturingBy technologyMiningAgricultureFossil fuelsManufacturingConstructionHealthcareFinanceRetail0%5%10%15%20%2023Share in global economyBy sectorEnergy Technology Pe

264、rspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|31 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Box 1.1 Near-zero emissions technologies for materials production Among materials,this report focuses on three key commodities steel,aluminium and ammonia that are particularly relevant to clean technology manufact

265、uring and trade.Steel and aluminium are direct inputs to the manufacturing processes for several clean energy technologies,while ammonia could play an important role in decarbonising global maritime trade.The production of all three materials is currently both very energy-and emissions-intensive,tog

266、ether accounting for nearly 10%of global energy sector emissions in 2023.Increased energy and materials efficiency,together with other modifications to the operation of existing manufacturing facilities,are expected to make substantial contributions to reducing emissions in these industries.However,

267、getting to net zero emissions globally also requires a fundamental shift to new manufacturing processes for these commodities.Many of the technologies required for these processes are at an earlier stage in their development than the other clean technologies addressed in this report(such as solar PV

268、 and wind turbines),and most are not commercially available on the market today(IEA,2023a).In this report,we refer to technologies that can produce steel from iron ore,aluminium from bauxite,and ammonia with emissions intensities that are compatible with the IEAs Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario(

269、see Chapter 2)as“near-zero emissions technologies”,and their outputs as“near-zero emissions materials”.This terminology echoes that used in the IEAs report,Achieving Net Zero Heavy Industries,produced for the Group of Seven(G7)(IEA,2022a).IEA work on near-zero emissions definitions and measurement p

270、rotocols has only addressed steel and cement production as yet,but forthcoming analyses,including those produced by the IEA Working Party on Industrial Decarbonisation(WPID)and the Climate Club may well consider similar definitions for aluminium,ammonia and other outputs of heavy industry(IEA,2024b)

271、.The use of the term near-zero emissions in this ETP differs from that used in the work on definitions for the G7 in two important respects:The original definition is based on a set of emissions-intensity thresholds,including various categories of indirect emissions and taking into consideration pro

272、cess arrangements at the facility level.These specificities cannot be considered precisely at the regional level in our modelling work for this report,so a narrower emissions boundary is used based on direct emissions only.The definition used in this report excludes production of steel and aluminium

273、 based fully on scrap,thereby focusing on production technologies that are barely deployed today and that require the most innovation and policy support(for example,hydrogen-based direct iron reduction(H2-DRI)production,aluminium smelters with inert anodes and carbon capture,utilisation and storage(

274、CCUS)-equipped steam methane reforming for ammonia production).These modifications to the usage of“near-zero emissions”apply only to this report and do not affect ongoing WPID and Climate Club work on definitions.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE

275、|32 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Investment in manufacturing Investment in the overall manufacturing sector has more than doubled in real terms over the past two decades,reaching over USD 6 trillion in 2023.Growth has been most spectacular in China,which has seen a sevenfold increase in manufacturing investment s

276、ince 2005,with capital spending rising on average by 11%per year,accounting for nearly two-thirds of global growth in manufacturing investment.The share of the leading Western economies in global manufacturing investment has dwindled over the same period,despite rising investment in absolute terms i

277、n most cases(Japan is the only major advanced economy where manufacturing investment has contracted in absolute terms).In the United States and the European Union,it grew by more than 40%(around 2%per year on average).Indias manufacturing investment grew fivefold(averaging 10%per year),but from a mu

278、ch lower base,such that its share of global investment rose from around 1.5%to 3%.The share of investment in manufacturing in the overall economy has evolved differently across countries.In the United States and the European Union,manufacturing investment has been fairly constant at around 3-4%of GD

279、P over the past two decades,whereas in Japan it remains around 9%,even after a sharp contraction during the global financial crisis of 2008.By contrast,Chinas manufacturing investment as a share of GDP rocketed from around 8%in 2005 to nearly 15%in 2023,despite a dip in 2017(alongside investment mor

280、e broadly)that resulted from government policies to reorientate the economy towards consumer spending.Manufacturing investment resumed its upward path in 2018,falling back temporarily in 2020 due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.The productivity of manufacturing investment also varies conside

281、rably across the world.In 2023,the ratio of manufacturing value added to investment ranged from 2.3 in China,3.0 in India,and 4.0 in the European Union and the United States,averaging 3.0 worldwide.These differences are explained largely by the structure of the manufacturing sectors in each economy

282、investment in higher value-added sectors(those that generate higher levels of value added per unit of capital invested)tends to be more concentrated in more developed economies.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|33 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Manufacturing sec

283、tor investment by country/region,2005-2023 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Sources:IEA analysis based on Oxford Economics Limited(2024a).Manufacturing investment has risen most rapidly in China over the past two decades,while the share of investment in GDP has stagnated in major advanced economies.Investment in clean

284、 energy technology supply chains Global investment in manufacturing in the five key clean technology supply chains this report focuses on solar PV,wind,EVs(including batteries),electrolysers and heat pumps jumped 50%to USD 235 billion in 2023,up from USD 160 billion in 2022(Figure 1.3).Investments w

285、ere led by solar PV and batteries,which together accounted for 80%of the total in 2023.China accounted for nearly three-quarters of total investment in 2023,with the United States and the European Union together accounting for around one-fifth.India,Japan,Korea and Southeast Asia accounted for most

286、of the rest,with virtually no investment taking place in either Africa or Central and South America.Overall investments in the steel,aluminium and ammonia industries increased more slowly than in clean energy technologies in 2023,rising from around USD 50 billion to just under USD 60 billion globall

287、y.Investment in aluminium capacity halved,while that in ammonia facilities decreased slightly,whereas investment in steel jumped by nearly 65%.Annual investment figures for these industries depend on the spending associated with the scheduling of a handful of projects and so tends to be cyclical.The

288、 majority of investment in these three industries took place in emerging markets and developing economies(EMDEs).0 2 4 6 820052023Trillion USD(2023,MER)ChinaEuropean UnionIndiaJapanUnited StatesRest of World0%5%10%15%20%20052023InvestmentShare of GDPEnergy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The

289、state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|34 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Global investment in clean energy technology and materials manufacturing,2022-2023 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:FID=final investment decision.Materials includes investment associated with global capacity additions for crude steel and iron for steel,and

290、alumina and primary production for aluminium.Only investments in new capacity are included.Completed projects include all projects in operation at end-2023.FID or under construction is as of end-June 2024.Sources:IEA analysis based on S&P Global(2024);WindEurope(2023);BNEF(2024a);GWEC(2023);(Wood Ma

291、ckenzie(2024);InfoLink(2024);SPV Market Research(2024);BMI(2024);EV Volumes(2024);BNEF(2024b);BNEF(2024c);IEA(2024a);Atlas EV hub(2024);IFA(2024);OECD(2024b);CRU(2024);Oxford Economics Limited(2024b);CEPII(2024)as well as announcements by manufacturers and personal communications,gathered by the IEA

292、.Investments in clean technology manufacturing grew by 50%year-on-year in 2023;much faster than investments in materials manufacturing.Cumulative investment in near-zero emissions technologies for materials production reached just under USD 6 billion in 2023,with iron and steel accounting for around

293、 90%and ammonia for the rest.A further USD 15 billion of investment is expected to take place in projects that have either reached final investment decision or are already under construction.The majority of this is for ammonia facilities using low-emissions hydrogen for new energy applications like

294、shipping and power generation.Only around USD 300 million of capital investment has been committed to near-zero emission aluminium production,and this is limited to demonstration projects with capacity typically around 1%of that of commercial-scale facilities.Commercial investment targeting emission

295、s reductions in the aluminium industry is mostly limited to the utilisation of greater shares of low-emissions electricity(which reduces indirect emissions),energy efficiency and fuel switching in alumina production.Projecting forward investments for the project pipeline for clean technologies is hi

296、ghly uncertain,as projects may well be cancelled,postponed or brought forward according to changes in policy incentives and market conditions.Assuming the whole project pipeline is completed and there is no change in the inflation-adjusted cost of building manufacturing facilities,total investment i

297、n clean technology manufacturing projects is expected to stand at roughly USD 200 billion(in 2023 dollars)in 2024(Figure 1.4).Current projects alone point to nearly USD 180 billion per year of investment over the period 2025-30,around 35%of which is 0 5 10 15 20Completedprojects,2023FID or undercons

298、truction0 50 100 150 200 25020222023Billion USD(2023,MER)BatteriesElectric vehiclesSolar PVWindOther0 10 20 30 40 50 6020222023AluminiumAmmoniaSteelClean technologiesMaterials(total)Materials(near-zero emissions)Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|

299、35 I EA.CC BY mitted.This includes an estimated USD 65 billion per year for EV manufacturing facilities.2 More projects will undoubtedly be announced for the second half of the 2020s,but the already high levels of capacity for solar PV and batteries(the main contributors to investment spending on ma

300、nufacturing plants today)relative to global demand suggest that some decline in the rate of investment is likely to occur.Global investment in clean energy manufacturing associated with announced projects,2022-2030 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:FID=final investment decision;e=estimated.Clean technologies incl

301、ude solar PV,wind,electric vehicles(EVs),batteries,electrolysers and heat pumps.Materials include investment spending associated with global capacity additions for crude steel,iron,aluminium,alumina and ammonia production.Avg.2025-30e=average annual investments associated with announced projects ove

302、r the period 2025-30,excluding electric vehicle(EV)factories,for which there are no project announcements.Investment in EV manufacturing in this analysis corresponds to projected capacity additions under stated policies(see Chapter 2 for full projections),as no project pipeline information is availa

303、ble for these facilities.Investment is allocated to the year in which it takes place,rather than when new capacity is due to come online up to 2024.From 2025 onwards,investment spending is calculated on an overnight basis.Sources:IEA analysis based on S&P Global(2024);WindEurope(2023);BNEF(2024e);BN

304、EF(2024a);GWEC(2023);Wood Mackenzie(2024);InfoLink(2024);BMI(2024);EV Volumes(2024);BNEF(2024b);IFA(2024);OECD(2024b);CRU(2024);Oxford Economics Limited(2024b);CEPII(2024);as well as announcements by manufacturers and personal communications,gathered by the IEA.Clean technology manufacturing investm

305、ent associated with announced projects is set to stand at roughly USD 200 billion in 2024 and USD 180 billion per year to 2030.Investment in material production facilities for steel,aluminium and ammonia is projected to slump to under USD 30 billion in 2024,but then rebound to an average level of US

306、D 45 billion per year over the rest of the decade,based on the pipeline of announced projects.The near-term slump is in large part due to a levelling-off of conventional capacity additions in China,which has contributed much of the growth over the past two decades.The projected rebound is primarily

307、driven by the huge pipeline of announced projects for ammonia for energy 2 No public information is available on the project pipeline for EV manufacturing facilities.An estimate based on the capacity required to meet demand under stated policies is used here;see Chapter 2 for an overview of the scen

308、arios used in this report.0 50 100 150 200 250202220232024eAvg.2025-30eBillion USD(2023,MER)0%33%67%100%0 20 40 60202220232024eAvg.2025-30eExisting,under construction and FIDPreliminaryElectric vehicles stated policiesShare near-zero emissions(right axis)Clean technologies manufacturingMaterials pro

309、ductionEnergy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|36 I EA.CC BY 4.0.applications.This raises the share of near-zero emissions technology in total ammonia investment to around 85%,up from under 15%in 2023.Of the total investment associated with the project

310、 pipelines for materials,less than 25%can be considered committed.Manufacturing capacity Clean technology manufacturing Clean technology manufacturing has been growing fast since ETP-2023,as have announcements for further capacity additions(IEA,2023b).Even solar PV manufacturing,a comparatively matu

311、re industry,has expanded rapidly over the past 4 years.For example,at the end of 2021 the base year for ETP-2023 capacity for making solar PV modules stood at just over 450 GW;it is more than doubled to 1.2 TW by the end of 2023 the base year for ETP-2024(Figure 1.5).At the end of November 2022,anno

312、uncements of manufacturing capacity expansions for solar PV modules implied an increase in capacity to just 790 GW by 2030.In other words,global manufacturing capacity exceeded 2030 expectations by 50%in the space of only about 12 months.In 2020,around 75 GW of PV module manufacturing capacity was a

313、dded(Figure 1.6).In 2023,this number jumped to 500 GW,well above the record levels of solar PV installations for electricity generation that year,which stood around 425 GW.Manufacturing capacity additions of 430 GW in China alone in 2023 were larger than the levels of global installations for electr

314、icity generation,and larger than the global manufacturing capacity additions between 2020 and 2022.Manufacturing capacity and additions associated with announced projects for selected clean technologies IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:ETP-23 assessed the capacity additions related to announced projects as of th

315、e end of November 2022.The cutoff point for ETP-24 is the end of June 2024.For batteries,values for 2021 and announcements for ETP-24 may differ slightly from ETP-23 due to the inclusion of Tier 3(See the Annex)battery makers for comparability with ETP-24.Source:IEA analysis based on IEA(2023b);and

316、IEA(2024a).Since the last edition of ETP,manufacturing capacity and announced capacity additions for most technologies have expanded substantially.0 5 10ETP-23ETP-24Battery cellsTWhCapacity in 2021Capacity in 2023Announcements to 20300 1 2ETP-23ETP-24Solar PV modulesTW0 100 200 300ETP-23ETP-24ETP-23

317、ETP-24ETP-23ETP-24Wind nacellesElectrolysersHeat pumpsGWEnergy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|37 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Net manufacturing capacity additions for selected clean energy technologies by country/region,2020-2023 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Note:RoW=Rest of Wor

318、ld.Sources:IEA analysis based on S&P Global(2024);WindEurope(2023);BNEF(2024a);GWEC(2023);Wood Mackenzie(2024);InfoLink(2024);SPV Market Research(2024);BMI(2024);EV Volumes(2024),BNEF(2024b);BNEF(2024c);Oxford Economics Limited(2024b);CEPII(2024);as well as announcements by manufacturers and persona

319、l communications,gathered by the IEA.Clean technology manufacturing capacity surged in 2023,with only heat pumps and electric vehicles seeing smaller capacity additions than in 2022.In the case of solar PV,manufacturing capacity additions for assembling modules have generally exceeded those of the k

320、ey components polysilicon,wafers and cells with the notable exception of China over the last 2 years(Figure 1.7).However,the utilisation rates of component manufacturing facilities generally remain low,averting bottlenecks.Average utilisation rates across PV module manufacturing facilities worldwide

321、 remained steady in 2023,at around 55%.In parallel,facilities for newer technologies like tunnel oxide passivated contact(TOPCon),heterojunction(HJT)and back contact(BC)cells are gaining market share over the older ones like passivated emitter rear cells(PERC).This has driven down prices and led to

322、some downscaling of expansion plans,especially in China(Box 1.2).Solar PV(modules)0 200 400 6002020202120222023GWChinaEuropean UnionIndiaJapanUnited StatesRoW0 12 24 362020202120222023Wind(nacelles)0 250 500 7501 0002020202120222023GWhBatteries(cells)0 5 10 152020 2021 2022 2023Electrolysers0 5 10 1

323、5 202020202120222023GWHeat pumps0 2 4 6 82020 2021 2022 2023Million unitsElectric vehiclesEnergy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|38 I EA.CC BY 4.0.The capacity additions associated with new projects have increased less rapidly for other clean technolo

324、gies.In the case of EVs,manufacturing capacity additions reached more than 6 million units in 2022,but fell slightly to 5.7 million in 2023.3 However,year-on-year growth in EV sales slowed from 60%in 2022 to just 30%in 2023,which could have an impact on further manufacturing capacity additions,as au

325、tomakers adjust near-term plans based on sales expectations.An estimated 70%of the manufacturing capacity additions in 2023 were in China,13%in the European Union and 8%in the United States.In the case of batteries,most of which are for electric cars,manufacturing capacity in 2021 stood at around 1.

326、1 TWh,increasing to more than 2.5 TWh in 2023;announced capacity additions have similarly grown,from 8 TWh at end-November 2022 to more than 9 TWh as of end-June 2024.Total manufacturing capacity for anodes and cathodes in 2023 stood well above that of battery cells.Cell manufacturing capacity nonet

327、heless remains well above global demand:in 2023,the utilisation rate of cell production facilities was less than 25%in China,which accounts for around 85%of global production capacity,and 35%worldwide.For wind turbines,manufacturing capacity expanded rapidly over 2020-23,with capacity additions more

328、 than doubling in 2023 to around 30 GW.For wind nacelles,global manufacturing capacity stood at 125 GW at the end of 2021,increasing to 180 GW at the end of 2023.Wind power installations during this period also grew rapidly 75 GW in 2022 and 115 GW in 2023 despite rising costs(see below).Nearly all

329、of the manufacturing capacity additions for wind in 2020-23 were in China,though the country accounted for only around 45%of global wind deployment for electricity generation.3 Quantifying manufacturing capacity is hard for EVs,as most assembly plants also produce conventional vehicles.We estimate c

330、apacity additions here based on actual production and the utilisation rates of existing car plants,regardless of whether they manufacture electric models exclusively or not.Energy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|39 I EA.CC BY 4.0.Net manufacturing cap

331、acity additions for solar PV,wind and battery components by country/region,2022-2023 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Notes:RoW=Rest of World.Other Asia Pacific excludes China.Sources:Sources:IEA analysis based on S&P Global(2024);WindEurope(2023);BNEF(2024a);GWEC(2023);Wood Mackenzie(2024);InfoLink(2024);SPV Market R

332、esearch(2024);BMI(2024);BNEF(2024b);and BNEF(2024c).Chinas lead in battery and solar PV manufacturing has increased further as a result of enormous recent capacity additions for anodes,cathodes,polysilicon and wafers.0 40 80 12020222023202220232022202320222023United StatesEuropean UnionOther Asia Pa

333、cificRoWGWhAnodesCathodesCells01 0002 0003 00020222023China0 15 30 4520222023202220232022202320222023United StatesEuropean UnionIndiaRoWGWPolysiliconWafersCellsModules0 200 400 60020222023ChinaSolar PVBatteries0246202220232022202320222023European UnionIndiaRoWGWNacellesTowersBlades0 12 24 3620222023ChinaWindEnergy Technology Perspectives 2024 Chapter 1:The state of manufacturing and trade PAGE|40