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1、We expect the second Trump admi ni strati on to bri ng hi gher Chi na and autontari ffs,much lower i mmi grati on,some fresh tax cuts,and regulatory easi ng.I fso,the US economy should grow 2.5%i n 2025,outperformi ng consensusexpectati ons and other DM economi es for the thi rd year i n a row.The b

2、i ggestri sk i s a large across-the-board tari ff,whi ch would li kely hi t growth hard.We have cut our Euro area GDP forecast to a below-consensus 0.8%,reflecti ngnongoi ng structural headwi nds and a hi t from trade poli cy uncertai nty.We havealso shaved our 2025 Chi na GDP forecast to 4.5%becaus

3、e of hi gher US tari ffsthat are only parti ally offset by easi er macro poli ci es.Ri sks i n both Europe andChi na are on the downsi de i f tari ffs i ncrease beyond our baseli ne.US core PCE i nflati on should slow to 2.4%by late 2025,hi gher than our pri ornforecast of 2.0%but sti ll beni gn.Our

4、 forecast would ri se to around 3%wi th anacross-the-board tari ff of 10%.I n the Euro area,we expect core i nflati on to slowto 2%by late 2025 and are less concerned about upsi de ri sks even wi th abroader trade war.Lowflati on ri sks have abated i n Japan.We expect si gni ficant further rate cuts

5、 over the next year.The Fed i s li kely to cutnto 3.25-3.5%,wi th sequenti al moves through Q1 and a slowdown thereafter.We have shaved our ECB forecast to 1.75%on the back of our growthdowngrade and also see si gni ficant room for poli cy easi ng i n EMs.However,weexpect the Bank of Japan to li ft

6、i ts poli cy rate to 0.75%by yearend.Our baseli ne forecast i mpli es a beni gn ri sk backdrop and US outperformance.nWe expect modest posi ti ve returns across equi ti es,commodi ti es,and DMbonds,alongsi de gradual USD appreci ati on.But markets have already moved along way i n a ri sk-posi ti ve

7、di recti on,and i t wi ll be i mportant to li mi t exposure tothe tai ls around our baseli ne.Movi ng toward a broader trade war would rei nforce USD upsi de but putnpressure on global equi ti es.Unusually hi gh US equi ty valuati ons not onlydampen long-term expected returns but also ampli fy the p

8、otenti al reacti on to anyeconomi c weakness.By contrast,posi ti ve tai lwi nds could emerge i f poli ci esshi ft to be even more corporate fri endly,oi l pri ces fall more sharply on sparecapaci ty,or i nflati on and fiscal fears prove overdone.Jan Hat zi us+1(212)902-0394|j an.hatzi Goldman Sachs&

9、Co.LLC Domi ni c Wi lson+1(212)902-5924|domi ni c.wi Goldman Sachs&Co.LLC Joseph Bri ggs+1(212)902-2163|j oseph.bri Goldman Sachs&Co.LLC Vi cki e Chang+1(212)902-6915|vi cki Goldman Sachs&Co.LLC Gi ovanni Pi erdomeni co+44(20)7051-6807|gi ovanni.pi erdomeni Goldman Sachs I nternati onal Sarah Dong+1

10、(212)357-9741|Goldman Sachs&Co.LLC Megan Pet ers+44(20)7051-2058| Goldman Sachs I nternati onalGlobal Economics Analyst Macro Out l ook 2025:Tai l wi nds(Probabl y)Trump Tari ffs14 November 2024|11:04AM ESTI nvestors should consi der thi s report as only a si ngle factor i n maki ng thei r i nvestme

11、nt deci si on.For Reg AC certi ficati on and other i mportant di sclosures,see the Di sclosure Appendi x,or go to following is a redacted version of the original report published November 14,2024 25 pgs.Macro Out look 2025:Tai lwi nds(Probably)Trump Tari f f s The economi c data thi s year have rei

12、nforced our long-standi ng opti mi sm about post-pandemi c normali zati on.Global GDP growth i s tracki ng at 2.7%i n 2024,si mi lar to the 2023 pace and sli ghtly above our esti mate of potenti al,wi th US growth agai n leadi ng the way among DMs.1 Global labor markets have rebalanced,wi th both un

13、employment and broader measures such as our j obs-workers gap back to pre-pandemi c levels.I nflati on has conti nued to trend down and i s now wi thi n stri ki ng di stance of central bank targets.And most central banks are well i nto the process of cutti ng i nterest rates back to more normal leve

14、ls.Trumponomics 2.0.How wi ll US economi c poli cy change i n the second Trump admi ni strati on?Exhi bi t 1 summari zes our expectati ons for four areas of focus:trade,i mmi grati on,fiscal,and regulati on.Exhi bi t 2 shows the effects on US GDP growth under our base case across all poli ci es,whi

15、le Exhi bi t 3 shows the effects for our ri sk case i n whi ch Presi dent-elect Trump i mposes an across-the-board tari ff of 10%.I f thi s happens,the most li kely ti mi ng i s 2025H2.Thi s means that there wi ll li kely be a peri od of uncertai nty that may ti ghten financi al condi ti ons and wei

16、 gh on growth.I n our base case,the uncertai nty resolves and financi al condi ti ons ease anew.I n our tari ff ri sk case,the uncertai nty conti nues to bui ld and financi al condi ti ons ti ghten further.The effects from the new poli ci es on US GDP are small and largely offsetti ng under our base

17、li ne outlook.The new admi ni strati on i s li kely to announce the Chi na and auto tari ffs 1We aggregate global GDP growth usi ng market exchange rates.I f we used purchasi ng power pari ty rates,as the I MF does,our esti mates would be about 0.5pp hi gher.Exhibit 1:We Expect New Tariffs on China,

18、Reduced Net Immigrat ion,Modest New Tax Cut s,and a More Relaxed Regulat ory St ance in t he Second Trump Administ rat ion ScenarioTradeImmigrationFiscalRegulationPost-Election Policy Changes Risk CasesBase Case Net immigration slows to 750k/year in response to increased funding and tighter enforcem

19、ent Tariffs on China:New tariffs up to 60%,averaging to a 20pp increase in the effective tariffrate and mostly reflecting new tariffs on list 1-3 items from the 2018-2019 trade war Tariffs on the EU:22.5pp increase in the effective tariff rate on autos Tariffs on Mexico:97.5pp increase in tariffs on

20、 imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles Overall:3.4pp increase in the effective tariff rate for US imports Full extension of expiring tax cuts in early 2025 Expand SALT deduction($30bn/yr)Exclude extra 50%overtime from income tax($20bn/yr)Exclude tips from income tax($10bn/yr)Lower corporate tax

21、for domestic manufacturersto 15%($25bn/yr)Reinstate more generous corporate incentives,(e.g.,100%bonus depreciation,R&D expensing,and interest deductibility;$60bn/yr)Allow enhanced ACA subsidies to expire(-$20bn/yr)Limitations on green subsidies(-$15bn/yr)Antitrust:Enforcement eases somewhat,though

22、major pending tech sector cases proceed Energy:Easier approval of energy projects,expanding LNG exports,and reversing restrictions on greenhouse gas emission Financial:Near-term easing of regulatory burden on consumer finance companies,medium-term easing of capital and liquidity requirements More br

23、oad-based tariffs:A 10pp surcharge on all imports(40%chance),or a tariff on all auto imports Revoking Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China(requires legislative action)Selective deportation of immigrants with criminalrecords(up to 1.2mn individuals)Forced deportations along the lines of Eisenh

24、ower model that removes up to 2.1mn individualsSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 2Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analystrelati vely soon after the January 20 i naugurati on,whi ch could also fuel uncertai nty about broader tari ff measures among busi nesses and marke

25、t parti ci pants.These tari ffs would result i n a modest hi t to real di sposable personal i ncome vi a hi gher consumer pri ces,and the broader uncertai nty of how much further the trade war mi ght escalate i s li kely to wei gh on busi ness i nvestment.The result i s a net drag averagi ng 0.2pp i

26、 n 2025.Assumi ng that the trade war does not escalate further,we expect the posi ti ve i mpulses from tax cuts,a fri endli er regulatory envi ronment,and i mproved“ani mal spi ri ts”among busi nesses to domi nate i n 2026,wi th a net boost to growth averagi ng 0.3pp.I n our tari ff ri sk case,by co

27、ntrast,the modest negati ve i mpulse from the Chi na and auto tari ffs gi ves way to a bi gger negati ve i mpulse from the across-the-board tari ff,both because the hi t to real i ncome i ncreases and because trade poli cy uncertai nty bui lds further.I n 2026,thi s results i n a net drag on growth

28、averagi ng 1.0pp and peaki ng at 1.2pp,although the peak drag decli nes to 0.8pp i f we assume that the i ncreased tari ff revenue i s fully recycled i nto tax cuts.Exhibit 2:We Expect a Small Hit t o Growt h in 2025 and a Moderat e Boost t o Growt h in 2026 Under Our Baseline Policy Assumpt ions-1.

29、0-0.50.00.51.01.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.5Jan-25Apr-25Jul-25Oct-25Jan-26Apr-26Jul-26Oct-26Jan-27Apr-27Jul-27Oct-27Consumption&Govt.Spending Fiscal EffectInvestment,FCI&Animal SpiritsTariff EffectImmigration EffectTotalPercentagepointsPercentagepointsImpact on US Year-over-Year RealGDP Growth,GS BaselineS

30、ource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 3Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analyst.And It s Effect s on Europe and China The growth hi t from US trade poli cy i s greater elsewhere.One key findi ng i n our research on tari ffs i s the i mportant i mpact of trade poli cy uncert

31、ai nty(TPU)on growth i n the Euro area.The left chart i n Exhi bi t 4 summari zes research suggesti ng that a ri se i n TPU to the peak levels of the 2018-19 trade war would subtract 0.3%from GDP i n the US but as much as 0.9%i n the Euro area.Moreover,the ri ght chart shows that trade poli cy uncer

32、tai nty(measured vi a menti ons i n corporate earni ngs reports)has already ri sen much more i n the Euro area than i n the US.We therefore cut our 2025 Euro area growth forecast on the back of the US electi on results by 0.5pp on a Q4/Q4 basi s and would li kely cut i t further i f the US i mposes

33、an across-the-board tari ff.Exhibit 3:We See a Bigger Hit t o Growt h Under an Added 10%Across-t he-Board Tariff Impact of Post-Election Policy Changes on US Year-over-Year Real GDP Growth-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.0-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.0Jan-25Apr-25Jul-25Oct-25Jan-26Apr-26Jul-26Oct-26Ja

34、n-27Apr-27Jul-27Oct-27Consumption&Govt.Spending Fiscal EffectInvestment,FCI&Animal SpiritsTariff EffectImmigration EffectTotalPercentagepointsPercentagepointsGS Baseline+10%Across-the-Board Tariff-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.0-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.0Jan-25Apr-25Jul-25Oct-25Jan-26Apr-26Jul-26

35、Oct-26Jan-27Apr-27Jul-27Oct-27Consumption&Govt.Spending Fiscal EffectInvestment,FCI&Animal SpiritsTariff EffectImmigration EffectTotalPercentagepointsPercentagepointsGS Baseline+10%Across-the-Board Tariff,With Tax CutsSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchExhibit 4:Hist orical Evidence a

36、nd Recent Trends Suggest Trade Policy Uncert aint y Will Disproport ionat ely Weigh on Euro Area GDP Source:LSEG Dat a&Anal yt i cs,GS Dat a Works,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 4Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystThe i mpact i s more di rect i n Chi na,whi ch wi ll a

37、lmost certai nly face tari ff i ncreases that we expect wi ll reach up to 60pp and average 20pp across all exports to the US.As shown i n Exhi bi t 5,we esti mate that the US tari ff i ncrease i n our baseli ne scenari o wi ll subtract almost 0.7pp from Chi na growth i n 2025.Assumi ng that Chi nese

38、 poli cymakers provi de macro sti mulus and some of the growth hi t i s offset by RMB depreci ati on,we have cut our 2025 growth forecast more modestly,by 0.2pp on net to 4.5%.However,we would li kely make larger downgrades i f the trade war were to escalate further,ei ther wi th an across-the-board

39、 tari ff or more aggressi ve Chi na-speci fic measures such as an end to permanent normal trade relati ons(PNTR)between the US and Chi na.Exhibit 5:The US Tariff Increase Would Subt ract 0.7pp From Chinese Growt h in 2025 123412341234202420252026-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.0-1.0-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.0TotalPer

40、centage pointsPercentagepointsEffect of the Trade War on China Quarter-over-QuarterAnnualized Real GDP Growth,GS Baseline Net TradeTrade Policy UncertaintyFCIReal IncomeSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchWe also expect a drag from US trade poli cy i n other economi es,wi th larger dra

41、gs i n more trade-exposed economi es and potenti al boosts i n certai n EMs that are well posi ti oned to gai n export share i f trade shi fts away from Chi na(e.g.,Mexi co and Vi etnam).Overall,we esti mate changes to US trade poli cy wi ll subtract 0.4%from global GDP,although i ncreased poli cy s

42、upport should dampen thi s hi t.The i mpact could be 2-3 ti mes larger i f the US i mposes a 10%across-the-board tari ff.Modest Price Boost s from Tariffs Hi gher tari ffs wi ll also rai se US i nflati on,at least i n the short term.The experi ence of the first Trump admi ni strati on shows that tar

43、i ffs are largely passed on to consumer pri ces.Thi s i s vi si ble i n the fact that pri ces i n tari ffed PCE categori es rose by almost exactly the tari ff amount,whi le pri ces i n non-tari ffed categori es remai ned on thei r pri or trend(Exhi bi t 6).14 November 2024 5Goldman SachsGlobal Econo

44、mi cs AnalystI f tari ffs are confined to Chi na and autos from Europe and Mexi co,thi s analysi s i mpli es that the US i nflati on i mpact wi ll be a relati vely modest 0.3-0.4pp,as shown i n Exhi bi t 7.I f we add a broader 10%across-the-board tari ff,the i mpact ri ses to almost 1.2pp.Barri ng s

45、i gni ficant second-round effects vi a expectati ons or wages,however,tari ff effects are pri ce level effects,so the i nflati on i mpact subsi des i n 2026-2027.Outsi de the US,i nflati on effects should be mi nor even under our assumpti on of full retali ati on.Anot her Solid Year for Global Growt

46、 h The upshot i s that,barri ng a broader trade war,poli cy changes i n the second Trump admi ni strati on are unli kely to change the broad contours of our global economi c vi ews.Exhibit 6:Tariffs Boost ed Consumer Prices During t he Last Trade War Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal

47、Invest ment ResearchExhibit 7:We Expect a Modest 0.3-0.4pp Boost t o US Core PCE Inflat ion Under Our Baseline Tariff Assumpt ions,Wit h a Larger Impact Under a Broader 10%Across-t he-Board Tariff Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 6Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Anal

48、ystAs shown i n Exhi bi t 8,we expect global growth to average 2.7%i n 2025,nearly the same pace as i n 2024 and sli ghtly above consensus.Relati ve to consensus,we are opti mi sti c i n the US and pessi mi sti c i n the Euro area,wi th other maj or economi es i n between.A key reason for opti mi sm

49、 on global growth i s the dramati c i nflati on decli ne over the past two years.Thi s di rectly supports real i ncome because pri ce i nflati on has fallen far more qui ckly than wage i nflati on,whi ch i s sti ll elevated as workers make up for the real wage losses they suffered i n the early post

50、-pandemi c years.The resulti ng strength i n real hourly wages has helped real di sposable household i ncome grow 3-4%over the past year across the maj or advanced economi es,a pace that i s li kely to moderate i n Europe but should remai n strong i n the US and Canada i n 2025(Exhi bi t 9).Exhibit

51、8:Solid Global Growt h,wit h US Out performance Relat ive t o Consensus PotentialGSGSGSGS2.82.72.51.92.32.02.42.10.80.70.81.21.01.40.61.0Germany-0.1-0.10.30.80.81.30.20.8France1.11.10.71.01.01.20.81.0Italy0.50.80.61.00.91.00.60.8Spain3.02.82.02.21.51.81.71.7-0.20.01.21.21.11.01.00.70.91.01.31.31.31.

52、51.21.41.11.11.91.82.02.22.02.11.21.21.82.02.52.52.02.64.94.84.54.54.04.13.94.16.77.06.36.76.76.56.06.23.13.02.02.02.32.03.02.13.53.51.21.62.11.42.32.32.72.72.72.62.62.62.52.5ConsensusNote:All forecasts calculated on calendar year basis.IMF forecasts used for India 2026 consensus when quarters not a

53、vailable in Bloomberg.Potential refers to GS estimates of potential growth for 2025.Global growth aggregates use market FX country weights and China NSA year-over-year growth.Q4/Q42024.2025GSAnnual Average2026BrazilRussiaWorldCanadaChinaIndiaAustraliaEuro AreaJapanUKUS2025.ConsensusReal GDP GrowthPe

54、rcent Change yoyConsensusSource:Bl oomberg,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 7Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystNone of thi s explai ns why real GDP i s growi ng so much faster i n the US than i n other advanced economi es.The answer,i nstead,i s found on the supply si

55、de.Followi ng the recent revi si ons to the US nati onal accounts,labor producti vi ty i n the US has grown at a 1.7%annuali zed rate si nce late 2019,a clear accelerati on from the pre-pandemi c trend of 1.3%.By contrast,labor producti vi ty i n the Euro area has grown at a 0.2%annuali zed Exhibit

56、9:Real Income Growt h Should Remain Firm in 2025 Due t o St rong Real Wage Growt h Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchJust as i mportantly,the i nflati on decli ne also i ndi rectly supports demand by allowi ng central banks to normali ze monetary poli cy and thereb

57、y ease financi al condi ti ons.Under the si mpli fyi ng assumpti on that our financi al condi ti ons i ndi ces remai n at thei r latest spot level,we esti mate a posi ti ve i mpulse to growth of about 0.2pp across the G10 economi es over the next four quarters(Exhi bi t 10).I f financi al condi ti o

58、ns ease further on the back of soli d global growth and central bank poli cy rate cuts,the posi ti ve i mpulse would be greater.Exhibit 10:Rat e Cut s and Financial Condit ions Easing Should Support Growt h in 2025 97.598.098.599.099.5100.0100.5101.097.598.098.599.099.5100.0100.5101.0201820192020202

59、12022202320242025IndexIndexGS DM Financial Conditions IndexTighteningNote:We consider a GDP-weighted average(market FX)of the US,the Euro area,Japan,the UK,Canada,Australia,Sweden,Norway,Switzerland,and New Zealand.-1.50-1.25-1.00-0.75-0.50-0.250.000.250.50-1.50-1.25-1.00-0.75-0.50-0.250.000.250.501

60、234123412341232022202320242025PercentagepointsPercentagepointsImpulse of GS FCI on Quarter-over-QuarterAnnualized Real DM GDP GrowthNote:The standard impulses assume that the FCI stays flat following 13th Nov.Weconsider a GDP-weighted average(market FX)of the US,the Euro area,Japan,the UK,Canada,Aus

61、tralia,Sweden,Norway,Switzerland,and New Zealand.Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 8Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analystrate over the same peri od,a clear decelerati on from an already-medi ocre 0.7%before the pandemi c.Other advanced economi es have shown si mi la

62、rly lackluster trends(Exhi bi t 11).We expect US producti vi ty growth to remai n si gni ficantly stronger than elsewhere,and thi s i s a key reason why we expect US GDP growth to conti nue to outperform.Remember Bumpy Disinflat ion?We have revi sed up our core PCE i nflati on forecast for late 2025

63、 to 2.4%,from 2.0%before the electi on.Moreover,the ri sks are ti lted to the hi gh si de because of the ri sk of a broader trade war.An across-the-board tari ff of 10%on top of the Chi na and auto tari ffs would li kely rai se core i nflati on to 3.1%i n early 2026(Exhi bi t 12).Exhibit 11:Product

64、ivit y Growt h Has Out performed in t he US,Underperformed Elsewhere Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 9Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystEven our revi sed US i nflati on forecast i s qui te beni gn,at least i n the baseli ne.Thi s i s partly j

65、 ust an extrapolati on of recent trends.Although core i nflati on i s sti ll modestly above target,at least on a year-on-year basi s,both headli ne i nflati on and 3-month annuali zed core i nflati on are close to(and i n several cases below)target across most maj or DM economi es.Australi a i s a h

66、i gh-si de outli er,but i ts worth rememberi ng that the RBA pursues a hi gher 2-3%i nflati on target vs.2%for most other central banks(Exhi bi t 13).There are also strong fundamental reasons to expect core i nflati on progress to conti nue.Asi de from a di rect tari ff boost i n the US,core goods i

67、 nflati on should remai n low due to Exhibit 12:China(and Aut o)Tariffs Would Modest ly Delay Disinflat ion,But a Broad 10%Tariff Would Cause Reaccelerat ion Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchExhibit 13:Inflat ion Has Already Ret urned Close t o Target Across DMs Source:Haver Anal yt

68、 i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 10Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analystconti nued growth i n Chi nese exports and i nventory normali zati on i n Europe.Meanwhi le,shelter i nflati on should conti nue to cool,parti cularly i n the US where market rent i ndi cators h

69、ave looked beni gn for nearly two years but the offici al measures are only gradually catchi ng up wi th reali ty(Exhi bi t 14).Most i mportantly,servi ces ex energy and housi ngwhi ch make up well over half of the core i ndi cesare parti cularly sensi ti ve to labor costs.I t i s therefore reassuri

70、 ng that a broad set of labor market ti ghtness measures across advanced economi es have returned to pre-pandemi c levels.For now,wage growth remai ns somewhat above the pace compati ble wi th target-consi stent i nflati on assumi ng producti vi ty grows i n li ne wi th the long-term trend.However,m

71、uch of the remai ni ng gap reflects lags i n the catch-up of negoti ated wages to the earli er pri ce surge,and we expect steady further wage di si nflati on i n 2025(Exhi bi t 15).Exhibit 14:Core Goods Inflat ion Has Eased and Should Remain Subdued;Shelt er Inflat ion Should Cont inue t o Trend Dow

72、n Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 11Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystThus,both the recent numbers and the fundamentals poi nt to further across-the-board di si nflati on,as shown i n Exhi bi t 16.Whi le we expect the Euro area and Canada to

73、return fully to 2%by late 2025,the US,the UK,and Australi a are li kely to cluster around 2%,wi th addi ti onal decli nes i n 2026 li kely.The i nflati on surge of 2021-2022 i s now firmly i n the rearvi ew mi rror.Furt her Gradual Rat e Cut s Ahead Agai nst thi s backdrop,we do not expect the US el

74、ecti on outcome to derai l the poli cy normali zati on process that i s currently underway,and see most maj or central banks easi ng si gni ficantly further through 2025.Exhibit 15:Core Services Inflat ion and Wage Growt h Progress Should Cont inue Wit h Labor Market s Most ly Rebalanced Source:Have

75、r Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchExhibit 16:We Expect Disinflat ion t o Cont inue Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 12Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystWe forecast that the Fed wi ll cut to 3.25-3.5%wi th sequenti al mo

76、ves through Q1 and a slowdown thereafter.I f anythi ng,the threat of a near-term growth drag from tari ffs and the Fed leadershi ps conti nued preference for frontloaded poli cy normali zati on have strengthened our confidence i n sequenti al cuts through early next year.Whi le the pace after Q1 and

77、 ulti mate stoppi ng poi ntwhi ch may depend on the Feds wi lli ngness to respond preempti vely to future i nflati on boosts from Presi dent-elect Trumps poli ci esadmi ttedly remai n uncertai n,our baseli ne and probabi li ty-wei ghted Fed forecasts are meani ngfully more dovi sh than current marke

78、t pri ci ng(Exhi bi t 17).Exhi bi t 18 shows our poli cy forecasts for other DMs.I n the Euro area,we conti nue to expect sequenti al ECB cuts and have lowered our termi nal forecast to 1.75%on the back of our growth downgrade.I n the UK,we are rai si ng our BoE forecast to reflect a better growth o

79、utlook followi ng a more expansi onary Autumn Budget,and now expect quarterly cuts back to 3.75%by end-2025 and a termi nal rate of 3.25%i n 2026Q2.We conti nue to see ri sks of faster UK cuts i f near-term growth di sappoi nts,however,and our termi nal rate forecast remai ns well below market pri c

80、i ng.We generally expect more aggressi ve cuts i n smaller DM central banks where i nflati on progress i s even more convi nci ng and unemployment rates have ri sen more meani ngfully.The BoC,RBNZ,and Ri ksbank have already deli vered 50bp cuts,and we anti ci pate the BoC,RBNZ,and SNB wi ll each cut

81、 by 50bp at thei r next meeti ngs.The excepti on among smaller DMs i s Australi a,where we conti nue to expect quarterly rate cuts starti ng i n February.But even here we see ri sks as skewed dovi sh gi ven that growth remai ns weak and i nflati on i ndi cators arent that di fferent from other DMs w

82、here cutti ng cycles are well underway.Exhibit 17:Our Fed Scenarios Suggest Risks Around Our Fed Forecast Are Skewed Dovish Relat ive t o Market Pricing s ri*This is the probability of a recession happening at any point over the horizon shown above.Our 12-month recession probability is 15%.012345670

83、1234567Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26Jul-26Fed Funds Rate Scenario AnalysisHigher Inflation/Tariffs/Higher Terminal Rate(25%)GS Baseline(50%)Recession Cuts(25%)*PercentPercent0123456701234567Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24Jan-25Jul-25Jan-26Jul-26Fed Funds RateGS Baseline PathGS Probability-Weig

84、hted Average PathMarket PricingPercentPercentSource:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 13Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystWe see si gni ficant room for monetary easi ng i n EMs as well gi ven that poli cy rates remai n far above neutral(Exhi bi t 19).Thi s i s especi al

85、ly true i n Lati n Ameri ca and CEEMEA,but we also expect rate cuts to broaden i n Asi a over the next few quarters.The mai n excepti on to our forecast for EM rate cuts i s Brazi l,where we anti ci pate an overheated economy wi ll prompt another 150bp i n rate hi kes through 2025Q1(to 12.75%)follow

86、ed by 125bp i n rate cuts(to 11.50%)by end-2025.Our EM poli cy rate forecasts are qui te dovi sh relati ve to market pri ci ng.The mai n outli er to our forecast for steady rate cuts i s Japan.A pi ckup i n i nflati on and wage growth after three decades of anemi c pri ce pressures allowed the BoJ t

87、o exi t negati ve i nterest rate poli cy i n March and hi ke agai n i n July.We are i ncreasi ngly Exhibit 18:We Expect Rat e Cut s t o Cont inue,Wit h Larger St eps in Smaller DMs Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchExhibit 19:High Real Rat es Leave Room for Significant EM Easing Sour

88、ce:Haver Anal yt i cs,Bl oomberg,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 14Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analystconfident lowflati on ri sks are behi nd us and rate hi kes wi ll conti nue.Wage growth should remai n firm(we forecast a 3-3.5%base pay i ncrease i n spri ng 2025s sh

89、unto wage negoti ati ons)and i s i ncreasi ngly correlated wi th pri ce i ncreases,suggesti ng that a vi rtuous wage-pri ce spi ral that wi ll help anchor i nflati on expectati ons has emerged.I n addi ti on,demand looks more robust and poli cy space has i ncreased relati ve to the recent past,sugge

90、sti ng less downsi de i nflati on ri sk i n the event that acti vi ty weakens.We expect that new core CPI (ex fresh food and energy)wi ll i ncrease by 2.1%year-over-year i n 2025 and 2.0%i n 2026 on an annual average basi s,a target-consi stent pace that supports our forecast for 25bp semi-annual hi

91、 kes to 0.75%by end-2025 and a termi nal rate of 1.5%i n 2027(Exhi bi t 20).Exhibit 20:Fading Risks of Lowflat ion Increase Our Confidence t hat t he BoJ Will Gradually Normalize Policy Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 15Goldman SachsGlobal Econom

92、i cs AnalystBet t er US Growt h but Bet t er Market Pricing Our baseli ne economi c forecast for steady growth,cooli ng i nflati on,and further non-recessi onary rate cuts,as well as poli ci es that could be helpful to corporate earni ngs,represents a fri endly ri sk asset backdrop for 2025.Thi s vi

93、 ew,alongsi de our economi c forecast for conti nued US outperformance i s reflected by our baseli ne 2025 market forecasts.A key challenge,however,i s that markets have already moved a long way to pri ce thi s ki nd of outlook.Our US growth vi ew i s once agai n well above the consensus forecast.Bu

94、t both ahead of and si nce the electi on,i nvestors have sharply upgraded the US growth vi ews embedded i n assets,pushi ng US equi ti es and the USD to fresh hi ghs and wi deni ng the gap between US and European bond yi elds(Exhi bi t 21).We thi nk our baseli ne forecasts sti ll j usti fy hi gher e

95、qui ty pri ces and further USD outperformance,but that j udgment i s more finely balanced than i t was.As US markets take more credi t for favorable poli ci es up front,the ri sk of ulti mate di sappoi ntment wi ll ri se.Because the market has moved much closer to our central case,our forecasts for

96、many key assets are not far from current levels.The modest posi ti ve returns that we expect for many assets come more from the yi eld or carry than a bi g shi ft i n spot pri ces.Thi s means that the i nvesti ng backdrop i s li kely to depend on the di stri buti on around that base case even more t

97、han usual.The US electi on outcome wi dens the di stri buti on of poli cy shi fts.The core challenge conti nues to i nvolve mai ntai ni ng some exposure to a robust US economi c outlook,whi le protecti ng agai nst the key tai l ri sks.Tail Risks Now a Crit ical Focus The potenti al for a broader tra

98、de war looms large among those tai ls.The narrowly focused tari ffs that feature i n our baseli ne scenari o are li kely to be less di srupti ve both to the US economi c pi cture and to Chi nas trade and markets,gi ven the experi ence si nce the first round of tari ffs i n 2018-2019 and Chi nas redu

99、ced trade exposure to the US.As i n 2019,the actual announcement of tari ffs could sti ll move markets,i ncludi ng Exhibit 21:Market Pricing Has Shift ed Towards Our More Posit ive US Growt h View*GS USD trade-weighted index.*GS USD Trade Weighted Index.4.4%6.2%-2.5%11.9%2.1%3.5%-2.7%4.8%68bp81bp25b

100、p11bp18bp-3bp-250255075100-505101520USD TWIS&P 500Eurostoxx50US Cyclicalsvs.DefensivesUS 2yYieldUS 10yYieldGermany10y YieldSeptember FOMCElectionPercentBasis pointsChange in Market Pricing Since:Right axisLeft axisSource:Bl oomberg,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 16Goldma

101、n SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystChi nas currency.But expectati ons of acti on on thi s front are hi gh and markets are relati vely well-prepared for these outcomes.We thi nk the i mpact of a broader across-the-board tari ff i s underpri ced,parti cularly for i ts potenti al i mpact on Europe and som

102、e non-Chi na EM economi es(the i ncremental pressure on Chi na should be relati vely smaller gi ven that tari ffs are already expected).We thi nk a firmer shi ft i n thi s di recti on could lead to meani ngful further USD upsi de(Exhi bi t 22)and add to downward pressure on non-US equi ti es and bon

103、d yi elds.Our baseli ne forecast i s already one i n whi ch European GDP growth i s below consensus and European yi elds and EUR/USD decli ne further.A broader trade war would add to those pressures.The i mpact on US markets i s less certai n,but we thi nk across-the-board tari ffs and the threat of

104、 retali atory acti on could wei gh on US equi ti es too and mi ght ulti mately push US yi elds lower,as i t di d i n 2019.Exhibit 22:Market s Do Not Seem t o Have Priced t he Risk of Broader Tariffs Yet Source:Bl oomberg,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchI n other areas,we thi nk the ri sks

105、 are more balanced.The US electi on has clearly i ncreased the possi bi li ty of addi ti onal fiscal expansi on and fresh focus on the sustai nabi li ty of the US publi c debt profile.But our central scenari o of only modest fiscal sti mulus makes us more skepti cal that we wi ll see a sharp i ncrea

106、se i n fiscal ri sk premi um i n US Treasury markets.Even i n the UK,where the market has worri ed more i n the li ght of the recent budget,we would look to fade those ri sks i n both rates and currency markets.Gi ven our robust US growth vi ews,the bi gger upsi de ri sk may si mply be an earli er s

107、toppi ng poi nt to the Fed easi ng cycle,whi ch could prompt markets to j udge that the neutral rate i s hi gher than we are assumi ng.I t i s only i n Japan where our baseli ne poli cy path li es well above the market and where we expect bonds to underperform.Near-term i nflati on ri sks are also t

108、wo-si ded,after a sharp move hi gher i n market pri ci ng of US i nflati on over the next couple of years.Short-dated US i nflati on swaps are pri ced well above our US i nflati on forecast,so we thi nk thi s i s one area of the market that already reflects a meani ngful chance of broader trade ri s

109、ks.Oi l market tai ls li e i n both di recti ons too.I n our baseli ne forecast,we expect Brent 14 November 2024 17Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analystpri ces to stay i n a$70-$85/bbl range.But the ri sks of breaki ng that range are growi ng.I n the short term,the new admi ni strati on rai ses the

110、 ri sks to I rani an supply,whi ch have already been elevated due to I srael-I ran confli ct.That upsi de tai l ri sk adds to the value of commodi ty longs i n a portfoli o context.We thi nk the medi um-term ri sks,however,skew to the downsi de of our forecast range.That i s both because ample suppl

111、y i s sti ll bei ng kept off the market whi ch could begi n to find i ts way back i nto the system i n 2025,but also because broader-based tari ff acti on could hurt global demand.I n those scenari os,oi l pri ces mi ght agai n become a tai lwi nd for di si nflati on trends.High Valuat ions Fat t en

112、 t he Downside Hi gh valuati ons rei nforce the i mportance of focusi ng on these tai l ri sks.US equi ty valuati ons are now at levels that have not been exceeded i n the post-war era except i n the late 1990s.Some of the recent upli ft comes on expectati ons that upcomi ng poli ci es wi ll boost a

113、fter-tax earni ngs.But even adj usti ng for thi s,US equi ty valuati ons look hi stori cally hi gh(Exhi bi t 23).Credi t spreads too are near thei r hi stori cal lows,and even those segments of the market that were pri ci ng more elevated ri sk premi um have now compressed.As our Portfoli o Strategy

114、 team recently showed,the long-term expected returns from equi ti es now look low as a result(they esti mate 3%nomi nal returns over the next decade when accounti ng for the ri sks from unusually hi gh market concentrati on).As a result,prospecti ve returns on government bonds and credi t on that lo

115、nger hori zon look relati vely better,reflecti ng hi stori cally low levels of the Equi ty Ri sk Premi um and Equi ty-Credi t Premi um.Exhibit 23:Equit y Earnings“Yield”Is Low vs.Hist ory Source:Haver Anal yt i cs,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment ResearchRi ch valuati ons are not an obstacle to fu

116、rther equi ty gai ns i f the cycli cal tai lwi nds are powerful,as we have seen already i n 2024.For US equi ti es,we find that the pri ce for hi gher valuati ons i s often pai d di sproporti onately when the cycle deteri orates(Exhi bi t 24).Our baseli ne forecast means that challenge wi ll most li

117、 kely be avoi ded i n 2025.But i f growth ri sks do ri se more sharply than we anti ci pate,equi ty downsi de could be faster and deeper than normal.The sharp drops i n ri sk assets,and spi kes i n volati li ty,i n early 14 November 2024 18Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystAugust may be a harbi

118、nger of that ki nd of sensi ti vi ty.That fatter downsi de tai l also hi ghli ghts the i mportance of keepi ng an eye on another ki nd of“valuati on challenge”the poi nt at whi ch our more opti mi sti c macro forecasts seem fully reflected i n assets.As i n 2024,we are li kely to push harder on our

119、asset vi ews when the market i s clearly i n doubt about elements of our macro pi cture.Maint ain Exposure,Limit Tails Although markets have already moved to reflect key elements of our macro vi ew,we sti ll forecast modest posi ti ve returns across the key asset classes(Exhi bi t 25).US growth resi

120、 li ence should sti ll support outperformance of US equi ti es and underperformance of US bonds,alongsi de some further expected upsi de to the US dollar.Gi ven subdued valuati ons,EM equi ti es are li kely to outperform fixed i ncome.And whi le EM hard currency fixed i ncome should prove more defen

121、si ve than local currency i n a strong USD envi ronment,local currency assets have more scope to perform i f the tai ls are avoi ded.Commodi ty markets should conti nue to benefit from a posi ti ve roll return,wi th lower contri buti on from pri ce shi fts.Exhibit 24:Richer Valuat ions Make Equit y

122、Market s More Vulnerable t o Cyclical Det eriorat ion Source:Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 November 2024 19Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystThe key challenge i s to mai ntai n exposure to these themes,whi le li mi ti ng the maj or tai l ri sks.Di versi ficati on can help address

123、 some of these challenges.The ongoi ng decli ne i n i nflati on across a range of economi es i n 2024 has allowed central banks,i ncludi ng the Fed,to focus more on the ri sks to growth.We see ri sks from both growth and i nflati on/poli cy shocks,parti cularly i n the next few months as the Trump p

124、oli cy agenda takes shape.But although the market may sti ll osci llate between these di fferent ri sks,we thi nk the correlati on of bonds and equi ti es i s more li kely to dri ft lower than hi gher over the medi um term.Thi s means that US Treasuri es,and even more so Bunds and Gi lts,can sti ll

125、play an i mportant di versi fyi ng role i n portfoli os.TI PS too look appeali ng si nce real yi elds have room to fall i f growth di sappoi nts,but i nflati on protecti on remai ns valuable.Broadeni ng US equi ty exposure towards mi d-cap equi ti es or a more equal-wei ghted allocati on may mi ti g

126、ate concentrati on and valuati on ri sks.Long USD posi ti ons should also provi de protecti on agai nst both US rate upsi de and broadeni ng tari ff ri sks,rei nforci ng the case for US i nvestors to keep hedgi ng thei r overseas bonds(and equi ty)exposures.As i n 2024,we thi nk there are strong arg

127、uments for usi ng opti ons to provi de protecti on agai nst macro tai ls.Equi ty volati li ty has fallen post-electi on and thi s makes i t easi er to gai n upsi de exposure to US assets through call opti ons agai n.Deeper downsi de exposure(i ncludi ng i n European equi ti es whi ch are vulnerable

128、to some key ri sks)also looks more attracti vely pri ced.Long USD opti onali ty remai ns appeali ng(especi ally agai nst EUR,CAD,SGD and KRW),whi le upsi de i n gold and oi l can sti ll protect agai nst some key tai ls.Some assets could also benefit i f US poli cy ri sks fai l to materi ali ze.I n 2

129、017,the first year of the first Trump admi ni strati on,EM stocks and currenci es ulti mately outperformed.A more restrai ned US fiscal i mpulse,or a more narrowly focused trade agenda,could agai n provi de reli ef to parts of the EM uni verse where those ri sks have been most clearly reflected.Some

130、 exposure to that ki nd of upsi de may be useful too.The wi der range of potenti al market outcomes means that any decli nes i n volati li ty Exhibit 25:We Forecast Modest Posit ive Ret urns Across Key Asset Classes Source:Dat ast ream,Bl oomberg,Gol dman Sachs Gl obal Invest ment Research14 Novembe

131、r 2024 20Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs Analystacross assets i n 2025 are li kely to be opportuni ti es to add hedges.14 November 2024 21Goldman SachsGlobal Economi cs AnalystDi sclosure Appendi x Reg AC We,Jan Hatzi us,Domi ni c Wi lson,Joseph Bri ggs,Vi cki e Chang,Gi ovanni Pi erdomeni co,Sarah D

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192、we descri be.Any tradi ng recommendati on i n thi s research relati ng to an equi ty or credi t securi ty or securi ti es wi thi n an i ndustry or sector i s reflecti ve of the i nvestment theme bei ng di scussed and i s not a recommendati on of any such securi ty i n i solati on.Thi s research i s

193、not an offer to sell or the soli ci tati on of an offer to buy any securi ty i n any j uri sdi cti on where such an offer or soli ci tati on would be i llegal.I t does not consti tute a personal recommendati on or take i nto account the parti cular i nvestment obj ecti ves,financi al si tuati ons,or

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196、on the value or pri ce of,or i ncome deri ved from,certai n i nvestments.Certai n transacti ons,i ncludi ng those i nvolvi ng futures,opti ons,and other deri vati ves,gi ve ri se to substanti al ri sk and are not sui table for all i nvestors.I nvestors should revi ew current opti ons and futures di

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