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1、Risks andResilience inGlobalTradeKEY TRENDS IN2023-2024Risks and Resilience in Global TradeKEY TRENDS IN 20232024This document,as well as any data and map included herein,are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty overany territory,to the delimitation of international frontiers and bounda

2、ries and to the name of any territory,city or area.The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities.The use ofsuch data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements inthe Wes

3、t Bank under the terms of international law.Note by the Republic of TrkiyeThe information in this document with reference to“Cyprus”relates to the southern part of the Island.There is no singleauthority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island.Trkiye recognises the Turkish Re

4、public ofNorthern Cyprus(TRNC).Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations,Trkiyeshall preserve its position concerning the“Cyprus issue”.Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European UnionThe Republic of Cyprus is recognised b

5、y all members of the United Nations with the exception of Trkiye.Theinformation in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.Please cite this publication as:OECD(2024),Risks and Resilience in Global Trade:Key Trends in 2023-2024,OECD Pu

6、blishing,Paris,https:/doi.org/10.1787/1c66c439-en.ISBN 978-92-64-32701-6(print)ISBN 978-92-64-59178-3(PDF)ISBN 978-92-64-51725-7(HTML)Photo credits:Cover bartuchnayahoo.pl/S.Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found at:https:/www.oecd.org/en/publications/support/corrigenda.html.OECD 2024 Attribut

7、ion 4.0 International(CC BY 4.0)This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence.By using this work,you accept to be bound by the terms of this licence(https:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Attribution you must cite the work.Translations you must ci

8、te the original work,identify changes to the original and add the following text:In the event of any discrepancy between the original work and the translation,only the text of original work should be considered valid.Adaptations you must cite the original work and add the following text:This is an a

9、daptation of an original work by the OECD.The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this adaptation should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its Member countries.Third-party material the licence does not apply to third-party material in the work.If using suc

10、h material,you are responsible for obtaining permission from the third party and for any claims of infringement.You must not use the OECD logo,visual identity or cover image without express permission or suggest the OECD endorses your use of the work.Any dispute arising under this licence shall be s

11、ettled by arbitration in accordance with the Permanent Court of Arbitration(PCA)Arbitration Rules 2012.The seat of arbitration shall be Paris(France).The number of arbitrators shall be one.3 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Foreword Since 2020,international trade has been significantly

12、 impacted by multiple,overlapping shocks that continue to reshape global trading patterns.The COVID-19 pandemics initial wave of restrictions shut down many economies,abruptly shifting consumption from services to goods and causing widespread disruptions across supply chains and transportation netwo

13、rks.As economies began to recover,pent-up demand stemming from the COVID-19 period added further pressure on already strained supply chains.At the same time,new challenges soon emerged including the ongoing Russian Federations(hereafter,Russia)war of aggression against Ukraine and associated sanctio

14、ns against Russia,increasing trade tensions between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China(hereafter,China),and the crisis in the Middle East and the Red Sea further disrupting trade flows and adding uncertainty to markets.It was during the COVD-19 recovery that international trade and

15、trade policy community recognised the need for timely information on these rapidly evolving trade patterns and this is when the OECD launched its first in a series of annual reports monitoring the rapid developments in global trade.These updates provide essential analysis of the impacts of these unp

16、recedented disruptions on the international trading system.Using high-frequency,detailed data and advanced modelling tools,past reports in this series have offered insights into the ongoing recovery from the pandemic and highlighted the trade implications of the Russias war of aggression against Ukr

17、aine.As the fourth report in this series,this update on international trade developments continues to monitor important trends in international trade amidst the aftermath of the pandemic and recent escalations in geopolitical tensions,such as changes in aggregate trade flows,trading patterns at the

18、product and partner level and international commodity prices.In addition,this report includes an overview of maritime routes and choke points and discusses how recent disruptions in key maritime routes may have impacted shipping costs and global trade overall.In the context of recent concerns and te

19、nsions over growing trade dependencies in the electric vehicles market(EVs),the report also examines the evolution in the global concentration of trade in EVs and EV batteries,critical components in the green transition,with long,complex supply chains which are increasingly targeted by industrial an

20、d trade policies.This OECD update on international trade developments serves as a critical resource for understanding current shifts in the trade landscape.It informs policy discussions and contributes to broader trade-related research,helping stakeholders navigate a rapidly evolving global trade en

21、vironment by providing analyses on both the risks and resilience of global trade.4 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Acknowledgements This report was prepared by Christine Arriola,Dylan Bourny,Charles Cadestin,Claire de Maricourt,and Przemyslaw Kowalski.The authors would like to thank J

22、ulia Nielson,Deputy Director of the Trade and Agriculture Directorate and the delegates of the Working Party of the Trade Committee for their useful comments and suggestions on this report.The authors would also like to thank Tha Chubinidze for her editorial assistance.5 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOB

23、AL TRADE OECD 2024 Table of contents Foreword 3 Acknowledgements 4 Executive Summary 7 1 Introduction 9 Note 9 2 Recent trends in global trade 10 2.1.Trade is expected to pick up in 2024 and 2025 after subdued growth in 2023 with also significant trade-related downside risks 10 2.2.Trade and price d

24、evelopments since COVID-19 12 2.3.Developments in goods and services trade 14 2.4.Chinas trade performance 19 2.5.Developments in Russias international trade 21 2.6.Effects on commodity markets of recent trade disruptions 25 Notes 29 3 Maritime transportation disruptions and international trade 32 3

25、.1.Modes of transportation of merchandise trade 32 3.2.Potential maritime trade chokepoints 36 3.3.Recent disruptions in maritime shipping 38 Notes 44 4 Recent trends in concentration of exports of electric vehicles and electric vehicle parts 46 4.1.Global export concentration 47 4.2.Concentrations

26、from the perspective of individual importers 50 Notes 53 5 Conclusion 54 References 56 Annex A.Data and methodology 58 Annex B.Supplemental figures and tables 60 6 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 FIGURES Figure 2.1.Trade estimates and projections by the IMF,OECD,and the WTO(2020-2025)

27、11 Figure 2.2.Evolution of global trade of goods and services relative to global GDP 12 Figure 2.3.Inflation in the OECD as measured by the Consumer Price Index(CPI)13 Figure 2.4.Year-on-year growth rate in world merchandise trade(value and volume terms)13 Figure 2.5.Contrasting recovery of goods an

28、d services trade from the COVID-19 pandemic 14 Figure 2.6.Recovery of services trade by services category 16 Figure 2.7.Changes in the structure of goods and services trade for G7 and China as of the end of 2023 17 Figure 2.8.Goods with largest gains and losses in G7 and Chinas export shares 18 Figu

29、re 2.9.Services sectors with largest gains and losses in G7 and Chinas export shares 18 Figure 2.10.Chinas trade of goods and services and GDP growth in the period 2020-2025 19 Figure 2.11.Comparison of Chinas recent merchandise trade growth with other main economies 20 Figure 2.12.Exports and impor

30、ts of goods and goods trade balance of Russia,2019-2023 22 Figure 2.13.Reconfiguration of merchandise trade of Russia 23 Figure 2.14.Trade between G7 and Russia continue to fall across most products 24 Figure 2.15.Crude oil price(United States vs Russia):Recent fading effect of sanctions on oil pric

31、e cap 25 Figure 2.16.Commodity prices are declining,but remain high 26 Figure 2.17.Energy prices have declined from recent historic levels 27 Figure 2.18.Food and fertiliser prices remain high 27 Figure 2.19.Trends in food prices vary by commodity 28 Figure 2.20.Prices of selected metals 29 Figure 3

32、.1.Share of merchandise trade by mode of transportation over time 33 Figure 3.2.Modes of transportation for merchandise trade vary across areas in 2023 34 Figure 3.3.Shares of modes of transportation by industries,2023 35 Figure 3.4.Structure change in modes of transportation for trade between 2019

33、and 2023 36 Figure 3.5.Most of maritime trade goes through a few chokepoints 37 Figure 3.6.The increase in traffic after the pandemic went mainly through a few chokepoints,notably the Malacca Strait 38 Figure 3.7.The Suez Canal disruption is diverting more ships than the Panama Canal drought 39 Figu

34、re 3.8.Oil products and cereals represented most of bulk traffic in the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal 40 Figure 3.9.Some small signs of shifts away from maritime transport due to Red Sea Crisis 41 Figure 3.10.Shipping rates for containers have been climbing since the escalation in the Red Sea 42 F

35、igure 3.11.Shipping rates for commodities not immune to transport disruptions 43 Figure 4.1.Exports of passenger vehicles from China to the European Union and the United States 47 Figure 4.2.Changes in concentration over time 49 Figure 4.3.The export market for battery packs and modules is highly co

36、ncentrated 49 Figure 4.4.Export market concentration of EV batteries has increasingly been driven by China 50 Figure 4.5.Concentration of Imports of EV batteries,United States 51 Figure 4.6.Concentration of Imports of EV batteries,EU27 52 Figure A B.1.The alternative route to the Suez Canal avoided

37、large disruptions in Mediterranean ports 60 Figure A B.2.The Suez Canal disruption did not have a significantly different effect on West or East Mediterranean ports 61 Figure A B.3.Change in outward FDI to connect countries between 2018 and 2022 63 Figure A B.4.Top countries gaining and losing marke

38、t share 64 Figure A B.5.Electric vehicles exports are accounting for a larger share of car exports 65 TABLES Table 2.1.Chinas merchandise trade:Top 10 products and partners in 2023 at HS2-digits 21 Table 2.2.Percentage change in value of trade in the period July 2023-June 2024 with respect to July 2

39、020-June 2021 23 Table A B.1.HS codes for passenger car and parts used in the analysis 61 7 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Executive Summary In 2023,international trade saw one of its weakest performances in four decades which has been thought to be a temporary situation driven by bo

40、th the compositional changes,the mix of goods and services traded,related to COVID-19 recovery and macroeconomic pressures such as inflation and high interest rates.While a more positive outlook is anticipated for 2024 and 2025,with trade expected to realign with global output growth,significant cha

41、llenges remain from economic uncertainties,geopolitical tensions,and transportation disruptions.This report leverages detailed and high-frequency data to offer a timely,in-depth monitoring of the evolving trade landscape and the factors underlying recent changes amidst the ongoing disruptions to int

42、ernational trade.Examining both short-term and structural trends during 2023 and the first half of 2024,the analysis found that:Services trade performed relatively well in 2023,driven by the recovery of travel-related services which were impacted more heavily by the pandemic travel restrictions in 2

43、020-22.The product composition of goods and services trade has been shifting back towards the pre-pandemic structure.However,relatively large differences remain even now,particularly for services.After the phase out of the Peoples Republic of Chinas(hereafter,China)COVID-19-related restrictions,the

44、countrys trade and output grew faster than those for the OECD area and the world in 2023 and at the beginning of 2024 and this supported world trade growth.Chinas trade in 2023 also saw notable changes in the partner and product structure which may be an indication of a more structural re-orientatio

45、n of its trade.The decline in Chinas import growth since the beginning of 2024 may be an indication of the countrys economic slowdown which could have significant negative implications for global trade and the world economy.The Russian Federations(hereafter,Russia)goods trade balance declined signif

46、icantly in 2023 due to a high base effect from soaring energy prices following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as well as the effects of far-reaching trade and other economic sanctions.Russias war on Ukraine and associated sanctions have altered global trade patterns with Russia redirecting exports

47、to China and India while importing less from the European Union and other sanctioning OECD countries.G7 imports from Russia have declined in both volume and value terms except for products where Russia is an important exporter such as cereals,fertiliser,metals,and inorganic chemicals.G7 exports to R

48、ussia of strategic products such as machinery,vehicles and aircrafts have also decreased.Commodity prices continued to decline in 2023,albeit also from historically high levels reached following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russias invasion of Ukraine and remained higher than pre-pandemic levels at the

49、 start of 2024 despite subdued global GDP growth the previous year.The on-going transportation disruptions in the Suez and Panama Canals respectively the nineth and the seventeenth most globally important maritime chokepoints,accounting together for 19%of global maritime trade in 2023 highlight the

50、importance of understanding the relationships between trade and transportation including routes,chokepoints,and shipping costs.8 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Maritime transport accounts for the bulk of internationally traded goods and is a particularly important mode of transport f

51、or energy-related and agricultural products which account for most of the non-containerised maritime traffic in the Suez and Panama Canals.The rerouting of ships from the Suez Canal is causing longer transit times,shipping delays and increased costs,on maritime routes crossing the Suez Canal,such as

52、 those connecting Asia and Europe,as well as on routes to and from the US East Coast due to the interconnectedness of maritime routeswhich are already experiencing an additional upward pressure from drought-related restrictions in the Panama Canal.Adjustments have been taking place and,so far,the im

53、pacts have been relatively limited,illustrating a degree of resilience of global trade to maritime transport disruptions.The analysis also shows a range of effects which,if magnified or spread to other transport routes or chokepoints,may have more significant implications for global trade,prices,and

54、 economic growth in the future.Against the background of recent announcements of further tariff increases by the United States,the European Union and Canada on electric vehicles(EVs)imported from China,this note explores the evolution of world trade concentration of electric vehicles and EV batterie

55、s.This analysis shows a significant increase in the concentration of global trade of EVs and EV-related parts,in particular batteries,mainly accounted for by the emergence of China as a new and fast expanding producer.Chinas growing market dominance has given rise to concerns about trade dependency

56、and resilience in an industry that is seen as crucial to the green energy transition.9 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Responding to the need for timely information on rapidly changing trade patterns emerging during the COVID-19 pandemic,starting in 2021,the OECD began producing regul

57、ar updates which provided analysis of impacts of recent and developing challenges to the international trading system(hereafter OECD Trade Updates).OECD Trade Updates are designed to inform trade policy discussions in OECD countries and feed into other trade-related work at the OECD.Using detailed d

58、ata and modelling tools,past reports provided updates on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and recovery and shed light on potential trade implications of Russias war of aggression against Ukraine and accompanying sanctions.1 This report continues to assess how trade has developed since the pandemi

59、c and Russias aggression against Ukraine and includes an assessment of recent disruptions in key maritime transportation routes as well as an overview of the evolution of concentration in international trade in electric vehicles(EVs)and EV batteries.Section 2 starts with an overview of what happened

60、 to goods and services trade in the past year and provides a discussion of projections for 2024 and 2025.The section also highlights trade developments in China and Russia and ends with an assessment of the commodity markets in the context of recent shocks,with a view of helping to better understand

61、 recent trade performance.Section 3 focuses on international trade transport,providing background information in the context of recent disruptions to key maritime routes.The section provides information on how goods are typically transported internationally,gives an overview of important trade route

62、s and maritime chokepoints,and discusses how recent disruptions in the Red Sea and Panama Canal may have impacted other trade routes,shipping costs and global trade overall.Given the recent tensions over the spike in exports of EVs from China,Section 4 includes a discussion on Chinas increasing domi

63、nance in exports of EVs and EV batteries in the context of key features of the passenger car supply chains evolution over the last two decades.Note 1 Past reports are available under the following OECD references:TAD/TC/WP(2023)10/FINAL,TAD/TC/WP/RD(2022)1/FINAL,and OECD Trade Policy Papers No.252,2

64、65 and 277.1 Introduction 10 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 2.1.Trade is expected to pick up in 2024 and 2025 after subdued growth in 2023 with also significant trade-related downside risks The estimates from the IMF,OECD and WTO suggest that 2023 was marked by a decline in internati

65、onal goods trade(WTO,20241)and a very small increase in international trade of goods and services(IMF,20242),(OECD,20243).The WTO and the IMF estimate the global goods trade to have declined by respectively 1.2 and 0.4%while the IMF and the OECD estimate that global goods and services trade increase

66、d by respectively 0.3 and 1%(Figure 2.1)while world output is estimated to have increased by approximately 3%.A comparison with historical growth rates of world goods and services tradein absolute terms and in relation to output growth(i.e.the so-called trade-to-GDP elasticity)reveals that 2023 feat

67、ured one of the weakest trade performances in the last four decades1(Figure 2.1,Panel A).The weak trade performance in 2023 also contributed to the deceleration in the growth of the world trade-to-GDP ratio observed since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09(Figure 2.1,Panel B).The weak trade perf

68、ormance in 2023 is thought to be due to a combination of cyclical macroeconomic factors.Structural factors,such as significant increases of trade costs,are not thought to be major components explaining the 2023 slow down.The plateauing of the world trade-to-GDP ratio(Figure 2.2,Panel B)suggests an i

69、ncreased presence of long term structural impediments to trade growth already since the Global Financial Crisis2 but the particularly weak trade growth in 2023 is rather explained by a combination of compositional changes related to the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic,as well as macroeconomic fa

70、ctors,most notably high inflation and interest rates which weighed on international trade of goods.The projections attribute the weak goods trade performance in 2023 to a combination of reductions in inventories(OECD,20243),a post-pandemic reorientation of spending from goods back towards services(O

71、ECD,20243;WTO,20241)and a weak import demand caused by inflationary pressures and high interest rates which weighed down on consumption of trade-intensive goods(WTO,20241).The better performance of services trade is explained by strong growth of travel-related services,which took longer to recover f

72、rom the pandemic and grew robustly in 2023.The projections also point to considerable differences in trade performance across different goods and services and in different countries and regions(IMF,20242;OECD,20243;WTO,20241),in particular,to the positive contribution to growth of trade in 2023 of C

73、hina,other dynamic Asian countries,as well as other non-OECD countries,and a relatively weak performance of trade in Europe.Overall,the leading international trade projections released in the first half of 2024 project trade growth to normalise and grow in line with output in 2024 and 2025(Figure 2.

74、1,Panels A and B),close to average 2011-19 growth rates and trade-to-GDP elasticities,albeit below longer-term averages(Figure 2.2,Panel A).These projections have been upheld in recent updates to the forecasts which take into account new data on the evolution of world goods trade in the first quarte

75、r of 2024.3 2 Recent trends in global trade 11 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 All the projections also point to downside risks associated with these projections,some of which are related to trade performance.The latter include continuation of the disruptions of maritime trade through

76、 the Suez and Panama Canals or potential disruptions of other major trade routes,impact on trade of military conflicts,growing uncertainty in international relations,increased trade and industrial policy tensions,and surging protectionism and geoeconomic fragmentation.4 All these downside risk scena

77、rios could significantly affect trade costs and,consequently,have negative implications for trade and long-term economic growth prospects.Figure 2.1.Trade estimates and projections by the IMF,OECD,and the WTO(2020-2025)Note:All trade and output growth estimates and projections are in real terms.Sour

78、ce:IMF(April 2024),OECD(May 2024)and WTO(April 2024)projections.Panel A.Trade growth estimate/forecastPanel B.Implied trade to GDP growth elasticity3.01.71.70.10.91.02.61.71.60.30.81.01.61.51.0-0.41.01.21.61.70.8-0.10.91.0-2-101234202020212022202320242025IMF(goods and services)OECD(goods and service

79、s)WTO(goods)IMF(goods)-8.010.95.90.33.03.3-8.010.75.21.02.33.3-5.09.63.0-1.22.63.3-4.210.92.6-0.42.83.3-10-5051015202020212022202320242025IMF(goods and services)OECD(goods and services)WTO(goods)IMF(goods)12 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.2.Evolution of global trade of goods

80、 and services relative to global GDP Note:Annual growth rates of volumes of worlds goods and services exports and gross domestic product(GDP)in 2015 prices.In Panel A,the average lines(av)refer to the period 1980-2022.Observations in red refer to 2023.Source:OECD Economic Outlook database.2.2.Trade

81、and price developments since COVID-19 The years during and following the pandemic have been characterised by particularly strong growth in prices which has significantly contributed to rising inflation.The inflation,as measured by the consumer price index(CPI),in the OECD area increased from 2.17%in

82、 December of 2019 to 10.69%at its peak in October 2022 with energy prices and to some extent food prices driving much of the change during the post-pandemic period(Figure 2.3).5 OECD(20214)identified sharp increases in commodity prices,including energy,supply shortages,and high transportation costs

83、as key drivers that pushed prices worldwide due to a combination of supply and demand side shocks during and post-pandemic.Significant shifts in demand towards goods and away from services during the pandemic,along with supply chain issues related to pandemic restrictions and shortages,put upward pr

84、essure on commodity prices which contributed to most of the rise in US inflation in 2021 and 2022(Bernanke and Blanchard,20235).Arce(20236)identified similar drivers of inflation for the euro area adding that the post pandemic recovery saw additional increases in demand stemming from a combination o

85、f pent-up demand for goods and services and the use of excess savings accumulated during the pandemic,while Russias aggression on Ukraine once again added upward pressure on food and energy prices particularly just after the invasion in early 2022(Arce et al.,20236).The authors found that spike in e

86、nergy prices is one reason why inflation was more persistent in the euro area compared to the United States.Panel A.Exports growth and elasticity with respect to GDP growth(volumes)Panel B.Exports to GDP ratio(volumes)-5.00.05.010.015.020.0-30-25-20-15-10-5051015201981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993

87、1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023Trade/GDP elasticityGrowth rate,%,y-o-yTrade growth rate(LHS axis)Trade to GDP growth elasticity(RHS axis)av=5.210%12%14%16%18%20%22%24%26%28%30%1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2

88、013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023av=1.5 13 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.3.Inflation in the OECD as measured by the Consumer Price Index(CPI)Note:Monthly series through August 2024.Source:OECD(2024)Consumer price indices(CPIs,HICPs),COICOP 1999 extracted 17 October 2024.The pric

89、e dynamics during the pandemic era,particularly when energy and food prices were significantly elevated,resulted in the growth of merchandise trade values outpacing the growth in volume terms(Figure 2.4).The changes in the value of merchandise trade were likely heavily influenced by price developmen

90、ts at this time.However,as the demand between goods and services have started to normalise,i.e.reorient back towards services,and inflation has started to stabilise(Figure 2.3),growth in merchandise trade volume has been more aligned with growth in volume terms(as indicated in the last three quarter

91、s of data presented in Figure 2.4).However,the shift back towards services implies an increase in the price of services as noted by the recent World Economic Outlook by the IMF(2024b7)which might also lead to discrepancies between the volume and value of services trade.6 Figure 2.4.Year-on-year grow

92、th rate in world merchandise trade(value and volume terms)Source:WTO Stats.Accessed 17 October 2024.-20-1001020304050Jan2019AprJulOctJan2020AprJulOctJan2021AprJulOctJan2022AprJulOctJan2023AprJulOctJan2024AprJul%TotalFood and non-alcoholic beveragesEnergyAll items non-food non-energy-30-20-1001020304

93、0502018Q1Q2Q3Q4 2019Q1Q2Q3Q4 2020Q1Q2Q3Q4 2021Q1Q2Q3Q4 2022Q1Q2Q3Q4 2023Q1Q2Q3Q4 2024Q1Q2%Total merchandise import valueMerchandise import volume indices,not seasonally adjusted value14 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 2.3.Developments in goods and services trade As highlighted in the

94、recent international trade projections,2023 was characterized by a relatively strong growth in services trade as compared to goods trade driven in part by unequal recovery of goods and services from the COVID-19 pandemic.Services trade slumped deeper than goods trade during the pandemic and recovere

95、d more slowly due to a shift of consumption toward durable goods and a more gradual lifting of some of the pandemic-related restrictions that affected trade of services such as travel or transport.Figure 2.5,Panel A shows that while trade of both goods and services have now more than made up for the

96、 losses during the pandemic,the goods trade gap closed at the end of 2021 while the gap for services closed only in the second quarter of 2023.The more recent recovery of services along with a higher sensitivity of goods trade to inflation and high interest rates helps explain,in some part,why,in 20

97、23,services trade continued to expand(9%growth in value in 2023)while goods trade declined(-4%)(Figure 2.5,Panel B).More recently,according to the latest balance of payments data,both goods and services trade registered positive growth at the beginning of 2024 contributing to a more positive outlook

98、 for 2024 and 2025.Similarly,OECD estimates for the first quarter of 2024 registered positive growths in both goods and services trade relative to the previous quarter.Exports of merchandise trade of G20 economies increased 1.9%,driven partly by the growth in China,while preliminary estimates of G20

99、 services exports increased 2.2%,partly fuelled by the continuing rise in international travel(OECD,20248).Figure 2.5.Contrasting recovery of goods and services trade from the COVID-19 pandemic Panel A.Cumulative trade gaps between actual trade values and a trend 15 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TR

100、ADE OECD 2024 Panel B.Year-on-year growth rates of trade values Note:By comparing the evolution of goods and services trade during the pandemic with a pre-pandemic trends,the gap between the two accounts for the accumulation of trade foregone since the pandemic.An assumption of the gap methodology i

101、s that trade in goods and services can be postponed in time,e.g.that the trade that was not possible during the pandemic(e.g.a cancelled travel or cancelled goods orders)could be realised when the pandemic restrictions were lifted.In Panel A,the gap measures the accumulated monthly shortfall(the red

102、 part of figure)and excess(the green part of figure)of trade values(for goods)or values(for services)relative to the pre-pandemic trend.The trend is estimated using the historical method and represents the volume(for goods)or value(for services)if values were the same as in 2019,the pre-pandemic per

103、iod.Latest data is for Q2-2024.Source:IMF International Financial Statistics,based on a sample of countries representing 95%of global trade.The relatively strong performance of services trade in 2023 was driven by travel,maintenance and repair,and personal,cultural and recreational services,that is,

104、the types of services that when traded internationally require international travel and therefore were impacted relatively heavily by the pandemic travel restrictions in 2020-22(Figure 2.6,Panel A).Services,which can be more easily delivered digitally,such as financial,insurance and other business s

105、ervices,were less impacted during the pandemic and grew more moderately in 2023.A gap analysis similar to that for the aggregate categories of goods and services in Figure 2.5,reveals that,despite high growth rates at the end of 2022 through early 2024(Figure 2.6,Panel A),travel and maintenance and

106、repair services yet to recover fully from the pandemic(Figure 2.6,Panel B).The gap is also still negative for trade in construction services,but the link to the pandemic trade restrictions is less clear as trade of this category of services had negative growth rates in the first half of 2019,and its

107、 oscillating growth in the period 2020-2023 suggests a stronger correlation with the global macroeconomic cycle.Overall,the product structures of international trade of goods and services have changed significantly since 2020,but they are now slowly reverting to their pre-pandemic composition.The Fi

108、nger-Kreinin exports similarity index,7 calculated for G7 countries and China as a group,measures the extent to which the composition of trade has changed relative to before the COVID-19 pandemic(2019).Figure 2.7 shows that changes in merchandise trade structure just one year into the pandemic(2020)

109、were as large as the changes that typically takes place over seven years(e.g.between 2012 and 2019).The difference in the product structure of services trade was even more dramatic,changing almost twice as much as goods trade over the same period.Moreover,the cumulative version of the index,where th

110、e four years 2020 to 2023 are treated as one period to smoothen any counterbalancing changes from one year to another,confirms that the structure of G7 and Chinas services exports has changed more than the structure of goods exports.The stronger shift in services in the last two years is another ill

111、ustration of the lagged recovery of services trade particularly travel relative to goods.16 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 More recently,the product composition of both goods and services trade has started to shift back towards the pre-pandemic structure and the difference in size of

112、 the compositional change between goods and services has narrowed.However,relatively large differences remain even now.Figure 2.6.Recovery of services trade by services category Note:The“Personal services”category includes“cultural and recreational services”.Included countries:Belgium,Canada,Czechia

113、,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Italy,Japan,Korea,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Poland,Portugal,Slovak Republic,Slovenia,Sweden,Trkiye,United Kingdom,United States,Brazil,China,India,Russia,Bulgaria,Malta,Mongolia,Pakistan,Romania,Serbia,Ukraine(85%of total trade in 2018-2019).Latest d

114、ata:July 2024.Source:WTO extracted November 2024.Panel A.Year-on-year growth ratesPanel B.Cumulative observed trade compared with historical values in 2018-2019-80-60-40-2002040%TotalInsurance servicesFinancial servicesTelecommunications&informationIntellectual property n.i.e.TransportPersonal servi

115、cesManufacturing servicesOther business servicesGovernment n.i.e.Maintenance and repairConstructionTravel-100-80-60-40-20020406080100%TotalMaintenance and repairTravelIntellectual property n.i.e.Manufacturing servicesOther business servicesInsurance servicesPersonal servicesTransportTelecommunicatio

116、ns&informationConstructionGovernment n.i.e.Financial services 17 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.7.Changes in the structure of goods and services trade for G7 and China as of the end of 2023 Finger-Kreinin index of similarity of export structure across products(1=structure id

117、entical to 2019)Note:The index,which varies between 0 and 1,is computed using product shares of total export value of G7 countries and China.A value of 1 indicates the group exported products in the same proportions as in the reference year 2019 and a value of 0 means that there were no common produ

118、cts exported in the two periods.A value of 0.5 can be approximately interpreted as a 50%overlap in export structures between the two periods.The index covers 2-digit HS categories for goods and twelve broad services categories(see Figures 2.8 and 2.9 for the list of goods and services).Manufacturing

119、 services on physical inputs owned by others are not reported by the United States and Canada for any of the covered years.Construction services are missing for Germany in 2012 and 2013.Maintenance and repair services n.i.e.is missing for China between 2012 and 2014.Sectors missing information are c

120、onsidered 0 in the computation.The Cumulative indices sum exports from 2020 to 2023,treating the post pandemic years as one period to assume away any counterbalancing changes.Series Goods(excluding Mineral Fuels and Oils)excludes HS chapter 27 Mineral fuels,mineral oils,and products of their distill

121、ation.Source:OECD calculations based on UN Comtrade data and ITC Trade Map data for France,Italy,and Japan for 2023(goods)and IMF Balance of Payments(services).Data extracted on 25 April 2024.A closer look at the composition of goods and services trade in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9,respectively,provi

122、des more information on the drivers of changes in the structure of trade.Energy(HS27)and commodity products(HS99)are among the types of goods driving the structural changes over the last few years.Some of the changes related to these products are certainly due to sharp increases in commodity prices

123、already during the COVID-19 pandemic and,particularly,after Russias invasion of Ukraine in 2022,since when they have only partially come down,remaining above pre-pandemic levels(see Section 2.6).Energy products apart,2023 marks a heavy increase in trade of vehicles(HS87)where the change in shares of

124、 total exports from the 2019 switched from a decline in 2022(-1.5 percentage points)to an increase in 2023(0.4 percentage points).8 The growth in trade of passenger cars in 2023 reflects pent up demand that has been realised after the pandemic-related production and delivery delays in prior years(se

125、e also Section 4).9 Electrical machinery and equipment(HS85)continue to account for a larger share of total exports compared to 2019 but the increase after the pandemic has diminished over the years,while aircraft products(HS88)continue to make up a smaller share of total goods exports.As suggested

126、by the Finger-Kreinin index,changes in the share of total exports among the service sectors were more radical,but the big shifts were accounted for by only a handful of sectors(Figure 2.9).The largest change was for travel services during the period of lockdowns,which lost 12 percentage points in 20

127、21 relative to 2019.As the sector recovered,the difference in share from the pre-pandemic period gradually decreased but its share of exports is still below 2019 levels.10 As of 2023,export shares of other business services(SJ),telecommunication,communication and information(SI),and insurance(SF),wh

128、ich fared well during the pandemic period,remain above their shares in 2019.For most other sectors,the changes over the years have been small and most are now close to their pre-pandemic shares.0.840.860.880.90.920.940.960.9811.02201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023GoodsGoods cumulativeG

129、oods(excl.Mineral Fuels and Oils)Goods cumulative(excl.Mineral Fuels and Oils)ServicesServices cumulative18 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.8.Goods with largest gains and losses in G7 and Chinas export shares Percentage point increase in export share since 2019,top-10 product

130、s with largest increases and decreases in export share between 2019-23 Note:Shows percentage point changes in export shares of G7 countries and China for ten merchandise sectors(2-digit HS)with the largest increases and deepest decreases between 2019 and 2023.HS code 99(“Commodities not specified ac

131、cording to kind”)is excluded from the graph.Source:OECD calculations based on UN Comtrade data and ITC Trade Map data for France,Italy,and Japan for 2023.Figure 2.9.Services sectors with largest gains and losses in G7 and Chinas export shares Percentage point increase in export share since 2019 Note

132、:Shows corresponding change in export shares for all broad categories of commercially traded services reported in the source data.Manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by others are not reported by the United States and Canada on the period.Source:OECD calculations based on IMF Balance of

133、Payments(data extracted on 25 April 2024).-1.2-1.0-0.6-0.2-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.10.10.10.10.20.20.30.30.40.51.1-2-1.5-1-0.500.511.522.5384-Nuclear reactors,boilers,machinery and mechanical appliances;parts88-Aircraft,spacecraft and parts thereof90-Optical,photographic,cinematographic,measuring,chec

134、king,medical62-Apparel and clothing accessories;not knitted or crocheted97-Works of art;collectors pieces and antiques52-Cotton94-Furniture;bedding,mattresses,mattress supports,cushions and48-Paper and paperboard;articles of paper pulp,of paper or paperboard03-Fish and crustaceans,molluscs and other

135、 aquatic invertebrates61-Apparel and clothing accessories;knitted or crocheted95-Toys,games and sports requisites;parts and accessories thereof74-Copper and articles thereof38-Chemical products n.e.s.28-Inorganic chemicals;organic and inorganic compounds of precious72-Iron and steel30-Pharmaceutical

136、 products85-Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof;sound87-Vehicles;other than railway or tramway rolling stock,and parts and71-Natural,cultured pearls;precious,semi-precious stones;precious27-Mineral fuels,mineral oils and products of their distillation;bituminous19-202019-202119-2022

137、19-2023-3.7-0.7-0.7-0.4-0.1-0.10.00.20.60.81.52.5-14-12-10-8-6-4-20246SD-TravelSH-Charges for the use of intellectual property n.i.e.SB-Maintenance and repair services n.i.e.SE-ConstructionSA-Manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by othersSK-Personal,cultural,and recreational servicesSL-Me

138、mo item:Government goods and services n.i.e.SG-Financial services SC-TransportSF-Insurance and pension servicesSI-Telecommunications,computer,and information servicesSJ-Other business services19-202019-202119-202219-2023 19 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 2.4.Chinas trade performance

139、As the worlds largest exporter and the second largest importer of merchandise products,Chinas macroeconomic and trade performance is a major factor influencing global trade.Chinas relatively strong trade performance in 2020 and 2021 was hampered in 2022 by the countrys strict COVID-19-related restri

140、ctions.In 2023,after the phase out of those measures,Chinas trade and output growth again outpaced those for the OECD area and the world,as shown by the latest estimates from the OECD Economic Outlook(OECD,20243)(Figure 2.10).In 2023,Chinas imports of goods and services grew faster(8.6%)than exports

141、(4.1%)reflecting weak import demand from Chinas trade partners.Figure 2.10.Chinas trade of goods and services and GDP growth in the period 2020-2025 Note:All growth rates adjusted for price movements.Forecast for 2024 and 2025.Source:OECD Economic Outlook 115.Chinas trade growth was also markedly vo

142、latile during the course of 2023,as illustrated in particular by the intermittent periods of high and low growth of merchandise exports(Figure 2.11,Panel A),but there are concerns whether the relatively strong growth recorded at the end of 2023 and the first half of 2024 will be sustained.Real merch

143、andise export growth seems to have already started to slow mid-way through the first quarter of 2024.On the merchandise imports side,China recorded relatively low growth rates at the beginning of 2023(Figure 2.11,Panel B)but,similarly to exports,the trend reversed in the second half of the year,befo

144、re slowing again at the end of 2023 and in early 2024.Since the second quarter of 2023,Chinas real imports growth has been positive and more dynamic than that of the largest OECD economies but slower than that of other emerging Asian economies.While it remained positive in mid-2024,it has declined g

145、radually since the beginning of the year.This may be an indication of Chinas economic slowdown which could have significant implications for global trade and the world economy.Panel A.Trade growth rate estimate/forecast Panel B.GDP growth rate estimate/forecast-9.09.87.70.11.32.80.511.9-5.06.26.44.7

146、-8.010.75.31.02.33.3-15.0-10.0-5.00.05.010.015.0202020212022202320242025OECDChinaWorld%-4.26.03.01.71.71.82.28.43.05.24.94.5-3.06.43.43.13.13.2-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.08.010.0202020212022202320242025OECDChinaWorld%20 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.11.Comparison of Chinas rece

147、nt merchandise trade growth with other main economies Notes:Four-month moving average of year-on-year growth rates on monthly trade statistics calculated using seasonally-adjusted volume data.Source:CPB World Trade Monitor,October 2024 release.The year 2023 also saw some stark changes in the partner

148、 and product structure of Chinas trade.The declines in the value of Chinas exports to the United States(-13%),the European Union(-10%),Japan(-9%)and Korea(-8%)contrast with the 46%increase for exports to Russia and,albeit much less so,to Mexico(6%)(Table 2.1,Panel A).The changes in Chinas bilateral

149、exports coincided with falls of export values across most of Chinas key export products,apart from exports of vehicles which grew by 29%(Table 2.1,Panel C).In 2023,China also imported less in value terms from ASEAN and most of its major OECD partners Korea(-19%);Japan(-13%);United States(-7%)and Eur

150、opean Union(-1%),while it imported more from Russia(14%)and other major commodity suppliers such as Brazil(13%)and Australia(10%)(Table 2.1,Panel B).The shifts in import shares appear broadly consistent with the pattern of changes across Chinas top 10 imported products which feature increases in imp

151、ort values for key commodities(Table 2.1,Panel D).To some extent,the shifts in product and important partner shares can be explained by a combination of an unequal recovery of China and its trading partners from the pandemic and changes in commodity prices(see also Section 2.6).However,these changes

152、 may also be an indication of a more structural re-orientation of trade across Chinas trade partners and warrant further monitoring.Panel A.Year-on-year change in export volumePanel B.Year-on-year change in import volume-10-505101520%Euro Area United States Japan China Emerging Asia,excl.China-15-10

153、-5051015%Euro Area United States Japan China Emerging Asia,excl.China 21 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Table 2.1.Chinas merchandise trade:Top 10 products and partners in 2023 at HS2-digits Panel A.Exports by partner Panel B.Imports by partner Country Value (USD bln)Growth rate Count

154、ry Value (USD bln)Growth rate 2023 2022-23 2023 2022-23 2019-23 ASEAN 537-6%49%ASEAN 390-5%38%United States 506-13%21%European Union 283-1%2%European Union 504-10%18%Chinese Taipei 200-17%16%Hong Kong(China)279-8%0%United States 166-7%36%Japan 158-9%10%Korea 163-19%-6%Korea 151-8%36%Japan 161-13%-6%

155、India 119 0%58%Australia 155 10%30%Russia 111 46%125%Russia 128 14%112%Mexico 82 6%77%Brazil 122 13%54%United Kingdom 79-3%27%Saudi Arabia 64-17%18%Panel C.Exports by HS2 product Panel D.Imports by HS2 product Country Value(USD bln)Growth rate Country Value(USD bln)Growth rate 2023 2022-23 2023 2022

156、-23 2019-23 85-Electrical machinery 905-6%35%85-Electrical machinery 552-15%11%84-Nuclear reactors 515-7%23%27-Mineral fuels 513-3%49%87-Vehicles 194 29%160%26-Ores,slag and ash 237 6%45%39-Plastics 135-7%59%84-Nuclear reactors 198-2%4%94-Furniture 125-5%26%71-Natural pearls,precious stones and meta

157、ls 114 10%89%73-Iron or steel articles 100-10%44%90-Optical,instruments 78-6%-21%95-Toys,games and sports requisites 91-13%45%12-Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 71 3%76%61-Apparel(knitted)84-8%18%87-Vehicles 71-13%-6%29-Organic chemicals 78-24%37%74-Copper 63-9%55%62-Apparel(not knitted)or crocheted

158、 72-6%8%39-Plastics 62-17%-13%Source:General Administration of Customs of the Peoples Republic of China.2.5.Developments in Russias international trade The marked increases in the shares of Russia as a destination for Chinas goods exports and as a source of China imports are also an illustration of

159、the large changes in Russias international trade and changes in global trade patterns that have been taking place since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.In 2023,the value of Russias good exports decreased by approximately USD 168 billion while imports increased by some USD 27 bill

160、ion,resulting in a USD 195 billion decrease in Russias goods trade balance which was equivalent in value to 12%of the countrys pre-invasion GDP(Figure 2.12).In 2023,the goods trade balance was also USD 72 billion(or 37%)lower than in 2021 and USD 45 billion(or 27%)lower than in 2019.To some extent,t

161、he significant decline in Russias goods trade balance in 2023 was driven by a high base effect of soaring energy prices following Russias invasion of Ukraine,which inflated the value of Russias goods exports in 2022.But these changes also reflect the continuing effects of the far-reaching trade and

162、other economic sanctions on Russia implemented by a coalition of countries(OECD,20239).11 22 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.12.Exports and imports of goods and goods trade balance of Russia,2019-2023 Note:*Balance on goods trade is expressed as%of Russias GDP in 2021.Source:

163、IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.The effects of sanctions can be seen in the changes in Russias trade levels and partner shares(Figure 2.13).In terms of products structure,before the invasion,energy products(HS27)accounted for some 42%of Russian exports and were exported mainly to the European Uni

164、on.Jewellery and precious metals(HS71)accounted for further 9%and were exported mainly to the United Kingdom while iron and steel(HS71)accounted for 4.7%and were exported mainly to European Union and Trkiye.Agricultural products(mostly wheat)accounted for 2.7%and were exported chiefly to European Un

165、ion and China.Since the invasion,Russia has been exporting visibly less to the European Union and other sanctioning countries while at the same time increasing exports to China and India(Figure 2.13,Panel B).Primarily,the increase in exports to India and China has been accounted for by energy produc

166、ts as the two countries took advantage of buying Russian oil at a discount.Russia has also been expanding natural gas sales to China,although this has been limited by the capacity of the gas pipelines between the two countries,with gas export volumes smaller than those previously sent to Europe.On t

167、he import side,before the invasion,Russias imports came mainly from Europe and consisted of high-tech products,such as ICT equipment,electronics,and automotive products.Since the invasion,exports from the European Union and other sanctioning OECD countries to Russia have declined significantly(by so

168、me 59%and 64%respectively),while exports from China,India,and other non-sanctioning OECD countries,predominantly Trkiye,have grown significantly(Table 2.2).0%5%10%15%20%25%010020030040050060070020192020202120222023USD blnExportsImportsBalanceBalance(%of GDP*-RHS axis)23 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBA

169、L TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.13.Reconfiguration of merchandise trade of Russia Note:Russian trade is proxied by partner countries reporting up to March 2024(i.e.it does not add up to 100%of total official Russian trade).Non-EU sanctioning:Canada,Switzerland,United States,Great Britain,Australia,Japan,

170、Norway,New Zealand.European Union:EU 27.Other OECD:Trkiye,Mexico,Israel.CIS:Azerbaijan,Belarus,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Moldova,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan.Latest data:June 2024.Source:UN Comtrade,Chinese Customs Statistics,ITC Trademap.Table 2.2.Percentage change in value of trade in the period July 2023-

171、June 2024 with respect to July 2020-June 2021 Non-EU sanctioning European Union Other OECD CIS China India Brazil All countries covered*Imports from Russia-81%-69%90%-57%105%972%212%1%Exports to Russia-71%-63%52%-64%89%58%-23%-16%Note:*Russian trade is proxied by partner countries reporting(i.e.it d

172、oes not add up to 100%of total official Russian trade).Non-EU sanctioning:Canada,Switzerland,United States,Great Britain,Australia,Japan,Norway,New Zealand.European Union:EU 27.Other OECD:Trkiye,Mexico,Israel.CIS:Azerbaijan,Belarus,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Moldova,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan.Source:UN Comt

173、rade,Chinese Customs Statistics,ITC Trademap.G7 countries and the European Union,which led the establishment of sanctions,continued to reduce trade ties with Russia in 2023.G7 imports from Russia exhibited strong declines in both volume and value terms for all products with the exception of cereals,

174、fertiliser,metals and inorganic chemicals,products where Russia is an important exporter(Figure 2.14,Panel A).G7 cereal imports from Russia increased significantly both in terms of value(77%)and volume(67%)while G7 fertilisers imports exhibited a smaller increase(13%in value terms and 16%in volume t

175、erms).For metals and inorganic chemicals,while import volumes have declined,the increase in prices of uranium and copper for instance,resulted in an increase 24 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 in imports in value terms.On the export side(Figure 2.14,Panel B),there have been significan

176、t drops in exports to Russia of strategic products such as machinery,vehicles,electrical machinery,and aircrafts,while the decline in exports has been less pronounced for pharmaceuticals and wearing apparel.Figure 2.14.Trade between G7 and Russia continue to fall across most products Change in G7-Ru

177、ssia total trade in 2023 relative to 2021 Note:Based on value and volume trade data of G7 countries at the HS 2-digit level.The charts present the top 35 HS 2-digit products in value terms which covers 99%and 94%of total value of imports and exports respectively.Volume change based on products for w

178、hich measurements in kilograms were available.Source:UN COMTRADE An additional sanction included a price cap imposed by a coalition of sanctioning countries which forbade insurance and financial companies to provide services to ships transporting Russian oil that is sold at a price higher than USD 6

179、0 per barrel.12 Initially,prices of oil exported from Russia dropped to around USD 60 per barrel at the start of the application of sanctions in December 2022(Figure 2.15 Panel A).However,the difference between the world price(proxied by the Brent price in Figure 2.15)and Russian prices(Urals and ES

180、PO)have progressively faded through the course of 2023(Figure 2.15 Panel B).The price of Russian crude oil dropped vis-vis the world prices following the second phase13 launched by the United States in February 2024,before climbing again in April.In November 2024,USD 9.9 and USD 3.6 difference betwe

181、en the world and Russian prices for,respectively,the Urals and ESPO prices,suggesting only a partial pass through of the sanction to Russian oil prices.14 Panel A.G7 imports from RussiaPanel B.G7 exports to Russia-150-100-5005010027-Mineral fuels,mineral oils 71-Natural,cultured pearls;72-Iron and s

182、teel76-Aluminium and articles03-Fish and crustaceans,44-Wood and articles of31-Fertilizers28-Inorganic chemicals;74-Copper and articles thereof26-Ores,slag and ash84-Nuclear reactors,boilers,40-Rubber and articles thereof75-Nickel and articles thereof81-Metals;n.e.c.,cermets39-Plastics and articles

183、thereof85-Electrical machinery and 29-Organic chemicals23-Food industries,residues 48-Paper and paperboard;90-Optical,photographic,73-Iron or steel articles99-Commodities not specified88-Aircraft,spacecraft and93-Arms and ammunition;70-Glass and glassware10-Cereals78-Lead and articles thereof87-Vehi

184、cles;other than 94-Furniture;bedding,12-Oil seeds and oleaginous 22-Beverages,spirits and07-Vegetables and certain 47-Pulp of wood or other 21-Miscellaneous edible33-Essential oils and 2023 value change(%)2023 volume change(%)-150-100-5005010084-Nuclear reactors,boilers,87-Vehicles;other than 85-Ele

185、ctrical machinery and 88-Aircraft,spacecraft and30-Pharmaceutical products90-Optical,photographic,39-Plastics and articles thereof38-Chemical products n.e.c.33-Essential oils and 99-Commodities not40-Rubber and articles thereof73-Iron or steel articles94-Furniture;bedding,29-Organic chemicals62-Appa

186、rel and clothing 61-Apparel and clothing 32-Tanning or dyeing 48-Paper and paperboard;34-Soap,organic surface-22-Beverages,spirits and21-Miscellaneous edible64-Footwear;gaiters and 83-Metal;miscellaneous35-Albuminoidal 27-Mineral fuels,mineral 82-Tools,implements,23-Food industries,residues 42-Artic

187、les of leather;18-Cocoa and cocoa74-Copper and articles thereof76-Aluminium and articles86-Railway,tramway 71-Natural,cultured pearls;28-Inorganic chemicals;72-Iron and steel2023 value change(%)2023 volume change(%)25 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.15.Crude oil price(United

188、States vs Russia):Recent fading effect of sanctions on oil price cap Note:ESPO:Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean.Daily data up to 4 November 2024.Source:London Stock Exchange Group(LSEG).2.6.Effects on commodity markets of recent trade disruptions In 2023,commodity prices have continued their decline,al

189、beit from historically high levels following the COVID-19 pandemic and Russias invasion of Ukraine.At the beginning of 2024,commodity prices remained higher than pre-pandemic levels despite subdued global GDP growth in 2023(Figure 2.16).The high level of commodity prices reflects several broader fac

190、tors such as a tightening of supplies,geopolitical tensions,and greater demand for industrial metals related to the green-energy transition(World Bank Group,202410).As of September 2024,the metal price index was up 33%from the average pre-pandemic prices,15 while the food price index was up 30%and e

191、nergy prices 19%(Figure 2.16).Within each index there are different behaviours among its components driving the changes.26 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.16.Commodity prices are declining,but remain high Note:*Excluding gold.Numbers in the label are the value of the index fo

192、r each commodity in June 2024.All metals include base metals,silver,palladium,platinum.Energy includes crude oil(petroleum),coal,and natural gas and propane.Food includes bananas,cereal,citrus-fruit,dairy products,legumes,meat,non-citrus fruit,seafood,sugar,vegetables,and vegetable oils.See the IMF

193、technical documentation for more information.Source:IMF Primary Commodity Price System(accessed 16 October 2024,last data point September 2024).The significant recent volatility in the energy prices has been driven by the price of natural gas and at times coal which faced increasing demands as gover

194、nments favoured coal-generated energy in the presence of high natural gas prices(Figure 2.17).Currently,energy prices remain lower than historic peaks and the price spread between the three energy types has narrowed to normal levels.An unseasonably mild winter in 2023 helped to keep natural gas mark

195、ets stable over the heating season in the Northern Hemisphere.However,concerns about high energy prices remain in the context of congestions and delays related to transportation disruptions and on-going military conflicts.Liquefied natural gas(LNG)flows have been affected by congestion in two strate

196、gic maritime shipping chokepoints,Panama and Suez Canals(see also Section 3).The impact on LNG freight rates and supply have been limited for the moment but long-term issues of congestion could put upward pressure on prices(IEA,202411).Moreover,at the end of 2024 a five-year agreement governing the

197、transit of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine will expire and there are no new negotiations underway.16 This could make delivery to landlocked European countries more difficult.In addition,recent Russian attacks on underground gas storage facilities in Ukraine,which has more storage capacity than any

198、 country in Europe and has been providing the European Union with large scale gas storage facilities since 2022,has put traders on alert to high volatility and supply disruptions.17 27 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.17.Energy prices have declined from recent historic levels

199、Source:IMF Primary Commodity Price System(accessed 16 October 2024,last data point September 2024).Food and fertiliser prices have declined considerably from the peaks reached following Russias invasion of Ukraine but are also still above pre-pandemic levels(Figure 2.18).The suspension of the Black

200、Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 caused a temporary increase in the price of vegetable oil,fertiliser and urea but so far has had minimal effects as Ukraine has been able to continue exporting through the seaborne corridor and new overland routes(World Bank Group,202410).Since the beginning of the

201、harvest last August,more than 700 ships have passed through the sea corridor largely passing also through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea despite recent disruptions on this route due to Houthi rebels attacks.18 The drop in fertiliser prices at the beginning of 2024 reflects increased production and l

202、ower prices of natural gas and coal prices,which are important inputs into fertiliser production(World Bank Group,202410).Figure 2.18.Food and fertiliser prices remain high Source:World Banks Pink Sheet for fertiliser prices;IMF Primary Commodity Price System(PCPS)for food prices(accessed 16 October

203、 2024,last data point September 2024).28 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 While the aggregate food price index has remained stable,albeit high,in recent months,trends vary by different food commodities(Figure 2.19).The price of vegetable oils,cereals,and meats have all declined since t

204、heir peaks in early 2022.Sugar prices,on the other hand,peaked sharply at the end of 2023 and have remained 64%above pre-pandemic levels mainly due to supply issues.The increase in the sugar price is related to El Nio which has weakened the monsoon season and brought dryness across parts of South an

205、d Southeast Asia resulting in an under production in major sugar producing countries(India and Thailand).19 Brazil who struggled with production in previous years,experienced port bottlenecks and logistical hurdles since October 2023 which have hampered sugar exports(USDA Foreign Agriculture Service

206、,202312).Nevertheless,increased production in Brazil along with dry weather conditions in the country,allowed cane harvesting and processing to continue through the end of the year20 and for sugar exports to leave the port faster than expected,and caused sugar prices to drop at the beginning of 2024

207、(World Bank Group,202410).Figure 2.19.Trends in food prices vary by commodity Source:IMF Primary Commodity Price System(accessed 16 October 2024,last data point September 2024).The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered an additional increase in metal prices in early 2022 although prices of several m

208、etals declined in the second half of 2022 and in 2023(Figure 2.20).One exception is uranium,a key component to produce nuclear energy and where Russia is a main exporter.The over 200%increase of uranium prices over the last five years is due to an increase in energy demand following the re-opening o

209、f the global economy after the pandemic as well as to Russias invasion of Ukraine after which prices took a sharp increase.More recently,fear of supply risk from Kazakhstan pushed prices up further.21 The pressure to cut emissions and belief that nuclear energy would make the energy transition safer

210、 and cheaper is expected to drive uranium demand higher in the coming years.22 Costs of inputs used in uranium production23 and their availability may put additional upward pressure on prices.The 2023 decline in lithium prices are related to the electric vehicles(EV)demand,particularly in China.A ke

211、y raw material used in electric car batteries,lithiums price has declined 79%from its peak in early 2022 as industry capacity has outpaced actual demand and demand expectations ease as car producers cut their production target plans.24 In particular,sales in China,the worlds largest EV market,have s

212、lowed down growing only 30%,after increasing more 250%in 2021 and 100%in 2022,following the end of an 11-year subsidy scheme on EV purchases in 2022.25 29 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 2.20.Prices of selected metals Source:IMF Primary Commodity Price System(accessed 16 Octobe

213、r 2024,last data point September 2024).Notes 1 In the period 1980-2023,only 1982-1983,2001,2009,and 2019-2020 show weaker real growth of world trade in goods and services relative to growth of world GDP.2 The plateauing in the world trade-to-GDP ratio likely reflects a combination of factors such as

214、 maturing of global value chains(and thus their slower growth)but also reduced commitment to multilateral trade liberalisation,as well as rising geopolitical and security concerns,and barriers to international trade and FDI.3 A July 2024 projection update from the(IMF,2024b7)notes an uptick in world

215、 trade growth in the first quarter of 2024 but argues that it is expected to moderate later in the year due to subdued manufacturing activity,leaving the earlier trade projections for 2024-25 unchanged.Also in July 2024,the WTO(202426)released its first estimates of world trade volume growth for the

216、 first quarter of 2024 and commented that these figures are also broadly consistent with its earlier(April 2024)world trade growth estimates for 2024 and 2025.The source states that if the current pace of expansion in the first quarter of 2024 continues through the end of this year,trade volume for

217、the whole of 2024 will be 2.7%higher than in 2023(as compared to 2.6%for good trade projected by the WTO in April 2024).The OECD Interim Economic Outlook released in September 2024(OECD,202425)describes goods and services strengthening especially in the second quarter of 2024;however,this boost in t

218、rade may have come from earlier-than-usual orders for the peak season in advanced economies to avoid congestions later in the year.4 For example,both the IMF(2024b7)and WTO(202427)report on signs of fragmentation of world trade along geopolitical divisions.5 See Subsection 2.6 for a discussion on re

219、cent developments of individual commodity prices.6 Complete merchandise and services trade at the detailed product level is only available in value terms.30 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 7 The Finger-Kreinin index is a measure of export similarity.In the analysis,it is used to measu

220、re the similarity of the“G7+China”regions export structure in different periods compared to the regions trade structure in 2019.The index ranges from 0 to 1,where an index value of 1 indicates perfect similarity,meaning that region exported the same products in the same proportions during the given

221、period as it did in 2019.A value of 0 indicates that region is exporting an entirely different set of goods.The lower the value,the greater the difference in export structure of the given year compared to 2019,before the COVID-19 pandemic.8 Looking more into details in the geographic composition of

222、trade for automotive products(HS87),between 2021 and 2023,the share of Chinas exports increased from 13.5 to 17%gaining 3.5 percentage points while European Unions share dropped from 29 to 27 percent loosing 2 percentage points among top 10 exporters(European Union,China,United States,Mexico,Japan,C

223、anada,Great Britain,Trkiye,South Africa,Brazil).Based on UN Comtrade.9 See https:/ These figures,which are averages for the G7 group and China mask significant heterogeneity in changes across individual exporting and importing countries:Japan tripled the share of exports in travel services in 2023(a

224、mong top 10 exporters).Chineses share in imports fell from 35%pre-covid(2019)to 24%in 2022 and gained again 4 percentage points during 2023 to 28%among top 10 importers.Based on WTO services trade database.11 Also note that,despite some measures taken by Russia to defend the value its currency(i.e.c

225、onversion of Russian export sales into rouble,prohibition of bank transfers,quoting export of Russian gas in Russian rouble),the RUB/USD exchange rate was at a historical low level 0.01 in November 2024.Factors driving the decrease in demand for Russian currency in 2023 include lower export proceeds

226、 and low levels of foreign inward investment.The weak rouble constrains Russias ability to import and adds more challenges to its value chain participation in non-energy related sectors that require foreign inputs.12 See https:/finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2024-01/guidance-russian-oil-price-cap

227、_en.pdf.13 See https:/home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/phase-two-of-the-price-cap-on-russian-oil-two-years-after-putins-invasion.14 The recent level of world prices(e.g.USD 72 per barrel on 6 November 2024)and the price cap of USD 60 for Russian crude would imply a USD 12 difference.The recen

228、t lowering of the difference between Russian and global price is mainly due to falling global prices.Other explanations of the partial pass through include inadequate monitoring and enforcement to prevent sanction circumvention as well as the“refining loophole”that allows non-sanctioning countries t

229、o buy and process Russian oil and then sell to anyone without restrictions(CREA,202323).Additionally,use of the so-called shadow fleet of tankers for shipments of Russian oil and ship-to-ship transfers and mixing or illegally and legally shipped oil,including by disactivating the automatic identific

230、ation system(AIS)that transmits ships position and other fraudulent practices(Hilgenstock,Pavytska and Ivanchuk,202424).15 Average of prices between January 2018 December 2019.16 See https:/carnegieendowment.org/politika/91649,accessed 26 April 2024.31 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024

231、17 See https:/ 26 April 2024.18 See https:/ 29 April 2024.19 See https:/ 29 April 2024.20 Traditionally sugar production in Brazils main producing region ends in November when the rainy season intensifies making it difficult to harvest sugar cane(USDA Foreign Agriculture Service,202312).21 Earlier t

232、his year,Kazakhstan,the worlds largest miner of uranium,announced it may cut its 2024 production plan due to problems of availability of sulfuric acid needed to produce uranium.22 See https:/ 29 April 2024.23 The supply of sulfuric acid,a bi-product of oil and gas production,will be impacted by the

233、green transition.Moreover,additional demand for the input comes from alternative uses such as in phosphate fertiliser production.24 See https:/ 29 April 2024.25 See https:/ 29 April 2024.32 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 In November of 2023,Houthi rebels began attacking commercial sh

234、ips in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden forcing major shipping and logistic companies to temporarily reroute vessels around the southern tip of Africa in order to avoid the Suez Canal.This recent disruption in shipping lanes compounds continued Russias invasion of Ukraine-related risks in the Black

235、Sea,an important trade and transportation route connecting Europe and Asia.In addition,a drought in Panama,which started in early 2023,has forced the Panama Canal authorities to drastically reduce the number and size of ships passing through the canal.Moreover,there have also been several strikes at

236、 major ports,disrupting operations in the United States,Canada,and France.1 These recent transportation disruptions further highlight the importance of understanding the relationships between trade and transportation including routes,chokepoints,and shipping costs.The objective of this section is to

237、 provide descriptive statistics on the modes of transportation of traded goods,the main routes of maritime trade,and potential chokepoints.This is accompanied by a discussion of recent transportation disruptions and their impact on shipping costs.3.1.Modes of transportation of merchandise trade Few

238、countries provide data on how goods are transported when they enter or leave a territory.For the purposes of this analysis,the OECD has compiled data for major economies that report bilateral trade values by modes of transportation2:Australia,Brazil,Canada,Japan,European Union,3 Trkiye,and the Unite

239、d States(See Annex A for a description of sources and methodology).While the database covers only a fraction of total trade(29.5%of world export value and 33.4%of import value in 2023),some important insights can be gleaned from the data at the region and product level.There are four major ways(mode

240、s)of moving goods over long distances:road,rail,air,and maritime.4 Deciding which mode to use depends on several factors related to each mode,such as cost,capacity,speed,and reliability,as well as the type of goods being shipped.Maritime or rail might be preferred for heavy or bulky items such as ca

241、rs,machinery,or grains,while air transportation is better suited for high-value or time-sensitive items.Among the main modes of transportation,maritime transport offers the largest carrying capacity in both volume and weight and,when compared to some other modes,is more affordable and practical when

242、 shipping on long distances.5 It is therefore by far the most used mode,accounting for almost half of internationally traded goods in 2023(48.3%,Figure 3.1,Panel C),followed by air(23.3%)and road(18.8%).Rail and other modes of transportation such as post,pipelines,self-propulsion or fixed mechanism,

243、accounted for 2.9%(Rail)and 3.1%(Other)of the value of goods being moved.Despite 3 Maritime transportation disruptions and international trade 33 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 significant disruptions to different transport modes during the COVID-19 pandemic,in 2023 the structure of

244、trade by mode of transportation was similar to that in 2019.The shares vary across countries,as the mode of transportation is determined by the geographical location and transportation infrastructure of a country,its trading partners and goods shipped.With at least one third of goods being shipped b

245、y water,maritime transport is the main mode for all the covered economies,except Canada(Figure 3.2).In Canada,goods enter the country mostly by road(52%of imports and 40%of exports were being shipped by trucks in 2023),revealing the importance of the countrys land border with the main trading partne

246、r,the United States.Canada is also the only covered country where rail transportation accounts for a relatively large share among the different modes recorded when goods cross its borders(9%of imports and 13%of exports).Most countries with a significant land border use different modes of transportat

247、ion as illustrated by the fact that at least 10%of goods enter or leave a country by sea,air and road.Brazil stands out with a lower value share of road and air transport for exports(respectively 6%and 4%),as its top exported commodities grains and oilseed,oil,and mining products are mainly transpor

248、ted by sea to China.Figure 3.1.Share of merchandise trade by mode of transportation over time Note:Based on trade values.Imports panel covers total imports for Australia,Brazil,Canada,Japan,European Union(extra-EU 27 trade,excluding trade with the United Kingdom,Trkiye,and United States.Exports pane

249、l excludes Australia which only provides mode of transportation for imports.Source:OECD calculations based on UN Comtrade,Eurostat,E-Stat,US Department of Transportation(North America Transborder Freight Data),US Department of Commerce-US Census Bureau(See Annex A for more information on the compila

250、tion of trade data by mode of transportation).34 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 3.2.Modes of transportation for merchandise trade vary across areas in 2023 Note:Based on trade values.Imports panel covers total imports for Australia,Brazil,Canada,Japan,European Union(extra-EU 2

251、7 trade,excluding trade with the United Kingdom),Trkiye,and the United States.Exports panel covers the same areas except Australia.Australia which only provides mode of transportation for imports.Source:OECD calculations based on UN Comtrade,Eurostat,E-Stat,US Department of Transportation(North Amer

252、ica Transborder Freight Data),US Department of Commerce-US Census Bureau For bulk items such as mining and agriculture products,maritime shipping is the predominant mode of transportation(Figure 3.3).Textile products and chemicals are also mainly imported by water(70%and 58%respectively)as well as m

253、otor vehicles,which has specific ships(“ro-ro”or“roll on/roll off”)to transport them.On the other hand,high-value or time-sensitive items like electronics or pharmaceuticals have larger shares of goods shipped via air(respectively 57%and 65%,for imports).If road transport accounts for an important s

254、hare of imports and exports for most of the goods,it is rarely the most preferred mode.For the selected economies covered in this analysis,exports show more varied modes of transportation as air and road transportations accounts for larger shares for many products compared to imports.6 For products

255、and countries that mostly rely on modes of transportation other than maritime,recent disruptions in maritime trade may be less concerning.There may be more relevant transportation disruptions for these products or countries,such as those experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic when air travel was l

256、argely shut down.These alternative transportation disruptions are not the focus of this section.35 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 3.3.Shares of modes of transportation by industries,2023 Note:Imports include data for Australia,Brazil,Canada,Japan,European Union(extra-EU 27 tra

257、de,excluding trade with the United Kingdom),Trkiye,and United States.Exports covers the same areas except for Australia which only provides mode of transportation for imports.Shares of the main modes of transportation are displayed for top 10 traded products.Other modes of transportation include sel

258、f-propulsion,post,and fixed mechanism.The product classification is BDTIxE industries converted from HS Nomenclature at the 6-digit level.Utilities include waste,recycled rubber,gas,and electricity.Other products cover optical media(e.g.digital storage devices),printed materials,and works of art.Mar

259、itime transport includes sea and inland waterways.Source:OECD calculations based on UN Comtrade,Eurostat,E-Stat,US Department of Transportation(North America Transborder Freight Data),US Department of Commerce-US Census Bureau The structure of trade by mode of transport has not changed dramatically

260、in the last four years although some changes can be observed(Figure 3.4).Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic,the shares of maritime and air transport among the covered economies decreased while road transport increased.Despite a rebound in maritime transport in 2021,the share of goods trans

261、ported by water was slightly below pandemic levels in 2023(Figure 3.1).The air cargo industry was also highly impacted as international passenger aircraft belly capacity was drastically reduced in the first half of 2020.In 2023,the air cargo capacities reached 2019 levels but the demand for cargo wa

262、s still 3.6%below pre-pandemic levels(IATA,202313).7 Road transportation has become more important in all the covered economies with land borders except Canada.In the United States,trade with Canada and Mexico increased by almost a third between 2019 and 2023,boosting road transportation.In the Euro

263、pean Union,the share of road transportation increased as a result of a more limited decline compared to other modes in the context of overall declining trade(Eurostat,202314)and higher value-to-weight ratios for products such as chemicals which are transported relatively intensely across EU borders.

264、36 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 3.4.Structure change in modes of transportation for trade between 2019 and 2023 Note:The structure change represents the difference in percentage points between 2023 and 2019 transportation value shares.It covers total trade(exports plus impor

265、ts)for Brazil,Canada,Japan,European Union(extra-EU 27 trade,excluding trade with the United Kingdom),Trkiye,and United States.For Australia,only imports are included.Source:OECD calculations based on UN Comtrade,Eurostat,E-Stat,US Department of Transportation(North America Transborder Freight Data),

266、US Department of Commerce-US Census Bureau.3.2.Potential maritime trade chokepoints With around half of major economies trade depending on maritime shipping,the recent disruptions of transport routes and growing geopolitical tensions have heighted interest in understanding maritime transport pathway

267、s and potential chokepoints.While there is no commonly accepted definition,chokepoints can be defined as strategically important,naturally narrow,high-traffic shipping pathways on the worlds most important maritime shipping routes that have few alternative routes.This section builds on two data sour

268、ces to provide more information on shipping routes and chokepoints:UN Trade and Development(UNCTAD)and IMF Portwatch.UNCTAD provides estimates of annual total volume of merchandise shipped by sea(UNCTAD,202315).The IMF Portwatch platform estimates the daily volume of trade going through 1 388 ports

269、and 24 chokepoints using AIS(Automatic Identification System)data transmitted from vessels and collected by the UN Global Platform(Arslanalp,Koepke and Verschuur,202116).8 In addition,traffic statistics from the Suez Canal9 and Panama Canal10 authorities are also used for annual volume of trade by p

270、roduct on these routes.There are five primary shipping routes for global trade connecting the different regions of the world.The Dover Strait,or the English Channel,connects the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean and is a vital trade link between Europe and the United Kingdom.It is also a primary mari

271、time route between the Atlantic and the port of Rotterdam,Europes busiest port.The Strait of Malacca near Indonesia is not only the main shipping lane out of Asia,but also connects Asias biggest economies.The Panama Canal is a key pathway between Asia and the East Coast of the United States signific

272、antly reducing travel time,between 5 to 17 days(or 15 to 37%),compared to routes around the Cape Horn or through the Suez Canal.11 The Suez Canal is the shortest sea route between Asia and Europe and,on the route from Shanghai to Rotterdam,for example,cuts transit time by some nine days(or 24%)when

273、compared with transport around the Cape of Good Hope or eight days(22%)12 when compared with transport through Panama Canal.13 The Danish Straits linking the North Sea and the Baltic Sea is an important route for trade between Russia and Europe.14 There are a few strategic locations along these majo

274、r maritime shipping routes where large shares of maritime trade transit through(Figure 3.5).Notably,a large share of international maritime trade goes 37 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 through several Asian chokepoints,highlighting the global importance of China in global trade.In 20

275、23,38%of global maritime trade passed through the Malacca Strait,and the Taiwan and Luzon Straits accounting for 25%and 19%,respectively.Another important shipping route is the one that links Asia to Middle East and Europe with 15%of 2023 global maritime trade transiting through the Red Sea and pass

276、ing through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.Another potential choke point is the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East.It is considered the worlds most important oil transit choke point with little options to bypass the strait.Only Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have pipelines that

277、can ship crude oil out of the Persian Gulf.15 Finally,19%of global maritime trade passes through the Gibraltar Strait which is another important location on maritime transport routes linking the Americas and Europe.Figure 3.5.Most of maritime trade goes through a few chokepoints Note:This map repres

278、ents the list of chokepoints identified by the IMF for which the share of 2023 total maritime trade is higher than 5%as well as the Panama Canal.Shares were calculated as the ratio of the volume of trade going through each chokepoint to the 2023 total volume of maritime trade.The volume of trade goi

279、ng through each chokepoint is estimated by the IMF using AIS data transmitted from vessels and collected by the UN Global Platform.2023 total volume of maritime trade was estimated using 2021 total maritime trade from UNCTAD database and yearly growth rates provided in UNCTAD maritime trade reports.

280、Source:Authors elaboration based on IMF Portwatch(data extracted on 10 September 2024)and UNCTAD.The relative importance of these locations appears to have been largely unaffected in the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic,but 2022 and 2023 feature more significant changes.Overall,the Malacca a

281、nd Taiwan straits are the two locations that experienced some the largest changes in their relative importance in global maritime transport.Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic,the Malacca Strait has appeared to have attracted relatively traffic while Taiwan Strait has seen a decrease in tra

282、ffic.The shares of traffic passing through the Gibraltar Strait and Suez Canal have increased while the share of Panama Canal has contracted(Figure 3.6).This can be explained by increased shares of maritime trade going to or coming from Asia(Malacca Strait),going through the Asia Europe route(Bab-el

283、-Mandeb Strait,Suez Canal)and the America Europe route(Gibraltar Strait).In addition,the geopolitical tensions between China and Chinese Taipei in 2022 seem to have shifted maritime trade from the Taiwan Strait to the nearby Luzon Strait 38 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 3.6.T

284、he increase in traffic after the pandemic went mainly through a few chokepoints,notably the Malacca Strait Note:Shares are calculated as the ratio of the volume of trade going through each chokepoint on the 2023 total volume of maritime trade.The volume of trade going through each chokepoint is esti

285、mated by the IMF using AIS data transmitted from vessels and collected by the UN Global Platform.2022 and 2023 total maritime trade were estimated using 2021 total maritime trade from UNCTAD database and yearly growth rates provided in UNCTAD maritime trade reports.The“Other”category represents the

286、average of the 18 other chokepoints identified by the IMF.Source:Authors elaboration based on IMF Portwatch(data extracted on 10 September 2024)and UNCTAD.3.3.Recent disruptions in maritime shipping Disruptions in two major maritime chokepoints have resulted in some re-routing of seaborne trade rout

287、es.The Red Sea Crisis has reduced traffic significantly since the start of the Houthis attacks on commercial ships which started at the end of 2023.Major shipping companies have re-routed vessels around the southern tip of Africa to avoid the Suez Canal altogether.Since the start of the attacks,the

288、volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal has been declining while at the same time trade transiting via the Cape of Good Hope has been increasing(Figure 3.7,Panel A).By the end of the first quarter of 2024 about four times more trade was transiting around Africa than passing through the Suez C

289、anal however overall,the total traffic on both these routes remained unaffected.The rapid adaptation of shipping companies to this alternative route avoided large disruptions in Mediterranean ports,in which the daily average volume of trade has not changed significantly compared with other ports wor

290、ldwide(Figure A B.1 and Figure A B.2).However,extreme weather conditions around the Cape of Good Hope starting in the third quarter of 2024 added further disruptions and transit delays causing wide swings in the average number of daily transits.Analysts believe the recent weather disruptions on this

291、 route will unlikely have significant supply chain impact,however carriers will have even more added pressure to adapt and stabilise their network already under pressure from the situation in the Middle East.16 Another worrisome chokepoint has been the Panama Canal which has been suffering from low

292、water levels due to a prolonged drought since early 2023.This forced canal authorities to significantly reduce the number of ships allowed to transit daily as of November 2023.17 Alternative shipping routes by-passing the Panama Canal include sailing around Africa,transiting through the Suez,which i

293、s for now a less viable option,or sailing through the Strait of Magellan or Cape Horn.Since the November 2023 announcement,daily trade volumes passing through the Panama Canal have dropped sharply(Figure 3.7,Panel B).The total volume of trade in the last quarter of 2023 and first quarter of 2024 dro

294、pped by 25%compared to the same period the year before.While historically relatively less trade passes through the Strait of Magellan than through the Panama Canal,there are some signs of rerouting of trade with 30%more trade volume passing through the Strait of Magellan in the last quarter of 2023

295、than the year before.However,the daily 05101520253035404520192020202120222023Percentage oftotal maritime tradeGibraltar StraitLuzon StraitMalacca StraitOtherPanama CanalSuez CanalTaiwan Strait 39 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 trade volume passing jointly through both these routes re

296、mained significantly lower implying that trading firms might have relied on alternative transportation.One major long-existing option is to unload containers from ships calling at western North American ports Los Angeles/Long Beach,Seattle,and Vancouver onto rail cars,a relatively economical,multimo

297、dal option.Other future alternatives are discussed in Section 3.3.1 Multimodal alternatives.Figure 3.7.The Suez Canal disruption is diverting more ships than the Panama Canal drought Note:Seven-day moving averages,using daily data up to 31 August 2024.The volume of trade going through each chokepoin

298、t is estimated by the IMF using AIS data transmitted from vessels and collected by the UN Global Platform Source:IMF Portwatch(data extracted on 10 September 2024).As highlighted previously,fossil fuels(coal,coke and petroleum products)and agricultural products are mostly traded through maritime tra

299、nsportation and they also account for most of the non-containerized traffic in the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal(Figure 3.8).This correlation between the industries shares of traffic at the chokepoints and their reliance on maritime trade(Section 3.1)emphasises the importance of these strategic lo

300、cations in maritime trade pathways and implies that trade in energy and agricultural products is potentially more exposed to such chokepoint disruptions.Panel A.Suez Canal traffic diversion to the Cape of Good Hope Panel B.Panama Canal traffic00.20.40.60.811.21.41.6Aug-2023 Sep-2023 Oct-2023 Nov-202

301、3 Dec-2023 Jan-2024 Feb-2024 Mar-2024 Apr-2024 May-2024 Jun-2024 Jul-2024 Aug-2024Volume of trade(million tonnes)Magellan StraitPanama Canal024681012Nov-2023Dec-2023Jan-2024Feb-2024Mar-2024Apr-2024May-2024Jun-2024Jul-2024Aug-2024Volume of trade(million tonnes)Suez CanalCape of Good Hope40 RISKS AND

302、RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Figure 3.8.Oil products and cereals represented most of bulk traffic in the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal Note:The data is available for the Suez Canal only up to 2019.Some product categories provided by the Suez Canal authorities and the Panama Canal authoriti

303、es have been renamed and regrouped to get a comparable list.Container cargo(accounting for 49.2%and 22.0%of total trade in the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal,respectively)have been excluded because of missing information on the products shipped.Source:Authors elaboration based on Suez Canal statist

304、ics 2019 annual report(Panel A)and Panama Canal statistics 2023 annual report(Panel B).3.3.1.Multimodal alternatives While maritime trade is the main mode of transportation for many products(Section 3.1),in some cases finding alternative modes of transportation is a viable way of responding to trans

305、portation disruptions.An alternative to transiting through the Panama Canal is to send cargo on ships to US West Coast ports and then transport the cargo by rail across the United States.Similarly,while the Suez Canal is the main shipping route between China and Europe,air,rail and road freight have

306、 long been used as alternative means of transporting goods between the two regions.Panel A.Suez CanalPanel B.Panama Canal050001000015000200002500030000350004000045000500002023 volume of trade(thousand tonnes)0200004000060000800001000001200002019 volume of trade(thousand tonnes)41 RISKS AND RESILIENC

307、E IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 In the case of the Suez Canal,the latest Eurostat monthly trade volumes data by mode of transport indicate that there may be signs of traders switching from sea freight to other modes of transportation particularly for imports into the European Union.While monthly import

308、volumes across all modes of transportation were down starting from July of 2023 relative to the same months in 2022(not shown),the share of maritime trade in 2023 has been increasing relative to previous years(Figure 3.9).However,since the start of the Red Sea Crisis in November 2023,this trend appe

309、ars to have been reversed as illustrated by the shifts in the shares in December 2023 and January and February 2024.In July 2024,for example,the share of maritime shipping declined almost two percentage points while the share of other modes increased.Rail experienced the strongest increase among the

310、 alternative modes.The recent maritime transport disruptions have also led to new initiatives focusing on upgrading of existing and development of new alternatives.As mentioned in the previous subsection,in the context of the Panama Canal disruptions,the Chilean President recently launched a USD 400

311、 million investment to improve port infrastructure at the Strait of Magellan.18 Governments and private investors have also explored other alternatives such as a canal across Nicaragua,a rail transport system across Colombia,a similar rail system across Mexico,a tunnel across Colombia and a South Am

312、erican land bridge.19 The recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor(IMEC),an ambitious multi-modal transportation corridor initiative that will link Europe and Asia could be an alternative to the Suez Canal.20 If pursued,these projects will take time to come on board.Figure 3.9.S

313、ome small signs of shifts away from maritime transport due to Red Sea Crisis Percentage point change of volume shares from previous years Note:Based on volumes(tonnes)of imports from China to the European Union.Shares by mode of transport do not include the“other”category which accounted for 1%or le

314、ss of monthly trade volumes.Source:OECD calculations based on Eurostat data.Extracted October 2024.3.3.2.Impact on shipping costs As far as the Red Sea situation is concerned,for the moment,about half of the concerned trade(OECD,20243)has been re-routed to avoid the Suez Canal facing longer transit

315、times,shipping delays and increased costs.ITF(202417)estimates that re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope adds around 8 500 nautical miles to a round trip voyage between the Far East and Europe and adds ten days of transit each way.This source estimates also that since the start of the attacks,the

316、 global average of container ship delays has deteriorated from 5.1 days in November 2023 to six days in January 2024 but improved again in February reflecting adjustment of shipping schedules to new routes(Sea-Intelligence,202418).-2.5-2-1.5-1-0.500.511.522.5JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecJanFe

317、bMarAprMayJunJul20232024Percentage point changeMaritimeAirRoadRailStart of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea(Nov)42 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Moreover,the lengthening of the sea route adds additional costs to shipping companies.Additional days at sea requires more fuel and more char

318、ter costs,which include things like wages,operations costs,insurance,management and administration costs.The longer trip also requires additional days of container hire.In total,ITF(202417)estimates the additional costs of a medium-sized container ship travelling from Asia-Europe transiting around t

319、he Horn of Africa to be USD 1.7 million for a round trip which represents an additional USD 272(or approximately 19%)per 40-ft equivalent unit(FEU 1 container)container into Europe.21 However,the recent increases in shipping costs appear larger than what is implied by the additional cost estimation.

320、Since the escalation of the situation in the Red Sea,shipping rates for containers have been climbing,particularly for routes between Asia and Europe(Figure 3.10).At the peak just after the initial attacks,shipping rates between Asia and Europe increased over 300%to about USD 5 000 per FEU between S

321、hanghai and Rotterdam and over USD 6 000 between Shanghai and Genoa.At the end of February,one month later,rates subsided falling to just 150%above the rates before the Houthi attacks.Due to interconnectedness between different maritime trade routes,the shipping costs on routes to and from the US Ea

322、st Coast which are already experiencing an additional upward pressure from the reduced capacity in the Panama Canal were also impacted by the Suez Canal disruptions.Rates on the Asia New York route increased by 126%to USD 5 820 per FEU.In the second quarter of 2024,container rates peaked once again.

323、Bad weather in key chokepoints in East Asia,including fog in Shanghai and torrential rain in Malaysia and Singapore,have resulted in increased port congestion and shipping delays.22 This comes at a time when shipping container demand is on the rise as retailers begin to stock up inventory for the ba

324、ck-to-school and holiday seasons coupled with container availability problems related to the Red Sea crisis.As a result,the composite index more than doubled between April and July 2024 before falling again and ending up around 20%higher than after the initial peak after the Houthi attacks.However,o

325、verall,while current container freight rates are relatively elevated,the level is far below what was observed during the COVID-19 pandemic-related supply chain disruptions.Figure 3.10.Shipping rates for containers have been climbing since the escalation in the Red Sea Weekly world container index No

326、te:Composite is weighted average of the eight available routes weighted by trade volume.See Drewry methodology for more information.Source:Drewry,via Infogram and MacroMicro(accessed 21 October 2024,last data point 17 October 2024).43 RISKS AND RESILIENCE IN GLOBAL TRADE OECD 2024 Only 6%of dry bulk

327、 trade passes through the Suez Canal,but bulk ships have been re-routing there due to reduced transit slots through the Panama Canal.23 The Baltic Dry Index(BDI)more than doubled in November after the Panama Canal Authorities reduced the number of daily transits and spiked again shortly after Houthi

328、 rebels attacks,reaching levels seen after Russias invasion of Ukraine.Grains and Oilseed Freight Index(GOFI)also responded to the Red Sea escalation,but not to the same extent as BDI.As of mid-October,the GOFI is down 4%since just before the Houthi attacks,while the BDI is up by 20%(Figure 3.11).Fi

329、gure 3.11.Shipping rates for commodities not immune to transport disruptions Evolution of the Baltic Dry Index(BDI)and the IGC Grains and Oilseeds Freight Index(GOFI)Source:Baltic Dry Index sourced from I(accessed 21 October 2024,last data point 18 October 2024),GOFI index and sub-indices sourced fr

330、om IGC,OECD calculations.In 2021,the OECD estimated that the sharp rise in commodity prices,along with higher shipping costs,accounted for much of the observed increase in import price inflation and consumer price inflation in 2021(OECD,202119).The impact of rising shipping costs alone on import pri

331、ces and headline inflation will be much lower,as transport costs are a smaller part of the cost of total imports.While there has been some reaction in shipping rates,for the moment,commodity prices showed only small if any reactions to the escalation in the Red Sea.However,since adjustments are stil

332、l taking place,a long-term impact of the Red Sea crisis and the Panama Canal drought on prices and on global trade may still not be fully visible.Overall,while adjustments have been taking place,showing a certain resilience of global trade to maritime transport disruptions,the analysis presented in

333、this Section also shows a range of effects which,depending on their duration and potential intensification or decline,may have more significant implications for global trade,prices and economic growth.OECD(20243)points out,for example,that the impact of an intensification of the evolving conflicts in the Middle East and resultant energy price spikes could be magnified if disruptions extended to th