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1、Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation PolicyFindings of a Horizon ScanJames Black,Theodora Ogden,Mlusine Lebret,Andy Skelton,Zsofia Wolford and Henri van SoestFor more information on this publication,visit www.rand.org/t/RRA3121-1About RAND Europe RAND Europe is a not-for-profi

2、t research organisation that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis.To learn more about RAND Europe,visit www.randeurope.org.Research Integrity Our mission to help improve policy and decision making through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of q

3、uality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behaviour.To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous,objective,and nonpartisan,we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process;avoid both the appearan

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8、nd.org/pubs/permissions.Preface This report summarises the findings of a short,one-month RAND study into the intersection of key emerging technologies with the space domain,both now and out to 2040.It considers the implications of projected future technology trends for the development of novel space

9、 capabilities and applications,both in upstream and downstream markets while acknowledging that the pace,direction and wider externalities of such developments will also be shaped by non-technological factors,not least regulation.It is impossible to predict the future and this study does not seek to

10、 prescribe what the future will or should look like.Rather,it aims to illustrate the sorts of trade-offs and dilemmas that technology may pose for future space regulation policy,as the UK seeks to strike a balance between mitigating risk(e.g.,to space safety,security or sustainability,or to terrestr

11、ial activities dependent on space data and services)and,at the same time,maximising opportunity(e.g.,to deliver broad societal and economic benefits and support delivery of other policy goals,through promotion of a vibrant and competitive space sector).This quick-turnaround study was commissioned in

12、 November 2023 by the Department for Science,Innovation and Technology(DSIT)and the Regulatory Horizons Council(RHC),in support of the RHCs independent advice and contribution to a wider UK Government review of space regulation policy.It was contracted through the Government Office for Science(GO Sc

13、ience)s Future Framework,and delivered by RAND Europe,the European arm of the RAND Corporation,the world s largest non-profit policy research organisation.RANDs aim is to help improve public policy and decision making through objective research and analysis.The study brought together researchers fro

14、m RAND Europes Centre for Futures and Foresight Studies(CFFS)and the RAND Space Enterprise Initiative(RSEI),a global hub for RANDs space-related research,analysis and gaming.It also built on previous and ongoing horizon scanning work for the UK Space Agency,the Defence Science and Technology Laborat

15、ory,and others across government.For more information about the study,RAND,or the CFFS and RSEI,please contact:James Black European Lead Space Assistant Director Defence and Security Research Group RAND Europe Eastbrook House,Shaftesbury Road,Cambridge,CB2 8BF,United Kingdom e.jblackrandeurope.org i

16、 Summary This report presents the findings of a one-month study exploring emerging technologies and space capabilities by RAND Europe and commissioned by the Regulatory Horizons Council(RHC).It aims to explore the intersection between seven critical technology areas and the space sector,with the goa

17、l of identifying space capability trends and their implications for future space regulation.The research draws on a literature scan,bibliometric analysis,horizon scanning,and a stakeholder workshop hosted by the RHC,and aims to provide practical insights for enhancing future space regulatory policy.

18、The Intersection of Emerging Technology with Space Capability The technologies and capabilities presented in this report have the potential to transform uses of space,both incrementally through offering improvements on existing technologies,and more radically,by enabling entirely new capabilities,us

19、e cases and markets.Illustrative examples of such impacts include:AI,autonomy and robotics can improve data analytics and decision making,as well as contributing to active debris removal and in-orbit servicing,while enabling the exploration of celestial bodies such as the Moon and Mars using a mix o

20、f uncrewed spacecraft and human-machine teaming.Telecommunication technologies have the potential to drastically improve connectivity and data transmission,with the potential for space-based data centres to enhance security and efficiency,while increasing the efficiency of data processing.Quantum te

21、chnologies offer advances in communication,computing and sensing technologies,with the potential to enhance or undermine data security and the encryption of satellite communications.Similarly,the implementation of quantum metrology could bring significant improvements to spacecraft navigation and co

22、mmunication,while terrestrial use of quantum technologies could boost resilience by providing alternatives to space-based services(e.g.,alternatives to reliance on GPS,Galileo,etc.).Engineering biology holds promise towards the development of food and medicine,which could help sustain life in space,

23、while improving the provision of health services,both on Earth and for space missions,through scientific breakthroughs such as advanced tissue engineering.Semiconductors can help improve the hardware capabilities,performance and longevity of satellites,data transmission and the accuracy of manoeuvre

24、s and measurements,with the potential to enhance space-based services such as positioning,navigation,and timing(PNT),satellite communications(SATCOM)and remote sensing to improve lives on Earth.ii Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy Energy and propulsion advancements h

25、ave the potential to enable faster and more efficient space travel,unlocking future uses of space for exploration,tourism,crewed missions and the transport of minerals and materials back to Earth,as well as providing new sources of energy for activities in space(e.g.,space-based nuclear)or on Earth(

26、e.g.,space-based solar power to terrestrial use).Novel materials and advanced manufacturing can improve the value-for-money,scale,number,diversity and performance of space-based assets.This could unlock a wide range of ambitious new possibilities,including space-based powerplants,habitats,factories,

27、repairs and refuelling.Opportunities and Risks for the United Kingdom(UK)Emerging technology is helping drive new space capabilities and use cases with the potential to drive economic growth,enhance national security and advance scientific research,with spillover effects felt across almost all indus

28、tries and parts of society.However,barriers such as a shortage of suitably qualified and experienced personnel(SQEP)in the UK could limit realisation of benefits.The UK is well-placed to act as an international broker for space diplomacy and has the potential to gain the first movers advantage by pr

29、oactively shaping the global space regulatory environment.Increasing militarisation of space,proliferation of debris,and potential for attacks on space-based assets all pose significant threats to UK s space capabilities.Other nations are investing heavily in their own national space sectors,driving

30、 fierce competition including on regulation.Implications for Space Regulation Policy This study identifies a range of both technology-specific and cross-cutting implications for UK space regulation,both in the near-term and out to 2040.Resolving any regulatory gaps and areas of friction or confusion

31、 would help encourage investment into the UK space sector,and pursuit of novel missions and revenue streams.At the same time,industrys desire to move quickly will need to be balanced against safety and environmental concerns,amongst other dilemmas.Research highlights the need for a continuous pursui

32、t of both incremental and radical innovations,backed by a more adaptive and anticipatory approach to UK space regulation policy in future.The UK is in a good position to leverage innovative mechanisms such as regulatory sandboxes,as well as employing strategic foresight methods and new tools such as

33、 AI to assist with more agile development of regulation fit for a fast-changing sector.Hard regulation is only one of a wider set of levers that the UK Government can use to help shape the future of space governance,both at home and globally,so as to gain a competitive advantage while avoiding a reg

34、ulatory race to the bottom.If the UK is to deliver on its ambition to be a genuine thought leader on space regulation,this implies a need for regulators to have access to funding,talent,technology and organisational processes and culture that enable continuous learning,adaption and the absorption of

35、 innovation both in terms of the novel space capabilities to be regulated,and of the cutting-edge regulatory approaches that the UK uses to shape the evolution of this fast-moving sector in its favour.iii Table of Contents Preface.i Summary.ii Abbreviations.vi 1.Introduction.1 1.Introduction.1 1.1.B

36、ackground.1 1.2.Research objectives.4 1.3.Study approach and methodology.5 1.4.Caveats and limitations.5 1.5.Report structure.6 2.Emerging Technology in Context.7 2.Emerging Technology in Context.7 2.1.Core assumptions.7 3.Intersection of Emerging Technology with Space Capability.10 3.Intersection o

37、f Emerging Technology with Space Capability.10 3.1.Summary:Intersections with the space domain.10 3.2.Critical Technology 1:AI,autonomy,and robotics.13 3.3.Critical Technology 2:Telecommunication technologies.14 3.4.Critical Technology 3:Quantum technologies.15 3.5.Critical Technology 4:Engineering

38、biology.16 3.6.Critical Technology 5:Semiconductors.17 3.7.Critical Technology 6:Energy and propulsion.17 3.8.Critical Technology 7:Novel materials and manufacturing.18 4.Opportunities and Risks for the UK.19 4.Opportunities and Risks for the UK.19 4.1.Opportunities for the UK.19 4.2.Risks and chall

39、enges for the UK.23 5.Implications for Space Regulation.27 5.Implications for Space Regulation.27 5.1.Implications of novel technologies and capabilities for regulation.27 6.Evolving the Approach to Space Regulation.36 6.Evolving the Approach to Space Regulation.36 6.1.Addressing the domestic dimens

40、ion.36 iv Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy 6.2.Addressing the international dimension.40 6.3.Harnessing technology to enable more effective regulation.41 7.Conclusion.42 7.Conclusion.42 References.43 Annex A.Methodology.60 Annex A.Methodology.60 A.1.Scoping review.6

41、0 A.2.Data collection.60 A.3.Stakeholder workshop.63 A.4.Final targeted research and reporting.63 Annex B.Technology Intersections.64 Annex B.Technology Intersections.64 B.1.Critical Technology 1:Artificial intelligence,autonomy,and robotics.64 B.2.Critical Technology 2:Telecommunication technologie

42、s.69 B.3.Critical Technology 3:Quantum technologies.73 B.4.Critical Technology 4:Engineering biology.77 B.5.Critical Technology 5:Semiconductors.80 B.6.Critical Technology 6:Energy and propulsion.84 B.7.Critical Technology 7:Novel materials and manufacturing.87 Annex C.Examples of Future Space Capab

43、ilities.90 Annex C.Examples of Future Space Capabilities.90 v RAND Europe Abbreviations AGI Artificial General Intelligence AI Artificial Intelligence ADR Active Debris Removal AEPS Advanced Electric Propulsion System ASAT Anti-Satellite BEIS Department for Business,Energy and Industrial Strategy BW

44、X Babcock&Wilcox CAA Civil Aviation Authority CEA Commissariat lnergie atomique et aux nergies alternatives CFFS Centre for Futures and Foresight Studies COPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space CSpO Combined Space Operations Initiative DARPA Defense Advanced Research Proj

45、ects Agency DfT Department for Transport DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid DRACO Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar Operations DSIT Department for Science,Innovation and Technology Dstl Defence Science and Technology Laboratory EM Electromagnetic EO Earth Observation EPS Electric Propulsion System ESA

46、European Space Agency ESO European Southern Observatory EU European Union FCDO Foreign,Commonwealth and Development Office FOCA Swiss Federal Office of Civil Aviation GO Science Government Office for Science vi Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy GNSS Global Navigation

47、 Satellite System GPS Global Positioning System GVA Gross Value Added ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation ISR Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISRU In-Situ Resource Utilisation ISS International Space Station ITU International Telecommunication Union JAXA Japan Aerospace Explo

48、ration Agency JWST James Webb Space Telescope KET Key Enabling Technology LEO Low-Earth Orbit LLM Large Language Model ML Machine Learning MOD Ministry of Defence NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NTR Nuclear Termal Rocket OECD Organisation fo

49、r Economic Co-operation and Development OEWG United Nations Open-Ended Working Group Ofcom Office of Communications OST Outer Space Treaty 1967 PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space PLA Polylactic acid PNT Positioning,Navigation,and Timing QKD Quantum Key Distribution R&D Research and Deve

50、lopment RAF Royal Air Force RHC Regulatory Horizons Council RSEI RAND Space Enterprise Initiative S&T Science and Technology SABRE Synergetic Air-Breathing Rocket Engine SATCOM Satellite Communication SDA Space Domain Awareness vii RAND Europe SEP Solar Electric Propulsion SORA Specific Operations R

51、isk Assessment SQEP Suitably qualified and experienced personnel SSA Space Situational Awareness SST Space Surveillance and Tracking STM Space Traffic Management TRL Technology Readiness Level UK United Kingdom UKSA United Kingdom Space Agency UN United Nations UNN Unnatural Amino Acid US United Sta

52、tes viii 1.Introduction This chapter introduces the context and objectives for this short study,and outlines its approach and methodology,the associated caveats and limitations,and the structure of this report on RANDs findings.1.1.Background 1.1.1.Innovation in technology and commercial models has

53、enabled a new race for space,which is becoming increasingly congested,contested and competitive.Governments,economies and societies are increasingly dependent on space for positioning,navigation,timing(PNT),satellite communications(SATCOM),Earth observation(EO)and meteorological services.1 The size

54、of the global space sector is also growing,with its value projected to grow to US$558bn(419bn)by 2026,up from US$360bn(270bn)in 2018.2 Space science and exploration are also seeing renewed excitement and investment.The James Webb Space Telescope(JWST)is providing scientists with new insight into the

55、 Universe.3 The United States(US)National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA)aims to return astronauts to the Moon by 2025 through its Artemis programme,as a precursor to interplanetary missions to Mars in the coming decade.4 This follows the successful deployment of lunar rovers by India and

56、 China,and a flurry of uncrewed missions to the Moons surface or orbit by countries as diverse as South Korea,Luxembourg,Israel,Japan and the United Arab Emirates not to mention competing initiatives to establish permanent lunar settlements for scientific,military or commercial purposes.5 Aiming at

57、reinforcing the calibre of terrestrial and in-orbit services,the last decade has seen an impressive increase in the number of objects launched into space,with a staggering 2,478 objects launched in 2023 compared to just 120 in 2010.6 This growth is largely due to the emergence of major private actor

58、s(e.g.,SpaceX,Blue Origin,etc.)and the so-called NewSpace economy.7 Increased competition and innovation have driven down launch costs per kilogram of mass,while also promoting miniaturisation and extracted 1 Black(2018).2 Research and Markets(2018).3 JWST(2023).4 NASA(2020b).5 Osburg&Lee(2022);Dobo

59、s(2022);Palkowsky(2023).6 Mathieu,et al.(2022).7 ESA(2019b).1 RAND Europe better performance out of satellites and their onboard components.These trends,in turn,are making it both technically and financially feasible to unlock new use cases and applications from space technology:establishing mega-co

60、nstellations in low-Earth orbit(LEO)to enable global connectivity;bringing Earth observation(EO)capabilities that used to be the sole domain of state intelligence agencies onto the general market;and launching a race to put billionaires,tourists and even a Tesla into space.8 At the same time,governm

61、ents,militaries,and NGOs have all raised concern about the increasingly congested,contested,and competitive nature of the space domain.9 Russian and Chinese tests of direct-ascent anti-satellite(ASAT)missiles have generated considerable debris clouds in recent years,causing damaging collisions with

62、satellites and even threatening the crew of the International Space Station(ISS);there have also been a series of high-profile cyber and electronic attacks(e.g.,dazzling,jamming,spoofing)against space systems and ground infrastructure,and an uptick in various other ambiguous or threatening behaviour

63、s,such as unwanted close-proximity manoeuvres around high-value or military satellites.10 Besides purposefully hostile activity,there is also the risk of accidental collisions,electromagnetic(EM)spectrum fratricide,or damaging environmental impacts as Earth orbit and cis-lunar space become more clut

64、tered.11 In this context,ensuring space safety,security and sustainability necessitates both international and domestic efforts to balance risk and opportunity from increasing space-based activity.Globally,this entails diplomatic initiatives to de-escalate interstate tensions and promote responsible

65、 behaviour,whether through normative or legal mechanisms(e.g.,building on the Outer Space Treaty OST of 1967,the Liability Convention of 1972,Registration Convention of 1974,or Moon Agreement of 1979).12 At home,this means making sure national legislation(i.e.,the UK Outer Space Act of 1986),regulat

66、ions,licensing regimes,standards and other forms of rule or guidance all remain fit for purpose in a fast-changing sector.1.1.2.The United Kingdom(UK)aspires to be a“meaningful player”in space,leveraging its unique strengths,with new technology and regulation both key enablers if done right.Getting

67、the regulatory balance right and adapting for the future are priorities for a review into UK space regulation policy by the Department for Science,Innovation and Technology(DSIT),due to conclude in March 2024.This ongoing effort supports the policy ambitions of the National Space Strategy,published

68、in 2021,which aims to increase the UKs share of the global space market and to contribute to wider prosperity through investing in space capabilities,supporting space innovation,encouraging international collaboration,and promoting commercial opportunities in the space sector.13 The security dimensi

69、on is 8 Black,et al.(2022).9 Ligor&McClintock(2022).10 Secure World Foundation(2023).11 McClintock,Feistel,et al.(2021);McClintock,et al.(2023);Ligor&Matthews(2022);Ligor,et al.(2023).12 Ligor(2022);Irving(2023).13 BEIS,et al.(2021);UK Space Agency,et al.(2021).2 Implications of Emerging Technology

70、for UK Space Regulation Policy further addressed through an accompanying Defence Space Strategy,issued in 2022,recognising the dual-use or dual-purpose nature of so many space-related technologies,capabilities and areas of infrastructure.14 Amid a fierce international competition,the UK boasts a ple

71、thora of strengths in the space sector,including:Strong alliances and partnerships,particularly within the United States,North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO),Five Eyes,AUKUS and the European Space Agency(ESA).Establishment of a National Space Council and increased cross-governmental collaboratio

72、n(especially between DSIT and the Ministry of Defence MOD,or the UK Space Agency UKSA and new UK Space Command),along with deepening engagement with industry and academia.Ambitious plans to be the first space launch site in continental Europe,with efforts underway to establish a series of space port

73、s for vertical and horizontal launch.Access to UK Overseas Territories and favourable geography at a range of latitudes and longitudes,of relevance both for responsive launch and for Space Surveillance and Tracking(SST)missions.15 Strong domestic cross-sectoral links and niche space capabilities,suc

74、h as SABRE and small sats deployed through the New Space growth strategy.16 Scientific advances via the current space science projects portfolio and a thriving academic sector.At the same time,the UK remains a small player in terms of its domestic market and financial clout,as compared to the United

75、 States,China,India,or other major European nations,and thus must make efficient use of all potential levers to secure a competitive advantage.This drives a need to review the space regulatory framework and its alignment with departmental objectives and international agreements(e.g.the Artemis Accor

76、ds or the Space Operations Vision 2031,which sets out the objectives of the UK and partner nations within the Combined Space Operations Initiative CspO).17 Effective regulation is crucial for positioning the UK as a competitive nation to attract investment into both the upstream and downstream segme

77、nts of the space economy,particularly for companies interested in licensing,launching and operating space objects from the UK,while mitigating the risk of unintended harms or spillovers from space-related activities.18 In addition to this wider DSIT-led review of space regulation policy,the Regulato

78、ry Horizons Council a committee of independent experts that advises the government on the impact of technological advancements and the necessary regulatory changes to facilitate their swift and secure implementation is 14 Slapakova,et al.(2021);MOD(2022b);Retter,et al.(2022).15 For example,the UK ho

79、sts a tracking radar for the US-led Space Surveillance Network at RAF Fylingdales in Yorkshire and an optical telescope on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.The UKSA and Space Command are also investing in a new telescope on Cyprus,where the UK maintains two Sovereign Base Areas,and the UK will colla

80、borate with the US and Australia to establish a new deep space radar in Pembrokeshire as part of trilateral cooperation on the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability(DARC)through AUKUS.See:RAF(2023);MOD(2023).16 BEIS,MOD&UKSA(2021).17 NASA(2020a);MOD(2022a).18 In this regard,national space regulation

81、compliments wider UK Government efforts to shape the future uses of space in a beneficial direction reflecting the OST and other legal instruments,as well as UK-led efforts to promote responsible behaviours in space and the formulation of norms through,inter alia,a UN Open Ended Working Group.3 RAND

82、 Europe conducting its own independent review of the regulatory impact of future space technologies.19 The aim is to investigate how the five critical technologies identified in the UK Government s Science and Technology(S&T)Framework20(i.e.,artificial intelligence(AI),engineering biology,future tel

83、ecommunications,semiconductors and quantum technologies)could be applied to the space sector and how regulatory reforms can help safely unlock these applications,whilst ensuring they deliver full value to society.Overall,the Regulatory Horizons Council(RHC)s goal is to ensure that future space regul

84、ation policy is positioned to enable the safe,swift and effective utilisation of new technologies to maximise their benefits for humanity,the planet and the UK.1.2.Research objectives This research seeks to inform RHC reporting,with the aim to leverage RAND Europes expertise and track record,particu

85、larly through its Centre for Futures and Foresight Studies.This report feeds into the wider work of the RHC,providing an evidence base for the identification of future space capabilities ahead of the RHC analysis of the UK regulatory landscape.The objectives of this short,one-month study are to:Iden

86、tify key intersection points:Identify and analyse the areas within the space sector where the five critical technologies can be integrated for potential benefits.Assess regulatory gaps:Support the RHCs ongoing wider analysis of existing space regulations to pinpoint regulatory gaps and challenges in

87、 accommodating these emerging technologies.Develop adoption strategies:Inform development of strategies and recommendations for ensuring effective utilisation of these technologies within the space sector.Maximise benefits for the UK:Inform exploration of ways to maximise the economic and societal b

88、enefits of integrating these technologies into the space sector while considering national interests.Integration with existing initiatives:Ensure that the study complements the wider ongoing Space Regulation Review by focusing on topics(e.g.,technology)that are outside the review s core focus.Inform

89、 policy development:Provide practical implications and insights for enhancing regulatory governance,from the perspective of the above technology horizon scanning exercise,which will be integrated into the final Space Regulation Review expected to be published in March 2024.Based on the above,the tea

90、m derived a set of research questions(RQs)to guide the study:1.How might the emerging technology areas identified in the UK Governments S&T Framework(a)intersect with capability development for the space domain,and(b)shape the sectors evolution out to 2040 in terms of both opportunities and risks?2.

91、What is the potential impact of these developments on how the UK regulates the implementation of new technologies for space,and where are there regulatory gaps or dilemmas to be addressed?19 Regulatory Horizons Council(2023).20 DSIT&Prime Ministers Office(2023).4 Implications of Emerging Technology

92、for UK Space Regulation Policy 3.What might the UK do to address these regulatory gaps or dilemmas,and overcome these obstacles to fully leverage the space sector and contribute to wider UK prosperity?As such,the study aims to focus in on the intersection of emerging technologies with the space doma

93、in,understanding how these may translate into new capabilities and use cases,and thus behaviours that the UK might wish to shape through regulation(e.g.,whether to encourage,enable,ban or de-risk).It is not intended as a broader review of other non-technological factors that will shape the future sp

94、ace sector,nor does it duplicate the wider analysis of UK space regulation policy being undertaken by the RHC and DSIT.1.3.Study approach and methodology This study employed a mixed-method approach,including:i)a scoping review,in which the current state of UK space regulation was identified for wide

95、r team awareness,ii)data collection,whereby bibliometric analysis and horizon scanning helped identify relevant emerging technologies,iii)a workshop with RHC,DSIT and other regulator,industry or academic experts to discuss the possible impact of emerging space tech and capabilities,and iii)a targete

96、d literature review into the critical technologies and the related implications for space regulations and the UK.These methods are explained in more detail in Annex A.1.4.Caveats and limitations This project was delivered within a short timeline and with limited resources and,as such,the data collec

97、tion and analysis activities were necessarily constrained.At the RHCs direction,the focus was on the five technologies identified as critical in the UK Governments S&T Framework.While RAND added other priority areas based on horizon scanning to broaden the scope somewhat(namely,energy and propulsion

98、 technologies,and advanced materials),it is not possible for this short study to go into depth on all relevant areas of S&T.As such,the findings are intended as an illustrative cross-section of relevant advances and their potential implications for space regulation policy,not an exhaustive list of t

99、echnology trends.Similarly,the potential use cases and applications of the technologies mentioned in this study were not analysed in-depth,though the study sought to focus on capabilities instead of specific technologies where possible.Further research into the non-technological factors affecting th

100、e barriers or enablers to,and likely timelines for,commercialisation and adoption would be needed to understand the potential benefits and risks to the UK and thus the full regulatory implications.More generally,the future is inherently uncertain.This study does not aim to predict or prescribe what

101、the future of the space domain will or should be,but rather to illustrate potential future directions for technological and capability development,based on current trends.The ongoing Space Regulation Review provides an opportunity to shape this future in the UKs favour.5 RAND Europe 1.5.Report struc

102、ture Chapter 2 discusses how technologies translate into capability and use cases to be regulated.Chapter 3 summarises the intersections of selected technology areas with space capability(RQ1a).Chapter 4 discusses the opportunities and risks for the UK(RQ1b).Chapter 5 examines the implications in te

103、rms of gaps and dilemmas for space regulation(RQ2).Chapter 6 concludes by examining ways of future-proofing space regulation policy(RQ3).Chapter 7 provides final reflections from the research team.This report also contains a bibliography and three annexes with the methodology and tech write-ups.6 2.

104、Emerging technology in context This brief chapter sets out the basic conceptual framework and assumptions for the rest of the report.More specifically,it examines the wider context in which critical technologies are used in the space domain,including their role in space value chains,and as building

105、blocks of space capabilities.This serves to bridge between the defined scope of this tech-focused study for the RHC,and the primary focus of UK regulation policy,which looks not to regulate technologies but rather capabilities,use cases and markets.2.1.Core assumptions 2.1.1.Technology is only one f

106、actor for space regulation policy to consider As the spacefaring community develops novel technologies,there is the potential to unlock a range of different futures through new space activities and applications.From improving AI to leap forward advances in satellite technology which could enable new

107、 capabilities for Earth observation,weather forecasting,and telecommunications,humans are also embarking on missions to explore our solar system and establish space-based habitats.The technology areas discussed in Chapter 3 reveal a multitude of ways in which space capabilities can unleash potential

108、 benefits and problematic risks,dependencies or externalities.Nevertheless,before discussing the critical technology areas in turn,it is important to position their development in a wider context,elaborating on their implications for the space domain and how they contribute to future space capabilit

109、ies.The research,development,fielding and exploitation of such technologies occurs against the backdrop of myriad political,economic,social,legal,environmental and military(PESTLE-M)trends shaping the space domain.As such,technology should be understood as just one element of future space capability

110、 with the space ecosystem a complex socio-technical system also comprising elements such as funding,talent,skills,networks and regulation.While the possible direction of these wider PESTLE-M trends,and how they may generate different potential future worlds out to 2040,are not covered in this short

111、tech-focused study,they will be addressed in wider work by RHC and DSIT.2.1.2.Technology offers building blocks for future space capabilities and use cases Emerging technologies such as those identified in the UK Governments S&T Framework have important implications for the space domain,as they are

112、potential building blocks towards future space capabilities that enable a wide range of applications.Critical and emerging technologies can both enhance existing space capabilities and contribute to the creation of entirely new ones.Enhancements to existing capabilities can include,for instance,impr

113、ovements to SATCOM systems,upgrades to the efficiency of spacecraft propulsion,and the integration of new instruments or software into existing satellites.Examples of more 7 RAND Europe novel capabilities in space technologies could include ground-breaking new propulsion systems,the use of advanced

114、materials and in-situ resource utilisation(ISRU)to construct new types of structure in outer space,or the invention of technical means for sustaining lunar or interplanetary settlements.Both types of capability developments are important for advancing space exploration and technology,and both can le

115、ad to advancements in scientific research,economic growth and national security.2.1.3.The impact of technological innovation is felt across both the upstream and downstream segments of the space economy,driving diverse new markets The technology areas covered in this study can all be exploited for t

116、errestrial,hybrid as well as space-based markets,due to the wide scope of their potential application.Furthermore,they also feed into both the upstream and downstream segments of the global space economy by,for instance,facilitating the design and manufacturing of spacecrafts or supporting space mis

117、sions.This upstream and downstream categorisation of the space economy is often used by space agencies and organisations worldwide to make sense of the value chain in the space domain.The upstream segment involves activities related to sending spacecraft and satellites into space,including the manuf

118、acturing of launch vehicles and satellites,while the downstream involves activities utilising space data to offer products or services(space applications)as well as ground segment applications(space operations).21 Figure 2.1 Contribution of technology to shaping the upstream and downstream space eco

119、nomy Figure 2.1 Contribution of technology to shaping the upstream and downstream space economy Source:Slapakova,et al.(2022).21 OECD(2019).8 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy The UK continues to contribute to and benefit from both the upstream and downstream segment

120、s of the space economy.The upstream space economy creates jobs in areas such as manufacture and,soon,launch,while contributing to economic growth and wider prosperity.The downstream space economy has potential to boost innovation and improve services depending on SATCOM,EO and PNT,which could genera

121、te growth across a range of industries,including transport and logistics.In the UK,the downstream is measured to be the largest source of space sector income,at 71 per cent.2 Downstream applications of space capabilities have various societal benefits too,such as environmental and public health moni

122、toring.Hence,regulation can play a crucial role in shaping how benefits and costs/risks are either socialised or privatised,with the potential to even generate public revenues(including through ownership stakes and warrants,or the polluter pays principle,in addition to the positive spillovers of spa

123、ce to the economy and tax base).3 This report consequently uses the upstream and downstream categorisation to better understand how critical technologies discussed in Chapter 3 feed into the development of space capabilities and thus activities and markets to be regulated.2.1.4.Regulation is one of

124、many factors shaping how technology develops While advancements in critical technologies and the commercialisation of space are likely to improve the adoption of new space capabilities,significant barriers remain in terms of funding,governance,regulatory frameworks,incentives,and risk appetites rela

125、ted to capability uptake.While it is beyond the scope of this short study to examine these in depth,some cross-cutting enablers that will positively impact the uptake and integration of critical technologies into future space capabilities are4:Investment in key enabling technologies and better utili

126、sation of existing technology.Pathways to access finance and support commercialisation(incl.public-private partnerships).The falling cost of launch,increasing access to orbit and making new products/services viable.Fostering public discourse as well as public and political interest in space.At the s

127、ame time,various barriers exist that could slow or hinder the adoption and/or application of new technologies in space capabilities,including but not limited to5:Limited access to funding and structural inefficiencies in public and private sector mechanisms.Barriers to sector-wide innovation and ada

128、ptation within industry and its supply chains.Uncertainties concerning Technology Readiness Levels(TRLs),appetites for risk,as well as future ethical and governance frameworks for future space applications.Insufficient and fickle or,conversely,excessively ponderous and onerous national and internati

129、onal legal and regulatory mechanisms.Challenges in the development of effective space domain awareness,debris removal and associated risk-mitigations to avoid a breakdown in safe and secure access to space.While the UK is in a good position to shape the future regulatory environment for the space do

130、main,including the use of critical technologies,then,it is essential to consider these technologies in their wider context to fully understand their complex interactions with wider trends in the space economy and regulatory environment posing new challenges for regulators,but also potential opportun

131、ities.9 3.Intersection of emerging technology with space capability This chapter builds on the previous discussion of how emerging technologies form the building blocks of novel space-related capabilities and uses cases,by summarising the possible intersections of each of the critical technologies i

132、dentified in the Governments S&T Framework with the space domain.This list of five key technologies provided by the RHC is augmented by two additional areas suggested by RAND.The sections below outline a brief description of each technology area,and examples of how this might translate into space ca

133、pabilities and use cases.Each short summary is supported by a longer discussion of the technology area in question in Annex B,which explores:Near-term technology trends(based on bibliometric analysis and a literature scan)Possible developments out to 2040(based on horizon scanning)How these could tr

134、anslate into new space capability and use cases How these could prompt new considerations for space regulation in the UK.This technology-focused analysis across Chapter 3 and Annex B,in turn,feeds in subsequent chapters,which will look at the cross-cutting issues that arise from the combination of m

135、ultiple technologies,along with non-technological factors(e.g.,finance,labour),to create new space-related applications and markets that must be proactively shaped through,inter alia,effective regulation to maximise the benefits and mitigate the risks for the UK.This will include regulatory gaps and

136、 dilemmas,and consideration of how to address both the international and domestic dimension of space regulation and adapt the UKs regulatory approach and toolkit to keep pace with rapid technological change.3.1.Summary:intersections with the space domain As the space sector continues to incorporate

137、new technologies,there is the potential to unlock a range of different futures through new space activities and applications.From improving AI to advances in satellite hardware which could enable new capabilities for Earth observation,weather forecasting and telecommunications,or the colonisation of

138、 cis-lunar space,or lunar surface and Mars,a mix of state and private actors are investing heavily in technological innovation to enable a growing range of missions.Examples of major intersections between individual technology areas with the space domain include:10 Implications of Emerging Technolog

139、y for UK Space Regulation Policy AI,autonomy and robotics can improve data analytics and decision making,as well as contributing to active debris removal and in-orbit servicing,while enabling the exploration of celestial bodies such as the Moon and Mars using a mix of uncrewed spacecraft and human-m

140、achine teaming.Telecommunication technologies have the potential to drastically improve connectivity and data transmission,with the potential for space-based data centres to enhance security and efficiency,while increasing the efficiency of data processing.Quantum technologies offer advances in comm

141、unication,computing and sensing technologies,with the potential to enhance or undermine data security and the encryption of satellite communications.Similarly,the implementation of quantum metrology could bring significant improvements to spacecraft navigation and communication,while terrestrial use

142、 of quantum technologies could boost resilience by providing alternatives to space-based services(e.g.,alternatives to reliance on Global navigation satellite system GNSS such as the Global Positioning System GPS,Galileo).Engineering biology holds promise towards the development of food and medicine

143、,which could help sustain life in space,while improving the provision of health services on Earth and for space missions,through scientific breakthroughs such as advanced tissue engineering.Semiconductors can help improve the hardware capabilities,performance and longevity of satellites,data transmi

144、ssion and the accuracy of manoeuvres and measurements,with the potential to enhance space-based services such as PNT,SATCOM and remote sensing to improve lives on Earth.Energy and propulsion advancements have the potential to enable faster and more efficient space travel,unlocking future uses of spa

145、ce for exploration,tourism,crewed missions and the transport of minerals and materials back to Earth,as well as providing new sources of energy for activities in space or on Earth.Novel materials and advanced manufacturing can improve space travel and the performance of space-based assets through li

146、ght-weight,high-strength components.The adoption of self-healing materials,for example,has the potential to increase the lifespan of satellites and reduce the need for in-orbit maintenance.Notably,the intersections between each of these technology areas and the space domain are not all equally matur

147、e.Some areas of R&D and technological innovation have long been established with operations in the space domain.Robotic systems have long been used in space,for example,given the vast majority of space objects are uncrewed,as have various communications technologies and other electronic systems deri

148、ved from semiconductors.By contrast,there has much less history of engineering biology in a space setting.Across all areas,however,space is only one of many sectors where such technologies can be applied,meaning it is not the primary driver of innovation(unlike,say,in the 1960s,when the sheer scale,

149、ambition and resources of the Apollo mission acted to channel the direction of R&D across multiple areas of S&T and to crowd in private-sector investment in areas of interest to NASA).22 22 Mazzucato(2021).11 RAND Europe To illustrate this,the table below compares the intersections with space in pub

150、lished scientific research.Table 3.1 Comparison of intersections between space and technology areas in publications data Table 3.1 Comparison of intersections between space and technology areas in publications data Technology area Search area(space+)in OpenAlex Count All of space sector Space flight

151、,exploration&in-orbit economy 122,100 AI Artificial intelligence and machine learning 26,700 Future telecommunications Telecommunications 22,900 Quantum Quantum mechanics and electrodynamics 21,800 Semiconductor Electrical,electronic and computer engineering 8,600 Engineering biology Synthetic biolo

152、gy,biotech,bioinformatics,biomedical engineering 350 Energy and propulsion Propulsion,solar energy,nuclear energy 2,517 Novel materials and manufacturing Additive manufacturing,materials,material science 3,700 Source:RAND Europe analysis of OpenAlex scientific publications data from 2017 onward(2023

153、).Figure 3.1 Focus areas for scientific research publications in space,as of 2023 Figure 3.1 Focus areas for scientific research publications in space,as of 2023 Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).Note:This covers scientific publications through OpenAlex for the period 2017-2023.Each abstract is repr

154、esented by a small marker and colour-coded by cluster.LLM-generated labels are shown for prominent clusters.See Annex A for more detail.12 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy 3.2.Critical technology 1:AI,autonomy,and robotics AI refers to machines that can perform vari

155、ous functions independently,simulating human intelligence.AI is a critical technology as it can help address complex problems that are difficult or impossible for humans to solve on their own.It can also help automate repetitive tasks,improve situational awareness and decision-making,especially unde

156、r tight timeframes,and provide insights into large amounts of data.23 Related fields of S&T investment and activity include machine learning(ML),autonomy,human-machine teaming(HMT),and robotic systems of varying levels of sophistication,automation,and capacity for collaboration(e.g.,multiple systems

157、 cooperating in a swarm,or a mothership-and-drone configuration).Table 3.2 Examples of capabilities and use cases for AI,autonomy and robotics Table 3.2 Examples of capabilities and use cases for AI,autonomy and robotics Segment Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream Insights from AI will help t

158、o unlock new design and maintenance approaches for space assets,increasing their performance,efficiency,safety,and resilience,boosting value-for-money across the capability lifecycle.AI will increasingly help to assist with spacecraft design,manufacture,and operations(e.g.,autonomous navigation and

159、docking),as well as continuous modelling of digital twins for both terrestrial and space-based systems,helping to predict faults,optimise sensor and network performance,conserve energy,etc.Advances in autonomy and robotics promise to provide space systems with new hardware capabilities(e.g.,enabling

160、 Active Debris Removal ADR,refuelling and in-orbit servicing in the medium-term,or the establishment of resource-extraction and manufacturing complexes in the longer-term).Autonomous and robotic systems are already used widely in exploration(e.g.,probes,rovers);further advances could enable orbital,

161、cis-lunar,Moon or Mars settlements.Downstream The use of AI and ML to make sense of space data could benefit a range of downstream industries and activities,including EO for agriculture,transportation,logistics,finance,telecommunications,and other purposes(e.g.,environment,land use,or climate and we

162、ather monitoring and modelling).This,in turn,can lead to the creation of valuable new markets(e.g.,AI-enabled,space-based climate monitoring could support development of new financial products associated with carbon net zero and the green transition).The use of AI and ML,along with edge computing,ca

163、n also help to reduce the amount of data that needs to be transmitted between satellites and ground stations,e.g.,by automatically deleting cloudy or otherwise not usable satellite imagery,thereby optimising energy,storage,and bandwidth usage,and reducing costs.24 The ability to collect and analyse

164、data from space-based sensors will be crucial not only for myriad civilian purposes,but for national security users as well,enabling monitoring of potential threats,decision support tools for military command and control,and satellite connectivity for uncrewed systems.Source:RAND Europe analysis(202

165、3).Further information is provided in Section B.1,including tech-specific considerations for space regulation.23 Menthe,et al.(2021).24 ESA(2023).13 RAND Europe 3.3.Critical technology 2:telecommunication technologies Telecommunication is the transmission of information by various types of technolog

166、ies over wire,radio,optical or other electromagnetic systems.It has evolved significantly over the years,from traditional landline phone calls to the internet,mobile networks,and is now increasingly dependent on space-based assets and capabilities.Future telecommunications include a range of technol

167、ogies such as space-based global broadband communication and web services,space laser communication technology,flexible satellites,quantum-encrypted communications,electromagnetic spectrum management,in-space communications relay,satellite backhaul,and space-based data centres.These technologies ena

168、ble the transmission of information between multiple locations through electrical signals or electromagnetic waves.Table 3.3 Examples of capabilities and use cases for future telecommunications technologies Table 3.3 Examples of capabilities and use cases for future telecommunications technologies S

169、egment Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream The integration of AI/ML into telecommunications will aid network optimisation,predictive maintenance,and energy efficiency,as examples.25 These advances will both drive costs down and improve technical capabilities including reduced latency.Space-ba

170、sed assets will become integrated into an Internet of Things(IoT)in space.26 This interconnectivity will enhance navigation and communication,improving the monitoring and collection of data about spacecraft,the Earth,and beyond.Flexible satellites that can be reprogrammed once in space offer the opp

171、ortunity to respond to changing demands over time.27 With the growth of data-intensive technologies like AI and the Internet of Things(IoT),there s increasing demand for data storage and processing.As a greater share of this data is either generated in or transferred through space,there will be grea

172、ter demand for space-based data centres,leveraging abundant solar power and natural cooling.28 Downstream The advent of LEO satellite mega-constellations,such as those launched by SpaceX s Starlink project,promises to provide high-speed,low-latency internet access globally.29 By 2040,we could see a

173、fully-fledged internet from space globally.As the internet from space expands,so too will the IoT By 2040,we could see a fully connected world,with billions of devices communicating with each other,transforming manufacturing,agriculture,healthcare,and transportation industries among others.IoT s gro

174、wth will require robust and extensive network coverage,that space-based infrastructure has the potential to provide.6G+communications will help realise new business models and even more advanced downstream technologies.30 This could include immersive technologies such as VR,AR and MR that will likel

175、y require high-speed,low-latency networks to function effectively.Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).Further information is provided in Section B.2,including tech-specific considerations for space regulation.25 ESA(2023).26 Kua,et al.(2021).27 UK Space Agency(2021).28 Thales Alenia Space(2022).29 Mar

176、quina(2022).30 Nguyen,et al.(2022).14 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy 3.4.Critical technology 3:quantum technologies Quantum technologies refer to technologies resulting from the quantum effects of quantum mechanics.31 Quantum technologies include quantum computing

177、,32 quantum sensing,quantum simulation,quantum measurement and quantum materials.Quantum technologies are essential as they have the potential to revolutionise computing,communication,navigation,encryption,and sensing.In the space sector,these technological developments could be applied to improve c

178、ommunications and operational efficiency.Table 3.4 Examples of capabilities and use cases for future quantum technologies Table 3.4 Examples of capabilities and use cases for future quantum technologies Segment Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream Quantum communication could enable new space-b

179、ased communications channels to be secured through physical properties,rather than simple encryption that can be hacked.33 Quantum cryptography can enhance security against adversaries using quantum communication technology,and Quantum Key Distribution(QKD)could enable secure inter-satellite and lon

180、g-distance satellite-to-ground optical communications.Quantum technologies have the potential to improve the accuracy of spacecraft navigation and communication,as well as the detection and characterisation of gravitational waves.Quantum technologies could support future efforts towards space debris

181、 removal,by enabling the rapid and efficient selection of debris,as well as optimised routes and fuel requirements.34 Downstream Developments in quantum technologies have the potential to improve EO capabilities,ranging from seismic activity monitoring and analysis;atmospheric gas monitoring;water q

182、uality monitoring;wildfire monitoring;landslide detection;and air pollution analysis.Space-based magnetometry may have military and defence applications,such as submarine detection.35 Future quantum radiofrequency sensing could lead to improvements in intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance and

183、 electronic warfare.36 Quantum imaging,which detects targets at range and mainly uses the particle nature of light,can have potential military applications such as for ISR and PNT,especially in GPS-denied environments.37 Quantum sensing can contribute to Earth observation and help mitigate the chall

184、enges of climate change and environmental events.38 Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).Further information is provided in Section B.3,including tech-specific considerations for space regulation.31 Ibaraki(2022).32 Quantum computers use qubits and exploit quantum properties like superposition and enta

185、nglement that both significantly accelerate the computers data processing speed.Superposition means a qubit is a mix of 0 and 1 but collapses into a specific state when observed,whilst entanglement is when particles become correlated,so measuring one determines the state of the other,even at large d

186、istances.Source:Gunashekar,et al(2022).33 ESA(2023).34 Short(2023).35 Krelina(2023).36 Krelina(2023).37 Silberglitt,et al.(2022).38 Short(2023).15 RAND Europe 3.5.Critical technology 4:engineering biology Engineering biology applies engineering principles to biology,enabling the manufacture of novel

187、 biological systems,such as cells or proteins,which can be applied across a wide range of sectors,including food,materials and health.39 Bioengineering has the potential to revolutionise space exploration by enabling the development of various new applications,from new materials for spacecraft,to su

188、pporting life in space.Table 3.5 Examples of capabilities and use cases for engineering biology Table 3.5 Examples of capabilities and use cases for engineering biology Segment Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream Engineering biology could contribute to the development of lightweight and durab

189、le materials which could be used in space suits,spacecraft and future habitats.There is also the potential for engineering biology to enable closed-loop life support systems to sustain astronauts in space through water recovery and the production of oxygen.Increased supportability could minimise log

190、istic resupply requirements from Earth.Further,engineering biology processes could allow crews to produce food and materials.For example,NASA is developing a technology that can convert carbon dioxide and water into organic compounds to enable microbial biomanufacturing of food products,vitamins,pla

191、stics and medicine.40 Advances in engineering biology could contribute to the production of biofuels through the treatment of wastewater,which could enable self-sufficient energy production for spacecraft,allowing for longer transit times for crewed missions.Engineering biology has the potential to

192、ensure the health of astronauts during long voyages,by addressing challenges associated with dental health,tissue engineering and emergency wound closure.Wearable biosensors and the ability to regrow tissue could prove critical in enabling crewed missions to Mars and beyond.Human augmentation could

193、allow humans to endure a wider range of environments and prevent illness under adverse conditions,potentially enabling longer voyages in space.Downstream Bio-inspired sensors and imaging systems could be used to provide high-resolution and cost-effective images of the space environment and Earth,whi

194、ch could have application for a range of industries reliant on image analysis,such as agriculture,environmental monitoring and national security.There is also potential for new pharmaceutical drugs to be developed and tested in space,making use of the microgravity environment to experiment medicines

195、 under conditions not possible on Earth.The ISS is currently hosting tests of HIV/AIDs drugs,with potential for further such experiments to take place.41 Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).Further information is provided in Section B.4,including tech-specific considerations for space regulation.39 Co

196、uncil for Science and Technology(2023).40 NASA(2018).41 Varda(2023).16 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy 3.6.Critical technology 5:semiconductors Semiconductors are key components with specific electrical properties,which are vital to modern computing and electronic

197、devices.Semiconductors play a crucial role in the design and manufacture of electronic components for satellites,including microprocessors,memory chips,and power amplifiers.These components are essential for the operation of satellites and other space-related digital technology,including for various

198、 applications such as communication,navigation,and remote sensing.Table 3.6 Examples of capabilities and use cases for semiconductors Table 3.6 Examples of capabilities and use cases for semiconductors Segment Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream Advances in semiconductor technologies are like

199、ly to have significant impacts on space hardware,allowing for miniaturisation and improved performance,making space assets lighter,cheaper and more powerful.The ability of spacecraft to communicate over longer distances without deterioration due to radiation and other challenges of the space environ

200、ment could enable crewed and uncrewed missions to the Moon and Mars.Improved communication through advancements in semiconductor technology also contributes to humanitys ability to sustain space habitats over the longer term.Smaller and more powerful semiconductors could enable advanced solar photov

201、oltaic cells,improving the solar sails of satellites and allowing them to travel further distances.Advanced semiconductors could allow for the creation of space solar farms to harness the suns energy above the atmosphere and transmit this power back to Earth.Semiconductors could contribute to improv

202、ed sensing technologies,enhancing our understanding of celestial bodies and increasing space situational awareness.Advances in semiconductor technologies could improve the accuracy and range of space probes and rovers,enabling deeper exploration of our solar system and neighbouring planets and aster

203、oids.Downstream Semiconductors have the potential to improve the speed and accuracy of data transmission and analysis,allowing higher volumes of data to be processed between spacecraft or with ground stations.As such,semiconductors may contribute to improved GNSS and PNT,and could have considerable

204、spillover effects across sectors such as transport,logistics,communication and national security.As an enabler of other critical technologies such as Quantum and AI/ML,advances in semiconductor technology could empower rapid processing of data,with the potential to advance developments in autonomous

205、 technologies,robotics and other areas.Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).Further information is provided in Section B.5,including tech-specific considerations for space regulation.3.7.Critical technology 6:energy and propulsion Energy and propulsion are essential enabler for space activities.Advance

206、ments in these fields could make it possible to create faster,more efficient and more sustainable space travel.It could also enable permanent settlement of celestial bodies and lead to the realisation of new paradigms of the space economy,such as in-orbit manufacturing.Related fields are those that

207、have to do with natural resource exploration and exploitation,mining,critical minerals and advanced materials.17 RAND Europe Table 3.7 Examples of capabilities and use cases for energy and propulsion technologies Table 3.7 Examples of capabilities and use cases for energy and propulsion technologies

208、 Segment Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream Improved propulsion technologies can make spacecraft more energy efficient.This can enable faster and longer space missions.Currently,spacecraft are designed primarily in function of their fuel system.For example,rockets need to carry very large fu

209、el storage tanks.Implementing different propulsion systems could reduce the design constraints imposed on spacecraft.Sustainable energy sources can reduce the environmental impact of space travel.The in-situ exploitation of energy sources could be a fundamental enabler for the construction of long-t

210、erm bases.Downstream Data provided by space assets can help improve the efficiency of terrestrial energy systems,for example by aiding the forecasting of wind speeds and solar irradiance.Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).Further information is provided in Section B.6,including tech-specific consider

211、ations for space regulation.3.8.Critical technology 7:novel materials and manufacturing Novel materials and manufacturing can transform the space sector by enabling the development of lightweight,high-strength spacecraft and satellite components.They can also improve solar panel performance,thermal

212、control systems and radiation shielding,while reducing mission costs through reusable spacecraft and reduced maintenance.Table 3.8 Examples of capabilities and use cases for novel materials and manufacturing Table 3.8 Examples of capabilities and use cases for novel materials and manufacturing Segme

213、nt Illustrative examples out to 2040 Upstream Additive manufacturing is likely to have a significant impact on the space sector,due to the reduced cost and complexity of spacecraft components.There is currently research underway to test the use of lunar or Mars regolith as a material source for addi

214、tive manufacturing,with the potential to enable in-space manufacturing,thereby reducing the energy required to move large quantities of materials into space for on-site construction of habitats and launch infrastructure.42 Lighter and more resilient materials could further reduce costs and improve t

215、he lifespan of objects,enabling reuse of launchers and components,facilitating deep-space missions.The ability for materials to self-heal could have significant implications for the space capabilities,where assets may not be accessible for in-orbit maintenance or repair.The use of bio-based material

216、s such as wood is being tested to improve sustainability and leverage the cheap and lightweight properties of the material.For example,LignoSat,a joint NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA)project,seeks to launch the first wooden satellite into orbit in 2024.Source:RAND Europe analysis(2

217、023).Further information is provided in Section B.7,including tech-specific considerations for space regulation.42 NASA(2015).18 4.Opportunities and risks for the UK This chapter draws from the emerging technologies outlined briefly in Chapter 3 and examined in more detail in Annex C and turns to th

218、e related opportunities and challenges for the UK.There are likely to be significant scientific,economic,security and diplomatic benefits across both the upstream and downstream segments of the space economy.However,it is important to weigh these benefits against the various challenges,ranging from

219、resourcing challenges to security risks.This chapter provides a high-level overview of these key issues,building both on literature and the stakeholder workshop convened for this study,which may help regulators as they address challenges associated with emerging space capabilities out to 2040.4.1.Op

220、portunities for the UK As space exploration and technology continue to advance,new and emerging space capabilities present opportunities for the United Kingdom.The UK has a long history of space exploration and has made significant contributions to the field.The country has a thriving space industry

221、,leveraging both the upstream and downstream segments of the space economy,with companies involved in satellite manufacture,launch services and space data applications.As an island nation with a long coastline,the UK is geographically well-placed to host launch services,with development underway for

222、 spaceports across the country to reach in-demand orbits.The UK has the potential to capitalise on new and emerging space capabilities to drive economic growth,enhance national security,and advance scientific research.By investing in space technology and infrastructure,fostering innovation,and colla

223、borating with international partners,the UK can position itself as a leader in the global space industry and reap the benefits of this rapidly evolving field.4.1.1.The UK promotes scientific innovation and has an outsized impact on global S&T research and development of space capabilities.The UK has

224、 a strong tradition of scientific research,making significant contributions to the field,with 40 per cent of all small satellites currently in orbit built in the UK.43 The UKs contributions to the JWST is already generating significant scientific insights across a number of areas,including cosmology

225、,exoplanet studies,the formation of stars and planets,and study of the solar system.The UK-built Rosalind Franklin Mars Rover is also expected to launch to Mars in 2028,with the potential to enhance our understanding of 43 ADS(2018).19 RAND Europe Mars and its potential for supporting life.44 There

226、is potential for the UK to have an outsized impact on scientific space discovery,already ranking third in the world for published scientific research.45 The UK launch sector is on the rise,with plans for seven sites underway,offering vertical and horizontal launch across the UK.The UK-US Technology

227、Safeguards Agreement enables US companies to operate from UK spaceports and export space launch technology,providing the UK access to US customers and revenues.Spaceport Cornwall is home to the Centre for Space Technologies,which includes the Space Systems Integration Facility,Space Systems Operatio

228、ns Facility,and R&D Facility.Combined,Cornwalls space cluster is breaking ground on developments in launch and spaceflight,while leading on sustainable practices with plans to roll out a Road to Net Zero roadmap to reduce the carbon impact of launch.46 The UK has implemented a“cluster”approach to th

229、e space industry,bringing together stakeholders from industry,government,and academia,particularly through initiatives such as Harwell Campus(see Box 4.1).This approach has thus far shown to be successful,enabling scientific collaboration,and the sharing of lessons and resources.Clusters play a key

230、role in empowering small and medium enterprises(SMEs),contributing to the interconnected UK space ecosystem.47 Creating an environment where innovations flourishes and access to emerging technologies is ensured is essential for the UK so it can maintain its competitive edge in the international aren

231、a and continue to lead on scientific breakthroughs.Box 4.1 Overview of the Harwell Space Campus Box 4.1 Overview of the Harwell Space Campus The Harwell Space Campus in the UK is widely regarded as a good practice example for the development of a thriving space industry ecosystem.The campus is situa

232、ted on a former RAF site and brings together a range of organisations,including government agencies,research institutions,and private firms,to collaborate and innovate.Notably home to the ESA Business Incubation Centre and the Satellite Applications Catapult,Harwell campus offers laboratories,testin

233、g facilities,and business support services,to support the development of new technologies and applications.The campus has successfully attracted investment and fostering innovation and become a hub for UK space industry.Source:Vorley,et al.(2019).4.1.2.The UK is well-placed to grow the upstream and

234、downstream space economy.Given the limited size of its domestic market compared to the major spacefaring nations and economic blocs(e.g.,the United States,the EU,China,increasingly India),the UK cannot hope to excel in all areas of the space value chain.Nonetheless,it has considerable strengths that

235、 it can bring to bear in key niches,including the ability to draw on areas of comparative advantage in other sectors(e.g.,finance,insurance,AI,quantum,life sciences,pharma,creative arts,education,etc.).In turn,advances in space technology and capabilities of the kind discussed in Chapter 3 are likel

236、y to impact almost all areas of the UK economy out to 2040 and beyond.This is depicted in Figure 4.1 overleaf,drawn from a 2021 RAND study for the UK Space Agency to inform development and implementation of the National Space Strategy.44 BEIS,MOD&UKSA(2021).45 British Council(2023).46 Launch UK(2023

237、).47 Space Enterprise Community(2022).20 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy Figure 4.1 Examples of sectors impacted by rollout of future space technologies and capabilities Figure 4.1 Examples of sectors impacted by rollout of future space technologies and capabilitie

238、s Source:Black,et al.(2022).21 RAND Europe Given the breadth of industries that stand to see innovation arising from space services,the UK continues to contribute to and benefit from both the upstream and downstream segments of the space economy:Upstream:the upstream space economy creates jobs in ar

239、eas such as satellite manufacture and launch applications,while contributing to economic growth and wider prosperity.The upstream sector heavily relies on imports for approximately 60 per cent of its inputs,ranging from small electronic components to large subsystems.However,the sector also has a st

240、rong export market,and the balance between imports and exports is roughly equal.48 Downstream:the downstream space economy has potential to boost UK innovation and improve existing services through satellite data analytics and improved PNT,which could generate growth across a range of industries,inc

241、luding transport and logistics.In the UK,the downstream sector is measured to be the highest source of space sector income,at 71 per cent.49 There are numerous downstream applications with public benefits,such as environmental and public health monitoring.Public procurement or regulation can play a

242、crucial role in these applications due to their wider benefits,with the potential to save public funds and even generate funds through the polluter pays principle.50 Overall,a flourishing space sector could attract investment in the UK,boost the economy,and create high-paying jobs across the UK,in l

243、ine with the levelling up agenda.UK space industry growth rates between 2019/20 and 2020/21 reached 5.1 per cent,outperforming global growth at 1.6 per cent.51 In the same timeframe,the space economy contributed an estimated 7 billion Gross Value Added(GVA)to the UK economy,not taking into considera

244、tion supply chain effects(which added 18.3 billion total GVA effect).52 4.1.3.The UK has a long history of partnerships in space exploration and technology,offering a platform to contribute to global space governance.A permanent member of the UN Security Council and the Five Eyes alliance,as well as

245、 a strong NATO member,the UK has a strong foothold in international space security.The UK is also a member of ESA and has strong ties with the United States and other spacefaring nations.The Artemis Accords,led by the United States and signed by 26 countries including the UK,sets out some of the bro

246、ader principles to govern behaviours and norms in space.The UK is also a member of multilateral organisations involved in space governance,including the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space(COPUOS)and the International Telecommunication Union(ITU).These provide fora for engag

247、ement with other countries on governing space activities.The UK has also made outsized contributions to the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group(OEWG)on promoting responsible uses of space.The OEWG was established in 2018 to develop a set of guidelines for the responsible use of space,with the ai

248、m 48 Space Enterprise Community(2022).49 Space Enterprise Community(2022).50 Space Enterprise Community(2022).51 UK Space Agency(2023).52 UK Space Agency(2023).22 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy of promoting the long-term sustainability of space activities,with the

249、 UK playing a major role in driving activity.As such,the UK is well-placed to act as an international broker for space diplomacy.The UK benefits from not having the same geopolitical challenges and baggage as the United States in the eyes of many smaller nations when it comes to space,due to the his

250、torically dominant position of the United States in this domain.53 Strong international partnerships,technical expertise,and a relatively neutral position in global politics can enable the UK to build trust and facilitate cooperation between countries with different interests.The UK has the potentia

251、l to gain the first movers advantage by proactively shaping the global space regulatory environment and setting the agenda for regulatory debates.This could help ensure that the regulatory environment is evolving in a way that is beneficial for the UK.4.2.Risks and challenges for the UK There are al

252、so several risks and challenges for the UK.A shortage of suitably qualified and experienced personnel(SQEP)has the potential to limit UK advancements in the sector.The increasing militarisation of space,the proliferation of space debris,and the potential for cyber-attacks on space-based assets all p

253、ose significant threats to the UK s space capabilities.Additionally,the UK faces competition from other countries,particularly China and Russia,who are investing heavily in space technology and exploration.4.2.1.Developments in the space can be hindered by the lack of highly skilled workers,includin

254、g data analysts,engineers and software developers.The shortage of SQEP in the UK was highlighted in the Space Sector Skills Survey 2023,which revealed that more than half of UK organisations report skills gaps in their current space workforce.54 The survey showed that organisations with skills gaps

255、experience reduced productivity,problems with product and service delivery,struggle to remain competitive and are less likely to introduce new technologies.Skills gaps in the UK are reportedly most noticeable in electronics,systems engineering and spacecraft operations.55 Though entry-level recruitm

256、ent may be oversubscribed,the pool of skilled individuals atrophies at the more senior levels,in part due to intense competition for key software and data skills in other sectors with higher pay.This has the potential to limit governments ability to deliver across the areas of space strategy,policy,

257、capability development,and operations,especially considering the central role that complex enabling technologies will play in the future of the space sector.56 4.2.2.An increasingly crowded space domain has seen a proliferation of new actors,giving rise to new security challenges both in orbit and o

258、n Earth.Today,most critical national infrastructure is reliant on access to space,and space as a domain plays a unique role as an enabler of defence operations,enabling a range of warfighting capabilities for countries 53 Retter,et al.(2022).54 Space Skills Alliance(2023).55 Space Skills Alliance(20

259、23).56 Retter,et al.(2022).23 RAND Europe with access to space infrastructure.57 Overall,space assets often perform dual-use functions with both military and civilian uses.This can mean that satellites may be seen as attractive targets,in order to weaken adversaries or deny key defence capabilities.

260、Challenges include an increased risk of accidental or intentional escalation of crises,damage caused by space debris,and cyber,electronic,and physical attacks on space-based systems.58 There is also potential for attacks on satellites to have intentional or unintentional spillover effects,generating

261、 debris or causing collisions,which could threaten the safety of other orbits for civil and commercial purposes.59 The United States,Russia,China and India have invested in ASAT capabilities,with Russia conducting a test of a direct-ASAT missile against a satellite target in 2021.60 The test generat

262、ed over 1,500 trackable pieces of debris,risking the integrity of other space assets in LEO,as well as posing a risk to humans onboard the International Space Station.61 Along with kinetic or physical attacks,there is an increased risk of non-kinetic attacks on satellites,such as hacking,jamming or

263、spoofing.Broadening supply chains in the space industry and the use of components from a variety of sources,generates the risk for hostile activity in lower tiers of the supply chain,through building in loopholes into systems allowing adversaries to compromise these.62 While advances in quantum tech

264、nologies may provide additional security and protection from hacking,the ongoing race to improve quantum-enabled satellites could see China seek to penetrate stealth military technologies,denying the United States and its allies air superiority in the event of conflict.63 Russia and Chinas collabora

265、tion and exponential growth of space capabilities has intensified the militarisation of space,with efforts underway to enhance Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance(ISR)capabilities,as well as to grow their arsenals of space-based kinetic and non-kinetic weapons.The exploration of the Lunar s

266、urface and Mars could accelerate competition,particularly with regard to resources and the construction of space-based support infrastructure.To avoid excessive competition and militarisation,there is likely to be a need for diplomacy and collaboration to ensure that space remains a domain for peace

267、ful cooperation and exploration.As technology proliferates,there is also potential for state and non-state actors to bypass legislation and conduct illegal launches and deployment of satellite systems,posing a challenge to regulation and enforcement.For example,US Satellite start-up Swarm Technologi

268、es conducted an unauthorised launch of four satellite prototypes in 2018 onboard a commercial Indian launcher,defying the US Federal Communications Commission and receiving a fine of$900,000.64 Though the assets were swiftly detected,there is potential for further such activity to take place,particu

269、larly if nations lower regulatory standards to attract businesses(the space-faring equivalent of flags of convenience in maritime shipping).Recently,the 57 Retter,et al.(2022).58 Black,et al.(2022).59 Retter,et al.(2022).60 Panda(2021).61 Panda(2021).62 Retter,et al.(2022).63 Howell(2023).64 Sheetz(

270、2018).24 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy North Korean government announced plans to launch a military satellite,which violates UN sanctions which prohibit the nation from testing ballistic missile technology used for space launches.65 The emergence of rogue launch

271、nations or state-backed proxies,acting with plausible deniability and seeking to undermine global norms or wage irregular warfare against target states could give rise to further illicit launches of potentially unsafe or harmful systems which may damage other satellites or the environment.66 Another

272、 challenge resulting from the new dynamics of the space domain is the lack of resources for the UK,and its allies,to thwart the growing financial,industrial and technological grasp that some competitors are gaining in strategic space-related sub-sectors.67 Foreign Direct Investment(FDI)encourages ec

273、onomic growth and prosperity,but can also be a geoeconomic tool that allows the investor to secure a desired dependence from the receiver nation,influencing decision-making within the targeted sector.68 This influence is acutely felt in technology sectors,as it can dictate the direction of innovatio

274、n and even pose security threats.69 From 2018 to 2023,for example,Chinese FDI became a trend in the space industry through the significant amounts of money invested in European space startups and American firms,enabling China to indirectly control technological advancements from these enterprises.70

275、 To circumvent the associated risks,further scrutiny should be exercised when accepting FDI,along with stricter regulation,as is currently the case in the Indian space sector.71 The UK has similarly included satellite and space technologies among the list of 17 areas of the economy of priority inter

276、est to the National Security and Investment Act(NSI Act),and continues to evolve its monitoring and enforcement regime.72 Relatedly,the risk of Intellectual Property(IP)theft remains an important issue among space companies and universities,with the United States in particular airing concerns on pre

277、venting IP theft of space programmes by Chinese actors.73 While industrial collaborations,foreign students and academic exchanges all remain key to furthering scientific discovery,there is a need to balance these benefits against security risks in order to safeguard IP and data and,with this,the UKs

278、 strategic advantage in space.74 The security of supply chains for key enabling technologies,such as semiconductors,and essential raw materials remains an area of concern.In 2022,RAND conducted a tabletop exercise exploring the geopolitical implications of Taiwan s semiconductor dominance,given the

279、nations tensions with the People s Republic of China(PRC).The study found that there are considerable risks associated with the concentration of semiconductor production and there is a need to diversify supply chains to mitigate these.75 Similarly,the export of key components and resources from Chin

280、a poses a risk due to imposed export 65 Tingley(2023).66 Klein(2023).67 Chronopoulos(2023).68 OECD(2019).69 Evroux,et al.(2023);DIT(2021).70 Alamalhodaei(2023);Kelly(2018);Zenglein,et al.(2022).71 Pandey(2023).72 Cabinet Office(2023).73 Erwin(2021).74 Quimbre,et al.(2022);Dortmans,et al.(2022).75 Ma

281、rtin,et al.(2023).25 RAND Europe quotas of rare earth elements,for example,intended to artificially restrict the availability of materials to increase prices outside the country and incentivise relocation of foreign business to China.76 The UK will need to take supply chain security into considerati

282、on to remain at the forefront of technology innovation and ensure the safety and security of future space assets.While the UK is in a good position to leverage its existing scientific,diplomatic and intelligence clout,and strong partnerships(e.g.,CSpO),there remains a need to take into consideration

283、 the scale and pace at which competition and conflict could escalate,and how best the UK could contribute alongside its allies.77 Enhancing the UKs ability to deter,de-escalate,be resilient against,and recover from potential conflict in space is essential if the UK is to mitigate security challenges

284、 and thereby continue to benefit from the scientific and economic opportunities of being a key spacefaring nation.78 76 Villalobos(2022).77 Moroney,et al.(2023).78 MOD(2022b).26 5.Implications for Space Regulation This chapter explores the cross-cutting implications for future space regulation polic

285、y arising from the various technological intersections and space capability developments discussed in Chapters 2 to 4.It begins with a brief overview of the relevant areas of national and international space law and regulation.It then provides examples of the sorts of possible regulatory gaps and ar

286、eas for clarification that emerge from ongoing technological innovation in the space domain differentiating between those pertaining to the near-term rollout of certain new space capabilities,and those longer-term issues which,while not yet felt as acutely,will only become more pressing over time as

287、 the space ecosystem evolves out to 2040 and beyond.Finally,the chapter frames some of the trade-offs and dilemmas that regulators face when trying to grapple with these issues thrown up by the intersection of emerging technologies with space capability development.5.1.Implications of novel technolo

288、gies and capabilities for regulation 5.1.1.The UK strives to become a thought leader in space regulation,promoting sustainability,innovation,and competitiveness,and has made recent progress.The UK is recognised as an influential and innovative player when it comes to the development of law,regulatio

289、ns,and standards notwithstanding the impact of Brexit on its ability to influence the approach taken by the worlds largest single market,the EU.The UK Government aspires to apply a similarly proactive and impactful approach to its regulation of the space sector.Including through active participation

290、 in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space(COPUOS),the UK has long contributed to international efforts to develop legal,regulatory and normative frameworks to shape the evolution of space.79 This includes being party to80:The 1967 Outer Space Treaty The Rescue Agreement Th

291、e Liability Convention The Registration Convention.79 Butchard&Mills(2022).80 By contrast,the UK is not a party to the Moon Agreement,which expands on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to address specific issues relating to activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies.27 RAND Europe At the domestic l

292、evel,the UK was one of the early pioneers to adopt national space legislation to regulate the space operational activities of non-governmental(private commercial)entities,81 having introduced the Outer Space Act in 1986.82 However,recognition of the Acts growing risk of obsolescence in the face of n

293、ew technologies and the growth of the NewSpace economy,sparked a flurry of activity in recent years.Aiming to stay relevant and competitive,the UK has introduced a raft of new legislation,regulation,guidance,and institutional reforms,with developments including:83 Creation of the UK Space Agency in

294、2010.Amendments to the Outer Space Act 1986 in the Deregulation Act 2015.Introduction of new primary legislation,with the Space Industry Act 2018 receiving Royal Assent in 2018 and entering into force from 2021,governing all space-related activities carried out in or from the UK(with the Outer Space

295、 Act 1986 still applying to overseas activities by UK entities).Designation of the Civil Aviation Authority(CAA)as the UKs space regulator,with effect from July 2021,alongside the continuing work of Ofcom as the UKs national spectrum regulator and representative for the International Telecommunicati

296、ons Union.Introduction of new secondary regulation,namely the Space Industry Regulations 2021,the Spaceflight Activities(Investigation of Spaceflight Accidents)Regulations 2021,the Space Industry(Appeals)Regulations 2021,and the Regulators Licensing Rules.Publication of official guidance on a wide r

297、ange of topics,including how to apply for launch operator,orbital operator,spaceport or range control licenses and the associated obligations,and how to assess environmental,security,or safety matters,address accidents,or make appeals.These efforts reflect a wider policy ambition to promote the rapi

298、d growth of the UK space sector alongside sustainable exploitation of the space domain,as per the vision set out in the 2021 National Space Strategy.84 As noted by one expert in space law,The Space Industry Act positively exploded the national space legislation scene,bringing with it 72 sections and

299、 12 schedules,in contrast to the Outer Space Act 1986s 15 sections in turn the new Space Industry Regulations effectively draw from their parent Act.85 As of May 2023,the CAA has reportedly issued some 343 new licences to companies working in the UK space sector,including the countrys first spacepor

300、t and launch licenses;its pipeline of applications under review includes several additional UK spaceports and launch companies.86 The CAA is also now monitoring more than 750 UK satellites in space,and funding technical research on relevant topics to inform development of future regulations and guid

301、ance,such as on the impact of suborbital flights on the health of passengers.87 81 Wheeler(2021).82 UK Government(1986).83 UK Government(2021);Wheeler(2021);Worthy(2023).84 UKSA,et al.(2021).85 Simmonds(2018).86 CAA(2023a).87 CAA(2023a).28 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation

302、Policy In addition,the UK has launched consultations on several other issues and committed to issue further regulations or guidance on emerging space activities such as in-orbit servicing and manufacturing(IOSM)and active debris removal(ADR),expected by 2024 and 2025 respectively.88 5.1.2.Despite th

303、is flurry of recent activity,gaps remain with new technologies and capabilities likely to further test the limitations of existing space regulation.While the UK has made significant progress on space regulation in the last few years,some issues still need further consideration.These include a mix of

304、 ambiguous sections within existing regulations that might need clarifying(non-liquet)and outright gaps(lacunae);in both cases,the lack of detailed answers on certain topics might be intrinsic,intentional features of space law and regulation,or unintentional and emergent over time,with technological

305、 progress unlocking new space capabilities and use cases that the original authors did not imagine at the time of writing.89 Emerging technologies such as those explored in Chapters 2-4 can place pressure on the regulatory framework in several ways,exposing possible gaps or areas of insufficient cla

306、rity.These include:Boosting the scale and diversity of activities in space,and the complex interactions between different technologies,activities and markets that were hitherto kept separate.Enhancing existing capabilities either boosting safety and reliability,or,conversely,introducing new safety r

307、isks,environmental impacts or other externalities that need to be regulated.Creating entirely new use cases and markets,with unfamiliar risks and opportunities to shape.Providing new technical means of either enhancing or degrading regulators access to evidence to inform licensing and other decision

308、s(e.g.,black box algorithms and non-deterministic AI would make it harder for regulators to validate and verify claims made about the safety of autonomous space systems,whereas advances in satellite surveillance and tracking could aid with monitoring and enforcement of national space regulations for

309、 UK spacecraft).Deepening cross-border linkages(e.g.,through enabling sharing of multiple payloads within a single satellite bus;or promoting globalised supply chains for key enabling technologies),with all the associated jurisdictional complications that this brings.Creating a more congested,contes

310、ted,and competitive space environment,with a more complex ecosystem of space stakeholders,and thus more dependencies,vulnerabilities,and risks to mitigate.Testing the limits of regulatory competence by introducing novel areas of S&T for which resource-constrained regulatory organisations need find s

311、uitable technical expertise,models and data.Placing time pressure on regulatory policymaking,given the pace of technological and commercial innovation,and the need for regulators to make complex but timely decisions that balance several competing imperatives while dealing with deep uncertainty about

312、 the future(see Section 4.1.3).88 Worthy(2023).89 Johnson(2019).29 RAND Europe 5.1.3.Collectively,the technologies examined in Chapter 3 support the rollout of a series of space capabilities that demand near-term attention from regulators.Developments in many of the technology areas examined for thi

313、s report are already feeding into capabilities on or nearing the market.The proponents of such capabilities are thus vying for regulators attention,especially as the UK Government seeks to achieve its 10-year vision for growing the space sector in line with the ambitions of the 2021 National Space S

314、trategy.A literature scan and stakeholder workshop suggest some near-term regulatory issues meriting further consideration if the UK is to keep pace with technology.Table 5.1 Possible near-term considerations for space regulation Table 5.1 Possible near-term considerations for space regulation Focus

315、 area Examples of possible regulatory priorities,gaps,and issues Embedding,Continuing to develop bespoke regulatory approaches to retain UK regulatory maturing,and thought leadership and competitiveness,encouraging Foreign Direct Investment(FDI)refining the new UK in the UK space sector.90 regulator

316、y framework Continuing to routinise and streamline the licensing of launch,orbital operators,spaceports(for both vertical and horizontal launch),range controls,etc.91 Enhancing regulators access to data from industry,including through data standards,increasing the ability to make informed assessment

317、s and to model potential risks and impacts from novel space technologies and capabilities.92 Driving down the financial and non-financial burdens on license applicants and regulators alike.93 Providing regulatory Promoting Space Domain Awareness(SDA)and trusted sources of insight into what enablers

318、for areas of is happening,and why,in space,as a basis of monitoring and attribution of major near-term behaviours on orbit.94 growth Addressing safety and other risks associated with the increase in space tourism.95 Continuing to understand and mitigate the safety risks,debris generation and spectru

319、m interference challenges,and insurance provisions associated with mega-constellations in LEO.96 Developing regulations and guidance to enable creation of a viable UK industry for active debris removal(ADR)and in-orbit servicing and manufacturing(IOSM),in line with wider UK investments and policy go

320、als in this area,while also addressing the associated risks in terms of potential perception by some states of such dual-use capabilities as hostile or weaponised.97 Ensuring that insurance and third-party liability(TPL)provisions remain appropriate in a fast-changing space sector.98 90 Wheeler(2021

321、).91 Worthy(2023).92 Ligor,et al.(2023).93 Hawkins,et al.(2019).94 Retter,et al.(2023).95 Ligor,et al.(2023).96 Simmonds(2021).97 Worthy(2023).98 Worthy(2023).30 Implications of Emerging Technology for UK Space Regulation Policy Focus area Examples of possible regulatory priorities,gaps,and issues A

322、ddressing national security and resilience concerns Promoting norms of responsible behaviour more generally,building on the UKs leadership in the relevant UN Open-Ended Working Group,including in terms of establishing agreed norms for close-proximity missions,etc.99 Addressing the ambiguity over wha

323、t constitutes a space weapon,given the dual-use nature of technologies,especially in the context of heightened geopolitical tensions more generally.100 Using regulation to help promote greater resilience of space systems and space-dependent services to deal with space weather and other natural hazar

324、ds(e.g.,outages caused by debris/collisions).101 Source:RAND Europe analysis(2023).5.1.4.In the long-term,more ambitious use cases will require a similarly bold look at space law and regulation.There are many regulatory gaps and ambiguities that will only become more pressing as technology progresse

325、s.As discussed in Chapter 3,these include specific tech-related gaps,e.g.,developing suitable regulations for space-based solar power102;nuclear power sources103;biosafety in space104;geoengineering105;etc.It also means addressing more cross-cutting questions to shape the sector in the long-term.Exa

326、mples emerging from the literature scan and stakeholder workshop held for the RHC study include:Table 5.2 Possible medium-and long-term considerations for space regulation Table 5.2 Possible medium-and long-term considerations for space regulation Focus area Examples of possible regulatory prioritie

327、s,gaps,and issues Governing a more expansive,diverse,and complex space ecosystem Streamlining licensing as many uses of space become more routinised and delivered at scale,while promoting international standards and collaboration between relevant agencies across jurisdictions.106 Addressing the inev

328、itable need for robust Space Traffic Management(STM),backed by SDA,as the usage of space increases,(e.g.,by means of a space-sector equivalent to the Chicago Convention,such as establishing an International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO for space,creating a new UN specialist agency,or expanding t

329、he remit of ICAO beyond Earths atmosphere).107 Moving beyond allocation of slots in GEO and regulating use of other strategically important locations within space,e.g.,Lagrange Points,to avoid conflict and manage competition.108 99 Retter,et al.(2023).100 McClintock,et al.(2021).101 Black(2018).102

330、Soroka&Kurkova(2019);Abashidze,et al.(2022);Pagallo,et al.(2023).103 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission(2023).104 Scott(2016);Rutter,et al.(2020).105 McClintock,McCormick,et al.(2023).106 RHC(2024).107 McClintock,et al.(2023);McCormick,et al.(2023).108 Byers&Boley(2022).31 RAND Europe Focus area Examp

331、les of possible regulatory priorities,gaps,and issues Promoting spectrum sharing with new telecommunications technologies,refining ITU and Ofcoms approach to regulating spectrum use to encourage rollout of 6G+.109 Addressing questions around spectrum management and comms in cislunar and lunar space.

332、110 Clarifying liability and other issues associated with spacecraft and other objects that originate from space-based manufacturing lines,e.g.,using in-situ resource utilisation(ISRU),rather than having been launched from Earth(given the focus of so many clauses and obligations on launch countries

333、in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,or the Registration and Liability Conventions).111 Similarly,considering any legislative or regulatory updates required for humans and animals born in space.Managing safety Clarifying the application of space law and regulations in situations involving risks at scale machine agents(i.e.,AI and autonomous systems),rather than humans(e.g.,pilots on spacecraft,or launch