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1、The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionI N S I G H T R E P O R TJ A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5In collaboration with McKinsey&CompanyImages:Getty ImagesDisclaimer This document is published by the World Economic Forum as a contribution to a project,insight area or interaction.The findings,interpr

2、etations and conclusions expressed herein are a result of a collaborative process facilitated and endorsed by the World Economic Forum but whose results do not necessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum,nor the entirety of its Members,Partners or other stakeholders.2025 World Econom

3、ic Forum.All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,including photocopying and recording,or by any information storage and retrieval system.ContentsForeword 3About the Global Cooperation Barometer 4Executive summary 6Introduction:The

4、state of global cooperation 71 Five pillars of global cooperation 11Pillar 1:Trade and capital 11Pillar 2:Innovation and technology 14Pillar 3:Climate and natural capital 16Pillar 4:Health and wellness 18Pillar 5:Peace and security 202 Recommendations:the need for disordered cooperation 22Appendix 2

5、3Contributors 26Endnotes 28The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition2ForewordThe second edition of the Global Cooperation Barometer comes amid unsettled political and geopolitical climates.Political shockwaves cut across many continents this past year a“super year”of elections in which ha

6、lf the worlds population had the opportunity to go to the polls.1 For the first time,every governing party facing an election in a developed economy lost vote share.2 These expressions of electorate disapproval are due,in large measure,to forces that have been building for over a decade and were int

7、ensified by the COVID-19 pandemic.A sense ofinsecurity financial or personal has increased alongside feelings that the“system”has not been working.People around the world are looking for solutions while expressing a desire for change tothe mechanisms meant to deliver results.At the same time,the glo

8、bal order that held for the first 30 years after the end of the Cold War has passed.Today,competition and conflict are rising,and countries are re-examining their place in the world.Alongside geopolitical upheaval,technological change is also under way.The rapid development and uptake of frontier te

9、chnologies such as generative artificial intelligence ispoised to reshape economies and societies.While the geopolitical dial wont,and shouldnt,turn back to the order of the past,it must turn more towards cooperation.Advancing global health,prosperity and resilience cannot be done by single nations

10、alone.Resolving ongoing security challenges can only happen through multilateral and multistakeholder processes.Unlocking the benefits of technological innovations in an equitable way while ensuring necessary guardrails are in place to mitigate risks will require some form of coordination.As a resul

11、t,leaders will need new mechanisms for working together on key priorities,even as they disagree on others.The past several years have shown this balance is possible.Foreign investment announcements are increasing across the world and data and intellectual property(IP)are flowing between countries in

12、 ever greater quantities.Meanwhile,global commitments to climate-and resilience-linked finance continue to grow.It is against this backdrop that the World Economic Forum and McKinsey&Company have released this second edition of the Global Cooperation Barometer with a focus on where cooperation stand

13、s today and what it can look like in the new technological age.The inaugural 2024 report stated its intentions:to serve as a tool for leaders to better understand the contours of cooperation broadly and along five pillars trade and capital flows,innovation and technology,climate and natural capital,

14、health and wellness,and peace and security.In its second year,the barometer draws on new data from the 41 indicators to offer an updated picture of the state of cooperation today:overall cooperation has been steady,with some significant drops that are offset by other gains.The hope is that by measur

15、ing the state of cooperation,the barometer can track trends and identify the potential for new areas of cooperation and help plot a path forward.Brge Brende President and Chief Executive Officer,World Economic ForumBob Sternfels Global Managing Partner,McKinsey&CompanyThe Global Cooperation Baromete

16、r 2025 Second Edition January 2025The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition3About the Global Cooperation Barometer The Global Cooperation Barometer is structured along five dimensions of global connection:trade and capital,innovation and technology,climate and natural capital,health and w

17、ellness,and peace and security.These five pillars were chosen because of their impact on global development and their explicit dependence on cooperative efforts among nations and economies.As a guiding element in the analysis,the barometer identified goals that actors are working towards in each of

18、these themes.In doing so,the barometer draws inspiration from the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs)and the efforts of other global institutions.To quantify change in these pillars,41 indicators were identified that research suggests are either cooperative actions that advance progre

19、ss towards the goals of the pillars or demonstrate a broad outcome from those actions.Cooperative action metrics measure actions that provide evidence of cooperation;these indicators(such as flows of goods and exchange of intellectual property)are evidence of real,manifested cooperation and do not i

20、nclude“on paper”commitments.Outcome metrics(such as life expectancy)measure the progress of cooperation but are typically influenced by additional factors beyond cooperation.The metrics span countries in all geographies and all levels of development.The barometer examines the period from 2012 to 202

21、3 to establish a trend line of cooperation.It indexes data to 2020 for the following reason:as the COVID-19 pandemic(hereafter referred to as“the pandemic”)took hold,it accelerated many existing trends in business and society and set many new ones in motion.Indexing the time series to 2020 highlight

22、s the trends in place before the pandemic and those that emerged from it.Note that some metrics have been inverted so that any increase represents a positive development.Though this tool is imperfect and necessarily incomplete,it offers an overview of global cooperation that both captures broad tren

23、ds and identifies important nuances.The methodology used for the Global Cooperation Barometer is outlined on the following page.Details on sourcing of individual metrics are in the Appendix.The Global Cooperation Barometers five pillars of global cooperationFIGURE 1The barometer rests on five pillar

24、s of global cooperation Trade and capitalPromote global development and resilienceFocus of analysis is on 1)development and resilient outcomes;through 2)presence of global economic flows that promote likely opportunities for these outcomes Innovationand technology Accelerate innovation and beneficia

25、l technological progress Focus of analysis is on 1)global progressin innovation and technology;through 2)presence of the global sharing of underlying knowledge that contributes to these outcomes by fostering collaboration across global talent Climate and natural capital Support the resolution of cli

26、mate and natural capital challenges Focus of analysis is on 1)lowering of emissions,preservation of natural capital,and preparedness for likely impact of climate change;through,2)shared global goals/commitments that increase humanitys ability to limit and adapt to the dynamics ofa changing climate H

27、ealthand wellness Enable global population to lead longer and better lives Focus of analysis is on 1)impact of the burden of disease on duration and quality of life;through 2)commitment to global public health standards and collaboration through flows of goods,R&D/IP and health financing Peaceand se

28、curity Prevent and resolve conflictsFocus of analysis is on 1)prevention of death and long-term negative implications of conflict;through,2)commitment to multilateral peacekeeping operations and international stabilization efforts 4The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionData coverage1.G

29、eography Across all metrics,the barometer aims to collect global data.In most cases,an aggregate global weighted average is available.When a global weighted average is not available,the most comprehensive data is used such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)member countri

30、es,or a sample set of countries where data is available for all years.2.Years While the barometer measures cooperation from 2012 through 2023,some metrics do not have data for all years.All metrics have 2020 data to ensure the indexed trendline can be calculated.Index calculationTo evaluate global c

31、ooperation fairly and compare trendlines of the action and outcome metrics across the five pillars,the global cooperation barometer applies the following methodology:1.Indexed trendlines Data from 2020 serves as the base year to develop comparable trendlines,with all values in 2020 equal to one(2020

32、=1).This base-year standardization is the basis of the score calculation,enabling a uniform reference point for all metrics and comparability,despite different units and datasets.2.Data normalization Where possible,metrics are normalized to ensure that trendlines can be assessed independently of the

33、 effects of economic growth or population changes.For example,trade,capital and other financial flows are normalized to global GDP(gross domestic product)while migration metrics are normalized to global population levels.3.Weighting Each pillar comprises two indices:an action index and an outcome in

34、dex.To arrive at each,the metrics within are weighted equally (i.e.the action index is a simple average of metrics measuring cooperative actions).The overall index for a pillar is calculated as an average of the action and outcome metrics.Aggregate indices across pillars are also calculated as a sim

35、ple average of pillar indices(i.e.equal weighting across pillars).5The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionAs the world transitions from what had been a stable post-Cold War global order to a new,more unsettled and unpredictable period,political and geopolitical turbulence has the potent

36、ial to degrade global cooperative efforts.But it does not need to.Amid mounting economic,environmental,technological and security challenges,constituencies may not be in favour of current methods but are looking for collaborative solutions to,rather than retreat from,these issues.As a result,leaders

37、 will need to be adaptive and innovative within todays more disordered context,identifying new ways to work with partners to deliver results.Progress will be especially important,not only because the patience of populations is wearing thin but because time is running out.As the world enters the latt

38、er half of the decade,there is limited time to meet the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs),of which just 17%arecurrently on course.3This lack of progress comes as the past year was the hottest on record,the global economy faces weak growth prospects and global security is at a crisis point.Many of

39、these challenges caused voters around the world to express a desire for a change to the status quo.Yet,despite strong voter backlash last year against sitting governments,there are signals that constituencies are looking toaccelerate rather than derail solutions.For instance,a large share of the glo

40、bal population wants their respective country to do more when it comes to addressing climate change.4 At the same time,advancements in frontier technologies are racing ahead faster than mechanisms can be developed to address theirrisks and share their benefits.Leaders even thosewho may be market or

41、geostrategic competitors will need to work together to unlock the benefits oftechnology while placing appropriate safeguards around it.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 uses 41 indicators to measure the current state of global cooperation.As with last years inaugural edition,the aim is to offer

42、leaders a tool to better understand the contours of cooperation broadly and along five pillars:trade and capital flows,innovation and technology,climate and natural capital,health and wellness,and peace and security.In this way,leaders can identify what is working and what is not,and adjust course a

43、ccordingly.The barometer finds that after trending mostly positively for the better part of a decade,overall global cooperation is above pre-COVID-19 pandemic(hereafter referred to as“the pandemic”)levels but has flatlined over the past three years.A key reason for the stall has been the significant

44、 degradation in global peace and security,which has pulled the barometers overall measurement down.Still,the barometer shows that while cooperation may be slowing in some areas,there are also signs of growth.Trade and capital:cooperation dropped slightly,driven mostly by reductions in goods trade in

45、 China and developing economies.These declines were partially offset by growing flows of capital,services and people.Innovation and technology:digitization of the global economy continues to drive increased cooperation,but global fragmentation of frontier technologies could slow global productivity

46、growth.Climate and natural capital:cooperation continues to show strength,but it needs to improve much more and much faster if the world is to meet climate and natural capital goals.Health and wellness:health outcomes like life expectancy continue to improve post-pandemic,but cross-border developmen

47、t assistance for health is falling.Peace and security:the worlds collective security system is under severe pressure from geopolitical tensions.Cooperation on this pillar deteriorated and pulled down the overall barometer.Increased conflicts and the high number of forcibly displaced people are promi

48、nent challenges.Ultimately,as last years edition presented,the foundation of resilience,security and growth is cooperation.The question leaders must ask themselves,then,is not whether they should cooperate,but how.Executive summaryAmid increasing global disorder,leaders must find new ways to coopera

49、te.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition6Introduction:The state of global cooperationWithin a turbulent global context,cooperation is flatlining.Global cooperation overall and by pillar FIGURE 2Health and wellnessTrade and capitalInnovation and technologyClimate and natural capitalPea

50、ce and securityOverallOverall0.70.80.91.01.11.2201620172018201920122013201420152020202120222023Global Cooperation Barometer over timeSource:Aggregation of 41 metrics,McKinsey&Company analysis.Global cooperation is above pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels,but only barely,and has stagnated since 2020.The fl

51、atlining of cooperation comes as the world is entering a state of greater instability caused by high levels of electoral discontent and geopolitical rivalry.The last year saw elections in 72 countries,withmany incumbent governments,both left and right facing strong voter backlash.The common messagea

52、mong electorates has been for change to the status quo.At the same time,global tensions have risen,threatening to undermine prior patterns ofmultilateral cooperation.A“purgatory of polarity”,as the United Nations(UN)Secretary-General Antnio Guterres termed it in which global divisions widen and hard

53、en is most stark when it comes to the degradation of security around the world.5 Russias invasion of Ukraine is approaching the three-year mark,ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have taken the lives of tens of thousands and the war in Sudan is creating a humanitarian crisis.All told,it is estimat

54、ed that 122 million people worldwide are currently forcibly displaced,double the number from a decade ago.6 The inability of the international community to come together to prevent or stop this escalation of violence is the most serious concern about the state of the global cooperative muscle.The co

55、ncern with a stalled level of cooperation is that as the world enters the second half of the decade,with critical global deadlines ahead,progress is not where it needs to be.For instance,just 17%of the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs)are on track to meet the 2030 deadline.7 Furthermore,as many co

56、mmunities have experienced,global temperatures have risen to record levels,with 2024 being the hottest year on record.8 Additionally,global economic growth is projected to be at historically The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition7weak levels(3.1%over the coming five years),according to

57、 the International Monetary Fund(IMF).9 This projection comes alongside a burgeoning debt crisis that has left over 3 billion people living in countries that spend more on debt interest than education or health.10The sharp decline in global security has weighed heavily on the Global Cooperation Baro

58、meters calculation of global cooperation.It is a key reason the barometer shows that for the last three years,overall global cooperation has levelled off despite relatively stronger levels of cooperation in the areas of climate and nature,innovation and technology,and health and wellness(Figure 2).H

59、owever,the flatlining of cooperation does not mean that cooperation has completely receded.In September 2024,the UN General Assembly adopted the Pact for the Future an ambitious agenda to strengthen international cooperation and revitalize multilateralism.In November,the worlds 20 largest economies

60、agreed in Rio de Janeiro to a joint G20 Leaders Declaration,a few days prior to a global agreement for a climate financing at the UN Climate Change Conference(COP29)in Baku.However,both did fall short of expectations,signalling that the global cooperative muscle,while working,is atrophying.The mixed

61、 picture of cooperation is salient when comparing cooperation before and after the COVID-19 pandemic(Figure 3).Strengthened cooperation can be seen across four of the five pillars,notably when it comes to indicators that track the cross-border spread of knowledge,R&D,data flows and the increase of c

62、ertain capital flows such as foreign investment and climate finance.However,these positive markers should be qualified in two ways;firstly,that rising flows were often concentrated in a few economies,potentially undermining the broad-based prosperity that is needed to sustain cooperative trends.Seco

63、ndly,as noted,these flows remain well below levels required to reach collective goals(for example,reaching net-zero targets).As the world moves further away from the post-Cold War era of cooperation and finds itself in a period of greater disorder,it is at risk of maintaining a new,structurally mute

64、d cooperative normal that offers fewer opportunities for actors to pursue solutions to known and emerging global issues together.To avoid this outcome,leaders will need to take steps that deliver immediate results to populations who are waiting for answers while putting the world on course towards a

65、chieving collective goals.Comparison of pre-and post-pandemic cooperationFIGURE 30.751.102022-23 average1.000.950.900.850.801.05Excluding the COVID-19 period,cooperation has increased across all pillars besides peace and security2018-19 average0.850.860.870.880.890.900.910.920.930.940.950.960.970.98

66、0.991.001.011.021.03Extrapolated increase based on 2012-19 trend45 line,where 2022-23 average=2018-19 averageThe black 45-degree line marks where cooperation in the latest two years(2022-23)is equal to the two years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic(2018-19),and the red line represents where the metri

67、cs would be if they maintained the average pre-pandemic trend.Four of the pillars displayed increased levels of cooperation relative to the pre-pandemic trend(above both the red and black lines).Health and wellnessHigher post-2020Climate and natural capitalTrade and capitalInnovation and technologyP

68、eace and securityLower post-2020Source:Aggregation of 41 metrics,McKinsey&Company analysis.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition8Frontier technologies are reshaping the global landscape.As the world enters a new period in which machine learning applications will scale across economies

69、 and societies,mastering artificial intelligence(AI)will be crucial for countries and companies to deliver growth.11 Generative AI alone could generate$2.6 trillion to$4.4 trillion in value across industries.12 Yet,while AI is projected to affect almost 40%of jobs around the world,according to the I

70、MF,approximately half of these are at risk of redundancy.13 Both companies and countries are racing to position themselves competitively within this new reality.In just over a year since it was introduced,generative AI is being used by the organizations of 65%of respondents to a McKinsey&Company sur

71、vey of global executives.14 At the country level,US federal investment in AI has accelerated significantly15 in recent years and China is expected to invest$1.4 trillion in its AI industry over the coming years.16 Saudi Arabia has committed17 to invest$100 billion in AI projects and India announced

72、plans to develop a“national AI innovation ecosystem”.18The rapid increase in national funding of AI,alongside restrictions in some countries over the ability to invest in foreign markets,raises the possibility of a new frontline of geostrategic competition,with the potential for an“AI arms race”in w

73、hich countries compete in zero-sum rivalry for geostrategic advantage.19 This landscape of competition would complicate the ability to develop safeguards to mitigate the risks of new technology.Left ungoverned,AI could accelerate the dissemination of disinformation and bring new risks to peace and s

74、ecurity.Yet,signs of cooperation have emerged.For instance,in November 2024 at a meeting in Peru on the sidelines of the APEC Summit,Chinese President Xi and US President Biden agreed to prevent AI from having control over nuclear weapons systems.In September,the UN Secretary-Generals High-level Adv

75、isory Body on AI issued its final report,Governing AI for Humanity,which presents the first global plan for addressing AI-related risks and ensuring the benefits of the technology are shared equitably.In todays challenging context,leaders will both need to find ways to work together to prevent new a

76、dvancements in AI from being used for harmful purposes(either on its own or by malicious actors),and unlock benefits in the areas the Global Cooperation Barometer measures.Trade and capital:crucial to and a beneficiary of new technologiesWell-functioning global cooperation in the form of trade and c

77、apital flow is a crucial requirement for the invention and deployment of new technologies.This type of cooperation includes the flow of financing for innovation,the flow of cross-border services to develop innovation,and the flow of materials and goods to manufacture and distribute innovation.Once t

78、echnologies are developed,cooperation is needed to ensure that these technologies are shared equitably.Rising trade restrictions,especially in important innovation sectors such as low-carbon technologies,present significant risks to global cooperation and progress on sustainability goals and the glo

79、bal accessibility of these innovations.20While trade is crucial for facilitating the development of new technologies,new technologies can offer immense efficiency gains and increased opportunities for trade.By some estimates,digitizing the trade ecosystem could increase trade across the G7 by nearly

80、$9 trillion or nearly 43%.21 Mastering artificial intelligence will be crucial for countries and companies to deliver growth.Innovation:a frontline of cooperation and competition9The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionClimate and natural capital:innovation as a lynchpin of meeting green

81、 goals As much as 90%of 2050 baseline man-made emissions could potentially be abated using current technologies.22 However,less than 10%of the required deployment has occurred to date.23 Cooperation is needed to realize the potential of technologies and ensure they are deployed and equitably distrib

82、uted.Indeed,the Paris Agreement notes“the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions”when it comes to climate action.24Nascent innovations that are early in their development curve but could be crucial for the energy transition could also open(and rely on)ne

83、w avenues of cooperation.For example,decarbonizing steel and ammonia could motivate new flows of hydrogen derivatives and“green iron”between economies in Africa and Europe.Health and wellness:advancing global health requires shared innovationFrontier technologies are showing immense promise regardin

84、g the detection,diagnosis and treatment of diseases.Yet,these developments,as well as long-standing technologies such as imaging devices,are often limited in low-and middle-income countries.25 Cooperative approaches to bringing medical technology to underserved areas or developing innovation or prod

85、uction pipelines will be key to advancing global health priorities.The many biomedical innovations born of cooperation that are now gaining momentum will continue to provide a tailwind for health outcomes around the world.The BioNTech/Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine comprised of 280 components from 19 diffe

86、rent countries26 pioneered the use of mRNA(messenger ribonucleic acid)vaccines,which are now being studied for their potential to treat a range of diseases,from influenza to cancer.At the same time,global collaboration is crucial to strengthening risk detection and protocols for pandemics.The World

87、Health Organizations(WHO)Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence is working towards a world where collaborative surveillance empowers countries and communities to minimize the impact of pandemic and epidemic threats.Collaborative surveillance,preparedness,response and resilience facilitate the sy

88、stematic strengthening of capacity among diverse stakeholders globally(both within and beyond the health sector)to enhance public health intelligence and improve evidence for decision-making.Peace and security:innovation as a tool for accord Technology has been a long-standing factor in shaping deve

89、lopments on the battlefield,but in recent years,new technologies have also helped with conflict response and even mitigation.High-resolution satellite imagery has been indispensable in assessing infrastructure damage in Ukraine.Organizations such as the UN Institute for Training and Research(UNITAR)

90、and private companies such as Maxar Technologies have provided up-to-date images of conflict zones.These images help map destroyed buildings,roads,bridges and utilities.The data supports humanitarian aid planning and lays the groundwork for future reconstruction efforts by identifying priority areas

91、 for rebuilding.Organizations are using AI and technologies like secure content verification tools on the frontline of conflict to identify patterns of violence,monitor ceasefire agreements and help strengthen peacekeeping efforts.27 Improved cooperation could help prevent conflicts from spreading b

92、y identifying and countering misinformation online,defending computer systems against cyberattacks,and developing technology to help mitigate damage,such as early-warning systems,emergency services,and search and rescue.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition10Five pillars of global coo

93、perationMeasuring cooperation along five pillars presents a picture of where cooperation is increasing and where it isnt.The Global Cooperation Barometer measures global cooperation across five areas,or pillars:trade and capital flows,innovation and technology,climate and natural capital,health and

94、wellness,and peace and security.Each pillar examines evidence of cooperative actions and outcomes of these actions to determine an overall level of global cooperation in that area.1Pillar 1Cooperation dropped slightly,driven mostly by reductions in goods trade from China and developing economies.The

95、se declines were partially offset by growing flows of capital,servicesand people.The trade and capital pillar looks at cooperation through flows of goods and services,trade,capital and people.It includes metrics about the magnitude of flows such as foreign direct investment or labour migration and t

96、he distribution of flows(including trade concentration and developing country share of manufactured goods).The global trade and capital flows pillar was on an upward trajectory from 2012 to 2022,overcoming even the volatility during the pandemic(see Figure 4).In 2023,this pillar experienced a small

97、decline,though almost all indicators remain above their pre-pandemic averages(above the black line inFigure 5).The exceptions are foreign portfolio investment(FPI)and trade concentration,which sit below their pre-pandemic averages.Trade of goods dropped by 5%in 2023,partially reversing some of the l

98、arge growth experienced in the prior two years.28 China accounted for nearly 15%of the reduction in global exports in 2023,and other emerging economies accounted for another 45%both as a result of increased conflicts29 and slower economic growth.Trade between Western and Eastern-aligned economies de

99、clined,while trade between partners who are geopolitically aligned increased,indicating an apparent intensification of geopolitical fragmentation.30 The World Trade Organization(WTO)projects the goods trade will increase by 2.7%in 2024,31 but warns that“geopolitical tensions and increased economic p

100、olicy uncertainty”are putting the near-term and medium-term growth forecasts into question.There are strong headwinds ahead interventions such as tariffs have increased three-to six-fold on trade between the US and China,the worlds two largest economies,since 2017.32Trade and capital Trade between p

101、artners who are geopolitically aligned increased,indicating an apparent intensification of geopolitical fragmentation.11The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionTrade and capital flow trendsFIGURE 42012-202020-222022-23Improvement in:6/102012-207/102020-226/102022-23-10-505100.600.650.700

102、.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.10201220142016201820202022Trends in developing countries and shrinking goods trade led to a slight drop in 2023Compound annual growth rate(CAGR)%Trade and capital indexForeign direct investment(FDI)stockLabour migrationServices tradeRemittancesForeign portfolio investmen

103、t(FPI)Trade concentration*,*Official development assistanceDeveloping countries share of FDIDeveloping countries share of manufacturing exports*Goods trade*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.*Outcome metrics.Note:Due to missing data in some metrics,data from the closest years are used

104、 to calculate the trend.These metrics include cross-border data flows.Sources:World Bank,UN Trade and Development(UNCTAD),UN Comtrade,International Monetary Fund(IMF),Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD),International Labour Organization(ILO),McKinsey&Company analysis.12The G

105、lobal Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionPre-and post-pandemic trade and capital cooperationFIGURE 50.601.202022-23 average1.000.950.900.850.800.650.700.751.051.101.152018-19 average0.450.500.550.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.101.151.2045 line,where 2022-23 average=2018-19 averageOnl

106、y trade concentration and FPI are lower today than pre-pandemicIndex averagesODAFDIFPIRemittancesGoods tradeDeveloping share of FDIServices tradeDeveloping share of manufacturingInternational migrationReduction in trade concentrationHigher post-2020Lower post-2020Sources:World Bank,UN Trade and Deve

107、lopment(UNCTAD),UN Comtrade,International Monetary Fund(IMF),Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD),International Labour Organization(ILO),McKinsey&Company analysis.While goods trade has retreated,capital flows grew in 2023.Foreign direct investment(FDI)and FPI stocks outgrew G

108、DP(gross domestic product)in 2023,a positive sign for cooperation,though the main beneficiaries were a small set of developed countries.Some of the largest FDI projects announced in 2023 were investments in strategic sectors,such as semiconductors,batteries and renewable energy,that were the focus o

109、f industrial policy,mostly in the US and Europe.In fact,as the world fragmented further in 2023,developing economies saw a decline in their share of trade and capital flows.Their share of global manufacturing exports dropped by two percentage points(mostly due to a decrease from China),and their sha

110、re of FDI inflows dropped by one percentage point.Developing economies also saw a flatlining of development assistance they received as a proportion of their gross national income(GNI).Nonetheless,there were bright spots of increased interconnectedness.In 2023,labour migration increased by 4.1%,and

111、remittances(the money foreign workers send to their home country)increased by 2.5%.Both have now surpassed their pre-2020 levels,indicating that flows of labour and immigration seem tohave recovered from the COVID-19 period(in 2020,migration flows fell by 2.5%and remittances dropped by almost 5%).Lo

112、oking ahead,substantial uncertainty remains about the evolution of trade and capital flows,as economies continue to reconfigure their economic ties.A fragmented global economy risks setting back progress on global priorities such as reducing poverty and inequality and can dampen growth while fuellin

113、g inflationary pressures.33 Leaders will need to pursue policies that strengthen trade while also investing in domestic programmes such as training and education to help make trade more inclusive.34The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition13Digitization of the global economy continues to

114、drive increased cooperation,but global fragmentation of frontier technologies could slow global productivity growth.The innovation and technology pillar examines elements of global cooperation that can accelerate innovation and create beneficial technological progress.In 2023,growth in this pillar c

115、ontinued the positive trajectory it has seen since 2012(see Figure 6).Almost all metrics remain above their pre-pandemic averages(above the black line in Figure 7).International students are the exception,which remain below their pre-pandemic average.The digitization of the global economy continued

116、to propel the growth of this pillar.In particular,IT services trade,cross-border data flows and the number of individuals using the internet continued to increase in 2023.Global cooperation in technology and innovation also continued to drive global adoption of newtechnologies.Lithium-ion batteries,

117、which rely onhighly global value chains,saw their prices fallin 2023.35 This was partly driven by continued innovation and a strong ramp-up in the supply of intensely traded critical minerals inputs,often enabled by advances in prospecting and extractiontechnologies.Pillar 2Innovation and technology

118、 Innovation and technology trendsFIGURE 62012-202020-222022-23ExtrapolationImprovement in:8/92012-206/92020-226/82022-23-10-20-50510150.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.10201220142016201820202022There were gains across the innovation portfolio in 2023,moderated only by declining trade in good

119、sCompound annual growth rate(CAGR)%Innovation and technology indexAverage price of a lithium-ion battery*,*IT services tradeInternational studentsCross-border data flowsIndividuals using the internet*Total factor productivity growth*Cross-border patent applicationsIT goods/intermediates tradeCross-b

120、order R&D*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.*Outcome metrics.Note:Due to missing data in some metrics,data from the closest years are used to calculate the trend.These metrics include cross-border data flows.Sources:The Conference Board,International Telecommunication Union,Bloomberg

121、NEF,Cisco,United Nations Trade and Development(UNCTAD),PATSTAT,Institute of International Education(IIE),Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development(OECD),McKinsey&Company analysis.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition14Pre-and post-pandemic innovation and technology cooper

122、ationFIGURE 72022-23 averageKnowledge sharing indicators tend to be above pre-pandemic trendIndex averages0.600.651.202018-19 average0.450.500.550.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.101.151.201.051.000.900.950.800.750.850.701.101.1545 line,where 2022-23 average=2018-19 averageBattery priceInter

123、net usersCross-border R&DTrade in IT goodsInternational studentsTotal factor productivity(TFP)Cross-border patentsCross-border data flowsTrade in IT servicesHigher post-2020Lower post-2020Sources:The Conference Board,International Telecommunication Union,BloombergNEF,Cisco,United Nations Trade and D

124、evelopment(UNCTAD),PATSTAT,Institute of International Education(IIE),Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development(OECD),McKinsey&Company analysis.This drop in price supported a growth of 30%in the deployment ofthis technology.Finally,in 2023,student flows started to rebound after their pan

125、demic decline,although they remain below their pre-pandemic average.Despite these positive signs,there are major questions about the global fragmentation of frontier technologies as different economies strive to maintain their advantages.Important supply chains,such as semiconductors,have been impac

126、ted by increased measures to control flows of raw materials and advanced technologies.36 The transfer of some intangibles around the globe has also slowed.Cross-border patent applications fell in 2023,and cross-border R&D fell in 2022(the latest year for which this data is available).All of these tr

127、ends may be contributing to theworryingly stagnant trajectory of total factor productivity(TFP).37 While not the only indicator,TFP is a useful measurement of overall innovation.It measures the ratio of overall output(GDP)to overall inputs,with innovation being a key factor inincreasing the producti

128、vity level.Looking ahead,as innovation becomes a frontline of geostrategic considerations,leaders will need to identify pathways for implementing common-sense security measures while not cutting off cooperation.For instance,sovereign AI developing AI systems and attendant capabilities within nationa

129、l borders can be pursued alongside the advancement of multilateral partnerships that set standards,establish guardrails and facilitate cross-border data flows38The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition15Pillar 3Cooperation improved in 2023 but would need to improve much more and much fast

130、er if the world is to meet global climate and natural capital goals.This pillar looks at the global cooperation on lowering emissions,preserving natural capital and preparing for the likely effects of climate change.Our measure shows modest improvement in 2023(see Figure 8).Nearly all metrics are ab

131、ove their pre-pandemic averages(black line in Figure 9).Nonetheless,because global emissions continue to rise,this pillar would need increased and accelerated cooperation if the world is to reach stated climate and natural capital goals.In 2023,cooperation in this pillar grew as finance and trade fl

132、ows enabled improvements in deployment and emissions intensity.Climate finance flows from both the public and private sectors reached new heights.Despite this growth,finance flows remain below the level required to make a meaningful impact.The capital committed to climate finance as of 2023 was betw

133、een a tenth and a fifth of the projected annual needs for the world to reach net zero by 2030.39The growth of finance flows also enabled expanded technology deployment and associated growth in trade.Trading in low-carbon technology products was 12%higher in 2023,one of the only categories of goods t

134、rade that saw growth.The acceleration of growth in the rollout of low-emissions technologies contributed to a decline in the emissions intensity of GDP(i.e.a reduction in emissions generated by unit Climate and natural capitalClimate and natural capital trendsFIGURE 82012-202020-222022-23Partial ext

135、rapolation(some countries reporting 2023 numbers)ExtrapolationImprovement in:7/82012-207/82020-226/82022-23-5025355101520300.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.101.15201220142016201820202022There were positive gains across the board on climate cooperation,headlined by accelerating financeCompou

136、nd annual growth rate(CAGR)%Climate and natural capital indexFinance:global climate mitigationFinance:global climate adaptationGlobal trade in low-carbon technology products*Global progress on emissions intensity*,*Terrestrial protected areas(million km2)Ocean Health Index*Global progress on emissio

137、ns*Marine protected area(million km2)*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.*Outcome metrics.Note:Due to missing data in some metrics,data from the closest years are used to calculate the trend.These metrics include terrestrial protected areas,climate finance mitigation and climate finan

138、ce adaptation.Trade in low-carbon technology products mostly based in 2023 actuals,partial extrapolation for missing dataSources:International Monetary Fund(IMF),Climate Policy Initiative(CPI),Organizational Health Index(OHI),Protected Planet,United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP),McKinsey&Compa

139、ny.16The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second EditionPre-and post-pandemic climate and natural capital cooperationFIGURE 91.002022-23 average0.600.900.800.701.101.201.601.301.401.501.702018-19 average0.450.500.550.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.101.151.20Climate finance has outperformed

140、 pre-pandemic trend,but progress in reducing emissions has laggedIndex averages45 line,where 2022-23 average=2018-19 averageClimate finance(mitigation)Trade in low-carbon goodsMarine protected areaClimate finance(adaptation)Emissions intensityTerrestrial protected areasOcean Health IndexEmissionsHig

141、her post-2020Lower post-2020Sources:International Monetary Fund(IMF),Climate Policy Initiative(CPI),Organizational Health Index(OHI),Protected Planet,United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP),McKinsey&Company analysis.of economic output).For example,solar and wind deployment moderated coal and gas

142、demand for power generation,while the deployment of electric vehicles(EVs)led to less oil demand than would have otherwise been observed.40 These trends continued in 2024,with continued growth in the deployment of EVs(including a 25%year-on-year increase in the first half of 2024)and renewable energ

143、y(including a 36%year-on-year increase in the first half of 2024).41Importantly,despite this progress,the world continues to be far from what would be required for a net-zero scenario.Absolute greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions grew in 2023 and are on track to set yet another record high in 2024.42 By som

144、e estimates,only around 10%of the required deployment of low-emissions technologies to meet climate goals has been achieved and further progress would require more global cooperation,including more flows of trade and capital.43 For example,clean technologies,such as solar,wind and EVs,rely on well-f

145、unctioning flows of critical minerals.44 Measures of cooperation relating to natural capital were mostly flat including terrestrial protected areas and the ocean health index or even declined last year,including marine protected areas(down by 1.3%).Looking ahead,though elements of climate and nature

146、 cooperation may continue on a positive trajectory,protectionist policies in key economies may set back efforts to reach net zero by 2050.These challenges to advancing a global climate agenda should not be used as an excuse to delay other efforts in the near term,particularly scaling up carbon tradi

147、ng mechanisms,investing in green technologies and securing the additional financing needed to meet climate targets.45The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition17Pillar 4Health outcomes like life expectancy continue to improve post-pandemic but cross-border assistance is falling.The health

148、and wellness pillar looks at the impact of global cooperation on enabling people worldwide to live longer and better lives.Cooperation increased from 2012 to 2019 and spiked in 2020 as the world navigated the pandemic.There was a decline in 2021 and 2022,which was partially reversed in 2023.Almost a

149、ll of the metrics in this pillar therefore remain above their pre-pandemic averages(represented by the black line in Figure 11).In 2023,metrics related to health outcomes(child mortality,maternal mortality and life expectancy)improved,but at a slower rate than before the pandemic.Disability-adjusted

150、 life years(DALYs),one of the key measures of health,stagnated after significant improvement in 2022.There is a risk that decreased cooperative actions now will eventually drag down health outcomes,as the former lags the latter.In fact,metrics related to cooperative actions,including cross-border as

151、sistance and pharmaceutical R&D,have continued to fall since 2020,although they remain above pre-pandemic levels.Health and wellnessHealth and wellness trendsFIGURE 102012-202020-222022-23ExtrapolationImprovement in:7/82012-204/82020-223/72022-23-20-15515-10-50100.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.002

152、01220142016201820202022Health outcomes saw steady improvement in 2023,but development assistance retreated with distance from the pandemicCompound annual growth rate(CAGR)%Health and wellness indexMaternal mortality*,*Disability-adjusted life year*,*Health-related goods tradeInternational Health Reg

153、ulations scoreDevelopment assistance for healthCross-border pharma R&DChild mortality*Life expectancy at birth*,*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.*Outcome metrics.Note:Trade in health-related goods mostly based in 2023 actuals,partial extrapolation for missing data.Sources:UN,Instit

154、ute for Health Metrics and Evaluation(IHME),Policy Cures Research,World Health Organization(WHO),UN Comtrade,McKinsey&Company analysis.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition18Pre-and post-pandemic health and wellness cooperationFIGURE 110.601.202022-23 average1.000.950.900.850.800.650.

155、700.751.051.101.15Most metrics are in line with pre-pandemic trends except assistance and pharma R&DIndex averages2018-19 average0.450.500.550.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.101.151.2045 line,where 2022-23 average=2018-19 averageMaternal mortalityHigher post-2020Lower post-2020Cross-border

156、flows of pharma R&D/intellectual property(IP)Health development assistanceTrade in health goodsInternational health regulationsChild mortalityDALYsLife expectancySources:United Nations(UN),Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation(IHME),Policy Cures Research,World Health Organization(WHO),UN Comtr

157、ade,McKinsey&Company analysis.There were other indications of flagging advancement in cooperation actions.For instance,trade in health-related goods,like most goods trade,fell this past year.International Health Regulations scores also declined,a sign that public health capacity was stagnating or fa

158、lling around the world.Furthermore,the World Health Assembly(WHA)failed to align on a Pandemic Agreement(a comprehensive,binding framework under the WHO constitution to better prevent,prepare for and respond to future pandemics).The latter is a stark example of challenges in post-pandemic global coo

159、peration on health and particularly concerning given the recent re-emergence of Mpox.Additionally,the growing number and protracted nature of conflicts around the world could have a major negative effect on global health outcomes,both from the physical impacts of conflict and the cascading disruptio

160、ns to health systems.46Looking ahead,actors will need to build cooperative mechanisms to protect against global health threats so that they bolster their own health systems.Over the next 25 years,the global population aged 60 and over is projected to double.This means that many economies will need t

161、o share best practices for developing health systems that are sustainable and can support this burgeoning ageing population while they collaborate on addressing near-term global health risks.47The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition19Pillar 5The worlds collective security system is unde

162、r severe pressure from geopolitical divides,with actors unable to prevent or end conflict.Levels of conflict and attendant humanitarian crises have increased to record levels in the past year.The peace and security pillar examines the impact of global cooperation in preventing and resolving conflict

163、s.The focus is on the prevention of death and ameliorating the long-term negative implications of conflict through commitment to multilateral peacekeeping operations and international stabilization efforts.This pillar has deteriorated for the past seven years and continued its trajectory in 2023.All

164、 metrics in this pillar remain below their pre-pandemic averages(below the black line in Figure 13).The decline in this pillar had the largest impact on the overall barometer results.Multilateral institutions that were created to prevent and resolve conflicts have largely been unable to do so in rec

165、ent years.The result has been a continued increase in conflicts in 2023,with the continued deterioration of security,including but not limited to the Middle East,Russia-Ukraine and Sudan,and a significant increase in the number of forcibly displaced people,estimated at more than 118 million in 2023

166、and over 122 million as of 2024.48Actions by the UN,such as new or augmented peacekeeping missions or resolutions from the UN Security Council,have been largely confined to humanitarian assistance rather than peace-making.49 Notably,the Security Council has not mandated a new peacekeeping operation

167、since 2014.Instead,there has been a shift towards regionally led peace operations.Recent analysis by the International Peace Institute found that cooperative actions in peace and security decreased the most among Peace and securityPeace and security trendsFIGURE 122012-202020-222022-23Improvement in

168、:3/62012-201/62020-222/62022-23-20204000.650.700.750.800.850.901.001.101.050.950.60201220142016201820202022Escalating conflicts have continued to drag on overall global cooperationCompound annual growth rate(CAGR)%Peace and security indexFatalities from conflicts*,*Significant cyber incidents*,*Forc

169、ibly displaced people*,*Conflicts*Ratio of mulitateral peacekeepingoperations-to-conflictsRatio of UNSC resolutions-to-conflicts*Metrics were reflected given negative connotation.*Outcome metrics.Note:Fatalities from conflicts is a lagging indicator.Sources:United Nations High Commission on Refugees

170、(UNHCR),UPPSALA,Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS),Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI),United Nations Security Council(UNSC),McKinsey&Company analysis.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition20Pre-and post-pandemic peace and security cooperationFIGUR

171、E 130.802022-23 average0.601.000.950.900.850.650.751.051.101.15All metrics are below pre-pandemic trendIndex averages0.702018-19 average0.450.500.550.600.650.700.750.800.850.900.951.001.051.101.151.201.2545 line,where 2022-23 average=2018-19 averageCyber incidentsLower post-2020FatalitiesForcibly di

172、splaced peopleUNSC resolutionsPeace operationsConflictsHigher post-2020Source:United Nations High Commission on Refugees(UNHCR),UPPSALA,Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS),Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI),United Nations Security Council(UNSC),McKinsey&Company

173、analysis.several domains of the multilateral system,50 with the Security Council passing fewer resolutions in 2023 than in any yearsince 2013.Although preliminary figures suggest fatalities declined in 2023,following a ceasefire in Ethiopia(one of the largest sources of casualties in 2022),final fig

174、ures may be revised upward due to increased fatalities in Sudan,Ukraine,Gaza and other frontlines of war.51Conflicts have also continued to figure extensively in the digital domain.Some measure of optimism can be seen in the fact that the number of significant cyber incidents was below the 2020 peak

175、 for the third consecutive year.That said,additional cooperation between governments and companies will be needed to improve cybersecurity standards and protect personal data and critical infrastructure.In September 2024,the UN General Assembly adopted the Pact for the Future,which includes commitme

176、nts to“redouble”efforts to build and sustain peace,but thus far,progress on this agenda has remained elusive.52The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition21Recommendations:The need for disordered cooperation 2Leaders across public and private sectors face new urgency in deepening cooperatio

177、n on critical global objectives that they cannot advance alone.Yet,such cooperation is at risk of becoming elusive as the world seems poised to enter a period of instability and volatility an era of greater geopolitical(and,in some cases,political)disorder.Because the landscape is fast-changing,hist

178、orical strategies for cooperation will likely be less effective than they once were.The following,therefore,are steps that leaders can take to build cooperation in todays context:Find flexible ways to cooperate.Leaders should be open to new approaches to cooperation that may depart from the more ord

179、erly approach that was fit for a more stable global context.While existing partnership models and multilateral mechanisms may still offer the possibility of broad global agreements,leaders cannot rely solely on approaches that were designed for more collaborative climates.Instead,within todays unset

180、tled political and geopolitical periods,leaders must be opportunistic and open to dynamic partnerships that may differ from issue to issue.Though this approach may feel disordered,ultimately,it will likely have the greatest chance of delivering effective solutions.Practice“planned opportunism”.Leade

181、rs must be ready to pivot quickly towards opportunities as soon as they emerge.“Planned opportunism”requires the ability to read weak geopolitical or market signals that offer early indications of emerging cooperative trends;it also requires the agility to rapidly reallocate resources to capture the

182、se nascent opportunities.53 To have this capacity,governments will need to be open to signals that may run counter to their assumptions or conventional thinking and build more nimble,responsive teams.Businesses will need to strengthen in-house geopolitical expertise and put in place mechanisms for r

183、eading these signals as well as empower teams to make decisions accordingly.Redefine proximity.To identify novel cooperative solutions,leaders will need to reevaluate what“proximity”means.While stakeholders who are geographically nearby,ideologically aligned or operate in the same sectors often make

184、 for natural partners,leaders will likely need to look further afield when it comes to forging solutions.This means potential partners should be seen as those who are not necessarily physically or ideologically nearby,but who are proximate to workable solutions and desirable outcomes.Think big by st

185、arting small.Leaders should not overlook what may appear to be small opportunities for cooperation.Starting with these small cooperative approaches can yield large long-term results,as the 2024 edition of the Global Cooperation Barometer advised,because,over time,cooperation can beget cooperation as

186、 trust among parties grows.Consider“structural segmentation”.In the private sector,firms are facing an existential question of whether they should remain global in a risk-filled landscape.One potential response is to pursue“structural segmentation”,which entails a series of moves to manage geopoliti

187、cal exposure,to enable locally informed decision-making,and to clear a pathway to safe,stable growth.Structural segmentation can take several forms,from localizing parallel activities in multiple locations across the world to relocating towards home or geopolitically aligned countries,at least in se

188、lect domains.This allows companies to retain a global footprint and its advantages while at the same time increasing resilience by reducing exposure to risks.Importantly,todays political climate and the urgency of issues like climate change,a weak global economy and a deteriorating global security l

189、andscape have shortened the timeframe leaders have to deliver results.Leaders will need to implement tools that are brutally honest in measuring progress and in keeping companies and countries only on pathways that are moving towards solutions.Staying the course on ineffective pathways will only bui

190、ld greater distrust among partners,leaders and between leaders and their constituents.However,being agile and pivoting to cooperative solutions will both deliver results and build trust among constituencies,creating a virtuous cycle in which trust in cooperation deepens and new opportunities for sha

191、red solutions emerge.Being agile and pivoting to cooperative solutions will both deliver results and build trust among constituencies.The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition22AppendixSources and methodologyThe section below highlights two important features of the 41 indicators included

192、 in the barometer:their sources and the methodology used to construct global trend lines(if a transformation was applied),organized by pillar.Trade and capitalDeveloping countries share of foreign direct investment(FDI)Methodological notes:FDI is defined as inward stock.Calculation uses categorizati

193、on of developing and developed countries as defined by the UN Statistics Division.Source:United Nations Trade and Development(UNCTAD)Developing countries share of manufacturing exports Methodological notes:Calculation uses categorization of developing and developed countries as defined by the UN Sta

194、tistics Division.Source:World BankFDI stock(as a percentage of GDP)Source:UNCTADForeign portfolio investment(FPI)(as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:End-December holdings used for 2012;end-June holdings used for 2013-2023(due to data availability).Source:International Monetary Fund(IMF)Good

195、s trade(as a percentage of GDP)Source:World BankLabour migration (as a percentage of the population)Methodological notes:For countries where 2023 data was unavailable,international migrant data was extrapolated using a five-year compound annual growth rate(CAGR).Source:International Labour Organizat

196、ion(ILO)Official development assistance(ODA)(as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:According to the OECD,prior to 2018,the ODA flows basis methodology covered loans expressed on a“cash basis,”meaning their full face value was included;repayments were subtracted as they came in.From 2018,the OD

197、A grant-equivalent methodology is used whereby only the“grant portion”of the loan that is,the amount“given”by lending below market rates counts as ODA.Source:Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)Remittances(as a percentage of GDP)Source:World BankServices trade(as a percentage

198、 of GDP)Source:World BankTrade concentration Methodological notes:Concentration is defined in this instance as the total value of concentrated imports as a share of total imports.First,the Herfindahl-Hirschman index(HHI)is computed for imports across all products for all countries.Then,each countrys

199、 imported product is categorized as“high concentration”(HHI greater than 3,000)or“low concentration”(HHI less than 3,000).Finally,the total value of trade for both concentration categories is aggregated over time to calculate the value share ofhigh-and low-concentration products globally.The 2023 fi

200、gure was extrapolated by applying the rate of change found from the partially reported 2023 data to the corresponding 2022 data and applying that tothe balance of the 2022 data.Source:UN ComtradeInnovation and technologyAverage price of a lithium-ion battery Methodological notes:Two published charts

201、 were used to construct the decade trend line:one presenting data from 2010-2018,and one presenting data from 2013-2023.Data from the former chart were used for years 2012-2018,and 2019-2023 data was extrapolated using the year-on-year growth rates from the latter chart.Source:BloombergNEFCross-bord

202、er data flows (as a percentage of total intellectual property traffic)Source:International Telecommunication Union(ITU)(international bandwidth usage);Cisco(IP traffic),TeleGeographyMethodological notes:2023 figure was extrapolated using the growth rate from TeleGeography report.Cross-border patent

203、applications (as a percentage of total patent applications)Source:European Patent Office,PATSTATCross-border R&D(as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:Total R&D is used in this instance as a proxy for cross-border R&D,given that cross-border R&D data is scant.Source:OECDThe Global Cooperation

204、Barometer 2025 Second Edition23Individuals using the internet Source:International Telecommunication Union(ITU)International students (as a percentage of the population)Methodological notes:Due to data availability,destination countries included are Australia,Canada,China,France,Germany,Japan,New Ze

205、aland,Norway,Spain,the UK and the US.The2021 values were linearly interpolated for Chinaand Norway.Source:Institute of International EducationIT goods trade(as a percentage of GDP)Source:UNCTADIT services trade(as a percentage of GDP)Source:UNCTADTotal factor productivity Source:The Conference Board

206、Climate and natural capitalAdaptation finance(as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:2023 figures were extrapolated based on the 2012-2022 CAGR.Source:Climate Policy Initiative(CPI)Biodiversity Intactness Index This metric was removed this year as it had not recently been updated.Its removal di

207、d not have a material impact.Greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions Source:United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP)GHG emissions intensity (ratio of emissions to GDP)Source:UNEP and World BankLow-carbon goods trade (as a percentage of GDP)Source:IMFMethodological notes:The 2023 figure was extrapolated from

208、the partially reported 2023 data to the corresponding 2022 data and applying that to the balance of the 2022 data.Marine protected area Source:Protected PlanetMitigation finance(as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:Mitigation finance includes dual-use finance,as it is assumed to be total clim

209、ate finance minus adaptation finance.The 2023 figure for total climate finance was extrapolated based on the 2012-2022 CAGR.Source:CPIOcean Health Index Source:Ocean Health IndexTerrestrial protected area Methodological notes:The 2022 and 2023 figures were extrapolated based on the 2012-2021 CAGR.So

210、urce:Protected PlanetHealth and wellnessCross-border health-related R&D (as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:Total health-related R&D isused in this instance as a proxy for cross-border R&D,given that cross-border R&D data is scant.Source:Policy Cures ResearchDevelopment assistance for healt

211、h(DAH)(as a percentage of GDP)Source:Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation(IHME)Disability-adjusted life years(DALYs)Methodological notes:IHMEs forecasted values were used for the 2020-2022 figures.Source:IHMEHealth-related goods trade (as a percentage of GDP)Methodological notes:The 2023 figu

212、re was extrapolated by applying the rate of change found in the reported data between 2022 and 2023 to the 2022 figure.Source:UN ComtradeInternational Health Regulations(IHR)score Methodological notes:All capacities average score used Source:WHOLife expectancy at birth Source:United NationsMaternal

213、mortality Source:IHMEUnder-five mortality Source:IHMEThe Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition24Peace and securityConflicts Source:Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP)Fatalities Source:UCDPForcibly displaced people Source:United Nations High Commission on Refugees(UNHCR)Multilateral peacek

214、eeping operations Source:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI)Significant cyber incidents Methodological notes:Significant cyber incidents are defined by CSIS as cyberattacks on government agencies,defence and high-tech companies,or economic crimes with losses of more than$1 millio

215、n.Source:Center for Strategicand International Studies(CSIS)UN Security Council resolutions Source:United Nations The Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition25ContributorsWorld Economic Forum Mirek DuekManaging Director Ariel KastnerHead,Geopolitical Agenda and CommunicationsJessica Margoli

216、sLead,Geopolitical Agenda Miriam SchiveDeputy Head,Geopolitical Agenda Production Laurence DenmarkCreative Director,Studio Miko Martha HowlettLead Editor,Studio MikoJay KellyDesigner,Studio MikoWill LileyEditor,Studio MikoMcKinsey&Company Oliver BevanPartner,Chicago,Risk and Resilience Practice Andr

217、es CadenaSenior Partner,Bogota,Strategy and Corporate Finance PracticeJeffrey CondonSenior Knowledge Expert,Atlanta,McKinsey Global InstituteTiago DevesaSenior Fellow,Lisbon,McKinsey Global Institute Mekala KrishnanPartner,Boston,McKinsey Global InstituteAcha LekeSenior Partner,Johannesburg,Social,H

218、ealthcare,and Public Sector Entities Practice and Chairman of McKinseys Africa regionMichael NearyEngagement Manager,San Francisco,McKinsey Global InstituteDaniel PacthodSenior Partner,New York;Global Leader,McKinsey Leadership FactoryOlivia WhiteSenior Partner,San Francisco,Director,McKinsey Global

219、 Institute Thank you to Anna Bruce-Lockhart,Charlotte Beale,Alexander Court,Trevor Chueu,Beatrice Di Caro,Karis Everhart,Spencer Feingold,Harry Gray Calvo,Maxwell Hall,Gayle Markovitz,Alan Mwendwa,Akolade Omishope,Luca Pasqualotti,Sybile Penhirin,Robin Pomeroy,Emily Poyser,Anais Rassat,Julia Rignot

220、and Christina Schunck with the World Economic Forum and Taylor Burns at McKinsey&Company for assistance in developing and launching the report.Thank you to Shreyangi Prasad and Daniel Soto and Senior Editor Max Berley and Editorial Director Mark Staples of McKinsey Global Publishing.This project ben

221、efited from the perspectives of individuals at McKinsey&Company:Matt Craven,Santiago Gazzo,Max Gleischman,Ziad Haider,Charlie Lewis,Jan Mischke,Ramiro Prudencio,Roger Roberts and Carlo Tanghetti.The report benefited from the insight and expertise of several members of the Global Cooperation Baromete

222、r Advisory Board(serving on the advisory board does not constitute endorsement of the reports finding).Members of the advisory board were drawn from the World Economic Forums network of Global Future Councils and included the below.Thankyou to Judith Espinoza,Rabab Fayad,Haleh Nazeri,Houssam Al Wazz

223、an and Kyle Winters at theWorld Economic Forum for facilitating discussion at the 17 October 2024 meeting of the Global Cooperation Advisory Board meeting in Dubai.AcknowledgementsThe Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition26Basma AlBuhairanManaging Director,Centre for the Fourth Industrial

224、 Revolution Saudi ArabiaDubai Abulhoul AlfalasiChief Executive Officer,Fiker InstituteBen CaldecottFounding Director,Oxford Sustainable Finance GroupIlona Szab de CarvalhoPresident,Igarape InstituteSantiago Fernndez de LisHead,Regulation,BBVA Mona HaddadGlobal Director,Trade,Investment and Competiti

225、veness,The World BankJane HarmanChair,United States Commission on the National Defense StrategyBruce JonesSenior Fellow,Center for Security,Strategy and Technology,The Brookings InstitutionLynn KuokChair,Southeast Asia Studies,The Brookings InstitutionOttilia Anna MaunganidzeHead,Special Projects,In

226、stitute for Security Studies(ISS)Eileen McNeelyMember,Faculty;Executive Director,Sustainability and Health Initiative,Harvard UniversityRobin NiblettDistinguished Fellow,Chatham HouseDanny QuahDean and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics,Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,National University of Sin

227、gaporeSamir SaranPresident,Observer Research Foundation(ORF)Jagjit Singh Srai Director,Research;Head,Centre for International Manufacturing,Institute for Manufacturing,University of Cambridge Kellee TsaiDean,College of Social Sciences and Humanities,Northeastern UniversityJrgen Karl ZattlerNon-Resid

228、ent Fellow,Center for Global Development)Weihuan ZhouAssociate Professor and Co-Director of CIBEL Centre,Faculty of Law and Justice,University of New South WalesThe Global Cooperation Barometer 2025 Second Edition27Endnotes1.United Nations Development Programme(UNDP).(n.d.).A Super Year for Election

229、s.https:/www.undp.org/super-year-elections.2.Burn-Murdoch,J.(2024).Democrats join 2024s graveyard of incumbents.Financial Times.https:/ Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.(2024).With less than one fifth of targets on track,world is failing to deliver on promise of the Sustainable Deve

230、lopment Goals,warns new UN report.https:/www.un.org/en/with-less-than-one-fifth-of-targets-on-track#:text=The%20report%20reveals%20that%20only,one%2Dthird%20stalled%20or%20regressing.4.United Nations Development Programme(UNDP).(n.d.).Peoples Climate Vote 2024.https:/peoplesclimate.vote/.5.United Na

231、tions.(2024).UNs Guterres urges global solutions as uncertain world edges toward a powder keg.https:/news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154771.6.United Nations High Commission on Refugees(UNHCR).(n.d.).Data and Statistics:Global Trends.https:/www.unhcr.org/global-trends#:text=Over%20117.3%20million%20peo

232、ple%20were%20forcibly%20displaced%20at%20the%20end%20of%202023.&text=This%20equates%20to%20more%20than%201%20in%20every%2069%20people%20on%20Earth.&text=The%20number%20of%20displaced%20people%20has%20increased%20every%20year%20for%2012%20years.7.United Nations.(2024).World on Track to Achieve Only 1

233、7 Per Cent of 2030 Agenda Targets,Speakers Warn,as Second Committee Takes Up Sustainable Development Reports.https:/press.un.org/en/2024/gaef3604.doc.htm#:text=With%20only%20six%20years%20remaining,as%20it%20took%20up%20that.8.Abnett,K.&A.Withers.(2025).2024 is the hottest year on record,EU scientis

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