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1、Chief Economists OutlookCentre for the New Economy and SocietyJanuary 20252Chief Economists OutlookDisclaimer This document is published by the World Economic Forum as a contribution to aproject,insight area or interaction.The findings,interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are a result of

2、 a collaborative process facilitated and endorsed by the World Economic Forum but whose results do not necessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum,nor the entirety of its Members,Partners or other stakeholders.2025 World Economic Forum.All rights reserved.No part of this publication

3、may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,including photocopying and recording,or by any information storage and retrieval system.3Chief Economists OutlookChief Economists OutlookJanuary 2025This briefing builds on the latest policy development research as well as consultations an

4、d surveys with leading chief economists from both the public and private sectors,organized by the World Economic Forums Centre for the New Economy and Society.It aims to summarize the emerging contours of the current economic environment and identify priorities for further action by policy-makers an

5、d business leaders in response to the compounding shocks to the global economy from geoeconomic and geopolitical events.The survey featured in this briefing wasconducted in late November 2024.4Chief Economists OutlookContentsExecutive summary _ 51.Downside risks have risen _ 72.All eyes on the US _

6、143.Global integration under growing strain _ 18Domestic and international policy drivers _ 18The challenges of fragmentation _ 204.A turbulent year for trade _ 23Trade-war dynamics set to intensify _ 23The shift to services trade continues _ 25References _ 28Contributors _ 33Acknowledgements _ 34Co

7、ver:Unsplash5Chief Economists OutlookExecutive summaryThe January 2025 edition of the Chief Economists Outlook launches at the start of what is likely to be an eventful year for the global economy.The outlook remains subdued,with a majority of chief economists(56%)expecting the global economy toweak

8、en over the next year,compared to17%anticipating improvement.Expectations for global growth are muted overall but subject to significant regional divergence.The US economy is expected to deliver robust growth in 2025,and South Asia,particularly India,is also expected to maintain strong growth.The ou

9、tlook for Europe remains gloomy,with 74%of respondents predicting weak or very weakgrowth this year.The outlook for China also remains weak,and growth is projected to slow gradually in the years ahead.Global inflation is easing,with the International Monetary Fund(IMF)projecting an annual average of

10、 4.3%in 2025,down from 5.8%in 2024.However,services inflation remains higher than goods inflation,particularly in advanced and emerging-market economies.Moderate inflation is expected in most regions,but the uptick in the short-term outlook for growth in the US has been accompanied by a significant

11、increase in inflation expectations,according to the chief economists.The chief economists expect US policy to have a significant impact on the global economy in the years ahead.Amajority(61%)characterize this impact as a long-term shift rather than a short-term disruption.Under the incoming administ

12、ration,the chief economists expect significant changes across trade,migration,deregulation,fiscal policy,industrial policy and foreign policy.Large majorities expect to see increases in inflation and public debt levels,as well as stock-market gains.The global economic landscape is increasingly fragm

13、ented.This is particularly true for goods trade,where 94%of chief economists expect further fragmentation over the next three years.Significant majorities also expect increased barriers tolabour mobility and transfers of technology and data.Geopolitical rivalries and domesticpolicy choices are viewe

14、d as the key drivers of current fragmentation trends,highlighting the growing importance of interactions between political and economicfactors.6Chief Economists OutlookThe main impact of rising fragmentation that the chief economists highlight is a likely increase in costs for consumers and business

15、es.Collaboration on global challenges such as climate change is also expected to become more difficult.In response to these shifts in the global landscape,the chief economists expect multinational companies to respond with a range of adaptations,including changes to supply chains and organizational

16、restructurings.The chief economists expect an intensification of trade-war dynamics in the years ahead,both between the US and China and more broadly.However,the expectation is also thattrade volumes will continue to increase.There is consensus that protectionism will cause durable changes to trade

17、patterns over the next three years,with conflict and national security concerns also highlighted as important drivers of change.The chief economists expect growing regionalization of trade,as well as a continuation of a gradual shift in the composition of trade from goods to services.In general,adva

18、nced economies tend to benefit more than developing economies from services trade,but a majority of the chief economists point to the increasing importance of services as a driver of economic development.7Chief Economists Outlook1 World Economic Forum.(2024).2 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024a

19、).3 Morgan Stanley.(2024).4 Goldman Sachs.(2024).Much weakerSomewhat weakerUnchangedSomewhat strongerMuch strongerShare of respondents(%)562817Economic growthThe outlook for the global economy remains subdued and downside risks have intensified,not least because of heightened uncertainty around the

20、economic implications of Novembers US presidential election.According to the World Economic Forums latest survey of chief economists,amajority(56%)expect the global economy to weakenover the next year compared to17%who expect it to strengthen(see Figure 1).Compared to the last survey inAugust 2024,e

21、xpectations for the year ahead havesoftened.1Figure 1.The global economic outlookLooking at the year ahead,what are your expectations for the future condition of the global economy?1.Downside risks have risenNote:The numbers in the graphs may not add up to 100%because figures have been rounded up/do

22、wn.Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).At the time of writing,the International Monetary Funds(IMF)latest projection isthat the global economy will expand by3.2%this year,unchanged from 2024,and that it will slow marginally to 3.1%over the next five years.2 This remains one of the weakest

23、 medium-term outlooks in decades,and there are signs elsewhere of global forecasts being trimmed to reflect the impact of expected changes to US policy.3The next section will look at the outlook for the US economy in greater detail,but expectations of a short-term boost are reflected in 44%of chief

24、economists pointing to strong US growth in 2025(see Figure 2)three times as many as in the last survey.4 The chief economists expect developments in the US to exert a drag on global growth,but they continue to expect significant divergence across regions.8Chief Economists Outlook5 Kaushik&Reed.(2024

25、).6 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024b).South Asia continues to stand out,with 61%of chief economists expecting strong or very strong growth in 2025.This regional performance has been driven largely by robust growth in India,which remains the worlds fastest-growing major economy.However,there a

26、re now signs of some momentum being lost:the latest national accounts data for India point to year-on-year GDP(gross domestic product)growth of 5.4%in the third quarter of 2024,the slowest rate in nearly two years,prompting a downward revision to the central banks annual growth forecast in December.

27、5 Elsewhere in the region,there has been strong growth in the countries of ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations),where GDP isexpected to expand by 4.7%in 2025.6Figure 2.Growth expectationsWhat is your expectation for economic growth in the following geographies in 2025?Source:Chief Economist

28、s Survey.(2024,November).Share of respondents(%)73211Central AsiaSouth AsiaUnited StatesEast Asia and Pacific509474487319185725225226256411464257474112126226Latin America and the CaribbeanSub-Saharan AfricaMiddle East and North AfricaChinaEuropeVery weakWeakModerateStrongVery strong9Chief Economists

29、 Outlook7 Eurostat.(2024).8 Ibid.9 Draghi,M.(2024).10 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024b).11 Ibid.12 Hale et al.(2024).13 International Monetary Fund(IMF)Asia and Pacific Department.(2024).14 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024a).For almost three years,Europe has registered the weakest regio

30、nal prospects among chief economists,and in the latest survey,74%of respondents expect weak or very weak growth for the region.The challenges facing the region were highlighted in the most recent national accounts data for the Euro area,which recorded aggregate year-on-year growth ofjust 0.9%in the

31、third quarter of last year this compares to 2.7%in the US overthe same period.7 The Euro areas largest economy,Germany,contracted by 0.3%,while there was growth of 0.4%in Italy,1.2%in France and 3.4%in Spain.8In a September report,Mario Draghi,the former Italian prime minister and governor of the Eu

32、ropean Central Bank,spotlighted Europes economic challenges.Sounding an alarm for the regions economic prospects,his report warned that annual investment equivalent to 5%of GDP would be required to revive its economic dynamism.9 However,the prospects of determined action to boost the European econom

33、y looked distant at the end of 2024,with both Germany and France mired in domestic political difficulties.The outlook for China also remains weak.Growth is expected to slow gradually and isprojected by the IMF at 4.8%in 2024 and 4.5%in 2025.10 Earlier forecasts for 2024 were revised downwards from 5

34、%as a result of disappointing domestic demand in the second quarter,and high-frequency data suggest that while exports have picked up,consumer demand has remained subdued.11 November retail sales growth of 3%missed expectations of 4.6%.12 Overthe medium term,growth is projected to slow down to about

35、 3.3%in 2029 amid headwinds from weak productivity and anageing population.13 In the other regions covered in the survey,the assessments of the chief economists surveyed remain broadly unchanged from the previous survey.For the Middle East and North Africa,almost two-thirds expect moderate growth in

36、 the year ahead,but the risks to this outlook are highlighted by the fact that more than twice as many respondents expect weak growth rather thanstrong.For Sub-Saharan Africa,the share of chief economists who expect moderate or stronger growth in 2025 increased to 78%.This uptick is in line with the

37、 projection of solid 4.2%growth for the region this year from the IMF.14 For Latin America and the Caribbean,almost two-thirds of chief economists continue toexpect moderate growth this year.10Chief Economists Outlook15 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024a).16 Ibid.Global inflation continues to e

38、ase,with the IMF projecting an annual average of 4.3%this year,down from 6.7%in 2023 and an estimated 5.8%in 2024.15 This overall deceleration has been driven primarily by the advanced economies,which have been returning to their inflation targets more rapidly than emerging-market and developing eco

39、nomies.Services inflation has been slower to ease than goods inflation,and in numerous advanced and emerging-market economies,the core services inflation rate is still around 50%higher than before the pandemic.16Regional inflation assessments by chief economists(see Figure 3)show that,after November

40、s election,the US now leads in inflation expectations.However,nearly three-quarters of respondents still anticipate only moderate inflation in 2025.Most of the regions record a broadly similar pattern,with a significant majority expecting moderate inflation and a much smaller share expecting either

41、weak or strong inflation.Figure 3.Inflation expectationsWhat is your expectation for inflation in the following geographies in 2025?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).Share of respondents(%)127315Sub-Saharan AfricaUnited StatesLatin America and the CaribbeanMiddle East and North Africa21

42、57212064162068122270719784583664159136720EuropeSouth AsiaCentral AsiaEast Asia and PacificChinaVery lowLowModerateHighVery high11Chief Economists Outlook17 International Monetary Fund(IMF)Asia and Pacific Department.(2024).In Latin America and the Caribbean,the share of respondents expecting low inf

43、lation increased from just 6%in the last survey to 21%in the latest.Europe and the East Asia and Pacific region have notably higher proportions of respondents anticipating low inflation(36%and 41%,respectively).However,China is the unsurprising outlier given the deflationary pressures the country ha

44、s been grappling with.Interestingly,the chief economists assessment(80%expecting low or very low inflation)is more bearish than in the last survey(69%).Thiscontrasts with the view of the IMF in its latest“Article IV”assessment of the Chinese economy,which estimates that consumer price inflation will

45、 pick up from 0.7%last year to 1.9%this year.17Figure 4.Monetary policy outlookWhat is your expectation for monetary policy in the following geographies in 2025?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).Share of respondents(%)United StatesLatin America and the CaribbeanEuropeEast Asia and Pacif

46、icSouth AsiaMiddle East andNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaChinaCentral AsiaLooserUnchangedTighter33333343431339574843798116317364241294626767512Chief Economists Outlook18 Giles,C.(2024).19 European Central Bank(ECB).(2024).20 Clarfelt,H.&Smith,C.(2024).21 Ibid.While central banks remain vigilant foll

47、owing the inflationary surge of recent years,the tightening phase for global monetary policy has clearly ended.The overwhelming majority of chief economists expect policy to remain unchanged or loosen in all regions this year,with expectations of interest rate cuts highest for Europe,China and the U

48、S.Given the large discrepancies in the economic prospects for Europe and the US,the policy stances of the European Central Bank(ECB)and the Federal Reserve are expected to diverge further.18 With growth inthe Euro area projected to remain low and inflation expected to settle around the target rate o

49、f 2%,the ECB looks likely to continue on a path of further interest rate cuts,following three cuts of 0.25%in the final four months of 2024,which took the main policy rate to 3%.19 In the US,the Federal Reserve cut rates by a full percentage point during the same period(to 4.5%),but its outlook has

50、shifted,and in December,it signalled a slower pace of loosening in 2025 than previously expected.20 This pivot to a morehawkish position jolted financial markets the dollar jumped to a two-year high,and the S&P500 stock index dropped by nearly 3%.21 Figure 5.Fiscal policy outlookWhat is your expecta

51、tion for fiscal policy in the following geographies in 2025?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).Share of respondents(%)United StatesLatin America and the CaribbeanEuropeEast Asia and PacificSouth AsiaMiddle East andNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaChinaCentral AsiaLooserUnchangedTighter96968

52、24812838012903128417375121284924914413Chief Economists Outlook22 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024c).23 Gaspar,V.(2024).24 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024c).In terms of fiscal policy,large majorities of the chief economists surveyed expect a looser stance in the US and China this year(75

53、%and 90%,respectively),while views on Europe are split but with a slight skew towards tightening.Elsewhere,most respondents expect fiscal policy to remain unchanged in the year ahead.However,the backdrop for fiscal policy decisions is likely to continue to pose significant challenges.The latest IMF

54、estimate for global public debt in 2024 is more than$100 trillion,with the potential to reach 115%of GDP over the next three years.22 Moreover,governments will face mounting pressures to address a“fiscal policy trilemma”23 of dealing with the costs related to security,population ageing and climate c

55、hange,without either jeopardizing debt sustainability or leading topolitical pushback against rising taxes.24 14Chief Economists Outlook25 The American Presidency Project.(2024).26 Klein,E.(2024).27 United States Federal Reserve.(2024).US election impact on the global economy3961Share of respondents

56、(%)No significant changeShort-term disruptionLong-term shiftThis edition of the Chief Economists Outlook launches as a new US administration takes office.The systemic importance of the US tothe global economy means that changes of administration are always closely assessed for their potential domest

57、ic and international implications.However,this pattern has been unusually intense since Novembers election,both because of already-fraught global conditions and the platform of dramatic policy change on which the President campaigned.25Among the chief economists surveyed,thereis unanimity that devel

58、opments in the US will alter the trajectory of the global economy,with a solid majority of 61%characterizing this change as a long-term shift rather than a short-term disruption(see Figure 6).This echoes the view that whereas the first Trump administration could be seen by some as a blip,the second

59、shouldbe seen more as an inflection point for thepolitical and economic order,consolidating trends that have been gathering momentum in many countries since the global financial crisis.26 The chief economists expectations for policy change in the US are broadly in line with the policy priorities art

60、iculated during the election campaign,with large majorities expecting significant change in the areas oftrade,migration,deregulation,fiscal policy,industrial policy and foreign policy.The only policy area in which respondents do not expect significant change is monetary policy,where the Federal Rese

61、rve is legally independent of both the presidency and Congress.However,monetary policy may have a significant role to play in cushioning developments in the real economy if changes in other policy areas prove to be inflationary.27Figure 6.Global impactHow would you characterise the likely impact of

62、the US election result on the trajectory of the global economy?2.All eyes on the USSource:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).15Chief Economists Outlook28 The Economist.(2024a).29 In February 2024,Donald Trump announced that he would increase tariffs on all goods from China by 60%and introduce n

63、ew tariffs of 10%across the board(Piciotto,2024).In November 2024,he clarified that he would introduce 25%tariffs ongoods from Mexico and Canada and an additional 10%on all Chinese goods coming into the US(Pitas,2024).30 U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics.(2024).31 Goudreau,C.(2024).Figure 7.Policy outl

64、ookIn which US policy areas do you expect to see the most significant changes under the new US administration?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).Share of respondents(%)6633333336826Foreign policyTrade policyMigration policyRegulatory policy4150593265833336715155029121596863Monetary polic

65、yFiscal policyIndustrial policyVery insignificantInsignificantNeutralSignificantVery significantIf fully implemented,the new administrations campaign agenda would be a significant departure from current economic policy.28 However,there remains a high degree of uncertainty over the extent to which th

66、e campaign agenda will be implemented.For example,while 68%of the chief economists expect very significant changes to trade policy,more than 90%expect that new US tariffs will be smaller than the ones promised during the presidential campaign(see Figure 15).29 Caution is needed,therefore,in anticipa

67、ting the likely magnitude of changes in 2025 and beyond.One potential restraining influence on policy could be consumer prices,which were a central issue during the presidential campaign.The evidence suggests that many voters were less concerned with the decelerating rate of change of prices(consume

68、r price inflation had fallen to 2.7%in November 202430)than with their cumulative increase(around 20%over the four preceding years).31 It is therefore at leastpossible that the new administration will not want to risk being associated with a renewed period of rising prices.Nevertheless,among the chi

69、ef economists,94%expect the inflation rate to increase under the new administration(see Figure 8),with the proportion expecting high inflation in 2025 doubling since the last survey(seeFigure 3).16Chief Economists Outlook32 Rogers,T.N.(2024).33 World Bank.(2024a).34 The Economist.(2024b).Figure 8.Ec

70、onomic impactWhat changes do you expect to the following US economic and financial indicators under the new US administration?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).Share of respondents(%)33 312931582Stock market indicesPublic debt levelsConsumer price inflationWage levels9137463562155629991

71、Unemployment rateTax ratesStrong decreaseDecreaseNo changeIncreaseStrong increaseThis is in line with a strong consensus that the new administrations campaign platform would be highly inflationary.Key elements that could be expected to drive prices higher include the stimulus effect of lower taxes(e

72、xpected by 91%of chief economists)and the impact on wages and prices of the labour supply shock that would result from a maximal implementation of a promised programme of mass deportations.32 Potential tariff increases would add even more pressure(see section4).It is notable that inflation expectati

73、ons inthe US ticked up in the weeks following the election.33 The chief economists are near-unanimous(97%)in their expectation that public debt levels will rise,pointing to a lack of confidence that tax cuts will be matched by a promised drive to cut public spending,which is being spearheaded by a n

74、ew high-profile advisory commission(the Department of Government Efficiency).34 17Chief Economists OutlookFigure 9.Growth impactWhat will be the impact of the next US administrations policy agenda on growthin the US?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).NegativeSomewhat negativeNeutralSomew

75、hat positivePositiveShare of respondents(%)95991232626Long-term impactShort-term impactMedium-term impact71183533A majority(56%)also expects the unemployment rate to remain unchanged,while almost two-thirds(62%)expect wage levels to rise.A large majority of respondents(80%)anticipate stock market ga

76、ins,in line with widespread expectations of a business-friendly stance in areas such as taxes and deregulation.On expectations for growth,the chief economists differentiate between likely trends in the US and internationally(see Figure 9).Domestically,almost half(47%)expect a positive or somewhat po

77、sitive short-term impact on growth from the newadministrations policy agenda,but thisfigure falls away in the medium term(27%),and over the long term,more than half of respondents(53%)expect the impact of policy to be somewhat negative or negative on growth.Globally,the position is more unambiguousl

78、y gloomy,with large majorities expecting a negative or somewhatnegative impact on growth over the short term(68%),medium term(80%)and long term(65%).globally?Share of respondents(%)122193812411292138Long-term impactShort-term impactMedium-term impact26216296NegativeSomewhat negativeNeutralSomewhat p

79、ositivePositive18Chief Economists Outlook35 Borrett,A.&Strauss,D.(2024).36 Burn-Murdoch,J.(2024).37 Cerdeiro,D.et al.(2023).38 Ibid.Domestic and international policy driversThe global economic landscape continues to fragment,with multiple forces increasing strain on different dimensions of global ec

80、onomic interconnectedness(see Figure 10).This is perhaps most clearly evident in relation to the global trading system,where an intensification of trade-war dynamics is a significant possibility in 2025.There is near-unanimity(94%)among the chief economists surveyed that there will be further fragme

81、ntation of goods trade over the next three years,while a smaller majority(59%)expects the same for services trade.The outlook for global tradeis covered in more detail in section 4.After goods trade,labour mobility is the next area where fragmentation is most likely,with more than three-quarters ofc

82、hief economists expecting higher or much higher levels of fragmentation.This expectation occurs against a backdrop where growing political pushback against immigration is coupled with record volumes of immigration.Data released in late 2024 show that legal migration to the 38 member countries of the

83、 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)totalled 6.5 million in 2023,a 10%increase on the previous record in 2022.35 This trend appears to have played a significant role in the global pattern of anti-incumbent voting in the many national elections that took place in 2024,and one

84、 analyst suggests that a new“misery index”combining inflation and immigration shows the highest level of socioeconomic upheaval that many countries have seen in generations.36Almost two-thirds of the chief economists surveyed expect higher fragmentation around transfers of technology and data.Nation

85、al security is playing an increasingly important role in constraining global flows of knowledge and technology,in addition to concerns around data privacy and intellectual property protection.37 Moreover,deepening fragmentation in high-technology sectors threatens to have an outsized economic impact

86、,given that in most countries,these sectors tend to be high-growth and highly trade-intensive.383.Global integration under growing strain19Chief Economists OutlookThe financial sector is something of an outlier,with less than half(48%)expecting increased fragmentation over the next three years.This

87、is likely to reflect the pivotal role of cross-border financial flows in the functioning of modern economies and the level of disruption that would follow any significant fragmentation of the system.This situation is not without risks,however,given current levels of political volatility.The evidence

88、 of recent years suggests thatthereis a growing appetite among some to break established norms and patterns,even if this entails significant disruption.39 Moreover,it should be noted that finance isby no means immune from fragmentation trends:for example,geopolitical tensions already have amarked im

89、pact on foreign direct investment(FDI)40 and portfolio investment flows.41When the chief economists were asked about the factors contributing to current levels of fragmentation,domestic and international political drivers stand out(seeFigure 11).More than 90%of respondents view geopolitical rivalrie

90、s as an important factor,with two-thirds viewing them as very important.The strategic rivalry between the US and China is at the heart of this,but there is mounting evidence of wider disruptions in the geopolitical landscape.According to one measure published last year,geopolitical and geoeconomic f

91、ragmentation has risen sharply since the global financial crisis,peaking during the COVID-19 pandemic.42 However,recent events,particularly in Ukraine and across the Middle East,suggest that the trend of widening and intensifying geopolitical instability may still have some way to go.Share of respon

92、dents(%)3331550994542Technology/DataFinanceServicesLabour5626152115682115796GoodsMuch higher fragmentationHigher fragmentationStableHigher integrationMuch higher integrationFigure 10.Fragmentation outlookWhat is your expectation for the integration or fragmentation of the global economy in the next

93、three years in the following areas?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).39 Williams,A.(2024).40 Boeckelman,L.et al.(2024).41 Catalan,M.et al.(2024).42 Fernndez-Villaverde,J.et al.(2024).20Chief Economists Outlook3 3362136727Share of respondents(%)Global economic shiftsGeopolitical rivalrie

94、sDomestic policy choicesMultilateral institutional decline61366112126301539184530Demographic changesVery unimportantUnimportantNeither important nor unimportantImportantVery importantDomestic policy choices were cited by almost all respondents(97%)as an important contributor to global economic fragm

95、entation and by around one-third as very important.Whereas geopolitical rivalries may lead to a mix of intended and unintended fragmentation of the global economy,the role of domestic policy choices highlights the growing electoral constituency in many countries that supports a rolling back of at le

96、ast some aspects of global integration.In particular,as noted above,immigration has become an increasingly central political issue in many countries.The challenges of fragmentationWhile these developments may have large distributional impacts,the chief economists see no clear economic gains in the a

97、ggregate.Framing the question in terms of economics perhaps misses the political gains that proponents of reduced global economic integration often hope to achieve,but it is nevertheless striking how little economic upside is expected overall.When asked whether fragmentation could lead to a reductio

98、n in systemic economic and financial risks for example,by reducing the potential for cross-border contagion effects during a crisis 88%ofchief economists viewed this as unlikely or very unlikely over the next three years(see Figure 12).When asked whether there might be reduced within-country inequal

99、ity for example,because of greater policy autonomy or strengthened bargaining power for workers 79%viewed it as unlikely or very unlikely.Although the results are more mixed,the chief economists are also unconvinced that fragmentation will lead to a surge in innovation as a by-product of technologic

100、al competition between geopolitical rivals.Only 21%of respondents view this as likely or very likely,while 36%view it as unlikely or very unlikely.Figure 11.Drivers of fragmentationTo what extent do you think the following factors are important contributors to current levels of global economic fragm

101、entation?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).21Chief Economists OutlookShare of respondents(%)359a weakening of collective action on climate change?increased use of interventionist industrial policy?increased costs for consumers and businesses?increased risk of conflict?387624993942121264

102、243186118277070672121333358336664842618422799552733a widening divide between the Global North and South?a more bipolar global system?declining levels of foreign direct investment?more fragmented financial markets?a strengthening of regional cooperation?an acceleration of global innovation?reduced in

103、equality within countries?a reduction in systemic economic and financial risks?Very unlikelyUnlikelyNeither likely nor unlikelyLikelyVery likelyThe clearest expectation of the chief economists surveyed is that global fragmentation will lead to higher prices,with unanimous agreement that it is likely

104、 or very likely that costs for consumers and businesses will increase over the next three years.One potential channel for such inflationary pressure is the disruption of global value chains for example,through companies increasing use of reshoring and friend-shoring.43 A 2024 survey of US chief exec

105、utive officers(CEOs)and chief operating officers(COOs)showed that the proportion of companies with plans toshorten their supply chains had jumped to81%from 63%in 2022,44 while in 2023,an annual index of reshoring in the US registered its largest increase on record.45 Moreover,in the US and elsewhere

106、,the process of reshoring is being bolstered bygovernments adoption of interventionist industrial policies,a trend that almost all(97%)chief economists expect to accelerate as a result of global fragmentation.Figure 12.Impacts of fragmentationIn light of current trends,how likely is it that over the

107、 next three years global fragmentation will lead toSource:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).43 Nagel,J.(2024).44 Bain&Company.(2024).45 Kearney.(2024).22Chief Economists OutlookThe survey responses point to an increasingly complicated and strained global landscape over the next three years:a m

108、ore bipolar system(79%),with a widening divide between the Global North and South(64%),declining levels of FDI(73%)and ashift towards regional cooperation(58%).The prospects for global collaboration are diminishing,especially for climate change(81%),while the proportion of respondents expecting the

109、risk of conflict to increase isworryingly high(88%).Increasing global economic fragmentation poses a particular strategic challenge for multinational companies operating across geopolitical and geoeconomic fault lines.Only around one in 10 chief economists expect these companies to adopt a wait-and-

110、see approach to increasing levels of fragmentation.By contrast,over three-quarters expect them to embark on potentially costly changes such as restructuring their supply chains(91%),regionalizing their operations(90%),focusing on activity in core markets(79%)or exiting high-risk markets(76%).There i

111、s already evidence of significant structural changes taking place.For example,in October 2024,a major global lender announced a restructuring of its operations into“eastern”and“western”groupings.46 Although the stated rationale of the move was to reduce costs and increase agility,it was widely perce

112、ived as being partlymotivated by geopolitical de-risking.4746 Aliaj,O.et al.(2024).47 Davies,P.J.(2024).Share of respondents(%)9129213655Regionalization of operationsRestructuring of supply chainsIncreased focus on risk managementIncreased focus on activity in core markets612778125821217331593355Exi

113、ting high-risk marketsNo major changes:adopt a“wait-and-see”strategy18Very unlikelyUnlikelyNeither likely nor unlikelyLikelyVery likelyFigure 13.Business response to fragmentationHow do you expect multinational companies to respond over the next three years to global economic fragmentation?Source:Ch

114、ief Economists Survey.(2024,November).23Chief Economists Outlook48 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD).(2024a).49 Van den Bossche,P.(2023).Trade-war dynamics set to intensifyAmong all the indications of the economic fragmentation discussed in the previous section,the erosion o

115、f support for the globaltrading system is the most prominent.Although global trade is on track to hit arecord$33 trillion in 2024,48 the system is facing significant threats.Institutionally,this is evident in the unresolved breakdown of a key dispute-resolution mechanism at the World Trade Organizat

116、ion(WTO)since 2019.49 Politically,it is exemplified by the success of a US presidential campaign that prominently featured a platform of across-the-board tariffs.All indications point to further trade turbulence in the year ahead.Indeed,large majorities of the chief economists surveyed expect a trad

117、e war of tit-for-tat trade restrictions between the US and China(89%)and more broadly(68%).However,while the new US administrations trade policy is likely to shape the outlook in 2025,it may not signal a dramatic change intrajectory.4.A turbulent year for tradeShare of respondents(%)93121871Between

118、the US and ChinaWider than the US and China62216Very unlikelyUnlikelyNeither likely nor unlikelyLikelyVery likelyFigure 14.Trade warLooking at the year ahead,do you expect a trade war of retaliatory trade restrictions to break out?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).24Chief Economists Out

119、look50 York,E.(2024).51 Global Trade Alert.(2024).52 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024a).53 World Bank.(2024b).54 Gopinath,G.et al.(2025).55 International Monetary Fund(IMF).(2024a).For one thing,it is highly unlikely that the harshest tariffs promised on the campaign trail will be implemented

120、94%of the chief economists expect more moderate interventions(see Figure 15).Yet,it is also important to note that trade restrictions are already a familiar feature of the global trading landscape.Protectionist trade policy,particularly towards China,was a hallmark of the last Republican administrat

121、ion in the US,and this stance was sustained and in some cases extended by its Democratic successor.50 More recently and more broadly,new trade-distorting policies among G20 countries outnumbered trade-liberalizing measures by 2,402 to 634 in 2024.51 In that sense,atrade war is already under way.Agai

122、nst the challenging recent backdrop of sharp geopolitical tensions and rising protectionism,global trade has been quite resilient.52 As a percentage of GDP,it stood at 58.5%in 2023,down from 62.8%the previous year but still above the 55.8%recorded in 2017.53 Geopolitical tensions have exerted a drag

123、 on trade,but the effect has been offset by growing trade between countries that are geopolitically aligned.54 All of this suggests that while the outlook for global trade is subject to significant uncertainty,the risks may not be as dramatic or disruptive as might have been feared.Inthe survey,48%o

124、f respondents said they expect global trade volumes to continue increasing,compared to 18%whodisagreed(see Figure 17).This relatively cautious view is in line with IMF estimates that trade volumes will increase by 3.4%in 2025 wellbelow the rates being recorded before the global financial crisis but

125、still in line with expectations forGDP growth.55Share of respondents(%)694US tariff increasesTariffs will remain unchangedTariffs will increase by less than the proposed amountTariffs will increase by the proposed amountTariffs will increase by more than the proposed amountFigure 15.US tariff policy

126、The incoming US administration campaigned on a policy of increasing tariffs by up to 10%across the board and by 60%for goods from China.To what extent do you expect this to be implemented?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).25Chief Economists Outlook56 Politi,J.et al.(2024).57 Simchi-Levi

127、,D.&Haren,P.(2022).The shift to services tradecontinuesProtectionism is identified in the survey as the factor most likely to drive lasting changes to global trade patterns(see Figure 16).However,a number of others feature prominently,including supply-chainrestructuring(93%of respondents),conflict a

128、nd sanctions(83%)and national security concerns(77%).Clearly,thereare close interconnections between many of these.For example,national security concerns are an increasingly prominent justification for protectionist trade restrictions,such asUS tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.56 Conflict can le

129、ad to significant supply-chainchanges,aswasthe case following Russias invasion of Ukraine in 2022.57 Only a minority of respondents expect either climate change(36%)or regulatory divergence(44%)to alter trade patterns significantly.It is notable that only a small majority(54%)expect global growth dy

130、namics to have a significant impact,suggesting a trading environment in which the influence of traditional economic drivers may be diminishing relative to a range of more structural factors.Another such factor is technological change,which is cited as a significant driver by 60%of chief economists.S

131、hare of respondents(%)6337National security concernsProtectionismSupply chain restructuringConflict(including sanctions)77617235027107701337333175374347713374374733Diverging regulatory standardsTechnological advancesGlobal growth dynamicsClimate changeVery insignificantInsignificantNeither significa

132、nt nor insignificantSignificantVery insignificantFigure 16.Drivers of changing trade patternsOver the next three years,how significant do you think the following factors will be in causing durable changes to trade patterns?Source:Chief Economists Survey.(2024,November).26Chief Economists Outlook58 G

133、opinath,G.et al.(2025).59 Javorcik,B.et al.(2024).60 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD).(2024a).Aside from the impacts of any protectionist orsimilar interventions in the short term,there are other changes that look set to affect the global trading landscape over the medium a

134、nd long term.A large majority of chief economists(82%)expect a greater regionalization of trade over the next three years.This echoes the trend of trade shifting towards geopolitically aligned countries,58 which research suggests could exert a significant drag on growth.59 The latest available data,

135、relating to the third quarter of 2024,point to a continuing trend of geopolitical friendshoring,albeit atslightly reduced levels,while the regional concentration of trade has begun to decline more prominently.60Share of respondents(%)Strongly disagreeDisagreeUncertainAgreeStrongly agreeTrade will be

136、come less global and more regionalIncreasing trade restrictions will lead to higher prices for consumersTrade will continue to shift from goods to servicesServices exports will become more important for development than goods exportsExport-led growth will be an important development pathwayGlobal tr

137、ade volumes will continue to increaseFaster global GDP growth rates will depend on a return to stronger trade growth rates64152115370121252151831537661827942482727452133Figure 17.Trade outlookLooking at the next three years,do you agree/disagree with the following statements?Source:Chief Economists

138、Survey.(2024,November).27Chief Economists Outlook61 UNCTADstat.(2024);authors calculations.62 World Trade Organization(WTO)&World Bank Group.(2023).63 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD).(2024b).64 World Trade Organization(WTO)&World Bank Group.(2023).A more well-established t

139、rend is the gradual shift in the composition of trade from goods toservices,which 82%of respondents expect to continue over the next three years.The value of merchandise exports is still about three times that of services exports,but services are growing slightly more rapidly.Between 2009 and 2023,t

140、he value of merchandise exports increased by 89%to$23.8 trillion,while services exports increased by 116%to$7.9 trillion.61 The deepening digitalization of economies has been a key driver of the growth of services trade in recent decades with exports of digitally delivered services experiencing the

141、fastest growth byincreasingalmost four-fold.62 On the face of it,the gradual shift towards trade in services tends to benefit developed economies.Whereas the value of merchandise trade is split roughly evenly between developing and developed economies,around two-thirds of services trade is associate

142、d with developed economies.63 Nevertheless,slightly more than half(51%)of the chief economists surveyed expect services to become more important for development than goods exports.One reason for this may be the relative employment intensity of services,which account for a greater share of global job

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168、l Paying for the Trump-Biden Tariffs.TaxFoundation.https:/taxfoundation.org/blog/biden-trump-tariffs/.33Chief Economists OutlookContributors The World Economic Forum would like to thank the members of the Community of Chief Economists for their thought leadership and guidance.We also thank the membe

169、rs of the broader core community of the Centre for the New Economy and Society for their ongoing commitment and contributions to addressing several of the factors presented in this outlook.Figures are based on 36 survey responses.We would like to thank,in particular,all community members who complet

170、ed the survey and contributed to this edition of the outlook through community discussions.We are grateful to our colleagues in the Centre for the New Economy and Society for helpfulsuggestions and comments,particularly Armita Behboodi,Jesse Caemmerer,Kateryna Karunska and Sriharsha Masabathula in t

171、he Economic Growth and Transformation team,aswell as Attilio Di Battista and Eoin Cathasaigh.Thank you to Sean Doherty in the Centre for Regions,Trade and Geopolitics for expert feedback on section 4.Thank you also to Silja Baller and Sriram Gutta for reviewing this edition and to Saadia Zahidi for

172、her guidance and oversight of the Chief Economists Outlook series.We are grateful to Martha Howlett and Laurence Denmark for copyediting,graphic design and layout.The views expressed in this briefing do not necessarily represent the views of the World Economic Forum or those of its members and partn

173、ers.This briefing is a contribution tothe World Economic Forums insight and interaction activities and is published to elicit comments and further debate.World Economic Forum Aengus Collins,Head,Economic Growth and Transformation,Centre for the New Economy and Society Philipp Grokurth,Insight Lead,E

174、conomic Growth and Transformation,Centre for the New Economy and Society34Chief Economists OutlookAcknowledgementsMembers of the Community of Chief EconomistsAndr Almeida,SONAEMansueto Almeida,Banco BTG PactualMusaab Almulla,Saudi AramcoShusong Ba,Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Rima Bhatia,Gulf In

175、ternational Bank BSC Marieke Blom,ING GroupPhilipp Carlsson-Szlezak,Boston Consulting GroupTomas Castagnino,AccentureJuan Cerruti,Banco SantanderSamy Chaar,Lombard OdierAhmet imenoglu,Ko HoldingPedro Conceio,United Nations Development Programme Fabien Curto Millet,GoogleGregory Daco,EY-ParthenonEric

176、a Diniz Oliveira,IPaul Donovan,UBSJohann Els,Old MutualCarsten Fink,World Intellectual Property Organization David Folkerts-Landau,Deutsche BankIndermit Gill,The World BankTyler Goodspeed,ExxonMobilPierre-Olivier Gourinchas,International Monetary Fund Paul Gruenwald,S&P GlobalSvenja Gudell,IndeedJrm

177、e Haegeli,Swiss ReKaren Harris,Bain&CompanyJanet Henry,HSBCFernando Honorato Barbosa,Banco BradescoBeata Javorcik,European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Ira Kalish,DeloitteSeisaku Kameda,Sompo Institute PlusChristian Keller,BarclaysSteffen Kern,European Securities and Markets Authority 35C

178、hief Economists OutlookRazia Khan,Standard Chartered BankRaja Asad Khan,Saudi National BankKarin Kimbrough,LinkedInKyle Kretschman,SpotifyBarret Kupelian,PwCValrie Lemaigre,The Swiss Bank of GenevaGordon Liao,Circle Internet FinancialAlexander MacDonald,NASAMario Magalhes Carvalho Mesquita,Ita Uniba

179、ncoJens Magnusson,Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Somprawin Manprasert,SCB XGiulio Martini,Lord Abbett Guy Miller,Zurich InsuranceGilles Moc,AXAMillan Mulraine,Ontario Teachers Pension PlanSrinivasa Rao Nagarjuna,Bajaj FinservDhiraj Nayyar,Vedanta ResourcesRalph Ossa,World Trade OrganizationEric Parra

180、do,The Inter-American Development BankErik Peterson,KearneySandra Phlippen,ABN AMRORenan Pinheiro Silverio,Petroleo Brasileiro-PETROBRASSaad Rahim,TrafiguraDebora Revoltella,European Investment BankNela Richardson,Automatic Data ProcessingAmlie Roux,Saint-Gobainlvaro Santos Pereira,Organisation for

181、Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)Michael Schwarz,MicrosoftJorge Sicilia,BBVAGraham Slack,A.P.Mller-MaerskLudovic Subran,AllianzEirik Waerness,EquinorCoram Williams,AdeccoRolf Woller,VolkswagenWorld Economic Forum9193 route de la CapiteCH-1223 Cologny/GenevaSwitzerland Tel.:+41(0)22 869 121

182、2Fax:+41(0)22 786 2744contactweforum.orgwww.weforum.orgThe World Economic Forum,committed to improving the state of the world,is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation.The Forum engages the foremost political,business and other leaders of society to shape global,regional and industry agendas.