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1、EuropeanElectricity Review 2025The EUs electricity transition continued at pace in 2024,as solar overtook coal for the first time and gas declined for the fifth year in a row.23 January 2025Dr Chris RossloweDr Beatrice PetrovichThe European Electricity Review analyses full-year electricity generatio

2、n and demand data for 2024 in all EU-27 countries to understand the regions progress in transitioning from fossil fuels to clean electricity.It is the ninth annual report on the EU power sector published by Ember(previously as Sandbag).Our data is free and easily downloadable,and is available at ann

3、ual and monthly granularity.We hope others also find the data useful for their own analysis.Share of solar in EU electricity in 2024,higher than coal.EU fossil gas power fell for the fifth year running.Avoided fossil fuel import costs due to new wind and solar since 2019.2AboutHighlights11%559 bnExe

4、cutive summary 4Introduction 8Chapter 1:2024 at a glance 10Solar reaches record highs while nuclear and hydro bounce back 10Fossil power falls to a historic low across the EU 12Chapter 2:Five years of progress 15Wind and solar displaced coal and gas 16Green Deal cut the EUs fossil import bill 17Coal

5、 nearing the end 18Five years of declining gas power 19Chapter 3:Solars meteoric growth continues 22Another record year for solar 22Clean flexibility will sustain solar growth and bring benefits 26Chapter 4:Wind sector challenges are blowing over 29Wind remains cost competitive,despite inflationary

6、pressures 31Policy obstacles still exist but changes are having an impact 32Further policy effort needed 35Policy recommendations 37Supporting materials 39Acknowledgements 473ContentsExecutive summaryThe transition of the EU electricity sector maintained momentum in 2024,despite challenging politica

7、l and economic conditions.Solar power grew strongly and overtook coal power for the first time.Another year of coal and gas decline the fifth year in a row for gas cut EU power sector emissions to below half their 2007 peak and further reduced reliance on imported fossil fuels.Significant progress h

8、as been made over the last EU political cycle,but delivery needs to be accelerated.The European Green Deal has delivered a deep and rapid transformation of the EU power sector.Driven by expanding wind and solar power,renewables have risen from a share of 34%in 2019 to 47%in 2024,as the fossil share

9、declined from 39%to a historic low of 29%.Solar remained the EUs fastest growing power source in 2024,rising above coal for the first time.Wind power remained the EUs second largest power source,above gas and below nuclear.The significant progress has brought benefits beyond reducing emissions.Struc

10、tural growth in wind and solar power has reduced the EUs fossil import bill and the blocs vulnerability to imported gas.While the progress made in the first half of this decade is impressive,an acceleration is needed between now and 2030.Progress in the EUs electricity transition builds confidence t

11、o 20304Solar overtakes coalSolar was the fastest growing EU power source in 2024;capacity additions hit a record high and generation was 22%higher than in 2023.Solar(11%,304 TWh)overtook coal(10%,269 TWh)for the first time in 2024,meaning coal has fallen from being the third largest EU power source

12、in 2019 to the sixth largest in 2024.This trend is widespread;solar is growing in every EU country,while coal is becoming increasingly marginal.More than half of EU countries either have no coal power or a share below 5%in their power mix.Accelerated clean flexibility and smart electrification are n

13、eeded to sustain solar growth.01Gas declined five years in a rowGas power generation declined for the fifth year in a row-despite a small rebound in electricity demand.Combined with another coal decline,this cut total power sector emissions in 2024 to below half of their 2007 peak.This sustained dec

14、line has played a key role in reducing total EU gas consumption by 20%in the past five years:about a third of this decline occurred in the power sector.Without wind and solar added in 2024,EU gas consumption for power would have been 11%higher.02Wind and solar avoided 59 billion in fossil fuel impor

15、ts since start of Green Deal In five years of the European Green Deal,a surge in wind and solar generation is the main reason for declining fossil generation.Without wind and solar capacity added since 2019,the EU would have imported 92 billion cubic metres more of fossil gas and 55 million tonnes m

16、ore of hard coal,costing 59 billion.To maximise future benefits,Member States must continue to implement reforms to accelerate wind power deployment,as delivery currently risks falling short despite cost competitiveness.035Key takeaways6The amount of progress made in five years of the European Green

17、 Deal should inspire confidence in what can be achieved by 2030.A faster roll out of clean flexibility,grid infrastructure and electrification will be key to sustaining clean power growth.Solar continues to be the fastest growing EU power source,but more storage and demand flexibility is needed to s

18、ustain growth and for consumers to reap the full benefits of abundant solar.After a challenging few years for the wind power sector,additions are set to grow,but not by enough to hit EU targets.Closing this gap will require continued policy implementation and political support,such that the rate of

19、additions between now and 2030 is more than double that of recent years.The EU has much to gain from accelerating its electricity transition:a clean electrified future,powered by wind and solar,will enhance energy security and bring down energy costs for all consumers.7The EU is striding closer towa

20、rds a clean energy future powered by homegrown wind and solar.This new energy system will reduce the blocs vulnerability to fossil price shocks,tackle the climate crisis and deliver affordable energy for its households and companies.Timely policy action that sustains wind and solar growth,accelerate

21、s the deployment of clean flexibility and promotes electrification,will help to secure the future of EU competitiveness.Dr Beatrice PetrovichSenior Energy Analyst,Ember“Fossil fuels are losing their grip on EU energy.At the start of the European Green Deal in 2019,few thought the EUs energy transiti

22、on could be where it is today;wind and solar are pushing coal to the margins and forcing gas into structural decline.While the EUs electricity transition has moved faster than anyone expected in the last five years,further progress cannot be taken for granted.Delivery needs to be accelerated particu

23、larly in the wind sector,which has faced unique challenges and a widening delivery gap.However,the achievements of the past five years should instil confidence that,with continued drive and commitment,challenges can be overcome and a more secure energy future be achieved.”Dr Chris RossloweSenior Ene

24、rgy Analyst,EmberIntroductionThe EU power sector transition made crucial progress in 2024,with momentum sustained despite economic headwinds and political upheavals.The new EU political leadership has been clear that the future of European competitiveness is through reduced fossil fuel dependency.Th

25、e transformation of the European power sector faced many potential stumbling blocks in 2024.Inflation remained above historic levels-creating challenging conditions for investment-and many national and European elections bred concerns that the transition to clean energy would lose support.On the con

26、trary,progress continued at pace.The strategic,economic and social case for the energy transition in Europe is clearer than ever.While the worst of the energy crisis might be over,Europes ongoing dependence on fossil energy leaves it vulnerable to global shocks in an increasingly volatile world.Euro

27、pean citizens-still suffering high energy prices caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine-are increasingly feeling the impacts of the climate crisis,from record summer heatwaves to extreme flooding.Not only are renewables addressing these problems by reducing emissions,they are the cheapest solutions

28、 available and are overwhelmingly popular.Continuing transition to clean power is key to competitiveness8As political attention shifts to Europes industrial and economic performance,some may argue for sustainability to be deprioritised.Conversely,the report by former European Central Bank President

29、Mario Draghi on the future of European competitiveness concludes the best route is through reduced fossil fuel dependency,confirming that industrial policy must be rooted in the energy transition.The return of President Trump to the White House and the likely US retreat from clean energy leadership

30、presents a clear opportunity for the EU to step up.In this context,it is welcome to see continued commitment to the European Green Deal from the new EU Commission,as citizens and businesses stand to benefit from a faster transition.This report outlines what happened in EU electricity in 2024,the pro

31、gress made during five years of the European Green Deal and key priorities to unlock further advances.9Chapter 1:2024 at a glanceFossil power declined again in 2024,despite increases in electricity demand and EU power exports.A record year of solar growth contributed most to fossil decline,lifting s

32、olar above coal for the first time.Fossil gas power fell for the fifth year running,and was lower than wind power for a second year.Solar growth and a recovery in hydropower meant renewables accounted for nearly half(47%)of EU power generation and clean sources reached 71%,both record highs.Solar re

33、aches record highs while nuclear and hydro bounce back Solar was the fastest growing EU power source in 2024,with generation 22%(+54 TWh)higher than 2023.This increase was due to a record amount of new capacity additions(66 GW),and despite slightly lower solar irradiance compared to 2023.Solar was t

34、herefore the single biggest driver of reduced fossil power in 2024.It provided 11%of EU electricity(304 TWh),overtaking coal(269 TWh)for the first year ever.Wind power generation remained similar to 2023 levels at 17%of EU power(477 TWh).Additions of wind capacity continued,but were offset by less f

35、avourable wind conditions.Even so,wind remained the second largest source of EU power behind The EU power sectorin 202410nuclear,widening its lead over gas(established in 2023).Wind and solar together reached a record share of 29%of the EUs power mix in 2024.This helped push renewables to nearly hal

36、f(47%)of total EU electricity generation.11Hydro and nuclear generation increased by 32 TWh(+10%)and 29 TWh(+5%)respectively,reaching shares of 13%and 24%,completing rebounds from their 2022 lows and pushing clean sources to a record 71%of the EU power mix.Hydro generation benefited from above avera

37、ge rainfall patterns across most of Europe,despite droughts in southeast Europe.The increased nuclear output can largely be explained by fewer outages in France.Fossil power falls to a historic low across the EU In 2024,EU fossil generation declined by 75 TWh(-9%)compared to 2023,falling to its lowe

38、st level for more than forty years(793 TWh).While not as large as the record fossil collapse between 2022 and 2023,the fall happened despite a small rise in 12power demand of 31 TWh(+1%)and an increase in net exports to non-EU countries(totalling+15 TWh,with notable increases of+11 TWh to the UK and

39、+4 TWh to Ukraine).Coal and gas power fell by 16%and 6%respectively,compared to 2023.This caused EU power sector emissions to fall by 9%to an estimated 585 million tonnes of CO2,less than half their 2007 peak.Coal generation fell to below 10%(9.8%)of EU power(269 TWh)for the first time in decades.It

40、 decreased in 16 of the 17 countries that still used it in 2024,and is now marginal or absent in most systems,making up less than 5%of the electricity mix in 16 Member States.The EUs remaining coal power is highly concentrated in just two countries,Germany(39%)and Poland(34%),but even they saw coal

41、generation fall by 17%and 8%respectively year-on-year.Gas generation declined for the fifth consecutive year,falling to 16%of EU power(430 TWh).Its decline was also widespread,occurring in 14 of the 26 countries with gas power,including three of the top four gas burning EU countries:Italy(-2%),Spain

42、(-19%)and the Netherlands(-5%).13Small increase in demand after two years of sharp declineIn contrast to the previous two years,which saw sharp declines in EU power demand,an increase of 31 TWh(+1%)was observed in 2024.While small,the recovery was consistent across the EU,seen in 22 out of 27 Member

43、 States,and it occurred in every quarter.Germany was a notable exception,with demand remaining almost the same as 2023,still 11%below 2019 levels.Total EU power demand remained low compared to pre-crisis levels(5%lower than 2019).It is too early to say whether this years rebound marks a new era of i

44、ncreasing power demand,which is expected due to growth in electrification,data centres,air conditioning and more.14Chapter 2:Five years of progress2024 marks five years since the start of the European Green Deal,the EUs landmark energy and climate policy package.Since its launch,wind and solar have

45、surged,taking renewables to nearly half of EU electricity in 2024 and reducing dependency on coal and gas.In half a decade,the EU has made enough progress to prove that a deep transformation of the power sector is achievable,while also reducing an expensive fossil import bill.In December 2019,the la

46、unch of the European Green Deal introduced key policies to spur the EUs clean electricity transition.In 2022,in response to Russias invasion of Ukraine and fossil price shocks,the EU further strengthened the blocs targets for wind and solar growth with the REPowerEU policy package.These EU initiativ

47、es have contributed to a deep transformation of the blocs electricity sector.In 2019,renewables provided a third(34%,979 TWh)of EU electricity,while fossil fuels provided 39%(1,130 TWh).By the end of 2024,renewables advanced to nearly half the EU mix(47%,1,300 TWh),as fossil power fell to a historic

48、 low of 29%(793 TWh).The European Green Deal delivered benefits beyond emissions reduction 15Between 2019 and 2024,the surge of renewable power was widespread across the bloc.In this time,the number of countries where renewables produce more electricity than fossil fuels rose from 12 to 20.As a resu

49、lt of its power sector transformation,the EU has cemented its position as a leader in clean power.The emissions intensity of EU electricity generation fell 26%over the last five years,to 213 gCO2 per kWh.This was a steeper decline than other major economies,such as the US,where the emissions intensi

50、ty fell by 13%over the same period,to 361 gCO2 per kWh in 2024.Wind and solar displaced coal and gas The surge of renewable power in the EU was driven by the meteoric rise of homegrown wind and solar.From 2019 to 2024,wind and solars share of the EU electricity mix increased from 17%to 29%.Solar gen

51、eration increased by 179 TWh(+144%)in this period,an amount equivalent to the annual production of over 50 coal power plants,and almost tripled its share of EU generation from 4%in 2019 to 11%in 2024.Wind generation increased by 110 TWh(+30%)over the same period,reaching a 17%share of EU electricity

52、 in 2024,up from 13%in 2019.The consistent growth of wind and solar distinguishes them from the other main sources of clean power in the EU.While installed solar capacity almost tripled from 120 GW in 2019 to 338 GW in 2024 and wind capacity grew by 37%from 169 GW to 231 GW over the same period,hydr

53、opower capacity remained flat at 130 GW and the nuclear fleet actually decreased from 110 GW to 96 GW.Over the past five years,nuclear and hydro generation fluctuated due to weather conditions and outages.Since the launch of the European Green Deal,rising wind and solar has driven a decline in fossi

54、l generation.Wind and solar installed in the past five years have cumulatively avoided 15%of fossil generation(736 TWh)over the period(see Methodology).This is equivalent to around 460 million tonnes of CO2,roughly the same as power sector emissions produced by Italy since 2019.16Green Deal cut the

55、EUs fossil import billBeyond reducing emissions,growth in wind and solar spurred on by the European Green Deal has delivered huge benefits to the EU through reduced energy costs and enhanced security.Without wind and solar capacity additions over the first five years of the European Green Deal,the E

56、U would have spent an additional 59 billion on fossil fuel imports for power generation:53 billion for fossil gas and 6 billion for hard coal.The total avoided gas imports of approximately 92 billion cubic metres is equivalent to around 18%of gas consumed in the power sector in the EU since the end

57、of 2019.The avoided coal imports of 55 million tonnes is equivalent to 23%of hard coal consumed in the EU power sector in that same period.In 2024 alone,without wind and solar installed since the previous year,EU power sector gas and coal consumption would have both been 11%higher.17Coal nearing the

58、 end Over the first five years of the European Green Deal,the importance of coal in the EU power mix fell significantly:from 16%of the EU power mix in 2019 to less than 10%five years later.The steep falls in coal power over the last two years cancelled out the temporary upticks in 2021 and 2022 resu

59、lting from the gas crisis.Over the past five years,Austria,Sweden and Portugal phased out coal from their electricity mix.In 2024,coal provided less than 5%of power generation in 16 countries,ten of which had no operating coal power plants.This is a change from 2019,when the dirtiest fuel provided l

60、ess than 5%of power generation in 12 countries and seven were coal-free.A new wave of coal plant closures is imminent:another 11 EU countries have announced a complete phaseout of coal from their electricity mix within the next five years.This means that only seven countries will still be using coal

61、 by 2030,with at least 34 GW of the remaining 101 GW of operating coal plants closing by that date.18Five years of declining gas powerSince the start of the European Green Deal,gas power has been consistently declining.The decline was widespread,with gas decreasing its share in the mix of 19 out of

62、27 EU Member States between 2019 and 2024.In 2019,fossil gas provided 20%of EU power(569 TWh)and was the second-largest source of EU electricity after nuclear.By 2024,gas had fallen by a quarter,dropping into third place with a share of 16%(430 TWh).19The decline of gas power has been a major factor

63、 in reducing EU gas consumption since the energy crisis,and reducing the EUs dependency on Russian energy.Total EU gas demand fell by 20%in the past five years,with about a third of this decline occurring in the power sector.In 2024,overall gas demand is expected to have remained almost stable,as re

64、duced gas burning for power offset a recovery in the industrial sector(see Methodology).Despite this progress,Russian gas still accounted for 14%of total EU gas consumption in 2024(down from around 50%in 2019).In fact,gas imports from Russia(including pipeline and liquefied natural gas)increased by

65、18%in 2024,from 38 bcm in 2023 to 45 bcm,mainly due to increased imports into Italy(+4 bcm),Czechia(+2 bcm),and France(+1.7 bcm)(see Methodology).The power sector alone consumed approximately 88 bcm of gas in 2024.Of this,approximately 10 bcm(12%)was from Russia,providing an estimated 4 bn in revenu

66、e.20In an effort to bring Russian gas imports to zero,the EU has not only been reducing gas consumption,but also diversifying gas sources.This led to more reliance on imports of liquefied natural gas(LNG),which accounted for 38%of imports in 2024,up from 22%in 2019.This reliance is only likely to de

67、epen as Russian gas exports to Europe via Ukraine stopped on the 1st of January 2025.Continuing to reduce EU gas demand in all sectors-including power-will deliver further strategic,economic and climate benefits.It will minimise the exposure of households and companies to the inherent volatility and

68、 price shocks of the global LNG market.Additionally,it will avoid negative climate impacts,as burning US LNG is as polluting as burning coal.Finally,it is fully aligned with the EUs security objectiveto end reliance on Russian energy.21Chapter 3:Solars meteoric growth continuesThe EUs solar success

69、story continued in 2024,as the bloc saw a record annual increase in solar generation.An accelerated rollout of batteries and smart electrification will be key to cost-effectively sustaining solars impressive growth.In 2024,solar grew in every EU country,delivering good progress towards 2030 targets.

70、Sustaining that growth requires an accelerated rollout of clean flexibility,which will also help lower electricity bills for consumers.Solutions such as batteries and smart electrification are already mature and ready to deploy,but require policy action to reach their full potential.Another record y

71、ear for solar2024 marked a record annual increase in solar generation,up 54 TWh(+22%)compared to 2023,when solar generation had already increased by 40 TWh compared to 2022.2024 was also a record year for annual capacity additions:the EU solar fleet grew by 66 GW,equal to over 450,000 panels added p

72、er day(see Methodology),and 4%more than the 63 GW of additions in 2023.Clean flexibility will light the way for further solar success22The rate of growth seen in 2024 is already above what the latest national targetswould require,highlighting a disconnect between the rapid pace of on-the-ground mark

73、et trends and the slow response of governments in updating their targets.Installed solar capacity reached 338 GW in 2024 and,if the current pace is sustained,the EU remains on track to meet the interim REPowerEU solar target of 400 GW total installed capacity by 2025.Furthermore,maintaining the curr

74、ent pace of growth would bring the EU solar target of 750 GW by 2030 within reach.23Solar is growing in every country In 2024,all EU countries saw growth in both solar generation and installed capacity compared to the year before.16 EU countries generated more than 10%of their electricity from solar

75、 in 2024,three more than in 2023.Innovative solutions are also emerging for solar beyond roofs and fields:solar on balconies boomed in Germany and policymakers are becoming aware of the vast unlocked potential for agri-PV.24Days with plentiful solar increase in many EU countriesAt its peak productio

76、n hours,solar is getting close to exceeding demand in the top-solar countries.In 12 EU countries,solar generation met 80%or more of power demand in at least one hour in 2024.In the Netherlands and Hungary,more than 70 days in 2024 saw solar meeting more than 80%of the countrys total demand at its pe

77、ak production hour.This is a significant jump from 2023,particularly for Hungary,where the peak solar generation met more than 80%of domestic demand in only 10 days in 2023.Hours with abundant solar generation present a valuable opportunity to further reduce reliance on expensive fossil power,if sol

78、ar growth is coupled with batteries,smart electrification,expanded grids and other clean flexibility solutions.Batteries,in particular,can shift abundant and cheap solar power beyond sunny hours to the evening demand peaks and replace expensive fossil power in power system balancing.Most of the clea

79、n flexibility tools are already deployable.25Clean flexibility will sustain solar growth and bring benefits In 2024,plentiful solar contributed to lower power prices in the central hours of the day.At times,the lack of demand for abundant solar electricity pushed hourly power prices to zero or even

80、below.Negative or zero price hours became more common in 2024 compared to 2023(4%of hours on average across the EU versus 2%in 2023)and happened virtually everywhere in the EU.Intraday price spreads widened as well,amplified by the high costs of fossil power generation ramping up in the evening.In 2

81、024,across the large majority of EU countries,the difference between the minimum and the maximum power price within the day was higher compared to 2023,particularly in the summer.In Q3 2024,18 EU countries saw average intraday price spreads increasing by at least 10%compared to the same quarter in 2

82、023.In five countries(Bulgaria,Greece,Hungary,Poland and Romania),average price spreads in Q3 2024 doubled compared to the same quarter in 2023 and were above 200/MWh.26The business case for clean flexibility strengthensNegative prices and increased spreads signal a business case for more clean flex

83、ibility options.Consumers could save money by shifting demand to periods of abundant solar generation and low prices(via smart electrification).Market participants could gain additional revenues by shifting solar across time(via storage)or space(via grids).Battery operators,for example,can earn reve

84、nues from buying power when prices are lower at midday and selling when prices are higher during the evening demand peak.A readily available solution is a battery co-located with a solar plant.This gives solar power producers more control over the prices they receive and helps them avoid selling for

85、 low prices in the middle of the day.Battery storage co-located with solar plants is set to become an industry standard in the years to come.This is because it improves the business case for solar while keeping solar electricity competitive against fossil generation.In fact,a combination of grid-sca

86、le battery and utility solar can now produce electricity more cheaply than existing coal or gas power plants,according to a recent study of generation costs in Germany.27An improved policy framework for clean flexibility is neededThe deployment of batteries has been growing rapidly in recent years:E

87、U installed battery capacity doubled to 16 GW in 2023,up from 8 GW in 2022.However,capacity is concentrated in a small number of countries,with 70%of the existing batteries located in Germany and Italy as of the end of 2023.Improving market access and removing barriers-such as double grid charging a

88、nd restrictive requirements for participation in capacity markets and grid services-can unlock further private investments in battery storage across the EU.Additionally,demand flexibility and smart electrification can help consumers reduce their bills.Flexible electricity use is gaining traction:the

89、 number of smart energy tariffs and services available for European energy consumers has almost tripled in the last three years.However,barriers to demand flexibility still exist.For example,smart meters are critical for giving consumers real-time control over their energy use,but in ten EU countrie

90、s fewer than 30%of households have access to them,and six countries have a smart meter rollout below 10%.Furthermore,the majority of EU power consumers are on fixed-price contracts,hindering their opportunity to access the cheapest electricity.Grids and cross-border interconnectors are also key prov

91、iders of clean flexibility.National targets that better reflect the rapid growth of solar would help in planning the EUs grid expansion and modernisation,thereby optimising an effective solution for sharing abundant solar within and between countries.2829Chapter 4:Wind sector challenges are blowing

92、overWind growth set to accelerate as obstacles are tackledWind capacity additions have been held back in the last few years by a combination of global macroeconomic challenges and domestic policy barriers.However,wind remains cost competitive with fossil power,and recent policy changes are starting

93、to show results,with turbine orders,auction volumes and permitting rates all increasing.Wind generation grew by 7 TWh year-on-year in 2024 to reach 477 TWh.This growth is lower than the average 30 TWh year-on-year increase seen between 2019 and 2023.While capacity additions continued in 2024,wind co

94、nditions were less favourable than in 2023,leading to lower than expected generation.Several factors suggest that wind generation is likely to resume its rising trend.Annual capacity additions are expected to increase over the next five years,rising from an estimated 13 GW in 2024 to nearly 30 GW by

95、 2030.Furthermore,offshore wind,which produces more electricity per GW than onshore installations,is expected to make up a progressively larger share of new capacity.30Wind remains cost competitive,despite inflationary pressures Globally,high inflation and supply chain problems-caused primarily by t

96、he Covid-19 pandemic and Russian aggression in Ukraine-have created challenges for the wind industry.These factors have disproportionately impacted wind due to long project lead times and relatively high upfront investment needs.It is partly for this reason that wind capacity additions have remained

97、 similar year-on-year,rather than accelerating quickly like solar.Macroeconomic challenges have interrupted cost declines in wind powerThe levelised costs of onshore and offshore wind power in Europe fell by 68%and 60%respectively between 2010 and 2021.The challenging economic environment of recent

98、years interrupted this trend,with costs broadly plateauing since 2021.In Europe,the price of wind turbines has increased by approximately 10%since 2021(based on Vestas and Nordex average turbine prices)but the majority of this occurred between 2021 and 2022,with prices remaining flat in 2024 compare

99、d to 2023.Additionally,the cost of capital in the energy sector increased in 2024(to 6.6%WACC from 6%in 2022/23),but by less than the previous annual rise(5.1%to 6%).These cost increases have counteracted the economic benefits of continued technological improvements.In Germany,for example,the leveli

100、sed cost of energy(LCOE)for onshore wind rose slightly from 39-83/MWh in 2021 to 43-92/MWh in 2024.Onshore wind auction prices have also increased,with the EU average rising from 47.6/MWh(2024 55.7/MWh)in 2021 to 76/MWh in 2024.By contrast,in the offshore sector,a steeper learning curve and continue

101、d improvements in capacity factors have allowed cost declines to continue.The latest LCOE estimate for Germany in 2024 is 55-103/MWh,lower than the pre-crisis level of 73-121/MWh(2021).Wind is still cheaper than fossil powerDespite this mixed picture for deployment costs,wind remains competitive aga

102、inst fossil gas generation,the typical price-setter on European wholesale power markets.31The price of gas on European markets(Dutch Title Transfer Facility)has grown steadily throughout 2024,starting the year at around 30/MWh and ending at around 50/MWh,well above the pre-crisis norm of 20/MWh.Acco

103、rdingly,the average short-run marginal cost of EU gas power across 2024 was an estimated 96/MWh,reaching a high of around 125/MWh in December.This remains above the typical cost of both onshore and offshore wind in the EU in 2024.Continued deployment of wind power would,therefore,have an important r

104、ole to play in reducing electricity prices in the EU even in the absence of further cost reductions.However,after a disruptive few years,the cost of wind is expected to start falling again as supply chains recover,inflation eases and technology advancements continue.Some indicators of recovery are a

105、lready visible.Turbine prices were raised after most European wind manufacturers posted losses in 2022,but their financial positions have significantly recovered since.This recovery,plus increased competition from Chinese suppliers,is likely to put downward pressure on prices.Furthermore,the price o

106、f steel-the single biggest material costs for a wind turbine-has fallen from its record high in 2022.Forecasts of LCOE confirm falling cost expectations,with onshore and offshore wind(in Germany)expected to fall to 39-84/MWh and 53-98/MWh respectively by 2035.Policy obstacles still exist but changes

107、 are having an impact In addition to macroeconomic issues,some of winds problems are made in Europe.It has become clear that processes at EU and national level for developing grids,permitting new projects and managing grid connections were inadequate for the pace of the energy transition.Suboptimal

108、support schemes and restrictive planning rules at the national level have also limited opportunities for growth.Offshore wind auctions in Lithuania and Denmark failed due to poor design.Sweden refused offshore wind developments on security grounds.Barriers exist onshore as well,with countries such a

109、s Polandcontinuing to enforce excessive minimum distance rules.32In recognition of such challenges in the wind sector,many policy actions have been taken at the EU level to accelerate deployment,especially since the gas crisis.For example,permitting times in the EU for onshore wind in 2022 averaged

110、6 years,while new rules aim to reduce them to 2 years.These interventions will take time to achieve their full impact,but there are already some signs of improvement.33A strengthening project pipeline Compared to previous years,2024 saw increased levels of wind farm permitting,more turbine orders an

111、d record levels of capacity up for auction.Permitting rates were higher in H1 2024 compared to H1 2023 in most markets with available data.While the vast majority of Member States have yet to fully implementEU permitting reforms,Germany has made more progress than most.Consequently,approvals reached

112、 12 GW in 2024,up by 60%compared with 2023,and more than the rest of the EU combined.Wind turbine orders also recovered across the EU in 2024,totalling 13.1 GW from January to September,40%higher than the same period in 2023,and the second highest ever.Auctions awarded a record 28 GW of capacity acr

113、oss the EU in 2024,with Germany alone awarding 19 GW.Auctions already announced for 2025 amount to a potential 71 GW.If the average success rate of auctions in 2024 was repeated,auctions in 2025 would deliver 65 GW of new capacity.This means auctions in 2024 and 2025 could cover 45%of the further ad

114、ditions needed for a REPowerEU target of 440 GW(see Methodology).Further policy effort neededWhile higher growth is on the horizon,the delays in recent years have created a widening delivery gap between market forecasts and EU ambition.Current outlooks from WindEurope and the IEA predict average ann

115、ual wind additions of 19-22 GW(net)between 2025 and 2030.However,an average of 34 GW is required to hit EU targets and deliver Member State plans for 2030.The delivery gap is biggest in the offshore sector,where several governments have lowered their 2030 ambitions and forecasts due to project delay

116、s.Timely implementation and enforcement of the existing policy framework is the first step to closing the delivery gap.For onshore wind,permitting reforms and updated grid connection processes will be key.For offshore wind,it is critical to have auction designs that provide attractive incentives,and

117、 an overall approach that maximises supply chain certainty.35Several files promised by the incoming European Commission could further improve the prospects for wind power.The Electrification Action Plan should outline a visionfor smart electricity demand growth,boosting the investment case for clean

118、 power.Both the pathway to get off Russian energy,and the 2040 climate target,should clearly signal a strong future role for wind power.36Policy recommendationsPolicies that sustain wind and solar growth,clean flexibility and electrification are needed to deliver energy security and competitiveness

119、for generations to come.The European Green Deal has delivered impressive progress in just five years.The new EU Commission can use its next landmark policy package the Clean Industrial Deal to build on the momentum of the EUs electricity transition over the next five years and continue to deliver be

120、nefits for households and businesses alike.There are compelling reasons to accelerate cleaning up the EU power sector.Wind and solar growth can drive down energy prices and lower dependence on expensive and risky fossil fuel imports,especially from Russia.Renewable energies are overwhelmingly popula

121、r with European citizens.As part of the Clean Industrial Deal,the EU has the opportunity to secure the skilled workers and value chain for the clean technologies that are set to dominate the future of energy markets.Building on the momentum of the EUs electricity transition in the next five years 37

122、With global markets becoming increasingly competitive,the EU needs to put the following priority actions on top of the policy agenda in 2025:The roadmap to ending Russian energy imports and the 2040 climate target proposal should clearly signal the pivotal contribution of wind power;Continued suppor

123、t should be provided to the European wind industry,including through cross-border investments;Permitting reforms for renewables need to be implemented,following already established examples;Renewables auctions with improved designs need to be executed on time,which is essential to guarantee the nece

124、ssary pace of wind deployment;National governments need to finalise spatial energy plans and remove overly restrictive minimum distance rules for wind farms;The Electrification Action Plan should enable smart electrification that helps consumers reduce their bills and improves the business case for

125、renewables;Existing electricity market rules need to be implemented to improve market access and remove barriers to accelerated deployment of clean flexibility,with a focus on battery storage and demand-side flexibility;The existing grid policy framework,including anticipatory grid investments,shoul

126、d be implemented without delay,ideally through a dedicated task force;A one-stop-shop for grids should be considered at the EU level,which would streamline access to finance for grid investments,enabling beneficial regional connectivity.38Supporting materialsGeneration,imports and demandAnnual data

127、from 1990 to 2023 is gross generation,published primarily by Eurostat with wind generation data from IRENA.2024 data is an estimate of gross generation,based on net generation gathered from monthly data.This estimate is calculated by applying absolute changes in net generation to the most recent gro

128、ss baseline.Net imports from 1990 to 2023 are also published by Eurostat,with recent data estimated in the same manner as generation.Demand is calculated as the sum of generation and net imports,and validated against direct demand figures published by ENTSO-E.Monthly data is gathered from a number o

129、f sources,including both centrally reported ENTSO-E data and directly reported national transmission system operators.In some cases data is published on a monthly lag;here we have estimated recent months based on relative changes in previous years.These cases are flagged in the dataset.Monthly publi

130、shed data is often reported provisionally,and is far from perfect.Every effort has been made to ensure accuracy,and where possible we compare multiple sources to confirm their agreement.Methodology39Below is a list of countries included,and sources for monthly data:Austria:ENTSO-E,Eurostat,E-Control

131、 GmbH Belgium:ENTSO-E Bulgaria:ENTSO-E Croatia:ENTSO-E Cyprus:Eurostat;hourly data used in analysis from Cyprus Transmission System Operator Czechia:ENTSO-E Denmark:ENTSO-E Estonia:ENTSO-E Finland:Biomass,gas,hydro,solar and wind from Eurostat;other fuels from ENTSO-E;hourly biomass data used in ana

132、lysis based on ENTSO-E and Eurostat France:ENTSO-E Germany:Gas and solar from Energy-Charts;other fuels from Agora Energiewende;flow data from ENTSO-E;yearly gas generation data from the Energy Institute Greece:ENTSO-E Hungary:Solar data before 2020 from Eurostat;other fuels from ENTSO-E Ireland:Gen

133、eration and flow data from Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland;hourly data provided by Green Collective Italy:Bioenergy and solar from Terna;other fuels from ENTSO-E;flow data from Terna Latvia:solar from AST;other fuels from ENTSO-E Lithuania:ENTSO-E Luxembourg:ENTSO-E Malta:Eurostat;no hourly

134、data available for use in analysis Netherlands:Base data provided by Statistics Netherlands(CBS);more recent months estimated based on data from EnergieOpwek;hourly data from the nationaal energie dashboard from 2021 onwards,pre-2021 data is based on ENTSO-E and CBS.Poland:Solar data from ARE via In

135、strat;other fuels from ENTSO-E;pre-2021 hourly solar data used in analysis modelled based on capacity from Instrat and insolation data from Open-Meteo Portugal:ENTSO-E Romania:ENTSO-E Slovakia:ENTSO-E Slovenia:ENTSO-E Spain:ENTSO-E;flow data from Red Elctrica Sweden:ENTSO-E;hourly solar data used in

136、 analysis from Elstatistik40Wind installed capacity data Actual and projected installed wind capacity is based on the data provided by Wind Europe in Wind energy in Europe:2023 Statistics and the outlook for 2024-2030.Updates to expected gross 2024 additions by country were published in their autumn

137、 update and where these differed to the previous forecast gross additions,this difference was applied to expected net additions to calculate installed 2024 total capacity.This report also takes into account the estimated gross wind capacity additions for the EU as a whole,published January 2025.Wind

138、 auction data The basis of the wind capacity auction data is Wind Europe.For 2024 and 2025 Ember supplemented this with awarded and announced capacity auctions from national agencies in charge of the tendering process.The average strike price is calculated as the capacity-weighted strike price in EU

139、R/MWh.Offshore refers to both floating and fixed-foundation offshore wind.The total auctioned capacity for 2024 may still increase,as results from some auctions,particularly those scheduled for December,are yet to be announced.Auctions with tender applications extending into 2025 are categorised und

140、er 2025.Solar installed capacity data Capacity numbers presented are in units of direct current(DC,gross output).Due to the lack of transparency on this issue in national reporting,not all capacity data in national energy and climate plans can be guaranteed to be in units of DC.As part of the REPowe

141、rEU plan,EU solar strategy aims to bring online over 320 GWac of solar photovoltaic by 2025(more than doubling compared to 2020)and almost 600 GWac by 2030.Those official numbers refer to units of alternating current(AC)and have been converted to units of direct current(GWdc)by multiplying by 1.25.T

142、he source used for solar capacity data is SolarPower Europe.41Annual capacity additions translated in number of panels added per day,assuming an average panel size of 400 W.The source for national solar targets is Embers Live EU NECP Tracker.Behind the meter solar We implemented adjustments for behi

143、nd the meter solar not accounted in official statistics for six countries(Austria,Croatia,Portugal,Spain,Slovenia,Romania),affecting 2022-2024.Gas demand and importsEU total gas demand:2019-2023 based on Eurostat;2024 calculated based on IEAforecast for 2023/2024 year on year change(-2%)and Eurostat

144、 data for 2023.Share of Russian gas in EU power sectors gas demand:gas import data by departure and destination country provided by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air(CREA)was used to calculate Russian share of imports.This was scaled to share of consumption using country import depende

145、ncies derived from Eurostat gas consumption and production data.Import dependencies for 2024 were taken from 2023 due to Eurostat reporting lag.The percentage of Russian gas burnt for power generation is assumed to be the same as the percentage of Russian gas in total consumption per country.This pe

146、rcentage is then applied to country gas in power demand and values summed across the EU to get the share of Russian gas in EU gas in power demand.The LNG share in EU gas imports was calculated using Bruegels gas import tracker.Avoided fossil fuel import costsThis method estimates avoided fossil fuel

147、 import costs due to added wind and solar capacities between two chosen years.For each fuel(onshore wind,offshore wind 42and solar),additional capacity is defined on a monthly basis as the difference between installed capacity in a given month,compared to the same month in an earlier reference year.

148、Monthly capacity data from various country sources is available for Belgium,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,Poland,Portugal and Spain.Where monthly capacity data is not available,a linear interpolation is performed across the year in question.Projected installed wind capacities for the end of 2024 ar

149、e taken from WindEuropes Autumn 2024 report as this is the latest country-level information available.Solar yearly capacities come from SolarPower Europes EU Market Outlook 2024-2028.This approach provides a scaling factor for each month of the year of interest,which is then applied to actual hourly

150、 generation data to estimate the volume of generation from new additions of each technology.It is assumed that if the new wind and solar hadnt been installed,the resulting generation gap would have been filled with another fuel.To determine which fuel would have replaced it,the following steps are a

151、pplied,in order,to each hour of generation data:If fossil generation accounts for 5%of hourly generation,it is assumed that extra wind and solar did not displace fossil,as it is likely other clean sources or imports-lower in the merit order than fossil-would have produced instead If fossil generatio

152、n is within 5%of its yearly minimum,it is assumed that additional wind and solar did not displace fossil,which is assumed to be operating at a minimum must run level.This takes into account,for example,combined heat and power plants which must often run at minimum capacities.If a country has no coal

153、 or gas capacity(eg Cyprus),all additional wind and solar is assumed to have replaced other fossil Short run marginal costs(SRMCs)for gas and hard coal are then used to determine which fuel would be setting the marginal price.It is assumed throughout that lignite is cheaper than hard coal and gas an

154、d would therefore not be the marginal price setter.If gas is the most expensive SRMC and gas generation is not zero in the given hour,it is assumed that gas is the marginal price setter and therefore has been displaced by added wind and solar capacity in that hour.The same logic applies to hard coal

155、 if it has a higher SRMC than gas.If gas is the most expensive SRMC but is not generating in the given hour,it is assumed that hard coal(so the second most expensive technology)would be displaced,and vice versa.43 In both points above,an installed capacity check is made to ensure there is sufficient

156、 hard coal or gas capacity available such that it could have generated more in the absence of the added wind and solar.Capacities are taken from GEMs coal and gastrackers.In the rare case there is insufficient capacity for one of these fuels,the gap is made up using the other,or if there is insuffic

157、ient of either,then other fossil is used.The above steps are applied,and summed over the hours of the year,to calculate the amount of hard coal and gas generation avoided by new wind and solar capacities added between a historical reference year(e.g.,2019)and a chosen year of interest(e.g.,2024).To

158、estimate the share of this avoided gas and hard coal generation that would have used imported fossil fuels,the avoided generation values are multiplied by gas and hard coal import dependencies per country per year.Import dependencies are derived from Eurostat data,so values are not available for 202

159、4 due to data reporting lags.To fill this gap,values are carried over from 2023,which represents a conservative approach as indigenous production is generally in decline across the EU.To calculate avoided fossil fuel import costs,the avoided gas and hard coal generation in TWh are first divided by a

160、ssumed plant efficiencies of 50%(Higher Heating Value)for gas and 40%for hard coal to estimate the volume of fuel avoided,and this value then multiplied by respective fuel costs.These are taken from day ahead TTF prices for gas,unless specific country market data is available,and daily front month A

161、PI2 prices for hard coal.Avoided gas imports are converted from TWh to bcm using a calorific value of 35.17 MJ/m3.Avoided coal is converted from TWh to million tonnes by multiplying by 0.122.To calculate total avoided fossil fuel import costs thanks to wind and solar added since the start of the Gre

162、en Deal,the above methodology is applied to each year from 2020 up to 2024 inclusive,using the historical reference year of 2019.Malta is excluded from this calculation due to a lack of data.44Solar capture rates calculationsSolar capture rates reflect the market value of solar energy when sold on t

163、he day-ahead market.Solar capture prices are the average prices that a solar generating unit earns for each kWh sold to the market,determined by its hourly production profile and the hourly spot power prices over a specific period.They are calculated using hourly day-ahead prices from ENTSO-E and ho

164、urly generation data as described above.Our model shows the one-year rolling average to give a better understanding of the long term development of solar capture rates.A marginal price-taking solar with a co-located battery storage unit is modelled with the following assumptions:90 MW AC solar array

165、 with output based on national generation data 60 MW AC battery with 1 hr(60 MWh)energy capacity 100 MW AC inverter 87%round trip efficiency,implemented on charging side,such that the battery charge rate is 87%of the panel discharge rate into the battery(i.e.a maximum charge rate of 52.2 MW)0 MWh mi

166、nimum state of chargeThe cycle strategy is as follows:Peak charging and discharging hours are parameterised by finding average minimum daytime and maximum evening price hours per quarter per country.These tend to be around midday and 6-7pm.Charge symmetrically around peak hours,maintaining a level o

167、utput profile to the grid.Any generation that would otherwise be curtailed(e.g.when the array output is bigger than the inverter capacity)is used to charge the battery if possible.The battery is charged as much as possible.Discharge symmetrically around peak hour at maximum possible rate No charging

168、 from the grid is allowedThis strategy is intentionally simple and is not optimised with real-time price information.It therefore represents an underestimate of the true marginal value of battery storage.45Power price data Wholesale electricity prices are average day-ahead spot prices per MWh sold p

169、er time period,cleaned and sourced from ENTSO-E.These are the prices paid to electricity generators,and are not the same as retail electricity prices or total costs to end users.Within-day power price spreads refer to the difference between the maximum and minimum day-ahead electricity prices within

170、 a day.Price spreads not computed for Cyprus,Malta,Luxembourg due to lack of reliable price data.46Lead authorsChris Rosslowe,Beatrice PetrovichOther contributorsAlison Candlin,Chelsea Bruce-Lockhart,Claire Kaelin,Hannah Broadbent,Harriet Fox,Josie Murdoch,Lauren Orso,Leo Heberer,Libby Copsey,Nicola

171、s Fulghum,Pawe Czyak,Richard Black,Sarah Brown,Tomos Harrison.Peer reviewersBram Claeys(Regulatory Assistance Project),Giovanni Sgaravatti(Bruegel),Hannah Ritchie(Our World in Data),Kingsmill Bond(RMI).With thanks toPanda Rushwood,Petras Katinas and Isaac Levi(Centre for Research on Energy and Clean

172、 Air),Ben Williams and Ugne Keliauskaite(Bruegel)and Green Collective.Ember,2025Published under a Creative Commons ShareAlike Attribution Licence(CC BY-SA 4.0).You are actively encouraged to share and adapt the report,but you must credit the authors and title,and you must share any material you create under the same licence.47Acknowledgements