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1、WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK2025APRINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDA Critical Juncture amid Policy ShiftsWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKA Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts2025APRINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND2025 International Monetary FundCover and Design:IMF CSF Creative Solutions DivisionComposition:Absolute Service

2、,Inc.Cataloging-in-Publication DataIMF LibraryNames:International Monetary Fund.Title:World economic outlook(International Monetary Fund)Other titles:WEO|Occasional paper(International Monetary Fund)|World economic and financial surveys.Description:Washington,DC:International Monetary Fund,1980-|Sem

3、iannual|Some issues also have thematic titles.|Began with issue for May 1980.|1981-1984:Occasional paper/International Monetary Fund,0251-6365|1986-:World economic and financial surveys,0256-6877.Identifiers:ISSN 0256-6877(print)|ISSN 1564-5215(online)Subjects:LCSH:Economic developmentPeriodicals.|I

4、nternational economic relationsPeriodicals.|Debts,ExternalPeriodicals.|Balance of paymentsPeriodicals.|International financePeriodicals.|Economic forecastingPeriodicals.Classification:LCC HC10.W79HC10.80 ISBN 979-8-40028-958-3(English Paper)979-8-40028-976-7(English ePub)979-8-40028-996-5(English We

5、b PDF)Disclaimer:The World Economic Outlook(WEO)is a survey by the IMF staff pub-lished twice a year,in the spring and fall.The WEO is prepared by the IMF staff and has benefited from comments and suggestions by Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on April 11,2025.The views

6、expressed in this publication are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMFs Executive Directors or their national authorities.Recommended citation:International Monetary Fund.2025.World Economic Outlook:A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts.Washington,DC.April.Pu

7、blication orders may be placed online,by fax,or through the mail:International Monetary Fund,Publication ServicesP.O.Box 92780,Washington,DC 20090,USATel.:(202)623-7430 Fax:(202)623-7201E-mail:publicationsIMF.orgbookstore.IMF.orgelibrary.IMF.orgErrataApril 30,2025This web version of the WEO has been

8、 updated to reflect the following changes to the PDFs published online on April 22,2025:-The Executive Summary,Foreword,Chapter 1,and Statistical Appendix(Introduction,Tables A,and Tables B)PDFs were replaced with the typeset versions.-In the Executive Summary,Figure ES.1:“US International Trade Com

9、mission”was added to the sources.-In Chapter 1,“Inflation Forecast”subsection,first paragraph:“for 2025”was deleted from the end of the last sentence.-In Chapter 1,Commodity Special Feature,“Commodity Market Developments”section,fourth paragraph:“a ton”was corrected to“per ounce”at the end of the la

10、st sentence.-In the Statistical Appendix Online Tables,Table B20,footnote 2:“2023”was corrected to“2024”in the second sentence,and“2024 and 2025”was corrected to“2025 and 2026”in the third sentence.International Monetary Fund|April 2025iiiAssumptions and Conventions viiFurther Information ixData xPr

11、eface xiForeword xiiExecutive Summary xvChapter 1.Global Prospects and Policies 1Policy Uncertainty Tests Global Resilience 1The Outlook:A Range of Possibilities 9Risks to the Outlook:Tilted to the Downside 17Policies:Navigating Uncertainty and Enhancing Preparedness to Ease Macroeconomic Trade-Offs

12、 22Commodity Special Feature:Market Developments and the Impact of AI on Energy Demand 35References 47Chapter 2.The Rise of the Silver Economy:Global Implications of Population Aging 49Introduction 49Uneven Pace of Global Population Aging 51Healthy Aging and Implications for Labor Markets 51Economic

13、 Implications of Global Population Aging 56Conclusions and Policy Implications 62References 72Chapter 3.Journeys and Junctions:Spillovers from Migration and Refugee Policies 75Introduction 75Migration and Refugee Patterns and Policies 78A Primer on Spillovers from Migration and Refugee Policy Change

14、s 80Estimating Spillovers from Migration and Refugee Policy Changes 80Modeling Spillovers from Migration and Refugee Policy Changes 83Conclusions and Policy Implications 86References 97Statistical Appendix 101Assumptions 101Whats New 101Data and Conventions 101Country Notes 103Classification of Econ

15、omies 105General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook Classification 105CONTENTSWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTSivInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025Table A.Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP,E

16、xports of Goods and Services,and Population,2024 107Table B.Advanced Economies by Subgroup 108Table C.European Union 108Table D.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings 109Table E.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region,Net External Position,He

17、avily Indebted Poor Countries,and Per Capita Income Classification 110Table F.Economies with Exceptional Reporting Periods 112Table G.Key Data Documentation 113Box A1.Economic Policy Assumptions underlying the Projections for Selected Economies 123Box A2.Revisions to Economic Projections 127List of

18、Tables 128Output(Tables A1A4)129Inflation(Tables A5A7)136Financial Policies(Table A8)141Foreign Trade(Table A9)142Current Account Transactions(Tables A10A12)144Balance of Payments and External Financing(Table A13)151Flow of Funds(Table A14)155Medium-Term Reference Forecast(Table A15)158World Economi

19、c Outlook Selected Topics 159IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook,April 2025 169TablesTable 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Reference Forecast 12Table 1.2.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Reference Forecast at Market Exchange Rate Weights 14Table 1.2.1.Long-Run Effects of T

20、ariffs 34Annex Table 1.1.1.European Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 41Annex Table 1.1.2.Asian and Pacific Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 42Annex Table 1.1.3.Western Hemisphere Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,

21、Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 43Annex Table 1.1.4.Middle East and Central Asia Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 44Annex Table 1.1.5.Sub-Saharan African Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 45Annex Table 1.1.

22、6.Summary of World Real per Capita Output 46Table 2.2.1.Size of Reforms Needed to Stabilize Age-Induced Increase in Public Debt 67Online TablesStatistical AppendixTable B1.Advanced Economies:Unemployment,Employment,and Real GDP per CapitaTable B2.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Real GDPTabl

23、e B3.Advanced Economies:Hourly Earnings,Productivity,and Unit Labor Costs in ManufacturingTable B4.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Consumer PricesTable B5.Summary of Fiscal and Financial IndicatorsTable B6.Advanced Economies:General and Central Government Net Lending/Borrowing and General G

24、overnment Net Lending/Borrowing Excluding Social Security SchemesCONTENTSvInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025CONTENTSTable B7.Advanced Economies:General Government Structural BalancesTable B8.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:General Government Net Lending/Borrowing and Overall Fiscal Bala

25、nceTable B9.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:General Government Net Lending/BorrowingTable B10.Selected Advanced Economies:Exchange RatesTable B11.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Broad Money AggregatesTable B12.Advanced Economies:Export Volumes,Import Volumes,and Terms of Trade in G

26、oods and ServicesTable B13.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:Total Trade in GoodsTable B14.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Source of Export Earnings:Total Trade in GoodsTable B15.Summary of Current Account TransactionsTable B16.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Su

27、mmary of External Debt and Debt ServiceTable B17.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:External Debt by MaturityTable B18.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Analytical Criteria:External Debt by MaturityTable B19.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Ratio of External Debt to

28、 GDPTable B20.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Debt-Service RatiosTable B21.Emerging Market and Developing Economies,Medium-Term Reference Forecast:Selected Economic IndicatorsFiguresFigure ES.1.US Effective Tariff Rates on All Imports xvFigure 1.1.Global Inflation Trends 2Figure 1.2.Labor M

29、arkets 2Figure 1.3.Growth Performance and Forecasts 3Figure 1.4.Overall Uncertainty,EPU,and TPU 3Figure 1.5.Income Growth and Cost-of-Living Changes 3Figure 1.6.Cyclical Positions 4Figure 1.7.Consumer Confidence 4Figure 1.8.Real GDP versus Prepandemic Trend 5Figure 1.9.Shifts in Energy Imports and E

30、xports 5Figure 1.10.Labor Productivity and Capital Investment 6Figure 1.11.Industrial Production Trends 6Figure 1.12.Fiscal Policy Space 7Figure 1.13.Inflation Deviation from Target 8Figure 1.14.Changes in Trade Composition 8Figure 1.15.Capital Flows and Exchange Rates 9Figure 1.16.Global Assumption

31、s 10Figure 1.17.Inflation Forecasts 16Figure 1.18.Medium-Term Outlook 17Figure 1.19.Current Account and International Investment Positions 18Figure 1.20.Rising Trade Restrictions and Fragmentation Concerns 19Figure 1.21.Spillovers from US Dollar Appreciation 19Figure 1.22.Number and Costs of Natural

32、 Disasters 21Figure 1.1.1.Forecast Uncertainty around Global Growth and Inflation Projections 27Figure 1.1.2.Impact of Scenario A on GDP 29Figure 1.1.3.Impact of Scenario B on GDP 30WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTSviInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025Figure 1.1.4.Impa

33、ct of Scenarios A and B on Current Account in Percent of GDP 30Figure 1.2.1.Short-Run Effects of Tariffs 33Figure 1.SF.1.Commodity Market Developments 35Figure 1.SF.2.The Growing Macroeconomic Relevance of AI-Producing Sectors 37Figure 1.SF.3.AIs Demand for Electricity 37Figure 1.SF.4.The Effects of

34、 Increased Demand for Electricity 39Figure 1.SF.5.Emission Impacts of Expansion in IT Sector 39Figure 2.1.Global Population Aging 50Figure 2.2.Global Demographic Trends 52Figure 2.3.Healthy-Aging Trends,200022 52Figure 2.4.Life Expectancy and Cross-Country Convergence 53Figure 2.5.Cognitive Capacity

35、 53Figure 2.6.Cognitive Health Inequalities 54Figure 2.7.Heterogeneity in Cognitive Health Trends 54Figure 2.8.Effect of Healthy Aging on Labor Market Outcomes 55Figure 2.9.Baseline Projections:Growth,Interest Rates,and Primary Balances 57Figure 2.10.Baseline Projections:Net Foreign Assets 58Figure

36、2.11.The Role of Healthy Aging and Demographic Trends 59Figure 2.12.Labor Force Participation by Age Group 60Figure 2.13.Average Impact of Labor Supply Policies on GDP Growth over 20252100 61Figure 2.14.Additional Fiscal Space in Combined Policy Scenario 62Figure 2.1.1.Low-Income Countries:Impact fr

37、om Enhanced Financial Integration and Migration Outflows 65Figure 2.2.1.Average Change in Consumption,202565 68Figure 2.3.1.Employment Shares:AI Exposure and Complementarity 70Figure 2.3.2.AI Exposure and Age-Friendliness,United States,Ages 55 and Older 70Figure 2.3.3.Workers Probability of Transiti

38、on across Occupations,by Age 71Figure 3.1.Global Trends 76Figure 3.2.Migration Perceptions and Preferences 76Figure 3.3.Changes in Stocks and Flows of Migrants and Refugees 78Figure 3.4.Gross Migration Flows,by Country-Group Pairs,202024 79Figure 3.5.Change in Share of Employed Migrants and Refugees

39、 Associated with Large Increases in Job Vacancy Ratios 79Figure 3.6.Migration and Refugee Policy Trends 80Figure 3.7.Categorizing Changes in Migration Flows between Origin and Destination Economies Following a Policy Tightening 81Figure 3.8.Destination Substitution in Response to Stricter Migration

40、and Refugee Policies in Other Destinations 82Figure 3.9.Refugee Inflows in Response to Stricter Policies 83Figure 3.10.Spillovers in Response to Stricter Migration Policy,by Skill Level 84Figure 3.11.Economic Effects of Stricter Economic Migration Policy 85Figure 3.12.Benefits of Regional Cooperatio

41、n by Destination 87Figure 3.1.1.Stocks and Flows of Forcibly Displaced People,200823 89Figure 3.1.2.Impact of Conflicts and Natural Disasters on Refugee Outflows from LIDCs 90Figure 3.1.3.Response of Migration Outflows to Natural Disasters 90Figure 3.2.1.Age Distributions of Migrants and Refugees Co

42、mpared with Those of Natives,2020 91Figure 3.2.2.Impact of Stronger Comparative Advantages on Net Migration Flows 92Figure 3.3.1.Cumulative Fiscal Impacts from Immigration 93Figure 3.3.2.Labor Force Participation Rate Gaps Relative to Those of Natives 94Figure 3.4.1.Inflation Response to Immigration

43、 Shock 95Figure 3.4.2.Wage Response to Immigration 96International Monetary Fund|April 2025viiA number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World Economic Outlook(WEO).It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates remained constant at their average levels du

44、ring March 6,2025April 3,2025,except for those for the currencies participating in the European exchange rate mechanism II,which are assumed to have remained constant in nominal terms relative to the euro;that estab-lished policies of national authorities will be maintained(for specific assumptions

45、about fiscal and monetary pol-icies for selected economies,see Box A1 in the Statistical Appendix);that the average price of oil will be$66.94 a barrel in 2025 and$62.38 a barrel in 2026;that the three-month government bond yield for the United States will average 4.2 percent in 2025 and 3.5 percent

46、 in 2026,that for the euro area will average 2.2 percent in 2025 and 2.1 percent in 2026,and that for Japan will average 0.5 percent in 2025 and 0.8 percent in 2026;and that the 10-year government bond yield for the United States will average 4.2 percent in 2025 and 3.8 percent in 2026,that for the

47、euro area will average 2.6 percent in 2025 and 2.7 percent in 2026,and that for Japan will average 1.4 percent in 2025 and 1.6 percent in 2026.These are,of course,working hypotheses rather than fore-casts,and the uncertainties surrounding them add to the margin of error that would,in any event,be in

48、volved in the projections.The estimates and projections are based on statistical information available through April 14,2025,but may not reflect the latest published data in all cases.For the date of the last data update for each econ-omy,please refer to the notes provided in the online WEO database

49、.Some economies have revised projections based on developments in commodity markets and international trade as of April 4,2025;these economies are listed in Box A2 in the Statistical Appendix.The following conventions are used throughout the WEO:.to indicate that data are not available or not applic

50、able;between years or months(for example,202324 or JanuaryJune)to indicate the years or months covered,including the beginning and ending years or months;and /between years or months(for example,2023/24)to indicate a fiscal or financial year.“Billion”means a thousand million;“trillion”means a thousa

51、nd billion.“Basis points”refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point(for example,25 basis points are equivalent to of 1 percentage point).Data refer to calendar years,except in the case of a few countries that use fiscal years.Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix,which lists the econom

52、ies with exceptional reporting periods for national accounts and government finance data.For some countries,the figures for 2024 and earlier are based on estimates rather than actual outturns.Please refer to Table G in the Statistical Appendix,which lists the latest actual outturns for the indicator

53、s in the national accounts,prices,government finance,and balance of payments for each country.What is new in this publication:For Bolivia,projections for 202730 have been omitted because of significant uncertainty regarding the economic outlook.For Ecuador,fiscal projections for 202530 are excluded

54、from publication because of ongoing program discussions.In the tables and figures,the following conventions apply:Tables and figures in this report that list their source as“IMF staff calculations”or“IMF staff estimates”draw on data from the WEO database.When countries are not listed alphabetically,

55、they are ordered on the basis of economic size.ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONSWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTSviiiInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025 Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect rounding.Composite data are provided for

56、various groups of countries organized according to economic characteristics or region.Unless noted otherwise,country group composites represent calculations based on 90 percent or more of the weighted group data.The boundaries,colors,denominations,and any other information shown on maps do not imply

57、,on the part of the IMF,any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.As used in this report,the terms“country”and“economy”do not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice.As used

58、 here,the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.International Monetary Fund|April 2025ixCorrections and RevisionsThe data and analysis appearing in the World Economic Outlook(WEO)are compiled b

59、y the IMF staff at the time of publication.Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness,accuracy,and completeness.When errors are discovered,corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and on the IMF eLibrary(see below).All substantive chang

60、es are listed in the online table of contents.Print and Digital EditionsPrintPrint copies of this WEO can be ordered from the IMF bookstore at imfbk.st/555871.DigitalMultiple digital editions of the WEO,including ePub,enhanced PDF,and HTML,are available on the IMF eLibrary at eLibrary.IMF.org/WEO.Do

61、wnload a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the charts therein from the IMF website at www.IMF.org/publications/weo or scan the QR code below to access the WEO web page directly:Copyright and ReuseInformation on the terms and conditions for reusing the contents of this publication are

62、at www.imf.org/external/terms.htm.FURTHER INFORMATIONInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025xThis version of the World Economic Outlook(WEO)is available in full through the IMF eLibrary(www.elibrary.imf.org)and the IMF website(www.imf.org).Accompanying the publication on the IMF website is a larger c

63、om-pilation of data from the WEO database than is included in the report itself,including files containing the series most frequently requested by readers.These files may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.The data appearing in the WEO are compiled by the IMF staff at the time o

64、f the WEO exercises.The histor-ical data and projections are based on the information gathered by the IMF country desk officers in the context of their missions to IMF member countries and through their ongoing analysis of the evolving situation in each country.Historical data are updated on a conti

65、nual basis as more information becomes available,and structural breaks in data are often adjusted to produce smooth series with the use of splicing and other techniques.IMF staff estimates continue to serve as proxies for historical series when complete information is unavailable.As a result,WEO dat

66、a can differ from those in other sources with official data,including the IMFs International Financial Statistics.The WEO data and metadata provided are“as is”and“as available,”and every effort is made to ensure their timeliness,accuracy,and completeness,but these cannot be guaranteed.When errors ar

67、e discovered,there is a concerted effort to correct them as appropriate and feasible.Corrections and revisions made after publication are incorporated into the electronic editions available from the IMF eLibrary(www.elibrary.imf.org)and on the IMF website(www.imf.org).All substantive changes are lis

68、ted in detail in the online tables of contents.For details on the terms and conditions for usage of the WEO database,please refer to the IMF Copyright and Usage website(www.imf.org/external/terms.htm).Inquiries about the content of the WEO and the WEO database should be sent by mail or online forum(

69、telephone inquiries cannot be accepted):World Economic Studies DivisionResearch DepartmentInternational Monetary Fund700 19th Street,NWWashington,DC 20431,USAOnline Forum:www.imf.org/weoforumDATAInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025xiThe analysis and projections contained in the World Economic Outl

70、ook are integral elements of the IMFs surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member countries,of developments in international financial markets,and of the global economic system.The survey of prospects and policies is the product of a comprehensive interdepartmental review of wor

71、ld economic developments,which draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with member countries.These consultations are carried out in particular by the IMFs area departmentsnamely,the African Department,Asia and Pacific Department,European Department,Middle East

72、and Central Asia Department,and Western Hemisphere Department together with the Strategy,Policy,and Review Department;the Monetary and Capital Markets Department;and the Fiscal Affairs Department.The analysis in this report was coordinated in the Research Department under the general direction of Pi

73、erre-Olivier Gourinchas,Economic Counsellor and Director of Research.The project was directed by Petya Koeva Brooks,Deputy Director,Research Department,and Deniz Igan,Division Chief,Research Department.Aqib Aslam,Division Chief,Research Department and Head of the Spillovers Task Force,supervised Cha

74、pter 3.The primary contributors to this report are Silvia Albrizio,Christian Bogmans,Patricia Gomez-Gonzalez,Bertrand Gruss,Shushanik Hakobyan,Eric Huang,Thomas Kroen,Toh Kuan,Andresa H.Lagerborg,Neil Meads,Giovanni Melina,Jean-Marc Natal,Diaa Noureldin,Carolina Osorio Buitron,Galip Kemal Ozhan,Andr

75、ea Pescatori,and Sneha Thube.Other contributors include Maryam Abdou,Michal Andrle,Gavin Asdorian,Daniel Baksa,Eric Bang,Sandra Baquie,Suman Basu,Jared Bebee,Paula Beltran,Luisa Calixto,Diego Cerdeiro,Shan Chen,Angela Espiritu,Rebecca Eyassu,Nicolas Fernandez-Arias,Daisuke Fujii,Pedro de Barros Gagl

76、iardi,Ganchimeg Ganpurev,Domenico Giannone,Ziyan Han,Da Huu Hoang,Chris Jackson,Nicole Jales,Maximiliano Jerez Osses,Camara Kidd,Jungjin Lee,Weili Lin,Barry Liu,Samuel Mann,Rui Mano,Xiaomeng Mei,Jorge Miranda-Pinto,Joseph Moussa,Dirk Muir,Zsuzsa Munkacsi,Emory Oakes,Manasa Patnam,Clarita Phillips,Ca

77、rlo Pizzinelli,Rafael Portillo,Shrihari Ramachandra,Diego Rodriguez,Johannes Rosenbusch,Lorenzo Rotunno,Michele Ruta,Marina M.Tavares,Nicholas Tong,Elizabeth Van Heuvelen,Isaac Warren,Evgenia Weaver,Philippe Wingender,Yarou Xu,Rachel Zhang,Canran Zheng,Dian Zhi,and Liangliang Zhu.Gemma Rose Diaz fro

78、m the Communications Department led the editorial team for the report,with production and editorial support from Michael Harrup,Lucy Scott Morales,James Unwin,MPS Limited,and Absolute Service,Inc.The analysis has benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from other IMF departments,as

79、well as by Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on April 11,2025.However,estimates,projections,and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or to their national authorities.PREFACEInternational Monetary Fund|April 20

80、25xiiThis April 2025 World Economic Outlook(WEO)was put together under exceptional circumstances,and I want to start by acknowledging the tremendous work of Petya Koeva Brooks,Deputy Director in the Research Department,and her team,as well as the staff of over 190 country teams within the IMF who wo

81、rked tirelessly with us to revise their country projections until the very last minute.The April 2 Rose Garden announcement forced us to jettison our projectionsnearly finalized at that pointand compress a produc-tion cycle that usually takes more than two months into less than 10 days.Shortly after

82、 the January 2025 WEO Update,the United States announced multiple waves of tariffs on major trading partners and critical sectors,culminating on April 2 with a set of nearly universal tariffs.While many of the scheduled tariff increases are on hold for now,the combination of measures and countermeas

83、ures has hiked US and global tariff rates to centennial highs.However,the context for such increases is very different.Unlike in the previous century,the global economy is now characterized by a high degree of economic and financial integration,with supply chains and financial flows crisscrossing th

84、e world,whose potential unwinding could constitute a major source of economic upheaval.For this reason,we expect that the sharp increase on April 2 in both tariffs and uncertainty will lead to a significant slowdown in global growth in the near term.While this is our central scenarioor“reference for

85、ecast”many possible paths exist,reflecting the unpredictability surrounding future trade policy and the varied impact of tariffs across different countries through a diverse set of channels.These are discussed in detail in Chapter 1.The common denominator,however,is that tariffs are a negative suppl

86、y shock for the economy imposing them,as resources are reallocated toward the production of noncompetitive goods,with a resulting loss of aggre-gate productivity,lower activity,and higher production costs and prices.Moreover,in the medium term,by reducing competition,tariffs increase the market powe

87、r of domestic producers,decrease incentives to innovate,and create multiple opportunities for rent seeking.For trading partners,tariffs constitute mostly a negative external demand shock,driving foreign customers away from their products,even if some countries could bene-fit from the rerouting of tr

88、ade flows.These effects are magnified in the presence of modern complex global supply chains.Most traded goods are intermediate inputs that traverse countries multiple times before their transformation into final products.Sectoral disruptions could propagate up and down the global input-output netwo

89、rk in ways with poten-tially large multiplier effects,just as we saw during the pandemic.Anticipating such disruptions we have also revised down our projection for global trade growth by 1 percentage points this year,with a slight recovery penciled in for 2026.The uncertainty around trade policy is

90、also a major factor depressing our outlook.Faced with increased uncertainty about access to marketstheir own but also those of their suppliers and customersmany firms ini-tial reaction will be to pause,reduce investment,and cut purchases.Likewise,financial institutions will reevaluate their credit s

91、upply to businesses,until they can assess the latters exposure to the new environment.The com-bined increased uncertainty and resulting tightening of financial conditions are a global negative demand shock and will weigh on activity.This could well dominate in the short termas reflected in the sharp

92、 decline in oil prices.The effect of tariffs on exchange rates is not straight-forward.First,the US,as the tariffing economy,may see its currency appreciate,as happened in previous episodes.This reflects the reduced demand for foreign currency as the demand for imports declines,but also the likeliho

93、od that tariffed countries may ease their monetary policy stance to respond to the negative demand shock.However,greater policy uncertainty,lower growth prospects in the US,and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assetswhich has been orderly so farcan weigh on the dollar,as we saw in the i

94、mmediate aftermath of the announcements.In the medium term,the dollar may depreciate in real terms if FOREWORDFOREWORDxiiiInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025tariffs translate into lower productivity in the US trad-ables sector,relative to its trading partners.At this juncture,while the situation

95、remains fluid,risks remain firmly tilted to the downside.The global economy showed surprising resilience during the severe shocks of the past four years and still bears significant scars.It is now being severely tested once again,espe-cially in emerging market and developing economies with more limi

96、ted buffers.More immediately,there is a risk that trade retaliation may further ratchet upinstead of dialing downtrade tensions,with negative consequences for global growth.Financial conditions may further tightenperhaps abruptlyif markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increase

97、d uncertainty.While banks remain well capitalized overall,and market movements have been orderly so far,they may be tested in the case of a full-blown risk-off epi-sode.The April 2025 Global Financial Stability Report reviews these market developments in detail.Yet herein lies also an upside:If coun

98、tries deescalate from their current tariff stance,and coordinate to deliver clarity and stability on trade policy,the outlook could immedi-ately brighten.Our policy prescriptions call for prudence,clarity,and increased collaboration.First,on trade policy the message is clear:to bring back stability

99、and find mutu-ally beneficial trade arrangements.It is not clear yet what new architecture will emerge.But businesses need predictability going forward.And the global economy needs a well-functioning rules-based trading system that addresses long-standing gaps,such as the pervasive use of nontariff

100、barriers and trade-distorting measures by some countries.Second,monetary policy will need to remain ahead of the curve in the face of multiple challenges.Faced with tariffs and supply-chain disruptions,some coun-tries may confront steeper trade-offs between inflation and output.Inflation expectation

101、s may become less well anchored with a new inflation shock following so close on the heels of the previous one.For these countries,forceful tightening will be needed.For others,the nega-tive demand shock will dominate,and their economies may slump unless policy rates are lowered.In all cases,credibi

102、lity of the monetary policy frameworkand its cornerstone,central bank independencewill remain key.Third,currency markets may experience strong volatility.This may be difficult to navigate,especially for emerging market economies.In line with our Integrated Policy Framework,it is important that count

103、ries let their currency adjust when the movements are driven by fundamental policy forces,as is the case now.That framework spells out the specific conditions under which it could be advisable for countries to intervene in currency markets.Fourth,fiscal authorities face starker trade-offs on top of

104、preexisting vulnerabilities associated with high debt,low growth,and rising financing costs.Heightened pres-sure on bond yields amid growing market nervousness could threaten fiscal stability.In addition,new spend-ing pressures are further weighing on fiscal fragilities.Calls for support will increa

105、se for those at risk of severe dislocation from trade policy.Some support may be inevitableand even desirablebut should remain narrowly targeted and incorporate automatic sunset clauses.The experience of the past four years suggests that it is easier to open the tap of fiscal support than to close i

106、t.Sunset clauses should also help frame expecta-tions.Moreover,some countries,especially in Europe,face new and permanent increases in defense-related spending.How should these new outlays be financed?For countries with little fiscal space,the answer is stark but simple:They have little choice but t

107、o stay within their budgetary envelope.Doing otherwise would jeopardize medium-term debt sustainability,with dire consequences.For countries with sufficient fiscal space,standard fiscal principles suggest that only the tem-porary part of the additional spendingfor example,temporary support to help a

108、dapt to the new environ-ment or an initial bulge in spending to rebuild defense capabilitiesshould be financed by debt.New perma-nent spending needs should be offset by spending cuts elsewhere or stronger domestic revenue mobilization.These points are further developed in the April 2025 Fiscal Monit

109、or.Fifth,we need to continue efforts to turn the tide on weak medium-term growth prospects.This means boosting total factor productivity,which can be raised by addressing existing deep-seated structural constraints that are holding back innovation,but also by exploiting technological breakthroughs.T

110、he recent progress of generative artificial intelligence offers such a promise,and countries should position themselves to harness it responsibly.This can be done by implementing poli-cies to develop the necessary digital infrastructure and WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIF

111、TSxivInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025acquire the skills necessary to benefit from the artificial intelligence transition.In this direction,the analytical chapters of our report take a step back and explore how the nexus of labor supply and growth plays out over the medium term.They tackle inte

112、rrelated themes of asynchronous aging and migration.Chapter 2“The Rise of the Silver Economy”focuses on the challenges from demo-graphic headwinds for growth and public finances and shows that progress in“healthy aging”people living not only longer,but living healthierhas been substantial.This,toget

113、her with policies that help increase labor force participation and close gender gaps,can offset some of the negative effects of aging popula-tions.Chapter 3“Journeys and Junctions”focuses on the spillover from migration policies in destination countries to origin,transit,and bordering economies.It h

114、ighlights that emerging market and developing econo-mies are increasingly on the receiving end of migration and refugee flows and that policies to improve the integration of migrants,minimizing skills mismatches,and alleviate pressures on local infrastructure can have large effects.Pierre-Olivier Go

115、urinchas Economic CounsellorInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025xvFollowing an unprecedented series of shocks in the preceding years,global growth was stable yet underwhelming through 2024 and was projected to remain so in the January 2025 World Economic Outlook(WEO)Update.However,the landscape ha

116、s changed as governments around the world reorder policy priorities.Since the release of the January 2025 WEO Update,a series of new tariff measures by the United States and countermeasures by its trading partners have been announced and implemented,ending up in near-universal US tariffs on April 2

117、and bringing effective tariff rates to levels not seen in a century(Figure ES.1).This on its own is a major negative shock to growth.The unpredictability with which these measures have been unfolding also has a negative impact on economic activity and the outlook and,at the same time,makes it more d

118、ifficult than usual to make assumptions that would constitute a basis for an internally consistent and timely set of projections.Given the complexity and fluidity of the current moment,this report presents a“reference forecast”based on information available as of April 4,2025(including the April 2 t

119、ariffs and initial responses),in lieu of the usual baseline.This is complemented with a range of global growth forecasts,primarily under different trade policy assumptions.The swift escalation of trade tensions and extremely high levels of policy uncertainty are expected to have a significant impact

120、 on global economic activity.Under the reference forecast that incorporates information as of April 4,global growth is projected to drop to 2.8 percent in 2025 and 3 percent in 2026down from 3.3 percent for both years in the January 2025 WEO Update,corresponding to a cumulative down-grade of 0.8 per

121、centage point,and much below the historical(200019)average of 3.7 percent.In the reference forecast,growth in advanced econ-omies is projected to be 1.4 percent in 2025.Growth in the United States is expected to slow to 1.8 percent,a pace that is 0.9 percentage point lower relative to the projection

122、 in the January 2025 WEO Update,on account of greater policy uncertainty,trade tensions,and softer demand momentum,whereas growth in the euro area at 0.8 percent is expected to slow by 0.2 percentage point.In emerging market and devel-oping economies,growth is expected to slow down to 3.7 percent in

123、 2025 and 3.9 percent in 2026,with significant downgrades for countries affected most by recent trade measures,such as China.Global headline inflation is expected to decline at a pace that is slightly slower than what was expected in January,reaching 4.3 percent in 2025 and 3.6 percent in 2026,with

124、notable upward revisions for advanced economies and slight downward revisions for emerging market and developing economies in 2025.Intensifying downside risks dominate the outlook.Ratcheting up a trade war,along with even more elevated trade policy uncertainty,could further reduce near-and long-term

125、 growth,while eroded policy Figure ES.1.US Effective Tariff Rates on All Imports(Percent)0601020304050Sources:US Bureau of the Census,Historical Statistics of the United States,17891945;US International Trade Commission;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The Jan.20Apr.1 tariffs in 2025 include 20 perce

126、nt tariffs on China;25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum;25 percent tariffs on Mexico and Canada;and a 10 percent tariff on Canadian energy imports.A United StatesMexicoCanada Agreement(USMCA)carve-out is assumed to halve the effective tariff increase for Canada and Mexico.The April 2 tariffs in

127、clude auto sector tariffs and country-specific tariffs,applying exemptions provided in Annex II of the Executive Order per IMF staff judgment.The April 9 tariffs include an increase in the tariffs on China to 145 percent and a reduction in other country-specific tariffs to 10 percent.It also include

128、s exemptions on some electronic products announced on April 11.GATT=General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.1821416181190121416181200125Tariff of Abominations(1828)Morrill tariff(1861)Smoot-Hawley(1930)GATT(1947)Jan.20Apr.12025 tariffs April 2 tariffsApril 9 tariffsEXECUTIVE SUMMARYWORLD ECONOMIC OUT

129、LOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTSxviInternational Monetary Fund|April 2025buffers weaken resilience to future shocks.Divergent and rapidly shifting policy stances or deteriorating sentiment could trigger additional repricing of assets beyond what took place after the announcement of sweepi

130、ng US tariffs on April 2 and sharp adjustments in foreign exchange rates and capital flows,especially for economies already facing debt distress.Broader financial instability may ensue,including damage to the international monetary system.Demographic shifts and a shrinking foreign labor force may cu

131、rb potential growth and threaten fiscal sustainability.The lingering effects of the recent cost-of-living crisis,coupled with depleted policy space and dim medium-term growth prospects,could reignite social unrest.The resilience shown by many large emerging market economies may be tested as servicin

132、g high debt levels becomes more challenging in unfavorable global financial conditions.More limited international development assistance may increase the pressure on low-income countries,pushing them deeper into debt or necessitating significant fiscal adjustments,with immediate consequences for gro

133、wth and living standards.On the upside,a deescalation from current tariff rates and new agreements providing clarity and stability in trade policies could lift global growth.The path forward demands clarity and coordination.Countries should work constructively to promote a stable and predictable tra

134、de environment,facilitate debt restructuring,and address shared challenges.At the same time,they should address domestic policy and structural imbalances,thereby ensuring their internal economic stability.This will help rebalance growth-inflation trade-offs,rebuild buffers,and reinvigorate medium-te

135、rm growth prospects,as well as reduce global imbalances.The priority for central banks remains fine-tuning monetary policy stances to achieve their mandates and ensure price and financial stability in an environment with even more difficult trade-offs.Mitigating disruptive foreign exchange volatilit

136、y may require targeted interventions,as outlined in the IMFs Integrated Policy Framework.Macroprudential tools should be activated as needed to contain the buildup of vulnerabilities and to provide support in case of stress events.Restoring fiscal space and putting public debt on a sustainable path

137、remain an important priority,while meeting critical spend-ing needs to ensure national and economic security.This requires credible medium-term fiscal consolida-tion plans.Structural reforms in labor,product,and financial markets would complement efforts to reduce debt and narrow cross-country dispa

138、rities.As Chap-ter 2 explains,countries age structures are evolving at different rates,with important consequences for medium-term growth and external imbalances.In addition,as Chapter 3 documents,migration policy shifts in destination countries have sizable spillover effects,disproportionately affe

139、cting emerging market and developing economies.International Monetary Fund|April 20251Policy Uncertainty Tests Global ResilienceThe global economy is at a critical juncture.Signs of stabilization were emerging through much of 2024,after a prolonged and challenging period of unprec-edented shocks.Inf

140、lation,down from multidecade highs,followed a gradual though bumpy decline toward central bank targets(Figure 1.1).Labor markets normalized,with unemployment and vacancy rates returning to prepandemic levels(Figure 1.2).Growth hovered around 3 percent in the past few years,and global output came clo

141、se to potential(Figure 1.3).However,major policy shifts are resetting the global trade system and giving rise to uncertainty that is once again testing the resilience of the global econ-omy.Since February,the United States has announced multiple waves of tariffs against trading partners,some of whic

142、h have invoked countermeasures.Markets first took the announcements mostly in stride,until the United States near-universal application of tariffs on April 2,which triggered historic drops in major equity indices and spikes in bond yields,followed by a partial recovery after the pause and additional

143、 carve-outs announced on and after April 9.Despite significant equity market corrections in early March and April,price-to-earnings ratios in the United States remain at elevated levels in historical context,raising concerns about the potential for further disorderly corrections(April 2025 Global Fi

144、nancial Stability Report GFSR).Uncertainty,especially that regarding trade policy,has surged to unprecedented levels(Figure 1.4).The degree of the surge varies across countries,depending on exposures to protectionist measures through trade and financial linkages as well as broader geopolitical relat

145、ionships.These developments come against an already-cool-ing economic momentum.Recent data on real activity have been disappointing,with GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2024 trailing the forecasts in the January 2025 World Economic Outlook(WEO)Update.High-frequency indicators such as retail sale

146、s and purchasing managers surveys point to slowing growth.In the United States,consumer,business,and investor sentiment was optimistic at the beginning of the year but has recently shifted to a notably more pessimistic stance as uncertainty has taken hold and new tariffs have been announced.In labor

147、 markets,hiring has slowed in many countries,and layoffs have risen.Meanwhile,progress on disinflation has mostly stalled,and inflation has edged upward in some cases,with an increasing number of countries exceeding their inflation targets.Services inflation,though still on a downward trend,remains

148、above levels prior to the inflation surge,and core goods inflation has seen an uptick since November 2024.Trade has held up,but this is mostly because of an increase in Chinese exports and US imports at the end of 2024,with consumers and businesses likely front-loading ahead of tariffs that were ant

149、icipated back then and now are in place.In the backdrop,domestic imbalances and policy gaps give rise to unbalanced growth while opening up potential fragilities.In some countries,such as China,growth in 2024 has been mainly supported by external demand.On the contrary,in the United States,private c

150、onsumptiontraditionally the major contributor to GDP growthas a share of GDP has reached its highest point during the 2020s,and the fiscal deficit remains historically large.Within-country inequalities in households income gains signal another potential vulnerability.In some cases,real GDP has recov

151、ered,but real GDP per capita has not(Figure 1.5,panel 1).In others,median income has fallen behind,whereas incomes at the top and bottom of the distribution have recovered.Meanwhile,salient indicators of the cost of living,such as house prices and rents,have increased substantially(Figure 1.5,panel

152、2).Varying Momentum across CountriesThe stable performance of the global economy in the past couple of years hides important differences across countries.These differences are the result of diverse shocks,structural characteristics,and policy actions.They manifest themselves in varying cycli-cal pos

153、itions and structural forces determining the outlook.CHAPTER1GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIESWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTS2International Monetary Fund|April 2025Cyclical PositionsMost countries are not fully back to their infla-tion targets yet,but output gaps are more d

154、ispersed(Figure 1.6,panel 1).In quite a few cases,fiscal policy remains accommodative even as monetary policy main-tains a restrictive stance(Figure 1.6,panel 2).The US economy was operating above its poten-tial in 2024,relying heavily on strong domestic demand.Private consumption grew at an annual

155、rate of 2.8 percent in 2024,in excess of its 2.4 percent historical(200019)average.However,in 2025,signs of a potential reversal have emerged.Consumer spend-ing declined by 0.6 percent in January and remained subdued in February after expanding by 0.6 percent in December 2024,with the decrease likel

156、y reflecting a normalization of private consumption toward more sustainable levels and the negative impact of recur-ring policy shifts on economic sentiment.This signals a deterioration of the cyclical position of the US economy.The euro area has been in a cyclical rebound,but domestic demand has be

157、en subdued and,with the exception of Germany,the contribution of consump-tion growth may have peaked in its largest economies.Weak consumer sentiment and elevated uncertainty have raised precautionary saving while weighing down consumption growth(October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Europe).Manufa

158、cturing activity has remained weak on the back of persistently higher energy prices,while services have been the main growth driver,WorldOther AEsChinaUSOther EMDEsFigure 1.1.Global Inflation Trends(Percent,year over year)1.Headline Inflation21202468102.Core Inflation2120246810Sources:Haver Analytic

159、s;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panels 1 and 2 plot the median of a sample of 57 economies that accounts for 78 percent of World Economic Outlook world GDP(in weighted purchasing-power-parity terms)in 2024.Vertical axes are cut off at 2 percent and 12 percent.The bands depict the 25th to 75th perc

160、entiles of data across economies.“Core inflation”is the percent change in the consumer price index for goods and services,excluding food and energy(or the closest available measure).AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.Jan.2018Jan.19Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Mar.

161、25Jan.2018Jan.19Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Mar.25LatestLowest pointEnd of 2019LatestPeakEnd of 2019Figure 1.2.Labor Markets(Percent)1.Unemployment Rates014246810122.Vacancy-to-Unemployment Ratios02.00.51.01.5Sources:Haver Analytics;India Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation,Periodi

162、c Labour Force Survey;International Labour Organization;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;US Bureau of Economic Analysis;US Bureau of Labor Statistics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,Indias unemployment in urban areas is from Periodic Labour Force Survey data.The“lowe

163、st point”is from the period spanning March 2019 to the latest available data.In panel 2,“Europe”includes Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Croatia,Cyprus,the Czech Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,The Netherlands,Poland,Portugal,Romania,

164、the Slovak Republic,Slovenia,Spain,and Sweden.The“peak”is from the period spanning January 2020 to the latest available data.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.EA=euro area.AUS CANJPN KOR GBR USABRA HUN IND MEX POL TUREAAUSCANGBRUSAEuropeCH

165、APTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES3International Monetary Fund|April 2025contributing to divergence among European countries,particularly those relying more heavily on these sectors,notably Germany versus Spain.For China,prolonged weakness in the real estate sector and its ramifications,including

166、 those for local government finances,have been key.When the pandemic seized the Chinese economy,signs of a downturn in the credit-fueled property market were gathering.This homegrown vulnerability has depressed domestic demand,even as policymakers have searched for measures to tackle property market

167、 oversupply and bolster confidence.Indeed,consumer confidence in China,after a decade of moving closely with that in the rest of the world,plunged in early 2022 and has not recovered(Figure 1.7).Rising trade tensions and new tariffs over the past years have also disproportion-ately affected the Chin

168、ese economy.The rebalancing of growth drivers from investment and net exports toward consumption has paused amid continuing deflationary WorldEMDEsEuro areaAEsUSChinaFigure 1.3.Growth Performance and Forecasts(Percent)1.Real GDP Growth0122468102.Global Output Gap5143210Source:IMF staff calculations.

169、Note:AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.20001420152320242520171819202122232425GDP growthGDP per capita growthHouse price appreciationChange in new mortgage rates(right scale)Change in consumer credit rates(right scale)Figure 1.5.Income Growth and Cost-of-Living Cha

170、nges1.Income Growth(Percent)140123Sources:Haver Analytics;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.2.Cost-of-Living Changes(Percent,relative to 2019:Q4)0100204

171、060800102468USAESPCANGBRJPNITAFRADEU2000141519202420001415192024200014151920242000141519202420001415192024200014151920242000141519202420001415192024USAESPCANGBRJPNITAFRADEUWUITPU(right scale)EPU(right scale)Figure 1.4.Overall Uncertainty,EPU,and TPU(Index)070,00010,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,0000

172、700100200300400500600Sources:Ahir,Bloom,and Furceri 2022;Caldara and others 2020;Davis 2016;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The uncertainty measures are news-and media-outlets-based indices that quantify media attention to global news related to overall uncertainty(WUI),economic policy uncertainty(E

173、PU),and trade policy uncertainty(TPU).Jan.2015Jan.17Jan.19Jan.21Jan.23Mar.25WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTS4International Monetary Fund|April 2025pressures and high household saving.Construction and real estate activity remains subdued,whereas industry,trade,and transpo

174、rt have been robust.Structural ForcesThe varying momentum also owes to the interaction of cyclical and structural factors.The cross-country differences in growth rates would be expected to narrow as the cyclical forces dissipate but may not disappear.Compared with the GDP level implied by the prepan

175、demic trend,most economies have made up for some of the damage done by the pandemic(Figure 1.8).The United States has been an outlier,but generally,scarring has been less pronounced than initially thought,speaking to the surprising resilience of the global economy(April 2024 WEO).Still,there are sev

176、eral cases in which output is still falling behind the prepandemic trend.A big part of the story behind the scarring is the energy shock.European economies,including major manufacturing hubs such as Germany and Italy,were particularly exposed to the disruption of natural gas markets following Russia

177、s invasion of Ukraine(Figure 1.9,panel 1).As oil and natural gas prices soared,countries shifted their energy sources and increased efficiency in their energy consumption.There are limits to such strategies,however,because substitution of energy sources may be difficult,and many countries remain dep

178、endent on oil and natural gas imports for their energy use(Figure 1.9,panels 2 and 3).Crucially,this shock had a twofold effect on commodity importers as the dollar strengthened,with the US terms of trade improving amid height-ened uncertainty(External Stability Report 2024).Because commodity prices

179、 are expressed in dollars,the stagflationary pressures on commodity import-ers have become stronger.Similar dynamics apply to global food markets,with the effects felt especially in low-income countries.By contrast,the United States not only was already less dependent on energy imports but had also

180、transitioned from being a net energy importer to a net energy exporter.This shift has partly insulated the US economy from the commodity mar-ket disruptions caused by the war.Inflation deviationOutput gapCHNUSAINDRUSJPNDEUBRAIDNFRAGBRITAMEXKORCANAUSZAFFigure 1.6.Cyclical Positions(Percent)1.Most Rec

181、ent Inflation and Output Gap2410123Sources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff estimates.Note:In panel 1,the inflation deviation is defined as the difference between 2025:Q1 inflation and the central banks inflation target.The output gap is the 2024 output gap.In panel 2,the fiscal balance refers to the g

182、eneral government structural primary balance in percent of potential GDP.The structural primary balance is the cyclically adjusted balance excluding net interest payments and corrected for a broader range of noncyclical factors such as changes in asset and commodity prices.Rolling 12-month ahead inf

183、lation expectations are used for the calculation of the real policy rate.The sample includes G20 economies excluding Argentina,Saudi Arabia,and Trkiye,owing to lack of data availability.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.EA=euro area.2.Mone

184、tary-Fiscal Policy Mix40164812POLCOLBRAMEXCHLUSAINDGBREAAUSCANKOR420246Latest real policy rateChange in fiscal balance,202224USChinaEAROWFigure 1.7.Consumer Confidence(Index,OECD harmonized)92106949698100102104Mar.25Jan.2014Jan.16Jan.18Jan.20Jan.22Jan.24Sources:OECD;and IMF staff calculations.Note:T

185、he rest of world(ROW)represents the average value for data across 22 countries.EA=euro area;OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES5International Monetary Fund|April 2025Labor productivity growth has declined in recent years in nearly every

186、 country besides the United States(Figure 1.10,panel 1).The relative strength in US labor productivity growth in part reflects stronger investment(Figure 1.10,panel 2).Capital shallowing because of chronic investment weakness can explain roughly half of the productivity growth slowdown in advanced e

187、conomies since 2010 and about a third of that in emerging market and developing economies(Fernald and Li 2023;Igan and others 2024).Greater labor market flexibility may have also played a role in how productivity growth has evolved since the pandemic.The rate of job-to-job transitions explains a lar

188、ge share of productivity growth in the United States since 2020(Dao and Platzer 2024).By contrast,countries where furlough programs were introduced have typically experienced slower productivity growth.Although these programs are designed to preserve skill 2025 gap=+3.62020 gap=4.1%2025 gap=5.3%2020

189、 gap=3.5%2025 gap=2.5%2020 gap=7.2%2025 gap=0.7%2020 gap=5.3%2025 gap=1.1%2020 gap=5.5%2025 gap=6.2%2020 gap=7.1%Figure 1.8.Real GDP versus Prepandemic Trend(Index,2019=100)1.United States2.China9012010011090140100110120130Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Solid-line data are from April 2025 World

190、Economic Outlook(WEO).Dashed lines denote prepandemic trend based on January 2020 WEO Update.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.20192123253.Euro Area9012010011020192123255.AEs Excluding US and Euro Area90120100110201921232520192123256.EMDEs Excluding China and Braz

191、il9014010011012013020192123254.Brazil901201001102019212325Average electricity generation dependent on Russian gas,201621Total energy supply dependent on natural gas,2023(percent)Renewable electricity generation growth,202123Electricity generation dependent on natural gas,2023(percent)ExportsImportsN

192、et exports share(right scale)ExportsImportsNet exports share(right scale)Figure 1.9.Shifts in Energy Imports and Exports1.Energy Dependency of European Countries(Terawatt-hours,unless noted otherwise)406020020402.Oil(Millions of barrels a day;Share in consumption,right scale)2020100101.01.00.500.5So

193、urces:Energy Institute;International Energy Agency;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,data labels use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.“Other EU”refers to the remaining European Union(EU)countries.In panel 2,oil trade includes both crude oil and oil products.I

194、n panels 2 and 3,“Europe”includes European members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development plus Albania,Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria,Croatia,Cyprus,Georgia,Gibraltar,Latvia,Lithuania,Malta,Montenegro,North Macedonia,Romania,and Serbia.Intra-European trade is excluded from“Eu

195、rope”values.DEUFRANLDPOLAUTFINHUNGRCITAOtherEU3.Natural Gas(Billions of cubic meters;Share in consumption,right scale)40030030020010001002000.80.60.60.40.200.20.4United StatesEuropeChina201419232014192320141922United StatesEuropeChina201419232014192320141922WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

196、 AMID POLICy ShIFTS6International Monetary Fund|April 2025matches and prevent skill-diluting unemployment spells,thereby enhancing medium-term productivity,their effectiveness may be compromised by addi-tional factors.The war-related energy shock,coupled with the persistent nature of these disruptio

197、ns,could adversely affect productivity by obstructing the neces-sary reallocation of resources across different sectors of the economy.More generally,traditionally higher job market churn in the United States relative to that in Europe has likely allowed workers to make job-to-job transitions more e

198、asily.The productivity growth discrepancies have a counterpart in how manufacturing activity con-tinues to shift away from advanced economies to emerging market economies.Industrial production plunged in all countries at the onset of the pandemic(Figure 1.11).The recovery paths,however,have been dec

199、isively different.Production has soared in China and has also expanded in smaller EU economies and the ASEAN-5(Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand),whereas it has struggled to get back to prepandemic levels in Japan and the largest EU countries.Industrial production in the United S

200、tates has made it back up and performed better there than in advanced economy peers.Adding to the manufacturing headwinds in some economies are demographic headwinds.Countries around the world are progressively crossing their demographic turning pointswhen the share of the working-age population sta

201、rts decliningwith direct implications for labor supply and productiv-ity(see Chapter 2).Germany,Italy,and Japan are ahead of others with declining shares of working-age population,as is China,while the United States is not too far behind those countries,but strong flows of immigrants with quick adap

202、tation to labor markets have shielded its economy more than other economies.Diminished Policy SpaceCrucially,much of the available policy space has already been exhausted in many countries(April 2020,April 2021,and October 2022 WEO reports),limit-ing how much support policymakers can give econo-mies

203、 in case of new negative shocks or a pronounced downturn.Many countries passed large fiscal support packages,first during the pandemic and then as energy and food prices spiked at the onset of Russias inva-sion of Ukraine.Fiscal policy was expected to pivot United StatesChinaOther AEsOther EMDEsFigu

204、re 1.10.Labor Productivity and Capital Investment1.Labor Productivity Growth(Percent)2012141618202224United StatesOther AEsEMDEs excluding China0123200110 11192023200110 11192023200110 111920232.Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation(Index,2014=100)80100120140160180Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:

205、In panel 1,labor productivity is calculated on a per-worker basis.In panel 2,dashed lines denote the 201419 trend.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.United StatesChinaJapanEU4Other EUASEAN-5Figure 1.11.Industrial Production Trends(Index,Jan.2019=100)601407080901001

206、10120130Sources:United Nations Industrial Development Organization;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Figure data are calculated as three-month moving averages.“EU4”refers to France,Germany,Italy,and Spain.“Other EU”refers to all other European Union(EU)countries.ASEAN-5=Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippi

207、nes,Singapore,and Thailand.Dec.24Jan.2019Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES7International Monetary Fund|April 2025somewhat toward consolidation;however,on account of recent geopolitical developments,some regions are now poised to pursue fiscal expansion.After the p

208、andemic,the decisive and forceful monetary policy response brought inflation down to near central bank targets at relatively little cost to economic activity(see Chapter 2 of the October 2024 WEO).The hard-earned credibility of central banks played an important role by limiting de-anchoring of infla

209、tion expectations.But the legacies,in the form of high public debt levels and increased scrutiny of central bank decisions,remain.High Public Debt amid Elevated Interest RatesFiscal support during the pandemic and at the onset of the war in Ukraine in response to spiking energy and food prices suppo

210、rted the recovery.But fiscal mea-sures sharply increased debt-to-GDP ratios.Despite some reductions that have occurred and additional cuts being planned,budget deficits remain large and cast a shadow on the outlook.Fiscal space is now much tighter than a decade ago,and the fiscal adjustment required

211、 to stabilize debt ratios is at a historic high(Figure 1.12,panel 1).At the same time,debt service as a fraction of fiscal revenue is rising(Figure 1.12,panel 2).The heterogeneous increase reflects cross-country diver-gence in fiscal policy stances,growth and inflation patterns,and debt maturity str

212、uctures,with rela-tively larger reliance on short-term debt in some cases.Although servicing costs remain below pan-demic levels in countries where debt was incurred under favorable conditions during COVID-19,effective rates are likely to surpass prepandemic lev-els as debt rolls over,notably those

213、for low-income countries and some emerging market and developing economies.After more than a decade of very low interest rates in advanced economies,real long-term govern-ment bond yields have been on the rise(Figure 1.12,panel 3),surging significantly in recent months.Higher long-term rates,initial

214、ly driven by monetary policy tightening,are persisting even as the monetary policy cycle has turned,owing to a global rise in term premiums.In the United States,a combination of increased issuances,higher expected inflation,and risk premiums compounded the rise in term premiums until mid-January,whe

215、n long-term interest rates mod-erated.The recent tariff announcements pushed them back up again.Inflation Expectations on Edge after Inflation ScareInflation expectations now exceed central bank tar-gets in most advanced economies as well as emerging market and developing economies,whereas their gro

216、up averages between 2017 and 2021 were at or below IQR of PB adjustmentCurrent adjustment(DSPB based)EMMIEsLIDCsAEs(right scale)United StatesJapanUnited KingdomEuro areaFigure 1.12.Fiscal Policy Space1.Fiscal Adjustment Need(Percent)44202Sources:Consensus Economics;Organisation for Economic Co-opera

217、tion and Development;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panel 1 shows current three-year adjustment need versus historical adjustment.IQR refers to the interquartile range of three-year primary balance(PB)adjustments over the period 200019,calculated as the change between years t+3 and t using a rollin

218、g window.Current adjustment need is based on the difference between the 2028 debt-stabilizing primary balance(DSPB)and the 2025 primary balance excluding other flows.In panel 2,lines show medians,and shaded area denotes the IQR over all countries.Panel 3 shows real rates calculated using long-term i

219、nflation expectations from Consensus Forecasts.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AEs=advanced economies;EMMIEs=emerging market and middle-income economies;G20=Group of Twenty;LIDCs=low-income developing countries.G20 advancedG20 emergingIT

220、AAUSDEUUSAGBRFRAMEXZAFBRA2.General Government Interest Payments020510150824620151617181920212223243.Real 10-Year Government Bond Yields(Percent per year)33210122015:Q117:Q119:Q121:Q123:Q125:Q1WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTS8International Monetary Fund|April 2025target(F

221、igure 1.13).Yields remain sensitive to infla-tion surprises and diminishing fiscal space(April 2025 GFSR).In economies already operating at or close to potential and facing potential inflationary pressures,including those from new trade policies and exchange rate movements,there is less leeway for c

222、entral banks to“look through”new negative supply shocks.Global Imbalances Arising from Domestic ImbalancesRising geopolitical tensions and widening domestic imbalancesin particular,weak demand in China and strong demand in the United Stateshave renewed concerns about global imbalances(Gourinchas and

223、 others 2024).Other nonmarket policies and state inter-ventions could also contribute to external imbalances.The volume of international trade in percent of world GDP has been broadly stable,but structural changes have been taking place nonetheless.Overall,increasingly more trade has been occurring

224、within countries historically aligned with each other rather than between them(October 2024 WEO).Moreover,since 201617,China and the United States have diversified their bases of trading partners,decoupling from each other in terms of export and import linkages(Figure 1.14).In some cases,this divers

225、ification has happened at a microeconomic level along the supply chain through trade rerouting and production real-location,such as that which has taken place among emerging markets in Asia,with an increasing share of import origination for the United States and as import as well as export counterpa

226、rts for China.In addition,a distinct macroeconomic dimension of trade reallocation has emerged.For example,shifting demand patterns have led Europe to import more from China in general,and from the United States in the energy sector.At the same time,Europe is exporting more to the United States in o

227、ther sectors.As a result,Europes trade expo-sure to both China and the United States has increased.201721 average2024 averageFive yearOne yearFigure 1.13.Inflation Deviation from Target1.Cross-Country Inflation Expectations(Percentage point deviation from target,next 12 months)2410123Sources:Central

228、 bank websites;Consensus Economics;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,sample includes 30 advanced economies(AEs)and 31 emerging market and developing economies(EMDEs).The horizontal lines in the middle of the boxes show the medians,and the upper(lower)limits of the boxes show

229、 the third(first)quartiles.The whiskers show the maximum and minimum within a boundary of 1.5 times the interquartile range from the upper and lower quartiles,respectively.In panel 2,“one year“is based on March 2025 data.Data labels use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country code

230、s.EA=euro area.AEsEMDEs2.Consensus Inflation Expectations(Deviation from central bank target)1.02.50.500.51.01.52.0JPN ZAF KOR FRA AUS USA DEUITAEACAN GBR IND BRA MEXEUChinaMexicoUSEmerging AsiaLACRussiaFigure 1.14.Changes in Trade Composition(Percentage points,change in trade shares,202324 minus 20

231、1617)1.Change in Export Shares by Destination5543210123412.217.5EUUSCanadaMexicoChinaVietnam2.Change in Import Shares by Origin554321012349.87.7EUUSCanadaMexicoChinaVietnamSources:IMF,Direction of Trade Statistics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:“Emerging Asia”excludes China and“LAC”excludes Mexico.

232、EMDE=emerging market and developing economy;EU=European Union;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES9International Monetary Fund|April 2025Global current account balancesthe sums of abso-lute surpluses and deficitshave declined from their 2022 peaks.But they rema

233、in larger than the averages observed just before the pandemic(see“The Outlook:A Range of Possibilities”section).The deficit in the United States is larger than it was in the late 2010s.Imbalances are also becoming visible in net inter-national investment positions.The net asset position of US reside

234、ntsUS holdings of foreign securities minus foreign holdings of US securitiesresumed its downward trend in 2023 after increasing briefly in 2022(April 2025 GFSR).The decline is attributable not only to US equity prices increasing more than for-eign equity prices but also to rising foreign purchases o

235、f US bonds during this period.Recent years have also seen a concentration of foreign direct investment(FDI)flows toward the United States(Figure 1.15,panel 1).The dollar appreciated sharply in the run-up to the US elections in November 2024,with markets expecting higher US growth and tighter monetar

236、y policy.However,since February 2025,the dollar has lost all the gains it achieved in the last quarter of 2024(Figure 1.15,panel 2),on the back of weaker US growth prospects and uncertainty.Initial depreciation pressures were particularly pronounced for the curren-cies of emerging market and develop

237、ing economies,but they have dissipated following the softening in 2025(Figure 1.15,panel 3).Since April 2,global risk appetite has declined substantially,with the risk-off environment inducing an offset to the appreciation of emerging market currencies.The Outlook:A Range of PossibilitiesThe swift e

238、scalation of trade tensions has generated extremely high levels of policy ambiguity,making it more difficult than usual to establish a central global growth outlook.Therefore,this WEO presents a range of global growth projections.First is a“reference fore-cast”based on measures announced as of April

239、 4.This is what is presented in the tables of this report and the WEO database.Second,a preApril 2 forecast(with a cutoff date of late March)incorporates all prior policy announcements and economic developments since the October 2024 WEO.Third,a postApril 9 model-based forecast is used to quantify t

240、he implications of the announced pause and associated additional exemp-tions,as well as the escalating tariff rates between China and the United States.Global AssumptionsThe reference forecast is predicated on several pro-jections for global commodity prices,interest rates,and fiscal policies(Figure

241、 1.16).Acknowledging the high United StatesChinaIndiaUnited KingdomJapanEUOct.16,2024Jan.16,2025Jan.17Apr.8,2025CumulativeFigure 1.15.Capital Flows and Exchange Rates1.Foreign Direct Investment Trends across Countries(Capital expenditure,billions of US dollars)025050100150200Sources:Bank for Interna

242、tional Settlements;Haver Analytics;Orbis Crossborder Investment;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panel 1 shows capital expenditure on new and expansion inward foreign direct investment projects that have been announced,completed,or postponed by destination country.Intra-EU investment is excluded for

243、EU values.In panel 2,exchange rates are based on end-of-month data,with April data up to April 8,2025.An increase indicates appreciation.In panel 3,percentage appreciation is computed as the difference in log exchange rates.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization

244、(ISO)country codes.EA=euro area;EU=European Union.2.US Dollar Nominal Effective Exchange Rate(Index,2020=100)1001201051101153.Exchange Rate Depreciation versus US Dollar151510505102013151719212324Jan.2024Apr.24Jul.24Oct.24Jan.25Apr.25US electionCHENGAPOLCZEEAROUDNKPERPHLHKGMACDZAHUNGBRISRINDSGPCOLCA

245、NCHNMYSMEXEGYBRACHLETHKORIDNTURAUSZAFWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTS10International Monetary Fund|April 2025level of prevailing uncertainty,Box 1.1 presents sce-narios involving additional trade,fiscal,and structural policies as well as other plausible shocks.Commodity

246、price projections:Prices of fuel com-modities are projected to decrease in 2025 by 7.9 percent,with a 15.5 percent decline in oil prices and a 15.8 percent drop in coal prices offset by a 22.8 percent increase in natural gas prices,the latter driven up by colder-than-expected weather and the halt of

247、 Russian gas flow to Europe through Ukraine since January 1.Nonfuel commodity prices are pro-jected to increase by 4.4 percent in 2025.Projected food and beverage prices have been revised upward compared with those in the January 2025 WEO Update.Monetary policy projections:The Federal Reserve and th

248、e European Central Bank are expected to con-tinue to reduce interest rates in the coming quarters,albeit at different paces from one another.In the United States,the federal funds rate is projected to be down to 4 percent at the end of 2025 and reach its long-term equilibrium of 2.9 percent at the e

249、nd of 2028.In the euro area,100 basis points in cuts are expected in 2025(with three cuts having already occurred this year),representing two more 25 basis point cuts than in the assumptions underlying the October 2024 WEO,bringing the policy rate to 2 percent by the middle of the year.In Japan,poli

250、cy rates are expected to be lifted at a similar pace as assumed in October 2024,gradually rising over the medium term toward a neutral setting of about 1.5 percent,consistent with keeping inflation and inflation expectations anchored at the Bank of Japans 2 percent target.Fiscal policy projections:G

251、overnments in advanced economies on average are expected to tighten fiscal policy in 202526 and,to a lesser extent,in 2027.The general government structural-fiscal-bal-ance-to-GDP ratio is expected to improve by 1 percentage point in the United States in 2025.Yet it is worth noting that under curren

252、t policies,US public debt fails to stabilize,rising from 121 percent of GDP in 2024 to 130 percent of GDP in 2030.These projections do not incorporate measures that remain under discussion at the time of publication,notably,the net expansionary US budget resolution(currently,most provisions under th

253、e Tax Cuts and Jobs Act are assumed to expire at the end of 2025).In the euro area,under the reference forecast,the primary deficit in Germany is expected to widen by about 1 percent of GDP by 2030 relative to 2024 and by about 4 percent of GDP relative to the January WEO forecast for 2030,with the

254、increase driven primarily by higher defense spending and public investment,and this is assumed to generate spillovers to France,Italy,and Spain.The euro area debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase from its EnergyFood and beverageUnited StatesEuro areaJapanFigure 1.16.Global Assumptions1.Energy an

255、d Food Prices (Index,2022:Q4=100)50120607080901001102022:Q423:Q424:Q425:Q426:Q42.Monetary Policy Projections (Percent,quarterly average)01123456723:Q424:Q425:Q426:Q427:Q42022:Q43.Fiscal Policy Projections (Percentage points;change in fiscal balance)0.500.51.02024252627Advanced economiesEmerging mark

256、et anddeveloping economies2024252627Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:In panels 1 and 2,solid lines denote projections from the April 2025 World Economic Outlook(WEO)and dashed lines those from the October 2024 WEO.In panel 3,the fiscal balance used is the general government structural primary bala

257、nce in percent of potential GDP.The structural primary balance is the cyclically adjusted primary balance excluding net interest payments and corrected for a broader range of noncyclical factors such as changes in asset and commodity prices.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES11International Mone

258、tary Fund|April 2025current 88 percent to 93 percent in 2030,although there is significant uncertainty surrounding the assessment of the economic impact of the additional fiscal spending.In emerging market and developing economies,primary fiscal deficits are projected to widen in 2025 by 0.3 percent

259、age point on average,followed by fiscal tightening starting in 2026.In China,the structural-fiscal-balance-to-GDP ratio is expected to deteriorate by 1.2 percentage points in 2025.Public debt in emerging market and devel-oping economies continues to rise from its current level of 70 percent of GDP,r

260、eaching a projected 83 percent in 2030.Trade policy assumptions:Tariff announcements between February 1 and April 4,with specific details on their implemen-tation,are included in the reference forecast.On February 1,executive orders signed by US President Donald J.Trump imposed tariffs on Canada,Chi

261、na,and Mexico.An additional tariff of 10 percent on all imports from China came into effect on February 4,and another 10 percent was imposed on March 4.China responded with tariffs of 10 to 15 percent on imports of select US agricultural products,energy commodities,and farm equipment,which took effe

262、ct on February 10,and on imports of agricultural prod-ucts,which took effect on March 10.Tariffs of 25 percent on all nonenergy goods imports from Canada(for energy,10 percent)and of 25 per-cent on all imports from Mexico took effect on March 4,with the exemption of goods compliant with the United S

263、tatesMexicoCanada Agree-ment(USMCA).Canada announced 25 percent countertariffs on roughly 40 percent of Canadian imports of goods from the United States.Mexico indicated the intention to respond without specifying the measures to be employed,hence the reference forecast includes no additional tariff

264、 imposed on Mexican imports from the United States.The United States also expanded tariffs on steel and aluminum,effective March 12,remov-ing all exemptions to the 25 percent tariff on steel imports and increasing the tariff rate on alumi-num from 10 to 25 percent.On March 26,the United States annou

265、nced a 25 percent tariff on all automobiles and auto parts,excluding US content in auto and auto parts exports.This tariff came into effect on April 3 for autos,while implemen-tation for auto parts was postponed to May 3.The US Fair and Reciprocal Plan was introduced on April 2,imposing a 10 percent

266、 minimum tar-iff on all countries other than Canada and Mexico and country-specific rates as high as 50 percent for roughly 60 countries.The universal 10 percent minimum tariff took effect on April 5,and the other tariffs were set to take effect on April 9.Exemptions applied to categories of goods d

267、eemed critical,such as pharmaceuticals,semiconductors,energy,and certain minerals.Countermeasures from Canada,announced on April 3,consisted of 25 percent tariffs on non-USMCA-compliant fully assembled vehicles imported from the United States.On April 4,China announced 34 percent tariffs,matching th

268、e increase in US duties on imports from China,to take effect on April 10.Under the reference forecast,trade policy uncer-tainty is assumed to remain elevated through 2025 and 2026.The perceived unpredictability of the current trade landscape is evident from the significant spike in the daily trade p

269、olicy indicator(Caldara and others 2020),which surged more than four standard deviations in just three days after April 2,despite the disclosure of the details of the expected tariffs.Growth ForecastGlobal Growth:Reference Forecast and AlternativesIn the near term,under the reference forecast,global

270、 growth is projected to fall from an estimated 3.3 percent in 2024 to 2.8 percent in 2025,before recovering to 3 percent in 2026.This is lower than the projections in the January 2025 WEO Update,by 0.5 percentage point for 2025 and 0.3 percentage point for 2026,with downward revisions for nearly all

271、 countries(Tables 1.1 and 1.2).The downgrades are broad-based across countries and reflect in large part the direct effects of the new trade measures and their indirect effects through trade linkage spillovers,height-ened uncertainty,and deteriorating sentiment.As indi-cated in the illustrative mode

272、l simulations presented in Box 1.2,the growth impact of tariffs in the short term varies across countries,depending on trade relation-ships,industry compositions,policy responses,and opportunities for trade diversification.Fiscal support in some cases(for example,China,euro area)offsets some of the

273、negative growth impact.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTS12International Monetary Fund|April 2025Table 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Reference Forecast(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)ProjectionsDifference from January 2025 WEO Update1Difference from Oct

274、ober 2024 WEO12024202520262025202620252026World Output3.32.83.00.50.30.40.3Advanced Economies1.81.41.50.50.30.40.3United States 2.81.81.70.90.40.40.3Euro Area0.90.81.20.20.20.40.3Germany0.20.00.90.30.20.80.5France1.10.61.00.20.10.50.3Italy0.70.40.80.30.10.40.1Spain3.22.51.80.20.00.40.0Japan 0.10.60.

275、60.50.20.50.2United Kingdom1.11.11.40.50.10.40.1Canada1.51.41.60.60.41.00.4Other Advanced Economies22.21.82.00.30.30.40.3Emerging Market and Developing Economies4.33.73.90.50.40.50.3Emerging and Developing Asia5.34.54.60.60.50.50.3China5.04.04.00.60.50.50.1India36.56.26.30.30.20.30.2Emerging and Dev

276、eloping Europe3.42.12.10.10.30.10.4Russia4.11.50.90.10.30.20.3Latin America and the Caribbean 2.42.02.40.50.30.50.3Brazil3.42.02.00.20.20.20.3Mexico1.50.31.41.70.61.60.6Middle East and Central Asia2.43.03.50.60.40.90.7Saudi Arabia1.33.03.70.30.41.60.7Sub-Saharan Africa 4.03.84.20.40.00.40.2Nigeria3.

277、43.02.70.20.30.20.3South Africa0.61.01.30.50.30.50.2MemorandumWorld Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates2.82.32.40.60.40.50.3European Union1.11.21.50.20.20.40.2ASEAN-544.64.03.90.60.60.50.6Middle East and North Africa1.82.63.40.90.51.40.8Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies4.33.73.80.50.40.5

278、0.3Low-Income Developing Countries4.04.25.20.40.20.50.4World Trade Volume(goods and services)3.81.72.51.50.81.70.9ImportsAdvanced Economies2.41.92.00.30.40.50.5Emerging Market and Developing Economies5.82.03.43.01.12.91.2ExportsAdvanced Economies2.11.22.00.90.61.51.0Emerging Market and Developing Ec

279、onomies6.71.63.03.41.73.01.3Commodity Prices(US dollars)Oil51.815.56.83.84.25.13.2Nonfuel(average based on world commodity import weights)3.74.40.21.90.34.60.6World Consumer Prices65.74.33.60.10.10.00.0Advanced Economies72.62.52.20.40.20.50.2Emerging Market and Developing Economies67.75.54.60.10.10.

280、40.1Source:IMF staff estimates.Note:See Box A2 of the WEO Statistical Appendix for a list of economies whose projections have been revised based on developments in commodity markets and international trade as of April 4,2025.Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels

281、prevailing during March 6,2025April 3,2025.Economies are listed on the basis of economic size.The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1 Difference based on rounded figures for the current,January 2025 WEO Update,and October 2024 WEO forecasts.2 Excludes the G

282、roup of Seven(Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,United Kingdom,United States)and euro area countries.3 For India,data and forecasts are presented on a fiscal year basis,and GDP from 2011 onward is based on GDP at market prices with fiscal year 2011/12 as a base year.4 Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippi

283、nes,Singapore,and Thailand.5 Simple average of prices of UK Brent,Dubai Fateh,and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.The average price of oil in US dollars a barrel was$79.17 in 2024;the assumed price,based on futures markets,is$66.94 in 2025 and$62.38 in 2026.6 Excludes Venezuela.See the country-spe

284、cific note for Venezuela in the“Country Notes”section of the Statistical Appendix.7 The assumed inflation rates for 2025 and 2026,respectively,are as follows:2.1 percent and 1.9 percent for the euro area,2.4 percent and 1.7 percent for Japan,and 3.0 percent and 2.5 percent for the United States.CHAP

285、TER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES13International Monetary Fund|April 2025Given uncertainty over where trade policy could settle,the two alternative growth outlooks are as follows:Under the preApril 2 forecast,global growth would be 3.2 percent for both 2025 and 2026,lower by 0.1 percentage point i

286、n each year compared with the January 2025 WEO Update.This forecast deviates from the global assumptions listed above on trade policy announcements,the level of uncertainty,and commodity prices.It is predicated on higher oil prices and only those trade policies announced between February 1 and March

287、 12,namely,tariffs on Canada and Mexico,the first wave of tariffs on China,associated responses by Canada and China,and sectoral tariffs on steel and aluminum.The downgrades to growth under this outlook are largest for the countries directly involved,but growth in other economies is also lower becau

288、se of increased uncertainty relative to that in January and tariff-re-lated spillovers.Table 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Reference Forecast(continued)(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)Q4 over Q48ProjectionsDifference from January 2025 WEO Update1Difference from October 2024 WEO12

289、024202520262025202620252026World Output3.52.43.00.80.10.7.Advanced Economies1.91.21.50.70.20.5.United States 2.51.51.70.90.40.4.Euro Area1.20.71.40.50.00.6.Germany0.20.31.00.50.11.0.France0.60.81.00.20.20.7.Italy0.60.80.90.20.20.2.Spain3.42.01.70.10.30.0.Japan 1.20.41.31.20.60.6.United Kingdom1.51.7

290、0.90.10.40.6.Canada2.40.62.21.50.31.5.Other Advanced Economies21.92.21.70.60.00.4.Emerging Market and Developing Economies4.83.34.00.90.21.0.Emerging and Developing Asia5.84.04.70.90.41.0.China5.43.24.21.30.31.5.India37.56.26.30.30.20.3.Emerging and Developing Europe3.01.82.01.10.40.9.Russia3.70.40.

291、80.80.40.8.Latin America and the Caribbean 2.31.62.81.10.41.3.Brazil3.32.02.20.10.10.2.Mexico0.50.22.01.60.11.6.Middle East and Central Asia.Saudi Arabia4.52.53.71.30.42.1.Sub-Saharan Africa.Nigeria3.53.72.80.01.00.0.South Africa0.80.81.60.20.60.2.Memorandum World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rat

292、es3.01.92.50.80.10.7.European Union1.51.11.70.40.00.3.ASEAN-544.73.64.30.30.70.6.Middle East and North Africa.Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies4.83.34.00.90.21.0.Low-Income Developing Countries.Commodity Prices(US dollars)Oil510.114.10.79.11.59.2.Nonfuel(average based on world commodity im

293、port weights)8.31.20.41.10.10.7.World Consumer Prices64.83.53.00.00.00.0.Advanced Economies72.42.42.10.30.10.4.Emerging Market and Developing Economies66.74.43.60.20.20.3.8 For world output,the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 90 percent of annual world output at purchas

294、ing-power-parity weights.For emerging market and developing economies,the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 85 percent of annual emerging market and developing economies output at purchasing-power-parity weights.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFT

295、S14International Monetary Fund|April 2025 The postApril 9 model-based forecast incorporates the tariff announcements made after April 4 and,hence,not included in the reference forecast.On April 9,the United States announced a 90-day pause on the higher tariff rates imposed on some countries but main

296、tained the 10 percent minimum on all countries while further raising tariffs on Chinese goods as a countermeasure to Chinas tariff response,which China then coun-tered again.The EU responded with 25 percent tariffs on a range of US imports,which were also paused for 90 days.On April 11,the United St

297、ates announced that it would exempt smart-phones,laptops,and other electronic devices and components from the April 2 tariffs,while China raised tariffs on US goods further,with the higher rate taking effect on April 12.As of April 14the cutoff date for data and information used in this chapterthe U

298、S effective tariff rate on Chinese goods was 115 percent,while that imposed by China on US goods was 146 percent,and the US effective tariff rate on the world stood at about 25 percent,up from under 3 percent in January 2025.If the measures announced between April 5 and 14 were considered in isolati

299、on from the associated market fallout and policy-induced uncertainty and assumed to be permanent,global growth for 2025 would be about 2.8 percent for 2025 and about 2.9 percent for 2026.This is similar to the estimates for global growth in the reference forecast,albeit with a different compo-sition

300、 of growth rates across countries.The gains from lower effective tariff rates for those coun-tries that were previously subject to higher tariffs would now be offset by poorer growth outcomes in China and the United Statesdue to the esca-lating tariff ratesthat would propagate through global supply

301、chains.Further,the losses in China and the United States would become larger in 2026 and beyond,while the gains in other regions would fade,leading to weaker global outcomes than the reference forecast.Growth Forecast for Advanced EconomiesFor advanced economies,growth under the refer-ence forecast

302、is projected to drop from an estimated 1.8 percent in 2024 to 1.4 percent in 2025 and 1.5 percent in 2026.Growth for 2025 is now pro-jected to be 0.5 percentage point lower relative to that in January 2025 WEO Update projections.The forecasts for 2025 include significant downward revi-sions for Cana

303、da,Japan,the United Kingdom,and the United States and an upward revision for Spain.For the United States,growth is projected to decrease in 2025 to 1.8 percent,1 percentage point lower than the rate for 2024 as well as 0.9 percentage point lower than the forecast rate in the January 2025 Table 1.2.O

304、verview of the World Economic Outlook Reference Forecast at Market Exchange Rate Weights(Percent change)ProjectionsDifference from January 2025 WEO Update1Difference from October 2024 WEO12024202520262025202620252026World Output2.82.32.40.60.40.50.3Advanced Economies1.81.41.50.60.30.40.3Emerging Mar

305、ket and Developing Economies4.13.53.70.60.40.60.3Emerging and Developing Asia5.24.34.40.60.50.50.2Emerging and Developing Europe3.32.12.30.20.20.20.3Latin America and the Caribbean 2.21.92.20.60.40.50.4Middle East and Central Asia2.02.93.60.80.41.10.5Sub-Saharan Africa 3.73.74.20.40.00.40.1Memorandu

306、mEuropean Union1.01.01.40.30.20.50.3Middle East and North Africa1.62.73.50.90.51.30.7Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies4.23.53.60.60.50.50.3Low-Income Developing Countries3.94.25.30.50.20.60.4Source:IMF staff estimates.Note:The aggregate growth rates are calculated as a weighted average,in

307、which a moving average of nominal GDP in US dollars for the preceding three years is used as the weight.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1 Difference based on rounded figures for the current,January 2025 WEO Update,and October 2024 WEO forecasts.CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES15International Monet

308、ary Fund|April 2025WEO Update.The downward revision is a result of greater policy uncertainty,trade tensions,and a softer demand outlook,given slower-than-anticipated con-sumption growth.Tariffs are also expected to weigh on growth in 2026,which is projected at 1.7 percent amid moderate private cons

309、umption.Growth in the euro area is expected to decline slightly to 0.8 percent in 2025,before picking up modestly to 1.2 percent in 2026.Rising uncertainty and tariffs are key drivers of the subdued growth in 2025.Offsetting forces that support the modest pickup in 2026 include stronger consumption

310、on the back of rising real wages and a projected fiscal easing in Germany following major changes to its fiscal rule(the“debt brake”).Within the region,Spains momentum contrasts with the sluggish dynamics elsewhere.The growth projection for 2025 for Spain is 2.5 percent,an upward revision of 0.2 per

311、centage point from that in the January 2025 WEO Update.This reflects a large carryover from better-than-expected outturns in 2024 and recon-struction activity following floods.Among other advanced economies,several down-ward revisions stand out.For Canada,growth forecasts are revised downward by 0.6

312、 percent-age point for 2025 and by 0.4 percentage point for 2026.This largely reflects the new tariffs on exports to the United States that came into effect in March as well as heightened uncertainty and geopolitical tensions.For Japan,the growth projec-tion for 2025 is 0.6 percent,marking a downgra

313、de of 0.5 percentage point relative to the forecast in January.The effect of tariffs announced on April 2 and associated uncertainty offset the expected strengthening of private consumption,with above-inflation wage growth boosting household disposable income.For the United Kingdom,the growth projec

314、tion for 2025 is 1.1 percent,lower by 0.5 percentage point compared to the forecast in January.This reflects a smaller carryover from 2024,the impact of recent tariff announcements,an increase in gilt yields,and weaker private consumption amid higher inflation as a result of regulated prices and ene

315、rgy costs.Growth Forecast for Emerging Market and Developing EconomiesFor emerging market and developing economies,growth under the reference forecast is projected to drop to 3.7 percent in 2025 and 3.9 percent in 2026,following an estimated 4.3 percent in 2024.This is 0.5 and 0.4 percentage point l

316、ower,respectively,compared with the rate projected in the January 2025 WEO Update.After a marked slowdown in 2024,growth in emerging and developing Asia is expected to decline further to 4.5 percent in 2025 and 4.6 percent in 2026.Emerging and developing Asia,particularly Association of Southeast As

317、ian Nations(ASEAN)countries,has been among the most affected by the April tariffs.For China,2025 GDP growth is revised downward to 4.0 percent from 4.6 percent in the January 2025 WEO Update.This reflects the impact of recently implemented tariffs,which offset the stronger carryover from 2024(as a r

318、esult of a stronger-than-expected fourth quarter)and fiscal expansion in the budget.Growth in 2026 is also revised downward to 4.0 percent from 4.5 percent in the January 2025 WEO Update on the back of prolonged trade policy uncertainty and the tariffs now in place.For India,the growth outlook is re

319、latively more stable at 6.2 percent in 2025,sup-ported by private consumption,particularly in rural areas,but this rate is 0.3 percentage point lower than that in the January 2025 WEO Update on account of higher levels of trade tensions and global uncertainty.For Latin America and the Caribbean,grow

320、th is projected to moderate from 2.4 percent in 2024 to 2.0 percent in 2025,before rebounding to 2.4 per-cent in 2026.The forecasts are revised downward by 0.5 percentage point for 2025 and 0.3 percentage point in 2026 compared with those in the January 2025 WEO Update.The revisions owe largely to a

321、 significant downgrade to growth in Mexico,by 1.7 percentage points for 2025 and 0.6 percentage point for 2026,reflecting weaker-than-expected activity in late 2024 and early 2025 as well as the impact of tariffs imposed by the United States,the associated uncertainty and geopolitical tensions,and a

322、 tightening of financing conditions.Growth in emerging and developing Europe is pro-jected to slow down considerably,from 3.4 percent in 2024 to 2.1 percent in 2025 and 2026.This reflects a sharp drop in growth in Russia from 4.1 percent in 2024 to 1.5 percent in 2025 and to 0.9 percent in 2026 as p

323、rivate consumption and investment decelerate amid reduced tightness in the labor market and slower wage growth.Compared with that projected in the January 2025 WEO Update,growth in Russia has been revised slightly WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AMID POLICy ShIFTS16International Monetary

324、Fund|April 2025upward for 2025 thanks to stronger-than-expected outturns in the data for 2024.For Trkiye,growth is projected to bottom out in 2025 at 2.7 percent and accelerate to 3.2 percent in 2026,owing to recent pivots in monetary policy.The Middle East and Central Asia is projected to come out

325、of several years of subdued growth,with the rate accelerating from an estimated 2.4 percent in 2024 to 3.0 percent in 2025 and to 3.5 percent in 2026 as the effects of disruptions to oil pro-duction and shipping dissipate and the impact of ongoing conflicts lessens.Compared with that in January,the

326、projection is revised downward,reflect-ing a more gradual resumption of oil production,persistent spillovers from conflicts,and slower-than-expected progress on structural reforms.For sub-Saharan Africa,growth is expected to decline slightly from 4 percent in 2024 to 3.8 percent in 2025 and recover

327、modestly in 2026,lifting to 4.2 percent.Among the larger economies,the growth forecast in Nigeria is revised downward by 0.2 percentage point for 2025 and 0.3 per-centage point for 2026,owing to lower oil prices,and that in South Africa is revised downward by 0.5 percentage point for 2025 and 0.3 pe

328、rcentage point for 2026,reflecting slowing momentum from a weaker-than-expected 2024 outturn,deteriorat-ing sentiment due to heightened uncertainty,the intensification of protectionist policies,and a deeper slowdown in major economies.South Sudan has a downward revision of 31.5 percentage points for

329、 2025 on account of the delay in in the resumption of oil production from a damaged pipeline.Inflation Forecast Under the reference forecast,global headline inflation is expected to decline to 4.3 percent in 2025 and to 3.6 percent in 2026.Inflation is projected to converge back to target earlier in

330、 advanced econo-mies,reaching 2.2 percent in 2026,compared with emerging market and developing economies,for which it declines to 4.6 percent over the same time hori-zon.Compared with that in the January 2025 WEO Update,the global inflation forecast is slightly higher.For advanced economies,the infl

331、ation forecast for 2025 has been revised upward by 0.4 percentage point since January.The United Kingdom and the United States stand out in both the direction and the magnitude of their revisions.Compared with those in the January 2025 WEO Update,the UK inflation forecast has been revised upward by

332、0.7 percentage point and the US fore-cast by 1.0 percentage point.For the United States,this reflects stubborn price dynamics in the services sector as well as a recent uptick in the growth of the price of core goods(excluding food and energy)and the supply shock from recent tariffs.In the United Ki

333、ngdom,it primarily reflects one-off regulated price changes.In the euro area,the forecast is unchanged.Among emerging market and developing economies,the revisions are mixed.In emerging and developing Asia,inflationary pressures are expected to be even more muted,with a downward revision of 0.5 per-centage point to 2025 forecasts relative to those in January.After a series of downward surprises,in