1、Global Landscape of Climate FinanceA Decade of Data:2011-2020SUPPORTED BY:1Authors:Baysa Naran,Jake Connolly,Paul Rosane,Dharshan Wignarajah,Githungo Wakaba.This work was led under the guidance of Dr.Barbara Buchner.Acknowledgements:We are grateful to Convergence,Climate Bonds Initiative,and the Int

2、ernational Energy Agency for sharing valuable data contained in the report.Finally,the authors would like to thank and acknowledge contributions from Caroline Dreyer,Rob Kahn,and Valerio Micale for advice,editing,and internal review,and Elana Fortin,Josh Wheeling,and Angela Woodall for layout and gr

3、aphic design.The authors appreciate the review and guidance from the following experts outside CPI(in alphabetical order):Alexis Bonnel(AFD),Renee Livesey(BEIS),Michael Knig(FS-UNEP Centre),Padraig Oliver(UNFCCC),Jens Sedemund(OECD),Charlene Watson(ODI)and many other contributors from CPI convened C

4、limate-aligned Finance Tracking Group.Recommended citation:Climate Policy Initiative B.Naran,J.Connolly,P.Rosane,D.Wignarajah,E.Wakaba,B.Buchner.2022.Global Landscape of Climate Finance:A Decade of Data 2011-2020.Related CPI reports:Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2021Private Financial Instituti

5、ons Commitments to Paris AgreementLandscape of Climate Finance in AfricaThe Landscape of Methane Abatement FinanceNet Zero Finance TrackerContact:Baysa Naran baysa.narancpiglobal.orgMedia contact:Caroline Dreyer caroline.dreyercpiglobal.orgCopyright 2022 Climate Policy Initiative climatepolicyinitia

6、tive.org.All rights reserved.CPI welcomes the use of its material for noncommercial purposes,such as policy discussions or educational activities,under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International(CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)License.For commercial use,please contact adminsfcpiglobal

7、.org2ContextIt has been more than a decade since CPI started comprehensively assessing global climate finance flows through the Global Landscape of Climate Finance(the Landscape).It monitors global primary investment by public and private actors in activities that reduce emissions and improve adapta

8、tion and resilience to climate change.By setting this baseline,we aim to provide a snapshot of where and how climate mitigation and adaptation finance is flowing globally,based on consistently reported and collected data over the years.The past decade saw growing momentum,where public and private cl

9、imate finance almost doubled between 2011 and 2020.However,reaching climate objectives will require climate investment to increase at least seventimes by the end of this decade as well as the alignment of all other financial flows with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.Climate-focused investment

10、 in the real economy is more important than ever.Our window of opportunity to limit global temperature rise by 1.5C is rapidly running out.3IntroductionReflecting on the past ten years of tracking global climate finance flows,this report presents seven key observations on climate finance in 2011 202

11、0 and concludes with key actions to rapidly scale climate finance to the trillions.The report provides a brief overview of sources,instruments,uses,and geographies in the past decade,as well as climate finance needs in the coming years by sectors and geographies.It also offers a preliminary estimate

12、 for climate finance in 2021,drawing on data published in 2022.To inform the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)fifth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows,we leveraged new data to update climate finance flow estimates for the years 2019 and 2020,as prev

13、iously reported in our 2021 Landscape.The Landscape goes beyond the developed countries commitment to a collective goal of mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate action in developing economies.It analyzes all climate mitigation and adaptation investment mobilized internationally and

14、 domestically,to assess global progress1.While tracking primary investment in climate mitigation and adaptation is important,we acknowledge that this is a means and not an end to meeting the challenge of aligning the global financial system with the climate goals of the Paris Agreement.There are sti

15、ll a lot of unknowns and data gaps in climate finance.The following observations are limited to what is known and tracked.1Further information on the definition and scope of the Global Landscape of Climate Finance is available here.41.Global climate finance almost doubled in the last decade,with a c

16、umulative USD 4.8 trillion in climate finance committed between 2011-2020 or USD 480 billion annual average.While climate finance increased at a cumulative average annual growth rate(CAGR)2of 7%,the current levels of increase are not on track to meet a 1.5C global warming scenario.We need at least U

17、SD 4.3 trillion in annual finance flows by 2030(CAGR 21%)to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.There is enough liquidity in global financial markets(USD 200 trillion held by investors in 2020)but barriers impeding deployment exist.2.Private sector investment is increasing,but not at the scale

18、 and speed necessary for the transition.Private sector actors,particularly financial institutions with trillions of asset under management,are committing to net zero and sustainable finance practices.Nonetheless,it is not clear how fast these commitments are translating into changes and investment o

19、n the ground.The growth rate of private climate finance was slower(4.8%)than that of the public sector(9.6%)and must increase rapidly at scale.The public sector has been vital in channeling finance to hard-to-invest sectors such as agriculture and adaptation.However,there still is room for public fi

20、nance to take more risks and a clearer mandate to mobilize both public and private capital,and to create enabling environments necessary for unlocking further pools of capital.3.Finance towards renewable energy made the most progress,whereas adaptation and resilience finance lags significantly.The r

21、enewable energy sector was transformed into an established and competitive sector with a 7x higher return on investment than fossil fuels(IEA&CCFI,2021).Public sector support was particularly crucial in scaling renewable energy investment by supporting and enabling technology cost reduction,as well

22、as providing incentives such as time bound subsidy mechanisms as markets became self-sustaining.Transport is the fastest-growing sector,built in part by government policy support for the industry.Other critical sectors,including agriculture,forestry,other land use and fisheries,industry,water and wa

23、stewater,all of which have potential to mature,are trailing behind.There is a lack of data on adaptation finance from the private sector.Nevertheless,the quantity and quality of adaptation finance fall far short of needs.Key observations:The need for scale2CAGR refers to the growth rate at an annual

24、 compounded rate to show smoothed rate taking into account any fluctuations year on year54.Continued fossil fuel support remains a barrier to achieving global climate goals.For example,the total fossil fuel subsidies in 51 major countries alone were 40%higher than the total global investment in clim

25、ate finance between 2011-2020.This is alarming as fossil fuel subsidies are only a part of the overall funding in high emitting activities.Immediate action to remove dependencies on fossil fuel,including subsidies,will free up resources for more sustainable investments,as well as improve consumer pr

26、ice stability and increase energy independence.5.Concessional finance was 16%of total climate finance,while debt consistently remained the main instrument for climate finance.Concessional financing is crucial in managing risks and uncertainties related to nascent technologies and markets.Grant finan

27、ce is increasing,with volumes almost tripling between 2011-2020.However,their relative share in total climate finance remains low at less than 5%.The majority of grants were provided by governments in the forms of subsidies or international climate finance.The private sector relied on balance sheet

28、investments(or investments through its own resources)and the public sector provided concessional or market rate loans.The majority of debt was raised in East Asia Pacific and Western Europe followed by North America,driven by renewable energy growth in those regions.6.76%of climate finance was raise

29、d domestically,primarily concentrated in East Asia&Pacific(dominated by China),North America,and Western Europe,confirming the importance of domestic capital pool.Central Asia and Eastern Europe attracted both domestic and international climate finance.Across all regions,there is a lack of consisten

30、tly reported data on domestic public climate finance.7.Data on finance flows is improving,but less is known about the impact and outcome of deployed climate finance.Public international climate finance is advancing on its reporting methodologies,which enables providers to better understand and prior

31、itize climate investments.However,the same level of sophistication and consistency in reporting is lacking from the private sector,as well as in public domestic budgets,which leads to data gaps.More broadly,there are knowledge gaps in impact,outcome,and outcome levels of climate finance that are imp

32、ortant to assess their effectiveness.Key observations:The finance and data gaps7Annual climate finance flows in 2019/20 reached USD 653 billion on average,which was 15%higher than in 2017/18.Our 2019/20 numbers were revised and enhanced following additional data sources on energy efficiency and upda

33、ted data from OECD-DAC.Further details in Annex I.Based on currently available information,our preliminary estimates suggest 2021 climate finance flows amount to USD 850 USD 940 billion,representing a 28%-42%increase from 2019/20 averages,reaching an all-time high.A more precise analysis of 2021 cli

34、mate finance flows will be confirmed in the next Landscape(2023)when more primary data becomes available.The estimated increase is attributable to a significant increase in the transport sector driven by increased demand for electric vehicles and related infrastructure.For example,sales of electric

35、vehicles alone doubled in 2021,reaching a new record.Climate finance continues to be affected by global economic conditions:Prices for energy,shipping,raw material,and labor are rising throughout the supply chains of various industries,including renewable energy.Nonetheless,renewable energy competit

36、iveness is high given that natural gas and coal prices sharply increase(IEA,2022c).High inflation environment may lead to high borrowing cost for all actors.Debt accounts for more than half of climate finance in developing economies,particularly in Africa(CPI,2022).High debt vulnerability poses risk

37、s to many countries that are also facing food insecurity,and exchange rate vulnerabilities.Climate disasters such as floods and droughts are intensifying and becoming the most frequent reasons for infrastructure disruptions,costing between USD 391-647 billion in low-and middle-income countries annua

38、lly(Hallegate et al,2019).Despite this,investment to improve the resilience of infrastructure remains low(Annex 3).Due to the relative change in energy prices,incentives are on the table to build 1.5C compatible portfolios green investments are more profitable than prior to the current crises(NGFS,2

39、022).Key insights from our preliminary estimates for 20217 key observations from tracking global climate finance2011-202091.Global climate finance flows almost doubled in the last decade*Low bound estimateFigure 1:Global climate finance in 2011-2021(USD bn,nominal)Global climate finance flows have b

40、een steadily increasing in the past decade.Climate finance increased at 7%(CAGR)on an annual basis reaching USD 665 billion in 2020.This was driven primarily by growth in the renewable energy and transport sectors.Data on climate finance also improved over the years(p.20).Despite the increase,curren

41、t investment levels are still significantly short of the estimated needs(p.9).Key observation 110A rapid and sustained increase in climate finance and redirection of high-carbon finance is required to secure a climate resilient,net zero futureFigure 2:Global tracked climate finance flows and the ave

42、rage estimated annual climate investment need*through 2050*Please refer to Annex II for further detailsAt least USD 4.3 trillion in annual finance flows or a 20%year-on-year increase by 2030 is required to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.Despite the seemingly dramatic scale of the funding

43、gap,it represents less than 5%of global GDP.3Moreover,this increase would not be based solely on new,additional sources of finance.Aligning finance with a 1.5C path would demand to cut the financing of high emissions activities and some resources to be reallocated to climate finance.3Global total GD

44、P is on average USD 94 trillion per year based on IMF estimations(IMF,2021)112.Private actors contributions are increasing,but not at the pace necessary considering public sector capacity constraintsFigure 3:Climate Finance by public and private sources in 2011-2020(USD bn)*The public and private se

45、ctors provided USD 4.8 trillion in climate finance in total between 2011-2020,with the private sector responsible for about half.These represent joint efforts of about 20,000 public and private investors,worldwide,which have accumulated knowledge,capacity,and capabilities in channelling climate fina

46、nce.Although private sector contributions are increasing,their CAGR was only 4.3%compared to 9.1%by the public sector between 2011-2020.Public actors have most recently(2019/20)provided the majority of climate finance.We anticipate that investment will continue to play a pivotal role going forward,w

47、ith efforts to pursue decarbonization,climate resilience,and alignment of all finance flows with the Paris Agreement.Cumulative 2011-2020 USD 4.8 trillionKey observation 212All public sources are increasing finance,but their roles are evolvingFigure 4:Climate finance from different sources within th

48、e public sector(USD bn)Cumulative 2011-2020 USD 2.4 trillionAbout 65%of National Development Bank funding went to renewable energy and energy efficiency at the beginning of the 2010s.While they continue to support domestic energy sector projects,the majority is going to transport sector in most rece

49、nt years.Bilateral DFIs and Multilateral Climate Funds have more focus on cross-sectoral projects recently,instead of renewable energy.Governments have played a prominent role in the transport sector.In recent years they have been providing grants and subsidies to increase the market uptake of lower

50、 emission vehicles.Climate Funds channeled about USD 2.5 billion on average.They play important roles in catalyzingand coordinating resources for co-financing,including at national levels.54%of total finance by public sector was provided through project-level debt and 31%was concessional finance in

51、the form of grants and low cost debt.13Solar PV costs reduced by 80%in the past decade,while onshore and offshore wind costs dropped by almost 45%.This means more capacity was added towards the end of the decade per dollar invested(IRENA,2022).The economics of decarbonizing the world economy would b

52、e fundamentally different if not for the rapid decline in the cost of renewable technologies.This was driven by bold policy decisions.Renewable energy and the role of public sectorGovernment initiatives in the last decade guaranteed the full electricity price to the investor,or a certificate that co

53、uld be sold to provide another income source alongside the wholesale market electricity price.Stable and subsidized markets have helped the private sector embrace the industry and enable mobilization of finance by the private sector at attractive returns(IRENA,2018).The success,mirrored by wind tech

54、nology,speaks to crucial role government plays in market creation driving demand and providing investment to encourage the development of climate solutions.Similar strategies must be applied to other sectors to reduce the cost of capital and achieve net zero across the economy.Figure 5:Wind and sola

55、r installed costs and average LCOE1496%of private finance is driven by corporates,commercial financial institutions,and householdsFigure 6:Climate finance by private sector actors between 2011-2020(USD bn)Cumulative 2011-2020 USD 2.4 trillionCorporates representing established energy utilities,indep

56、endent power producers,and project developers specializing in renewable energy represented the largest single class of investors historically.Their composition is now gradually diversifying whereby non-energy related corporates and commercial financial institutions are joining the efforts to combat

57、climate change.Households have been contributing to climate finance by purchasing low carbon equipment such as solar water heaters or low carbon vehicles.Direct investment by institutional investors was USD 3.2 billion annually.Institutional investors make indirect investments to corporates,financia

58、l institutions,or funds that then invest in climate action.These may appear as balance sheet investments by corporates or other private finance institutions which are not captured by this analysis.15Adaptation finance has been growing faster,with an overall 16.7%CAGR compared to a 6%CAGR in mitigati

59、on finance.However,it remains severely underfunded.Most adaptation finance was channelled via public actors such as multilateral and national development finance institutions.Top sectors included water and waste water management,AFOLU and other cross sectors.It should be noted that the concept of ad

60、aptation finance and the methodologies of its tracking are less developed than mitigation finance.Adaptation finance is usually tracked as an incremental investment over business as usual.Therefore,adaptation finance is less directly comparable to mitigation finance.There are significant data gaps o

61、n adaptation finance,particularly from the private sector.3.Adaptation finance is increasing,but is starkly underfundedFigure 7:Adaptation finance between 2011-2020(USD bn)Key observation 316Mitigation finance was dominated by renewable energy in the last 10 years,accounting for almost 70%of totalLo

62、w carbon transport is now the fastest growing climate mitigation solution in the most recent five years.Transport attracts funding from a variety of actors due to investment size and commercial viability.Other solutions,such as energy efficiency,agriculture,and other industry-related investment lack

63、 progress due to various sectoral barriers(examples are in Annex 3).Less than 2%of climate finance tackles methane emissions,although it is responsible for half of net global warming to date(CPI,2022a).The agriculture,forestry,other land use and fisheries(AFOLU)sector attracts considerably low level

64、s of climate finance,although it is responsible for almost 20%of emissions.More importantly,there is a lack of climate investment data on these critical sectors from the private sector,making it hard to track progress against climate objectives.Figure 8:Climate mitigation finance by solutions betwee

65、n 2011-2020(USD bn)17End-use sectors and AFOLU show alarming signs of delayed climate actionAlthough needs figures should be compared to tracked investment with caution,due to coverage discrepancies of tracked climate finance and the finance needs scenarios,overall trends suggest end-use(Transport,I

66、ndustry,Buildings)and AFOLU sectors suffer from dramatic climate underinvestment.*Not all mitigation and multi-benefit climate finance can be allocated to the sectors shown in the table.The Mitigation&Multiple Objectives and Adaptation categories do not add up due to rounding.Data and knowledge on c

67、limate finance needs are evolving and their assessment will change with the course of actions taken by public and private actors and with more data becoming available.Adaptation finance needs may be underestimated as the latest available data is from 2016.All references used can be found in Annex II

68、.Table 1:Climate finance flows and needs by sector*184.Continued fossil fuel support remains a barrier to achieving global climate goalsFossil fuel subsidies only represent a partial picture of all financial flows supporting high emissions and business-as-usual finance flows.Even then,subsidies for

69、51 major economies4amounted to USD 6.8 trillion between 2011-2020,according to OECD and IEA(2022)40%more than climate finance.Global fossil fuel subsidies are projected to climb from USD 5.9 trillion(or 6,8%of global GDP in 2020)to 7.4%of global GDP in 2025(IMF,2022a),partly due to the current energ

70、y crisis.Although short term interventions are understandable(i.e.providing energy security for the most vulnerable),they delay the energy transition.Subsidies contribute to climate change by reducing the price of fossil fuels,thereby supporting greater production and consumption.The current energy

71、crisis reinforces the need for a longer term just transition strategy to decouple dependence on fossil fuel based energy systems exposed to high price volatility.Figure 9:Fossil fuel subsidies vs climate finance(USD bn)Key observation 4Source:Fossil fuel subsidies data by OECD Inventory of Support M

72、easures for Fossil Fuels;global climate finance data is by CPI 4 These include Australia,Brazil,Canada,the Peoples Republic of China,Germany,France,United Kingdom,Indonesia,India,Italy,Japan,Korea,Mexico,Russian Federation,Republic of Trkiye,United States,South Africa,Algeria,Angola,Argentina,Azerba

73、ijan,Bahrain,Bangladesh,Bolivia,Brunei Darussalam,Colombia,Ecuador,Egypt,Gabon,Ghana,Iraq,Iran,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,Libya,Malaysia,Nigeria,Oman,Pakistan,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Sri Lanka,Chinese Taipei,Thailand,Trinidad And Tobago,Turkmenistan,Ukraine,United Arab Emirates,Uzbekistan,Venezuela,Viet Nam195.Co

74、ncessional funding represented about 16%of total tracked climate financeFigure 10:Climate finance by instrument(USD bn)between 2011-2020Concessional financing is crucial in managing risks and uncertainties related to nascent technologies and markets.Concessional funding was primarily led by National

75、 and Bilateral DFIs and governments provided in the forms of debt or grant.For example,Western Europe received 24%of the concessional funding through domestic finance in energy efficiency and transport sectors,whereas Latin America and Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa received 14%each of total conce

76、ssional funding through international climate finance.Grant financing has been low but picking up gradually reaching almost USD 30 billion most recently.Most grant funding is sourced by governments for agriculture,cross-sectoral,and transport sector projects.According to Convergence(2021),the use of

77、 blended finance as a tool by investors remained limited despite its potential.Approximately USD 39.1 billion of blended finance from 2015-2020 was directed towards climate-focused opportunities.80%of climate finance was provided in the form of debt or equity expecting market-rate returns on investm

78、ent.These were mainly driven by corporates,National DFIs,and households investing in renewable energy and transport sectors in Western Europe,North America,and East Asia Pacific.Key observation 5206.Most finance is concentrated in only a few regions75%of all climate finance was concentrated in North

79、 America,Western Europe,and East Asia&Pacific(primarily led by China).Also,76%of all climate finance flows were raised and spent domestically.Voluntary actions and domestic policies to reduce emissions in Western Europe,North America,and East Asia Pacific provided a significant push for the advancem

80、ent of climate finance in those regions.For example,China set mandatory targets to reduce its national energy intensity.The identification of solar as a strategic industry has led to immense government investment in manufacturing capability.Chinas own Feed-in Tarif policies have led to a 70 x increa

81、se of installed solar capacity there since the beginning of the decade.Regions where the majority of low-and middle-income countries are located received less than 25%of climate finance flows.Across all regions,there is a lack of consistently collected data on domestic climate finance suggesting tha

82、t countries do not systematically monitor climate expenditure against policy objectives.Figure 11:Climate finance regional distribution in 2011-2020(%)Key observation 621Barriers to climate finance in emerging economiesThere is enough liquidity in global financial markets(USD 200 trillion held by in

83、vestors in 2020),but barriers impeding deployment in many emerging markets persist.The cost of capital is generally higher in emerging markets compared to advanced economies.Additionally,the cost of capital for developing countries is increasing due to climate vulnerability(United Nations Environmen

84、t Programme,2018).High up-front costs associated with mitigation and adaptation projects can act as a significant deterrent for private investment.Up-front capital investment and long time horizons for large infrastructure projects contribute to this(IMF,2022b).Climate solution projects suffer from

85、regulation uncertainty.Cost overruns,delays,and permit risk limit the supply of high-quality climate solution projects.DFI risk mitigation tools are being deployed at too small a scale.Mobilized private finance has been increasing,averaging USD 48.6 billion over 2018-2020(TOSSD,2022).However,to meet

86、 needs,the public investment and/or the ratio of public to private investment,must further increase.Lack of price signalling,in the form of effective carbon markets(among others)reduces incentives for investors to provide capital to climate solutions.Scarce public funding is being directed at subsid

87、izing the fossil fuel industry in many emerging economies.In Africa,annual climate finance over 2019/20 stood at USD 9.4 billion,while government subsidies for fossil fuels was USD 37 billion(CPI,2022b).Lack of local currency instruments poses risks to foreign currency denominated investment.The cur

88、rent underdevelopment of domestic financial ecosystems and their ability to raise capital means that this risk is not easily mitigated.Institutional reform takes time.Many of the underlying risks investors face in developing economies are structural.Risks and uncertainty surrounding exchange rate fl

89、uctuation,regulatory environments,demand volatility,and others require long term solutions(IMF,2022b)227.Climate finance flows data are improving,but standardized information on its outcome and impact remain scarce Landscape analysis has evolved over the years with methodological advancements by rep

90、orting institutions and data additions.Nonetheless,climate finance trends were driven by increases in flows rather than increases in data additions.These helped improve a more granular understanding of global climate finance flows.Data gaps persist(Annex 3)and more efforts are now required to standa

91、rdize understanding of climate finance impact and its outcome to climate goals.Key observation 7Figure 12:Global Landscape of Climate Finance data and methodology improvements4 key climate finance actions for this decade2022-onwards24In the last ten years,the world has learned valuable lessons and d

92、eveloped crucial capacity to move faster towards Paris alignment and net zero goals.Building on this effort,public and private actors must work closer together to drive technology costs down,lower the cost of capital,scale up investment at pace while redirecting flows away from high-carbon investmen

93、ts.Climate transition presents tremendous investment opportunities across a range of sectors and regions.However,the current rate of increase of climate investment will fail to secure the low carbon and climate resilient development needed.Only through rapid accelerationto reach seven times the curr

94、ent level of investment and alignment of all finance flows with climate goals will we bridge the significant funding shortfalls.The funding landscape needs to go beyond incremental investment through traditional funding instruments,such as project-level debt,and increasingly embrace innovative finan

95、cial instruments that unlock capital at scale.Mobilization of private finance is crucial to achieving net zero goals.Historically,the public sector has facilitated this by funding initial research and development into unproven technologies and creating policy environments that encourage private inve

96、stment and domestic public finance to scale up markets.To minimize disruptions related to the much-needed transition,there is a need for a holistic systems view and an organized climate space,which breaks silos,brings in stakeholders who are not yet actively involved.These efforts should translate c

97、hallenges and opportunities into implementable programs at sectoral,subnational,and national levels to mobilize international and domestic finance.This final section proposes four key actions that,based on a decade of experience,will mobilize climate finance at scale to create a significant impact o

98、ver this decade.Conclusion25Climate transition presents tremendous investment opportunities across a range of sectors and regions.However,the current rate of climate investment increase will fail to secure the low carbon and climate resilient development needed.To match the 20%year-on-year increase

99、in climate finance needed through 2030,four key actions to focus on in this decade are:1:Adopt holistic sectoral strategies.Current blind spots in our response to climate change must be acknowledged and addressed.This means building sector-wide decarbonization and resilience strategies that spur sys

100、temic transformations-from cradle-to-grave and ensure implemented solutions are well integrated.It also means leaving no sector behind.From a climate perspective,AFOLU,buildings,and the industry sectors are particularly underfunded,despite the crucial role they play in our resilience to external sho

101、cks,our health and that of the biosphere,and in allowing a just transition.2:Shift to a new finance paradigm.To implement holistic sector strategies,further public and private actor coordination is necessary.Every actor should know which part they can play and who they should be working with.But tha

102、t alone will not be enough.Investors also need to look beyond short-term financial returns,use longer-term and multi-factor informed investment strategies,and explore innovative financial mechanisms that could be deployed at scale.And public financial institutions need clear mandates to mobilize fur

103、ther public and private finance.3:Policies to create enabling environments for private finance mobilization.The successes achieved in the energy sector must be mirrored in other sectors and in emerging economies through a coordinated set of actions and policy decisions around reducingtechnology cost

104、s,providing incentives and risk sharing to promote innovation in hard-to-abate sectors and to scale proven technologies,redirecting fossil fuel support,and creating predictable environments that accelerate net zero transition.4:Make decision-critical data on climate finance flows available:The publi

105、c and private sectors should collaborate on a common definition of climate expenditure.This will help improve disclosure and build a climate investment data platform to channel climate finance to where it will have the most impact.Each actor has a role to play.Data on the quality of finance flows sh

106、ould improve through the development and consolidation of common methods and standards to understand the expected impact and its outcome level.In addition to regulators,initiatives such as GFANZ and TCFD,could support through detailed guidance on reporting investment in climate solutions,and a simil

107、ar initiative should help foster action and knowledge sharing across the public sector.Four key actions to scale up climate finance this decade26With climate finance concentrated in just a handful of technologies,clear gaps appear within sectors.This demonstrates a disconnect between our current sca

108、ttered response and the real-world necessities that we face.Current blind spots in our response to climate change must be acknowledged and addressed:Build sector-wide decarbonization and resilience strategies.Narrow approaches to climate action reduce the effectiveness of implemented solutions.This

109、calls for:Cradle-to-grave assessments:Policy and investment should span the entire value chain to avoid loopholes that hinder both mitigation potential,adoption,and resilience,e.g.,embodied carbon in new building construction.Integrated solutions:Deployment of solutions should incorporate local need

110、s and complementary,functioning systems in order to deliver the intended impact,e.g.,EVs and public charging infrastructure;renewable energy and grid integration solutions(e.g.,storage);to fully displace the use of fossil fuels.Leave no sector behind:AFOLU,buildings,and industry need to be taken jus

111、t as seriously.These three pillars to local economies are severely underfunded in comparison to transportation and energy.Beyond their mitigation potential,solutions in these sectors contribute to:Building resilience to external shocks:Local food systems become less vulnerable to droughts and floods

112、;low-energy buildings significantly reduce energy demand;households become less impacted by energy prices,energy-efficient and locally-robust industries minimize supply chain disruptions.Delivering impact across the board:from improved biodiversity(e.g.,agroforestry),to job creation(e.g.,building re

113、furbishments,emerging industries),and health benefits(e.g.,clean cooking,food security and quality).Enabling a just transition:Holistic strategies include planning for job loss,revenue redistribution,and other just transition needs and impacts that may create implementation and adoption barriers if

114、not proactively addressed across all sectors.A people-centered approach is needed.Key Action 1:Adopt holistic sectoral strategies27To implement holistic sector strategies and reach the 20%year-on-year increase needed in climate finance through 2030,further public and private actor coordination is ne

115、cessary.This includes innovative ways of doing finance.To achieve scale,all actors should know which part they can play and who they should be working with:Through collaboration across value chains and across the public and private ecosystems,funders and investors should seek to build coherent and c

116、omplementary portfolios of climate solutions that create credible transition pathways to functioning,low-carbon,and climate resilient systems.In segments with significant technology,adoption and/or scale barriers,such as energy storage or industries with significant process emissions(e.g.,cement,ste

117、el),concessional finance and other risk balancing mechanisms can spur innovation and cover high upfront costs.All actors should be engaged proactively in the phase out of fossil fuels and other high emission assets to reach overall alignment of portfolios and policies,and urge peers,suppliers,and in

118、termediaries to strive for the same goal.Investors need to look beyond short-term financial returns.Scaling climate finance will require renewed investment practices from both public and private actors.This includes:Adopt longer-term and multi-factor informed investment strategies that incorporate t

119、he broader economic cost of continuing business-as-usual as well as the economic value of transforming systems towards decarbonization and climate resilience,e.g,finance effectiveness assessments,environmental valuation(biodiversity,ecosystem services,carbon and methane pricing).Develop large-scale

120、financial innovation mechanisms and platforms led by public and private sectors,such as the Global Innovation Lab for Climate Finance5,that enable the replication of successful business models to unlock private investment.5https:/www.climatefinancelab.orgKey Action 2:Shift to a new finance paradigm2

121、8Key Action 3:Expand enabling environments through policies that mobilize private financeThe success achieved in the energy sector must be mirrored in other sectors and in emerging economies through a coordinated set of actions and policy decisions such as:Grant funding in novel technologies with a

122、particular focus on reducing technology costs and innovating in hard-to-abate sectors such as aviation,steel,and cement.Provide abundant,well-timed subsidies and public investment to proven technologies that need scaling.This approach has helped novel technologies to become commercially viable and a

123、ttractive to private capital(e.g.,offshore wind,solar PV,batteries).Reduce cost of finance through risk distribution.Countries and development finance institutions with lower borrowing costs could underwrite some of the transition costs,particularly where higher risks make private capital unable or

124、unwilling to invest,e.g.,emerging markets and nascent technologies.Such risk sharing and management could come in the forms of guarantees,blended finance arrangements,and innovative financial mechanisms such as carbon markets.For low and middle-income countries,general capacity building is essential

125、.While climate solutions can face specific issues,many underlying barriers to investment are present across development finance.Technical assistance and capacity building in these countries is key to providing a steady pipeline of climate projects suitable for investment.Redirect Fossil Fuel support

126、.Long-term dependencies and investment on fossil fuel,such as subsidies or issuance of new licenses for exploration,should be redirected to low-emission alternatives to accelerate the transition to net zero.These long-term dependencies impede the development of low-emission technologies and lock in

127、fossil fuel extraction and use for decades.Create regulatory targets and a predictable environment that accelerate the net zero transition.Legally binding national emission reduction targets,sectoral policies,and phasing out of high emission technologies(such ICE vehicles and gas fired heating syste

128、ms)provide clear signals and a stable environment to the private sector that encourages investment in low-emission alternatives.R&D in novel technologiesRevenue incentives/risk sharing to create markets for climate solutionsRobust and consistent long-term policy environment to attract private capita

129、lRedirect fossil fuel support29The public and private sectors should collaborate on a common definition of climate investment,including also considerations on the impact and quality.This will help improve consistent and comparable disclosure and build a climate investment data platform for investors

130、 to channel climate finance to where it will have the most impact.By building on existing and emerging best practices and taxonomies,each actor has a role to play:International public climate finance providers(including development finance institutions,multilateral climate funds and governments):Dat

131、a on the quality of finance flows including impact and outcome level should improve through the development and consolidation of common methods and standards.These actors should encourage reporting of climate investment by their intermediaries and contribute to the development of common approaches,s

132、tandards,or norms to enhance coherence of action.Public domestic actors(including governments,ministries and subnational governments):Regularly monitor climate expenditure to compare against country-specific climate objectives.By harnessing already existing green budgeting tools,such as climate publ

133、ic expenditure and institutional review,national climate finance tracking and emerging best practices in climate taxonomies,public domestic actors can and should track country level data.This vital information will help build a baseline of climate finance and identify key sectors and sub-regions tha

134、t need the most funding and coordinate with private sector and international public climate finance providers to increase efficiency of flows.Private sector:Whether through mandates,incentives,or guidance by regulatory bodies,or through voluntary initiatives,detailed climate investment reporting wil

135、l increasingly become industry standard for the private sector.Private actors should invest in building capacity to report on climate expenditure.In addition to regulators,initiatives such as GFANZ and TCFD,for example,could support through detailed guidance on reporting investment in climate soluti

136、ons.Key Action 4:Make decision-critical data on climate finance flows availableUnderstand current investment levelsAssess its impact and compare against policy/needsRevise investment goals aligned with climate objectivesIdentify financing gapsAnnexes31Total climate finance flows were USD 653 billion

137、 annual average for 2019/2020The numbers were updated following Rio marked climate related development finance data released by OECD DAC in June 2022.The CPI database was also updated through adding data points on energy efficiency in buildings by reviewing buildings level data per green building ce

138、rtificatesKey impacts were as follows:Public climate finance up from USD 321 billion to USD 335 billion Private climate finance up from USD 310 billion to USD 318 billionAdaptation climate finance up from USD 46 to USD 49 billionMitigation climate finance up from USD 571 to USD 586Cross sectoral cli

139、mate finance up from USD 15 to USD 17Annex 1:Updated view on Global Climate Finance Flows in 2019/2032Updated data tables for Global Climate Finance Flows in 2019/20Actor201920202019/2020 AveragePrivate303333318Commercial FI116128122Corporation118132125Funds835Households/Individuals515955Institution

140、al Investors354Unknown777.0Public337332334Bilateral DFI232524Export Credit Agency(ECA)111Government353032Multilateral Climate Funds444Multilateral DFI627568National DFI160130145Public Fund222SOE121313State-owned FI385245Total640665653Table A.1:Breakdown of global climate finance by public and privat

141、e actors(USD billion)33Sector201920202019/2020 AverageMitigation582589586Agriculture,Forestry,Other land uses and Fisheries798Buildings&Infrastructure335745Energy Systems316345330Industry253Information and Communications Technology000Others&Cross-sectoral601537Transport163153158Unknown011Waste122Wat

142、er&Wastewater111Adaptation425649Agriculture,Forestry,Other land uses and Fisheries465Buildings&Infrastructure111Energy Systems111Industry000Information and Communications Technology000Others&Cross-sectoral202121Transport274Unknown000Waste000Water&Wastewater142017Multiple Objectives161918Agriculture,

143、Forestry,Other land uses and Fisheries222Buildings&Infrastructure000Energy Systems212Industry000Information and Communications Technology000Others&Cross-sectoral978Transport111Unknown063Waste000Water&Wastewater132Total640665653Table A.2:Breakdown of global climate finance by use and sector(USD billi

144、on)34Instrument201920202019/2020 AverageBalance sheet financing(debt portion)104119112Balance sheet financing(equity portion)142170156Grant312930Low-cost project debt556661Project-level equity564651Project-level market rate debt246225236Unknown6108Total640665653Recipient201920202019/2020 AveragePriv

145、ate327371349Public101125113Public-Private242524Unknown188144166Total640665653Table A.3:Breakdown of global climate finance by instruments(USD billion)Table A.4:Breakdown of global climate finance by public and private recipients(USD billion)35Region201920202019/2020 Averagenon-OECD386392389Central A

146、sia and Eastern Europe261420East Asia and Pacific263274268Latin America&Caribbean222222Middle East and North Africa151515South Asia0330Sub-Saharan Africa212222Transregional91210OECD244266255Central Asia and Eastern Europe81210East Asia and Pacific131011Latin America&Caribbean121112Middle East and No

147、rth Africa121Other Oceania084US&Canada907482Western Europe110150130Transregional1078East Asia and Pacific312Latin America&Caribbean402Transregional455Total640665653Table A.5:Breakdown of climate finance by OECD membership and region(USD billion)36Region201920202019/2020 AverageDomestic495494494non-O

148、ECD297282290Transregional000OECD197211204International146171158From Non-OECD to OECD344From Non-OECD to Transregional333From Non-OECD to Other Non-OECD162822From OECD to Other OECD445147From OECD to Transregional745From OECD to non-OECD728176From Transregional to OECD000From Transregional to non-OEC

149、D101Total640665653Table A.6:International and domestic climate finance flows(USD billion)37The studies on climate finance needs are relatively new and are continuously evolving.CPI built its assessment on climate finance flows based on the best publicly available resources that are comparable to the

150、 current climate finance flows tracked under the Global Landscape of Climate Finance.As more literature and knowledge build up and depending on the course of economic development(e.g.high inflation environment)and climate investment decisions made in the future,our climate needs assessment may chang

151、e.The literature used to build the climate finance needs assessment in this study are as follows:Annex 2:Climate Finance Needs assessmentReferenceScope/coverageBloomberg New Energy Finance(BNEF),2021.New Energy Outlook 2021.Renewable power,Power T&D,CCUS,Integration solutions(Hydrogen,Pumped Hydro,S

152、torage).Bloomberg New Energy Finance(BNEF),2022.Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022.Battery electric vehicles.International Energy Agency(IEA),2020.Global EV Outlook 2020.Battery electric vehicles.International Energy Agency(IEA),2019.The Future of Rail.Rail transport.International Energy Agency(IEA),2021

153、.Net Zero by 2050 A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector.Renewable power,Power T&D,Biofuels,CCUS,Integration solutions,Transport,Industry,Buildings,Distributed Renewables.International Energy Agency(IEA),2020.Outlook for biogas and biomethane.Biofuels.International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA),202

154、1.World Energy Transition Outlook.Abu Dhabi.Renewable power,Power T&D,Biofuels,CCUS,Integration solutions,Transport,Industry,Buildings,Distributed Renewables.United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP),World Economic Forum(WEF),and The Economics of Land Degradation(ELD),2021.State of Finance for Natu

155、re.Re/Afforestation,Sylvopasture,Mangrove and Peatland restoration.United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP),2018.“The Adaptation Gap Report 2018.”Nairobi.Adaptation.Harmsen,J.H.M.,D.P.van Vuuren,D.R.Nayak,A.F.Hof,L.Hglund-Isaksson,P.L.Lucas,J.B.Nielsen,P.Smith,and E.Stehfest.2019.Long-term margina

156、l abatement cost curves of non-CO2 greenhouse gasesMethane abatement.Kreibiehl,Silvie;Knig,Michael;Moon,Jongwoo(2022):Data for Figure TS.25-Technical Summary of the Working Group III Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.MetadataWorks,04 April 2022.DOI:10.48490/dw6j-ef56 Regional split of

157、 climate investment needsTable A.7:Literature review on climate finance needs assessment38Annual investment needs through 2030 to decarbonize economiesRegional needs figures adapted from:Kreibiehl,Silvie;Knig,Michael;Moon,Jongwoo(2022):Data for Figure TS.25-Technical Summary of the Working Group III

158、 Contribution to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.MetadataWorks,04 April 2022.DOI:10.48490/dw6j-ef56 Figure A1:Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019/202039Historical dataData between 2011-2020 were based on previously published CPI reports from the Global Landscape of Climate Finance series.Data

159、collection methodologies incrementally changed over the years.For this analysis,CPI backtracked the methodological changes based on the available data.Climate Resilient Infrastructure Data CPI undertook a study in 2022(to be published in late 2022)to propose a new approach for tracking climate resil

160、ient infrastructure investments which looks at the full cost of the project rather than the incremental investment in resilience.This view enables an understanding of the share of investment in infrastructure that takes into account climate resilience in an attempt to bridge the knowledge gap on pub

161、lic and private sector investment in climate resilient infrastructure.The full cost data is slightly more accessible when attempting to fill in the private finance data gaps in climate resilience.Based on this analysis,CPI estimated that investment to improve the resilience of infrastructure remains

162、 low at only USD 31.3 billion annual average in 2019/2020.This includes USD 18 billion in CPIs tracked climate finance of which 64%were adaptation finance,16%mitigation and 20%dual benefits finance.In addition,it includes USD 5 billion of newly tracked investments that undertook full or partialadapt

163、ation solutions.Water and wastewater sector received the largest share(42%,USD 13.1 billion)followed by agriculture,forestry and other land use(20%,USD 6.4 billion),transport(9%,USD 2.9 billion),energy systems(3%,USD 867 billion)while other cross-sectoral projects received 26%(USD 8 billion).The app

164、roach used a broad definition of critical infrastructure to select 4 sectors namely water and wastewater,agriculture,forestry and other land use,transport and energy.A taxonomy of keywords was used to sift through previously tracked climatefinance by CPI as well as other data sources including Globa

165、l Water Intelligence and World Bank PPI to identify climate resilient infrastructure projects that undertook full or partial adaptation solutions.The keywords followed a broad typology of climate resilient infrastructure to tag projects as grey,green or blue infrastructure,building resilience of or

166、through projects and doing hard or soft interventions.To calculate full cost of the project by multilateral development banks which report incremental adaptation investment,a resilience multiplier was used to calculate the full cost of the project.The resilience multiplier refers to the share of ada

167、ptation finance in the total project commitment made by multilateral development banks as reported in the activity level OECD-DAC database on climate-related development finance.Annex 3 Methodological notes and additional information40Common barriers in scaling climate finance in key sectorsSectorTe

168、chnical barriersCommercial barriersOther governance barriersAFOLUInformational barriers on climate solutionsHigh technology costs in certain solutions Limited access to insurance and guarantee schemes to cover default riskHigh transaction costs due small-scale and dispersed customersSmall scale agri

169、culture:limited formal property rights limiting the ability of farmers to provide collateral to access financeAdaptation&resilient infrastructureInformation asymmetries and knowledge gaps:lack of information on private sector investmentLack of climate data:limited information on location specific cl

170、imate risk and vulnerability.Insufficient capacity in financial structuring and metrics developmentPotential large upfront cost set against long payback times Limited progress in investment ready national adaptation plansInability to recognise environmental and social benefits of adaptationBuildings

171、New low-carbon buildings:limited supply of technical skills and low-carbon construction materials.Deep retrofits:Lack of baseline performance data;New low-carbon buildings:High investment costs compared to alternatives;Limited supply of dedicated financing instrumentsDeep retrofits:Lack of awareness

172、 of funding options;inability to pay for upfront costs;Split incentive between landlords and tenantsNew low-carbon buildings and deep retrofits:lack of building regulation support;Lack of information standards and labellingEnergyRenewable power:Difficult integration of variable renewable energy(VRE)

173、in power grids due to lack of storage,transmission,and demand-side management capacity.Biofuels&Biomethane:Energy crops can compete with other agricultural land uses:food crops,livestock,textiles,etc.Competition from the fossil fuel industry as they remain dominant players in the energy sector.Subsi

174、dies provided to conventional energy is much higher than that of renewable energyBiofuels&Biomethane:Lack of regulation support on energy crops.IndustryProcess emissions from the manufacturing of key materials are hard to abate(cement,steel,iron,aluminum,etc.)Lack of green solutions(e.g.green hydrog

175、en)at the industrial scaleStrong regulatory framework face risk of relocation of production and carbon loopholes TransportElectrification of road transport-Passenger:The current availability of public charging infrastructure can slow deployment of Battery Electric Vehicles.Freight:long-distance heav

176、y-road transport faces battery duration limitations.Modal switch to rail transport Passenger:Suited to high activity areas.Freight:Suited to high freight volumes only need of multi-modal logistics to transport goods from terminals to final destination.Modal switch to rail transport-Passenger:Urban r

177、ail infrastructure has expensive capital costs.Modal switch to rail transport Passenger&Freight:Cross-jurisdiction projects require central/national planning.Table A8:Examples of barriers in scaling climate finance in key sectors41Understanding of climate finance flows is improving,but there are per

178、sistent data gaps.Without this data,it is difficult to measure progress against baseline and identify opportunities for scaling up finance in a more targeted manner.Public international climate finance has been advancing on its climate finance reporting methodologies which enabled providers to under

179、stand and prioritize their portfolio of climate investment.However,the same level of sophistication and consistency in reporting is lacking from the private sector as well as in public domestic budgets.Further effort is now required to understand the impact and outcome level of climate finance,defin

180、e,report and track adaptation finance globally,bring private sector and domestic public actors to disclose direct investment in climate mitigation and adaptationData gaps in climate finance prevent global understanding on progress PrivateData gapsPublic domestic Global South-SouthGlobal North-SouthF

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