國際清算銀行（BIS）：2020全球年度宏觀經濟報告（英文版）（118頁）.pdf

1、Annual Economic June 2020 Report BIS Bank for International Settlements 2020. All rights reserved. Limited extracts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. www.bis.org emailbis.org Follow us mRrNnPvNxP8O8Q7NmOoOoMoOkPqQqPeRoOpO8OrQsMvPmNmOMYnQpR BIS Promoting global monetary ?

2、 Annual Economic June 2020 Report This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2020e.htm). Bank for International Settlements 2020. All rights reserved. Limited extracts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISSN 2616-9428 (print) ISSN 2616-9436

3、 (online) ISBN 978-92-9259-392-6 (print) ISBN 978-92-9259-393-3 (online) Contents Annual Economic Report 2020: Editorial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix A global sudden stop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4、 . . . . . . . . ix A real crisis turns financial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix The policy response so far . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii Mone

5、tary policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii Prudential policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Fiscal policy . . . . . . . . .

6、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Looking ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv Central banks and payments in the digital er

7、a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi I. A global sudden stop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Box I.A: The Covid-19 pandemic and the policy trade-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8、 . . 3 Economic activity plunged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Box I.B: Covid-19 and the quest for lost revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 A financial sudden stop . . . . . . . . . .

9、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Financial pressure points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Fragile household and corporate balance sheets . . . . . . . . . .

10、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Fickle market funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Banks withstand pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

11、 Box I.C: Real estate markets in the wake of the Covid-19 shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Managing the fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Central banks as crisis managers . . . . . . . . . .

12、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Fiscal responses to the coronavirus crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Box I.D: Cash transfers to support informal workers in emerging market economies . . 25 U, V, W? The alphabet sou

13、p of the recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Box I.E: China returns to work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 II. A monetary lifeline: central banks crisis response . . . . . . . .

14、. . . . . . . 37 Central banks crisis management: a shifting state of play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Objectives and crisis toolkit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Lender of last resort and the evolving fina

15、ncial landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Reaching the last mile domestically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Box II.A: Dislocations in the US Treasury market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 and

16、extending the reach globally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Emerging market economies weather a perfect storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Box II.B: Market stress in US dollar funding markets and central bank swap lines . .

17、. . . 49 Box II.C: Central bank bond purchases in emerging market economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 The evolving crisis playbook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Vigorous, prompt and mandate-consistent interventions . . . .

18、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Extending boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Well coordinated with fiscal authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Looking ahea

19、d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 iiiBIS Annual Economic Report 2020 Box II.D: How much additional lending could the release of bank capital buffers support? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Box II.E: Monetary financing: What is it (not)? And is it a step too far? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 III. Central banks and payments in the digital era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Introduction . . .

21、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Money and payment systems: the foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Box III.A: The payment system, trust and central banks

22、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Todays payment systems: key facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Access, costs and quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23、 . . . . . . 70 Box III.B: The payment system deconstructed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Box III.C: The evolution of wholesale payment systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Industrial organisation: network effects in payments

24、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Box III.D: Payments amid the Covid-19 pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Central bank policies to improve efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 As op

25、erator: providing public infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 As catalyst: promoting interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 As overseer: guiding and regulating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Ensuring safety and integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 CBDC: designing safe and open payments for the digital economy . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Box III.E: Designing retail CBDC: shaping the future of payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 ivBIS Annual Economic Report 2020 vBIS Annual Economic Report 2020 Graphs I.1 Covid-1

28、9 pandemic: the timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 I.2 Containment measures hit economic activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 I.3 Analysts expect a very deep recession in 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 I.4 Unemployment soars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 I.5 Staggered shutdowns and traffic bottlenecks disrupt global supply chains . . . . . 9 I.6 Oil prices drag down economic activity, ex

30、ports and fiscal revenues . . . . . . . . . . . 10 I.7 Markets faced several weeks of high volatility as the pandemic worsened . . . . . . 11 I.8 A sudden stop in market funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 I.9 Deleveraging left households in

31、 better shape than in 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 I.10 Corporate strength and vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 I.11 EMEs vulnerable to tightening in global financial conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 I.12

32、 Rating agencies downgrade corporates; investors withdraw funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 I.13 Banks entered the Covid-19 crisis with significantly more capital than pre-GFC . 17 I.14 Banks under pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33、. . . . . . 18 I.15 Swift and forceful response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 I.16 Pledged fiscal packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 I.17 Institutional fact

34、ors and corporate vulnerabilities drive the fiscal response . . . . . 27 I.18 Fiscal space is tight in some places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 I.19 Fiscal deficits and debt ratios will soar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35、 . . . . . . . . . 28 II.1 Swift and forceful response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 II.2 Post-Great Financial Crisis changes in financial structure and tensions in money market funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36、 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 II.3 Asset purchases alleviate strains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 II.4 Little divergence between policy and reference rates amid funding tensions . . . 43 II.5 Low

37、profitability and price-to-book ratios hinder banks willingness to lend . . . . 46 II.6 Bank credit line buffers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 II.7 Global US dollar funding squeeze . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38、. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 II.8 Perfect storm in emerging market economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 II.9 Changing nature of foreign exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 II.10 Central banks rapid

39、crisis response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 II.11 Near-term inflation risks tilted downwards and outlook more uncertain . . . . . . . 61 II.12 Growing central bank presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40、. . . . . . . . 62 III.1 Financial inclusion and access are improving, but gaps remain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 III.2 Costs of payments are higher for some economies, users and instruments . . . . . 74 III.3 Two-sided markets as an open marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41、 . . . . . . . . . . . 77 III.4 Digital platforms differ from traditional networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 III.5 Digital technologies can help support inclusion and convenience . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 III.6 Merger and acquisition (M or in widespread relative v

42、alue “arbitrage” trades by hedge funds that ended up causing turmoil in the US Treasuries market. Second, and closely related, non-bank leverage was high. Corporate debt was elevated in many advanced and emerging market economies. Examples are leveraged loans, collateralised loan obligations and, mu

43、ch underappreciated, private ? highly illiquid investments, almost as large as the leveraged loan market and just as overstretched. Corporate debt levels burgeoned while credit quality deteriorated, as ? grade (“junk”). Household debt was high in several countries less affected by the GFC, typically

44、 “small” open advanced economies such as Canada, Australia and the Nordics as well as a number of EMEs, including Korea. Moreover, sovereign debt loomed large in several advanced economies and, above all, in EMEs, partly as a result of the policy response to the GFC. Finally, there was a strong incr

45、ease in offshore US dollar borrowing, both on- and off-balance sheet, notably via FX swaps. So far, these vulnerabilities have manifested themselves in various ways. These ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? aggravated tensions in US dollar funding markets; and the sudden stop in capital ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

46、 ? ? ? ? emerging among households and sovereigns too. Indeed, rating agencies have already started to downgrade some sovereigns or put them on a negative outlook. A silver lining in this sobering picture is the state of the banking system. In contrast to the GFC, the pandemic found banks much bette

47、r capitalised and more ? expansion. Indeed, as discussed further below, policymakers have looked at banks as part of the solution rather than as part of the problem. Huge drawdowns on credit lines have stretched banks balance sheets, but not by enough to force them into ? ? ? Nevertheless, banks face challenges. This real-life stress test is more severe than the scenarios supervisors adopted in their pre-crisis solvency exercises. One ?