1、1JOBS AND TECHNOLOGY JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYWORLD BANK EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 20242EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024 WORLD BANK EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024Jobs and Technology 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop

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13、 20433,USA;e-mail:pubrightsworldbank.org.ISBN(electronic):978-1-4648-2175-2DOI:10.1596/978-1-4648-2175-2Cover photo:Engineer checks shipment of chemicals at oil and gas industry pipeline job site by warodom changyencham Getty Images.Used with the permission of Getty Images.Further permission require

14、d for reuse.JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYiiiLIST OF CONTENTSContentsPreface and Acknowledgments xiList of Abbreviations xiiiAbstract xvOverview xviiRecent Developments and Outlook 1Technology and Jobs in EAP 37Appendix 97References 109EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024ivLIST OF CONTENTSLis

15、t of FiguresSummary FigureO1.TheregioncontinuestogrowfasterthantherestoftheworldbutslowerthanbeforethepandemicxiiiFigureO2.GeopoliticalriskshaveincreasedandRedSeadisruptionstoshippingandtradecontinuexivFigure O3.Chinas growth has benefitted developing economies,but the benefits have become smaller a

16、s its growth slows down and its exports grow faster than it imports xvFigure O4.The number of new trade-distorting measures continues to increase,both globally and in the EAP region xvFigure O5.EAP countries employ more people in routine manual occupations and fewer people in cognitive occupations t

17、han advanced countries xviiFigure O6.Robot adoption has led to higher employment and earnings of more educated workers while increasing the informality rate of the low-skilled xviiiFigure O7.AI largely affects cognitive task-based occupations,while complementing some non-routine cognitive task-based

18、 occupations;the EAP workforce is less exposed to AI than advanced economies due to the higher share of manual jobs xixFigure O8.Hard and soft skills:the share of STEM graduates is relatively small in developing EAP;socio-emotional learning(SEL)can be fostered in schools xxRecent Developments and Ou

19、tlook Figure1.Theregioncontinuestogrowfasterthantherestoftheworldbutslowerthanbeforethepandemic1Figure2.Whileoutputpercapitaiswellabovepre-pandemiclevelsinmostofthelargereconomies,itremains below those levels in many Pacific Island Countries and Myanmar 2Figure3.TheEAPcountrieswererapidlycatchingupw

20、ithper-capitaincomesinadvancedcountriesbutthe process has slowed down 2Figure4.Povertyratesareexpectedtodeclinefurther3Figure5.TheEAPprosperitygaphasbeensteadilydeclining3Figure6.Privateconsumptionhassustainedgrowthinthemajorcountries,butitscontributionhasbeendeclining in China and Thailand;services

21、 exports have helped boost growth in Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand,and public investment in Indonesia and Malaysia;private investment and goods exports remain weak in most countries 4Figure7.Eventhoughconsumptionissupportinggrowth,consumerspending,importsandconfidenceremain subdued,especiall

22、y in China 5Figure8.InvestmentgrowthhasbeendeclininginmostcountriesbuthasrevivedinVietNam5Figure B1.1.Property market slump has weighed on residential investment growth,whereas manufacturing investment remains robust 6Figure B1.2.Capacity utilization has decreased in some sectors as profit margins d

23、ecline and the share of loss-reporting firms increases 7Figure9.Theregionsexportsarerecoveringonlygraduallyasistourism8Figure10.Chinasexportsreboundedfromtheslumpin2023supportedbyanincreasingshareofexportsto the rest of the region 8Figure11.FiscalpolicyisexpansionaryinChina,IndonesiaandThailand,butn

24、otinMalaysiaandthePhilippines;monetary policy remains non-expansionary,but has started to ease 9Figure12.Inflationremainscontainedinmostoftheregion,butisstillhighinLaoPDRandMyanmar,and the US interest rates are expected to decline 10Figure13.Capitaloutflowscontinue,andsomecountriesfacedepreciationpr

25、essures11Figure14.Chinasshareinglobaltradehassignificantlyincreased,1985-202311JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYvLIST OF CONTENTSFigure15.Withinthe EAP region,some countries exports are dominated by manufactured goods while other countries specialize in commodities 12Figure16.Developingeconomiesgrowthbenefittedon

26、averagemorefromChinasincreaseddemandforimports than it was hurt by Chinas increased competition in export markets 13Figure17.Publicandprivatedebthaveincreasedcomparedtopre-pandemiclevels;privatedebtremainshighinChina,Malaysia,ThailandandVietNam14Figure B2.1.Increased household debt is negatively cor

27、related with consumption growth;Increased government debt and high private debt are negatively correlated with private investment growth 15Figure18.Interestpaymentsonexternaldebthaveincreasedin2023inmostcountries,butfallinginterest rates may offer some respite 16Figure19.RisksfromRedSeadisruptionsto

28、shippingandtradecontinue17Figure20.UncertaintyintheUnitedStateshasspikedandremainselevated19Figure21.Uncertaintyappearstobesynchronizedacrosscountries,likelydrivenbyglobalfactors19Figure22.UncertaintyintheEAPhasseenrecentspikes20Figure23.ImpactofUSuncertaintyonEAP21Figure24.Thenumberofnewtrade-disto

29、rtingmeasurescontinuestoincrease,bothgloballyandintheEAP region 22Figure25.USandChinadecreasedtheirreciprocalshareofFDIinmanufacturingandR&D.ChinaincreaseditsshareofFDItoMexicoandVietNam23Figure26.VietNamandMexicoemergedas“connector”countries,especiallyinthemanufacturingsector24Figure27.Theincreasei

30、ntheshareofChinese(US)FDIoutflowstoacountryispositively(negatively)correlated to increase in its share of US(China)imports.An increase in the share of Chinese(US)FDIoutflowstoacountryispositivelycorrelatedtoincreaseinitsshareof Chinese(US)imports 25Figure28.DeepdiveVietNam:themorefirmswereengagedini

31、nternationalexportsin2017,thehigherthe gain in sales,productivity and employment over 20172021 26Figure29.DeepdiveVietNam:eventstudyanalysisrevealsthatfirmswhowereexportingtotheUSatanypoint between 2016 and 2021 had higher sales,employment,and productivity growth than the other exporters in 2018-202

32、1,this coupled with a relative increase in capital intensity and use of material.27Figure B4.1.GDP growth and contributions 30Figure B4.2.Measures of real output 31Figure B5.1.In Cambodia,non-performing loans are rising as private credit growth is declining 34Figure B5.2.Lao PDRs banking sector is f

33、acing higher accrued interest payments,worsening asset quality,and increasing currency mismatches 35Technology and Jobs in EAP Figure1.AlargershareoftheworkingagepopulationisemployedinEAPcountriesthaninmostotherdeveloping economies,but the share of the working age population in total population is f

34、allinginMongolia,China,Thailand,andVietNam38Figure2.Theyoungarestrugglingtofindjobs,especiallyincountrieslikeChinaandIndonesia,andolder workers have lower labor force participation rates 38Figure3.Laborforceparticipationremainslowerforwomen,thoughtoalesserextentinCambodiaandVietNam,andhasimprovedlit

35、tleexceptinMalaysia,thePhilippines,andIndonesia39Figure4.Theeducationallevelsoftheworkforcehaverisenbutonlyasmallfractionhavetertiaryeducation,except in Mongolia 40Figure5.Employmenthasmovedmostlyfromagriculturetolow-earningsectorssuchastrade,accommodation and construction,and less to high-earning s

36、ectors 42Figure6.InformalemploymenthasdeclinedinEAPmorethaninotherregions,butisstillhighinLaoPDR,PNG,Timor-Leste,Myanmar and most Pacific Island Countries 43EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024viLIST OF CONTENTSFigure7.Thedecreaseininformalemploymentinagriculturewaspartlyoffsetbyin

37、creaseinservices43Figure8.WagegrowthhasbeenrobustinEAPcountriesandfasterthanlaborproductivitygrowth44Figure9.Womenstillearnlessthanmenbutthegenderwagegapisdeclining,exceptinIndonesia44Figure10.Wagesrosefasterforyoungerworkers45Figure11.Thewagepremiaonsecondaryandtertiaryeducationaresignificantbuthav

38、edeclined,exceptin Indonesia 46Figure12.Thehighestwagesareearnedinskilledservices,followedbymanufacturing,low-skilledservices,and agriculture 46Figure13.Wageshavebeenconvergingacrosssectorsandoccupations,exceptthatICTandtechnicalprofessionals have seen their already high wages increase even faster 4

39、7Figure14.Anintegratedviewofnewtechnologiesandaffectedoccupations49Figure15.EAPcountriesemploymorepeopleinroutinemanualtaskoccupationsandlesspeopleincognitive task occupations than advanced countries 50Figure B1.1.Jobs in EAP are more physical task-based than in advanced economies and non-routine co

40、gnitive jobs are relatively scarce 51Figure16.Robotadoptionhasincreasednotonlyinautomotiveandcomputerandelectronicssectorsbutalso in others such as rubber and plastics 54FigureB2.1.Robotadoptionispositivelycorrelatedwithwages,industrialstructure,andaging.55Figure17.Amonghigh-adoptionindustriesinEAP,

41、robotpenetrationispositivelycorrelatedwithoverallemployment growth 56Figure18.RobotadoptionhasrapidlyincreasedinVietNamafter2016;drivenbytwohigh-productivityindustries:(i)electricalequipmentand(ii)computers&electronics57Figure19.Robotadoptionisconcentratedinindustrialzones,wherethereisadominantprese

42、nceofforeign-owned enterprises 58Figure20.Districtswithgreaterrobotadoptionhaveseenincreasesinhigher-educatedemploymentandtheir earnings 59Figure21.Thedisplacementeffectofrobotizationcanbeobservedonlowandmedium-skilledworkersperforming routine physical tasks,who are likely to be absorbed into the in

43、formal sector 59Figure22.Maleandfemaleworkersindistrictswithgreaterrobotadoptionexperiencesimilaremploymentand wage gains 60Figure B3.1.Meta-analysis documenting estimated employment effect of robotization 62Figure23.AIlargelyaffectscognitivetasks,butsomenon-routinecognitivetaskscanbecomplementedbyA

44、I;the EAP workforce is less exposed to AI due to its high concentration in physical tasks 63Figure B4.1.Jobs involving routine and non-routine cognitive tasks may be substituted by AI while some jobs involving non-routine cognitive tasks are likely to be complemented by AI 65Figure24.EAPcountriesare

45、relativelylessexposedtolabordisplacingeffectsofAIthanadvancedeconomies,and also have less jobs that are complementary to AI 67Figure25.InEAP,women,thehigher-educated,andworkersincommercesectorsaremorelikelytobeengaged in AI-exposed occupations 67Figure26.HigherexposuretoAIisassociatedwithlowerearnin

46、gsinmostEAPcountries,whileAIexposureis not correlated with employment growth 68Figure27.TheshareofemploymentindigitallyintensiveoccupationsislowerinEAPcountriesthaninadvanced economies and in other EMDEs with similar incomes 72Figure B7.1.Digital-intensity of jobs is highly correlated with the share

47、 of workers who use digital technology(VietNam,2021)74Figure28.DigitallyintensiveoccupationsseehigherwagepremiainEAPandhigheremploymentgrowthin some countries 75Figure29.Workingwithdigitaltechnologiesyieldsahigherwagepremiumforthemoreeducated75JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYviiLIST OF CONTENTSFigure30.Womenwork

48、ingwithdigitaltechnologiestendtohavehigherearningsandemployment growth than men 75Figure B8.1.An increasing share of workers,both formal and informal,male and female,use digital technologies 76Figure B8.2.Digital workers in both the formal and informal sector enjoy a wage premium 77Figure B8.3.Most

49、workers in the informal sector do not have insurance or pensions 77Figure31.Thesizeofthedigitalplatformeconomyhasbeenincreasingrapidlyanduniformlyin EAP countries 78Figure32.TherapiddiffusionofdigitalplatformsinPhilippinesandVietNam,especiallyinretailandlogistics industries,can be observed from webs

50、ite traffic 79Figure33.Platformdiffusionhaspositiveeffectsonfirmproductivityandvalueadded,butcontrastingeffectsonemploymentinthePhilippinesandVietNam79Figure34.WithinthespecificservicesectorswheredigitalplatformsoperateinVietNam,platformsgenerate both business-creation and competition effects 80Figu

51、re35.Agingisassociatedwithgreaterrobotadoptionacrosscountries81Figure B9.1.Platform entry has a positive and durable earnings effect on motorbike drivers thanks to the technology-driven productivity gain;but only a transient boost to earnings of car drivers possibly as a result of competition effect

52、 82Figure36.OlderworkersaremoreexposedtoautomationandlessengagedindigitaloccupationsrelativetoyoungerworkersinEAP83Figure37.OlderworkersinEAParelessengagedindigitaloccupationsandlessequippedwithdigitaldevicesthanyoungerworkers83Figure38.OlderworkersinVietNambenefitlessfromrobotadoptionintermsofemplo

53、ymentgainandlabor productivity relative to younger workers 84Figure39.Socio-emotionalskillcanbedevelopedinschools88Figure40.SupplyofSTEMgraduatesislimitedinEAP89Figure41.ThesupplyofengineersintheUSispositivelycorrelatedwithlong-termtechnologyadoptionandinnovationincludinginthedigitalsector90Figure42

54、.Barrierstolabormobilitycantrapgenerationsinlow-productivityemployment(shareofworkers employed in Agriculture by birth cohort,19992019)92Figure43.Highertaxationofcapitalrelativetolaborisassociatedwithlowerrobotadoption94Figure44.Gigworkersarewillingtopayforsocialinsurance96Appendix Figure A1.US and

55、China decreased their reciprocal shares of imports and exports.Chinas share of exports toMexico,VietNam,ThailandandMalaysiaincreased,andsodidtheshareofimportsoftheUS from those countries 97FigureA2.USandChinadecreasedtheirreciprocalshareofFDIinmanufacturingandR&D.ChinaincreaseditsshareofFDItoMexicoa

56、ndVietNam.98FigureA3.VietNamandMexicoemergedas“connector”countries,especiallyinthemanufacturingsector99Figure A4.A surprising asymmetry:an increase in the share of Chinese(US)FDI outflows to a country is positively(weakly negatively)correlated to increase in its share of US(China)imports.Less surpri

57、singly,anincreaseintheshareofChinese(US)FDIoutflowstoacountryispositivelycorrelated to increase in its share of Chinese(US)imports 100Figure A5.EAP country-specific task intensity and AI exposure 101Figure A6.A.Change in robot adoption and worker wage 108Figure A6.B.Change in robot adoption and work

58、er wage 108EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024viiiLIST OF CONTENTSList of TablesRecent Developments and OutlookTable 01.GDP growth forecast xTable 1.GDP growth forecast 29TableB5.1.FinancialVulnerabilitiesinEAP33Technology and Jobs in EAPTable B5.1.Examples of newly added digital

59、occupations in China 73Table B7.1.Share of IT-related occupations and high-skill professionals in EAP is smaller than in advanced economies.77JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYixLIST OF CONTENTSList of BoxesRecent Developments and Outlook Box1.InvestmentinChina6Box2.Theeffectsofhigherdebtinconsumptionandinvestment

60、15Box3.PreferentialTradeAgreements:AShieldagainstIndustrialPolicy?28Box4.EconomicrecoveryandoutlookinthePacificIslandCountries 30Box5.Financialsectorpolicyinapost-forbearancelandscape33Technology and Jobs in EAP Box1.Classifyingjobsbytaskcontent51Box2.Empiricalevidenceonthedeterminantsofrobotadoptio

61、n54Box3.Aliteratureonemploymenteffectsofindustrialrobotsacrosstheworld61Box4.ExposuretoAIandcomplementarity65Box5.ThecreationofnewdigitaljobsinChina69Box6.Theliteratureonemploymentandwelfareimpactsofdigitalconnectivity70Box7.Measuringdigitalintensityofoccupations72Box8.Digitaljobs,informality,andfem

62、alelaborforceparticipationinIndonesia76Box9.Incomeeffectofride-sharingplatforms82Box10.PolicyresponsestotheemergenceofAIinthePhilippines85Box11.Fosteringsocio-emotionalskillsofchildren89Box12.Buildingadvancedtechnicalskillstoharnessdigitaltechnologies90Box13.UsingDigitalTechnologiestoimproveproducti

63、vityofself-employedsmallholderfarmers93Box14.Innovativeapproachestofostersocialinsuranceforgigandself-employedworkers95JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxi PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTSPreface and AcknowledgmentsThis report is a collective endeavor and involved several parts of the World Bank including the EAP and E

64、FI.It was prepared by a core team comprising Omar Arias,Daisuke Fukuzawa,Ergys Islamaj(Task Team Leader),Duong Trung Le,and Aaditya Mattoo.Other members of the team were Alessandro Barattieri,Caroline Gerd G De Roover,Jongrim Ha,Narya Ou,Agustin Samano,Jonathan Timmis,and Cecile Wodon.Significantcon

65、tributionstothefirstpartofthereportweremadebyKetutAriadiKusuma,JulianCasal,KevinC.Chua,TimL.DeVaan,RenoDewina,TatianaDidier,SebastianEckardt,JunGe,YushaLi,ValerieMercer-Blackman,Elitza Mileva,VeronicaSoniaMontalvaTalledo,OuNie,VidaovanhPhounvixay,IliasSkamnelos,TrangMinhTa,KaltrinaTemaj,VietQuocTrie

66、u,GuillermoVerduzcoBustos,MariusVismantas,andShichaoZhou.TheSpecialfocus,“JobsandTechnology”,benefitedfromsignificantcontributionsbyPaulaMarieMellaBonilla,Andrs M.Csar,Kevin Thomas Garcia Cruz,Johanna Fajardo-Gonzalez,Jaime Frias,Yashodhan Ghorpade,Maddalena Honorati,SandorKaracsony,NaotoKanehira,Bh

67、arathKumar,YanchaoLi,VeronicaSoniaMontalvaTalledo,HieuMinhNguyen,RemrickPatagan,IvanTorre,ThuyMinhTo,NguyetThiAnhTran,GonzaloVarela,YiNingWong,ShuYu,FeiYuan,andanalysisforthePhilippinesbenefitedfromresearchcollaborationswiththeADB,namely,Benedict Evangelista,Jiang Yi and Martino Pelli.ManuelaV.Ferro

68、providedvaluableguidanceandhelpfulcomments.Wearegratefulforstimulatingdiscussions,com-mentsandinputsfromSamuelChristopherHill,AleksanderKremer,LarsMoller,LalitaM.Moorty,ZaferMustafaoglu,HabibRab,MicheleRuta,MariamSherman,CarolynTurk,EkaterineT.Vashakmadze,MaraWarwick,FabricioZarcone,staff of the EAP

69、 region who participated in the review meetings on August 11 and September 3,2024,and the EAP Regional Management Team meeting on September 5,2024.We greatly appreciate the support for dissemination provided by Geetanjali Chopra,Mariana Lucia De Lama Odria.The following staff from the Macroeconomics

70、,Trade and investment Global Practice and the Poverty and Equity Global Practicepreparedcountry-specificmacroeconomicoutlookpages:DwiEndahAbriningrum,VisheshAgarwal,SharonFaye Alariao Piza,Tanida Arayavechkit,Kiatipong Ariyapruchya,Mehwish Ashraf,Undral Batmunkh,Patrizia Secuya Benedicto,Yew Keat Ch

71、ong,Kevin C.Chua,Andrea Coppola,Amina Coulibaly,Kevin Thomas Garcia Cruz,Somneuk Davading,RenoDewina,JoseLuisDiazSanchez,DungVietDo,LilianaDoCoutoSousa,SachaSamuelJacquesDray,KimAlanEdwards,DulmaaEnkhtuya,RemrickEspinPatagan,JunGe,IndiraMaulaniHapsari,FayaHayati,TaufikIndrakesuma,Alexandra Jarotschk

72、in,Sandra Kapota Murray,Ypsse Kim,Shivneel Sumit Kirpal,Csilla Lakatos,Yusha Li,Fionne Lim Jing Wen,Sodeth Ly,Dorsati Madani,Kemoh Mansaray,Wael Mansour,Yus Medina Pakpahan,Elitza Mileva,VeronicaSoniaMontalvaTalledo,ThiDaMyint,DarianNaidoo,ShoheiNakamura,RuthNikijuluw,Samuel Nursamsu,Keomanivone Phi

73、mmahasay,Ruslan Piontkivsky,Ririn Salwa Purnamasari,Warunthorn Puthong,Rong Qian,TuimasiRadravuUlu,RatihDwiRahmadanti,ApurvaSanghi,WilliamHutchinsSeitz,DeisiganShammugam,Hilda Shijaku,Reshika Singh,Sutirtha Sinha Roy,Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir,Lodewijk Smets,Katherine Anne Stapleton,Thu-HaThiNguyen,S

74、aileshTiwari,KimsunTong,RalphVanDoorn,EkaterineT.Vashakmadze,SamuelWills,The work was managed by Sebastian Eckardt and Lars Christian Moller for the Macroeconomics,Trade and investment Global Practice,and by Benu Bidani for the Poverty and Equity Global Practice.Paola Alejandra Alvarado Castillo,An-

75、drew Burns,Alexander Haider,Kristina Catherine Tan Mercado,Sun Hwa Song made contributions to the model,table production,and assisting staff with their forecasts.Minisha Mandeepal and Sandra Buana Sari provided production support.The report was edited and typeset by Circle Graphics,Inc.,Reisterstown

76、,MD.EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024xiiPREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThroughoutthereport,geographicgroupingsaredefinedasfollows:Developing East Asia and Pacific comprises Cambodia,China,Indonesia,Lao Peoples Democratic Republic(PDR),Malaysia,Mongolia,Myanmar,PapuaNewGuinea,thePhil

77、ippines,Thailand,Timor-Leste,VietNam,andthePacificIsland Countries.The Pacific Island Countries comprise Fiji,Kiribati,the Marshall Islands,the Federated States of Micronesia,Nauru,Palau,Samoa,theSolomonIslands,Tonga,Tuvalu,andVanuatu.The ASEAN member countries comprise Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,In

78、donesia,Lao PDR,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,andVietNam.The ASEAN-5compriseIndonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,Thailand,andVietNam.The analysis in this report is based on the latest country-level data available as of September 27,2024.JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxiii LISTOFABBREVIATIONSL

79、ist of AbbreviationsAEAdvanced EconomyADAnti-dumpingAIArtificialIntelligenceASEANThe Association of Southeast Asian NationsBPOBusiness Process OutsourcingCOVIDCoronavirus DiseaseCPIConsumer Price IndexEMDEEmerging Markets and Developing CountriesEPUEconomic Policy UncertaintyEUEuropean UnionEVElectr

80、icVehicleFAIFixed Asset InvestmentFDIForeign Direct InvestmentFX/FOREXForeign ExchangeGPRGeopolitical Risk IndexGDPGross Domestic ProductGFCFGross Fixed Capital FormationGVCGlobalValueChainHICHigh Income CountryIPIndustrial PolicyICTInformation and Communications TechnologyISCOInternationalClassific

81、ationofOccupationsIFRInternational Federation of RoboticsILOSTATInternational Labour Organization StatisticsIMFInternational Monetary FundISICInternationalStandardIndustrialClassificationITUInternational Telecommunication UnionLFSLabor Force SurveyNPLNonperforming loansO-NET/ONETOccupational Informa

82、tion NetworkOECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentppPercentage pointPTAPreferential Trade AgreementPIAACProgram for the International Assessment of Adult CompetenciesPISAProgram for International Student AssessmentPPPPurchasing Power ParityR&DResearch and DevelopmentRHSRight Hand

83、 SideSTEMScience,Technology,Engineering and Mathemat-icsSTEPSkills towards Employment and ProductivitySMESmall and Medium EnterpriseSELSocio-emotional learningSDStandard DeviationSOEState-Owned EnterpriseTFPTotal Factor ProductivityUNCTADUnited Nations Trade and DevelopmentVIXVolatilityIndexWDIWorld

84、 Development IndicatorWEOWorld Economic OutlookWTOWorld Trade OrganizationRegions,World Bank Classification and Country GroupsEAPEast Asia and PacificECAEastern Europe and Central AsiaLACLatin America and the CaribbeanMNAMiddle East and North AfricaSARSouth AsiaSSASub-Saharan AfricaCurrency UnitsBTh

85、ai bahtCRCambodian rielDVietnamesedongF$Fiji dollarKMyanmar kyatKPapua New Guinea kinaKipLao kipPPhilippine pesoRMMalaysian ringgitRMBChinese renminbiRpIndonesian rupiahSI$Solomon Islands dollarTogMongolian tugrikUS$Timor-Leste(U.S.dollar)US$United States dollarEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPD

86、ATE OCTOBER 2024xivLISTOFABBREVIATIONSCountry/Economy AbbreviationsCHNChinaEUEuropean UnionFJIFijiFSMFederated States of MicronesiaHKGHong Kong SAR,ChinaIDNIndonesiaJPNJapanKHMCambodiaKIRKiribatiKORRepublic of KoreaLAOLao Peoples Democratic RepublicMNGMongoliaMMRMyanmarMYSMalaysiaNRUNauruPHLPhilippi

87、nesPICsPacificIslandCountriesPLWPalauPNGPapua New GuineaRMIRepublic of the Marshall IslandsSLBSolomon IslandsTHAThailandTLSTimor-LesteTONTongaTUVTuvaluTWNTaiwan,ChinaUKUnited KingdomUSA/USUnited StatesVNMVietNamVUTVanuatuWSMSamoaSector AbbreviationsAGRAgriculture,forestryandfishingMINMining and quar

88、ryingFOODManufacture of food products;beverages and tobacco productsTEXManufacture of textiles,wearing apparel,leather and related productsPAPERManufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork,except furniture;manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials;manufacture of paper and paper

89、 products;printing and reproduction of recorded mediaMIN_CHEMManufacture of chemicals and non-metallic mineral productsMETALManufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products,except machinery and equipmentCOMManufacture of computer,electronic and optical productsELECManufacture of electrical

90、equipmentMACHINEManufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.AUTOManufacture of motor vehicles,trailers,semi-trailers and of other transport equipmentO_MANUManufacture of furniture;jewellery,musical instruments,toys,etc.;repair and installation of machinery and equipmentUTILElectricity,gas,steam and

91、 air conditioning supplyWATERWater supply;sewerage,waste management and remediation activitiesCONSTConstructionTRADEWholesale and retail trade;repair of motor vehicles and motorcyclesTRANSTransportation and storageACCOMAccommodation and food service activitiesICTInformation and communicationFINAFina

92、ncial and insurance activitiesREALReal estate activitiesPROFProfessional,scientificandtechnicalactivitiesADMIAdministrative and support service activitiesPUBPublic administration and defence;compulsory social securityEDUEducationHEALHuman health and social work activitiesARTSArts,entertainment and r

93、ecreationO_SRVOther service activitiesSELFActivities of households as employers;undifferentiated goods-and services-producing activities of households for own useJOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxvABSTRACTAbstractEastAsiaandthePacific,seeninthecontextoftheworldeconomy,standsoutasaparagonofdevelopment.Despitethe r

94、ecent ravages of the pandemic and the persistent tensions of geopolitics,the region is growing at stably high rates andthebenefitsarewidelyshared.Butseeninthecontextofitsownpastanditspotential,theregionseconomicperformance is less impressive.Growth is still below pre-pandemic levels,except in Indone

95、sia,and output has not yet recoveredtopre-pandemiclevelsinseveralcountries,especiallyinthePacific.This Economic Update examines three challenges faced by the region:shifting growth dynamics,trade protectionism,andtechnologicalchange.Forthreedecades,Chinasgrowthhasspilledoverbeneficiallytoitsneighbor

96、s,butthesize of that impetus is now diminishing.The region will therefore need to strengthen domestic drivers of growth by implementing long-deferred deeper reforms(Reviving Growth,April 2023 EAP Economic Update).The other two challenges stem from changes in the twin pillars of the regions remarkabl

97、e inclusive growth:exporting to predictably open global markets and producing with labor-intensive methods.Policies and uncertainty precipitated by globaltensionsarechangingpatternsoftradeandinvestment.Whilesomecountries,likeVietNam,arebenefitingfromtheirroleashubs,thedivergentandconflictingobjectiv

98、esoftheirlargetradingpartnersmaylimitopportunitiestoplaythis role.Concluding deeper international trade agreements within the region and with other large countries may help create more open and stable trade regimes.Lastly,newtechnologies,suchasrobots,artificialintelligence,digitalplatforms,andbroade

99、rdigitalization,areirresistiblebecauseoftheirpowerfulimpactonfirmproductivity(FirmFoundationsofGrowth,April2024EAPUpdate).Thesetechnologies are,however,affecting the relationship between growth and jobs,through three channels:creating new tasks,enhancing labor productivity,and displacing workers.The

100、 productivity gains from automation and the resulting higher scale of production helped create jobs for skilled workers engaged in non-routine manual and cognitive tasks in Indonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,Thailand,andVietNam.However,robotshavealsodisplacedlow-skilledformalworkers who were engaged

101、in routine manual work.EAP countries,with their weaker services sectors,employ fewer people in cognitive task occupations than advanced countries but the share of workers potentially exposed to AI is in fact larger than the share exposed to robots.Digital platforms are encouraging participation in t

102、he labor force of the marginalized but also inducing some formal sector workers to embrace a new digital informality.While the evolution of technology is hard to predict,the region must equip its people with deeper technical,digital and soft skills that complement the new technologies;facilitate cap

103、ital mobility and worker mobility across sectors,occupations and space;remove factor price distortions that could lead to excessive automation;and encourage social insurance for workers in the new digital informal economy.JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxviiOVERVIEWOverview Recent developmentsTheeconomiesofdevel

104、opingEastAsiaandPacific(EAP)continue to outperform economies in the rest of the world.Regional growth is projected to be 4.8 percent in 2024,compared to an average growth of 3.3 percent in other EMDEsand1.5percentinadvancedeconomies(figureO1;Table O1).In EAP countries,private consumption and service

105、s exports helped sustain growth,but private investment and goods exports remained weak.FigureO1.The region continues to grow faster than the rest of the world but slower than before the pandemicSource:World Bank.Note:EMDE:Emerging Market and Developing Economies.PercentEAPexcludingChinaEMDEexcluding

106、EAPAdvancedEconomies202468EAPChina20151920202220232024f2025fGDP growthEAP growth is anticipated to slow to 4.4 percent in 2025.That is mostly because growth in China,the regions largest economy,is projected to decline from 4.8 percent this year to 4.3 percent in 2025.Chinas growth in 2024 was suppor

107、ted by the bounce back of services consumption and exports in the early part of the year.But growth is expected to slow down in 2025 in the face of persistent property market weakness,low consumer and investorconfidence,aswellasthechallengesofagingandglobaltensions.Recentlysignaledfiscalsupportmayli

108、ftshort-term growth but longer-term growth will depend on deeper structural reforms.TherestoftheEAPregionisforecasttogrowat4.7percentin2024and4.9percentin2025.Growthin2024benefittedfrom increasing domestic consumption,recovering goods exports,and a tourism rebound.Growth in 2025 is expected tobesust

109、ainedbycontinuedexportrecoveryandmorebenignfinancialconditions.ThePacificIslandCountriesareprojected to grow by 3.5 percent in 2024 and 3.4 percent in 2025.Economic performance across the region is also being affected by geopolitical,macroeconomic and policy uncertainty.Geopoliticalriskshavebeenaggr

110、avatedbytheconflictintheMiddleEastandarereflectedinhighershippingcostsandhighervolatilityincommodityprices(figureO2).Anindicatorofglobalshippingrateshasrisenbynearly40percentsincethestartoftheMiddleEastconflictinOctober2023.Heightenedeconomicpolicyuncertaintyabroadforexample,increasedfiscalortradepo

111、licyuncertaintyintheUScouldreduceindustrialproductionandstockpricesinEAP by up to 0.5 percent and 1 percent,respectively.Increased domestic policy is expected to have comparable effects on EAP stock markets and output.In the longer term,the region could see shifts in relative dynamism,as well as fun

112、damental changes in trade and technology.China has led growth in the region for more than three decades,but its relative growth is likely to slow down in future.EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024xviiiOVERVIEWFigureO2.Geopolitical risks have increased and Red Sea disruptions to sh

113、ipping and trade continueSource:Bloomberg,Caldara and Iacoviello(2022);Comtrade(database);Haver Analytics:UN Global Platform,UNCTAD,International Energy Agency;IMF PortWatch;World Bank.Note:A.Geopoliticalriskindex(GPR)reflectsautomatedtext-searchofelectronicarticlesfrom10newspapersrelatedtoadversege

114、opoliticaleventsineachnewspaperforeachmonth.Ahigherindexisrelatedtolowerinvestment,stock prices,and employment.Last observation is September 30,2024.B.40-day rolling averages,in millions of metric tons.Last observation is September 17,2024.50100150200300250Sep-23Oct-23Nov-23Dec-23Jan-24Feb-24Apr-24M

115、ay-24Mar-24Jun-24Jul-24Aug-24Sep-24Index,100=19852019A.Geopolitical risk index7-day moving average30-day moving average02468Jan-23Feb-23Apr-23May-23Jun-23Aug-23Sep-23Nov-23Dec-23Feb-24Mar-24May-24Jun-24Aug-24Panama CanalSuez CanalCape of Good HopeMmtB.Shipping transit routesby trade volume Global te

116、nsions are changing patterns of trade and investment,the lifeblood of regional economies,with opportunities for some countries to function as hubs constrained by the divergent objectives of large trading partners.Technologicalchange,takingtheformofrobots,artificialintelligence,digitalplatforms,andbr

117、oaderdigitization,is affecting the relationship between economic expansion and jobs,which has been central to the regions model of inclusive growth.Changing regional growth dynamicsTheprospectofdiminishingspilloverbenefitsfromChinasgrowthheightenstheneedforEAPcountriestoseeksourcesof autonomous grow

118、th,especially through deeper domestic reform.New empirical analysis reveals that,in the past,growthinotherEAPeconomiesbenefitedmoreonaveragefromChinasincreasingdemandforimportsthanitwashurtby Chinas increasing competition in export markets.Chinas growth is estimated to have boosted developing countr

119、ies growth by around 1 percentage point annually during the 1995-2019 period,and by 0.67 percentage points annually duringtheperiod2020-2023whenChinasgrowthsloweddown(figureO3).Twoconcernsarise.First,ifChinasgrowthslowsdownfurther(say,totheprojected4.3percentin2025),thebenefitsfor developing countri

120、es will decline.A one percentage point slowdown in Chinas growth could reduce growth in other developing countries by an estimated 0.14 to 0.21 percentage points.Second,if Chinas exports grow faster than its imports,ashascontinuedtobethecase(inthefirstsevenmonthsofthisyear,merchandiseexportsgrewyear

121、-on-yearby4 percent and imports by 2.8 percent),then the negative impact of increased competition in international markets may outweigh the positive impact from greater demand.JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxixOVERVIEWFigureO3.Chinasgrowthhasbenefitteddevelopingeconomies,butthebenefitshavebecomesmallerasitsgrow

122、thslowsdownand its exports grow faster than it imports Source:UN Comtrade,BACI,WDI.02468100.00.51.01.52.0199520072008201920202023Chinas GDP growth(percent)Estimated total effect(p.p.)Total effect of China growth through similarities toChina imports and exportsChinas per-capita GDP growth(annual aver

123、age;RHS)A.Aggregate effects of China per-capita GDP growth051015202519851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011201320152017201920212023Manufacturing exportsManufacturing importsPercentB.Chinas share of global manufacturing tradeFigureO4.The number of new trade-distorting measures contin

124、ues to increase,both globally and in the EAP regionSource:Global Trade Alert.Note:The charts divide the type of interventions in four categories:domestic subsidies,export-oriented policies(including export subsidies),tariff and contingent protection,and a residual category including all other types

125、of interventions(on FDI,licensing,migration etc.).See notes in the main document for detailed explanation.05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023SubsidiesExport-relatedTariffs/ADOtherNumber of measuresA.New trade-distorting measures:WorldSu

126、bsidiesExport-relatedTariffs/ADOther050100150200250300200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023Number of measuresB.New trade-distorting measures:EAP Trade,investment,and global tensionsRecent years have been marked by a surge in both trade protectionism and potentially trade-disto

127、rtive industrial policy(IP)actions in many countries.The number of such measures taken globally and by developing EAP economies has been increasing(figureO4).EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024xxOVERVIEWCountrieslikeVietNamhavebenefitedfrom“connecting”majortradingpartnersasglobalt

128、ensionsrose,butthescopeforplayingsucharolemaybeshrinking.VietnamesefirmsexportingtotheUSsawsalesgrowalmost25percentfaster than those exporting to other destinations over the period 20182021.However,economies may now be limitedtoplayinga“one-wayconnector”role.Whilecountrieshavebeenabletoharnessimport

129、sandinvestmentfrom China to boost exports to the US,investment from the US has not boosted exports to China.Furthermore,the application of more stringent rules of origin may limit even the one-way connector role.In this context,concluding deep trade agreements with large trading partners may act as

130、a shield against the negative effects of their restrictive trade and industrial policies.Labor markets and digital technologiesWefirsthighlightcertainaspectsofEAPlabormarkets.Overalleconomicgrowthhasbenefittedworkers,withwagesincreasingfasterthanlaborproductivity.Wageshave grown for most categories

131、of workers.The gender wage gap is declining,but women still earn between 10to15percentlessthanmen;thebettereducatedearnsignificantlymorethanthelesseducatedbutthehigher education wage premium is shrinking;and workers in relatively high-paid technical and ICT services have seen relatively higher growt

132、h in wages EAP countries have had high rates of employment compared to the rest of the world,but the working age population isshrinkinginMongolia,China,Thailand,andVietNam,mainlyduetoagingpopulations.Youthunemploymentrates are higher in China,Indonesia,Malaysia and Mongolia than in other economies i

133、n the region;although older workers have lower unemployment rates than younger workers,fewer participate in the labor force.Female labor force participation is higher than in other developing regions,but it remains lower than for men across the region.It has improved little except in Malaysia,the Ph

134、ilippines,and Indonesia.The work force is more educated than it was two decades ago,but the quality of basic education is uneven,and the share of workers with a college education or more remains under one third of the workforce.After a period of rapid industrialization,employment has shifted primari

135、ly from low-productivity agriculture to low-productivity services and less to high productivity manufacturing and services.Informal employment has declined overall but increased in low-productivity services,and remains higher than in other middle-income regionsitcomprisesoverhalfofemploymentinthePac

136、ificislands.New technologies are affecting labor markets in the region.Technological advancement is expanding the scope of tasks that machines can perform.Robots are already displacing industrial workers in routine manual task occupations.AI threatens to displace primarily services workers not just

137、in routine but increasingly also in non-routine cognitive task occupations.AI empowered robots also potentially could take over the tasks of workers in non-routine manual occupations both in manufacturing and services.The adoption of new technologies is affected,however,not just by technical feasibi

138、lity but by economic viability,which depends on their quality-adjusted cost,the local labor cost and the responsiveness of demand to price changes.Theadoptionofnewtechnologiesisenhancingfirmproductivityandchangingjobopportunities.Sinceincreasedproductivity leads to increased scales of production and

139、 growth,technological progress generally supports increases JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxxiOVERVIEWin jobs and wages.But if technological progress takes labor saving forms,then it can dampen growth in employment and wages.And because the effects of technology are heterogenous across age groups,gender,skills,

140、and work status,technology can either exacerbate or ameliorate inequalities in EAP labor markets.Jobs in most EAP countries are likely to be affected both by robots and AI though in ways that differ from advanced economies.EAP countries employ more people in routine manual task occupations and less

141、people in cognitivetaskoccupationsthanadvancedcountries(figureO5).ThisoccupationalstructurereflectssuccessfulindustrializationincountrieslikeChina,Malaysia,Thailand,andVietNam,andtherelativelyweakerstateofregional services sectors.Therefore,EAP countries,like other EMDEs,are more vulnerable today th

142、an advanced countries to job displacement by industrial robots and less to displacement by AI.However,the share of the population in EAP potentially exposed to AI is in fact larger than the share exposed to robots.Malaysia and China stand out as countries with a relatively high share of people emplo

143、yed in non-routine cognitive tasks who may beequippedtobenefitfromcomplementaritieswithAI.Rapid robot adoption,particularly in high value-added,trade-oriented manufacturing industries such as computers&electronicsandautomotives,isassociatedwithincreasesinemploymentandlaborincome-inVietNamofabout10an

144、d5percent,respectively(figureO6).InVietNam,themediumandhigh-skilledworkersbenefitbutthelow-skilled,especially those engaged in routine tasks,suffer reduced employment and are likely to be absorbed intotheinformalsector.Between2018and2022,robotsdisplacedanestimated1.4millionor3.3percentoflow-skilled

145、formal workers who were engaged in routine manual work in Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,andVietNam.Atthesametime,theproductivitygainsfromautomationandtheresultinghigherscaleof production helped create an estimated 2 million jobs(4.3 percent of formal skilled employment)for skilled work

146、ers engaged in non-routine manual and cognitive tasks.FigureO5.EAP countries employ more people in routine manual occupations and fewer people in cognitive occupations than advanced countries Source:Microdata,ILOSTAT,China Census 2020.Note:Latestyeardata.A.EAPshowssimpleaverageoftheshareofemployment

147、classifiedbythetaskintensityofoccupationsinChina,Indonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,ThailandandVietNam.AdvancedEconomiesand other EMDE show the population weighted averages for advanced economies and emerging economies,respectively.See notes in the main document for detailed explanation.020406080100E

148、APAdvanced EconomiesOther EMDEAgricultureNon-routine manualNon-routine cognitiveRoutine cognitiveRoutine manualPercentA.By regionsAgricultureNon-routine manualNon-routine cognitiveRoutine cognitiveRoutine manualPercent020406080100Viet NamChinaCambodiaIndonesiaPhilippinesThailandMalaysiaMongoliaB.By

149、EAP countries Across countries and over time,aging countries adopted robots faster in manufacturing,and population aging aloneaccountsfor35percentofthevariationinrobotadoptionacrosscountriesbetween19932014.AttheEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024xxiiOVERVIEWFigureO6.Robot adoption

150、 has led to higher employment and earnings of more educated workers while increasing the informality rate of the low-skilledSource:WorldBankestimations,basedondatafromInternationalFederationofRobotics(IFR),VietNamLaborForceSurvey(20112020).Note:Econometricestimatesoftheeffectsofexposuretorobotsonloc

151、allabormarketoutcomesinVietNamduring20142020.Seenotesinthemaindocumentfordetailedexplanation.0.100.050.000.050.100.150.20Point estimates(p.p.)Hourly wage(log)Total employment(log)Primaryeducationor belowSecondaryeducationTertiaryeducationPrimaryeducationor belowSecondaryeducationTertiaryeducationA.E

152、stimated labor market effects of robot adoption in Viet Nam0.020.010.000.010.020.030.04Low-skilledHigh-skilled(non-manual)High-skilledRoutinephysicalRoutinecognitiveNon-routineMedium-skilled(manual)Point estimates(p.p.)B.Estimated effects of robot adoption on districts informality rate Workingwithdi

153、gitaltechnologiesmorebroadlyalsoappearstohaveworkeraugmentationbenefits,beingassociatedwith higher and increasing wage premia,for example,in Malaysia,the Philippines and Thailand(25,21 and 17percentincrease,respectively,correspondingto1-standard-deviationofdigital-intensityofoccupations).Thebenefita

154、lsotendstobelargerforwomeninmostEAPcountries,withtheincreaseinpremiainsomecasestwiceaslargeasthatformen(inVietNamandIndonesia).New technologies have encouraged the emergence of new business models,like digital platforms.In general,platformsenhancetheefficiencyofintermediationandthereforecanalsoaffec

155、tthenumberandnatureofjobs.First,platforms operate on a large scale and therefore can accelerate automation and AI adoption and hence same time,older workers in EAP countries are more exposed than younger workers to automation,less engaged indigitaloccupations,andlesslikelytobenefitfromdigitization.T

156、hesefindingstogethersuggestthatrobotadoption and digitization in the region could help remedy the problem of the declining work force in aging countries but could also magnify it by accelerating the exit of older workers from the work force.TheimpactofAIdeploymentcannotyetbeestimatedbuttheemergingev

157、idencesuggeststhatAIhasbothdisplacementandaugmentationeffectsacrossoccupations.Displacementeffectsarebeginningtobefeltin occupations involving primarily routine cognitive tasks that involve standard optimization and low social interaction(risk assessors),and more gradually in occupations involving n

158、on-routine cognitive tasks(translation).Augmentationeffectsarebeingfeltinoccupationswhereasignificantsubsetoftasksinvolvingsocialinteraction,creativity or strategy can still only be performed by humans,but another subset of tasks can be delegated to AI(teachers,financialanalysts).Jobsinvolvingtasksc

159、omplementarytoAIareonlyabout10percentinEAP,whichis comparable to that in other emerging economies but much lower than the 30 percent in advanced economies(figureO7).JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxxiiiOVERVIEWFigureO7.AI largely affects cognitive task-based occupations,while complementing some non-routine cogni

160、tive task-based occupations;the EAP workforce is less exposed to AI than advanced economies due to the higher share of manual jobsSource:World Bank estimations using Labor Force data and ILOSTAT,and the methods developed by Felten,et.al.(2021)and Pizzinelli et al.(2023).Note:Verticalaxiscapturesthem

161、anualandcognitivetaskcontentofoccupations;horizontalaxismeasurestheirroutinetaskintensity,followingAutorandDorn(2013).ColorcodeisbasedonmedianthresholdofAIexposure(Felten,et.al.2021)and AI complementarity measure(Pizzinelli et al.2023).Bubble size denotes the average employment share in EAP in the l

162、atest available year(9 countries).See main document for detailed explanation.Chief Executives,Senior Officials and LegislatorsAdministrative and Commercial ManagersProduction and Specialized Services ManagersHospitality,Retail and Other Services ManagersScience and Engineering ProfessionalsHealth Pr

163、ofessionalsTeaching ProfessionalsLegal,Social and Cultural ProfessionalsScience and Engineering AssociateHealth AssociateLegal,Social,Cultural AssociateBusiness and Administration ProfessionalsICT ProfessionalsBusiness and Administration AssociateICT TechniciansGeneral and Keyboard ClerksCustomer Se

164、rvices ClerksNumerical and Material Recording ClerksOther Clerical SupportWorkersSales WorkersPersonal Service WorkersPersonal Care WorkersProtective Services WorkersSkilled Agricultural WorkersSkilled Forestry,Fishery and Hunting WorkersSubsistence Farmers,FishersBuilding and Related Trades Workers

165、Metal,Machinery and Related Trades WorkersHandicraft and Printing WorkersElectrical and Electronics Trades WorkersFood,Wood,Garment Trades WorkersStationary Plant and Machine OperatorsAssemblersDrivers and Mobile Plant OperatorsCleaners and HelpersAgricultural,Forestry and Fishery LabourersLabourers

166、 in Mining,Construction,Manufacturing and TransportFood Preparation AssistantsRefuse Workers and Other Elementary Workers0.30.20.100.10.20.30.40.5High exposure,high complementarityHigh exposure,low complementarityLow exposureRoutine task intensity,reversePhysical Cognitivetheeffectofeachonemployment

167、.Thesizeofthedigitalplatformeconomyhasreached57percentofGDPinmostEAPcountriesin2023.Thegrowthofdigitalplatformshasincreasedfirmproductivityindependentsectors,forexampleinthePhilippinesandVietNam.Second,platformsfacilitatelaborforceparticipation,task matching and the emergence of new tasks,but in som

168、e cases by shifting tasks from formal to informal employment.Within the services sector where they operate,platforms induce contraction in employment in some existing enterprises but offer entrepreneurial opportunities for small businesses and self-employed workers,including women.Digitalplatformsar

169、eturningsomeformalsectorworkersintoinformalworkersbutencouragingthebeneficialparticipation in the labor force of the marginalized.For example,digital workers in the informal sector in Indonesia earn almost as much as nondigital workers in the formal sector,indicating digitization could shrink thegap

170、betweentheformalandinformalsectors.Therolloutofride-hailingappsinVietNamdidnotdurablybenefittaxidriverswhowerepreviouslyintheformalsectorbutledtoa20percentincreaseintheearningsofmotorbike drivers who were already in the informal sector.EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024xxivOVERVI

171、EWFinally,policy must try to turn technological change into a blessing rather than a curse for all.While the evolution of technology is hard to predict,the region must equip all its people with deeper technical,digital and soft skills that complement the new technologies;facilitate capital mobility

172、and worker mobility across sectors,occupations and space;remove factor price distortions that could lead to the adoption of inappropriate technologies;and encourage social insurance for workers in the new digital informal economy.Equipping the workforce with the necessary skills Digital skills would

173、 equip people to engage with an increasingly digitized workplace,using digital devices,applications,and digital platforms.In Japan,Singapore and the Republic of Korea,teachers receive continuous professional development to enhance their digital pedagogic competencies and there is an emphasis on digi

174、tal skills in the curriculum,the use of digital textbooks,online learning platforms,and coding classes.Social and emotional skills would give people a comparative advantage over machines in tasks that involve social interactions,from education to healthcare.Research supports the notion that social a

175、nd emotional skills aremalleableandteachablethroughschoolinterventions(figureO8).InIndonesia,alarge-scaleinterventiontodevelopaGrowthMindsetbeliefsthatintelligenceandothersocio-emotionalqualitiesarenotfixedbutdevelop with effort through structured lessons had positive impacts on attitudes and test s

176、cores.FigureO8.Hard and soft skills:the share of STEM graduates is relatively small in developing EAP;socio-emotional learning(SEL)can be fostered in schoolsSource:UIS statistics;van de Sande et al.(2019).Note:A.Figure shows the percentage of college graduates in STEM fields.B.Figure shows the effec

177、t sizes of interventions from a meta-analysis that covers 40 RCT and QE studies in 12 countries,ages 11-19.See main report for details.Advanced technical skills would enable people to work in creating and working with these new technologies.The supply of such skills is relatively scarce in developin

178、g EAP.In the Republic of Korea,the Meister high schools address critical technical skill needs in priority sectors,including ICT,semiconductor manufacturing,and biotechnology,and offer a customized vocational training curriculum developed in collaboration with companies like Samsung Electronics and

179、Hyundai Motor Company.0510152025303540Malaysia,2022Myanmar,2018Thailand,2023Philippines,2021Cambodia,2019Lao PDR,2019Viet Nam,2016Indonesia,2018Mongolia,2023Singapore,2021Korea,rep.2022OECD ave,2021Percent of tertiaryeducated populationA.Share of STEM graduates00.10.20.30.40.50.60.7Social awarenessS

180、elf-awarenessSelf-managementDecision-makingRelationship skillsEffect sizesB.Impacts from meta-analysis of socio-emotional learning programsJOBS AND TECHNOLOGYxxvOVERVIEW Facilitating labor and capital mobility Labor mobility is impeded by both market failures and policy distortions.The former includ

181、e poor information about job opportunities,underdeveloped land and housing markets,and inadequate connectivity;the latter compriserigidlabormarketinstitutionsandinadequateportabilityofbenefits.Forexample,inChinaandVietNam,thehouseholdregistrationsystemsthatregulateaccesstohousingandpublicsocialservi

182、ceshavecurtailed rural-urban migration,trapping many farmers in low-productivity agricultural jobs.In Indonesia,reducingbarrierstointernalmobilitycouldleadtoproductivityandlaborincomegainsofaround20percent.Private digital job intermediation platforms like online job boards and freelance marketplaces

183、 can facilitate matches and mobility.Labor mobility,of course,also requires capital to be mobile.Therefore,impediments to capitalmobility,suchasrestrictionsonfirmentryandexitintheformofburdensomelicensingrequirementsand bankruptcy procedures,also need to be addressed.Removing factor price distortion

184、s Across a range of developed and developing economies,the stock of industrial robots(per thousand workers)is negatively associated with the relative taxation of capital and labor.Empirical evidence from the US and other advanced economies shows that exemptions and allowances(e.g.,for depreciation)l

185、ead to higher effective tax ratesonlaborthanoncapitalcomplementarytoautomationtechnologies,andhencetofavor“excessiveautomation”andsuboptimallyloweremployment.Removingthesedistortionswouldbringtheadoptionofautomation technologies closer to what is socially optimal and raise employment levels.Expandin

186、g social insurance for workers in the new digital informal economy Self-employed workers in Malaysia are willing to accept a slight reduction in their income in exchange for regular contributions to social insurance schemes such as unemployment insurance and pensions.A range of schemes across the wo

187、rld,from the public(in Indian and Colombia),public-private partnerships(in Malaysia),and purely private initiatives(in Denmark),have successfully used approaches from informing workers about the existence andbenefitsofschemes(asinIndia),financialincentives(asinColombiaandMalaysia)andbehavioralnudges

188、to offer social insurance to informal workers.EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024xxviOVERVIEWTableO1.GDP growth forecast2015192020202120222023Oct 2024 forecastApr 2024 forecastfor 2024for 2025for 2024for 2025EastAsia&Pacific6.41.27.63.45.14.84.44.54.3EastAsia&Pacific(excludingChin

189、a)5.23.82.95.84.34.74.94.64.8PacificIslandCountries 3.110.32.89.55.73.53.43.63.3China6.72.28.43.05.24.84.34.54.3Indonesia5.02.13.75.35.05.05.14.95.0 Malaysia4.95.53.38.93.64.94.54.34.4Philippines6.69.55.77.65.56.06.15.85.9Thailand3.46.11.62.51.92.43.02.83.0Viet Nam7.12.92.68.15.06.16.55.56.0Cambodia

190、7.13.63.15.15.05.35.55.86.1Lao PDR6.60.52.52.73.74.13.74.04.1Mongolia4.64.41.65.07.25.36.54.86.6Myanmar6.46.69.012.04.01.01.01.32.0Papua New Guinea4.03.20.85.22.74.63.74.83.6Timor-Leste5.18.32.94.02.33.03.53.64.5Palau1.79.113.40.00.212.011.012.411.9Fiji3.117.04.920.08.03.13.33.53.3SolomonIsl.3.03.32

191、.62.33.02.52.92.83.1Tuvalu6.74.31.80.73.93.53.03.52.4MarshallIsl.4.81.81.00.63.03.44.03.02.0Vanuatu3.55.01.61.92.20.91.53.73.5Kiribati5.80.68.53.94.25.84.15.62.0Tonga2.40.51.30.12.01.82.42.52.2Samoa3.43.17.15.38.010.55.54.53.6Micronesia2.01.83.21.40.41.11.71.11.7Nauru1.80.77.22.80.61.82.01.41.2Sourc

192、es:World Bank.Note:Percent growthofGDPatmarketprices.Valuesfor2023forthesmallislandeconomiesrefertoGDPgrowthestimates.ValuesforTimor-Lesterepresentnon-oilGDP.Forthefollowingcountries,valuescorrespondtothefiscalyear:FederalstatesofMicronesia,Palau,andRepublicoftheMarshallIslands(October1-September30)

193、;Nauru,Samoa,andTonga(July1-June30).MyanmarsgrowthratesrefertothefiscalyearfromApril to March.JOBS AND TECHNOLOGY1RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKRecent Developments and OutlookRecent developmentsDevelopingEastAsiaandPacific(EAP)isgrowingfasterthantherestoftheworld,butgrowthisslowerthanbeforethepandemic

194、(figure1).Growthintheregionisprojectedtobe4.8percentin2024.Chinaseconomyisprojectedtogrow by 4.8 percent and the rest of the region by 4.7 percent in 2024,slower than the 6.7 percent and 5.2 percent,respectively,recordedduringthe201519period.ThePacificIslandCountriesareprojectedtogrowby3.5percentin

195、2024,faster than the 3.1 percent during 201519 period.Figure1.The region continues to grow faster than the rest of the world but slower than before the pandemicSource:World Bank.Growth in the region is expected to slow to 4.4 percent in 2025.China is forecast to grow by 4.3 percent,more slowly thant

196、herestoftheregionsforecastgrowthof4.9percent.Chinasgrowthisbeinginfluencedbypersistentpropertymarketweakness,lowconsumerandinvestorconfidence,aswellaschallengeslikeagingandglobaltensionswillweighongrowth.Recentlysignaledfiscalsupportmayliftshort-termgrowthbutlonger-termgrowthwilldependondeeperstruct

197、uralreforms.Thelikelyrecoveryofglobaltradeandtheexpectedeasingofglobalfinancialconditionsareexpectedtosupportgrowthintherestoftheregion.ThegrowthrateinthePacificIslandcountriesisexpectedtomoderateto3.4percentin2025,asthepost-COVID-19rebounddissipates.202468EAPChina20151920202220232024f2025fPercentEA

198、PexcludingChinaEMDEexcludingEAPAdvancedEconomiesA.GDP growth across country groups20151920202220232024f2025fViet NamChinaPhilippinesIndonesia MalaysiaThailand202468PercentB.GDP growth in EAP economiesRecoveryremainsunevenacrosstheregion.PercapitaoutputinChinaandVietNamhadalreadyexceededpre-pandemic

199、levels in 2020 and is now about 20 percent and 15 percent higher,respectively.But output remains belowpre-pandemiclevelsintherestofthePacificIslandcountries(PICs)aswellasinMyanmarandPapuaNewGuinea(figure2).2EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure2.Whi

200、le output per capita is well above pre-pandemic levels in most of the larger economies,it remains below those levels inmanyPacificIslandCountriesandMyanmarSource:World Economic Outlook database.3020100102030FijiChinaViet NamKiribatiIndonesiaMalaysiaCambodiaPhilippinesMongoliaLao PDRTuvaluTongaThaila

201、ndMarshall Isl.Micronesia,F.S.PNGSolomon Isl.SamoaTimor-LesteVanuatuPalauMyanmar20202021202220232024PercentEvolution of GDP per capita(estimate)compared to 2019Figure3.The EAP countries were rapidly catching up with per-capita incomes in advanced countries but the process has slowed downSource:World

202、 Development Indicators.Note:GDP per capita in PPP.Bars denote period averages of the 5-year moving average of the percent change in relative per-capita income.6420246810ChinaViet NamIndonesiaCambodiaMalaysiaLao PDRPhilippinesMongoliaThailandMyanmar201020142015201920222023PercentA.Percent change in

203、GDP per capita relative to EU,UK,and US,larger EAP economies201020142015201920222023Percent6420246Marshall IslandsKiribatiTuvaluFijiMicronesia,Fed.Sts.Papua New GuineaTongaVanuatuPalauTimor-LesteB.Percent change in GDP per capita relative to EU,UK,and US,smaller EAP economiesEAP countries were closi

204、ng the gap in per-capita incomes with advanced economies since the early 1990s but the process has slowed down in recent years.Output per capita in the region was growing much faster than that in the advanced economies,on average,output per capita in the rest of the region is expected to grow at rou

205、ghly the same rate as in advancedeconomies(figure3).3JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKPovertyratesintheregioncontinuetodecline(figure4).Chinas pace of poverty reduction picked up in 2023 and is expected to continue over the next years based on the upper-middle income poverty line(US$6.

206、85/day,2017 PPP)although still at a slower pace than in the pre-pandemic years.In the rest of the region,the rate of poverty reduction also picked up in 2023,averaging around half of Chinas rate.Overall,29 million people in the region are projected to escape poverty between 2023 and 2024 based on th

207、e upper-middle income poverty line.The EAP region has made remarkable progress in reducing the Prosperity Gap-a new measure of shared prosperity introduced by the World Bank which measures the average factor by which incomes in country must increase to reach$25/day(the typical poverty line in rich c

208、ountries today).It also represents the number of days that a typical person in a country would need to work to earn what a person at the poverty line in rich countries earns in a day.On average,the EAP region experiencedthefastestdeclineinthisindicatorcomparedtootherregions(figure5).In2000,itwouldha

209、vetaken12daysforaworkerinChinatoearn$25dollar.By2023,ittakestwoandahalfdays.IndonesiaandVietNamalsosawlarge improvements in this new measure of prosperity,as have most countries in the region.By 2023,Prosperity Gap remains above world average only in Lao PDR.Figure4.Poverty rates are expected to dec

210、line furtherSource:World Bank staffs estimation.Poverty estimates are based on growth forecasts,population projections,and historical growth elasticities of poverty.Note:Forecasts are based on GDP growth projections as of September 24,2024.010203040502019202020212022202320242025ChinaEAP excluding Ch

211、inaPercent of populationUpper middle-income class poverty line($6.85 per day in 2017PPP)2525171614121147464747464543Figure5.The EAP prosperity gap has been steadily decliningSource:World Bank staffs estimation.Note:The prosperity gap is the average factor by which incomes in country must increase to

212、 reach$25/day(the typical poverty line in rich countries today).Earliest and Latest available data vary by country.China:2000,2023;Indonesia:2000,2023;Malaysia:2003,2018;Philippines:2000,2021;Thailand:2000,2021;VietNam:2002,2022;Fiji:2002,2019;LaoPDR:2002,2018;Mongolia:2010,2018.05101520199119931995

213、19971999200120032005200720092011201320152017201920212023Europe&Central AsiaLatin America&CaribbeanMiddle East&North AfricaSouth AsiaSub-Saharan AfricaEast Asia&PacificNumber of daysA.Prosperity gap by region2000 or earliest available2023 or latest availableWorld 2000World 202302468101214ChinaIndones

214、iaViet NamLao PDRVanuatuPhilippinesKiribatiMarshall IslandsThailandMongoliaFijiTongaMalaysiaNumber of daysB.Prosperity gap select economies4EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKComponents of demand:consumption,investment,exports,government spendingPrivate

215、 consumption has sustained growth in the major countries,but its contribution has been declining in China,Philippines andThailand(figure6).ManufacturingexportshavesupportedgrowthinMalysia,whileprovidingonlyamodestboostinIndonesia and Thailand.Services exports have helped boost growth in Malaysia,the

216、 Philippines,and Thailand.Public investment has supported growth in China,Indonesia,Malaysia and the Philippines,while private investment remains low in much of the region and goods exports remain weak in most countries.Figure6.Private consumption has sustained growth in the major countries,but its

217、contribution has been declining in China and Thailand;services exports have helped boost growth in Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand,and public investment in Indonesia and Malaysia;private investment and goods exports remain weak in most countriesSource:Haver Analytics;World Bank.Note:Figure sho

218、ws the percentage point contribution to GDP growth.Chinas private consumption includes government consumption.201510505101520252022 2023 24Q1 24Q22022 2023 24Q1 24Q22022 2023 24Q1 24Q22022 2023 24Q1 24Q22022 2023 24Q1 24Q2ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandPrivate consumptionGovernment consump

219、tionPublic and private investmentServices exportsImportNet export(for China)Commodity exportsManufacturing exportsGDPPercentage point ConsumptionConsumption growth is contributing to growth in the region,but the pace has declined over time.This trend is evident in the slower growth of retail sales a

220、nd imports compared to the pre-pandemic period,with retail sales now below pre-pandemiclevelsinIndonesiaandthePhilippines(figure7;thePhilippinesrefertomanufacturingsales).Importgrowthhasalsodecreasedacrosstheregioninthepasttwodecades.Additionally,consumerconfidenceremainsweakacross the region.In Chi

221、na,consumption has been dampened,on the one hand,by slowing growth in wage,salary and property incomes,and wealth declines caused by lower property prices;and on the other hand,by higher savings due to demographic trends and limited social safety nets.InvestmentInvestment growth has been declining a

222、cross most countries in the region over the past two decades,with particularly sharp drops in China,Indonesia,Malaysia,and more recently,the Philippines.Currently,investment 5JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure7.Eventhoughconsumptionissupportinggrowth,consumerspending,importsandcon

223、fidenceremainsubdued,especially in ChinaSource:Haver Analytics.Note:A.B.Linesshow12-monthmovingaverageofannualized5-yeargrowthrate.Indonesia,MalaysiaandThailandarevolume-basedindices;ChinaandVietNamarevalue-basedindices;Philippinesshowmanufacturingsalesbasedonvolumes.ShadedareasinAandBdenoteglobalre

224、cessions.C.Seasonallyadjustedseries.OtherEastAsiaincludesIndonesia,Malaysia,Thailand,PhilippinesandVietNam.10505101520Jan-14Aug-14Mar-15Oct-15May-16Dec-16Jul-17Feb-18Sep-18Apr-19Nov-19Jun-20Jan-21Aug-21Mar-22Oct-22May-23Dec-23Jul-24ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandViet NamPercentPercentIndex

225、10010203040Jul-05Jul-06Jul-07Jul-08Jul-09Jul-10Jul-11Jul-12Jul-13Jul-14Jul-15Jul-16Jul-17Jul-18Jul-19Jul-20Jul-21Jul-22Jul-23Jul-24ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandViet NamEAP excl.China406080100120Dec-19Apr-20Dec-20Aug-20Apr-21Aug-21Dec-21Apr-22Aug-22Dec-22Apr-23Aug-23Dec-23Aug-24Apr-24Chin

226、aOther East AsiaA.Growth in retail salesB.Growth in importsC.Consumer confidenceCovid Alpha waveCovid Omicron waveFigure8.InvestmentgrowthhasbeendeclininginmostcountriesbuthasrevivedinVietNamSource:Haver Analytics.Note:Quarterlydata.Linesshow12-monthmovingaverageofannualized5-yeargrowthrate.Duetodat

227、aavailability,ratesarebasedoninvestmentinfixedassets,excludingruralhouseholdsinChina,andestimatesofquarterlyGFCFfromannualGFCFinVietNam.Shadedareasdenoteglobalrecessions.1050510152025302005q42006q42007q42008q42009q42010q42011q42012q42013q42014q42015q42016q42017q42018q42019q42020q42021q42022q42023q4C

228、hinaMalaysiaThailandIndonesiaPhilippinesViet NamEAP excl.ChinaPercentGross fixed capital formation growthlevels are below pre-pandemic levels in Malaysia and the Philippines and have not surpassed pre-pandemic levels in Thailand(figure 8).In China,the property market slump is contributing to the inv

229、estment growth slowdown,while manufacturing investment is supporting growth(box 1).Investment growth appears to be relatively robust inVietNam.6EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKBox1.Investment in ChinaLower investment has been one of the key contribut

230、ors to Chinas growth slowdown in recent years.The prolonged property market downturn has led to a large and persistent decline in real estate investment,which fell by a cumulative 26.7 percent from its peak in June 2021.This sharp contraction has contributed to stagnant private investmentoverthepast

231、twoyears,despitehigherprivateinvestmentinmanufacturing(figureB1.1A).StateOwned Enterprise(SOE)investment growth has moderated somewhat but remains robust,while foreign investment hasslowedrecentlyamidheightenedeconomicuncertaintyandgeopoliticaltensions(figureB1.1B).Robustmanufacturing investment has

232、 compensated to some extent for the decline in real estate investment.FigureB1.1.Property market slump has weighed on residential investment growth,whereas manufacturing investment remains robustSource:NBS,PBC,World Bank staff estimates.Note:Figure B:Foreign investment does not include investment th

233、rough Hong Kong SAR,China,Macau SAR,China and Taiwan,China.At the same time,parts of Chinas manufacturing sector confront demand and supply imbalances.Overall industrial capacity utilization has decreased slightly to 74.9 percent in 2024H1,from 76.7 percent in 2017-19.However,a few sectors have expe

234、rienced more pronounced declines.These include construction materials(e.g.non-metal minerals,which include cement and glass)in which capacity resulting from years of high propertyinvestmentnowexceedsdemand(figureB1.2A).Meanwhile,thecomputerandelectronicssectorhasalso seen a decline in capacity utili

235、zation,resulting from a rapid production capacity expansion during the pandemic and the subsequent global demand normalization post-pandemic.Capacity utilization in the auto sector has also dropped likely driven by a combination of lower capacity utilization in the internal combustion engine(ICE)aut

236、omobilesectoraswellasarapidexpansionofEVcapacity.505101520Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24Jul-24PrivatePrivate:manufacturingPrivate:infrastructurePercentA.Private FAI by sector(ytd y/y)Percent2015105051015201920202021202220232024Jan-JulState holdingForeignPrivateB.FAI by ownership(y/y)(continued)7JOBS

237、 AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOK(Box 1.continued)Lowercapacityutilizationrateshaveledtoadeteriorationinfinancialperformanceinthesesectors.Profitmarginsinsomesectorshavefallenbelowthe2019levels(figureB1.2B)andtheproportionofloss-makingfirmshasriseninthepasttwoyears(figureB1.2C).Intheautomo

238、bilesector,theshareofloss-makingenterpriseshasbeendeclininginrecentquarters,withprofitmarginsstabilizing,whichmightsignalastartofmarketconsolidationwithinthesector.Nevertheless,there is a risk that sustained investment in manufacturing capacity could exacerbate resource misallocation especiallyifnon

239、-viablefirmscontinuetooperateinsectorswithpersistentdemand-supplyimbalances.FigureB1.2.Capacityutilizationhasdecreasedinsomesectorsasprofitmarginsdeclineandtheshareofloss-reportingfirmsincreasesSource:Wind.0255075100Chemical FiberPharmaceuticalFerrous MetalGeneral EquipmentElectric MachineryNon Ferr

240、ous MetalTextileChemicalSpecial EquipmentComputer&ElectronicsAutomobileFoodNonmetal MineralCapacity Utilizationin 2024H1Capacity Utilization20172019 avegage70851001151302019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024Computer&ElectronicsGeneral EquipmentSpecial EquipmentAutomobileElectric Machinery&Equipment010203040J

241、an-13Nov-14Sep-16Jul-18May-20Mar-22Jan-24Computer&electronicsIndustrial EnterpriseGeneral equipmentSpecial equipmentAutomobileElectric machineShare of profit loss firms,percent,12mmaIndex,2019=100A.Capacity utilization rate by sectorB.Profit margins in key manufacturingsectorsC.Share of loss-making

242、firms in keymanufacturing sectors ExportsGoodsexportgrowthispositivethisyearafterthecontractionin2003(figure9).Buttherecoveryingoodsexportshasbeenslower than anticipated.The revival of tourism has boosted services exports in some EAP economies,but tourist arrivals have onlyexceededpre-pandemiclevels

243、inafewcountries.Cambodia,Fiji,Malaysia,andVietNamhaveseentouristarrivalsreturn to or surpass pre-pandemic numbers,while in the rest of the EAP region,arrivals have plateaued below those levels,partly due to the slow recovery of Chinas outbound tourism.Additionally,discretionary spending by tourists

244、remains below pre-pandemic levels in several countries,reducing their overall contribution to the domestic economy.Chinas merchandise exports rebounded with a growth of 4.0 percent y/y in the seven months of the year,driven by the automobile and machinery sectors,as well as the upswing in the global

245、 technology cycle(Figure 10A).Shipments to developing markets,led by ASEAN,have been the primary driver of export growth.In 2023,ASEAN overtook the US to become Chinas largest export market amid escalating trade tensions between the US and China(Figure 10B).Chinasmerchandiseimportgrewmoderatelyat2.8

246、percenty/yinthefirstsevenmonthsasdomesticconsumerdemandremained subdued.8EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure9.The regions exports are recovering only gradually as is tourismSource:Haver Analytics,World Bank.Note:Seasonally adjusted series.B.100=20

247、19 average.2502550Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23Apr-23Jul-23Oct-23Jan-24Apr-24Jul-24ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandViet NamEAP averagePercentA.Goods exports020406080100120140Jan-20Jul-20Jan-21Jul-21Jan-22Jul-22Jan-23Jul-23Jan-24Jul-24CambodiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandViet NamFijiIndonesia

248、IndexB.Tourist arrivalsFigure10.Chinas exports rebounded from the slump in 2023 supported by an increasing share of exports to the rest of the region Source:GeneralAdministrationofCustoms,UNCTAD,HAVER,WorldBankstaffestimates.648220468202220232024 YTDLow-techAutoMedium tech machineryChemicalsHigh-tec

249、h electronic&electricalOthersTotalA.Export by sector02040608010020012004200720102013201620192022PercentASEANJapanUnited StatesKorea,Rep.European UnionOthersHong Kong,SAR ChinaB.Export by country9JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOK Macroeconomic policyThefiscalstancein2024hasnotbeenexpans

250、ionaryinMalaysiaandthePhilippinesbuthasbeenexpansionaryinIndonesiaandChina.MalaysiaandthePhilippinesareprojectedtohaveastructuraldeficitlowerthaninthepreviousyear,suggestingrelativelyconservativestance.Thisstanceisreflectedinahigherstructuraldeficitinthesecountriesin2024comparedto2023(figure11A).InT

251、hailand,aseven-monthdelayinapprovingthebudgethasresultedinasmallerfiscaldeficitcomparedtolastyearforthefirstthreequartersofFY24.Bytheendofthefirst10monthsofFY24,only 45 percent of the public investment budget had been spent.Responding to the recent moderation in economic activityinChina,theauthoriti

252、essignaledinSeptemberthatadditionalcounter-cyclicalfiscalsupportwillbeprovidedintheshortterm.Highercentralfiscaltransferstolocalgovernmentscouldhelpeasefinancingconstraintsandincreasepublic spending lifting short-term growth but longer-term growth will depend on deeper reforms.Monetarypolicyforthemo

253、stparthasnotbeenexpansionaryexceptforinChina,thePhilippines,andIndonesia(figure11B).Policyinterestrateswereraisedgloballytoaddressinflation.TheriseinpolicyratesinmanyEAPcountrieswassmallerthaninotheremergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)becauseinflationarypressuresintheEAPregion were weaker.EAP

254、 countries were nevertheless obliged to maintain higher interest rates because the relatively highratesinindustrialcountriesraisedconcernsaboutcapitalflightandexchangeratedepreciation.Nowlowinflationinsomecountriesispushinguprealinterestrates.Forexample,inChina,despitetherecentcutsinthepolicyrate,re

255、alinterestratesremainelevatedduetothelowinflation.Recentmeasuresthatloweredpolicyratesandthereserve requirement ratio,as well as additional measures to support the property sector and the stock market,are likely toeasefinancialconditions,buttheimpactongrowthwillbemoderatedbyweakcreditandhousingdeman

256、d.InVietNam,the central bank sold dollars to fend off pressure on the exchange rate coming from the interest rate differential withtheUSandtheUSdollarglobalstrengtheninginthefirsthalfof2024,resultingintightenedliquidity.Figure11.Fiscal policy is expansionary in China,Indonesia and Thailand,but not i

257、n Malaysia and the Philippines;monetary policy remains non-expansionary,but has started to easeSource:WEO Database,April 2024;Haver Analytics.221101122Percent of GDPChinaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandother EMDEAEIndonesia20202220232024A.Change in structural balance01234567Jan-20Sep-20May-21Jan-22Sep-22

258、May-23Jan-24Sep-24ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandViet NamPercentB.Policy ratesThecombinationoflowdomesticinflationanddeclininginternationalinterestratesiscreatinggreaterspaceformoresupportivemonetarypolicyintheEAPregion.InflationremainscontainedinmostoftheEAPregion,andespeciallylowin10EAST

259、 ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure12.Inflationremainscontainedinmostoftheregion,butisstillhighinLaoPDRandMyanmar,andtheUSinterestratesare expected to declineSource:Haver Analytics;CME Group Fed Watch;Citigroup,Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis;Haver A

260、nalytics;World Bank.Note:A.Figure shows year-on-year change of CPI/Core CPI,latest month available.B.A.Solid blue line is the upper bound of the target range for the U.S.federal funds rate.Dotted lines are vintages of market-based policy rate expectations,derived from derivatives markets.Last data p

261、oint:9/24/2024.051015202530PercentCPICore CPITargetA.Inflation in EAP0.40.60.62.02.13.34.45.45.524.330.20.60.31.92.02.62.6ThailandChinaCambodiaMalaysiaIndonesiaPhilippinesViet NamFijiMongoliaLao PDRMyanmarLowModerateHigh0246Jan-22Apr-22Aug-22Nov-22Mar-23Jul-23Oct-23Feb-24May-24Sep-24Jan-25Apr-25Aug-

262、25Dec-25Jun-22Jun-23Jan-24Sep-24Policy ratePercentB.Market expectations of U.S.policy ratesCapitaloutflowpressuresonEAPexchangerateshavethereforesubsided.WhentheUSFederalReservestartedtotightenmonetarypolicy,China,Indonesia,andMalaysiaexperiencedcapitaloutflows(figure13).Currenciesdepreciatedearlier

263、intheyearinallmajoreconomies,reflectinghigher-than-anticipatedinterestratesintheUS.DepreciationwassteepestinLaoPDRbecauseofseriousmacroeconomicimbalances.Pressureshavenoweasedinmostcountries,thoughoutflowscontinueinThailandamidweakeninginvestorconfidence.Majoreconomiescurrencieshavestartedappreciati

264、ngsinceearlyAugust,anticipating the beginning of the rate cut in advanced economies.Fourinfluencesonregionalgrowth Shifting growth dynamics GrowthindevelopingEAPhasbeeninfluencedbyChinasgrowth(EAPEconomicUpdate,October2023,April2024).Internationaltradehasbeenakeychannelofimpact,asChinassharesingloba

265、ltradehaveincreaseddramatically(figure14).AkeyquestionishowthedualaspectsofChinasinfluenceinexportandimportmarketsaffectsgrowthinEMDEsingeneraland the EAP in particular.On the one hand,the expansion of Chinas demand for imports,especially of intermediate goods,implies higher global prices for a rang

266、e of products that developing countries export.On the other hand,the expansion in Chinasexports,especiallyoffinalconsumergoods,hasreducedtheglobalpricesofproductsthatdevelopingcountriesexport.NewempiricalanalysisshowsthatgrowthinotherdevelopingeconomiesbenefittedmoreonaveragefromChinasincreasingdema

267、ndforimportsthanitwashurtbyChinasincreasingcompetitioninexportmarkets.ButthesespilloverbenefitsfromChinas growth may diminish in the future,heightening the need for EAP countries to seek sources of autonomous growth.Cambodia,China,andThailand,asmostcommoditypriceshavestabilizedandsupplyconstraintsha

268、veeased(figure12A).ExceptionsaresomePacificIslandCountries,aswellasLaoPDRandMyanmar,whereinflationisstubbornlyhigh,reflectingthe rising prices of some commodities like rice,high dependence on imports,and/or rapid depreciation of currencies.At thesametime,interestratesinadvancedcountries,whichhadincr

269、easedsignificantly,arenowdecliningasinflationhasdropped(figure12B),thoughtheyremainhigherthanpre-pandemic.11JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure13.Capitaloutflowscontinue,andsomecountriesfacedepreciationpressuresSource:Haver Analytics.Note:B:7-day moving average1.51.00.50.00.51.02.0

270、1.5Feb-22Aug-22Feb-23Aug-23Feb-24Aug-24ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandPercent of GDPA.Capital flows(cumulative since Feb 2022)9095100105110Jan-24Feb-24Mar-24Apr-24May-24Jun-24Jul-24Aug-24ChinaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandViet NamLao PDR(RHS)MongoliaCambodiaIndex,Jan 2024=100B.Nomina

271、l exchange rates(local currency to dollar)Figure14.Chinasshareinglobaltradehassignificantlyincreased,1985-2023Source:UN Comtrade,BACI,WDI.0510152025Manufacturing exportsManufacturing importsPercent19851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011201320152017201920212023A.Chinas share of globa

272、l manufacturingtrade20230510152025Commodity exportsCommodity importsPercent1985198719891991199319951997199920012003200520072009201120132015201720192021B.Chinas share of global commodity trade02468101219851987198919911993199519971999200120032005200720092011201320152017201920212023Services exportsServ

273、ices importsPercentC.Chinas share of global services tradeThespecificimpactofChinastradegrowthoncountriesintheEAPregionhasdependedontheirstageofdevelopmentandpatternofcomparativeadvantage(figure15).MostoftherelativelyindustrializedcountriesMalaysia,Thailand,thePhilippines,VietNamandevenIndonesiahave

274、faceddirectcompetitionathomeandabroadfromChinainmanufacturedgoods.ButcountrieshavealsobenefitedfromtheimpactonincreasedChinesedemandforcommodities(Indonesia,Myanmar,LaoPDRandMongolia);services(e.g.Philippines,ThailandandthePacificIslands);fromintegrationintoglobal-andChina-linkedmanufacturingvaluech

275、ains(e.g.MalaysiaandVietNam);andfromrelocationofChineseproduction(e.g.VietNamandCambodia).The positive impact of Chinas demand and supply has been felt not just through direct trade with China but also through changes in prices in global markets for EAP products that China demands and supplies.12EAS

276、T ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure15.Within the EAP region,some countries exports are dominated by manufactured goods while other countries specialize in commoditiesSource:BACI.020406080100120140199520072017202219952007201720221995200720172022199520

277、0720172022199520072017202219952007201720221995200720172022199520072017202219952007201720221995200720172022PHLTHAVNMMYSKHMIDNFJILAOMMRMNGAgricultureElectronicsMachine&vehiclesMetalsMineralsTextileOthersPercent of GDPA.EAP exports to the worldAgricultureElectronicsMachine&vehiclesMetalsMiningTextileOt

278、hers02468101214161820199520072017202219952007201720221995200720172022199520072017202219952007201720221995200720172022199520072017202219952007201720221995200720172022PHLTHAVNMMYSKHMIDNFJILAOMMRPercent of GDPB.EAP exports to China13JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKEmpiricalanalysisofthed

279、ualaspectsofChinasinfluenceinexportandimportmarketsshowsthatgrowthinotherdevelopingeconomiesbenefittedmoreonaveragefromChinasincreasingdemandforimportsthanitwashurtbyChinas increasing competition in export markets.Thenetincrementaleffectispositiveandstatisticallysignificant.Theestimatessuggestthatao

280、ne-percentincreaseinChinas GDP per-capita growth was associated with a 0.11 percentage-point increase in EMDEs GDP per-capita growth during 1995-2007,a 0.14 percentage-point increase in 2008-2019,and a 0.13 percentage-point increase in 2020-2023.The overall effect of Chinas per-capita GDP growth on

281、average EMDE growth during 2020-2023 was still positive,at0.67percentage-points,butsmallerthanthe1.1percentage-pointsduringthe2008-2019period(figure16).Figure16.DevelopingeconomiesgrowthbenefittedonaveragemorefromChinasincreaseddemandforimportsthanitwashurt by Chinas increased competition in export

282、marketsNote:Estimated effects from regressing EMDEs per-capita GDP growth on the interactions between Chinas per-capita GDP growth and each EMDE countrys export similarity to Chinas imports(red)and to Chinas exports(orange).The sample includes all EMDEs with available GDP per-capita growth and value

283、s of export similarities to Chinas imports and exports within the analysis period(1995-2019).The regression controls for country andyearfixedeffects,andEMDEslaggedGDPpercapitagrowth.EachbarheightisaproductoftheestimatedcoefficientsandEMDEsaveragesimilaritiescalculatedseparatelyforthreeperiods,1995-2

284、007,2008-2019,and2020-2021(datafor2022and2023areextrapolated).Whiskersrepresent90-percentconfidenceintervals.ExportsimilaritytoChinasexportsandimportsaremeasuredusingthedefinitionproposedbyFingerandKreinin(1979),using detailed product-level data at the 4-digit level.This index takes values between z

285、ero and one,and the higher its value the closest is the product distribution of exports in the two countries.B.Net effectsarecalculatedasthelinearcombinationsofimportandexportsimilaritiesestimatedseparatelyforeachperiodcorrespondingtofigureA.0.30.20.10.00.10.20.30.4199520072008201920202023Estimated

286、effect(p.p.)Effect of China growth through exportsimilarities to China importsEffect of China growth through exportsimilarities to China exportsA.Effect of China per-capita GDP growth through EMDEcountries export similarities to China imports and expo0.000.050.100.150.200.25199520072020202320082019N

287、et effect(p.p.)Net effect of China growth through similaritiesto China imports and exportsB.Net effects of China per-capita GDP growth through EMDEcountries export similarities to China imports and exportsHowever,twoconcernsarisegoingforward.First,ifChinasgrowthslowsdownfurther,thebenefitsfordevelop

288、ingcountrieswill decline:for example,a one percent slowdown in Chinas growth could reduce growth in other developing countries by 0.14 to 0.21 percentage points.Second,if Chinas exports grow faster than its imports,as has continued to be the case in manufacturing and overall trade,then the negative

289、impact of increased competition may outweigh the positive impact ofdemandenhancementininternationalmarkets.TheprospectofdiminishingspilloverbenefitsfromChinasgrowthheightens the need for EAP countries to seek sources of domestic growth,especially through domestic reform.The burden of debtDebt as a s

290、hare of GDP is higher than the pre-pandemic share in most EAP countries.General government debt as a shareofGDPissignificantlyhighertodayintheregionseconomies,exceptinMongoliaandVietNam(figure17).The14EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure17.Public a

291、nd private debt have increased compared to pre-pandemic levels;private debt remains high in China,Malaysia,ThailandandVietNamSource:Institute of International Finance,World Bank staff estimates.ThailandPhilippinesChinaIndonesiaMongoliaViet NamCambodiaEMDEsPercent of GDPPercent of GDP0204060801001201

292、40160180ChinaViet NamMalaysiaThailandPhilippinesIndonesiaMongoliaLao PDREMDEsQ4-19 Q1-2420192024MalaysiaFijiMyanmarLao PDR020406080100Government debtNonfinancial corporate debtPercent of GDPPercent of GDP020406080100MalaysiaChinaViet NamMongoliaIndonesiaPhilippinesLao PDREMDEs0204060ChinaThailandMal

293、aysiaLao PDRIndonesiaPhilippinesViet NamMongoliaEMDEsThailandQ4-19 Q1-24Q4-19 Q1-24Household debtFinancial corporate debtriseingovernmentdebtfollowedtheeasierfinancialconditionsaftertheglobalfinancialcrisisandincreasedbudgetdeficitsduringthepandemic.Highgovernmentdebtlimitsfiscalspace,constrainingpu

294、blicinvestment,andmayalsohinder private investment by raising interest rates.Private debt has also surged in major economies.Corporate debt as a share of GDP has increased in China,Malaysia and Thailand,by 30,20 and 40 percentage points,respectively.By 2024,nonfinancialcorporatedebtinChinaandVietNam

295、exceededthelevelsmostotherEMDEs.Highcorporatedebtmayhurtprivateinvestmentbyleavingfirmswithlessresourcesfornewprojects.Householdandfinancialcorporatedebt too is higher in China,Malaysia and Thailand compared to levels in other emerging markets,and that is squeezing consumption and investment(Box 2).

296、15JOBS AND TECHNOLOGYRECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKBox2.The effects of higher debt in consumption and investmentIncreased indebtedness can negatively impact consumption and investment in the EAP.Rising household debt in several economies can reduce disposable income and limit consumption,while elevate

297、d private debt can constrain private investment by reducing available funds and increasing borrowing costs.Additionally,increases in government debt can crowd-out private investment.Traditional models such as the life-cycle permanent income hypothesis(PIH)suggest that anticipated income changes shou

298、ld not affect consumption,as they are presumed to be internalized.However,research shows that consumption is more sensitive to income changes than PIH predicts,highlighting the role of liquidity and credit constraints.This sensitivityisfurtherinfluencedbyfactorslikehousepricesandpopulationaging(Octo

299、ber2023EAPEconomicUpdate).Empirical evidence suggests that a 10-percentage point increase in household debt would decrease consumption growth by0.4percentagepoints(figureB2.1A).Investment growth has been closely linked to rising levels of corporate and government debts,as well as export growth andin

300、creasedpolicyuncertainty(figureB2.1B).Previousstudieshaveshownthateconomicpolicyuncertaintyisnegatively correlated with investment growth(Bloom 2009;Baker et al.,2016).Elevated private debt in the region,particularlyinChina,ThailandandVietNam,haslikelyconstrainedprivateinvestmentbyreducingavailablef

301、undsandincreasing borrowing costs.FigureB2.1.Increased household debt is negatively correlated with consumption growth;Increased government debt and high private debt are negatively correlated with private investment growth Source:World Bank staff estimates.Note:A.Figureshowsregressioncoefficients(b

302、arheight)and90%confidenceinterval(whiskers)onprivateconsumptionpercapitagrowthonincomepercapitagrowthand(i)housepricesgrowth;(ii)shareofworkingagepopulation;and(ii)householddebtasashareofGDP.Regressionscontrolfortimeandcountryfixedeffects.Standarderrorsareclusteredatcountrylevel.Dataisquarterlyfor65

303、emergingmarketanddevelopingeconomiesbetween2001-2022.B.Barsshowmarginaleffectsofeachvariableinpredictinginvestmentgrowth.Coefficientsarestandardizedbydivingbythestandarddeviationofeachvariable.Blacklinesshow90percentconfidenceintervals(1.68xstandarderrors).Othervariablesincludedintheregressionarelag

304、gedGDPgrowth,creditgrowth,FDIgrowth,laggedgovernmentdebtasashareofGDP,laggedpublicinvestmentasashareofGDPandchangeinprivateinvestmentasashareofGDP,andadummyforcrisis.Theregressionsincludecountryandyearfixedeffects.Sampleincluded98 emerging markets and developing economies.00.80.60.40.20.20.40.60.81I

305、ncome(1 percent)House price(1 percent)Share ofworking agepopulation(1 percentagepoint)Householddebt/GDP(10percentagepoint)PercentA.Correlates of private consumption growth864202ExportsgrowthUncertaintyIndexGovernmentdebt(change in%of GDP)Private Credit(%of GDP)Marginal effect B.Correlates of private

306、 investment growth16EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKFigure18.Interest payments on external debt have increased in 2023 in most countries,but falling interest rates may offer some respiteSource:International Debt Statistics,World Bank staff estimates.

307、Note:Data is according to the original repayment plan and could include deferred debt such as in Lao PDR.0123456MNGLAOFJIKHMIDNTHAVNMPHLCHNPublicPrivatePercent of GDP202320182220232018222023201822202320182220232018222023201822202320182220232018222023201822Interest payment on long-term external debt

308、as a share of GDP UncertaintyWhile the EAP region has enjoyed higher growth rates than most other economies,three immediate risks could weigh on growth in the near term:geopolitical tensions,global economic slump,and policy uncertainty.Geopolitical riskAnintensificationofgeopoliticaltensionsposesado

309、wnsiderisk.TheconflictintheMiddleEast,inadditiontocreatingahumanitarian crisis,has added to the ongoing challenges posed by the protracted Russian invasion of Ukraine.The geopolitical risk index has moderated in recent months but remains over 40 percent above its 10-year average since the conflictbe

310、gan(figure19A).Throughout2024,shipshavecontinuedtoavoidtheRedSeaduetoongoingsecurityconcerns;ayearearlier,thisroutehandledabout15percentofglobalshipments(figure19B).Asofmid-September,tradetransitvolumethroughtheRedSeahaddroppedby75percentsincethebeginningof2024,withtrafficdivertingthroughtheCapeofGo

311、odHope(figure19C).Onapositivenote,thetrafficdelaysthroughthePanamaCanal,causedbyseveredrought-inducedlowwaterlevels in 2023,have subsided.In2023,interestpaymentsonexternaldebtincreasedsignificantlyinmostcountriesintheregion.Highlyindebtedcountriessuch as Lao PDR and Mongolia have experienced a large

312、r increase in interest payments,especially on private debt on which interestratesaremorelikelytofollowthemarketrate(figure18).InLaoPDR,whichhasbeenassessedtobeindebtdistress,interest payments to China(approximately 165 million USD or 1.1 percent of GDP)were deferred in 2023.While the deferral provid

313、estemporaryrelief,therepaymentprofileremainsuncertainandsubjecttotheconclusionofdebtnegotiations.Theincreaseininterestpaymentslimitsfiscalspaceandcanconstrainpublicandprivateinvestment.InterestpaymentsonprivateexternaldebthavealsoincreasedmarkedlyinCambodia,Fiji,ThailandandVietNam.17RECENTDEVELOPMEN

314、TSANDOUTLOOK(continued)Shippingcostshaveincreasedbutarelikelytoaddlittletoinflationintheregion.SincethestartoftheMiddleEastconflict,theShanghaiContainerizedFreightIndex(SCFI)hassurgedby175percentrising82percentinJanuaryalonewhiletheBalticDryIndex,abroaderindicatorofglobalshippingrates,hasrisenbynear

315、ly40percent(figure19D).The increased freight rates suggest that shippers anticipate the elevated costs to persist,which in turn could raisethecostofimportedgoodsacrosssupplychains.However,theeffectoninflationislikelytobesmall.Accordingto estimated elasticities from Carriere-Swallow et al.(2023),the

316、rise in the Baltic Dry Index could increase annual globalheadlineandcoreinflationby0.4percentagepointsbySeptember2024(currently2.6percentand4.0percent,respectively,as of August 2024).A similar analysis for 11 East Asian economies,using the SCFI,suggests that the pass-througheffectisnearlydouble,with

317、risingshippingcostsraisingannualizedheadlineinflationby0.7percentagepointsandcoreinflationbyanestimated0.4percentagepoints.Giventhat12-monthcoreinflationinEastAsiaisaround2.5percent(asofAugust2024),theeffectoninflationislikelytoberelativelymild.Figure19.Risks from Red Sea disruptions to shipping and

318、 trade continueSources:Bloomberg,Caldara and Iacoviello(2022);Comtrade(database);Haver Analytics:UN Global Platform,UNCTAD,International Energy Agency;IMF PortWatch;World Bank.Note:A.Geopoliticalriskindex(GPR)reflectsautomatedtext-searchofelectronicarticlesfrom10newspapersrelatedtoadversegeopolitica

319、leventsineachnewspaperforeachmonth.Ahigherindexisrelatedtolowerinvestment,stock prices,and employment.Last observation is September 30,2024.B.Average share of trade passing through Suez Canal.C.40-day rolling averages,in millions of metric tons.Last observation is September 17,2024.D.Shanghai Contai

320、nerized Freight Index(SCFI)is a composite measure of spot rates for export container transport market.It includes both freight rates(indices)of 15 individual shipping routes and a composite index.The Baltic Dy Index measures the average price paid to transport dry bulk materials(which accounts for a

321、bout half of world trade across more than 20 oceanic shipping routes(UNCTAD 2015).Daily data,last observation is September 23,2024.50100150200250300Index,100=19852019A.Geopolitical risk index and conflicts7-day moving average30-day moving averageSep-23Oct-23Nov-23Dec-23Jan-24Feb-24Apr-24May-24Mar-24

322、Jun-24Jul-24Aug-24Sep-2405101520253035TradeCrude oil andrefined productsLNGContainers20232024PercentB.Global trade through the Suez Canal,2023 and 202402468Panama CanalSuez CanalCape of Good HopeMmtFeb-23Apr-23May-23Jun-23Aug-23Sep-23Nov-23Dec-23Feb-24Mar-24May-24Jun-24Aug-24Jan-23C.Shipping transit

323、 routesby trade volume01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,000Jan-20Aug-20Mar-21Oct-21May-22Dec-22Jul-23Feb-24Sep-24Shanghai Containerized Freight IndexBaltic Dry IndexIndexD.Freight costs18EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ECONOMIC UPDATE OCTOBER 2024RECENTDEVELOPMENTSANDOUTLOOKUncertainty appears to be synchronize

324、d across countries,likely driven by global factors.Novel empirical analysis utilizes harmonized monthly uncertainty measures in 71 countries over the 2008-2024 period as compiled by Ahir,Bloom,and Furceri(2022)andinvestigatescomovementacrosscountries.Thefirstprincipalcomponentofthecross-countrydatas

325、ervesasameasureofglobaluncertainty,withfactorloadingsrepresentingthesensitivityofcountry-specificuncertaintyto the global factor.Positive factor loadings indicate that global uncertainty has positive contemporaneous impacts onacountryseconomicuncertainty(figure21).Thefactorloadingsarepositiveinaroun

326、d90percentofcountries,suggesting that a one percentage point increase in global uncertainty is associated with around a 0.3 percentage point increase in domestic uncertainty.The loadings are higher among advanced economies(0.41)compared to EMDEs(0.30).In EAP EMDEs,60 percent showed positive loadings

327、 over the 2008-24 period(average 0.25).Althoughtheriseincommoditypriceshasbeenlimitedsofar,anescalationorexpansionoftheMiddleEastconflictcoulddisruptoilandothercommoditymarkets.TheconflictinGazahasheighteneduncertaintyinoilmarkets,leadingtoincreasedpricevolatility.Afteraninitialspiketo$90/bblinOctob

328、er2023,Brentcrudeoilpriceshavefluctuatedsignificantlybuteasedto$74/bblbymid-Septemberassupplyconcernslessened.Whileoilpricesareprojectedtoaverage$81/bbl in 2024,further geopolitical disruptions could keep prices volatile,potentially causing moderate to extreme supply disruptions and impacting transp

329、ort costs and other commodity prices.Macroeconomic,financial and policy uncertaintyIncreaseduncertaintycanresultina“wait-and-see”responsefromconsumersandinvestors,delayingspendingand investing and leading to drop in investment and output,especially in the short run.Increased uncertainty about macroe

330、conomic developments abroad can negatively affect economic activity in EAP through various channels.First,increased uncertainty abroad can depress economic activity abroad and result in negative spillovers through realchannelsinEAP.Second,uncertaintycanaffectfinancialassetpricesandcreditcostsabroada

331、ndintheEAP,amplifying the contractionary effects of economic uncertainty(Glichrist et al.,2014,Caballero et al.,2019;Caggiano et al.,2021,Akinci et al.,2023).Third,heightened uncertainty abroad,especially if global or in major partner countries,cantransmittohighercountry-specificuncertaintyinindivid

332、ualEAPcountries(Carrire-SwallowandCspedes 2013;Londono et al.2021;Miescu 2023;Georgiadis et al.2024).Domestic economic uncertainty also negativelyimpactseconomicconfidenceandsentimentsinEAPcountries(HaandSo2023).1 Our empirical analysis focuses on three types of uncertainty:macroeconomic uncertainty

333、forecast-based measures;economicpolicyuncertaintynews-basedmeasures;andfinancialuncertaintystockmarketvolatility-basedmeasures.2 In addition,economic policy uncertainty is also decomposed into different types of policy uncertaintymonetary,fiscal,andtradepolicies.Global economy uncertainty has spiked and remains elevatedwell above the pre-pandemic levelin the latter halfof2024.High-frequencyfinanci