1、California Landscape of Climate Finance(beta)January 29,20242Authors:Matthew Solomon,John Michael LaSalle,and Chris Grant.Acknowledgments:We are grateful to the Milken Institute and Irvine Foundation for supporting this work.We appreciate Vibrant Data Labs for sharing valuable data contained in this

2、 report.The authors would like to thank Jessica Liston and Joyce Wei for their research contributions to this project,in addition to Barbara Buchner,Caroline Dreyer,Rob Kahn,Baysa Naran,Chavi Meattle,and Bella Tonkonogy for advice,editing,and internal review,and Elana Fortin and Josh Wheeling for la

3、yout and graphic design.The authors appreciate review and guidance from Lynn von Koch-Liebert and Sean Kennedy(California Strategic Growth Council)and review and data gathering from Dan Adler and Taylor Carnevale(California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank).Data sources include the Calif

4、ornia Air Resources Board Scoping Plan,the Princeton Net-Zero America project,Bloomberg NEF,California Climate Investments,and more.A full list is available in the Annex.Recommended citation:Climate Policy Initiative M.Solomon,JM.LaSalle,C.Grant.2023.California Landscape of Climate Finance(BETA).Con

5、tact:Matthew Solomon matthew.solomoncpiglobal.orgMedia Contact:Rob Kahn rob.kahncpiglobal.org 3Climate Policy Initiative is an analysis and advisory organization focused on advancing economic development while addressing climate change.CPI has more than a decade of experience tracking and analyzing

6、climate finance data,including through our Global Landscape of Climate Finance.We also produce numerous regional,national,and sub-national landscape analyses.This beta version of a California Landscape tracks deployed funds from private and public actors,by county,across several sectors including en

7、ergy and transport from 2019 to 2022.We do not include many non-cap-and-trade-funded state programs,local spending,or private investment in sectors such as building electrification.As described in Part 1,to be consistent with our Global Landscape definition of climate finance,we do not include R&D s

8、pending,investments in low-carbon solution manufacturing,or secondary market transactions such as stock purchases.In Part 1,we review Californias climate context and our definition of climate finance.Part 2 describes our assessment of climate finance needs in California.Part 3 presents our analysis

9、of past climate finance.In Part 4we present concluding observations and recommendations.This first-ever California climate finance landscape builds on a decade of CPI experience tracking climate finance globally41.California is making substantial progress in increasing climate finance,with a 26%annu

10、al growth rate from 2019 to 2022.We estimate that California climate finance,or spending on deployed climate projects,is 63%of the annual investment needed through 2035 to meet Californias climate goals.Globally,climate finance was only 14%of 2030 needs in 2021/2022.However,achieving Californias cli

11、mate goals will require quick progress to close the remaining gap,as needs will increase after 2035 and each year of delay increases decarbonization costs in subsequent years.2.Private sector investment is the largest source of finance with 77%of the total,driven by an increase in passenger zero-emi

12、ssion vehicle sales,which in Q3 2023 represented 27%of new vehicle sales in the state.Californias policy and budget actions played a key role in catalyzing new markets for private investment,especially in EVs and solar power.The trend of private climate finance growth is encouraging and demonstrates

13、 a sustainable and scalable model considering scarce public finance.3.Given current budget constraints,California should focus on using its public dollars to catalyze private and federal investment,including through pre-development and matching,reducing regulatory barriers,and targeting investment i

14、n vulnerable communities.4.Climate finance in California is distributed relatively evenly across all counties on a per-capita basis,although populations living in areas with higher pollution or more climate vulnerability will require higher-than-average investment going forward.5.This beta landscape

15、 uses a limited data set.A full Landscapecovering all climate sectors and a more detailed sub-county-level analysiswould better reveal investment trends and gaps,including tracking finance to disadvantaged communities.Key takeawaysGTPart 1:Introduction6Over the past decade,California has passed laws

16、 that:require an 85%reduction in emissions and carbon neutrality by 2045;phase out internal combustion engine vehicles by 2035 and decarbonizing medium-and heavy-duty vehicles;and increase the states resilience to severe heat and drought.The states 2022 and 2023 budgets include$51.4 billion in mitig

17、ation and adaptation spending,and the state stands to receive substantial federal climate funding from the Inflation Reduction Act(IRA)and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act(IIJA),which will provide an estimated$41.9 billion for California over the next five years.California is a national leader

18、 in addressing climate change7To support California in meeting its climate goals and using its capital most effectively,CPI created this first-of-its-kind landscape of climate finance in California.This analysis will help policymakers and private sector actors identify opportunities,establish priori

19、ties,measure progress,and develop coordinated plans to meet the scale of the climate challenge,including for budgets,regulations,tapping into federal funding,and investment plans.This beta version tracks public and private investments by county across several sectors,including energy and transport,f

20、rom 2019 to 2022.CPI started with a beta version to demonstrate potential value and use cases of a complete landscape,particularly for data that covers all public and private financial flows across multiple sectors.CPI aims to fill a gap in comprehensive data on climate finance and climate investmen

21、t needs in the state8We focused on primary investments in mitigation and adaptation project deployments,adapting CPIs standard-setting methodology developed for our Global Landscape of Climate Finance and subsequent regional,national,and sub-national Landscapes.A full description of the methodology

22、is available in Part 3,including which sources we include in the beta version.Our definition of climate finance*includes:Primary investments:excluding secondary market transactions such as stock purchases.Committed finance:finance that is tracked when there is a firm obligation of spending to a spec

23、ific project,as opposed to upon disbursement.Deployments:we do not track R&D spending or investment in low-carbon solution manufacturing,to better align with the climate finance needs taxonomy described in Part 2.What does“climate finance”mean for this Landscape?*The United Nations Framework for Con

24、vention on Climate Changes definition of climate finance is:“Climate finance aims at reducing emissions,and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing vulnerability of,and maintaining and increasing the resilience of,human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts.”Part

25、 2:Needs Assessment10By understanding how much money will be needed to meet Californias climate policy goals,policymakers will be able to set the appropriate level of ambition and identify the types of investments where scarce public funds can have the greatest catalytic effect to reduce emissions a

26、nd increase resiliency.As of 2020,the California Air Resources Board attributed emissions across the following economic sectors:CPI estimated future investment needs to put current spending in context11CPI estimated statewide climate finance needs by tailoring its established needs assessment method

27、ology with state and third-party model estimates.We identified the investment needed in different sectors to meet Californias climate goals,including net zero by 2045 and interim targets.The needs assessment can help policymakers target budgetary resources and investments at sectors where the impact

28、 on emissions will be greatest.This analysis is not intended to define the single“correct”way for California to meet its climate goals.Rather,these estimates represent one possible pathway that is dependent upon modeling,technological,and policy assumptions.How are investment needs estimated?12Our f

29、ocus was on sectors with commercially viable green technologies for which the state has developed decarbonization plans for in the next decade.These include:energy,zero-emission vehicles,natural working lands,building decarbonization,and methane abatement.We did not include sectors such as industry(

30、steel,concrete,etc.),oil&gas,carbon capture or removal,active transportation,and mass transit due to data availability and uncertainty as to the decarbonization path and scale of these sectors.A full list of inputs is provided in the Annex,and include the California AB32 Scoping Plan,estimates from

31、CPUC,CARB,and CAISO,and third-party estimates from the Princeton Net-Zero America project.Needs assessment methodologySectors included in needs assessmentSectors not included in needs assessment13We estimated climate finance needs in U.S.dollars on an annual basis through 2045.Sources used are estim

32、ates of investment needed to meet Californias climate goals,including both net zero emissions by 2045 and interim targets.For sectors with limited data inputs(such as electric transmission),estimates are extrapolated through to 2045 as needed.For sources that only provided needs in real units(e.g.,M

33、W of renewable energy or number of air-source heat pumps),we incorporated unit prices from sources such as the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and the California Energy Commission.A full list of sources is in the Annex.Within each sector,CPI identified the lowest and highest cost estimates,and

34、provides an average of all inputs in each sector.For those sectors with only one input,the low,average,and high are the same.Needs assessment methodology14These estimates are solely focused on achieving emissions targets,and therefore do not consider issues such as equity or economic priorities.Poli

35、cymakers may decide to prioritize different types or schedules of investment given these other factors.The third-party inputs to our model consider technical and geographic limitations and make assumptions about cost trends through 2045.However,there may be additional limitations based on extended e

36、nvironmental permitting,supply chain challenges,or cost drivers such as higher interest rates.Needs assessment methodology15Total average annual needs through 2035 are$62 billion annually.Current climate finance,discussed in Part 3,was$39 billion in 2022.California will need between$40 and$83 billio

37、n of climate finance annually to meet its climate goalsTable 1:Annual Climate Finance Needs($bn)16Total average annual needs through 2035 are$62 billion annually.Current climate finance,discussed in Part 3,was$39 billion in 2022.California will need between$40 and$83 billion of climate finance annua

38、lly to meet its climate goalsFigure 1:Average Annual Climate Finance Needs,2023-2035($bn)17Half of annual needs through 2035 are for zero-emission vehicles(ZEV).77%of ZEV needs are to decarbonize the 1 million passenger vehicles sold in CA every year.On an annual basis this represents a 76%increase

39、in annual spending on passenger ZEVs compared to 2021/2022.CARB regulations require all passenger vehicles to be ZEVs starting in 2035.Despite being a major barrier to EV adoption,ZEV charging needs are only tens of millions of dollars per year.*Zero-emission trucks and buses,which are currently rel

40、atively nascent,will need more than$7 billion per year by 2035.Zero-emission transport drives future needs*The average annual needs for ZEV chargers(DC Fast and Level 2)are not included in this chart,and are$17 million and$27 million respectively.Figure 2:Average Annual Zero-Emission Vehicle Investm

41、ent Needs,2023-2035($bn)18California has a goal of 90%clean electricity by 2035.In 2022,59%of the states electricity was clean.Transmission and distribution,which includes addressing current challenges such as transmission bottlenecks and interconnection delays,will be the largest individual need at

42、 28%of energy systems investment,as described in processes such as CAISOs 10-year and 20-year transmission plans.Utility-scale and rooftop solar continue to be the largest renewable energy technology investment needs through 2035(23%and 20%of energy systems,respectively).Technologies that have not b

43、een deployed at scale in the last decade in California(e.g.,geothermal and offshore wind)account for$1.5 billion of annual needs going forward.Energy systems is the next largest need,led by the states renewable energy buildout*The average annual need for in-state onshore wind is not included in this

44、 chart and is$131 million.Figure 3:Average Annual Energy Systems Investment Needs,2023-2035($bn)19Agriculture and land use requires$10.7 billion annually through 2035,including restoring the San Francisco Bay delta wetlands,installing tree cover,and implementing sustainable and low-carbon agricultur

45、al practices.This will require local,state,and federal financial support and coordination.Buildings and infrastructure requires$6.7 billion annually through 2035 to decarbonize.This could be accelerated through households retrofitting incentives(like the IRA),targeted state support for low-income an

46、d disadvantaged communities,and building code regulations requiring all-electric new construction.Methane requires$279 million annually through 2035 to reduce emissions from livestock,waste,and fossil fuel extraction and distribution.Other sectors will require more proactive regulation,technology de

47、ployment,and public sector support to close the finance gapThis analysis excludes sectors such as industry(steel,concrete,etc.),oil&gas,carbon capture or removal,active transportation,and mass transit due to data availability and uncertainty as to the decarbonization path and scale of these sectors.

48、20After 2035,annual needs increase from to$62 billion to$79 billion.The increase is almost entirely from higher uptake of ZEVs,including from CARB regulations requiring 100%ZEV sales for passenger vehicles and phasing in of ZEVs for medium-and heavy-duty trucking.At the same time,CA will need to con

49、tinue deploying renewable energy($8.5 bn average annual investment need from 2036-2045),new transmission lines and distribution upgrades($5.2 bn),building electrification technologies($5.6 bn),and low-carbon agriculture and land use solutions($10.7 bn),in addition to technologies not included in thi

50、s analysis such as decarbonization for steel and cement.Near-term action is crucial to enable these higher levels of investment in the future,unlock other pools of capital,and to avoid back-loading too many emissions reductions.Needs increase after 2035 as deployment ramps up*The average annual need

51、s for ZEV chargers(DC Fast and Level 2)are not included in this chart and are$19 million and$22 million,respectively,from 2036-2045.Figure 4:Average Annual Zero-Emission Vehicles Investment Needs 2036-2045($bn)21Future costs of meeting Californias climate goals are dependent on internal and external

52、 factors:If California defers investments in key sectors,future needs will increase as emissions will need to be reduced more dramatically in a shorter time period.Delay increases the risk of higher future costs for the same results;alternatively,earlier investment could create cost reductions,for e

53、xample through technological breakthroughs.Other policy choices influence the cost of meeting our climate goals;for example,denser cities or better mass transit options might reduce the need to purchase new zero-emission vehicles.Earlier investment maximizes the real impact and co-benefits from clim

54、ate solutions,including reduced air pollution,increased resiliency,and economic development.Future needs could be significantly higher if climate investment is deferredPart 3:Current Climate Finance23SourceData IncludedFederal governmentClimate-related federal grants and loans from relevant agencies

55、,including:Departments of Energy,Transportation,Agriculture,Housing and Urban Development,Interior,Treasury,and Defense,and the Corps of Engineers,Environmental Protection Agency,and Federal Emergency Management AgencyState governmentCalifornia Climate Investments:cap-and-trade proceeds,through Nove

56、mber 30,2022State grant programs:Air Resources Board,Energy Commission Clean Transportation Program,Active Transportation Program,Transit and Inter-City Rail Capital ProgramLocal governmentBond proceeds for residential&commercial energy conservation improvement and public transitPrivateEnergy system

57、s:renewable energy(utility-scale and rooftop);utility-scale battery storageTransport:ZEV passenger vehicles,ZEV chargersFor this beta,we prioritized the largest sources of CA climate financeData not included is in the Annex.CPI aims to expand this landscape in the future to include these data source

58、s as is feasible.24CPI tracked$39 billion of spending in 2022,with an annual growth rate of 26%from 2019*“Unknown”is primarily zero-emission vehicle charger investment,as source data are not available.California has made substantial progress in increasing climate finance since 2019,primarily through

59、 increases in the private sector.In 2022,CA reached 63%of its annual needs through 2035,while globally climate finance was only 9%of needs(in 2020).Climate finance is expected to continue to increase with uptake of electric vehicles,the$51.4 billion state climate budget,and federal investment throug

60、h the Inflation Reduction Act,CHIPS Act,and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.Figure 5:California Climate Finance by Actor Type,2019-2022*25For both public and private tracked sources of finance,transport is by far the largest destination sectorCPI only tracked private sector spending in transp

61、ort and energy,which is why these are the only two sectors.Figure 6:California Climate Finance by Actor and Sector,2021-20222677%of tracked climate finance in 2022 came from private sources,which will continue to be the largest source given policy and regulatory driversRising private sector climate

62、finance is encouraging and will be a more sustainable method to scale investment in California given relatively scarce public funds.This trend has a few key drivers:Commercial viability:National trends of decreasing costs for renewable energy and zero-emission vehicles.Regulatory environment:CA laws

63、 and regulations requiring a rising share of clean electricity generation and phase-out of internal combustion engines.Financial incentives:Substantial investment in rooftop solar($8.7 bn in 2022,a 42%increase from 2021)due to a rush to lock in net metering incentives before new rules took effect.Co

64、nsumer demand:Customer interest in cleaner alternatives.27Transport.As passenger ZEVs become more viable without state support,CA grant programs have shifted from blanket support for all buyers to 1)supporting disadvantaged communities;2)supporting less commercially mature technologies such as zero-

65、emission heavy-duty trucking;and 3)funding mass transit and active transportation programs.Energy.In energy systems,73%of public climate finance is for purchasing distributed solar systems for public buildings,which can have the additional benefit of reducing costs longer-term.Future public finance.

66、Total public climate finance will likely increase in coming years through increased state budget allocations and federal legislation,although state budget constraints may limit the rate of growth.Public finance is heavily focused on clean transportationFigure 7:California Public Climate Finance by S

67、ector,2021-2022($mn)28Cap-and-trade proceeds were the states largest source of climate finance overall in 2019-2022Cap-and-trade proceeds,which are distributed as grants by California Climate Investments(CCI),were the single largest source of state public climate finance we tracked:CCI-provided proj

68、ect financing declined in 2022 due to the lagged effects of a drop in cap-and-trade auction proceeds early in the COVID-19 pandemic but will likely increase in the next few years given a rebound in auction proceeds in 2021-2023.These funds are catalytic:according to CCI,$9 billion in cap-and-trade f

69、unding has catalyzed$37 billion of additional federal,state,local,and private funding since 2014.General fund infusions to the Transit and Intercity Rail Capital Program and the Active Transportation Program in 2021 and 2022 led to a doubling of the scale of those programs,growth which will continue

70、 over the next five years.Figure 8:California State Climate Finance by Source29Although large counties,like Los Angeles,deploy more climate finance than smaller counties,on a per-capita basis climate finance is fairly evenly distributed across counties.*However,climate finance is not currently being

71、 channeled at a higher rate to those areas with worse current and historical pollution metrics.This indicates further work is needed to ensure disadvantaged communities receive sufficient climate finance to address their needs.An interactive version of this map is available on the CPI website.Climat

72、e finance is distributed relatively evenly per capita by county*Due to data availability,county-level comparisons do not include distributed solar,the Active Transportation Program,or the Transit and Inter-City Rail Capital Program.Based on a comparison of average county-level CalEnviroScreen scores

73、 and per capita climate finance.Using a weighted average of census tracts by county,the correlation between CalEnviroScreen and per capita climate finance is-0.08.30To complement the climate finance trends,we tracked funding to climate-related start-ups and non-profits.*While this funding was primar

74、ily venture capital and private philanthropy,22%of companies and 12%of non-profits received at least one government grant.California climate venture grew 4-fold from 2018-2022 and matched the total public climate finance tracked in 2022($9bn).Despite this growth,Californias portion of total US clima

75、te venture fell from a peak of 50%in 2019 and 2020 to 36%in 2022.California climate philanthropy was at least an order of magnitude less than venture and declined 37%from 2018-2020.It remained relatively constant as a percent of total US climate philanthropy at a level on par with Californias%of the

76、 US population(12%).By sector,California venture funding to Agriculture&Land Use matched or surpassed that to Transport or Energy Systems from 2019 to 2021-driven by large investments in plant-based foods(e.g.Impossible Foods).By 2022 Energy investments grew to almost double those in Agriculture&Lan

77、d Use or Transport.Buildings was the fastest growing venture sector with an over 8-fold increase in funding from 2018-2022.Venture capital to California climate companies reached$9bn in 2022,an average annual growth rate of 50%since 2018*Data were synthesized by Vibrant Data Labs and include pre-see

78、d,seed,early venture,and late venture investments,philanthropic grants,and government grants to California-based,climate-related companies and non-profits.Post-venture funding was excluded.See for data and methods.In all charts the bars are the median(and error bars the interquartile range)estimated

79、 from resampling the data 1,000 times.Sharper philanthropy declines were observed after 2020 likely due to tax filing delays at the time of data collection.Investments and grants were assigned to CPI sectors based on mentions of sector-relevant keywords in the descriptions of each funding recipient.

80、If a recipient matched more than one sector,its total funding was evenly divided across those sectors.Part 4:Conclusion32Given CPIs findings on the growth and distribution of climate finance in California,policymakers,civil society,and the private sector can build on the states progress.1.Develop a

81、comprehensive roadmap to close the climate investment gap in each sector,and implement policies to incentivize the transition to net zero and remove any remaining investment barriers.2.Track the impact of new policies on climate finance trends,and adjust interventions accordingly.3.Identify opportun

82、ities where public and concessional funds can have the biggest impact on increasing overall climate finance,including through pre-development,project preparation,and de-risking,especially for sectors or populations which are currently viewed as commercially unviable by the private sector.Recommendat

83、ions for further action to achieve Californias climate goals33Given current budget constraints,the state should continue to prioritize spending on programs that catalyze investment from the private sector and federal government,and that meet socio-economic policy priorities.This can include funding

84、for:Pre-development to build capacity and develop projects to a stage where they can access private sector or federal government funding,especially in less commercially viable sectors.Bottleneck technologies with relatively low overall needs compared to their benefits such as charging for electric v

85、ehicles($44 million per year through 2035)and transmission for renewable energy($1.1 billion per year).Disadvantaged communities which may not have the resources to make the energy transition on their own and are disproportionately impacted by current emissions.The barrier to expanding finance is no

86、t always more money,as factors such as permitting,electric grid interconnections,coordination between different actors,and the existence of medium-term goals and plans can change the overall cost and risk profile of investments.State government can play a catalyzing role in helping meet climate fina

87、nce needs34A full landscape would build on this beta version to facilitate improved decision-making and prioritization for state policymakers,development banks,and philanthropies.Additional topics CPI could cover in a full landscape include:Climate finance tracking:Adding additional sectors and acto

88、rs,such as private investment in building decarbonization and agriculture,climate finance through local budgets,and all state agencies and expenditures.Needs assessment:Identifying which actors are likely to play a role in each sector;adding sectors without clear decarbonization pathways;analyzing i

89、mpacts of incorporating equity and economic priorities on climate finance needs.Capacity building:Identifying funds that can be used for matching federal funds,building local capacity through technical assistance,and facilitating project development.Level of analysis:Adding regional and sub-county c

90、limate finance tracking and needs assessment,including for specific disadvantaged and tribal communities.A full landscape of California climate finance could increase policy and investment effectivenessclimatepolicyinitiative.orgclimatepolicyclimatepolicyinitiativeLearn more at:climatepolicyinitativ

91、e.org/california-landscape-of-climate-financeAnnex37We tracked funding across different:Sectors(CPIs definitions):Energy Systems,Industry,Waste,Water&Wastewater,Buildings&Infrastructure,Transport,Information&Communications Technology,Agriculture,Forestry,Other land uses&Fisheries,and Others&Cross-Se

92、ctoralActor types:Private,Federal Government,State Government,and Local GovernmentsFinancing instruments:balance sheet-financing(equity and debt),project-level financing(equity and market-rate debt);and grants.The sectoral breakdown is slightly different from other sources(such as the CARB Scoping P

93、lan),but there are only minor discrepancies in what would be categorized as climate finance in past spending.Future budgeted items may require deeper review between definitions,including for example funding for grid reliability and ratepayer support.To provide data on progress towards CAs climate ne

94、eds,we tailored CPIs existing methodology and prioritized the largest sources of finance for the beta version38InstitutionNotable data not included in betaState governmentAll other non-CCI-funded climate-related state programs,including for example:CECs School Bus Replacement Program and Equitable B

95、uilding Decarbonization Program,Safe and Affordable Drinking Water Fund,and flood plain and wetlands restoration programsState expenditures on climate-related activities,such as adaptation(e.g.wildfire fighting and prevention)and ZEV purchases for state fleetsLocal governmentClimate-related bond pro

96、ceeds other than Residential&Commercial Energy Conservation Improvement and Public TransitCity,county,MPO,and other sub-state entity budgetsPrivateEnergy systems:electric transmission&distribution;behind-the-meter battery storageTransport:ZEV medium-and heavy-duty trucksBuilding energy efficiency/el

97、ectrification:heat pumps,heat pump water heaters,electric stoves,etc.Agriculture and land-useNotable data not included in this beta39Data inputs for needs assessmentReferenceScope/coverageLarson et al.,2021.Net-Zero America:Potential Pathways,Infrastructure,and Impacts.Renewable energy,passenger ZEV

98、s,ZEV Chargers DC Fast and Level 2.California Air Resources Board,2022.AB 32 Climate Change Scoping Plan.Renewable energy,passenger ZEVs,medium-and heavy-duty zero-emission trucks,ZEV buses,Natural Working Lands,Buildings&Infrastructure,Methane.California Public Utilities Commission,2023.Fact Sheet:

99、Decision 23-02-040 Ordering Supplemental Mid-Term Reliability Procurement(2026-2027)and Transmitting Electric Resource Portfolios to the California Independent System Operator for the 2023-2024 Transmission Planning Process.Renewable energy.California Independent System Operator,2023.2022-2023 Trans

100、mission Plan.Electricity transmission.California Independent System Operator,2022.2021-2022 Transmission Plan.Electricity transmission.California Independent System Operator,2022.20 Year Transmission Outlook.Electricity transmission.Kevala,2023.Electrification Impacts Study Part I:Bottom-Up Load For

101、ecasting and System-Level Electrification Impacts Cost Estimates.Electricity distribution.The Public Advocates Office,2023.Public Advocates Office Study on the costs of upgrading the distribution grid for electrification.Electricity distribution.California Air Resources Board,2022.Advanced Clean Car

102、s II Regulation.Passenger ZEVs.California Air Resources Board,2020.Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation.Medium-and heavy-duty zero-emission trucks.40ReferenceScope/coverageNational Renewable Energy Laboratory,2022.Annual Technology Baseline.Renewable energy$/MW price.California Energy Commission,2017.Tr

103、ansportation Energy Demand Forecast 2018-2030 Staff Report.Passenger ZEV prices,medium-and heavy-duty zero-emission truck pricesEnergy Information Administration,2023.Annual energy outlook 2023.Passenger ZEV prices.Metropolitan Transit System,2020.Zero-Emission Bus Fleet Transition Study.ZEV bus pri

104、ces.National Renewable Energy Laboratory,2020.Financial Analysis of Battery Electric Transit Buses.ZEV bus prices.World Resources Institute,2019.Cost and Emissions Appraisal Tool for Transit Buses.ZEV bus prices.California Air Resources Board,2021.Draft Advanced Clean Fleets Total Cost of Ownership

105、Discussion Document.Medium-and heavy-duty zero-emission truck prices.International Council on Clean Transportation,2023.Purchase costs of zero-emission trucks in the United States to meet future Phase 3 GHG standards.Medium-and heavy-duty zero-emission truck prices.California Energy Commission.CALeV

106、IP DC Fast Chargers,Average Rebate,Unit Cost,and Total Project Cost per Charger.ZEV Chargers DC Fast and Level 2.U.S.Department of Energy,2015.Costs Associated With Non-Residential Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment.ZEV Chargers DC Fast and Level 2.International Council on Clean Transportation,2021.Charging Up America:Assessing the Growing Need for U.S.Charging Infrastructure Through 2030.ZEV Chargers DC Fast and Level 2.Data inputs for needs assessment