1、Michele Della Vigna,CFA +39 02 8022-2242 Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE-Milan branch EQUITYRESEARCH|October 9,2024|6:00PM CESTGoldman Sachs does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports.As a result,investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest t

2、hat could affect the objectivity of this report.Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures,see the Disclosure Appendix,or go to employed by non-US affiliates are not registered/qualified a

3、s research analysts with FINRA in the U.S.The Goldman Sachs Group,Inc.The GS net zero carbon scenarios a reality checkWe update our paths to net zero carbon that we introduced in June 2021,reflecting rising emissions and coal use since the 2022 energy crisis and material changes to our Carbonomics c

4、ost curve.We now present three global paths for de-carbonization by sector and technology,adding a GS 2.0 scenario alongside our GS 1.5 and GS 2.0 scenarios.We highlight four main changes since 2021:1)The 1.5 scenario would require an acceleration in de-carbonization efforts that we view as increasi

5、ngly difficult to achieve(e.g.global coal retirement by the early 2030s,implying$1.7 trn of stranded assets,and full electrification of auto sales by 2035).2)The more realistic,but still ambitious scenario aligned with 2.0 of global warming would imply lower coal stranded assets,but also a likely ma

6、terial increase in adaptation costs by 2050(vs the 1.5 scenario).3)Tracking the progress by technology,we highlight an acceleration in adoption of EVs,solar and nuclear,while technologies higher on the cost curve have shown slower take-up than expected(hydrogen,carbon capture).4)We see a longer life

7、 for hydrocarbon assets,with peak oil demand occurring beyond 2030 and demand growing for natural gas as a transition fuel until 2050.This implies new greenfield oil&gas developments are likely to be needed beyond 2040.We translate these net zero scenarios into pathways for emission intensity reduct

8、ion for 30 key emitting corporate industries,providing an updated framework for gauging corporate emission reduction targets.CarbonomicsYulia Bocharnikova+971 4 214-Goldman Sachs InternationalQuentin Marbach+44 20 7774-Goldman Sachs InternationalAnastasia Shalaeva+971 4 214-Goldman Sachs Internation

9、alAlberto Gandolfi+39 02 8022-Goldman Sachs Bank Europe SE-Milan branchNikhil Bhandari+65 6889-2867 Goldman Sachs(Singapore)Pte2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953NoteNote:The following is a redacted version of the original report published October 9,2024 100 pgs.Thesis in 18 charts 3 Assessing emission

10、s path developments in 2021-23 versus our 2021 expectations 8 Whats changed compared to the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario?11 Comparing our updated 3 global carbon neutrality scenarios:2.0C,2.0C and 1.5C 24 The investment path:c.US$75 tn infrastructure investment opportunity on the path to carbon neutrality

11、32 Power generation:The critical component in global carbon neutrality 34 Transportation:The rise of EVs and alternative fuels with dif f erent technologies across transport modes 41 Buildings:Fuel switch and ef ficiency to govern emissions reduction path 53 Industry,waste&other fugitive:Clean hydro

12、gen,CCUS,ef ficiency,circular economy and electrification setting the scene for a new industrial technology revolution 55 An ecosystem of key transformational technologies 65 Clean hydrogen:A rising technology with multiple applications 66 Carbon sequestration:CCUS,DACCS and natural sinks all key to

13、 unlocking net zero emissions 71 Fossil fuel investments:Investments in oil and natural gas continue to be needed for at least another decade 80 Natural resources:At the heart of the global net zero evolution 82 Assessing climate damage risks 85 Corporate carbon intensity de-carbonization pathways b

14、y industry consistent with 1.5C,2.0C and 2.0C global warming 87 Disclosure Appendix 96 9 October 2024 2Gol dman SachsCarbonomicsTabl e of Contents 2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Thesis in 18 charts Exhibit 1:Our updated GS 2.0 degrees emissions scenario shows a 66%increase in cumulative emissions v

15、s.our 2021 Paris Agreement-aligned scenario.GS Gl obal net zero carbon scenarios CO2 emissions(MtCO2):2024 vs 2021 scenarios comparison Exhibit 2:.with a slower development of electricity demand,mainly impacted by slower green hydrogen developments.Changes in power generation demand by sector in 202

16、4 GS 2.0 degrees vs 2021 GS 2 degrees scenarios 2222222222222222222222-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,00050,000200020032006200920122015201820212024202720302033203620392042204520482051205420572060206320662069GS global carbon neutrality scenarios CO2 emissions(MtCO2eq)2021 GS 2.0C Net zero by 2060 scenar

17、io2024 GS 2.0C Net zero by 2070 scenario-25%-20%-15%-10%-5%0%5%10%15%20%-25,000-20,000-15,000-10,000-5,00005,00010,00015,00020,0002030204020502060Changes in power generation,TWhBase electricity GDP and efficiencyGreen hydrogenLDVs EvsMDVs EvsElectric railBuildingsIndustryData CentersTotal Power gene

18、ration change(RHS)Source:Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 3:.and solar PV and nuclear surpassing our previous estimates,but slower wind capacity.Gl obal R

19、ES instal l ed capacity,GW:2024 GS 2.0 degrees scenario vs 2021 GS 2 degrees Exhibit 4:We now estimate peak oil demand to take place in the early-2030s.Oil demand(kbpd)under our two highl ighted paths 05,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,000GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0G

20、S212.0GS242.020232030204020502060RES global capacity,GWSolarOnshore windOffshore windNuclear020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Oil demand,kbpdGS21 2.0GS24 2.0Source:Ember,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research

21、Source:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 3Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 5:.while natural gas remains a key transition fuel until late-2040s Natural gas demand(EJ)under our two highl igh

22、ted paths Exhibit 6:We have constructed three global carbon neutrality scenarios:one aspirational scenario consistent with 1.5C global warming by 2100;one consistent with well below 2.0C global warming,in line with the Paris Agreement ambition;and the scenario we see as most realistic,with global ne

23、t zero being achieved by 2070 and global warming reaching 2.0C by 2100,short of the Paris Agreement ambitions GS Gl obal net zero carbon scenarios CO2 emissions(MtCO2)020406080100120140160180200201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Natural gas demand,EJG

24、S21 2.0 scenarioGS24 2.0 scenario-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,00050,0002000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024202620282030203220342036203820402042204420462048205020522054205620582060GS global carbon neutrality scenarios -CO2 emissions(MtCO2eq)GS 2.0CNet zero by 2060 scenarioGS 1.5CNet z

25、ero by 2050 scenarioGS 2.0CNet zero by 2070 scenarioSource:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,GCBExhibit 7:We

26、 believe 1.5 is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve including$1.1 trn of potentially stranded coal assets.Coal-fired power pl ant net retirements(GW)Exhibit 8:.while renewable power grows strongly in all scenarios.RES share in power generation mix,%-50005001000150020002500Before 20252025-2035

27、2035-20452045-2055Beyond 2055Coal-fired power plant net retirements(GW)Natural retirements progressionGS 2.0GS 2.0GS 1.545%75%77%33%53%68%74%28%43%55%66%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%20152017201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Share of Renewables(excl.H

28、ydro)in power generation mix,%GS 1.5CGS 2.0CGS 2.0CSource:IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 4Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 9:.and nat

29、ural gas is most sensitive to the scenarios given its role as a transitional fuel Natural gas demand(EJ)Exhibit 10:We estimate that there exists in aggregate a c.US$74.6 tn investment opportunity across sectors on the path to global net zero by 2070 Cumul ative investment opportunity across sectors

30、for our GS 2.0 gl obal net zero by 2070 scenario(US$tn)020406080100120140160180201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Natural gas demand(EJ)GS 2.0GS 1.5GS 2.011.1 9.5 6.6 1.4 0.8 3.3 4.0 7.0 5.1 3.7 1.9 1.3 9.3 4.0 4.5 0.9 74.6 -10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Ren

31、ewablepowerNaturalgaspower(incl.CCUSretrofit)NuclearpowerPowernetworksEnergystorage(batteries)Transportinfra.(EVs,FCEVs)BiofuelsH2plantsIndustrialprocessesincl.CCUSBuildingupgrades(heat pumps,hydrogenpipelines)DACCSNaturalsinksCumulativeGS 2.0pathinvestmentsto 2070Global cumulative investments for n

32、et zero by 2070(US$tn)Solar PVOnshore windOffshore windHydroelectricOther RES(geothermal,biomass)Source:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 11:Based on our global net zero by 2070 path,power generation demand increases three-fold to 2070.G

33、l obal el ectricity generation(TWh)Exhibit 12:.as it forms a critical part of the de-carbonization route for other sectors Gl obal el ectricity generation bridge to 2070E(TWh)020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000200020032006200920122015201820212024202720302033203620392042204520482051205420572060206320662

34、069Power generation(TWh)CoalPetroleum LiquidsNatural Gas(and other gas)NG/Coal+CCUSNuclearHydroelectric ConventionalSolar PV Onshore wind Offshore windBiomass&geothermalOther(incl.pumped hydro,waste etc)H2CGGTGS projections29,9252,97822,8667,152 11,32411,33211,22496,801020,00040,00060,00080,000100,0

35、00120,000Global 2023electricitygen.Baseelectricityincorporatingeff.improvementsElectr.oftransportBuildingselectr.Industryelectr.(heat)GreenH2DatacentersGlobalpowergenerationin net zeroby 2070Global power generation(TWh)Source:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Gl

36、obal Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,Ember9 October 2024 5Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 13:Transportation mostly sits in the high-cost area of our de-carbonization cost curve.2023 carbon abatement cost curve for anthropogenic GH

37、G emissions,based on current technol ogies and current costs,assuming economies of scal e for technol ogies in the pil ot phase Exhibit 14:.while renewable power(mostly wind)is seeing a temporary set-back due to higher rates.LCOE for sol ar PV,wind onshore and wind offshore for sel ect regions,%redu

38、ction spl it by operational and financial -20002004006008001,0001,2001,400048121620242832364044485256Carbon abatement cost(US$/tnCO2eq)GHG emissions abatement potential (Gt CO2eq)Power generation(coal switch to gas&renewables)Transport(road,aviation,shipping)Industry(iron&steel,cement,chemicals and

39、other)Buildings(residential&commercial)Agriculture,forestry&other land uses(AFOLU)-61%-28%-18%0%-3%-7%-70%-60%-50%-40%-30%-20%-10%0%10%20%2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024ERenewables LCOE%reduction(from 2010 base)split between operational and financial Solar

40、PV-operational reductionSolar PV-financial reductionOnshore wind-operational reductionOnshore wind-financial reductionOffshore wind-operational reductionOffshore wind-financial reductionSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 15:Biofuel

41、s have scope to de-carbonize transportation within current infrastructure Liquid fuel s GHG intensity,gCO2e/MJ Exhibit 16:Carbon sequestration remains a core part of the net zero solution Carbon sequestration cost curve(US$/tnCO2eq)and the GHG emissions abatement potential (GtCO2eq)94929086785516100

42、%fossil5%biodiesel5%RD10%RD20%RD50%RD100%RD-82%GHG intensity reduction050100150200250300350400024681012141618202224262830323436Cost per tonne CO2 sequestered(US$/tnCO2)CO2 capture potential(GtCO2)Iron&Steel CCSLow costreforestation,afforestation&agro-forestry12Natural gasprocessingCCS3Medium cost fo

43、restry(A/R,agro)4Fertilizer&chemicals production CCS56High cost forestry(A/R,agro)Coal PC CCS 7IGCCCCS8NGCC CCS9Cement CCS10Direct Air Capture(DACCS)*Bioenergy CCS(BECCS)*1)Natural sinks:occupyingthe lowest end of the sequestration cost curve2)Industrial CCUS:varying costs that are inversely related

44、 to the carbon concentration of the stream3)Direct air carbon capture&storage(DACCS):the wild card technology that could unlock almost infinitely scalable de-carbonization potentialRD is renewable diesel,GHG int ensit y is based on used cooking oil feedst ock Source:EU RED II Direct ive,compiled by

45、Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research*Indicat es t echnologies primarily in early development/pilot phase wit h wide variabilit y in t he est imat es of cost s.Source:IPCC,Global CCS Inst it ut e,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 6Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c

46、7303f5a989d953Exhibit 17:We estimate that investments in oil will continue to be needed beyond 2040.Total Oil production required to satisfy demand,incl uding natural decl ine rate Exhibit 18:.and towards 2050 for natural gas Total Gas production required to satisfy demand,incl uding natural decl in

47、e rate 02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00020242025202620272028202920302031203220332034203520362037203820392040Oil supply and demand(mn blpd)Growth from shaleOPEC spare capacityGrowth from committed greenfields(OPEC and non-OPEC)BrownfieldsTotal Oil production required to satisfy demand,including natural dec

48、line rateRequiredGreenfield investmentsGS 2.0GS 2.0GS 1.5-5,000-4,000-3,000-2,000-1,00001,0002,0003,0004,0005,00020242025202620272028202920302031203220332034203520362037203820392040Gas supply and demand Growth from committed greenfields and brownfields ramp-upBrownfieldsTotal Gas production required

49、 to satisfy demand,including natural decline rateRequiredGS 2.0GS 2.0GS 1.5Source:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 7Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Assessing emissions path devel opments in 2021-23 versus

50、 our 2021 expectations In our 2021 Carbonomics report,we presented our modeling of the paths to net zero carbon,outlining two global scenarios of de-carbonization by sector and technology,leveraging our Carbonomics cost curve.Back then,we presented a scenario consistent with the Paris Agreements goa

51、l to keep global warming well below 2C(GS 2400GW by 2023,exceeding the initially expected c.2200GW,mainly driven by the rapid acceleration of solar power installed capacity,which expanded significantly in 2023,accounting for c.75%of total renewable capacity additions for that year.Global capacity ad

52、ditions of wind and solar PV reached a record of almost 462 GW in 2023,up 67%from the level of 2022.China stood at the forefront of the renewables capacity expansion last year,contributing as much solar PV as the entire world did in 2022.Growth in nuclear power capacity also surpassed our 2021 proje

53、ctions,reaching 400GW by 2023,which can be explained by the revival of global interest in nuclear energy,with many countries planning and starting nuclear power programmes to reach climate policy objectives.At the same time,fossil-fuel power generation remained resilient in 2022-23 amid higher gas p

54、rices and lower hydropower output due to the droughts in 2023.China and India saw substantial increases in emissions from coal combustion,driven by reduced hydropower generation and strong electricity demand growth,which were only partially of fset by declines in advanced economies,preventing a decl

55、ine in global emissions in the electricity sector.In Transport,EV(BEV and PHEV)penetration in passenger car sales in 2021-23 overshot our 2021 expectations,primarily due to faster-than-expected EV penetration in China.In 2023,the global EV share in passenger car sales reached 16%compared with 10%bas

56、ed on our 2021 expectation.China became a leader in EV penetration with c.35%EV sales share in 2023,significantly exceeding the 13%projection of our global9 October 2024 8Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Auto team,supported by government subsidies,tax breaks and other policy

57、incentives,as well as a number of homegrown EV brands.At the same time,we note lower fuel efficiency savings in ICE cars and higher-than-expected adoption of hybrids due to their significant advantage in payback period compared to EV.Overall,transport CO2 emissions in 2021-23 overshot our 2021 forec

58、asts by c.1.5%,or 360 mn t.In Industry,CO2 emissions in 2021-23 came in broadly in line with our expectations,with weaker-than-expected industrial production of fsetting slower-than-expected adoption of several green technologies,especially green hydrogen and carbon capture.In Agriculture(including

59、LULUCF),CO2 emissions remained almost unchanged in 2021-23,higher than we had forecast.The trend for AFOLU remains more uncertain,due to the multitude of drivers that af f ect emissions and removals for land use,land-use change and forestry.Buildings was the only sector to see emissions fall at the

60、global level,decreasing by 2%in 2021-23,surpassing the 1%decrease we previously expected.In Buildings,we have seen faster-than-expected deployment of low-carbon technologies,including heat pumps and renewables,and lower gas consumption owing to milder temperatures experienced in 2023.The share of lo

61、w-carbon energy sources reached 41%by 2023 vs the 36%that we had projected in the previous edition of this report.Exhibit 19:CO2 emissions overshot our 2021 expectations,primarily in power generation,land use and transport Emissions CO2 by sector incl.LUFUC 2021 projections versus historical data 1.

62、81.513.612.913.212.912.58.27.37.67.88.012.612.212.312.412.33.63.53.63.63.64.44.43.93.63.442.540.240.640.339.8051015202530354045201920202021E2022E2023EGtPower generationTransportIndustryBuildingsAgriculture2021 projections13.613.614.514.714.98.27.17.68.08.412.611.812.312.312.33.63.33.43.43.34.44.44.5

63、4.54.442.540.242.442.843.40510152025303540455020192020202120222023GtPower generationTransportIndustryBuildingsAgriculture2021-23 historical dataSource:Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 5.0,FAO,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 9Gol dman S

64、achsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 20:Comparison of 2021-23-25E scenarios;2024 and 2021 editions 2021E2023E2025E202120232025ESummary:total CO2 emissions(MtCO2)Power generation13,22812,54011,52014,53314,87214,885decelerationTransport7,5958,0317,9847,6108,3328,494decelerationIndust

65、ry12,29412,34312,18812,34912,35012,325decelerationBuildings3,5863,5633,4633,4403,3503,302accelerationAFOLU3,9183,3532,7694,4724,4484,359decelerationTotal40,62139,83137,92442,40443,35243,366Power generationPower generation,TWh28,67330,12031,00728,54829,92532,070Power mix,%Coal36%33%30%36%35%33%decele

66、rationGas27%27%27%23%23%22%accelerationRenewables(wind,solar,biomass)12%15%18%13%16%19%accelerationNuclear9%8%8%10%9%9%accelerationGeneration capacity,GWSolar8851,2121,5728741,4192,097accelerationOnshore wind8049611,1287709451,125decelerationOffshore wind4153655473105accelerationNuclear4013903824024

67、00422accelerationTransportLDV sales mixICE+HEV share94%90%82%92%84%78%BEV+PHEV share6%10%18%8%16%22%accelerationHDV sales mixICE share100%100%99%99%98%95%BEV+FCEV share0%0%1%1%2%5%accelerationLDV fleet,mn units1,2721,3151,3621,2681,2971,367ICE+HEV1,2581,2851,3021,2521,2561,288BEV+PHEV143059164078HDV

68、 fleet,mn units414446727071ICE414446716970BEV+FCEV000112IndustryVolumes,mn tIron&steel1,7731,8841,9171,9601,8881,910Non-metallic minerals(lime,clay,cement)4,0724,0904,1054,2714,1004,147Aluminium981031099497103Chems-ammonia187200211183191199Chems-methanol107112117107108114Chems-HVCs254269282282294312

69、Share of CCUS,hydrogen,electricity,bioenergy%Iron&steel30%31%34%30%28%31%decelerationNon-metallic minerals(lime,clay,cement)1%2%3%2%4%6%accelerationAluminium33%33%33%28%27%28%decelerationChems-ammonia1%1%2%1%1%2%Chems-methanol0%0%1%0%0%0%Chems-HVCs2%5%7%0%1%2%BuildingsShare of electricity,bioenergy,

70、renewables%35%36%37%39%41%43%accelerationCCUSCarbon captured annually,mn t49140236101653decelerationHydrogenGreen hydrogen demand,mn t259001deceleration2021 edition(2.0C)2024 edition(2.0C)Trend*accelerat ion/decelerat ion st and for t he t raj ect ory of t he decarbonizat ion t rend Source:Goldman S

71、achs Global Invest ment Research,Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Ember,Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy9 October 2024 10Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Whats changed compared to the 2021 GS 2.0C scena

72、rio?As described in the previous section of this report,over the last three years,total global CO2 emissions have continued to rise,reaching a record high level of 43.2 Gt in 2023,contrary to our previous projections.Since our 2021 report,the energy sector has faced many changes,including the global

73、 energy crisis,accelerated by Russias invasion of Ukraine.This has spurred many countries,especially in Europe,to adapt to the reshaped energy world:the last two years have seen remarkable progress in developing and deploying some key clean energy technologies.This 2024 update of our GS global emiss

74、ions path sets out a revised trajectory to net zero by 2070,taking into account key developments that have occurred since 2021.In this section,we compare our new GS 2.0 scenario a more realistic,but still ambitious path to global net zero by 2070 with the previous GS 2.0 scenario,a path consistent w

75、ith global net zero by2060.Exhibit 21:2024 update of our GS global emissions path sets out a revised trajectory to net zero by 2070 GS Gl obal net zero carbon scenarios CO2 emissions(MtCO2):comparison of 2024 and 2021 most real istic,but stil l ambitious scenarios 50 000-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,

76、00050,000200020022004200620082010201220142016201820202022202420262028203020322034203620382040204220442046204820502052205420562058206020622064206620682070GS global carbon neutrality scenarios CO2 emissions(MtCO2eq)2021 GS 2.0C Net zero by 2060 scenario2024 GS 2.0C Net zero by 2070 scenarioSource:Emis

77、sion Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 11Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 22:Comparison of 2030-40-50-60E scenarios;2024 and 2021 editions 2030E2040E2050E2060E2030E2040E2050

78、E2060ESummary:total CO2 emissions(MtCO2)Power generation9,7585,8871,66117513,4909,1846,8014,682decelerationTransport7,4054,8781,7643688,5707,9136,0793,782decelerationIndustry11,2926,9133,29989312,0049,5086,1413,636decelerationBuildings2,9891,291148153,0812,1831,306670decelerationAFOLU1,392-1,476-2,6

79、60-2,6603,7632,060-237-2,851decelerationTotal32,83617,4944,212-1,20940,90830,84720,0909,918decelerationPower generationPower generation,TWh34,76356,74677,64383,30736,57249,73865,22981,820decelerationPower mix,%Coal23%6%0%0%28%15%7%4%decelerationGas27%19%5%0%20%18%14%7%mixedRenewables(wind,solar,biom

80、ass)25%45%65%73%28%43%55%66%mixedNuclear6%7%7%6%9%9%9%9%accelerationGeneration capacity,GWSolar2,6896,85313,74016,6924,2458,76013,93519,887accelerationOnshore wind1,5994,0837,5388,8821,6452,8984,6436,845decelerationOffshore wind1129852,6443,3571867671,8702,860decelerationNuclear360632870812462622816

81、1,023mixedTransport58%28%1%19%LDV sales mixICE+HEV share60%6%0%0%57%29%0%0%BEV+PHEV share40%94%100%100%43%71%100%100%mixedHDV sales mixICE share95%37%0%0%83%36%11%0%BEV+FCEV share5%63%100%100%17%64%89%100%accelerationLDV fleet,mn units1,4431,7322,1772,7231,5752,0792,4312,860ICE+HEV1,22970313801,3291

82、,236840512BEV+PHEV2141,0292,0402,7232468431,5912,348decelerationHDV fleet,mn units526480967399148188ICE515017368594730BEV+FCEV1146393640101159accelerationIndustryVolumes,mn tIron&steel1,9822,0422,0942,1471,9552,0152,0662,118Non-metallic minerals(lime,clay,cement)4,1384,1744,1864,1904,2494,3634,4034,

83、417Aluminium121149185229119152194249Chems-ammonia242354570730219267326397Chems-methanol127152180214126154187229Chems-HVCs314387478591351444503521Share of CCUS,hydrogen,electricity,bioenergy%Iron&steel44%73%94%100%42%73%93%100%decelerationNon-metallic minerals(lime,clay,cement)4%21%62%97%11%37%70%95%

84、accelerationAluminium35%39%46%63%30%38%60%74%mixedChems-ammonia7%34%63%98%7%31%48%75%decelerationChems-methanol4%23%60%98%5%23%43%71%decelerationChems-HVCs13%30%50%66%5%26%56%75%BuildingsShare of electricity,bioenergy,renewables%42%70%94%99%47%59%72%84%decelerationCCUSCarbon captured annually,mn t69

85、13,9296,7667,7201932,0104,0685,935decelerationHydrogenGreen hydrogen demand,mn t2413529937583884145deceleration2021 edition(2.0C)2024 edition(2.0C)Trend*accelerat ion/decelerat ion st and for t he t raj ect ory of t he decarbonizat ion t rend Source:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,Emission

86、 Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Ember,Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy9 October 2024 12Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Power generation Global electricity generation increases by c.2.7 times by 2060 vs 2023 i

87、n the GS 2024 base scenario(vs 2.8 times in our previous report).We see total electricity demand growing faster by the end of the decade,with an average annual growth rate of c.3%vs c.2%expected before,reflecting near-term rapid acceleration of Chinese electricitydemand on the back of increased elec

88、trification in the transport,buildings and industrysectors.Despite slightly higher power generation in the near term,we see slowerdevelopment of electricity demand in the longer term,mainly impacted by significantlyslower clean hydrogen development and slower adoption of EVs and heat pumps after2030

89、,partly offset by the new rising source of electricity consumption data centersand cryptocurrencies.We estimate electricity consumption of data centres(includingcryptocurrencies)to account for about c.2%of global electricity demand in 2030,potentially rising to c.10%by 2060.The 2024 GS 2.0 degrees s

90、cenario,a more realistic,but still ambitious path,assumes a slower pace of transition towards non-fossil energy sources:until 2030,we project the same split between fossil and clean energy sources as we had in the 2021 GS 2.0 pathway,with the share of non-fossil fuel reaching c.50%by 2030.However,lo

91、w-emission sources of electricity renewables,nuclear and hydrogen expand at a less rapid pace thereaf ter vs our 2021 assumptions,overtaking unabated fossil fuels just af ter 2030 and reaching 75%of total generation by 2050 and c.84%by 2060.Besides the smaller share of renewables in the power genera

92、tion mix,we assume that natural gas plays less of a role,as a swing producer,until 2040 due to the slower phase-out of coal in the 2024 scenario than in the 2021 version.We have lowered natural gass share in power generation from 27%to 20%in 2030 driven by the increased share of coal from 23%to 28%o

93、n the back of the continuing growth observed in coal-fired power generation in the last three years,partly caused by the energy crisis and record-high natural gas prices.However,starting from 2050,we Exhibit 23:Global electricity generation increases by c.2.7 times by 2060 vs 2023 in our GS 2024 bas

94、e scenario(vs 2.8 times in our previous report)Power generation(TWh):2024 GS 2.0 degrees scenario vs 2021 GS 2 degrees Exhibit 24:We see slower development of electricity demand in the longer term,mainly impacted by slower clean hydrogen development and slower adoption of EVs and heat pumps after 20

95、30,partly offset by the new rising source of electricity consumption-data centers and cryptocurrencies Changes in power generation demand by sector in 2024 GS 2.0 degrees scenario vs 2021 GS 2 degrees 010,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,00020192021202320252027202920312033203520372039

96、2041204320452047204920512053205520572059Power generation(TWh)GS21 2.0 scenarioGS24 base scenario-25%-20%-15%-10%-5%0%5%10%15%20%-25,000-20,000-15,000-10,000-5,00005,00010,00015,00020,0002030204020502060Changes in power generation,TWhBase electricity GDP and efficiencyGreen hydrogenLDVs EvsMDVs EvsEl

97、ectric railBuildingsIndustryData CentersTotal Power generation change(RHS)Source:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 13Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d9

98、53attribute a higher share in the power generation mix to natural gas(14%in 2050 and 7%in 2060 vs 5%and 0%,respectively,in our 2021 report)due to the more gradual phase-out of gas and slower adoption of clean electricity sources.We expect global RES capacity additions to diverge from our 2021 GS 2.0

99、C scenario,with solar PV and nuclear capacity additions surpassing our previous estimates,but a slower pace of wind capacity developments Our 2024 GS net zero path includes a faster and larger increase in solar PV capacity than the 2021 version.Solar PV capacity is c.60%and c.19%higher in 2030E and

100、2060E,respectively,than in the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario,reflecting recent market acceleration and the rapid scaling up of manufacturing capabilities.We also expect the increased interest in nuclear power observed in the last two years to continue,with growing acceptance of the need for nuclear energy a

101、s part of de-carbonization efforts.In particular,at COP28,more than 20 countries launched a declaration to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050 vs 2020.We project global installed nuclear power capacity to double by 2050 vs 2020,exceeding our previous estimates by c.30%in 2030/60,reflecting streng

102、thened policy support in leading markets and small modular reactors paving the way for a nuclear energy revival.On the other hand,we project a deceleration in wind power generation,with global installed capacity c.20%lower by 2060 than in our 2021 report due to a tough macroeconomic environment.The

103、wind industry,especially in Europe and North America,is facing challenges owing to a combination of ongoing supply chain disruptions,higher costs and long permitting timelines.Reflecting these challenges,we have lowered our forecasts for onshore and of fshore wind additions as overall project develo

104、pment has been slower than expected.Hydrogen and fossil fuels with carbon capture also play a smaller role than in our 2021 report as a result of continuing high costs and a smaller-than-expected number of projects.Exhibit 25:The 2024 GS 2.0 degrees scenario assumes a slower pace of transition towar

105、ds non-fossil energy sources Power generation mix(%):2024 GS 2.0 degrees vs 2021 GS 2 degrees 61%61%52%51%31%36%12%25%6%16%39%39%48%49%69%64%88%75%94%84%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.020232030204020502060Power generation mix,%Fo

106、ssil fuelNon-fossil fuelSource:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 14Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953We estimate a 1.8x increase in power generation emissions vs the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario Overall,w

107、e expect growth in CO2 emissions from power generation,with cumulative CO2 emissions from 2024 to 2060 increasing by 1.8x vs the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario,driven by a higher share of fossil fuels in the energy mix.We now project 2025 as the first year when the trend reverses and power generation emissio

108、ns start to drop consistently,while previously we had 2022 as a starting point for emissions reduction.While in the previous scenario,power generation was one of the fastest sectors to de-carbonize and become almost emissions-free by 2060,we now model some emissions in 2070 due to the unabated fossi

109、l fuels such as coal and natural gas consumed in emerging markets and developing economies,which still account for c.7%of the power generation mix(incl.fossil fuels equipped with CCUS).The total carbon budget allocation to the sector is 431Gt,representing 35%of the total carbon budget to 2070,while

110、in the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario,power generation contributed c.246Gt to RCB(Remaining Carbon Budget).Exhibit 26:Solar PV and nuclear capacity additions surpass our previous estimates,but wind capacity shows a slower pace of development Gl obal RES instal l ed capacity,GW:2024 2.0 degrees scenario vs 20

111、21 GS 2 degrees 05,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,000GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.020232030204020502060RES global capacity,GWSolarOnshore windOffshore windNuclearSource:Ember,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 15Gol dman SachsCarbonom

112、ics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Transport In the transport sector,EV(BEV and PHEV)penetration in passenger car sales in 2021-23 overshot our 2021 expectations primarily due to faster-than-expected EV penetration in China.In 2023,the global EV share in passenger car sales reached 16%compared with

113、our 10%expectation in 2021.China became a leader in EV penetration with c.35%EV sales share in 2023,significantly exceeding the 13%projection of our global Auto team,supported by government subsidies,tax breaks and other policy incentives,as well as a number of homegrown EV brands.Our global Auto te

114、am now expect the EV sales share in China to reach 80%in 2030(vs a previous expectation of 35%)and 99%in 2040(previously expected at 67%).The US and Europe have slightly undershot their EV expectations(Exhibit 30 and Exhibit 31),and they have lowered their 2024-2027 EV penetration forecasts to accou

115、nt for the recent slowdown in EV sales(link),with several automakers having said that concerns about driving range and charging infrastructure are increasing.Overall,the 2024 GS net zero path includes faster EV penetration by 2030 than the 2021 version,primarily due to higher EV adoption in China,an

116、d slower adoption post 2030,as we moderate our assumptions for the rest of the world:we now model EV sales share reaching 100%globally in 2050 vs 2042 before(Exhibit 28).Exhibit 27:We estimate a 1.8x increase in power generation emissions to 2060 vs the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario Power generation CO2 emi

117、ssions(GtCO2):2024 vs 2021 comparison 1405101520253035404550Total CO2 emissions(GtCO2)0246810121416201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Power generation CO2 emissions(GtCO2)GS21 2.0 scenarioGS24 2.0 scenarioSource:Emission Dat abase for Global At mosphe

118、ric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 16Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953With regard to our global car fleet forecast,we leverage the analysis of our APAC Energy team and their global ROAD(Refining Oil Auto Demand)to ac

119、count for global passenger vehicle fleet growth and increased vehicle ownership in EM.Our APAC Energy team expect the global passenger vehicle fleet to grow at a c.3%CAGR in 2024-2030E,supported by India,where the adoption of 4-wheel cars is set to accelerate,and vehicles penetration to increase fro

120、m 40/thousand people to almost 100 by 2040E(180 global average in 2023 and c.600-700 in DM),as well as China,where they expect vehicle penetration to increase from 200/thousand people to almost 350 by 2040.Therefore,the 2024 GS net zero path envisages global ICE fleet growth of c.6%by 2030 vs a decl

121、ine of 4%in our 2021 edition,and a much slower phase-out of ICE cars post 2030 than previously expected(see Exhibit 33);this results in higher oil demand and higher transport emissions than previously expected:cumulative CO2 emissions from 2024 to 2060 increase by 70%vs the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario(Exh

122、ibit 32).Exhibit 28:2024 GS net zero path includes faster EV penetration by 2030 than the 2021 version,and slower adoption post 2030 Gl obal EV(BEV+PHEV)share in LDV sal es,2024 vs 2021 projections comparison Exhibit 29:China far overshot our 2021 EV sales expectations China EV(BEV+PHEV)share in LDV

123、 sal es,2024 vs 2021 projections comparison(Powertrain model)90%84%60%57%6%29%10%16%40%43%94%71%100%100%100%100%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.020232030204020502060Global passenger car sales mix,%ICE+HEVEV+PHEV0%10%20%30%40%50%60

124、%70%80%90%100%China EV(BEV+PHEV)sales share(2021)China EV(BEV+PHEV)sales share(2024)Source:BNEF,IHS Global Insight,MarkLines,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:BNEF,IHS Global Insight,MarkLines,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 30:Our global Autos team now model lower EV

125、sales share in the US in 2024-28 than they did in 2021 US EV(BEV+PHEV)share in LDV sal es,2024 vs 2021 projections comparison(Powertrain model)Exhibit 31:Europe EV penetration has been roughly in line with expectations;we model some slowdown in 2024-25 before penetration accelerates and reaches 100%

126、by 2035E Europe EV(BEV+PHEV)share in LDV sal es,2024 vs 2021 projections comparison(Powertrain model)0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%US EV(BEV+PHEV)sales share(2021)US EV(BEV+PHEV)sales share(2024)0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Europe EV(BEV+PHEV)sales share(2021)Europe EV(BEV+PHEV)sales share(20

127、24)Source:BNEF,IHS Global Insight,MarkLines,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:BNEF,IHS Global Insight,MarkLines,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 17Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 32:Cumulative CO2 emissions from 2024 to 2060 incre

128、ase by 70%vs the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario Transport CO2 emissions(GtCO2):2024 vs 2021 comparison Exhibit 33:We increase our estimates for the I CE fleet in line with our APAC energy teams projections Gl obal car fleet spl it,bn units,2024 vs 2021 projections comparison 0.01.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.0201

129、920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Transport CO2 emissions(GtCO2)GS21 2.0 scenarioGS24 2.0 scenario1.31.31.21.30.71.20.10.80.00.50.20.21.00.82.01.62.72.30.00.51.01.52.02.53.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.0GS212.0GS242.02023203020

130、4020502060Car global fleet,bn unitsICE+HEVEV+PHEVSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 34:The global passenger vehicle fleet could continue to grow at a c.3%CAGR Exhibit 35:I ndias adoption of 4-wheel cars is set to accelerate as inco

131、me grows-5%0%5%10%15%20%25%30%20062011201620212026E2031E2036Eyoy%Global:passenger car ownership implied by income growthWorldIndiaChina0204060801002010201520202025E2030E2035E2040EVehicle/th people India:passenger vehicle ownership(4 wheel)Calculated historicalGSeTypical S-shaped curve impliedDM typi

132、cal S-shaped curve(+/-1 SD range)Source:Respect ive government st at ist ics agencies,World Bank,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:SIAM,World Bank,Wind,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 36:For China,vehicles penetration is set to increase from 200/thousand people to almo

133、st 350 by 2040E Exhibit 37:Typical S-shape curve for vehicle ownership from the historical data of developed economies 05010015020025030035040045050020022007201220172022E2027E2032E2037EVehicle/th people China:passenger vehicle ownershipReported(NBS)GSeTypical S-shaped curve impliedDM typical S-shape

134、d curve(+/-1 SD range)010020030040050060070080090005,00010,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000Vehicle/th peopleGDP per capita(constant 2015 US$,adjusted for car price)Developed markets:passenger vehicle ownership vs.incomeSwitzerlandNorwayIrelandBelgiumDenmarkGermanyUSFinland

135、UKKoreaJapanAustriaSwedenNetherlandsAverage&+/-1SD range(excluding the maximum and minimum outliers)Source:NBS,World Bank,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchThe average line represent s t he simple average of sample DMs Source:Respect ive government st at ist ics agencies,World Bank,Goldman Sa

136、chs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 18Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Buildings In the buildings sector,the main changes are a slower switch from natural gas to electricity,which primarily reflects a slower take-up of heat pumps and slower adoption of clean hydroge

137、n in heating.By 2030,we project faster than previously expected deployment of clean energy sources in buildings,including heat pumps,hydrogen and renewables;we now assume the share of low-carbon energy sources reaches 47%by 2030 vs a 42%projection in our 2021 report.However,in the long term,we forec

138、ast slower adoption of low-carbon energy,reaching c.84%by 2060 vs our previous assumption of c.99%,reflecting the challenges of retrofitting old buildings with heat pumps especially in emerging markets.A higher share of low-carbon energy sources by 2030 leads to lower emissions from buildings vs the

139、 2021 GS 2.0C scenario;however,when the trend reverses,CO2 emissions start to surpass our previous estimates,with a more gradual reduction than previously expected(average annual decline rate of 4%vs 13%before).Overall,we forecast growth in CO2 emissions from the buildings sector,with cumulative CO2

140、 emissions from 2024 to 2060 increasing by 1.5x vs the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario.The total carbon budget allocation to the sector is 94Gt,representing c.7%of the total carbon budget to 2070,while in the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario,power generation contributed c.64Gt to Remaining Carbon Budget(RCB).Hydrogen In

141、 the 2021 GS 600 Mtpa,with clean hydrogen contributing c.20%of global de-carbonization.However,during the last year,we have observed some slowdown in the development of hydrogen projects driven by the high interest rate environment,more expensive renewable power generation and uncertainty associated

142、 with the publication of conditions to qualify for 45V incentives under the US IRA.We are reflecting this slowdown in our global hydrogen demand forecasts,and now Exhibit 38:I n the buildings sector,the main changes are a slower switch from natural gas to electricity,which primarily reflects a slowe

143、r take-up of heat pumps and slower adoption of clean hydrogen in heating Buil dings final energy consumption mix 2024 vs 2021 scenarios comparison,%Exhibit 39:We expect growth in CO2 emissions from the buildings sector,with cumulative CO2 emissions from 2024 to 2060 increasing by 1.5x vs the 2021 GS

144、 2.0C scenario Buil dings CO2 emissions(GtCO2):2024 vs 2021 comparison 36%42%70%94%99%41%47%59%72%84%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%2023203020402050206020232030204020502060GS21 2.0GS24 2.0Buildings final energy consumption,%CoalOilNatural gasOtherElectricityRenewablesHydrogenClean energy(heat pump

145、s,H2,RES)011223344201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Buildings CO2 emissions(GtCO2)GS21 470 Mtpa,with clean hydrogen contributing c.12%of global de-carbonization.The slowdown in FID and development of H2 projects has been observed across almost all in

146、dustries.In transport,we have revised down consumption of hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels,with the share of FCEVs in the HDV sales mix reaching c.17%by 2060 vs c.55%in our previous scenario.A similar downward revision was also applied to hydrogen use in buildings:the share of hydrogen in the build

147、ings energy consumption mix has decreased from c.9%in 2060 based on our 2021 report to 4%in our 2024 GS 2.0 degrees scenario.We have also diminished the role of H2CGGT in the power generation mix,reducing its share from 4%to 3%in 2050.In contrast,we see more demand in industry for hydrogen,with the

148、number of project announcements for hydrogen-based direct reduced iron(DRI)steel production increasing significantly since 2021;this is reflected in growth in the assumed share of H2 DRI-EAF in the technology mix of iron and steel production,from 26%in 2060 as of 2021 to c.50%in our 2024 2.0 degrees

149、 scenario.Overall,we now expect lower global demand for green hydrogen than we did previously.On average,the decrease is c.70%in annual global green H2 demand by 2060 between the two scenarios,impacted by lower total hydrogen demand and a smaller share of green hydrogen in clean hydrogen,in particul

150、ar.CCUS In the 2021 GS 470 Mtpa Changes in hydrogen demand by sector in 2024 2.0 degrees scenario vs 2021 GS 2 degrees,mtpa Exhibit 41:The average decrease is c.70%in annual global green H2 demand by 2060 between the two scenarios Green hydrogen demand,mtpa-50%-40%-30%-20%-10%0%10%-250-200-150-100-5

151、00501002030204020502060Changes in hydrogen demand,mtpaIndustrial energyIndustrial feedstockTransport(heavy duty vehicles,long-haul rail etc)Power generation(energy storage,buffering)Buildings heatBase hydrogen demandTotal hydrogen demand change(RHS)050100150200250300350400202120232025202720292031203

152、32035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Green hydrogen demand,mtpa20212024Source:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 20Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953advanced to operation given a c.7-year

153、average development time.We continue to believe CCUS technology will play a meaningful role in reaching net zero,especially in hard-to-abate industries(cement,steel,chemicals),but we moderate the pace of adoption to account for the slower growth seen so far.We now forecast c.200 mtpa of carbon captu

154、red by 2030(vs 690 mtpa before),2 Gt by 2040(4 Gt before)and 4 Gt by 2050(6.7 Gt before).I ncreased role of fossil fuels in the energy mix In the exhibits that follow,we present the total oil,natural gas and coal demand under the two paths we focus on here(2021 GS 2.0 and 2024 GS 2.0).In the case of

155、 oil,our 2024 GS 2.0 scenario envisions significantly higher oil demand until 2060 compared with the 2021 GS 2.0 scenario(Exhibit 44),primarily driven by higher oil product consumption in light-duty vehicles(Exhibit 45)as we revise up our ICE fleet forecast(see Transport section for more details).We

156、 now expect oil demand to peak in the early 2030s compared with 2023 before.The case of natural gas on the other hand is dif f erent,with total demand for natural gas lower in the 2024 GS 2.0 scenario than the 2021 GS 2.0 scenario until 2043,mainly on the back of lower demand in power generation due

157、 to the increased role of coal-fired power generation,as well as the smaller role of carbon-capture in reducing emissions from fossil fuel power plants given the lack of new projects.However,we see a reversal of the trend from the early 2040s,with total natural gas demand surpassing our previous est

158、imates in the 2021 GS 2.0 path given both the larger carbon budget and the extra available decade to achieve global net zero,which enables a smoother and less abrupt transition.Such a transition appears more realistically achievable under the current economic and policy frameworks in place globally,

159、compared with the 2021 GS 2.0 scenario.In the case of coal,overall demand is higher in our 2024 GS 2.0 scenario,with this scenario allowing the flexibility for a slower demand decline compared with the 2021 GS 2.0 scenario.The increase in coal demand between the two scenarios is predominantly driven

160、 by a higher share of coal in the power generation mix.Exhibit 42:The pipeline of commercial CCS facilities in development,construction and operation increased to 361 mtpa in 2023 Annual CO2 capture&storage capacity from l arge-scal e CCS facil ities Exhibit 43:We moderate the pace of adoption to ac

161、count for the slower growth seen so far CCUS captured,mtpa 0501001502002503003504002010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023CO2 annual capture and storage capacity(Mtpa)OperatingUnder constructionAdvanced developmentEarly development01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,0

162、009,000Carbon captured,mn tCCUS 2021CCUS 2024Source:Global CCS Inst it ut e St at us Report 2023Source:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 21Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 44:The 2024 GS 2.0 scenario allows the flexibility for a slower oil demand

163、 decline compared to the 2021 GS 2.0 scenario;peak oil demand moves to the early 2030s vs our previous estimate of 2023 Oil demand(kbpd)under the two paths Exhibit 45:The higher demand for oil is mainly driven by a higher share of traditional I CES and HEVs in the car fleet mix Changes in oil demand

164、 in our 2024 2.0 scenario vs 2021 GS 2.0,kbpd 020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Oil demand,kbpdGS21 2.0GS24 2.0-20%0%20%40%60%80%100%-2000002000040000600008000010000020232030204020502060Changes in oil demand,kbp

165、dLDVsMDVs and HDVsRailAviationShippingPower generationBuidingsIndustry-non combustibleIndustry-combustibleTotal oil demand change,%(RHS)Source:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 46

166、:Natural gas demand is lower in our 2024 GS 2.0 scenario until 2043,mainly on the back of lower demand in power gen due to the increased role of coal-fired power generation.Natural gas demand(EJ)under the two paths Exhibit 47:.however,we see a reversal of the trend from the early 2040s,with total na

167、tural gas demand surpassing our previous estimates Changes in natural gas demand,EJ 020406080100120140160180200201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Natural gas demand,EJGS21 2.0 scenarioGS24 2.0 scenario-30%-15%0%15%30%45%60%75%90%-50-35-20-510254055708

168、510020232030204020502060Changes in natural gas demand,EJGas with CCUSIndustryBuidingsPower generationTotal natural gas demand change,%(RHS)Source:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 Octob

169、er 2024 22Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953AFOLU:Reaching a natural net emissions sink by 2050 vs 2035 in the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario Historically,carbon emissions from AFOLU have been very volatile,fluctuating in the range of 4.3-5.8 GtCO2 since 2000.We project AFOLU emissions

170、(including LULUCF)to show an average annual decline rate of c.13%between 2023 and 2050 and reach a natural net emissions sink from 2050 thanks to reforestation,soil carbon sequestration,agroforestry and other ways of carbon dioxide removals.In the 2021 GS 2.0C scenario,we projected a higher annual r

171、eduction rate of c.19%,reaching a carbon sink in 2035.The trend for AFOLU remains more uncertain due to the multitude of drivers that af f ect emissions and removals for land use,land-use change and forestry.Exhibit 48:I n the case of coal,overall demand is higher in our 2024 GS 2.0 scenario,with th

172、is scenario allowing the flexibility for a slower demand decline Coal demand(Mt)under the two paths Exhibit 49:The increase in coal demand between the two scenarios is predominantly driven by a higher share of coal in the power generation mix Changes in coal demand,Mt 01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,000

173、7,0008,0009,00010,000201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Coal demand,MtGS21 2.0 scenarioGS24 2.0 scenario-40%-20%0%20%40%60%80%100%120%140%-40004008001,2001,6002,0002,40020222030204020502060Changes in coal demand,MtElectricity and heatIron and steelInd

174、ustry-otherResidentialTotal coal demand change,%(RHS)Source:IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 50:We forecast AFOLU to reach a natural net emissions sink by 2050 vs 2035 previously AFOLU emissions(GtCO2):2024 vs 2021 2.0 scenario comp

175、arison-4-3-2-10123456201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059AFOLU CO2 emissions(GtCO2)GS21 2.0 scenarioGS24 2.0 scenarioSource:GCB,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 23Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Comparing

176、 our updated 3 gl obal carbon neutral ity scenarios:2.0C,2.0C and 1.5C We have constructed three global emission paths for carbon neutrality:GS more realistic,but still ambitious scenario,or 2.0:We see this as the mostnrealistic scenario,with global net zero achieved by 2070 and global warmingreachi

177、ng 2.0C in 2100,short of the Paris Agreement ambitions.GS 2.0:A path consistent with global net zero by 2060 and in line withnmaintaining global warming well below 2.0C,consistent with the ParisAgreement ambitions.GS 1.5:An aspirational path that aims for global net zero by 2050,with a carbonnbudget

178、 that would be consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5C withlimited overshoot.While we focus primarily on outlining in detail our 2.0 scenario(GS 2.0)in the later sections of this report,in this section we aim to draw some comparisons across the three scenarios.In this report,we have introduc

179、ed our less aspirational,but also perhaps more realistically achievable,global net zero scenario in which global net zero is achieved by 2070,with global warming reaching 2.0C in 2100,short of the Paris Agreement ambitions.Exhibit 51 shows a comparison between the three emission paths,GS 2.0,GS 2.0

180、and GS 1.5.The carbon budget for the GS 2.0 scenario is higher than the GS 50%(a wide range is provided;we choose a budget close to the mid-point),implying a cumulative remaining carbon budget of around 1250 GtCO2 from 2020.Achieving net zero by 2050 or 2060,consistent with GS 1.5 and GS 2.0,represe

181、nt aspirational scenarios that would require transformational changes across all key parts of the global energy ecosystem and broader economy,and in our view have a limited probability of occurring under the current economic and policy frameworks globally.For the purposes of the analysis presented i

182、n this report,we primarily focus on outlining in detail our sectoral approach for achieving global net zero by 2070 the GS 2.0 scenario.Nonetheless,we also provide a scenario comparison with GS 1.5and GS 2.0 to showcase some key technological and financial dif f erences between the three paths.The c

183、arbon budget for our GS 2.0 scenario is within the range of the IPCCs RCP2.6 scenario(a wide range is provided;we choose a budget close to the mid-point),implying a cumulative remaining carbon budget of around 750 GtCO2 from 2020.In 2.0 scenario we reach net zero in 2051(first year of negative net e

184、missions thanks to of fsets such as natural sinks and DACCS),however the remaining carbon budget is calculated until 2060 in line with the Paris Agreement.For the GS 1.5 scenario,we assume the carbon budget for remaining net cumulative CO2 emissions from all 9 October 2024 24Gol dman SachsCarbonomic

185、s2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953sources from 2020 to be c.500 GtCO2,consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C with a 50%likelihood.That said,in GS 1.5 scenario,global net zero is achieved already by 2042(first year of negative net emissions thanks to of fsets such as natural sinks and DACCS);the rem

186、aining carbon budget is calculated until 2050 in line with Paris Agreement.Carbon budgets Our GS 2.0 path to global net zero by 2070 addresses all the key emitting sectors:power generation,transport,industry and waste,buildings and AFOLU including agriculture,forestry and other land use emissions.As

187、 mentioned in the previous sections,the pace of de-carbonization in each sector and sub-sector included in our path is expected to vary,depending on the carbon abatement cost and readiness of the available de-carbonization technologies.Consequently,we expect the sectoral and sub-sectoral allocation

188、of the carbon budget required to limit global warming within 2.0C to be dif f erent from the current share of emissions of each sector.The sectoral and sub-sector allocations of the remaining carbon budget to 2070 are shown in Exhibit 52.Power generation and industry are the two key sectors with the

189、 largest carbonbudget allocation to 2070,c.35%and 31%,respectively,reflecting the return ofcoal-fired power generation in the wake of the 2022 energy crisis and industry beingresponsible for some of the hardest-to-abate emissions,with the clean technologyalternatives relatively costly and in several

190、 cases largely undeveloped.Among these areheavy industries(iron&steel,cement,high-temperature heat).Exhibit 51:We have constructed three global carbon neutrality scenarios:one aspirational scenario consistent with 1.5C global warming by 2100;one consistent with well below 2.0C global warming,in line

191、 with the Paris Agreement ambition;and the scenario we see as most realistic,with global net zero by 2070 and global warming reaching 2.0C in 2100,short of the Paris Agreement ambitions GS Gl obal net zero carbon scenarios CO2 emissions(MtCO2)-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,00050,0002000200220042006200

192、820102012201420162018202020222024202620282030203220342036203820402042204420462048205020522054205620582060GS global carbon neutrality scenarios -CO2 emissions(MtCO2eq)GS 2.0CNet zero by 2060 scenarioGS 1.5CNet zero by 2050 scenarioGS 2.0CNet zero by 2070 scenarioSource:Emission Dat abase for Global A

193、t mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,GCB9 October 2024 25Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 52:Sectoral coverage of CO2 emissions under our GS 2.0 path and sectoral carbon budget allocation to 2070 Source:Goldman Sachs

194、 Global Invest ment Research1)Comparison of sectoral carbon budgets allocation:Under the current economic andpolicy framework,all sectors,especially power generation,transform at a slower andmore achievable pace under the GS 2.0 scenario compared to GS 1.5 and GS 2.0We have adopted the same methodol

195、ogy and sectoral hybrid approach for theconstruction of all three scenarios,leveraging our Carbonomics de-carbonization costcurve,and allocating the available carbon budget across different emitting industries onthe basis of the current cost and technological readiness.The more aspirational GS 1.5pa

196、th has a very strict carbon budget and as such calls for a complete and immediateoverhaul of the energy sector that requires transformative changes across all keyemitting industries globally.It also aims to achieve global net zero by 2050,while the GS2.0 path envisages global carbon neutrality by 20

197、60(a decade later and in line withthe ambitions laid out by the worlds largest emitter,China).Our newly introduced GSbase 2.0 path is a less aspirational,but perhaps more realistically achievable,global netzero path that implies global net zero by 2070,with global warming reaching 2.0C.9 October 202

198、4 26Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 53:I n this section of the report,we focus on drawing comparisons between our three global net zero scenarios consistent with 1.5,2.0 and 2.0 degrees of global warming,respectively.GS gl obal carbon neutral ity scenarios CO2 emissi

199、on(MtCO2)Exhibit 54:.with the three paths.GS 2.0(base)CO2 emissions by sector(GtCO2)-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,00050,0002000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024202620282030203220342036203820402042204420462048205020522054205620582060GS global carbon neutrality scenarios -CO2 emissions(M

200、tCO2eq)GS 2.0CNet zero by 2060 scenarioGS 1.5CNet zero by 2050 scenarioGS 2.0CNet zero by 2070 scenario-5051015202010201220142016201820202022202420262028203020322034203620382040204220442046204820502052205420562058206020622064206620682070CO2 emissions(GtCO2)Power generationTransportIndustry,industria

201、l waste&other fugitiveBuildingsLULUCFSource:Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 55:.

202、showing different sectoral carbon emission allocations GS 1.5 vs GS 2.0 CO2 emissions by sector(GtCO2)-10-50510152020102012201420162018202020222024202620282030203220342036203820402042204420462048205020522054205620582060CO2 emissions(GtCO2)Power generation 2.0Transport 2.0Industry&other 2.0Buildings

203、2.0AFOLU 2.0Power generation 1.5Transport 1.5Industry&other 1.5Buildings 1.5AFOLU 1.5Source:Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GCB,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 27Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953In Exhibit 53 and Ex

204、hibit 55 above,we show a comparison of the emission paths under the three scenarios,both in aggregate and by sector.It is evident that all sectors de-carbonize at a faster pace under the GS 1.5 path compared to the 2.0or 2.0 path given the lower available carbon budget and the additional decade/two

205、decades to reach net zero.Within this,the most striking dif f erence is the pace of de-carbonization of power generation.Under the more aspirational GS 1.5 path,power generation becomes the first sector to de-carbonize,and does so at a very fast pace.This is because power generation remains the sole

206、 key sector where the available clean de-carbonization technologies have been developed at scale and are economic under the current policy framework.In contrast,under the less strict GS 2.0 and more realistic GS 2.0 path,power generation de-carbonizes at a slower pace,enabling a greater role for nat

207、ural gas as a transition fuel.Notably,the pace of de-carbonization of transport and industry is not too dissimilar under the three scenarios,implying that given the larger carbon budget under the GS 2.0 and GS 2.0 paths,industry and transportation have a relatively lower carbon budget contribution,l

208、eaving further space for power generation to de-carbonize.Exhibit 56:The overall carbon budget and the sectoral carbon budget allocations differ between our three global carbon neutrality scenarios*Direct emissions Negat ive emissions indicat e offset s from nat ural sinks and DACCS Source:Goldman S

209、achs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 28Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d9532)The role of fossil fuels:Natural gas is most sensitive to the scenarios given its role asa transitional fuelIn the exhibits that follow,we present total oil,natural gas and coal demand under t

210、hethree paths we have constructed.In the case of oil,the overall path shown in Exhibit 57looks similar under the three scenarios,with the GS 2.0 path allowing the flexibility fora slower demand decline compared to the GS 2.0 and GS 1.5 scenarios.The case ofnatural gas on the other hand is dif f eren

211、t,with the fossil fuel having a critical role as atransition fuel in the GS 2.0 and GS 2.0 paths given both the larger carbon budgetand the extra available decade to achieve global net zero,which enables a smoother andless abrupt transition compared to the GS 1.5 path.The GS 2.0 transition appears m

212、orerealistically achievable under the current economic and policy frameworks in placeglobally,compared to GS 1.5.In the case of coal,the overall demand path looks similarunder the three scenarios,with the GS 2.0 scenario allowing the flexibility for aslower demand decline compared to the GS 1.5 scen

213、ario,while the GS 2.0 scenarioenvisages a very gradual decrease in coal consumption,predominantly driven by ahigher share of coal in the power generation mix.Exhibit 57:Oil demand shows a similar path under the three scenarios,with the key difference being the pace of demand decline for combustible

214、oil.Oil demand(kbpd)under our three paths Exhibit 58:.while in contrast,the role of natural gas varies notably under the three scenarios,with the GS 2.0 and 2.0 scenarios incorporating natural gas as a key transition fuel in power generation and industry,a flexibility that is not available under the

215、 more constrained GS 1.5 path Natural gas demand(EJ)Oil demand(kbp020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Oil demand(kbpd)GS 2.0GS 1.5GS 2.002040608010012014016018020192021202320252027202920312033203520372039204120432

216、0452047204920512053205520572059Natural gas demand(EJ)GS 2.0GS 1.5GS 2.0*We use t he crude oil energy conversion t o find t he t ot al energy in EJ wit hout dist inguishing bet ween t he different oil product s Source:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Re

217、search9 October 2024 29Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d9533)Fossil fuel asset retirements:We believe 1.5 is becoming increasingly difficult toachieve due to an estimated$1.1 trn of potentially stranded coal assetsGiven the dif f ering pace of the transition of power generation

218、between the threescenarios as described above,the pace of retirements of fossil fuel-based power plantsalso dif f ers between the three scenarios.Exhibit 61 shows coal power plant retirementsby decade on the path to global net zero under four distinct scenarios:(1)the naturalretirement progression o

219、f existing coal power plant capacity based on the current agedistribution of existing plants,(2)the net retirement of coal power plants in the GS 2.0path,(3)the net retirement of coal power plants in the GS 2.0 path and(4)the netretirement of coal power plants in the stricter,more aspirational GS 1.

220、5 path.As shownin the exhibit,both the GS 2.0 and GS 1.5 de-carbonization scenarios call for a fasterpace of coal power plant retirements than the natural progression would suggest(giventhe relatively young coal power plant fleet in Asia,with the majority being 20 yearsold),but the GS 2.0 path shows

221、 a smoother retirement profile than GS 1.5,whichrequires the vast majority of coal power plants to be retired by 2035.Unlike the twomore strict scenarios,our base GS 2.0 path implies a pace of coal power plantretirements similar to the natural progression of retirements.The average operationallif et

222、ime of a coal-fired power plant in this analysis is assumed to be around 45 years.Inthe GS 1.5 scenario,many coal-fired power plants would not run for their anticipatedlif e-expectancy.This would be likely to result in stranded assets,making coal anincreasing financial risk.Our analysis suggests tha

223、t if global action aligns to limitwarming to 1.5,early retirements required by 2035 would strand assets to the value ofUS$1.7 trn(assuming a value of US$2bn/1GW plant).Exhibit 59:I n the case of coal,the overall demand path looks similar under the three scenarios,with the GS 2.0 scenario allowing th

224、e flexibility for a slower demand decline compared to the GS 1.5 scenario,while the GS 2.0 scenario envisages a very gradual decrease in coal consumption,predominantly driven by a higher share of coal in the power generation mix.Coal demand(Mtpa)Exhibit 60:Renewables grow their share in the power ge

225、neration mix significantly in the GS 1.5 scenario,offsetting a steep fall in coal and natural gas consumption RES share in power generation mix,%01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,00010,000201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Coal demand(Mtpa)GS

226、 2.0GS 1.5GS 2.045%75%77%33%53%68%74%28%43%55%66%0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%20152017201920212023202520272029203120332035203720392041204320452047204920512053205520572059Share of Renewables(excl.Hydro)in power generation mix,%GS 1.5CGS 2.0CGS 2.0CSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSourc

227、e:Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 30Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 62 shows a similar analysis for natural gas power plants.The aspirational GS 1.5 path calls for net capacity addition

228、s before 2025,since the renewables capacity additions are not enough to of fset the fast pace of coal retirements,thus requiring additional natural gas as a swing producer.However,af ter 2025,the GS 1.5 path calls for the retirement of all natural gas-fired plants by 2045,whilst in contrast the GS 2

229、.0 path calls for net capacity additions over 2025-35 with natural gas being a key transition fuel,particularly in emerging markets and a more gradual pace of retirements based on the current age distribution of global gas power plants.In our GS 2.0 2.0 scenario,natural gas plays a significant role,

230、with net capacity additions continuing until 2045 due to the slower phase-out of gas and slower adoption of clean electricity sources,with natural gas plants still not retired by the end of 2070.The operational lif etime of a gas power plant in this analysis is assumed to be around 35 years,the aver

231、age operating lif e of gas plants today.Exhibit 61:While all of our global net zero scenarios assume a phase-out of coal power plants,the coal-fired plant retirement profiles under the GS 2.0 and 2.0 paths are smoother Coal-fired power pl ant net retirements(GW)Exhibit 62:As natural gas is very sens

232、itive to scenarios,the retirement schedule differs a lot across scenarios Gas power pl ant net retirements(GW)-50005001000150020002500Before 20252025-20352035-20452045-2055Beyond 2055Coal-fired power plant net retirements(GW)Natural retirements progressionGS 2.0GS 2.0GS 1.5-1000-5000500100015002000B

233、efore 20252025-20352035-20452045-2055Beyond 2055Gas power plant net retirements(GW)Natural retirements progressionGS 2.0GS 93%by 2070.Gl obal power generation fuel mix(%)Exhibit 67:.leading to 25,000 GW of solar and 11,000 GW of wind net power generation capacity additions to 2070 Gl obal net power

234、generation capacity bridge to 2070(GW)0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%200020032006200920122015201820212024202720302033203620392042204520482051205420572060206320662069Power generation mix(%)Renewables(excl.Hydro)CoalPetroleum LiquidsNatural Gas(and other gas)Hydroelectric ConventionalH2CGGTNG+CCUSNuclearBy

235、 2050:Non-fossil share:75%By 2070:Non-fossil share:93%By 2030:Non-fossil share:50%-5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000Globalpower gencapacity2023FossilfuelretirementsSolarWindHydroOtherRESNuclear H2CCGTNGCCUSGS Globalpower gencapacity2070Global power generation capac

236、ity bridge to net zero by 2070(GW)CoalN.GasSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World EnergySource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,EmberExhibit 68:Based on our GS 2 scenario,although power generation emissions decline rapidly,decreas

237、ing c.94%by 2070 vs 2022 and reducing reliance on fossil fuels,we model some emissions in 2070 due to the unabated fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas consumed in emerging markets and developing economies.Power generation CO2 emissions(MtCO2)Exhibit 69:.achieving close to zero carbon emissions

238、 by 2070 and helping to facilitate de-carbonization across other sectors through the uptick of electrification Power generation carbon intensity(kgCO2/MWh)-2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000200020032006200920122015201820212024202720302033203620392042204520482051205420572060206320662

239、069Power generation CO2 emissions(MtCO2)CoalPetroleum LiquidsNatural Gas(and other gas)OtherPtiCO2ii580 503 464 369 266 185 140 104 80 57 10 -100 200 300 400 500 600 700Power generation carbon intensity(kgCO2/MWh)Source:Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 8.0,GC

240、B,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,Energy Inst it ut e St at ist ical Review of World Energy9 October 2024 35Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953transport and various industrial processes,electricity used for heating and m

241、ore.Renewable power costs have fallen 45%in aggregate across technologies over the past 15 years,thanks to the operational cost reduction that renewable energy has enjoyed over the past decade,owing to economies of scale.However,as we highlight in our report Carbonomics:Cost curve 2023,last year saw

242、 cost inflation and higher funding costs in renewable power leading to an increase in Levelized Cost of Energy(LCOE)for solar and wind yoy.The weighted average cost of capital(WACC)for new renewable power projects increased to c.4.8%in 2023 from c.3.6%in 2022,driven by the increase in risk-free rate

243、s in Europe and in the US.We show in Exhibit 75 how the change in the cost of capital and operational reduction have contributed to the reduction in LCOEs of renewable technologies since 2010.Financial and operational costs decreased until 2020,leading to a decline in LCOE in solar and wind power ge

244、neration.However,in 2021-2022,the LCOE of off/onshore wind and solar grew,driven by higher financial and operating costs.In 2023,we observed higher equipment costs in renewable energy,although cost inflation has been most prominent in offshore wind,while in solar,module prices have been decreasing.O

245、verall,higher interest rates and cost inflation led to the LCOE of renewable power generation(solar,wind)in Europe increasing by c.11%yoy and c.40%vs the trough observed in 2020.Cost inflation and higher cost of capital most prominent in offshore wind,while solar still offers the most attractive eco

246、nomics Solar power generation has been relatively less prone to cost inflation,with solar module prices declining significantly since last summer.The ongoing decline in equipment costs,and somewhat stickier PPA prices,suggest better economics for solar:we estimate the solar LCOE at c.40/MWh in Europ

247、e,which is less than half the cost of of fshore wind,as a ref erence.Better relative competitiveness against other renewable technologies,and its high deflationary impact in the context of current power prices(especially in Europe),suggest that solar could gain incremental market share from other te

248、chnologies.Meanwhile,steep cost inflation has been most evident in of fshore wind(especially in the US,owing to an under-developed supply chain).Since its inception in the late 1990s,the of fshore wind industry has benefited from a major improvement in economics.In Europe,we estimate that between 20

249、08 and 2020,the LCOE for of fshore wind dropped by c.-60%,from c.200/MWh to a trough of c.77/MWh.Yet,following a steep,20-year decline in costs,the more recent cost inflation in raw materials and an unprecedented spike in funding costs have led to a significant increase in of fshores levelized costs

250、.We estimate that the LCOE of of fshore wind in Europe and the US increased by c.10%in 2023 yoy.Capacity expansion 2023 saw a step change in renewable capacity additions,mainly driven by solar capacity expansion.Global net annual renewable capacity additions increased by c.42%,the fastest growth rat

251、e over the past two decades.In 2023,China stood at the forefront of the renewables capacity expansion,contributing as much solar PV as the entire world did in 2022,while its wind additions also grew by 66%yoy.Globally,solar PV alone accounted for c.75%of total renewable capacity additions.We expect

252、renewable power 9 October 2024 36Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953capacity additions to continue to accelerate,reaching 550GW by 2030,a c.20%increase compared to 2023.Besides the renewable power capacity expansion,we also expect a revival of nuclear power.During the last two

253、decades,installed nuclear capacity grew by only c.10%,but we expect it to more than double by 2060 vs 2023.At COP28,more than 20 countries launched the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy,committing to work collaboratively to advance a global aspirational goal to triple global nuclear capacity by 2

254、050 vs.2020.The declaration signed by the US,Canada,France,the UK,South Korea and others also promises ef forts to extend the lif e of existing plants where appropriate,mobilize investments in nuclear power,and support new technologies such as small modular reactors.Exhibit 70:Access to renewable po

255、wer is the most critical component,being broadly vital for the de-carbonization of c.30%of the current global anthropogenic emissions across sectors.Gl obal anthropogenic GHG emissions de-carbonization cost curve,with orange indicating technol ogies rel iant on access to renewabl e power Exhibit 71:

256、.and as a result,we expect standout growth in renewable capacity,in particular for wind and solar,for our GS 2 degrees path,consistent with global net zero by 2070 Sol ar and wind total instal l ed capacity for gl obal net zero(TW)008009001,0001,100CO2eq)-200-10001002003004005006007008009001,0001,10

257、002468 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56Carbon abatement cost(US$/tnCO2eq)GHG emissions abatement potential (Gt CO2eq)De-carbonization technologies relying on renewable powerOther de-carbonization technologies-5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000202320252027

258、202920312033203520372039204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Solar&wind installed capacity for global net zero by 2070(GW)Onshore windOffshore windSolarSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research,EmberExhibit 72:Renewable po

259、wer LCOEs have increased across technologies over the last 2 years.LCOE for sol ar PV,wind onshore and wind offshore for sel ect regions in Europe(EUR/MWh)Exhibit 73:.on the back of increased financing costs and cost inflation RES WACC and I RR in Europe,%02040608010012014016018020022020082009201020

260、112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024ERenewables LCOE(Eur/MWh)SolarWind OnshoreWind Offshore4.8%5.3%4.8%4.4%3.7%3.0%2.7%3.1%3.3%2.7%2.4%2.3%3.6%4.8%4.4%7.0%7.4%6.8%6.3%5.5%4.7%4.3%4.6%4.7%3.9%3.7%3.6%5.5%6.7%6.3%RES WACC and IRR in Europe,%WACCIRRSource:Company dat a,Goldman Sachs G

261、lobal Invest ment ResearchSource:IRENA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 37Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953The power generation investment opportunity:Higher capital intensity of renewable power and the rising importance of energy storage and networks i

262、nfrastructure pave the way for a c.US$52 tn investment opportunity Earlier in this report,we highlighted the substantial potential investment creation opportunity associated with a path consistent with net zero emissions by 2070.Renewable power generation acts as a major contributor to this infrastr

263、ucture investment opportunity(Exhibit 63).This is mainly due to the higher capital intensity of these technologies and their associated infrastructure,compared with traditional fossil fuel energy developments.In the exhibits that follow,we present the capital intensity(capex)per unit of output energ

264、y for each type of power generation technology.We present the results both in units of capex per flowing unit of energy(US$/GJ of peak energy capacity)and per unit of energy over the lif e of the asset(US$/GJ).This shows higher capital intensity per unit of energy as we move to cleaner alternatives

265、for power generation.However,this does not necessarily translate into higher costs for the consumer,thanks to the availability of cheap financing(under an attractive and stable long-term regulatory framework)and lower opex,compared with traditional hydrocarbon developments.Exhibit 74:Solar module pr

266、ices have declined significantly since last summer Gl obal average sol ar modul e cost($/W)Exhibit 75:Renewable power LCOEs have decreased by 70%in aggregate across technologies,benefiting from a reduction in the cost of capital for these clean energy developments,contributing c.1/3 of the cost redu

267、ction since 2010 LCOE for sol ar PV,wind onshore and wind offshore for sel ect regions,%reduction spl it by operational and financial0.000.100.200.300.400.500.600.702015201620172018201920202021202220232024-61%-28%-18%0%-3%-7%-70%-60%-50%-40%-30%-20%-10%0%10%20%2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

268、 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024ERenewables LCOE%reduction(from 2010 base)split between operational and financial Solar PV-operational reductionSolar PV-financial reductionOnshore wind-operational reductionOnshore wind-financial reductionOffshore wind-operational reductionOffshore wind-financial

269、reductionSource:PV Insight sSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 38Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953As the growth in renewable power accelerates,intraday and seasonal variability has to be addressed through energy storage solutions.To reach full de-c

270、arbonization of power markets,we believe two key technologies will likely contribute to solving the energy storage challenge:utility-scale batteries and hydrogen,each having a complementary role.We incorporate both of these technologies in our path to net zero and expect utility scale batteries for

271、energy storage to reach c.3,000 GW by 2050(Exhibit 78,while clean hydrogen-run CGGTs reach c.3.2%in the electricity generation mix in a similar timeframe).Energy storage and the need for extensive network infrastructure are particularly important considerations as demand for power generation growth

272、accelerates,to ensure a resilient global energy ecosystem.While batteries are currently the most developed technology for intraday power generation storage,we consider hydrogen as a more relevant technology for seasonal storage,implying the need for innovation and development of both technologies.Ba

273、tteries,for instance,are particularly suited to sunny climates,where solar PV production is largely stable throughout the year and can be stored for evening usage.Exhibit 76:Renewable clean technologies in power generation have higher capital intensity compared with traditional fossil fuel sources,b

274、ased on per flowing unit of energy.Capex per flowing unit of energy(US$/GJ)Exhibit 77:.and over the lifetime of the asset Capex per unit of energy over the l ife of the asset(US$/GJ)for each technol ogy 0100200300400500600Coal-firedcombustionNaturalgasCGGTSolar PVBiomassOnshorewindHydroOffshorewindG

275、eothermalCapital intensity per flowing unit of energy ($/GJ)Capex per flowing unit of energyCapex per flowing unit of energy-GS base case for China0510152025Coal-firedcombustionNaturalgasCGGTSolar PVBiomassOnshorewindHydroOffshorewindGeothermalCapital intensity per unit of energy over the lifetime o

276、f the asset ($/GJ)Capex per unit of energy over asset life-rangeCapex per unit of energy over asset life-GS base case for ChinaSource:Company dat a,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Company dat a,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 78:Our GS 2 path incorporates a large acc

277、eleration of utility battery energy storage,expected to reach c.3,000 GW by 2050 Power generation battery energy storage(GW)01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,0002016201820202022202420262028203020322034203620382040204220442046204820502052205420562058206020622064206620682070Battery installed

278、capacity(GW)Source:Company dat a,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 39Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Hydrogen on the other hand,and the process of storing energy in chemical form and reconverting it to power through fuel cells,could be used to of fset t

279、he seasonal mismatch between power demand and renewable output.Yet,with fuel cells overall currently having ef ficiencies that vary between 50%and 65%,the overall ef ficiency of energy storage becomes a weak point for hydrogen,where we estimate the lif e-cycle of energy storage ef ficiency to be in

280、the range of c.25%-40%overall,compared with c.70%-90%for batteries,as shown in Exhibit 79.Exhibit 79:We see utility scale batteries and hydrogen as the two key complementary technologies to address the energy storage challenge Energy storage Efficiency Comparison1Energy generation100%Transportation,

281、distribution85-95%Electric Battery storage70-90%Power generationOverall efficiency70-90%2Battery storageHydrogen storage Power generationOverall efficiency25-40%Energy generation100%Electrolyzer H2production60-70%Compression&distribution45-65%Fuel cell electricity25-40%Source:Company dat a,Goldman S

282、achs Global Invest ment Research.9 October 2024 40Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Transportation:The rise of EVs and al ternative fuel s with different technol ogies across transport modes Transportation,in contrast to power generation,mostly sits in the high-cost area of th

283、e de-carbonization cost curve(Exhibit 80),with the sector responsible for c.20%of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions(2022,incl.AFOLU).As part of our analysis,we lay out the path to net zero emissions for transportation,as shown in Exhibit 81,addressing all key transportation modes:short-and medium-h

284、aul road transport,heavy long-haul transport,rail,aviation and shipping.The speed of de-carbonization varies depending on the transport mode,as shown in Exhibit 82,largely driven by the dif f erence in costs and technological readiness of the available clean alternatives required for each sub-sector

285、.Light-duty vehicles and rail(which is already c.33%electrified)are the two transport modes with a faster relative de-carbonization,given the readiness and notable cost deflation of clean technologies for both(electrification).On the other hand,heavy trucks,aviation and shipping de-carbonize at a sl

286、ower pace,given the still largely undeveloped or early stage development of de-carbonization alternatives in these areas(sustainable aviation fuels,synthetic fuels,clean hydrogen and ammonia),which we expect to enjoy a large uptake in adoption and account for a notable part of the fleet only post 20

287、30.We further address how the fuel mix of the energy consumption of transport evolves over time in our GS 2.0 scenario and present the results both in aggregate and by key transport mode in Exhibit 83 and Exhibit 84.Overall,electricity increases its share in total transport energy consumption to c.4

288、5%by 2060 and 60%by 2070,while the fossil Exhibit 80:Transportation mostly sits in the high-cost area of the de-carbonization cost curve 2023 carbon abatement cost curve for anthropogenic GHG emissions,based on current technol ogies and current costs,assuming economies of scal e for technol ogies in

289、 the pil ot phase-200-10001002003004005006007008009001,0001,1001,2001,3001,40002468101214161820222426283032343638404244464850525456Carbon abatement cost(US$/tnCO2eq)GHG emissions abatement potential(Gt CO2eq)Power generation(coal switch to gas&renewables)Transport(road,aviation,shipping)Industry(iro

290、n&steel,cement,chemicals and other)Buildings(residential&commercial)Agriculture,forestry&other land uses(AFOLU)Non-abatable at current conservation technologiesSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 41Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953fuel share decline

291、s from c.95%at present to 30%by 2060 and 5%by 2070.Bioenergy,clean hydrogen&synthetic fuels,and ammonia all emerge as important energy sources for transportation,accounting for c.11%/7%/3%respectively by 2060 and 16%/8%/5%by 2070.Light-duty road transport vehicles:Electrification at the heart of the

292、 transport evolution For light duty vehicles(LDVs)transport(primarily constituting passenger vehicles,commercial vehicles and short/medium-haul trucks),we consider electrification the key de-carbonization technology.EV share in the global sales mix in 2023,including battery electric vehicles(BEVs)an

293、d plug-in hybrid EV(PHEVs),stood at c.16%,overshooting our 2021 expectation of 10%,primarily owing to faster-than-expected EV sales penetration in China.While in 2024 EV sales momentum has slowed globally,driven by concerns around EV capital costs due to lower prices for used EVs,poor visibility on

294、government policy,and a shortage of rapid-charging stations,we expect the EV sales share to show moderate growth and reach c.18%in 2024.In our 2.0 Exhibit 81:We model the emissions in the transport sector by mode in our GS 2.0 path.Transport sector emissions(MtCO2)spl it by key transport mode Exhibi

295、t 82:.with the speed of de-carbonization varying across modes depending on the cost and readiness of the respective clean technologies Transport emissions by mode%change vs.2023 base 01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,0009,00020052007200920112013201520172019202120232025202720292031203320352037203

296、9204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Transport emissions(MtCO2)Light-duty vehicles(LDVs)Heavy-duty vehicles(trucks,incl,buses)RailAviationShipping-100%-80%-60%-40%-20%0%20%Transport emissions by mode%change vs 2023 baseLight-duty vehicles(LDVs)Heavy-duty vehicles(trucks,incl,

297、buses)RailAviationShippingTotal transportSource:Emission Dat abase for Global At mospheric Research(EDGAR)release version 5.0,FAO,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 83:We expect the energy mix of the transport sector to evolve dramati

298、cally over time.Transport energy consumption by fuel (EJ)Exhibit 84:.with electrification,bioenergy,synthetic fuels,clean hydrogen and ammonia all playing key roles in the transition Fuel mix of energy consumption in transport by transport mode(%)02040608010012014016020192021202320252027202920312033

299、203520372039204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Transport consumption by fuel(EJ)Fossil fuelsElectricityBioenergyHydrogen&hydrogen-based synthetic fuelsAmmonia0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%202320302040205020602070202320302040205020602070202320302040205020602070202320302040

300、205020602070202320302040205020602070Light-dutyvehiclesHeavy-dutyvehiclesRailAviationShippingOilGasBioenergyHydrogenAmmoniaElectricitySynthetic fuelsSource:IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 42Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e

301、8b174644998c7303f5a989d953scenario GS 2.0 scenario,we model global EV sales(BEVs and PHEVs)to make up 43%of total sales by 2030 and 71%by 2040,leveraging our Auto teams analysis.Post 2040,we model 85%global EV sales share in 2045 and 100%by 2050 in our 2.0 scenario.We also focus on the evolution of

302、the LDV fleet for the purpose of emission accounting in this analysis,with the fleet evolution reliant on both vehicle sales and retirements,as it is ultimately the penetration in the fleet that directly translates into transport emissions.In our 2.0 scenario,the global LDV fleet grows by a 2.8%CAGR

303、 in 2023-2040 and 1.3%CAGR in 2040-2070,supported by increasing vehicle ownership primarily in emerging markets:our APAC Energy team expect growth in the global passenger vehicle fleet to be mainly supported by India in the coming years,where the adoption of 4-wheel cars is set to accelerate;for Chi

304、na,they embed our Auto teams forecast of slow near-term passenger car sales given tepid consumer demand amid a housing downturn,and expect an eventual convergence to the lower end of the typical vehicle ownership range in the long run.Our GS 2.0 path assumes a major shif t in the mix of the fleet of

305、 LDVs to 2060,with EVs(including BEVs and PHEVs)making up c.16%/41%/66%/83%of the fleet by 2030/40/50/60E respectively.Exhibit 85:The global passenger vehicle fleet could continue to grow at a c.3%CAGR in 2024-2030 Exhibit 86:I ndias adoption of 4-wheel cars is set to accelerate as income grows.-5%0

306、%5%10%15%20%25%30%20062011201620212026E2031E2036Eyoy%Global:passenger car ownership implied by income growthWorldIndiaChina0204060801002010201520202025E2030E2035E2040EVehicle/th people India:passenger vehicle ownership(4 wheel)Calculated historicalGSeTypical S-shaped curve impliedDM typical S-shaped

307、 curve(+/-1 SD range)Source:Respect ive government st at ist ics agencies,World Bank,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:SIAM,World Bank,Wind,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 87:.and the case is similar for China,despite slower domestic passenger car sales in the near ter

308、m Exhibit 88:Our GS 2.0 path assumes a major shift in the mix of the LDV fleet to 2060.Light-duty vehicl es fleet(k units)05010015020025030035040045050020022007201220172022E2027E2032E2037EVehicle/th people China:passenger vehicle ownershipReported(NBS)GSeTypical S-shaped curve impliedDM typical S-sh

309、aped curve(+/-1 SD range)0500,0001,000,0001,500,0002,000,0002,500,0003,000,0003,500,0002015201720192021202320252027202920312033203520372039204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Fleet for light-duty vehicles(k units)ICE and otherHEVPHEVEVSource:NBS,World Bank,Goldman Sachs Globa

310、l Invest ment ResearchSource:BNEF,IHS Global Insight,MarkLines,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 43Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Heavy-duty road transport and other vehicles:Biofuels a near-term viable de-carbonization option,with electrification and

311、clean hydrogen gaining pace post 2030 Electrification and biofuels remain key near-term de-carbonization technologies in trucks and buses,with hydrogen an attractive option for heavy-duty trucks.Penetration of EVs in global sales of trucks and buses has been significantly lower compared to LDV sales

312、 so far:in 2023,around 3%of bus sales were EVs and c.1%of medium and heavy trucks.This is driven by the smaller product of f ering and the need for further technological innovation in the case of long-haul large capacity batteries.While medium-heavy trucks and buses are easier to electrify due to lo

313、wer daily travel distance,for heavy-duty trucks,we consider clean hydrogen a potentially competitive option,owing to its faster refueling time,lower weight and high energy content.In our 2.0 scenario GS 2.0 scenario,for heavy trucks,we model global EV and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles(FCEV)sales makin

314、g up 5%and 4%in 2030,respectively,and 36%and 16%in 2040,respectively,leveraging our Auto teams analysis.Beyond that,we model 50%/30%global EV and FCEV sales shares in 2050 and 60%/40%by 2060 for heavy trucks.For buses,we model the fastest electrification route among heavy vehicles Exhibit 89:.with E

315、Vs(including BEVs and PHEVs)making up c.16%/41%/66%/83%of the fleet by 2030/40/50/60E respectivelyLight-duty vehicl e fleet mix evol ution over time(%)Exhibit 90:We now model EVs(BEVs and PHEVs)share in the global sales mix at 44%/72%/100%by 2030/40/50E.Light-duty vehicl es sal es mix(%)0%10%20%30%4

316、0%50%60%70%80%90%100%2015201720192021202320252027202920312033203520372039204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Fleet mix for LDVs(%)EVPHEVHEVICE and otherBEVs and PHEVs:c.100%of the fleet by 2070BEVs and PHEVs:16%of sales by 2030BEVs and PHEVs:41%of sales by 2040BEVs and PHEVs:

317、66%of sales by 20500%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%20202022202420262028203020322034203620382040204220442046204820502052205420562058206020622064206620682070Sales mix for LDVs(%)EVPHEVHEVICE and otherBEVs and PHEVs:71%of sales by 2040BEVs and PHEVs:100%of sales by 2050BEVs and PHEVs:43%of sales by 20

318、30Source:BNEF,IHS Global Insight,MarkLines,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchExhibit 91:.and model the carbon intensity of the fleet tracking the carbon intensity of sales,with a c.10-15 year delay LDVs CO2 carbon intensity per km travel l ed(gC

319、O2/km)Exhibit 92:Theoretically,1 million BEVs replacing 1 million I CEs lowers oil demand by c.20 kb/d 0501001502002503002016201820202022202420262028203020322034203620382040204220442046204820502052205420562058206020622064206620682070LDVs CO2 emissions per km(gCO2/km)Carbon intensity of fleetCarbon i

320、ntensity of sales05101520253020052010201520202025E2030E2035E2040Ekb/dOil consumption of 1mn ICE newly sold in a given yearThe range from compact cars to SUVICE efficiency gainsSource:Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:iCET,Arora et al.(2011),Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 Oc

321、tober 2024 44Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953given relatively fixed driving patterns and lower daily travel distances,with global EV share reaching 30%/60%/100%by 2030/40/50,respectively.For medium-duty trucks,we model global EV share reaching 20%/55%/85%by 2030/40/50.We the

322、refore expect the shift in the fleet mix for heavy-duty vehicles to start later than the transition in LDVs,with EVs and FCEVS making up c.8%/35%/63%/83%of the fleet by 2030/40/50/60E respectively.Given this backdrop,we believe biofuels remain a viable de-carbonization technology in the near and med

323、ium term to decarbonize heavy-duty transport.We leverage our Carbonomics bioenergy report analysis on biodiesel and renewable diesel consumption by 2030 driven by country-specific mandates:biodiesel consumption increases by c.10%by 2030E vs 2023,primarily driven by growing Latam and Asia consumption

324、,resulting in a c.6%blending rate by 2030E globally.Beyond that,we assume an increase in biodiesel consumption to a c.10%blending rate by 2045 globally,which represents a technical limit to blending rates given biodiesel chemical properties(e.g.the presence of oxygen).For renewable diesel,we model c

325、.2 times higher consumption by 2030 driven by growing consumption in Europe and the US,resulting in a c.3.2%blending rate by 2030 globally(from 1.6%in 2023).Beyond that,we assume the blending rate increases to c.5%by 2040 and stays flat from there,with biofuels mandates and long-term waste and resid

326、ue feedstock limitations representing major areas of uncertainty.Exhibit 93:Clean hydrogen and electrification are in our view the two key technologies to address long-haul heavy-duty transport emissions.Fl eet mix for heavy-duty vehicl es and other road transport(%)Exhibit 94:.with NEVs(FCEVs and E

327、Vs)accounting for c.100%of heavy-duty vehicle sales by 2060E Sal es mix for heavy-duty vehicl es and other transport(%)0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%2015201720192021202320252027202920312033203520372039204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Fleet mix for HDVs and other road tr

328、ansport (%)EVFCEVICE and otherBEVs and FCEVs:c.95%of the fleet by 2070BEVs:c.5%of the fleet by 2030BEVs and FCEVs:c.50%of the fleet by 20500%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%2015201720192021202320252027202920312033203520372039204120432045204720492051205320552057205920612063206520672069Sales mix for HD

329、Vs and other road transpoirt(%)EVFCEVICE and otherBEVs and FCEVs:43%of sales by 2040BEVs:15%of sales by 2030BEVs and FCEVs:72%of sales by 2050BEVs and FCEVs:100%of sales by 2060Source:BNEF,IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:BNEF,IEA,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October

330、 2024 45Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b174644998c7303f5a989d953Exhibit 95:Biofuels have potential to de-carbonize transportation within current infrastructure Liquid fuel s GHG intensity,gCO2e/MJ Exhibit 96:For renewable diesel,we model almost 2 times higher consumption by 2030,driven by growing c

331、onsumption in Europe and the US RD demand(current pol icies),mn t 94929086785516100%fossil5%biodiesel5%RD10%RD20%RD50%RD100%RD-82%GHG intensity reduction5556891011125891011111111111013141719202223240.05.010.015.020.025.030.020222023E2024E2025E2026E2027E2028E2029E2030EEurope(EU+UK)NAAsiaLatamRD deman

332、d(current policies),mn tRD is renewable diesel,GHG int ensit y is based on used cooking oil feedst ock Source:EU RED II Direct ive,compiled by Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment ResearchSource:IEA,EPA,Eurost at,Goldman Sachs Global Invest ment Research9 October 2024 46Gol dman SachsCarbonomics2aeb9e8b

333、174644998c7303f5a989d953Aviation:One of the harder-to-abate sectors,with new generation aircraft/fleet renewal,sustainable aviation fuels(SAFs)and other new propulsion technologies paving the way for technological transformation Aviation sits at the top of our Carbonomics cost curve and is one of the toughest sectors to de-carbonize.Sustainable aviation fuel(SAF),also typically known as biojet(inc