1、 Enhancing Cross-border Payments Stage 1 report to the G20: Technical background report 9 April 2020 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies in order to develop and promote the imp
2、lementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. Its mandate is set out in the FSB Charter, which governs the policymaking and related activities of the FSB. These activities, including any decisions reached in their context, shall not be binding or give rise to
3、any legal rights or obligations under the FSBs Articles of Association. Contacting the Financial Stability Board Sign up for e-mail alerts: www.fsb.org/emailalert Follow the FSB on Twitter: FinStbBoard E-mail the FSB at: fsbfsb.org Copyright 2020 Financial Stability Board. Please refer to: http:/www
4、.fsb.org/terms_conditions/ iii Contents Introduction . 1 1. Existing arrangements for cross-border payments . 2 1.1 Introducing the cross-border market . 2 1.2 Retail end-user facing environments (front end) . 8 1.3 Architecture of cross-border payment services (back end) . 10 2. Challenges and fric
5、tions in existing arrangements for cross-border payments. 12 2.1 Challenges in existing arrangements . 13 2.2 How frictions affect the cross-border payment process . 18 2.3 Considerations for policymakers . 22 3. Areas to explore further in developing the roadmap . 26 Annex Trusted ledger arrangemen
6、ts for payment arrangements . 29 iv 1 Introduction The Saudi Arabian G20 Presidency has asked the FSB to coordinate amongst the relevant stakeholders on a three-stage process to develop a roadmap to enhance cross-border payments: Assessment (Stage 1): The FSB, in coordination with relevant internati
7、onal organisations and standard-setting bodies has considered the existing practice of cross- border payment arrangements through conducting an assessment of existing arrangements and challenges, and accordingly is providing an update to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBGs)
8、meeting in April 2020. Building Blocks (Stage 2): The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is leading the work on creating building blocks of a response to improve the current global cross-border payment arrangements. This will set out areas where further public sector work could
9、assist in moving to an improved cross-border payments system and in public goods or removing unnecessary barriers, and accordingly provide an update to the G20 FMCBGs meeting in July 2020. Roadmap (Stage 3): Building on the previous stages, the FSB will coordinate, with CPMI and other relevant inter
10、national organisations and standard-setting bodies, the development of a roadmap to pave the way forward. In particular, the FSB will report to the G20 on practical steps and indicative timeframes needed to do so. The three-stage process will be submitted as a combined report to the G20 FMCBGs meeti
11、ng in October 2020. This technical report is a supporting document for the assessment report to the G20, delivering on the Stage 1 mandate by covering: Existing arrangements for cross-border payments Issues/challenges with these arrangements Areas to explore further To develop the report, the FSB fo
12、rmed a Cross-border Payments Coordination Group (CPC), co-chaired by Jon Cunliffe (Chair of CPMI) and Alejandro Diaz de Leon (Governor of Bank of Mexico) and comprises the BCBS, BIS, FATF, IMF and World Bank, the chairs of relevant FSB Groups (the Regulatory Issues of Stablecoins Group and Correspon
13、dent Banking Coordination Group), the G20 Presidency, and a small number of other FSB member institutions with payments responsibility in major currency areas. The CPC has been supported in the drafting of the report by a technical experts group, which comprises members of the CPMI Cross-border Paym
14、ents Task Force and other experts nominated by members of the CPC, and the report has also benefited from input from the CPMI Cross-border Payments Task Force as a whole.1 1 The Task Force reached out to almost 40 market participants and other stakeholders, both in writing and through discussions, t
15、o obtain their views on issues in cross-border payments and possible actions/solutions to improve cross-border payments. About half of the respondents were banks or banking associations, and the non-bank sector and back-end infrastructures each represented about a quarter of the respondents. The res
16、ponses from this stakeholder outreach have largely confirmed the findings described in this report. 2 1. Existing arrangements for cross-border payments 1.1 Introducing the cross-border market Definitions For the purposes of this report, “cross-border payments” can be broadly defined as funds transf
17、ers for which the sender and the recipient are located in different jurisdictions.2 Cross- border payments may or may not involve a currency conversion.3 The cross-border payments market is often thought of in terms of two segments, retail and wholesale, each with markedly different characteristics.
18、 In the cross-border retail payments market segment, the parties to the payment are end-users (i.e. individuals, businesses or government agencies), and the payments are usually of smaller size.4 Although the term “wholesale” can be used to describe a variety of characteristics, in cross-border whol
19、esale payments the parties are financial institutions (usually banks). Cross-border wholesale payments typically involve large-value transfers that are made between financial institutions for their own accounts or on behalf of their customers (including for the settlement of retail payments), throug
20、h dedicated bilateral interbank arrangements or multilateral payment systems.5 Trends in cross-border payments The increased international mobility of goods and services, capital, and people is contributing to the growing global importance of cross-border payments6: International trade has grown str
21、ongly over the last 10 years, and the internationalisation of production has led supply chains to become increasingly global. For instance, the global value of merchandise trade exports increased by 20% and of exports of commercial services by 46% between 2008 and 2018.7 Cross-border e-commerce acti
22、vity has contributed to the growth of person-to-business cross-border retail payments and is expected to grow substantially further in the years to come; 15-20% of e-commerce transaction value is already international.8 International travel and migration continue to grow, creating additional demand
23、for cross- border payments. International tourist arrivals worldwide grew 53% from 2010 to 2019.9 Many international migrants send funds to support family and friends back home, and 2 This simple definition does not cover all circumstances in which individuals or businesses make use of cross-border
24、payments systems. For instance a tourist may be temporarily physically located in the same country as the receiver of funds, but wishes to send funds from an account in his home location; or a company may wish to make an internal transfer of funds between accounts in different currencies or location
25、s. 3 Payments across national borders within a monetary union typically encounter fewer of the challenges and frictions discussed within this report; nevertheless a number of the challenges discussed in the report exist also for those payments. 4 CPMI (2018). https:/www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d173.htm 5
26、BIS (2017). https:/www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1703g.pdf 6 CPMI (2018) https:/www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d173.htm 7 WTO (2019) https:/www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2019_e/wts19_toc_e.htm 8 McKinsey (2018) border-payments 9 UN World Tourism Organization (2020). https:/www.unwto.org/world-tourism-b
27、arometer-n18-january-2020 3 annual remittance flows grew 50% from 2010 to reach $707 billion, of which $529 billion were to low- and middle-income countries.10 These trends in the real economy suggest that cross-border payments represent an important, and probably growing, part of total payments vol
28、umes. However, comprehensive and comparable data on cross-border payments are not currently available. This is due to a lack of common definitions and coordinated, large-scale data collection efforts. Most cross-border payments flow through the correspondent banking network (either as single transac
29、tions or bundled into wholesale payments).11 Therefore, in the absence of comprehensive data on cross-border payments, and while acknowledging that other types of payment arrangements exist (as discussed in Section 1.3 below), correspondent banking values and volumes can serve as an indicator of ove
30、rall trends in cross-border payments. The volume and value of global cross-border payments sent using the SWIFT payment messaging system has risen in recent years, as shown in Figure 1 on the left. However the number of correspondent banking relationships has fallen globally by 20% from 2011 to 2018
31、, with the decline affecting almost all regions and countries (Figure 1, middle panel). This is a source of concern for the international community because, in affected jurisdictions, it may have an impact on the ability to send and receive cross-border payments, or drive some payment flows undergro
32、und, with potential adverse consequences on economic growth, financial inclusion, financial integrity and international trade.12 Some regions (such as the Pacific islands) have relatively few correspondent banking relationships and are therefore more vulnerable to loss of access than others (right-h
33、and panel).13 10 World Bank, Remittance inflows data available at https:/www.knomad.org/data/remittances 11 Correspondent banks make their payments by sending instructions (mainly via the SWIFT Network) to debit or credit their accounts. Depending on which relationships are in place, several payment
34、s between different intermediary correspondent banks might be necessary for a single underlying transaction (a payment chain). In the case of wholesale and large-value retail payments the transactions may be processed on an individual transaction basis via correspondent banking, whereas lower-value
35、retail payments are often cleared locally and correspondent banking is used for the settlement of the final net positions only. 12 FSB (2019) https:/www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P290519-1.pdf 13 An analysis of challenges in correspondent banking in the small states of the Pacific is available at:
36、Alwazir et al., (2017). https:/www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/04/07/Challenges-in-Correspondent-Banking-in-the-Small-States- of-the-Pacific-44809 4 Global figures for the different channels used for cross-border payments do not exist. The channels used in different regions may be strongl
37、y influenced by the availability of multilateral cross-border payment systems and by other factors, such as the existence of a monetary union. For instance, data suggest that around half of euro-denominated cross-border payments originated through correspondent banking arrangements are settled throu
38、gh various types of multilateral payment system, while the remaining payments are processed solely through correspondent banking arrangements.15 Globally, one important purpose for cross-border retail payments are international remittances. Remittances are a critical source of financing for people i
39、n most developing countries and play an important role in economic growth. For many households in these countries they are probably the most stable, or even the primary, source of income. Remittances inflows have increased by 64% in the last decade, from $432 billion in 2009 to an estimated $707 bil
40、lion in 2019 (see Figure 2). Remittances sent from G20 countries account for more than 50% of the global total. 14 Source: Rice, T, G von Peter, C Boar (2020): “On the global retreat of correspondent banking”, https:/www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2003g.htm 15 Around 46% in 2016 (down from 52% in 2014)
41、. Correspondent banking landscape14 Figure 1 Banks have been retreating1 The decline in relationships is global2 Some regions are less connected3 Jan 2011 = 100 201118 % change 1 Three-month moving averages. 2 The black dotted line shows the average percentage change of active correspondents across
42、regions. 3 2018 data. Correspondent banks that are active in several corridors are counted several times. Averages across countries in the following subregions: Africa: Eastern, Middle, Northern, Southern and Western; Asia: Central, Eastern, South-Eastern, Southern and Western; Eastern Europe; Europ
43、e: Northern, Southern and Western; Latin America: Caribbean, Central and South America; Northern America; Oceania: Australia and New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. Source: SWIFT BI Watch, National Bank of Belgium. 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 1817161514131211 Value of cross-border paymen
44、ts Volume of payment messages Number of active correspondents Number of corridors 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 Africa Asia Eastern Europe Europe Latin America Northern America Oceania Active correspondents Corridors Number of: 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 150125100755025 Africa Asia Eastern Europe Europe Latin Ame
45、rica Northern America Oceania No of corridors No of active correspondents (000) 5 Remittances (Total inflows) in USD bn Figure 2 Source: World Bank16 The cost of sending remittances has declined over the last 10 years (see Figure 3), but the rate of reduction has slowed in recent years and the globa
46、l average cost of sending $200, at 6.82% in Q4 2019, remains well above the G20 commitment in 2011 to reduce the cost to 5% and the UN Sustainable Development Goal target of 3% by 2030.17 Costs vary widely across country corridors18 and types of remittance service providers: the global weighted average of sending $200, which accounts for the relative size of the flows in each corridor, was estimated at 5.10% in Q4 2019, closer to the G20 commitment, but having reduced