1、ASIA AND PACIFICREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKResilient Growth but Higher Risks2024NOVINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDResilient Growth but Higher Risks2024NOVASIA AND PACIFICREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDCopyright 2024 International Monetary FundCataloging-in-Publication DataIMF LibraryN

2、ames:International Monetary Fund,publisher.Title:Regional economic outlook.Asia and Pacific:resilient growth but higher risks.Other titles:Asia and Pacific:resilient growth but higher risks.|Resilient growth but higher risks.|Regional economic outlook:Asia and Pacific.Description:Washington,DC:Inter

3、national Monetary Fund,2024.|Nov.2024.|Includes bibliographical references.Identifiers:ISBN:9798400287220(paper)9798400292118(ePub)9798400292095(Web PDF)Subjects:LCSH:Economic forecastingAsia.|Economic forecastingPacific Area.|AsiaEconomic conditions.|Pacific AreaEconomic conditions.|Economic develo

4、pmentAsia.|Economic developmentPacific Area.Classification:LCC HC412.R44 2024The Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific is published once a year,in the fall,to review developments in Asia and the Pacific.Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMFstaff and do not necessarily

5、represent the views of the IMF,its Executive Board,or IMF Management.Publication orders may be placed online,by fax,or through the mail:International Monetary Fund,Publication ServicesP.O.Box 92780,Washington,DC 20090(USA)T.+(1)202.623.7430F.+(1)202.623.7201publicationsIMF.orgwww.IMFbookstore.orgwww

6、.elibrary.IMF.orgContentsAcknowledgments.vDefinitions.viExecutive Summary.viiOutlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher Risks .1Recent Developments.1The Outlook:Resilient Growth in a Challenging Environment.6Risks:Tilted to the Downside.8Macroeconomic Policies.10References.13BOXESB

7、ox 1.Exchange Rate Developments in the Asia-Pacific.14Box 2.Geoeconomic Fragmentation:How ASEAN Economies Have Been Adapting .16 Box 3.What Drives Monetary Policy in Emerging Asia?.19FIGURESFigure 1.Growth Developments.1Figure 2.High-Frequency Indicators.2Figure 3.China.3Figure 4.Inflation.4Figure 5

8、.Exchange Rates,Interest Rates,and Capital Flows.5Figure 6.Trade Restrictions.6Figure 7.Economic Policy Uncertainty:Deviation from Historic Averages.8Figure 8.Changes in Export Market Shares(2024:H1 versus 2019:H1).9Figure 9.Fiscal Policy.11Figure 10.Inflation and Monetary Policy.12Box Figure 1.1.Ex

9、change Rate Developments.15Box Figure 2.1.ASEAN Exports to China and the US.16Box Figure 2.2.Relative Export Gains from US-China Tariffs and Correlated Drivers.17Box Figure 2.3.ASEANs Global Integration.18Box Figure 3.1.Responses to Changes in Expected Federal Reserve Policy Rates and the Impact of

10、Export and Monetary Policy Shocks on Growth .19Box Figure 3.2.Indicators of Financial Market Development.20TABLESTable 1.Asia:Real GDP.21November 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDiiiContentsAcknowledgmentsThe Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific and the accompanying analytical note,Asias Struct

11、ural Transformation:The Past and Prospects,were prepared by a team led by Johannes Wiegand and Alasdair Scott,under the overall direction of Krishna Srinivasan and Thomas Helbling.The main authors are Sandile Hlatshwayo(lead),Jonghyun Kim and Ying Xu for the main chapter,and Rahul Giri(lead),Chikako

12、 Baba and Anne Oeking(co-leads)for the analytical note.Contributions(to both the chapter and the note)are from Natasha Che,Federico Diez,Giovanni Donato,Julia Estefania Flores,Ashique Habib,Tristan Hennig,ShujaatKhan,Emmanouil Kitsios,Chris Redl,Haruki Seitani,Vyshnavi Thumbala Saikrishnan,Arthur Xi

13、e,Weining Xin,and Yizhi Xu.Paige Brewer and Judee Yanzon assisted with the preparation of the report.Cheryl Toksoz of the IMFs Communications Department edited the volume and coordinated its publication and release.This report is based on data available as of October28,2024,and benefited from commen

14、ts from other IMF departments.AcknowledgmentsNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDvDefinitionsIn this Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific,the following groupings are employed:“ASEAN”or“ASEAN-10”refers to Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,Lao Peoples Democratic Republic(Lao PDR),Malaysi

15、a,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam,unless otherwise specified.“ASEAN-5”refers to Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.“Advanced Asia”refers to Australia,Hong Kong Special Administrative Region(Hong Kong SAR),Japan,Korea,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan Prov

16、ince of China,unless otherwise noted.“Emerging Asia”refers to China,India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam,unless otherwise noted.“Asia”refers to ASEAN,advanced Asia,Bangladesh,Bhutan,China,India,Maldives,Nepal,and Sri Lanka,and other Asian economies.The following conventions

17、are used:In figures and tables,shaded areas show IMF projections.“Basis points”refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point(for example,25 basis points are equivalent to of 1percentage point).“Billion”means a thousand million;“trillion”means a thousand billion.As used in this report,the term“country”do

18、es not,in all cases,refer to a territorial entity that is a state as under-stood by international law and practice.As used here,the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLO

19、OKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 2024viExecutive SummaryShort-term prospects for Asia and the Pacific are somewhat more favorable than described in the April 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and the Pacific,even though growth is still expected to moderate in 2024 and 2025.Th

20、e region is forecast to contribute roughly 60 percent to global growth in 2024.At the same time,risks have increased,reflecting rising geopolitical tensions,uncertainty about the strength of global demand,and potential for financial volatility.Demographic change will act increasingly as a brake on a

21、ctivity,though struc-tural shifts into high-productivity sectors such as tradable services hold promise to sustain robust growth.In the first half of 2024,growth slightly exceeded the April forecast.Although exports picked up for the entire regionsupported by a surge in demand for technology product

22、sthe picture was more nuanced for domestic demand:consumption and investment expanded at a robust pace in much of emerging Asia,but consumption weakened in advanced Asia,reflecting in part the impact of past monetary tightening.In China,adjustment of the property market continued to weigh on private

23、 demand.The regional growth forecast for 2024 has been marked up to 4.6 percent from 4.5 percent in April,largely reflecting the overperformance in the first half of the year.In 2025,more accommodative monetary conditions are expected to support activity,resulting in a slight upward growth revision

24、to 4.4 percent from 4.3 percent in April.Inflation has retreated in much of the region.Low goods price inflation has been key,as global demand shifted from goods to services in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.In most emerging Asian economies,inflation returned to target already by the end of 2023.

25、Disinflation in advanced Asia has been sloweras wage pressures stymied services disinflationbut,in most countries,inflation is expected to return to policy targets by early 2025.In early August,financial markets suffered a spike in volatility when expectations about the Federal Reserves policy rate

26、path shifted downward;it also occurred soon after a policy rate increase by the Bank of Japan.The yen appreciated sharply as yen-funded carry trade positions unwound,with pressures spilling over into other Asian currencies.Stock markets sold off but recovered quickly.Markets now expect most Asian ce

27、ntral banks to ease,though to a lesser degree than the Federal Reserve,whereas the Bank of Japan remains on a gradual tightening path.Data surprises could affect these expectations and trigger more market volatility.Notwithstanding recent robust growth,risks to the outlook have increased,and the bal

28、ance of risks is now tilted to the downside.A near-term risk is a weaker external environment,if the lagged impact of global monetary tightening in 202123 bites more than expected,trade tensions or conflicts escalate further,or if the slowdown in China deepens.Cautious and nimble policy management w

29、ill be needed to steer Asias economies through the period ahead.Central banks should focus on domestic monetary stability needswhich can mean delaying policy easing in economies where inflation remains persistently above target,but also providing monetary support where core inflation is undesirably

30、low.For many economies,fiscal consolidation is a priority,given high debt levels and medium-term challenges that will require additional fiscal space,such as aging populations and climate change.As lagged effects of past monetary tightening pass through to corporate and household balance sheets,supe

31、rvisors should monitor risks vigilantly.Trade restrictions continue to be implemented at a rapid pace across the globe.In past decades,Asian economies took advantage of global economic integration and developed competitive tradable sectorshence,rising tensions are dangerous for the region.The analyt

32、ical note accompanying this outlook,Asias Structural Transformation:The Past and Prospects,analyzes the longer-term growth prospects for Asian economies and how these would be affected by a shift to a more services-oriented economy.The note finds that,while growth in Asia is likely to slow,this refl

33、ects mostly demographic factors.At the same time,a gradual transition toward tradable services has not only been ongoing for decades already,it also promises to generate new opportu-nities to reinvigorate growth rather than harming it.However,success requires supporting polices,including education a

34、nd training to adapt to new technologies.Executive SummaryNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDviiOutlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksRecent DevelopmentsGrowth in Asia and the Pacific remained robust in the first half of 2024.Outturns surprised mostly on the upside(

35、Figure 1,panel 1),even though growth drivers differed:in advanced Asia,activity was heavily reliant on exports,whereas in emerging Asia,both domestic and external demand contributed to growth(Figure1,panel2).Disinflation made progress:in much of emerging Asia,inflation has already returned toor is c

36、lose tocentral bank targets,whereas in parts of advanced Asia,sticky services prices initially slowed disinflation but have started to recede.Almost all of Asia benefited from robust export demand in the first half of 2024,but private consumption weakened in advanced economies.In advanced Asia exclu

37、ding Japan,private consumption retreated,possibly reflecting the impact of tight monetary conditions(Figure 2,panels 1 and 2).Growth received a welcome boost from manufacturing activity and exports,however(Figure 2,panels 3 and 4),with strong demand from the United States and emerging markets(Figure

38、 2,panel 5).In Japan,growth in the first half of 2024 disappointed amid domestic supply disruptions,but real earnings have turned positive,and forward-looking indicators suggest that growth will return to above potential.InvestmentStatistical discrepancyPrivate consumptionNet exportsPublic consumpti

39、onGrowthFigure 1.Growth DevelopmentsSources:Haver Analytics,IMF World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For panel 2,the data are not seasonally adjusted.AE Asia 2024:Q1 includes Australia,Hong Kong SAR,South Korea,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan Province of China.EM Asia inc

40、ludes Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand.AE Asia for 2024:Q2 excludes New Zealand.China data are from October 2024 World Economic Outlook.AE=advanced economy;EM=emerging economy.1.Growth Surprises 2024:H1(Year-over-year percent change)2.Contributions to GDP Growth(Year-over-year percent

41、age points)2810123456717135Real GDP growth outturnsProjected real GDP growth(WEO April 2024)11357AustraliaNew ZealandJapanKoreaChinaIndiaIndonesiaMalaysiaPhilippinesSingaporeThailandVietnamPositiveNegativeAE Asia(excludingJapan)JapanEM Asia(excludingChina andIndia)ChinaIndia2024:Q124:Q22024:Q124:Q22

42、024:Q124:Q22024:Q124:Q22024:Q124:Q2Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND1JapanChinaAsia AE(excluding Japan)Asia EMDE(excluding China)JapanChinaAsia AE(excluding Japan)Asia EMDE(excluding China)JapanChinaAsia AE(excluding Japan)Asi

43、a EMDE(excluding China)ChinaAE AsiaEM Asia excluding ChinaAE Asia electronicsAE Asia goodsEM Asia electronicsEM Asia goods2023:H12024:H1Figure 2.High-Frequency Indicators1.Services PMI(Diffusion index,deviation from 50,+=expansion)2.Retail Sales(Year-over-year percent change)51531135791113Sources:Ha

44、ver Analytics;IMF Direction of Trade Statistics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For panel 1 and 3,Chinas services and manufacturing PMI data are from Caixin.For panel 2,Asia AE includes Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,Korea,Singapore,Taiwan Province of China,and New Zealand and Asia EMDE inc

45、ludes Indonesia,India,Malaysia,Thailand,Philippines,and Vietnam.New Zealand and Thailand data are missing for May 2024 observation.For panel 4,AE Asia includes Australia,Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,Japan,Korea,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan Province of China;EM Asia includes China,Indo

46、nesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam.Indonesia missing data since May 2024.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets,EMDE=emerging and developing economies;Hong Kong SAR=Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;Macao SAR=Macao Special Administrative Region;and PMI=Purchasing Managers Index

47、.Jan.2023Mar.23May23July23Sep.23Nov.23Jan.24Mar.24May24July24Sep.24Jan.2023Mar.23May23July23Sep.23Nov.23Jan.24Mar.24May24July24Sep.24520051015Jan.2023Apr.23July23Oct.23Jan.24Apr.24July24Jan.2023Apr.23July23Oct.23Jan.24Apr.24July243.Manufacturing PMI(Diffusion index,deviation from 50,+=expansion)4.As

48、ia Electronics and Total Goods Exports(Year-over-year percent change)55432101234151510505105.Asia Exports by Recipient(Value in US dollar;index 2019:H1=1)6.Chinese Tourist Arrivals(Percent of 2019:H1)0.52.10.70.91.11.31.51.71.90901020304050607080ASEAN 10Rest ofAsiaUnitedStatesOtherAEOtherEM2021:H122

49、:H123:H124:H12021:H122:H123:H124:H12021:H122:H123:H124:H12021:H122:H123:H124:H12021:H122:H123:H124:H1Macao SARThailandKoreaJapanVietnamFijiThe PhilippinesAustraliaHong Kong SARCambodiaSri LankaREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 20242 Different from advanced

50、 economies,growth in emerging Asia excluding China has remained broad-based.Both exportsespecially for technology productsand domestic demand underpinned activity.Many emerging market economies are also benefiting from a recovery in tourism from China(Figure 2,panel 6).In India,strong growth has bee

51、n driven by investment and private consumption.Chinas growth weakened after the first quarter of this year,as private consumption,private investment,and local government finances continued to suffer from Chinas drawn-out real estate sector correction(Figure3,panel 1).Exports have grown solidly,with

52、rising demand from emerging marketsboth within and outside Asiasubstituting for weaker demand from advanced economies(Figure 2,panel 5).Disinflation advanced further across Asia,even though some advanced economies took time to complete the last stage of disinflation(Figure 4,panels 1 and 2).In advan

53、ced Asia excluding Japan,inflation exceeded,on average,policy targets by more than a percentage point at the beginning of the year,but the overshoot has since evaporated.Rapid disinflation for goods prices has been key,as global demand shifted from goods to services in the aftermath of the COVID-19

54、pandemic and fewer supply disruptions occurred(Figure 4,panel 3).By contrastand similar to other advanced economiesservices inflation remained above prepandemic levels until recently,lifted by wage pressures that often reflect the attempt to recuperate real income losses endured in 202123(Figure 4,p

55、anels 5 and 6;Chapter 1 of the October 2024 World Economic Outlook Report).However,in recent months,services inflation has also started to retreat.In Japan,headline inflation remains above target(2.5 percent in September),and core inflation has edged up recently,reflecting broad-based price increase

56、s.In Asian emerging markets excluding China,disinflation has advanced faster than in other emerging markets around the world(Chapter 1 of the October 2024 World Economic Outlook Report).Inflation rates had reached preCOVID-19 levels already at the end of 2023 and remain at orin some caseseven below

57、policy targets(Figure 4,panel 2).SaleReal estate investmentConsumer confidence(right scale)Asia EMDEs excluding China(import price index)Asia AEs(import price index)China(export price index)Figure 3.China1.China:Real Estate Sector and Consumer Confidence(Year-over-year percent change;2013=100)302525

58、20151050510152060130708090100110120Jan.2019June 20Nov.21Apr.23Sep.242.Asian Import Prices and Chinas Export Prices(Year-over-year percent change)2030151050510152025Feb.2019Aug.19Feb.20Aug.20Feb.21Aug.21Feb.22Aug.22Feb.23Aug.23Feb.24Aug.24Sources:China NBS;Haver Analytics;Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and I

59、MF staff calculations.Note:For panel 1,the data are in 12-month moving averages,except consumer confidence.For panel 2,Asia EMDEs include India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam;Asia AEs include Australia,Korea,Hong Kong SAR,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan Province of China.Th

60、e data are year-over-year percent changes,seasonally adjusted.August 2024 data unavailable for India,Vietnam,the Philippines,Australia,and New Zealand.AE=advanced economies;EMDE=emerging and developing markets.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIO

61、NAL MONETARY FUND3FoodHeadline CPIOther categories(core)Energy/fuel/transportAE AsiaEM Asia(excluding China)Goods inflationServices inflationAsia EM excluding ChinaJan.2015Sep.2019 averageAsia AE excluding JapanJan.2015Sep.2019 averageAsia AE excluding JapanAsia EM excluding ChinaAsia EM excluding C

62、hinaJan.2015Sep.2019 averageAsia AE excluding JapanJan.2015Sep.2019 averageAsia AE excluding JapanAsia EM excluding ChinaFigure 4.Inflation1.Contributions to Headline Inflation(Year-over-year percent change)2710123456EMAE2022:Q122:Q323:Q123:Q324:Q124:Q32022:Q122:Q323:Q123:Q324:Q124:Q32022:Q122:Q323:

63、Q123:Q324:Q124:Q32022:Q122:Q323:Q123:Q324:Q124:Q3ChinaJapanAE AsiaexcludingJapanEM AsiaexcludingChina2.Headline Inflation:Average Deviations from Targets orHistorical Averages(Year-over-year percent change,deviations)0.21.200.20.40.60.81.0AEEMDec.2023LatestDec.2023LatestEnd-2024WorldEconomicOutlookf

64、orecastEnd-2024WorldEconomicOutlookforecast3.Asian Goods Inflation(Year-over-year percent change,seasonally adjusted)8202468202464.Asian Services Inflation(Year-over-year percent change,seasonally adjusted)5.Asian Wage Inflation(Year-over-year percent change)202468Jan.2019June 19Nov.19Apr.20Sep.20Fe

65、b.21July 21Dec.21May 22Oct.22Mar.23Aug.23Jan.24June 246.Correlation of Goods/Services Inflation with WageInflation for Advanced Asian Economies(Year-over-year percent change;201024)101062284046810505101520Goods or servicesinflationWage inflationSources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note

66、:AE Asia includes Australia,Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,Korea,Macao Special Administrative Region,New Zealand,Singapore,and Taiwan Province of China.EM Asia includes Indonesia,India,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand.For panel 1,core refers to the consumer price index basket excluding

67、 food and energy,fuel,and transport.The exact categories used in the decomposition vary across economies.The September headline CPI data point is not available for Macao Special Administrative Region.For panel 2,AE excludes Macao Special Administrative Region.The latest data for AE and EM Asia are f

68、rom September 2024,except the latest for Australia is June 2024.For economies with ranges,midpoints are used.For economies without targets,historical averages are used over the period from 2010 to 2019.For panels 3 and 4,Asia Advanced Economies excludes Macao Special Administrative Region.Asia Emerg

69、ing and Developing Economies includes Vietnam.Data are seasonally adjusted.The latest data are as of September 2024 except for Australia.For panel 5,AE Asia excludes Taiwan Province of China.EM Asia(excluding China)excludes the Philippines.The June 2024 data point for Indonesia is not available.For

70、panel 6,the chart reflects AE Asia excluding Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan Province of China.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets.Oct.2019Jan.20Apr.20July 20Jan.21Apr.21Oct.21Jan.22July.22Oct.22Apr.23July 23Jan.24Apr.24July 24Oct.20July.21Apr.22Jan.23Oct.23Jan.2019Apr.19July 19

71、Jan.20Apr.20Oct.20Jan.21July 21Oct.21Apr.22July 22Jan.23Apr.23July 23Oct.23Jan.24Apr.24July 24Oct.19July 20Apr.21Jan.22Oct.22REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 20244 In China,consumer price inflation recovered somewhat but remained low,at 0.4 percent in Sep

72、tember 2024(Figure 4,panel 1).Moreover,export prices continued to decline(Figure 3,panel 2).In early August,global and regional financial markets briefly turned volatile as expectations about monetary policy shifted.In the first half of the year,many Asian currencies had still been under substantial

73、 depreciation pressures,reflecting unusually compressed or even negative interest differentials vis-vis the Federal Reserve(Box1).These pressures partially reverted when weaker US inflation and labor market data triggered a shift in expectations about imminent and sustained policy easing by the Fede

74、ral Reserve(Figure 5,panel 1).The reversal was especially pronounced for the Japanese yen,where it triggered an unwinding of carry trade positions with the yen as funding currency,following a policy rate hike by the Bank of Japan on July 31.Asian equity markets also sold off but recovered quickly.Ch

75、inaIndiaKoreaIndonesiaThailandPhilippinesMalaysiaJan.1July 1,2024July 1Oct.3,2024Oct.3 to dateYTD 2024AnnouncedCompletedFigure 5.Exchange Rates,Interest Rates,and Capital Flows1.Exchange Rate Movements vis-vis the US Dollar(Percent change;+=appreciation)2015105051015KORJPNNZLAUSSGPVNMPHLINDIDNCHNTHA

76、MYSAsia AEAsia EM2.Net Portfolio Flows to Asia(Percent of IIP liabilities)1.00.500.51.01.52.0Jan.2024Feb.24Mar.24Apr.24May24June24July24Aug.24Sep.24Oct.243.Foreign Direct Investment(Announced and Completed)(First half of 2022,2023,and 2024;billion of dollars)01020304050602022:H123:H124:H12022:H123:H

77、124:H12022:H123:H124:H12022:H123:H124:H1ChinaEM AsiaexcludingChinaJapanAE AsiaexcludingJapan4.Foreign Direct Investment Flows from China and the US:Selected Economies(Completed)(First half of 2023 and 2024;billion of US dollars)2023:H124:H12023:H124:H12023:H124:H12023:H124:H12023:H124:H1To JapanTo A

78、SEAN-5To ChinaTo JapanTo ASEAN-5From ChinaFrom United States00.51.01.52.0Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;Haver Analytics;BIS;Institute of International Finance;Orbis Database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For panel 1,data as of October 21,2024.For panel 2,all countries include equity and debt flows

79、 with the exception of Korea and the Philippines where debt data are unavailable.Latest data through October 11,2024.For panel 3,AE Asia includes Australia,Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,Japan,Korea,and New Zealand.Latest data till July 2024.For panels 3 and 4,the figure includes the number

80、 of greenfield projects,expansions,and relocations,by source and destination countries.For panel 4,ASEAN-5 includes Indonesia,the Philippines,Malaysia,Thailand,and Vietnam.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging

81、 markets;and IIP=International Investment Position.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND5Consistent with the renewed strength of Asian currencies,net portfolio inflows have ticked up for several economies,although in some cases fr

82、om a low base(Figure 5,panel 2).There are also signs of stronger foreign direct investment inflows into the region,with the notable exception of China,where foreign direct investment inflows turned negative in the second quarter of 2024(Figure 5,panels 3 and 4).Countries around the globe adopted num

83、erous new trade restrictions(Figure 6,panel 1).Some measures reflect efforts to strengthen supply chain resiliency and diversification in critical sectors(for example,high-tech and green products),while others have a retaliatory character.1 While few of the measures implemented in Asia appear to tar

84、get intra-regional trade,(Figure 6,panel 2),many Asian countries have implemented industrial policies that contain trade-distorting elements(Box 3 from the April 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and the Pacific).The Outlook:Resilient Growth in a Challenging EnvironmentWhile growth in Asia is fore

85、cast to slow in 2024 and 2025reflecting fading support from the pandemic recovery and secular factors like population agingshort-term prospects are somewhat more favorable than expected in April.Regional growth in 2024 has been revised up marginally by 0.1 percentage point to 4.6 percent,primarily r

86、eflecting the robust performance early in the year(Table 1).With this,the Asia and Pacific region is expected to contribute roughly 60 percent to global growth this year.Strength remains concentrated in emerging market economies.By contrast,growth in advanced economies is sluggish,owing to less buoy

87、ant private consumption and temporary production disruptions in Japan in early 2024.For 2025,growth for the region has also been marked up by 0.1 percentage point to 4.4 percent,as looser global and domestic monetary conditions are expected to boost private demand,especially in advanced economies.Th

88、is said,the outlook is subject to sizable economic and geopolitical uncertainties(see the“Risks:Tilted to the Downside”section).1 The number of restrictions is an imperfect indicator for their severity and comparison across years.For example,the 2024 US Section 301 tariff increase on Chinese exports

89、 targeted roughly$18 billion in goods,compared with the increase on roughly$250 billion of Chinese exports in the 201819 rounds of Section 301 tariffs,which largely remain in place.Asia-PacificAmericasEuropeMiddle East and Central AsiaAfricaAsia-PacificNon Asia-PacificBothFigure 6.Trade Restrictions

90、1.Trade Restrictions Imposed(Average new measures per month)08010203040506070200810121416182022242.Trade Restrictions Imposed by Asian Countries,by Targeted Countries(Average new measures per month)0205101520081012141618202224Sources:Global Trade Alert;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For panel 2,Asi

91、a-Pacific and Non-Asia-Pacific include measures exclusively targeted at these groups of economies,respectively.“Both”reflects measures that either affect both groups or when bilateral information is not available.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 20246Adva

92、nced EconomiesGrowth in advanced Asia is forecast to slow to 1.6 percent in 2024 from 2.0 percent in 2023,but to recover to 1.9 percent in 2025 as domestic demand strengthens.Japans 2024 growth forecast has been revised down to 0.3 percenta shift of 0.6 percentage point relative to April,due in part

93、 to temporary supply disruptions.Growth is expected to recover to 1.1 percent in 2025,as robust real wage growth supports private consumption.Korea and other advanced Asian economies are benefiting from strong global demand for technology products.Koreas 2024 growth projection has been marked up by

94、0.2 percentage point relative to April to 2.5percent.A slightly lower growth rate at 2.2 percent is expected for 2025,amid gradual rebalancing from external to domestic demand.In Australia and New Zealand,headwinds from tight monetary policy stances are weighing on growth.Australias 2024 growth rate

95、 has been marked down by 0.3 percentage point relative to April to 1.2 percent,while growth in New Zealand is projected to stall.In 2025,private demand is expected to firm as real income growth strengthens.Emerging Market EconomiesGrowth in Emerging Asia is projected to slow somewhat,but at a less r

96、apid pace than previously forecast.Relative to April,emerging Asias growth has been revised up by 0.1 percentage point for 2024 and 2025,to 5.3 percent and 5.0 percent,respectively.For China,2024 growth was revised up to 5 percent in July at the conclusion of the 2024 China Article IV consultation,r

97、eflecting stronger-than-expected private consumption in the first quarter.However,after disap-pointing domestic demand in the second quarter,it is now forecast at 4.8 percentwhich is still broadly in line with the authorities growth target.High frequency data suggest that consumer demand has remaine

98、d subdued,while exports are performing well.Stronger-than-anticipated policy support later in the year could provide upside risks to the forecast.For 2025,opposing forces are at work:the property market is expected to bottom out,which should support domestic demand,but potential growth would retreat

99、 in view of population aging and slowing productivity growth.Overall,the 2025 forecast has been marked up by 0.4percentage point to 4.5 percent relative to April.Growth in 2024 for India has been revised up by 0.2 percentage point to 7.0 percent relative to the April forecast,as rural consumption is

100、 benefiting from an improved agricultural season,and as public infrastructure investment continues to expand.These trends are expected to continue in 2025.With this,India remains the worlds fastest growing major economy.Growth for the countries belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

101、(ASEAN)is forecast at a robust 4.6 percent in 2024 and at 4.7 percent in 2025,largely supported by strong domestic demand and exports.Indonesia,the Philippines,and Vietnam are all projected to grow robustly,while activity in Thailand remains more subdued.Frontier Economies and Small StatesBangladesh

102、s short-term prospects have been affected negatively by recent political turbulence,with growth projected to slow to 5.4 percent in 2024 from 5.8 percent last year.Mongolia is forecast to grow at a robust 5.5 percent in 2024 and at 7.0 percent in 2025,as mining sector activity is strengthening.Growt

103、h in Nepal is also expected to improve,from 3.1 percent in 2024 to 4.9 percent in 2025,on the back of higher capital spending,a good harvest,and supportive monetary policy.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND7Many Pacific island

104、countries are expected to continue benefiting from a recovery in tourism,even though the impact on growth is expected to fade in 2025.Pacific island economies also face unique challenges,including vulnerability to climate shocks and undiversified economies,resulting in a high degree of uncertainty a

105、round their growth paths.As a group,growth in Pacific island countries is expected to decline from 3.9 in 2024 to 3.3 percent in 2025.InflationAverage inflation is projected to drop to 2.2 percent in 2024,before a mild resurgence to 2.6 percent in 2025.In advanced Asia excluding Japan,disinflation i

106、s projected to continue as the lagged impact of past monetary tightening weighs on wage growth and reins in services inflation.For 2024,average inflation of 2.5 percent is expected,receding further to 2.3 percent in 2025.In Japan,after the successful exit from unconventional monetary policy,the 3.5-

107、percent boost in nominal wages from the Shunto wage negotiations is expected to support re-anchoring inflation at the Bank of Japans target.Inflation rates of 2.2 percent and 2.0 percent are forecast for 2024 and 2025,respectively.In emerging Asia,average 2024 inflation is projected at 2.1 percentth

108、e lowest rate in almost 25 years.In 2025,inflation is expected to recover somewhat to 2.7 percent,largely reflecting the gradual normalization of inflation rates in China and Thailand,which are currently at very low levels.Risks:Tilted to the DownsideNotwithstanding robust growth in the first half o

109、f 2024,the risk landscape has deteriorated since April,as worsening geopolitical tensions,Chinas ongoing property market correction,and the possibility of more financial market turbulence are all complicating the economic environment.Risks are now tilted to the downside.This shift occurs in the cont

110、ext of already elevated policy uncertainty for several countries(but not all)in the region(Figure 7).In some countries,social and political tensions have also increased.A More Difficult External EnvironmentExternal demand could be weaker than forecast if the impact of past global monetary tight-enin

111、g is stronger than anticipated.Until recently,monetary policy has been on hold in much of the world,but with inflation retreating,real policy rates have increasedwhich could weigh on global activity and therefore on prospects for exports.Moreover,escalating international tensions and conflicts could

112、 impact Asia and the Pacific negatively,especially if there are spillovers to commodity and financial markets,or if tensions increase trade costs.In advanced Asia,domestic demand could also suffer from the after-effects of past tightening,especially if regional central banks need to maintain a tight

113、 stance for longer to complete the disinflation process.IndiaKoreaJapanChinaSingaporeFigure 7.Economic Policy Uncertainty:Deviation from Historic Averages(Indexed differences from averages)70380203080130180230280330Jan.2016July 16Jan.17July 17Jan.18July 18Jan.19July 19Jan.20July 20Jan.21July 21Jan.2

114、2July 22Jan.23July 23Jan.24July 24Sources:Baker and others(2016);Davis(2016);Davis and others(2019);Saxegaard and others(2022);and IMF staff calculations.Note:Seven-month moving averages;long-term historical averages based on data for 2006 to 2015.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATION

115、AL MONETARY FUND November 20248A Drawn-out Drag from Chinas Real Estate CorrectionA longer and larger-than-expected slowdown in China would be harmful for both the region and the global economy.As discussed in the April 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and the Pacific,persistent downward price pr

116、essures from China can undermine the competitiveness of sectors in countries with similar export structures to China and provoke trade tensions.Chinas policy response is critical in this context:measures to stimulate manufacturing and exports could worsen tensions,while additional efforts to facilit

117、ate property sector adjustment and strengthen private consumption would support both regional and global growth.Geoeconomic Fragmentation and a Further Increase in Trade TensionsAn acute risk is the escalation in tit-for-tat retaliatory tariffs between major trading partners.This would ulti-mately a

118、ffect growth prospects for all countries,including connector countries that may benefit from a rewiring of supply chains in the short term(see Box2).Adjustments to trade fragmentation are already evident in the data:whereas the ASEAN-10 countries have been able to expand trade with both the United S

119、tates and China,Chinas exports are increas-ingly directed toward emerging markets,while exports to advanced economies have fallen in importanceincluding to advanced Asian economies(Figure 8).As discussed in the April 2024 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific,changes in nominal trade patterns t

120、end to be more pronounced than changes in traded value added,suggesting that some of the re-orientation represents an economically inefficient lengthening of supply chains(see also Alfaro and Chor 2023 and Qiu and others 2023).Market TurbulenceRecent market turbulence could foreshadow future bouts o

121、f volatility.Financial markets are now pricing in additional,large rate cuts by the Federal Reserve in late 2024 and 2025(Figure 10,panel 3)and similar but significantly smaller cuts by Asian central banks,as the latter are typically closer to a neutral monetary position than the Federal Reserve.At

122、the same time,the Bank of Japan is expected to continue to gradually increase policy rates.Sudden changes in expectations of these policy paths could cause exchange rates to adjust sharply,with spill-overs into other financial market segments.Although volatility by itself would not necessarily be ha

123、rmful,it could undermine consumer confidence and investment(see Chapter 1 of the October 2024 Global Financial Stability Report).Transition Risks and New TechnologiesStructural challenges are discussed in detail in the analytical note accompanying this outlook.Population aging will affect many Asian

124、 economies in the coming decades,weighing on potential growth and raising fiscal chal-lenges.A shift to a services-oriented economy can create new growth opportunities,especially if economies invest in tradable services such as business services and finance,but success requires accompanying educatio

125、n Figure 8.Changes in Export Market Shares(2024:H1 versus 2019:H1)(Percentage points)6104202468ChinaASEAN 10Other AEsUnited StatesChinaUnited StatesRest of worldEmergingmarkets+ASEAN 10Asia AE(excludingSingapore)Asia AE(excludingSingapore)Sources:IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and IMF staff calcu

126、lations.Note:Export values in billion USD.AE=advanced economies.ASEAN 10:members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND9and labor market policies.Similarly,new technologies can not only

127、 trigger higher productivity and growth but also provoke worker dislocation and displacementespecially for countries with low levels of preparedness(Box1 of Asias Structural Transformation:The Past and Prospects).Climate ChangeMany Asian economies are vulnerable to global warming,which can cause bot

128、h immediate and long-lasting economic impacts such as supply chain disruptions,damages to infrastructure,food insecurity,and internal and cross-border migration.In Pacific island countries,as well as in several low-and middle-income countries,large shares of the population are exposed to climate-rel

129、ated disasters(IMF 2016).Larger and more frequent climate shocks would also exacerbate fiscal burdens,impair financial instability,and ultimately lead to lower growth.Macroeconomic PoliciesCautious and nimble macroeconomic management will be needed to steer Asias economies through the period ahead.K

130、ey are efforts to strengthen fiscal sustainability,monetary management that focuses on safeguarding domestic monetary stability while preserving the capacity to react rapidly to changing circumstances,and vigilant financial supervision.Fiscal PolicyPublic debt and debt servicing ratios in Asia remai

131、n well above prepandemic levels(Figure 9,panels 1 and 2),rendering growth-friendly fiscal consolidation an urgent priority,especially for many Pacific island countries and emerging markets.Although public sector debt ratios would stabilize or even fall in most economies based on current projections,

132、consolidation plans have fallen behind schedule repeatedly,especially in advanced Asia(Figure9,panels3 and 4).As discussed in prior Regional Economic Outlooks,reforms should target revenue mobilization and growth-friendly expenditure rationalization.More systematic taxation of greenhouse gas emissio

133、ns would both raise more revenue and advance the transition of Asian economies to a low-carbon mode of production.Monetary and Exchange Rate PolicyAsias success with combating the postpandemic inflation surge speaks well of the capacity of the regions central banks to safeguard stable monetary condi

134、tions.As inflation pressures have ebbed off,room has emerged to cut rates and move to a more neutral stance.This said,in a few economies where inflation is still above target,aggressive loosening should wait until inflation and wage expectations are firmly re-anchored(Figure 10,panel 1).In a few eco

135、nomies,inflation is uncomfortably low;here,maintaining accommodative monetary conditions or policy easing is warranted.At the same time,central banks should stand ready to adjust their policy stance if the risks discussed above materialize.In the first half of 2024,most Asian central banks kept poli

136、cy rates on holdarguably reflecting concern about depreciation pressures if they were to cut before the Federal Reserve.The recent downward shift in the Federal Reserves interest rate expectations and start of its easing cycle have loosened this constraint and should grant Asian central banks more s

137、cope to adjust policy in line with domestic needs,as some central banks have begun doing(Figure 10,panels 2 and 3).IMF staff research shows that,in the past three decades,Asian capital markets have deepened,balance sheet dollarization has receded,and foreign reserves coverage has improved:all factor

138、s that should have increased the degrees of freedom for Asian central banks to focus on domestic condi-tions and let exchange rates adjust(Box 3).REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202410Financial and Macroprudential PoliciesGiven the prospect of monetary a

139、nd financial easing in many Asian economies,financial regulators and supervi-sors should monitor risks closely and,if needed,use macroprudential tools to address pockets of vulnerability,for example in real estate markets and other high-risk credit segments,to prevent the build-up of systemic risks.

140、For example,household debt levels remain above peer averages in many regional advanced and emerging market economies(Figure 10,panel 4).Asia AE(excluding Japan)Asia EMs(excluding China)Asia PICAsia LIDCsAsia AE(excluding Japan)Asia EMs(excluding China)Asia PICsAsia LIDCsOct.2024 WEOApril 2024 WEOOct

141、.2023 WEOCumulative planned primary balanceCumulative debt-stabilizing primary balanceFigure 9.Fiscal Policy1.Debt Ratios(Percent of fiscal year GDP,weighted average;simple averagefor Asia PICs)20803040506070COVID-192007101316192225282.Debt Service Ratios(Percent of general government revenue,weight

142、ed average;simple average for Asia PICs)2427121722273237COVID-192016 1718192021222324252627283.Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance Forecasts(Percent of GDP;simple average)Advanced Asia5143210292022232425262728Emerging Asia51432102920222324252627284.Forecast versus Debt-Stabilizing Cumulative Primary

143、Balances 202426(Percent of GDP)25520151050AustraliaBangladeshChinaHong Kong SARIndonesiaIndiaJapanKoreaMalaysiaNew ZealandThe PhilippinesThailandVietnamSources:IMF World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For panels 1 and 2,Pacific island countries aggregates(PICs)show the sim

144、ple average,not the weighted average.For panel 4,debt is assumed to be stabilized at 2023 levels for calculating the debt-stabilizing estimates.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging economies;PICs=Pacific Island Countries;LIDC=Low-income developing countries.Each group includes all countries with availa

145、ble data in World Economic Outlook database,grouped according to World Economic Outlook classifications.WEO=World Economic Outlook;and Hong Kong SAR=Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND11Ju

146、ne FOMCLatest2019:Q12024:Q1Inflation targeting rangeLatest headline inflation2024 WEO forecast(eop,headline)Inflation targetJan.2024June 20242024:Q32024:Q4 Realized2024:Q42025:Q12025:Q2Figure 10.Inflation and Monetary Policy1.Headline Inflation(Percent,year-over-year)2.Market-Implied Policy Rates(Pe

147、rcent)Sources:IMF,World Economic Outlook database;Bloomberg Finance L.P.;Haver Analytics;BIS;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For panel 1,the latest headline inflation data are as of September 2024,except for Australia,which has June 2024 data,available as of October 28,2024.For panel 2,AE Asia inclu

148、des Australia,New Zealand,Korea,and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.EM Asia includes China,India,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand.Latest data are as of October 18,2024.For panel 3,2024:Q4,2025:Q1,and 2025:Q2 data are from Bloomberg median forecasts.Data as of October 25,2024.Data labels

149、 in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets;and FOMC=Federal Open Market Committee.3.Policy Rates and Forecasts(Percent change)4.Household Debt-to-GDP Ratio(Percent)01234567012345625020015010050050100020406080100120140

150、AUSJPNNZLSGPGlobalAEsKORHKGINDGlobalEMsMYSIDNTHACHNINDAUSVNMJPNNZLSGPMYSPHLIDNKORHKGTHACHNUSAAUSNZLJPNPHLIDNTHAMYSINDKORUnited StatesAE Asia excludingJapanEM Asia3M6M1Y2Y3Y3M6M1Y2Y3Y3M6M1Y2Y3YREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202412ReferencesAlfaro,Laura,a

151、nd Davin Chor.2023.“Global Supply Chains:The Looming“Great Reallocation”.”Working Paper No.w31661,National Bureau of Economic Research,Cambridge,MA.Baker,Scott R.,Nicholas Bloom,and Steven J.Davis.“Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics131.4(2016):1593-1636.Davis,S

152、teven J.“An Index of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty.”No.w22740.National Bureau of Economic Research,2016.Davis,Steven J.,Dingquian Liu,and Xuguang Simon Sheng.“Economic Policy Uncertainty in China since 1949:The View from Mainland Newspapers.”Fourth Annual IMF-Atlanta Fed Research Workshop on Ch

153、inas Economy Atlanta.Vol.19.2019.Basu,Suman,Emine Boz,Gita Gopinath,Francisco Roch,and Filiz Unsal.2020.“A Conceptual Model for the Integrated Policy Framework.”IMF Working Paper 2020/121,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.A Conceptual Model for the Integrated Policy Framework(imf.org)Benigno

154、,Gianluca,and Pierpaolo Benigno.2006.“Designing Targeting Rules for International Monetary Policy Cooperation.”Journal of Monetary Economics 53(3):473506.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.01.008Clarida,Richard,Jordi Gal,and Mark Gertler.2002.“A Simple Framework for International Monetary Policy

155、Analysis.”Journal of Monetary Economics 49(5):879904.https:/doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00128-9Fajgelbaum,Pablo,Pinelopi Goldberg,Patrick Kennedy,Amit Khandelwal,and Daria Taglioni.2024.“The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations.”American Economic Review:Insights 6(2):295312.International Mo

156、netary Fund(IMF).2016.“Small States Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change-Role for the IMF.”IMF Staff Report.Small States Resilience to Natural Disasters and Climate Change-Role for the IMFInternational Monetary Fund(IMF).2023.Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific:Challenges to

157、 Sustaining Growth and Disinflation.October 2023.“Chapter 3:How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia?”International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.International Monetary Fund(IMF).2023.“Integrated Policy FrameworkPrinciples for the Use of Foreign Exchange Intervention.”Policy Paper No.202

158、3/061,International Monetary Fund,Washington,DC.Integrated Policy FrameworkPrinciples for the Use of Foreign Exchange Intervention(imf.org)International Monetary Fund(IMF).2024.Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and Pacific:Steady Growth amid Diverging Prospects.April 2024.Regional Economic Outlook for

159、Asia and Pacific(imf.org)Qiu,Han,Hyun Song Shin,and Leanne Si Ying Zhang.2023.“Mapping the Realignment of Global Value Chains.”BIS Bulletin No.78.Bank for International Settlements.Saxegaard,Elif C.A.,Steven J.Davis,S.Arata Ito,&Naoko Miake 2022.“Policy Uncertainty in Japan.”Journal of the Japanese

160、and International Economies,64,101192.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND13Box 1.Exchange Rate Developments in the Asia-PacificAsia-Pacific currencies have experienced significant movements in recent years.In 2022 and 2023,most

161、regional currencies depreciated against the US dollar,in the context of much stronger monetary policy tightening by the Federal Reserve relative to Asian central banks.In the first half of 2024,depreciation pressure persisted despite no further Federal Reserve rate hikes,as the Federal Reserve still

162、 communi-cated a relatively hawkish stance.Then,around mid-year and ahead of the start of the Federal Reserves easing cycle in September,currency movements reversed sharply,and currencies regained much of the ground lost earlier in the year.At the same time,currency movements have varied considerabl

163、y:the Japanese yen,for example,depreciated by almost 14 percent in the first half of 2024,which is twice as much as the Thai baht,the Korean won,the New Zealand dollar,or the Indonesian rupiah.Depreciation of other Asian currencies has been even less.Generally,Asian exchange rates have moved in tand

164、em with interest rate differentials vis-vis the United States.For many regional economies,differentials narrowed sharply or even turned negative in 202224(Box Figure 1.1,panel 1),as the Federal Reserve increased policy rates sharply in response to intense inflationary pressures,while both inflation

165、and the monetary policy response in Asia were more subdued.Staff analysis shows that regional exchange rates vis-vis the US dollar depreciated on average by 7 percent for a one percentage point change in the policy rate differential during the postpandemic period(Box Figure 1.1,panel 2).1 In the fir

166、st half of 2024,actual differentials were essentially constant,with both the Federal Reserve and Asian central banks on hold.However,differentials on market-implied policy rates and yields on longer-duration government bondsthat capture policy rate expectationsfirst compressed further,reflecting the

167、 hawkish Federal Reserve stance early in the year,before reversing from about May(Box Figure 1.1,panel 3).This said,both exchange rates and interest rate differentials are endogenous and driven by other factors,such as macroeconomic fundamentals.For example,inflation differentials with the US affect

168、 both currency valuations and interest rates.Empirical analysis also identifies trade exposure and foreign reserves positions as influential factorsthe latter possibly proxying for a countrys international financial strength.2 Stylized facts also suggest a role for growth dynamics and financial exte

169、rnal exposure to the United States(Box Figure 1.1,panel 4).The authors of this box are Anne Oeking and Haruki Seitani(both at the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific).1 Figure 1,panel 2 uses the local projections approach,controlling for the following factors as domestic economic fundamentals:y

170、ear-over-year real GDP growth rate,year-over-year CPI inflation rate,monetary policy-related interest rates,reserve assets per GDP,general government debt per GDP(central government debt per GDP for countries where general government figures are not available),and the current account position relati

171、ve to GDP.Our panel comprises currencies from 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region.It starts in 2010 and is based on quarterly data.2 The analysis uses a panel fixed effects regression model with monthly data.Covariates include market-implied interest rate differentials to the US and changes in t

172、his differential,changes in the inflation differential with the US,changes in the trade balance,and changes in foreign exchange reserves to proxy for a countrys external position.The panel comprises eight regional economies for the period from January 2021 to June 2024.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia

173、and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202414Box 1.(continued)AEsEMsAEs:Interest rate differentialAEs:Market implied rate differentialEMs:Interest rate differentialEMs:Market implied rate differentialHighLow1.Interest Rate Differential against US Rates(Average in percent)Box Figure 1.1.Exch

174、ange Rate Developments36210123452010121416182022242.Impulse Response of Asian Exchange Rates to US Interest Rate Differential Shock(Percent,response to one percentage point change)1441210864202Depreciation012345678Quarters3.Market-Implied Rate Differentials with US(Percent)2.51.02.01.51.00.500.5 Jan

175、.2024Feb.24Mar.24Apr.24May 24June 24July 24Aug.24Sep.244.Maximum Exchange Rate Depreciation byDeterminant(Percent)807654321GDP growthPortfolio investmentliabilities versus USSources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panel 1:Asian AEs include Australia,Japan,Korea

176、,and New Zealand.Asian EMs include India,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand.Panel 2:Dashed lines indicate 90-percent confidence interval.Panel 3:Market-implied policy rates shown here at one-year horizon,calculated as difference relative to US rates.Panel 4:The maximum average cumulativ

177、e exchange rate movements in 2024 against the US dollar,with each economys fundamentals grouped relative to the average determinant at end-2023(with High=above average and Low=below average).AE=advanced economies;EM=emerging markets.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksN

178、ovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND15Box 2.Geoeconomic Fragmentation:How ASEAN Economies Have Been Adapting How have economies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)navigated the China-US trade tensions that intensified from 2018?ASEAN economies have benefited from decades of glob

179、al integration and maintain strong trade links with both China and the United States.This box takes a closer look at both the impact of the China-US trade tensions on ASEAN economies and on the broader trends for the regions integration in the global economy in the context of rising global fragmenta

180、tion.Despite geopolitical tensions,ASEAN has continued to strengthen trade and investment links with both China and the US.Since 2018,the ASEAN countries have increased their market share of Chinese and US goods imports,with both China and the US absorbing a higher share of the regions value added(B

181、ox Figure 2.1).The ASEAN economies have also continued to attract foreign direct investment from both China and the US(see Figure 5,panel 4).Moreover,the ASEAN economies appear to have found ways to capture export opportunities generated by Chinese and US tariffs.Employing the approach of Fajgelbaum

182、 and others(2024),empirical analysis shows that in several ASEAN economies,exports of products targeted by Chinese or US tariffs grew faster than exports of untargeted products.Moreover,the ASEAN economies increased exports in targeted goods to third countries,suggesting that they exploited not only

183、 trade diversion opportunities but also realized economies of scale(Box Figure 2.2,panel 1).1 Countries that are integrated into global value chains and with less restrictive foreign direct investment regimes appear to have been especially successful in gaining from trade diversion(Box Figure 2.2,pa

184、nel2).2 These suggestive results offer some crude support to the hypothesis made by Fajgelbaum and others(2024)that some countries invested in“new plants,trade infrastructure,or facilitation,with these investments benefiting exports to all destinations,or that some countries were already well integr

185、atedThe authors of this box are Giovanni Donato,Ashique Habib,and Emmanouil Kitsios.1 The sample includes the top 50 exporters(excluding oil producers)and compares the exports of the most recent period(2022/23)to the exports prior to 2018.The following difference-in-difference identification strateg

186、y allows for an estimation of the causal effect of the China-US 201819 tariffs on bystanders exports to three n=US,CHN,ROW destinations,as tariffs have not significantly changed since then:(1)D ln X n iv 5 b n 1iv D ln T US (CH,v)1 b n 2iv D ln T CH (US,v)1 b n 3iv D ln T US (i,v)1 b n 4iv D ln T CH

187、 (i,v)1 a n (ij(v)1 Vn SIZE iv 1 p n D ln X n (iv,t21)1 n iv ,where the growth rate of country is export of product to destination n is regressed on four sets of different tariff changes(lnT)imposed respectively by the US on China,by China on the US,and by the US or China on country i belonging to t

188、he rest of the world(ROW).Aggregating the estimated coefficient betas allows us to predict country is export growth of variety to the world relative to non-targeted varieties and calculate the aggregate export growth of targeted varieties.(2)(D ln X WD i )5 Sv Sv 5 US,CHN,ROW vlb n iv(b n 1iv D ln T

189、 US (CH,v)1 b n 2iv D ln T CH (US,v)1 b n 3iv D ln T US (i,v)1 b n 4iv D ln T CH (i,v),where vlb n iv is the share of(pre-tension)export values for continuing products divided by total country exports.2 The extent of restrictive foreign direct investment policies is based on the“red”-classified acti

190、ons from the Global Trade Alert,which signify interventions that are almost certain to discriminate against foreign interests.ASEAN share of China importsASEAN value added share of China importsASEAN value added share of US importsASEAN share of US importsBox Figure 2.1.ASEAN Exports to China and th

191、e US(Percent of total imports)020246810121416182012 1314151617181920212223Sources:IMF Direction of Trade Statistics;ADB MRIO;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Value added shares series exclude Myanmar.ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations:Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,Myanm

192、ar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202416Box 2.(Continued)with the global trading system and could take advantage of the new exporting opportunities across multiple sectors.”Examining the mechanisms by which

193、 ASEAN countries were able to seize such trade gains offers fertile ground for future research.More broadly,ASEAN managed to strengthen global and regional integration post-2018,although there is significant heterogeneity across sectors and economies.The ASEAN region increased its share of inward fo

194、reign direct investment,world exports,and global value added(Box Figure 2.3,panels 1 and 2).Intra-ASEAN trade has also increased.At the same time,it is worth noting that the trade reallocation gains from the China-US tariffs have not necessarily translated into stronger overall exports across all AS

195、EAN members.Whereas some members experienced strong export growth(for example,Vietnam),in others,exports growth slowed(Thailand)or stagnated(for example,the Philippines and Singapore)relative to the global average since 2018.Overall,a nuanced picture of the impact of fragmentation on ASEAN emerges.A

196、SEANs integration with the global economy has continued,despite global fragmentation,and the region has even been able to take advantage of trade diversion opportunities caused by US-China trade tensions.At the same time,a further intensification of geopolitical pressures could still harm the region

197、,as fragmentation policies are1.Estimated Relative Export Gains in Tariff-Targeted Products,202223(Log change in predicted tariffed exports relative to non-tariffed products to the world)Box Figure 2.2.Relative Export Gains from US-China Tariffs andCorrelated Drivers0.400.20.20.40.62.Correlates of E

198、xport Gains in Tariff-Targeted Products(Estimated coefficient)0.20.10.10.100.10.2AustraliaThe PhilippinesMalaysiaVietnamSingaporeNew ZealandIndonesiaJapanIndiaKoreaHong Kong SARBangladeshThailandGDP per capitaRestrictiveFDI policiesGDP(real PPP)GVCparticipationindexSources:CEPII-BACI;Trade Data Moni

199、tor;EORA;Global Trade Alert;IMF World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panel 1 plots each economys(log)change in predicted exports of products tariffed by China or the US during 201819 relative to other products to the world.The 90-percent confidence intervals(teal dots)were

200、 constructed using 50 bootstrap samples as in Fajgelbaum and others(2024).A positive coefficient(blue dots)indicates that an economys exports to the world in tariff-targeted relative to untargeted products have increased because of the tariffs.FDI=foreign direct investment;GVC=global value chain;Hon

201、g Kong SAR=Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;PPP=purchasing power parity.Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND17Box 2.(Continued)likely to reduce activity in major trading partnersand thus lower external demand for ASEANs ex

202、ports.Put differently,even if bystander economies such as ASEAN gain export share,they may still be worse off because of a smaller global economy(October 2023 Regional Economic Outlook:Asia and the Pacific).FDI share(right scale)Export shareIndonesiaMalaysiaThe PhilippinesSingaporeThailandVietnamOth

203、er ASEANASEAN-9 value added(right scale)Box Figure 2.3.ASEANs Global Integration1.ASEAN Share of Global Exports and FDI(Percent)6.07.07.56.58.08.501041621461281820201214161719131518202122232.ASEANs Global Value Added Contribution(Billions of US dollars;percent of world value added,right scale)3.03.1

204、3.23.43.33.53.602004006001,0008001,2001,400201214161719131518202122Sources:IMF Direction of Trade Statistics;ADB MRIO;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panel 2:Summed values of value added embedded in exports and shares of total value added for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,excluding Myan

205、mar.FDI=foreign direct investment.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202418Box 3.What Drives Monetary Policy in Emerging Asia?Disinflation in Asia and the Pacific is well on track.As noted in the main text,some advanced Asian economies are still coping with

206、 sticky services and wage inflation,which had complicated the last stage of needed disinflation.In most emerging Asian economies,however,inflation returned already at the end of 2023 to rates(headline and core)at or even below policy targets and prepandemic levels.Moreover,in many emerging Asian eco

207、nomies,output is discernably below the prepandemic trend.Taken together,this suggests that conditions may have been in place in early 2024 to start reversing some of the monetary tightening from 2021 to 2023.However,in the first half of 2024,most central banks in emerging Asia kept rates on hold.The

208、re are several possible and complementary explanations.First,central banks may have sought to limit currency fluctuations and hence oriented monetary policy on global interest rates.We find that expectations for regional policy rates shifted almost one-to-one with expectations for the Federal Funds

209、rate(Figure3.1,panel 1).Second,as monetary policy tightening in Asia was relatively modest in 202123 compared to other regions(see Box 1),the drag on growth from the monetary stance has been relatively muted,thereby reducing the cost of delaying interest rate cuts(Figure 3.1,panel 2).1The literature

210、 on optimal monetary policy suggests that exchange rate flexibility would often be helpful for emerging markets,by creating greater monetary policy space for addressing domestic conditions.If financial markets are well developed and integrated globally,but producer prices are sticky in local currenc

211、y,flexible exchange rates would eliminate price dispersion between foreign and local goods.The authors of this box are Chris Redl and Yizhi Xu.1 Only the Philippines displays evidence of a modest drag,which has been overcompensated by favorable export developments,however.Monetary policy shocksExpor

212、t shocksBox Figure 3.1.Responses to Changes in Expected Federal Reserve Policy Rates and the Impact of Export and Monetary Policy Shocks on Growth1.Response of Expected Policy Rates in Emerging Asian Economies to 100 bps Decline in Federal Funds Expectations(Basis points)1608012040140601002000123456

213、78910 11 12Weeks after decline in expectedFederal Funds rate2.Contributions to GDP Growth from Exports and Monetary Policy Shocks(Percent,deviation from trend)0.60.20.400.20.60.40.81.0Thailand Indonesia MalaysiaThe PhilippinesVietnamSources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,

214、the emerging Asian economies include China,India,Malaysia,the Philippines,and Thailand.Weekly data covers from August 20,2023 to August 9,2024.Solid blue line represents mean;dotted lines are 1-standard-deviation confidence intervals.In panel 2,bars represent average contribution from monetary polic

215、y and export growth from the first quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024.Decomposition is estimated from a recursive SVAR model in GDP,core CPI inflation,commodity prices,US interest rates,domestic monetary policy rate,nominal effective exchange rates,and export growth.Outlook for Asia and th

216、e Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND19Box 3.(Continued)It would then be desirable for the central bank to focus only on ensuring low and stable inflation,as it would in a closed economy,rather than responding to global shocks(Clarida,Gal,and Gertler 20

217、02;Benigno and Benigno 2006).This result no longer holds when financial frictions and foreign exchange(FX)invoicing is present(Basu and others 2020;IMF 2023).However,in that case,central banks should still respond to global conditions only partially,to leave space for addressing domestic monetary ne

218、eds.Several indicators suggest that financial market frictions are less present in todays operating environ-ment for emerging Asian central banks than in previous decades.Local capital markets have grown and deepened rapidly(Figure 3.2,panel 1),enhancing their capacity to absorb shocks.Dollarization

219、 of Asian debt has decreased and is now lower than that of peers in other regions,while foreign exchange reserve buffers have improved(Figure 3.2,panels 2 and 3).Participation by non-residents in domestic bond markets is lower than a decade ago(Figure 3.2,panel 4),and often lower than in other regio

220、nswhich likely mitigates inward spillovers from external financial shocks.However,higher foreign participation could enhance market depth,potentially leading to greater liquidity and more efficient price discovery.March 2007March 2013March 2024March 2008March 2013March 202419972007201320221.Size of

221、the Domestic Central GovernmentBonds Market(Percent of GDP)2.Nonfinancial Corporate Sector ForeignExchange Debt Share(Percent of nonfinancial corporate debt)3.Foreign Exchange Reserves(Percent of quarterly goods and services imports)4.Foreign Participation in Local Bonds Market(Percent)Box Figure 3.

222、2.Indicators of Financial Market Development1997:Q22024:Q2020401030506070010305152025354045500152551020303502001003004005006000200100300400500600IndonesiaThailandMalaysiaIndiaOther EMsIndonesia Thailand Malaysia India ChinaNon-AsiaEMDEsIndonesiaThailandMalaysiaIndiaThePhilippinesSources:Haver;CEIC;a

223、nd IMF staff calculations.Note:Panel 2:Non-Asia emerging market and developing economies include Argentina,Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Hungary,Mexico,Peru,Poland,Russia,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,and Trkiye.Panel 3:For Indonesia,foreign exchange reserves are reported in percent of goods imports because of

224、the lack of historical data on services imports.Vietnams latest foreign exchange reserves are observed in 2024:Q1.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes.BGD=Bangladesh,IDN=Indonesia,THA=Thailand,MYS=Malaysia,IND=India,CHN=China,and VNM=Vietnam.

225、BGDCHNINDIDNPHLTHAVNM*MYSREGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202420Table 1.Asia:Real GDP(Yearoveryear change;percent)Actuals and Latest ProjectionsDifference from April 2024 WEO202320242025202320242025Asia5.04.64.40.00.10.1Advanced Economies(AEs)2.01.61.90.2

226、0.10.1 Australia2.01.22.10.10.30.1 New Zealand0.60.01.90.01.00.1 Japan 1.70.31.10.20.60.1 Hong Kong SAR 3.33.23.00.10.30.3 Korea 1.42.52.20.00.20.1 Taiwan Province of China11.33.72.70.10.60.0 Singapore 1.12.62.50.00.50.2 Macao SAR80.510.67.30.03.32.3Emerging Markets and Developing Economies(EMDEs)5.

227、75.35.00.10.10.1 Bangladesh5.85.44.50.20.32.1 Brunei Darussalam1.42.42.50.00.00.0 Cambodia5.05.55.80.00.50.3 China 5.24.84.50.00.20.4 India28.27.06.50.40.20.0 Indonesia 5.05.05.10.00.00.0 Lao P.D.R.3.74.13.50.00.10.5 Malaysia3.64.84.40.10.40.0 Myanmar2.51.01.10.00.50.9 Mongolia 7.45.57.00.41.01.0 Ne

228、pal2.03.14.91.20.00.3 Philippines 5.55.86.10.10.40.1 Sri Lanka Thailand 1.92.83.00.00.10.1 Vietnam 5.06.16.10.00.30.4Pacific Island Countries32.73.93.30.60.10.2 Fiji7.53.03.40.50.00.0 Kiribati4.15.84.10.10.00.0 Marshall Islands3.95.03.56.92.01.5 Micronesia0.81.11.70.00.00.0 Nauru0.61.51.40.00.10.1 P

229、alau0.98.18.50.14.33.4 Papua New Guinea2.94.63.70.20.10.0 Samoa8.09.74.20.04.30.8Outlook for Asia and the Pacific:Resilient Growth but Higher RisksNovember 2024 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND21Actuals and Latest ProjectionsDifference from April 2024 WEO202320242025202320242025 Solomon Islands3.12.32.50

230、.10.10.0 Tonga42.01.82.40.60.70.0 Tuvalu3.93.53.00.00.00.5 Vanuatu2.20.91.50.02.12.0ASEAN54.14.64.70.10.00.1ASEAN564.04.54.50.10.00.1EMDEs excluding China and India4.54.84.80.10.10.4Sources:IMF World Economic Outlook database;and IMF staff estimates and projections.Note:AE=advanced economy;ASEAN=Ass

231、ociation of Southeast Asian Nations;EMDE=emerging market and developing economy.1 Taiwan Province of China forecast data source is Consensus Forecast.2 Indias data are reported on a fiscal year basis.Its fiscal year starts from April 1 and ends on March 31.3 Pacific island countries aggregate is cal

232、culated using simple average;all other aggregates are calculated using weighted average.4 Tongas data are reported on a fiscal year basis.Its fiscal year starts from July 1 and ends June 30.5 ASEAN comprises Brunei Darussalam,Cambodia,Indonesia,Lao P.D.R.,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam.6 ASEAN5 comprises Indonesia,Malaysia,Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOKAsia and PacificINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND November 202422