《世界資源研究所：2024印度清潔能源轉型的關鍵礦產研究報告（英文版）（28頁）.pdf》由會員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關《世界資源研究所：2024印度清潔能源轉型的關鍵礦產研究報告（英文版）（28頁）.pdf（28頁珍藏版）》請在三個皮匠報告上搜索。

1、WORKING PAPER|Version 1.0|June 2024|1CONTENTSHighlights.1Executive summary.2Background.2Introduction.3Mapping Indias critical minerals require-ments in the energy transition context.5Discussion on Indias critical mineral vulnerabilities.10Coreperiphery dynamics of the critical minerals economy.13 Co

2、nclusion .16Appendix A.18Appendix B.19References.22Acknowledgments.28About the authors.28Working Papers contain preliminary research,analysis,findings,and recommendations.They are circulated to stimulate timely discussion and critical feedback,and to influence ongoing debate on emerging issues.Sugge

3、sted Citation:Tagotra,Niharika,Nidhi Srivastava,Abhinav Sharma,and T.S.Gowthami.2024.“Critical Minerals for Indias Clean Energy Transition.”Working Paper.New Delhi,India:World Resources Institute.Available online at:https:/doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.23.00063.WORKING PAPERCritical minerals for Indias cle

4、an energy transitionNiharika Tagotra,Nidhi Srivastava,Abhinav Sharma,and T.S.GowthamiHIGHLIGHTS The demand for critical minerals in India is expected to rise steeply.The current levels of production indicate a significant domestic supply shortfall,and these minerals are currently being imported from

5、 a small group of countries.To overcome domestic scarcity,mitigate import dependence,and create resilient supply chains,domestic production and processing of these minerals must be enhanced and end-of-life ecosystems developed around recovery and recycling.Adequate institutional capacity and policyr

6、egulatory frameworks are needed to enable these outcomes.If the socio-environmental impacts of mineral mining are not adequately mitigated,the trust of local communities will be lost,resulting in project delays and cost overruns.To develop resources,a social license to oper-ate is important.China,an

7、 upper-middle-income economy,does not fit into the traditional coreperiphery models explanation of resource economies.It dominates the critical mineral value chains in the midstream and downstream segments.The key takeaway for India is that establishing low-cost economies of scale in mineral process

8、ing and manufacturing and pro-moting innovation are important for domestic clean energy technology manufacturing.India can build strategic partnerships around critical minerals by increasing investments,enhancing diversification,addressing socio-environmental concerns,and leveraging these groupings

9、to strengthen partnerships for securing supplies.2|EXECUTIVE SUMMARYBackgroundThe value chain of minerals begins with exploration and ends with the sale of the final product,with a small percent-age of minerals being recycled through recovery.Some of these minerals are considered critical due to the

10、ir usefulness to certain sectors of the economy,demand-supply mismatch,high risk of supply chain disruption,and the long lead times of mines(U.S.DOE 2024).Critical minerals are a subset of the larger group of minerals and have similar value chains.Their unique geographic distribution and significanc

11、e for the energy transition,however,necessitate a nuanced approach to unpack their trajectory from mounds to markets.Because these minerals are key inputs to several clean energy technolo-gies(CETs),their value chains are crucial to the value chains of several end-use CETs and their applications.Cri

12、tical minerals are also of great significance to India,whose critical mineral requirements are expected to increase significantly as it undertakes the energy transition across most of its sectors.It also plans to source a large part of these technologies from domestic manufacturing.Meeting these req

13、uirements would require strengthening its mineral sup-ply chains,which remain vulnerable owing to factors such as domestic scarcity,highly concentrated supply chains outside Indias jurisdiction,and capacity-related domestic challenges in regard to policies,regulations,and institutions.In light of In

14、dias energy transition goals(PIB 2022a),this report focuses on electric vehicle(EV)batteries and stationary battery storage for CETs.The estimated minerals requirements and various technology scenarios point to seven critical minerals:aluminum(bauxite),cobalt,copper,graphite,lithium,manga-nese,and n

15、ickel.These minerals have been selected based on a comprehensive assessment of various studies and modeling scenarios conducted by various organizations(see Appendix B,Table B-1).To understand why minerals are critical for achieving Indias net zero goals,the first step is to estimate the mineral req

16、uirements for Indias CETs.This study estimates Indias mineral requirements until 2050 based on projections from published scenarios.This is done based on the assumption that a 2070 net zero goal implies that Indias emissions would peak around 2050.The estimates are based on the requirements of CETs

17、supported by mineral-intensive storage batteries(for EVs and stationary storage).These estimates,when compared with the existing reserves and levels of mineral production,reveal the potential supply-demand imbalance that forms the basis of the vulnerabilities in Indias mineral supplies.The resilienc

18、e and sustainability of supplies are areas of con-cern for India.The critical minerals economy in India follows the energy technology curve;that is,whereas the domestic CET manufacturing industry has grown rapidly,domestic critical minerals requirements have begun attracting atten-tion only recently

19、.Further,there is little jurisdictional overlap between the national government and state governments regarding policies related to the mining of critical minerals and the energy transition.Mining minerals often negatively impacts local communi-ties,which has been a long-standing issue in India and

20、the world.Indias push for domestic extraction of certain groups of minerals could worsen these issues.As domestic produc-tion of critical minerals is ramped up,the environmental externalities of mineral mining,such as acid mine drainage and contamination of air,water,and soil,raise concerns about th

21、e sustainability of supplies.These concerns will need to be addressed adequately.Research problemGiven these complex interlinkages between the security,resilience,and sustainability of mineral supplies,as well as the global political economy of critical minerals,policymaking in India needs to chart

22、out a way forward for India to secure its critical mineral supplies.About this paperThis paper unpacks the meaning of the term“critical”in“critical minerals”by highlighting the vulnerabilities that affect the availability of these minerals in India.It maps the critical mineral scenario for India by

23、examining the domestic vulnerabilities of Indias critical mineral supplies and unpack-ing the political economy of global mineral resource flows while contextualizing them for Indias energy transition.Finally,based on these observations,it suggests a way forward for India to secure its critical mine

24、rals economy.ApproachThe critical minerals economy,when juxtaposed with the dynamics of the global energy transition,exhibits interesting dynamics.To better understand and explain these dynamics at the interface of the vulnerabilities of critical mineral supplies in India and the global political ec

25、onomy of critical minerals resource flows,this paper uses two frameworks.The vulner-ability assessment framework looks at the vulnerabilities of Indias domestic mineral supplies.This framework is based on the factors that cause supply disruption,as defined by the International Energy Agency(IEA 2022

26、b).Further,this paper relies on the coreperiphery framework to explain the political WORKING PAPER|June 2024|3Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitioneconomy of global mineral resource flows and to locate India within the emerging landscape.The coreperiphery framework has been extensivel

27、y deployed to explain resource exchanges at the global scale.Although it has also been used to explain developmental outcomes in resource economies,for the purpose of this research,we use the framework only to explain resource exchanges,without touching on the associated devel-opmental outcomes.The

28、coreperiphery framework relies on the fundamental assumption that globally,primary resources flow from their extraction sites in the periphery to markets in the core(Dodge 2021).The framework,which derives its basic premises from the coreperiphery model proposed by John Friedmann(Friedmann 1966),is

29、used to analyze the status of countries in international trade(Zhou et al.2022).The model helps explain the nature of resource flows based on the development of global economies of scale,transportation costs,and the share of manufacturing in the national income of trading countries(Krugman 1991).To

30、this end,we use the coreperiphery framework in this paper as a lens to examine the nature of global exchanges of critical minerals and locate India within the emerging political economy of critical minerals.This two-pronged exercise helps map Indias vulnerabilities and its international position wit

31、hin the critical minerals ecosystem.DiscussionWhen examined through the lens of the coreperiphery framework,critical minerals yield interesting results that deviate from the frameworks expectations.The most promi-nent anomaly is not just the presence but near dominance of an advanced middle-income c

32、ountry,China,at the core of the critical minerals economy,with a near monopoly over mineral production,processing,and CET manufacturing.The devia-tions from the framework underline the need for a separate theoretical model to explain the political economy of critical minerals.Moreover,the collaborat

33、ive partnerships observed in the critical mineralsclean energy space are based on interests that are fundamentally different from those observed in the case of conventional fuels.INTRODUCTIONUnpacking the“critical”in“critical minerals”This section provides an overview of the ongoing discussions on c

34、ritical minerals,covering topics such as mineral criticality,vulnerabilities in mineral supplies,the future of the critical minerals ecosystem,and the social and environmental impacts of the ecosystem.Critical minerals are usually conceptualized based on the concerns of the resource-consuming develo

35、ped countries.This perspective needs to be revisited,contextual-ized,and updated for India,which is aiming to transition its energy system toward greater reliance on clean energy technologies(CETs).This recalibration will be useful not just to India,but also to other economies that are ramping up th

36、eir commitments to rapidly expand CET deployment.Background Several organizations that play a key role in steering the global energy transition,such as the International Energy Agency(IEA),the International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA),the U.S.Department of Energy(DOE),and the European Commission,

37、have assessed the importance of critical minerals for the clean energy transition(IEA 2023b;IRENA 2023;U.S.DOE 2024;European Commission 2023).All these reports have underlined the crucial role of critical minerals in the clean energy transition,because these miner-als are a key input for most CETs.M

38、ost of these reports,however,are based on the concerns of resource-consuming developed countries around the use of critical minerals in their economies.More recently,literature on critical minerals has also emerged from resource-consuming developing countries.Recent research has analyzed vulnerabili

39、ty frameworks and identified priority areas for critical minerals requirements for India and other countries(CEEW et al.2023).Studies have assessed the criticality levels for India of supply vulnerabilities such as concentration of minerals,bottlenecks(identified using bottleneck analysis),import re

40、liance,and governance indica-tors(Chadha et al.2023).In India,a government-appointed committee analyzed certain“strategic minerals”in 2011(Planning Commission 2011).Subsequently,the Ministry of Mines(MoM)released a report in 2012 that reviewed the status and availability of rare earth elements and e

41、nergy-critical elements from the standpoint of long-term national raw materials security(CSTEP and Government of India 2012).However,critical minerals were not given much attention in Indian policy and the literature until a few years later.A few studies on critical-minerals-related challenges for I

42、ndia have dealt with the energy 4|sector and all the other end uses,such as telecommunication,automobiles,and defense(Lele and Bhardwaj 2014;Randive and Jawadand 2019).Given Indias energy transition goals and the global focus on the importance of critical minerals in net zero pathways,there has been

43、 renewed interest in the topic.Some recent studies have focused on the interlinkages between the energy transition and critical minerals from an Indian perspective(Chadha and Sivamani 2022;CEEW et al.2023;Chadha et al.2023).The demand for minerals for the energy transitionThe IEA,in its flagship Wor

44、ld Energy Outlook Special Report(IEA 2022b),identifies key minerals and metals that are significant to the global energy transition.It also unpacks the potential risks to their supply chains that threaten the global collective efforts to achieve the energy transition.It estimates that the requiremen

45、t of minerals for the deployed CETs will almost quadruple by 2040(IEA 2022b).Vari-ous reports and studies have raised concerns regarding the demand-supply mismatch of certain minerals,such as cobalt,lithium,magnesium,titanium,and zinc(Valero et al.2018;Weil et al.2020),nickel(Nate et al.2021),galliu

46、m and neodymium(Bruckner et al.2013),and tellurium(McLel-lan et al.2016).The supply-demand structures of minerals show that techno-economically feasible and accessible quantities of minerals are limited,and increasing their production could take from 10 to 20 years(McLellan et al.2016).For CETs,supp

47、lies of minerals such as indium,selenium(McLellan et al.2016),neodymium,and dysprosium could be constrained in the short term while those of copper and lithium could be constrained in the long term(Mnberger and Stenqvist 2018),because their demand is outpacing their supply.This supply-demand mismatc

48、h in minerals could impact the prices of the CETs that use them as a key input.Raw materials make up 5070 percent of the total cost of a lithium-ion battery,and if the prices of lithium or nickel double,the overall cost of a battery could increase by nearly 6 percent(IEA 2022b,11).Similarly,the cost

49、 of copper and aluminum makes up nearly 20 percent of the total grid investment cost(IEA 2022b,11).Understanding criticalityAn essential aspect of identifying criticality involves assess-ing the vulnerability of supply chains to possible disruptions,which takes into account factors such as concentra

50、tion of reserves and production,country risks,geopolitical risks,recyclability,technological development,substitutability,and trade(Frenzel et al.2017;Dominish et al.2019;Zepf 2020;CEEW et al.2023).There is no universal definition of“criti-cal minerals,”but several parameters,broadly classified into

51、 economic and supply indicators,are considered when assessing criticality(Srivastava and Kumar 2022;Chadha et al.2023;European Commission 2023).The factors used to assess the criticality of minerals are dynamic and continue to evolve at the local,regional,and global levels.Thus,the list of critical

52、minerals is subject to change and varies by countries,contexts,and times,corresponding to changes in technology choices,the relative importance of minerals,and supply chains(Gilbert 2020;Bilek et al.2023;CEEW et al.2023).In June 2023,the Government of India(GoI)released a list of 30 critical mineral

53、s(MoM 2023a)and amended its mining and minerals law accordingly.Assessing vulnerabilitiesGovernments and researchers have adopted various methods for assessing the criticality of minerals,which are detailed in their reports(Hackenhaar et al.2022).Most of these approaches,developed by Graedel et al.(

54、2012),the European Commission(2017),Japans Resource Strategy(METI 2020),and the British Geological Survey(2021),assess criticality by identifying vulnerabilities in their supply.Vulnerabilities in critical mineral supplies that could lead to market tightness(a scenario where supplies fall short of d

55、emand)and price volatility include concentration of mineral production in certain regions,long lead times for project development,the quality of mineral resources available,climate-related risks,and availability of water and land(IEA 2022b).IRENA(Gielen 2021)posits that“soft factors”such as“acceptan

56、ce and access for new mining projects”and“geo-political implications of certain supply routes”could become a factor in judging the criticality of certain minerals.It identifies the potential supply problems arising from short-term supply chain issues and long-term structural bottlenecks that could g

57、lobally impact the trajectory of the energy transition.Environmental and social externalitiesExtracting and processing minerals has significant financial,social,and environmental costs.These processes consume large amounts of water,require significant energy input,and in some cases produce hazardous

58、 waste.Although copper production is a water-intensive process,nearly 80 percent of the copper produced by Chile comes from arid regions(Bontje and Duval 2022).The environmental impact of water-intensive lithium mining on deserts and wetlands has been a concern as well(Heredia et al.2020;Lee et al.2

59、021).In countries with these mineral resources,concerns persist regarding wasteful mining practices and negative spillovers such as air,water,and land pollution;water scarcity challenges;and threats of deforestation and loss of biodiversity(Janard-hanan et al.2023).WORKING PAPER|June 2024|5Critical

60、minerals for Indias clean energy transitionGaining access to reserves that are locked in remote and dif-ficult terrain would require heavy investments in energy and infrastructure.However,the regulations governing mineral mining,in terms of its social and economic implications,remain a challenge for

61、 economies with fragile institutions and weak regulatory structures(Fortier et al.2021).Threats such as armed conflict,corruption,and human rights violations pose a serious challenge to critical mineral supply chains(Clare and Crawford 2018)by diminishing public support for mining projects and creat

62、ing greater resistance to them.In addition to the social externalities,some of the practices associated with critical minerals extraction and inadequate governance mecha-nisms lead to higher risk of accidents and other occupational hazards(Lee et al.2020).This review of the literature provides an ov

63、erview of the ongo-ing conversations on critical minerals,in terms of what defines the mineral criticality,the idea underlying vulnerabilities in mineral supplies,and the social and environmental impacts of the emerging ecosystem,among others.It can,however,be observed that the discourse on critical

64、 minerals is mostly based on the concerns of the developed countries.In view of Indias energy transition goals,there is a need to review its critical mineral requirements for its clean energy transition.We need to unpack the concerns,challenges,and opportuni-ties that lie ahead for India in the doma

65、in of critical minerals and materials.In the following sections,we attempt to address some of these topics.MAPPING INDIAS CRITICAL MINERALS REQUIREMENTS IN THE ENERGY TRANSITION CONTEXTTechnology requirements for Indias clean energy transitionAccording to the IEAs forecasts,Indias energy consumption

66、 is set to increase by 30 percent by 2030 and by 90 percent by 2050,with the corresponding carbon emissions rising by 32 percent and 72 percent,respectively,in these periods(IEA 2023).Further,the GoI committed to a series of climate actions at the 26th UNFCCC Conference of Parties(COP-26)held in Gla

67、sgow,and according to its updated Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs),India has committed to reducing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 45 percent from the 2005 level by 2030 and achieving about 50 percent cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil-fuel-based energy resou

68、rces by 2030(PIB 2022a).To meet these ambitious commitments,the country would have to significantly decarbonize the sectors that emit the most greenhouse gas emissions,such as power,transport,build-ings,and industries(see Appendix A).Several studies have identified the sectors and technologies that

69、play a key role in driving the energy transition in India.See Appendix B,Table B-1,for a comparative summary of these studies.In 2022,the IEA released the global minerals requirements categorized by technology(see Table 1).Table 1|The energy transition and minerals requirements CRITICAL MINERALSENER

70、GY TECHNOLOGYCOPPERCOBALTNICKELLITHIUMREESCHROMIUMZINCPGMSALUMINUMSolar PVWind energyEVs and battery storageNote:=High.=Moderate.=Low.EVs=electric vehicles.PGMs=minerals requirement.PV=photovoltaic.REEs=rare earth elements.Source:Data from IEA(2022b).6|Assessment of Indias technology and mineral req

71、uirements in 2050 The significant capacity increase in CETs required to meet the needs of the energy transition indicates the scale of future mineral demand.The year 2050 is used as the assessment year,under the assumption that the countrys technology requirements will peak by then and plateau there

72、after by 2070(CEEW 2021b).To arrive at a range of demand figures for various energy technologies,this paper reviews the estimates put out by several until the year 2030 and uses compound annual growth rate(CAGR)calculations to arrive at the possible demand for CETs in 2050.These include the demand f

73、or solar PVs,wind energy capacity,stationary battery storage,and EVs.Of these,only stationary batteries and EV batteries remain highly critical-mineral intensive(as indicated in Table 1),and therefore,the demand numbers for battery energy storage system(BESS)and EV batteries are used to arrive at th

74、e range of potential demand for critical minerals in India up to 2050.The detailed methodology for these estimates,and the estimates,are provided in Appendix B.Based on the CAGR calculations,the estimated range of battery demand for EVs and BESS in India in 2050 is shown in Table 2.As the next step,

75、this paper uses the most prevalent battery composition scenarios for BESS and EV batteries(Table 3)together with their mineral requirements(Figure 1)to arrive at the expected range of mineral demand in India in 2050(Table 4).Table 2|Estimated battery demand for EVs and BESS in India in 2050 TYPE OF

76、BATTERY DEMAND AMOUNT OF BATTERY DEMAND(GWH)Total for EVs23,142(IESA estimatesa)9,427(CEEW estimatesb)Total for BESS2,265(IEA estimatesc)4,124(U.S.DOE estimatesd)Note:BESS=battery energy storage system.CEEW=Council on Energy,Environment and Water.EV=electric vehicle.GWh=gigawatt-hour.IEA=Internation

77、al Energy Agency.IESA=India Electronics and Semiconductor Association.U.S.DOE=United States Department of Energy.Source:a.IESA 2020;b.Warrior et al.2023;c.IEA 2021;d.U.S.DOE 2024.Table 3|Battery composition scenarios BATTERYCOMPOSITIONB1 70%NMC,25%LFP,5%OthersB2 50%NMC,40%LFP,5%OthersNote:“Others”in

78、cludes lithium nickelcobaltaluminum oxide(NCA)and lithium-ion manganese oxide batteries.LFP=lithium iron phosphate.NMC=nickelmanganesecobalt.Source:Dunn et al.2021.Figure 1|Mineral requirements for different battery compositions for a 60 kW lithium-Ion battery NMC811 NICKEL(80%)MANGANESE(10%)COBALT(

79、10%)NMC523 NICKEL(50%)MANGANESE(20%)COBALT(30%)NMC622 NICKEL(60%)MANGANESE(20%)COBALT(20%)NCA+NICKEL COBALT ALUMINUM OXIDE(20%)LFP LITHIUM IRONPHOSPHATELITHIUM5KG7KG6KG6KG6KGCOBALT5KG11KG11KG2KG0KGNICKEL39KG28KG32KG43KG0KGMANGANESE5KG16KG10KG0KG0KGGRAPHITE45KG53KG50KG44KG66KGALUMINUM30KG35KG33KG30KG

80、44KGCOPPER20KG20KG19KG17KG26KGSTEEL20KG20KG19KG17KG26KGIRON0KG0KG0KG0KG41KGSources:Bhutada 2022.WORKING PAPER|June 2024|7Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionTo arrive at a more comprehensive assessment of the supplydemand scenario,the available reserves in India,along with the produc

81、tion figures(as in 2023)are assessed.This helps examine the potential supply-demand imbalances that could impact Indias critical mineral economy.Tables 4,5,and 6 reveal that India does not have sufficient proven reserves for all the minerals,except for the mineral reserves present domestically(alumi

82、num,copper,and man-ganese),in commercially extractable quantities which is explained in detail later in the paper.For nickel,cobalt and graphite,the resources fall under the“Remaining Resources”category,which refers to the balance of the Total Mineral Resources that have not been identified as Miner

83、al Reserves.The domestic production of aluminum,copper,and man-ganese is also insufficient,and the domestic demand is met through imports.Table 5|Reserves and production of key minerals in India MINERALRESERVES(MT)PRODUCTION(IN 2023;MT)Lithium5.9NoneNickelNil(The entire reserves fall under the“Remai

84、ning Resources”category and are therefore not commercially extractable).The country does not produce nickel from primary sources,and the entire demand is met through imports.Cobalt44.91(Remaining Resources)The country does not produce cobalt from primary sources,and the demand is usually met through

85、 imports.Manganese75.043.6Aluminum1,6003.64Copper163.893.3Graphite211.62(Remaining Resources)0.03Notes:Mt=megatonne.Sources:MoM 2023b.Table 4|Expected range of mineral demand in India in 2050 MINERALLOWER RANGE OF DEMAND IN 2050(MT)UPPER RANGE OF DEMAND IN 2050(MT)Lithium0.583.62Nickel1.227.62Cobalt

86、1.16.89Manganese1.38.16Aluminum 14.6891.98Copper3.421.32Graphite4.5728.64Note:Mt=megatonne.Source:Author calculations,presented in detail in Appendix B.8|Table 6|Year-wise production of key minerals in India MINERAL20182019(TONNE)20192020(TONNE)20202021(TONNE)Copper concentrate0.140.120.11Copper ore

87、4.133.953.38Manganese ore2.832.912.69Graphite0.040.030.03Aluminum4.003.643.62Source:MoM 2023b.Table 7|Lithium:Import scenario COUNTRYQUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20182019(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL LITHIUM IMPORTS(%)QUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20192020(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL LITHIUM IMPORTS(%)QUANTIT

88、Y IMPORTED IN20202021(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL LITHIUM IMPORTS(%)Hong Kong47,24855.438,54753.326,64137.32China16,86819.814,98820.722,88132.05Indonesia1127613.239,06312.56,6899.37Singapore4,9295.85,0777.05,8498.19Korea 3,2573.82,7803.85,0907.13Table 8|Nickel:Import scenarioCOUNTRYQUANTITY IMPO

89、RTED IN 20182019(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NICKEL IMPORTS(%)QUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20192020(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL NICKEL IMPORTS(%)All countries47,229n/a48,428n/aJapan2,6345.55,11610.56Norway5,76812.215,90112.18China2,3054.84,5689.43United States1,7653.732,7965.77South Africa5,08110.75

90、4,0408.34Netherlands4,4199.353,7497.74Source:MoM 2023b.Notes:n/a=not applicable.Sources:Indian Bureau of Mines 2022.Mapping Indias mineral import dependence India is highly dependent on imports for certain key minerals due to their negligible domestic production.Tables 711 present the country-wise i

91、mport scenario for these minerals.WORKING PAPER|June 2024|9Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionTable 9|Cobalt:Import scenarioCOUNTRYQUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20172018(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL COBALT IMPORTS(%)QUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20182019(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL COBALT IMPO

92、RTS(%)All countries873n/a832n/aChina657.4515518.6Netherlands151.7111814.18United Kingdom829.398510.21United States11012.610312.37Belgium10712.259110.93Japan323.66678.05Table 10|Copper:Import scenarioCOUNTRYQUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20202021(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL COPPER IMPORTS(%)All countries86

93、2,741n/aChile326,75138Indonesia179,35021Australia101,12812Peru100,03412Panama61,2027Japan323.66Notes:n/a=not applicable.Sources:Indian Minerals Yearbook 2021a.Notes:n/a=not applicable.Sources:WITS 2021.Table 11|Graphite:Import ScenarioCOUNTRYQUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20172018(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TO

94、TAL GRAPHITE IMPORTS(%)QUANTITY IMPORTED IN 20182019(TONNE)PERCENTAGE SHARE OF TOTAL GRAPHITE IMPORTS(%)All countries39,863n/a47,053n/aChina34,25385.934,74273.8Madagascar1,9874.94,95010.5MozambiqueXX4,4449.44Brazil2,3675.91,4763.13Germany1510.371790.38Notes:n/a=not applicable;X=data not available.So

95、urces:Indian Bureau of Mines 2021a.10|Evidently,most of Indias critical mineral imports come from a small group of countries.Indias imports of lithium,for instance,remain highly concentrated,with Hong Kong and China accounting for over 60 percent.China accounts for nearly 80 percent of graphite impo

96、rts,and China is also an important source of nickel and cobalt.Indias critical mineral supplies face manifold vulnerabilities due to lack of domestic production and overwhelming import dependence on a handful of countries.The following section contextualizes some of these vulnerabilities for the Ind

97、ian scenario.DISCUSSION ON INDIAS CRITICAL MINERAL VULNERABILITIESIntroductionThis section contextualizes the contours of vulnerabilities in Indias mineral supplies and categorizes them under the broader themes of supply security,supply resilience,and sus-tainable development of supplies.This vulner

98、ability framework is based on the factors that cause supply disruption,as defined by the IEA(IEA 2022b)(see Figure 2).Security of mineral suppliesThe security of mineral supplies is a cornerstone of criti-cal mineral supply chain vulnerability,and its connotations assume greater significance in the

99、context of energy security as countries switch to cleaner forms of energy.Table 12 pres-ents an assessment of Indias projected demand compared to the domestic supply scenario.Clearly,demand outpaces the domestic supply.Mineral resources such as lithium,nickel,and cobalt are underexplored,with most o

100、f the resource inventory fall-ing under the“indicated reserves”(i.e.,unexplored reserves)categories(see the UN Framework Classification of Minerals).More detailed exploration and reconnaissance are required to increase confidence in the availability of these mineral resources in India.The country po

101、ssesses indicated reserves for four of the seven identified minerals,but they are difficult to extract commercially,especially without adequate invest-ment in exploration and production.Thus,the demand is met through imports,mostly from a small group of countries.This dominance of a small group of c

102、ountries is a global phenomenon,because a handful of countries dominate min-eral production.Minerals and metals produced in India are also imported in significant quantities(see Figure 3).India has significantly increased its imports of copper,manganese,and bauxite(alu-minum ore)over the last few ye

103、ars.These imports increase the countrys import dependence,especially given that it is heavily dependent on imports of other critical minerals needed for the energy transition.A recent report by the MoM on critical minerals in India highlights the vulnerability of the supply chain.According to this r

104、eport,India is import dependent on 15 critical minerals,with 100 percent import dependence for 10 of them and more than 50 percent import dependence for 3 of them(MoM 2023a)(see Figure 4).The report,however,identified the minerals based on the needs of a range of sectors and associated technologies,

105、and not just from the standpoint of the energy transition.The analysis in this paper,on the other hand,links the critical minerals requirements specifically to Indias energy transition goals.Domestic scarcity coupled with extreme import dependency creates a supply risk that could disrupt domestic CE

106、T value chains.Supply-side disruptions,such as trade wars,geo-political risks,adverse weather events,and labor shortages,impact the prices of minerals,which would have a multiplier effect on CET prices(Attinasi et al.2021).According to the IEA report Critical Minerals Market Review,most energy-trans

107、ition-related critical minerals experienced a significant price increase over the last two years,showing high peaks and volatility(IEA 2023b).The threats of supply disruption and price volatility internationally create challenges to Indias energy security in the clean energy sector(see Box 1).Figure

108、 2|Conceptualizing the vulnerability framework for critical mineral supply chains SECURITY OF SUPPLIESSUSTAINABILITY OF SUPPLIESRESILIENCE OF SUPPLIESScarcity of Critical Minerals(Resources,Production versus Demand)Maintence of ESG norms for Mining and ProcessingDeforestation challengesAbility to re

109、cover from disruptions in supply chainsImpact on volatility of pricesWaste and Wastewater ManagementImpact on local communities,lives,and livelihoodsImport dependencies for mineralsRegional trade of critical minerals Notes:ESG=environmental,social,and governance.Sources:Based on the definition by IE

110、A(2022b).WORKING PAPER|June 2024|11Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionTable 12|Demand projections and domestic supply of selected critical minerals in India MINERALLOWER RANGE OF DEMAND IN 2050(MT)UPPER RANGE OF DEMAND IN 2050(MT)DOMESTIC RESERVES AS OF 2021(MT)DOMESTIC PRODUCTION I

111、N 2021(MT)Lithium0.583.625.9NoneNickel1.227.62189NoneCobalt1.16.8944.91NoneManganese1.38.16503.622.6Aluminum 14.6891.9816003.6Copper3.421.3216003.4Graphite4.5728.64211.620.03Note:Mt=megatonne.Source:Demand from the authors calculations(see Annexure);reserves and production from Indian Bureau of Mine

112、s(2021b).Source:Indian Bureau of Mines 2021;MoM 2022;WITS 2023.Source:Based on data from Indian Bureau of Mines(2021b)and WITS(2023).Figure 3|Comparison of Indias domestic production with its imports of selected critical minerals and metals(20202021)Figure 4|Indias import sources for four selected c

113、ritical minerals(20202021)CobaltNickelLithiumLithium-ionLithiumGraphiteCobaltGraphiteManganeseManganeseCopperAluminum0%010203040506070809010%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Domestic productionImportAustraliaUnited Arab EmiratesOthersBahamasBelgiumBrazilChinaGabonHong KongIndonesiaJapanMadagascarMalaysia

114、MozambiqueNetherlandsSingaporeUSASouth Africa1007923122272058924543237978237310206431171Countries(%)South KoreaVietnam12|Resilience of mineral suppliesThe resilience of a countrys supplies is determined by its ability to recover from supply disruptions,and the supply gaps are usually filled by domes

115、tic production.In India,low levels of domestic production and processing,a fragmented policyregulatory environment for mineral mining and processing,and some systemic gaps create internal challenges that impact the resilience of critical mineral supplies.Despite adequate domestic reserves,some miner

116、als are produced slowly and in insufficient quantities for a number of reasons,such as lack of private investment,lack of techno-logical know-how,and inadequacies in the policyregulatory environment governing the mining sector(Kumar and Sinha 2020).In 2023,the legal regime for certain critical miner

117、als was changed to encourage the participation of private players in the mines and minerals sector(PIB 2023a).It is too early to comment on the efficacy of these changes.Overall,the policyregulatory environment for promoting domestic exploration,extraction,and processing has remained inadequate and

118、fragmented.To overcome some of these challenges,the Mines and Minerals(Development and Regu-lation)(MMDR)Act underwent major amendments in 2015.Notably,the amendment allowed mining leases to be granted through competitive bidding or auctions,replacing the exist-ing first-come-first-served mineral co

119、ncession mechanism.However,the response to the new concessions regime has been mixed.Most of the auctioned mines quoted very high premiums and went to large integrated players(companies with mining,beneficiation,and refining operations)and not to commercial miners without end-use facilities(Ray 2023

120、).Successful bidders have been affected by“the winners curse”:they have not been able to start production due to post-auction costs and other hurdles(FIMI 2021).Most of the auctions have been for brownfield sites,with few greenfield sites(Chadha and Sivamani 2021).The experience with the composite l

121、icense,which combines the prospecting license and the mining lease,has been unsatisfactory because the prospecting license has been issued in only 34 percent of the cases(Mishra 2023).According to industry representa-tives,smaller companies do not have any incentive to incur the risks involved in ex

122、ploration(Mishra 2023).To boost exploration,the industry could explore technology and global exploration standards such as the Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards(CRIRSCO)and the Australasian Code for Reporting of Exploration Results,Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves(JO

123、RC);an improved national mineral inventory is also needed(Jain 2022).Policy uncertainty,such as the discontinuation of the lease renewal system,has also led to the surrender of several mining leases(Ray 2023).There has been limited jurisdictional coherence between policies related to critical minera

124、l mining and those related to the energy transition.The downstream policy initiatives that aim to promote renewable energy and decarbonization focus on the end-use-technology side of the value chain and are governed by policies issued by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy(MNRE)at the center.Th

125、e success of these policy initiatives,however,depends on upstream mineral mining and processing,the policies around which are drafted by the MoM along with the concerned state governments,because it is the responsibility of both the central government and the state governments.At the time of this wr

126、iting,policies related to the energy transition have been ahead of the curve,but those related to critical minerals have not evolved at the same pace and lag behind.This is also due to inherent differences between the life cycles and gestation periods of RE projects and min-ing projects.However,it i

127、s necessary to minimize the gap in policies between the two areas to provide an enabling and coherent environment for adequate investment in the domestic critical minerals sector.Recent developments in the policyregulatory space for critical minerals aim to fill some of these gaps,but a more nuanced

128、 approach is needed to determine the minerals that should be prioritized for energy transition technologies.Sustainable development of mineral suppliesMining for minerals,including critical minerals,is associ-ated with deforestation,land use change,and land alteration.Various interested entities com

129、pete for the land required for exploration and mining activities.Most of the mineral reserves lie in forest land(Bhushan and Hazra 2008)or close to indigenous communities(Owen et al.2022).This is especially true for India,where mines have been established by divert-Box 1|Post-pandemic price volatili

130、ty of solar powerAs the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains globally,the price of solar modules in India increased by 42 percent between August 2020 and November 2021.This increase is attributed to a supply-demand mismatch for polysilicon,whose prices increased from$6.8/kg in July 2020 to$43/k

131、g in Novem-ber 2021.a The price volatility continued until 2022,affecting returns on nearly 4.4 GW of solar power projects that were awarded between 2020 and 2021b and impacting the profitabil-ity of Indian manufacturers.Source:a.JMK Research&Analytics 2022.b.Gupta 2022.WORKING PAPER|June 2024|13Cri

132、tical minerals for Indias clean energy transitioning large tracts of forest land surrounded by hills and rivers(Ranjan 2019).Reasi district in Jammu and Kashmir,where lithium has been discovered,is surrounded by the Himala-yas,sits on the bank of the river Chenab,and has a fragile topography(typical

133、 of the Himalayas)and an equally fragile ecosystem(Yashwant 2023).One of the most widely reported environmental externali-ties associated with mining is deterioration of the air,water,and soil quality.Studies have flagged concerns such as acid mine drainage,increased levels of metal concentration in

134、 soil and groundwater,and discharge of mining dust and other contaminants that can lead to degradation of the quality of surface and underground water in the vicinity of copper and manganese mines(Pandey et al.2007;Goswami et al.2014).The release of toxins from mining and processing opera-tions has

135、impacted flora and fauna,and overconsumption of water in mining operations has led to the disappearance of certain water bodies(Punia et al.2021).Because most mineral reserves are close to forests and other ecologically fragile ecosystems,mining could end up exacerbating the impact of environmental

136、pollution in these ecologically important and sensitive regions.Mining for lithium,which is already being explored in India,is known to have significant environmental impacts,especially on water,soil composition,and biodiversity.Recent discoveries in India of lithium blocks are primarily in the natu

137、re of hard rock deposits,whose extraction is technology intensive and challenging because these deposits require complex processes and the use of explosives,drills,and so on.This process often produces fragmented and broken rocks(Meshram et al.2014;Kaunda 2020)and is also more energy and water inten

138、sive than lithium extraction from brines(Kempton et al.2010;Gao et al.2023).Although India has regulations for the man-agement of overburden,tailings,and slime,greater attention must be paid to post-mining management as mining increases.Mining is also associated with adverse social impacts such as l

139、oss of indigenous land and habitats and loss of livelihood opportunities(Nalule 2020).The relationship that com-munities have traditionally enjoyed with their lands can be negatively impacted by displacement or change in access to the mining region(Nalule 2020).Mining in India has had a checkered pa

140、st despite the drafting of extensive regulations for mining,environmental protec-tion,rehabilitation,and social inclusion.Judicial interventions to promote these regulations have not been able to prevent inefficient mining,wastage,environmental degradation,health and safety concerns,and protests fro

141、m the local population(Banerjee 2020).Given the push to enhance the production of critical minerals,these negative impacts are likely to increase.Inadequate mitigation and management of externalities can create apprehension and a lack of trust among the local communities,all of which can feed into p

142、roject delays and cost overruns.A social license to operate(SLO)is,therefore,as vital as the environmental licenses and legal approvals for development of mineral resources.An SLO would help avoid potential conflicts with the local population and affected com-munities by enlisting their tacit approv

143、al.The security,resilience,and sustainability of supplies are the key factors that determine critical mineral supply chain vulnerabilities.The energy technology value chains in India remain highly import dependent for mineral inputs,mak-ing them extremely vulnerable to external shocks and global pri

144、ce volatility.This vulnerability adds to the countrys energy security concerns,making it imperative to build domestic mineral production and processing capacities to increase the resilience of mineral supplies.Moreover,India has historically grappled with the environmental and social concerns around

145、 mining practices,which could intensify once the country scales exploration and extraction of newer critical minerals from the available domestic reserves.This chapter maps the critical minerals economy of India.However,the picture remains incomplete without an assessment of the global criti-cal min

146、erals economy and Indias position within it,which the following section attempts to map.COREPERIPHERY DYNAMICS OF THE CRITICAL MINERALS ECONOMY:ASSESSING INDIAS POSITIONIntroductionThe previous section mapped Indias critical minerals economy,using the vulnerability assessment framework to map out th

147、e vulnerabilities in Indias critical mineral supplies.The picture,however,remains incomplete without understanding the global critical mineral resources economy and locating India within it.Indias unique position in the complex spectrum of critical minerals for the energy transition is better unders

148、tood by examining the global ecosystem associated with the energy transition and critical minerals.In view of the above,this section attempts to analyze the global ecosystem surrounding critical minerals and assess Indias position within it.At the very outset,it deploys the conventional economic cor

149、eperiphery framework to under-stand the political economy around critical minerals.The framework has been traditionally used to explain the resource economy of various conventional fuels,including their demand and supply dynamics(Hryniewicz 2014).As explained at the outset of this paper,the coreperi

150、phery model is based on the premise that primary economic resources 14|move from their primary extraction and processing sites in the periphery to the markets in the core(Dodge 2021).Paul Krugman develops this model to show how the movement of resources through the economies of the world combined wi

151、th localization of industries,development of economies of scale,and transportation costs result in the development of manu-facturing cores and resource peripheries(Krugman 1991).The coreperiphery model characterizes regions and countries that have succeeded in certain economic activities,such as lar

152、ge-scale industrialization,production of high-end technologies,and cutting-edge research,as the core.These countries and regions become the epicenter of global economic activities and form the“wealthy core regions”of the world(Klimczuk and Klimczuk-Kochaska 2019).The peripheral regions of the world

153、are made up of countries that supply raw materials for production;they form the supply sources for the indus-trialized core.Because critical minerals are a subset of economic resources,they can also be analyzed using the coreperiphery framework.Exner-Pirot(2023)describes the Arctic economies as reso

154、urce peripheries for critical minerals,blaming the situation on low commodity prices.In the case of rare earths,Xia et al.(2023)use the coreperiphery structure as one of the frameworks to analyze the complex trading structures of rare earths but conclude that the coreperiphery structure does not hol

155、d up significantly when used for the analysis of the global rare earth trade,because China became the worlds largest exporter,with a relatively complete rare earth industry.The application of the framework to critical minerals reveals its inadequacies in explaining the dynamics of the critical miner

156、als economy.Because the framework assumes that resource peripheries,as they are called,are locked into their structurally defined positions(Hayter et al.2003),it is unable to explain the emergence of markets at the sites of critical mineral processing and production,which allows countries to reposit

157、ion themselves at the core of the critical mineral economy(Arboleda 2020).The emergence of China as the worlds largest critical mineral processing,production,and export destination is a significant outlier and an important case in point.This is because as an upper-middle-income country,China boasts

158、some of the largest mineral production and processing sites,and has also become the largest center for the manufacturing of high-end CETs,thus dominating the upstream,midstream,and downstream parts of the critical mineral value chain(see Figures 5 and 6).Chinas dominance over the mineralenergy techn

159、ology value chain remains unparalleled and can be attributed to its heavy investments in CET value chains,setting up of economies of scale,and constant innovation(Xiaoying You 2023).China accounts for nearly 78 percent of the global EV battery manu-facturing capacity;besides,nearly 75 percent of the

160、 worlds lithium-ion mega-factories are located in China(Castillo and Purdy 2022)(see Table 13).Figure 5|Share of countries in the extraction and processing of critical minerals(2019)Note:DRC=Democratic Republic of Congo.LNG=liquefied natural gas.Source:IEA estimates(IEA 2021).MineralsFossil fuelsExt

161、ractionProcessingOilOil refiningPhilippinesSaudi ArabiaRussiaIranMyanmarPeruJapanFinlandBelgiumArgentinaMalaysiaLNG exportCopperNickelCobaltLithiumRare earthsNatural gasCopperNickelCobaltRare earthsLithium20%20%40%40%60%60%80%80%100%100%WORKING PAPER|June 2024|15Critical minerals for Indias clean en

162、ergy transitionFigure 6|The mineralsenergy technology value chain CLEAN TECHNOLOGIESMININGPROCESSINGBATTERY MATERIALPOLYSILICONWIND TURBINE&COMPONENTSBATTERY CELL/PACKSOLAR PANELEV DEPLOYMENTEV DEPLOYMENTEV DEPLOYMENTLITHIUMNICKELCOBALTRARE EARTHSCOPPERChileChileChilePeruAustraliaChileIndonesiaIndon

163、esiaPhilipinesDRCChinaChinaChinaChinaChinaChinaChinaEuropean UnionEuropean UnionEuropean UnionSouth KoreaSouth KoreaJapanSouth KoreaSouth KoreaGermanyCanadaGermanyChinaChinaChinaChinaSpainIndiaUnited States of AmericaUnited States of AmericaUnited States of AmericaUnited States of AmericaUnited Stat

164、es of AmericaChinaChinaChinaNote:EV=electric vehicle.PV=photovoltaic.Source:IEA 2022b.Locating India in the global critical minerals ecosystemThis mapping of the political economy of critical minerals and the possible anomaly that China presents is especially relevant from the standpoint of locating

165、 India within the global criti-cal minerals economy as it evolves,given that it is trying to advance its critical minerals economy in relation to the energy transition.To this end,learnings from other countries could prove useful for India to position itself as an important critical minerals and CET

166、 market.Although India is pushing to scale its domestic clean energy transition by developing a domestic base for CET manufac-turing(MNRE 2021),it is a marginal player in the supply chain ecosystem for several critical minerals identified by the GoI.India has significant resource potential for a few

167、 miner-als,such as copper,graphite,and manganese,but they remain commercially underdeveloped due to a lack of suitable invest-ments and the inadequate participation of the private sector(PIB 2017).The GoI has announced a series of measures to expedite detailed exploration in the country through incr

168、eased capital investments and deployment of advanced technolo-Table 13|Chinas share of global refining and battery component manufacturing REFINING(%)BATTERY COMPONENT MANUFACTURING(%)NICKEL68Cathodes70COPPER40Anodes85LITHIUM59Separators66COBALT73Electrolytes62Source:Data from Castillo and Purdy(202

169、2).16|gies.These measures will be supported by private sector participation,which is expected to be stimulated by a recently announced Mines and Minerals(Development&Regulation)Amendment Bill,2023,which focuses on promoting private sector participation in critical minerals mining.As the global criti

170、cal minerals economy evolves,countries are expanding domestic production and the processing of certain groups of minerals due to concerns regarding the security of their supplies.This expansion is being achieved through an enhanced focus on exploring and extracting domestic mineral resources,acquiri

171、ng overseas mines,improving reuse and recycling,and building the capacities of the domestic work-force(U.S.DOE 2024).Countries are also aware that they must diversify their supplies and increase private investment in the midstream and downstream segments of the mineral value chain.Toward this end,co

172、untries are forming alliances based on their relative positions within the critical minerals economy.India is a part of some of these groupings,such as the United Statesled Mineral Security Partnership,which focuses on increasing investments in the entire value chain of critical minerals while adher

173、ing to ESG norms(PIB 2023c).India is also a member of the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining,Minerals,Metals and Sustainable Development,which supports“good mining governance”(IGF n.d.).Discus-sions also being held under the Quad initiative(McIlroy 2022)on topics such as mapping semiconductor supply

174、chain vulnerabilities(Sadler 2022)and joint investments in criti-cal minerals(Sakaguchi 2023).Apart from these multilateral collaborations,India is also developing bilateral partnerships,such as the Critical Minerals Investment Partnership with Australia to develop mineral supply chains between the

175、two countries(PIB 2023b),and a lithium pact between the GoI-owned KABIL Joint Venture and Argentina(Arora 2023;PIB 2024).An interesting aspect of these collaborations is that countries are aligning with each other driven by the importance of securing mineral supply chains by enhancing diversificatio

176、n,ramping up investments in mineral production and processing,and promoting sustainability in mining.These partnerships are observed to be more strategic than those witnessed histori-cally for conventional fuels such as oil and gas,where the need to cartelize the supplies or form consumer blocs drov

177、e the formation of international groupings.This divergence,which arises from the relatively more complex ecosystem surrounding critical minerals,offers important opportunities for developing countries such as India.These countries can achieve a clean energy transition by securing their mineral suppl

178、ies through a multipronged approach spanning domestic mining,overseas acquisition,and mineral supply partnerships.The critical minerals economy and its landscape both globally and within India have been analyzed using the coreperiphery and vulnerability assessment frameworks,respectively.This compre

179、hensive examination helps unpack the set of challenges and opportunities for India in the upstream,midstream,and downstream segments of critical minerals value chains.The global critical minerals economy,as it evolves,will provide India with several opportunities for strengthening and diversifying m

180、ineral supplies through enhanced collaboration,while also perhaps allowing it to position itself around issues of sustainable mining and the development of socially accept-able norms around mineral mining and processing.These efforts can,however,only be successfully achieved by plugging the gaps in

181、its domestic mineral economy,through effective institution-building and capacity-building.CONCLUSION The“critical”in“critical minerals”is the result of a range of economic,social,and technical factors that limit their supply relative to their growing demand.The methods to assess the criticality of m

182、inerals rely on their economic importance and the supply-side vulnerabilities that could lead to market tightness and greater volatility in prices.The vulnerabilities in mineral supplies have thus far been focused on factors such as the concentration of production of critical minerals in certain reg

183、ions,long lead times for project development to reach the production stage,and the quality of resources available.The current literature that defines mineral criticality and vulnerability of supplies is based largely on the perspectives of developed countries.However,the emerging literature that ana

184、lyzes mineral criticality is based on the needs of developing countries.The vulnerabilities related to critical minerals,which are not restricted to developing countries,include import reliance,governance indicators,policyregulatory structures,the social costs of mineral extraction,threats of defore

185、station,loss of biodiversity,and environmental pollution.Indias net zero transition goals are expected to result in significant CET requirements,which would increase the demand for EV batteries and BESS.The energy transition relies heavily on both EV batteries and BESS,which are highly mineral inten

186、sive and generate the primary demand for certain minerals.Indias critical mineral vulnerabilities can be categorized under the broad pillars of security,resilience,and sustainable supplies.Supply insecurity stems from a domestic scarcity of minerals,coupled with extreme import dependence on some cou

187、ntries for processed minerals,producing a multiplier effect on the volatility of the prices of CETs.WORKING PAPER|June 2024|17Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionThe way forward To achieve domestic supply chain resilience,it is necessary to focus on upstream exploration and developme

188、nt,as well as developing an end-of-life ecosystem for the recovery and recycling of minerals in the downstream segment.Adequate institutional capacity and policyregulatory frameworks are needed to enable these outcomes.When considering the sustainability of mineral supplies,it is important to consid

189、er the social and environmental impacts of critical mineral mining in India.Inadequate mitigation and management of externalities creates apprehensions and a lack of trust among the local communities,which can feed into project delays and cost overruns.Social licenses to operate must be given the sa

190、me importance as environmental licenses and legal approvals for the development of mineral resources.China has emerged as an important outlier to the traditional coreperiphery model.Although it is as an upper-middle-income economy,it dominates the critical mineral supply chains in the upstream,midst

191、ream,and downstream segments,from mineral processing to the manufacture of CETs.This has important learnings for India as it promotes innovation in domestic CET manufacturing,establishes low-cost economies of scale for CETs,and promotes domestic exploration,production,and processing of critical mine

192、rals with untapped reserves.Strategic partnerships in the domain of critical minerals are driven by the need for securing supply chains by ramping up investments,enhancing diversification,and maintaining ESG norms.These partnerships differ from those that were formed historically around traditional

193、fuels such as oil and gas,which were driven by the need for supply-side cartelization and demand-side bloc formation.India can leverage some of these groupings to develop stronger partnerships with member countries in the domain of critical mineral supplies.18|APPENDIX A.THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIAS DEC

194、ARBONIZATION POLICIESThe Government of India(GoI)committed to a series of climate actions at the 26th Conference of Parties(COP-26)held in Glasgow,of which achieving net zero emissions by 2070 was a key announcement(PIB 2022b).The GoI also committed to reaching a non-fossil energy capacity of 500 GW

195、 by 2030,while meeting 50 percent of its energy require-ments from renewable energy by the same year(PIB 2022b).If these targets are to be achieved,the country will have to undertake an extensive and deep decarbonization of the sectors that are the largest sources of greenhouse gas emis-sions,such a

196、s power,transport,buildings,and industries.To back these targets with concrete policy measures,the GoI has announced targets of achieving 280 GW of installed solar capacity by 2030(PIB 2022c)and about 140 GW of installed wind energy capacity by 2030(GWEC 2022).There has also been a concerted push by

197、 the GoI to boost the adoption of electric vehicles(EVs)in the country,through the FAME-India(Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of(Hybrid and)Electric Vehicles in India)scheme,which aims to generate demand for EVs in the country(PIB 2022c).In addition to the above,the GoI has also announced the deve

198、lopment of a Green Energy Corridor,that is,an intra-state transmission system of nearly 20,500 circuit kilometers(ckm),which would facilitate power evacuation of renewable energy(PIB 2022d).Several states have also formulated EV policies that offer con-sumer demand incentives,industry incentives,and

199、 charging infrastructure incentives(Kanuri et al.2021).Considering the goals of Indias net zero transition,the IEA identifies the sectors and technologies that will be funda-mental in driving the energy transition in India.Among other things,the IEAs India Energy Outlook 2021 report anticipates a ri

200、se in demand for battery storage systems,which will be fundamental in giving the power sector the flexibility to integrate renewables(IEA 2021,13).In the transportation sector,the IEA has estimated a tremendous rise in Indias EV fleet,and EVs are expected to represent nearly 34 percent of Indias ent

201、ire road stock by 2040(IEA 2021,92).The ShellTERI report also evaluates the technologies India needs to transition to a net zero energy emissions system(Shell and TERI 2021).The report identifies large-scale deployment of solar,wind,and hydropower to replace coal in the power sector for extensive el

202、ectrification across the country(Shell and TERI 2021,15).This would need to be matched with large-scale energy storage to tackle intermit-tency.The report also foresees extensive electrification of the transport sector,with two-and three-wheelers going completely electric by 2030 and sale of passeng

203、er vehicles also restricted to EVs by 2030(Shell and TERI 2021,16).The Central Electricity Authority,in its National Electric-ity Plan(202232),focuses on the growing importance of renewable-based capacity,including solar,wind,large and small hydro,and battery energy storage systems in the coun-trys

204、electricity sector over the next decade.The plan envisages that the share of non-fossil-based capacity in the total capac-ity would increase to nearly 68 percent by the end of 203132,from 42.5 percent in April 2023(PIB 2023d).WORKING PAPER|June 2024|19Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transi

205、tionAPPENDIX B.METHODOLOGY FOR INDIAS CRITICAL MINERALS REQUIREMENTS PROJECTIONSTo calculate the demand projections for Indias critical mineral requirements in 2050,the following steps were followed.This paper considers the demand projections made by several studies until the year 2030 and uses comp

206、ound annual growth rate(CAGR)calculations to arrive at the possible demand for clean energy technologies in 2050.The figures presented provide a demand range for Indias clean energy technology requirements in 2050(see Tables B-1 and B-2).Table B1|Demand projections by various studies ENERGY TECHNOLO

207、GY/DEMAND IN 2050IEAaTERIbWRTSIL AND LUTCNRELDCEEWECENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITYSTEPSSDSIVCBCSHRESPrimary energy demand(GWh)2,32,60,0001,53,86,4902,31,66,960XXXXXXElectricity demand(GWh)50,51,00046,19,00056,45,00076,40,0001,07,07,00059,21,00041,90,00057,58,000XSolar PV generation(GWh)17,45,00019,96,

208、00018,95,00093,53,0001,53,02,00050,80,000X63,36,00012,65,000Solar PV capacity(GW)1,0331,1761,1355,5119,7973,076X3,728732Wind energy generation(GWh)7,22,00011,19,0009,51,00058,91,0001,27,62,00012,92,000X24,64,0007,26,000Wind energy capacity(GW)2984763931,4863,340410X1,053329Battery storage(GW)726X1,4

209、81XX2,352800X1,548Energy capacity of storage(GWh)XXXXX95,00049,000XXNotes:BCS=Baseline Capacity Scenario.CAGR=compound annual growth rate.CEEW=Council on Energy,Environment and Water.DRS=Delayed Recovery Scenario.GW=gigawatt.GWh=gigawatt-hour.HRES=High Renewable Energy Scenario.IEA=International Ene

210、rgy Agency.IVC=India Vision Case.NREL=National Renewable Energy Laboratory.PV=photovoltaic.STEPS=Stated Policies Scenario.TERI=The Energy and Resources Institute.X=Data not available.Source:a.IEA 2021,b.Shankar et al.2022,c.Wrtsil 2021,d.Chernyakhovskiy et al.2021,e.CEEW 2021a.Table B2|EV,EV battery

211、,and BESS demand in India in 2050(based on CAGR calculations)EV DEMAND IN 2050IEA APS SCENARIOaINDIA ECONOMIC SURVEYbCEEW CEF MODELcGIZ-NITI REPORTdTotal(million)563.88678,8476,942.5BATTERY DEMAND FOR EVS IN 2050IESA ESTIMATESeCEEWfCEEW CEF MODELcTotal(GWh)23,1429,4272,585BESS DEMAND IN 2050CEAgIEAh

212、U.S.DOEiTotal(GWh)1,7672,2654,124Notes:APS=Announced Pledges Scenario.BESS=battery energy storage system.CAGR=compound annual growth rate.CEA=Central Electricity Authority.CEEW=Council on Energy,Environment and Water.CEF=Centre for Energy Finance.DOE=Department of Energy.EV=electric vehicle.GIZ=Deut

213、sche Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit.GWh=gigawatt-hour.IEA=International Energy Agency.IESA=India Energy Storage Alliance.NITI=National Institution for Transforming India.Source:a.IEA 2022a,b.GoI 2023,c.Singh et al.2020,d.Rather et al.2021,e.IESA 2020,f.CEEW 2021a,g.CEA 2023,h.IEA 2021

214、,i.U.S.DOE 2024.20|Figure 1 of this paper indicates that most of the demand for critical minerals will come from the batteries used in both EVs and stationary storage for renewable energy systems.The paper aims to formulate demand projections for seven miner-als(lithium,nickel,cobalt,manganese,alumi

215、num,copper,and graphite)by using Tables B-1 and B-2 to estimate a range for battery requirements in India in 2050(see Table B-3).The predominant battery compositions(see Table B-4)were used to calculate the critical minerals in batteries by weight(see Table B-5),which were then used to calculate the

216、 mineral composition range for each battery composition for the year 2050(see Tables B-6 and B-7).Table B3|Battery requirements in 2050 in India(GWh)LOWER RANGEUPPER RANGEEV batteries563.8867BESS23,1429,427Notes:BESS=battery energy storage system.EV=electric vehicle.GWh=gigawatt-hour.Source:WRI auth

217、ors.Table B4|Battery composition BATTERYCOMPOSITIONB170%NMC,25%LFP,5%OthersB250%NMC,40%LFP,5%OthersNotes:“Others”includes lithium nickelcobaltaluminum oxide(NCA)and lithium-ion manganese oxide(LMO)batteries.LFP=lithium iron phosphate.NMC=nickelmanganesecobalt.Source:Dunn et al.2021.Table B5|Li-ion b

218、attery pack composition by weight(kg/kWh)MINERAL/METALLFPLMONCANMCLithium0.0950.1060.1020.141Nickel000.6720.351Cobalt000.1270.352Manganese01.39600.328Aluminum 3.5283.3692.923.11Copper0.9460.8630.5640.677Graphite1.0850.9110.9780.978Notes:LFP=lithium iron phosphate.LMO=lithium manganese oxide.NCA=nick

219、elcobaltaluminum.NMC=nickelmanganesecobalt.Source:WRI authors.WORKING PAPER|June 2024|21Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionTable B6|Mineral composition range for battery B1 for the year 2050 MINERAL/METALLOWER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(KG)LOWER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(MT)UPPER RANGE FOR

220、 EV BATTERIES(KG)UPPER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(MT)LOWER RANGE FOR BESS(KG)LOWER RANGE FOR BESS(MT)UPPER RANGE FOR BESS(KG)UPPER RANGE FOR BESS(MT)Lithium34,34,17,2500.343,07,44,14,7003.0723,47,45,9500.2354,78,73,4000.55Nickel72,19,90,5000.726,46,35,60,6006.4649,35,23,1000.491,15,18,33,2001.15Cobalt65

221、,33,58,7500.655,84,91,40,5005.8544,66,09,2500.451,04,23,41,0001.04Manganese77,39,49,0000.776,92,87,14,8006.9352,90,39,8000.531,23,47,25,6001.23Aluminum8,72,03,68,2508.7278,06,83,79,90078.075,96,08,86,1505.9613,91,21,07,80013.91Copper2,02,08,23,7502.0218,09,12,58,50018.091,38,13,52,2501.383,22,39,37,

222、0003.22Graphite2,71,50,25,5002.7224,30,60,42,60024.311,85,58,80,1001.864,33,14,37,2004.33Table B7|Mineral composition range for battery B2 for the year 2050 MINERAL/METALLOWER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(KG)LOWER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(MT)UPPER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(KG)UPPER RANGE FOR EV BATTERIES(MT)LO

223、WER RANGE FOR BESS(KG)LOWER RANGE FOR BESS(MT)UPPER RANGE FOR BESS(KG)UPPER RANGE FOR BESS(MT)Lithium30,73,56,5000.312,75,15,83,8002.7533,46,69,8000.3349,03,43,6000.49Nickel54,05,23,5000.544,83,89,92,2004.8436,94,79,7000.3786,23,28,4000.86Cobalt47,13,74,7500.474,21,99,43,7004.2232,22,12,4500.3275,20

224、,11,4000.75Manganese60,43,73,0000.65,41,05,99,6005.4141,31,24,6000.4196,41,91,2000.96Aluminum8,48,04,80,2508.4875,92,08,02,30075.925,79,69,08,5505.813,52,94,00,60013.53Copper3,50,48,72,2503.531,91,16,60,90031.912,39,57,86,9502.45,59,15,25,4005.59Graphite2,63,01,08,2502.6323,54,58,27,90023.551,79,78,

225、34,1501.84,19,59,63,8004.2Notes:B1 composition:70%NMC,25%LFP,5%Others.“Others”includes lithium nickelcobaltaluminum oxide(NCA)and lithium-ion manganese oxide(LMO)batteries.BESS=battery energy storage system.EV=electric vehicle.LFP=lithium iron phosphate.Mt=megatonne.NMC=nickelmanganesecobalt.Sources

226、:WRI authors.Notes:B2 composition:50%NMC,40%LFP,5%Others.“Others”includes lithium nickelcobaltaluminum oxide(NCA)and lithium-ion manganese oxide(LMO)batteries.BESS=battery energy storage system.EV=electric vehicle.LFP=lithium iron phosphate.Mt=megatonne.NMC=nickelmanganesecobalt.Sources:WRI authors.

227、22|REFERENCESArboleda,Martn.2020.Planetary Mine:Territories of Extraction un-der Late Capitalism.London:Verso Books.https:/ State-Owned Firm to Sign Lithium Pact with Argentina.”Reuters.https:/ Grazia,Mirco Balatti,Michele Mancini,and Luca Metelli.2021.“Supply Chain Disruptions and the Effects on th

228、e Global Economy.”ECB Economic Bulletin,no.8.https:/www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2022/html/ecb.ebbox202108_01e8ceebe51f.en.html.Banerjee,Sreshta.2020.“Mining and Jurisprudence:Observations for Indias Mining Sector to Improve Environmental and Social Performance.”Working Paper.New De

229、lhi:Brookings Institution.https:/www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Mining-and-Jurisprudence_F.pdf.Bhushan,Chandra,Monali Zeya Hazra,and Souparno Banerjee.2008.Rich Lands,Poor People:Is“Sustainable”Mining Possible?New Delhi:Centre for Science and Environment.Bhutada,Govind.2022.“The Key Mi

230、nerals in an EV Battery.”Ele-ments by Visual Capitalist.https:/ Ramdoo,and Murtiani Hendriwardani.2023.ASEAN-IGF Minerals Cooperation:Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply.Winnipeg:International Institute for Sustainable Development.https:/www.iisd.org/system/files/2023-05/scoping-study-critical

231、-minerals-asean.pdf.Bontje,Harrison,and Don Duval.2022.Critical Minerals Supply and Demand Challenges Mining Companies Face.New York:EY Ameri-cas.https:/ Geological Survey.2021.UK Criticality Assessment of Technology Critical Minerals and Metals.London:British Geological Survey Commissioned Report,C

232、R/21/120.https:/www.bgs.ac.uk/download/uk-criticality-assessment-of-technology-critical-miner-als-and-metals/.Bruckner,Martin,Liesbeth de Schutter,Ernst Schriefl,Andreas Haider,Lisa Bohunovsky,Barbara Lugschitz,and Christine Polzin.2013.Feasible Futures for the Common Good.Energy Transition Paths in

233、 a Period of Increasing Resource ScarcitiesProgress Report 3:Scenarios of RE Technology Growth.Vienna:Sustainable Europe Research Institute.Castillo,Rodrigo,and Caitlin Purdy.2022.Chinas Role in Supplying Critical Minerals for the Global Energy Transition:What Could the Future Hold?Washington,DC:The

234、 Brookings Institution.https:/www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2022/08/LTRC_China-SupplyChain.pdf.CEA(Central Electricity Authority).2023.National Electricity Plan 202232.Vol.1:Generation.New Delhi:Government of India.https:/cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/irp/2023/05/NEP_2022_32_FINAL_GAZETTE-1.p

235、df.CEEW(Council on Energy,Environment and Water).2021a.Implica-tions of a Net-Zero Target for Indias Sectoral Energy Transitions and Climate Policy.New Delhi:CEEW.https:/www.ceew.in/sites/default/files/ceew-study-on-implications-of-net-zero-target-for-indias-sectoral-energy-transitions-and-climate-p

236、olicy.pdf.CEEW.2021b.Peaking and Net-Zero for Indias Energy Sector CO2 Emissions.Issue Brief.New Delhi:CEEW.https:/www.ceew.in/sites/default/files/ceew-study-on-how-can-india-reach-net-zero-emissions-target.pdf.CEEW,IEA,UC-Davis,and WRI.2023.Addressing Vulnerabilities in the Supply Chain of Critical

237、 Minerals.New Delhi:Council on Energy,Environment and Water.https:/www.ceew.in/sites/default/files/ad-dressing critical minerals supply chain vulnerabilities-india.pdf.Chadha,Rajesh,and Ganesh Sivamani.2021.“Non-fuel Mineral Auctions:How Fair Is the Game,and for Whom?”CSEP Working Paper 11.New Delhi

238、:Centre for Social and Economic Progress(CSEP).https:/csep.org/working-paper/non-fuel-mineral-auctions-how-fair-is-the-game-and-for-whom.Chadha,Rajesh,and Ganesh Sivamani.2022.“Critical Miner-als for India:Assessing Their Criticality and Projecting Their Needs for Green Technologies.”Working Paper.N

239、ew Delhi:Centre for Social and Economic Progress(CSEP).https:/csep.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Critical-Minerals-for-Green-Technologies_26-Aug-22.pdf.Chadha,Rajesh,Ganesh Sivamani,and K.Bansal.2023.“As-sessing the Criticality of Minerals for India.”Working Paper.New Delhi:CSEP.https:/csep.org/wor

240、king-paper/critical-minerals-for-india-2023/.Chernyakhovskiy,Ilya,Mohit Joshi,David Palchak,and Amy Rose.2021.Energy Storage in South Asia:Understanding the Role of Grid-Connected Energy Storage in South Asias Power Sector Transforma-tion.Golden,Colorado:National Renewable Energy Laboratory.https:/w

241、ww.nrel.gov/docs/fy21osti/79915.pdfChurch,Clare and Alec Crawford.2018.Green Conflict Minerals:The Fuels of Conflict in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy.Win-nipeg:International Institute for Sustainable Development.ww.iisd.org/system/files/publications/green-conflict-minerals.pdf.CSTEP and Gov

242、ernment of India.2012.Rare Earths and Energy Criti-cal Elements:A Roadmap and Strategy for India.Bangalore:CSTEP(Center for Study of Science,Technology and Policy)and New Delhi:Ministry of Mines,Government of India.https:/mines.gov.in/admin/storage/app/uploads/64a3eae23bee21688464098.pdf.Dodge,Alexa

243、nder.2021.“From Resource Peripheries to Emerging Markets:Reconfiguring Positionalities In Global Production Net-works.”In Resource Peripheries in the Global Economy,Economic Geography,eds.F.Irarrazaval and M.Arias-Loyola.Cham,Switzer-land:Springer https:/doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84606-0_4.WORKING P

244、APER|June 2024|23Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionDominish,Elsa,Sven Teske,and Nick Florin.2019.Responsible Minerals Sourcing for Renewable Energy.Report prepared for Earthworks by the Institute for Sustainable Futures,University of Technology,Sydney.https:/earthworks.org/wp-conte

245、nt/uploads/2019/04/Responsible-minerals-sourcing-for-renewable-energy-MCEC_UTS_Earthworks-Report.pdf.Dunn,Jessica,Margaret Slattery,Alissa Kendall,Hanjiro Ambrose,and Shuhan Shen.2021.“Circularity of Lithium-Ion Battery Materi-als in Electric Vehicles.”Environmental Science&Technology 55(8):518998.h

246、ttps:/doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.0c07030.European Commission.2017.Methodology for Establishing the EU List of Critical Raw Materials.Luxembourg:European Commission.https:/doi.org/10.2873/769526.European Commission.2023.“European Critical Raw Materials Act.”European Commission.https:/commission.europa.e

247、u/strat-egy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/green-deal-industrial-plan/european-critical-raw-materials-act_en.Exner-Pirot,Heather.2023.Overcoming Remoteness:Innovations to Support Economic Development,Critical Minerals,and Security.Washington,D.C:Wilson Centers Canada Institute.h

248、ttps:/5g.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Overcoming%20Remoteness%20-%20Innovations%20to%20Support%20Economic%20Development%2C%20Critical%20Minerals%2C%20and%20Security%20in%20the%20Arctic.pdf.FIMI(Federation of Indian Mining Industries).2021.Auction of Min-eral Resources

249、:An Anatomy(New Delhi:FIMI.https:/ M.,Nedal T.Nassar,Karen D.Kelley,Graham W.Lederer,Jeffrey L.Mauk,Jane M.Hammarstrom,Warren C.Day,and Robert R.Seal II.2021.“USGS 2020 Critical Minerals Review.”Min-ing Engineering 73(5).https:/me.smenet.org/abstract.cfm?preview=1&articleID=10190&page=32.Friedmann,J

250、ohn.1966.Regional Development Policy:A Case Study of Venezuela.Cambridge:Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.Frenzel,M.,J.Kullik,Markus A.Reuter,and J.Gutzmer.2017.“Raw Material CriticalitySense or Nonsense?”Journal of Physics D:Applied Physics 50(12):123002.https:/iopscience.iop.org/ar-ticl

251、e/10.1088/1361-6463/aa5b64/pdf.Gao,Tian-ming,Na Fan,Wu Chen,and Tao Dai.2023.“Lithium Extraction from Hard Rock Lithium Ores(Spodumene,Le-pidolite,Zinnwaldite,Petalite):Technology,Resources,Envi-ronment and Cost.”China Geology 6(1):13753.https:/doi.org/10.31035/cg2022088.Gielen,D.2021.Critical Mater

252、ials for the Energy Transition.Abu Dhabi:International Renewable Energy Agency(IRENA).https:/www.irena.org/-/media/Irena/Files/Technical-papers/IRENA_Critical_Materials_2021.pdf?rev=e4a9bdcb93614c6c8087024270a2871d.Gilbert,Paul Robert.2020.“Making Critical Materials Valuable:Decarbonization,Investme

253、nt,and Political Risk.”In The Material Basis of Energy Transitions,edited by Alena Bleicher and Alexan-dra Pehlken,91108.Cambridge,MA:Academic Press.https:/doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819534-5.00006-4.GoI(Government of India).2023.India Economic Survey 202223.New Delhi:GoI.https:/www.indiabudget.gov.i

254、n/economicsurvey/.Goswami,Shreerup,Jyoti Shankar Mishra,and Madhumita Das.2009.“Environmental Impact of Manganese Mining:A Case Study of Dubna Opencast Mine,Keonjhar District,Orissa,In-dia.”Journal of Ecophysiology and Occupational Health 9:18997.https:/ E.,Rachel Barr,Chelsea Chandler,Thomas Chase,

255、Joanne Choi,Lee Christoffersen,Elizabeth Friedlander,et al.2012.“Methodology of Metal Criticality Determination.”En-vironmental Science&Technology 46(2):106370.https:/doi.org/10.1021/es203534z.Gulagi,Ashish,Manish Ram,Dmitrii Bogdanov,Sandeep Sarin,Theophilus Nii Odai Mensah,and Christian Breyer.202

256、2.“The Role of Renewables for Rapid Transitioning of the Power Sector across States in India.”Nature Communications 13:5499.https:/doi.org/10.1038/s41467-022-33048-8.Gupta,Uma.2022.“Solar Module Price Increases to Affect Returns on 4.4 GW of Indian Solar,”July 1.pv magazine International.https:/www.

257、pv- Wind Energy Council).2022.“Accelerating On-shore Wind Capacity Additions in India to Achieve the 2030 Target.”Global Wind Energy Council.https:/ AF Alvarenga,Till M.Bachmann,Federico Riva,Rafael Horn,Roberta Graf,and Jo Dewulf.2022.“A Critical Review of Criticality Methods for a European Life Cy

258、cle Sustainability Assessment.”Procedia CIRP 105:42833.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2022.02.071.Hamadeh,Nada,Catherine Van Rompaey,Eric Metreau,and Shweta Grace Eapen.2022.“New World Bank Country Classifica-tions by Income Level:20222023”Data Blog,July 1.https:/blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/new-wo

259、rld-bank-country-classifications-income-level-2022-2023.Hayter,Roger,Trevor J.Barnes,and Michael J.Bradshaw.2003.“Relocating Resource Peripheries to the Core of Economic Geogra-phys Theorizing:Rationale and Agenda.”Area 35(1):1523.https:/doi.org/10.1111/1475-4762.00106.24|Heredia,Florencia,Agostina

260、L.Martinez,and Valentina Surraco Urtubey.2020.“The Importance of Lithium for Achieving a Low-Carbon Future:Overview of the Lithium Extraction in the Lithium Triangle.”Journal of Energy&Natural Resources Law 38(3):21336.https:/doi.org/10.1080/02646811.2020.1784565.Hryniewicz,Janusz T.2014.“Core-Perip

261、heryan Old Theory in New Times.”European Political Science 13:23550.https:/doi.org/10.1057/eps.2014.5.IEA(International Energy Agency).2021.India Energy Outlook 2021.Paris:IEA.https:/ EV Outlook 2022:Securing Supplies for an Electric Future.Paris:IEA.https:/ Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy

262、 Transi-tions.World Energy Outlook Special Report.Paris:IEA.https:/ Energy Outlook 2023.Paris:IEA.https:/ Minerals Market Review 2023.Paris:IEA.https:/ Energy Storage Alliance).2020.India Stationary Energy Storage Market Overview Report 20202027.Pune:IESA.https:/indiaesa.info/resources/industry-repo

263、rts/3106-india-stationary-energy-storage-market-overview-report-2020-2027.IGF(Intergovernmental Forum on Mining,Minerals,Metals and Sustainable Development).n.d.“About Us.”Intergovernmental Forum.https:/www.igfmining.org/about-us/.Indian Bureau of Mines.2021a.Indian Minerals Yearbook 2019.Nag-pur,In

264、dia:Indian Bureau of Mines,Ministry of Mines.https:/www.ibm.gov.in/writereaddata/files/06222021154208Priliminary%20pages%20Vol%201.pdf.Indian Bureau of Mines.2021b.Indian Minerals Yearbook 2021 Vol.III(Mineral Reviews).Nagpur,India:Indian Bureau of Mines,Ministry of Mines.https:/ibm.gov.in/IBMPortal

265、/pages/Indian_Minerals_Yearbook_2021_Vol_III_Mineral_Reviews.Indian Bureau of Mines.2022.Indian Minerals Yearbook 2020.Nag-pur,India:Indian Bureau of Mines,Ministry of Mines.https:/ibm.gov.in/writereaddata/files/01172022163411FT.pdf.IRENA(International Renewable Energy Agency).2023.Geopoli-tics of t

266、he Energy Transition:Critical Materials.Abu Dhabi:IRENA.https:/mc-cd8320d4-36a1-40ac-83cc-3389-cdn- Kumar.2022.“Mineral Auction Regime in India:Challenges and Future Outlook.”Mineral Economics 35(1):1733.https:/doi.org/10.1007/s13563-020-00244-1.Janardhanan,Nandakumar,Mustafa Moinuddin,Simon Hiberg

267、Olsen,Temuulen Murun,Satoshi Kojima,Upalat Korwatanasakul,Akio Takemoto,et al.2023.Critical Minerals for Net-Zero Transition:How the G7 Can Address Supply Chain Challenges and Socio-Environmental Spillovers.Hiroshima:G7 Summit.https:/think7.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/T7JP_TF2_Critical-Minerals-f

268、or-Net-Zero-Transition-How-the-G7-can-Address-Supply-Chain-Chal-lenges-and-Socioenvironmental-Spillovers.pdf.JMK Research&Analytics.2022.“Solar Module Prices Increased 38%in the Last 20 Months,”April 22.pv magazine India.https:/www.pv-magazine- Rao,and Pawan Mulukutla.2021.“A Re-view of State Govern

269、ment Policies for Electric Mobility.”Bengaluru:World Resources Institute India.https:/www.wricitiesindia.org/sites/default/files/Full_report_EV_State_Policy.pdf.Kaunda,Rennie B.2020.“Potential Environmental Impacts of Lithium Mining.”Journal of Energy&Natural Resources Law 38(3):23744.https:/doi.org

270、/10.1080/02646811.2020.1754596.Kempton,Houston,Thomas A.Bloomfield,Jason L.Hanson,and Patty Limerick.2010.“Policy Guidance for Identifying and Ef-fectively Managing Perpetual Environmental Impacts from New Hardrock Mines.”Environmental Science&Policy 13(6):55866.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2010.

271、06.001.Klimczuk,Andrzej,and Magdalena Klimczuk-Kochaska.2019.“Core-Periphery Model.”In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies,edited by S.Romaniuk,M.Thapa,and P.Mar-ton,18.Cham,Switzerland:Palgrave Macmillan.https:/doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_320-1.Krugman,Paul.1991.“Increasing R

272、eturns and Economic Geog-raphy.”Journal of Political Economy 99(3):48399.https:/doi.org/10.1086/261763.Kumar,Vijay S.,and R.K.Sinha.2020.Mineral Auctions in India:Win-ners Curse or Owners Pride.New Delhi:TERI.https:/www.teriin.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/mineral-auctions-india-dp.pdf.Lee,Jordy,M

273、organ Bazilian,and Sara Hastings-Simon.2021.“The Material Foundations of a Low-Carbon Economy.”One Earth 4(3):33134.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.02.015.Lee,Jordy,Morgan Bazilian,B.Sovacool,and S.Greene.2020.“Responsible or Reckless?A Critical Review of the Environmental and Climate Assessmen

274、ts of Mineral Supply Chains.”Environmental Research Letters 15(10):103009.10.1088/1748-9326/ab9f8c.Lele,Ajey,and Parveen Bhardwaj.2014.Global Distribution of Strate-gic Mineral Resources.Strategic Minerals:A Resource Challenge for India.New Delhi:Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA).http

275、s:/www.idsa.in/system/files/book/book_strategicmaterail.pdf.WORKING PAPER|June 2024|25Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionMnberger,Andr,and Bjrn Stenqvist.2018.“Global Metal Flows in the Renewable Energy Transition:Exploring the Effects of Sub-stitutes,Technological Mix and Developme

276、nt.”Energy Policy 119:22641.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.056.McLellan,Benjamin C.,Eiji Yamasue,Tetsuo Tezuka,Glen Corder,Artem Golev,and Damien Giurco.2016.“Critical Minerals and EnergyImpacts and Limitations of Moving to Unconven-tional Resources.”Resources 5(2):19.https:/doi.org/10.3390/

277、resources5020019.McIlroy,Tom.2022.“Australia Rallies Quad on Critical Minerals Security.”Australian Financial Review,July 13.https:/ T.R.Mankhand.2014.“Ex-traction of Lithium from Primary and Secondary Sources by Pre-treatment,Leaching and Separation:A Comprehensive Review.”Hydrometallurgy 150:19220

278、8.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.hydromet.2014.10.012.METI(Agency for Natural Resources and Energy).2020.“Japans New International Resource Strategy to Secure Rare Metals.”July 31.https:/www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/special/article/detail_158.html.Mishra,Twesh.2023.“Mining Industry Flags issues with

279、Indias Mineral Exploration Regime.”The Economic Times,September 8.https:/ of Mines).2022.Annual Report 202122.New Delhi:MoM,Government of India.https:/mines.gov.in/admin/storage/app/uploads/6433db04b14f91681120004.pdf.MoM.2023a.Critical Minerals for India:Report of the Com-mittee on Identification o

280、f Critical Minerals.New Delhi:MoM,Government of India.https:/mines.gov.in/admin/storage/app/uploads/649d4212cceb01688027666.pdf.MoM.2023b.Annual Report 2022-23,New Delhi:MoM,Gov-ernment of India.https:/mines.gov.in/admin/storage/app/uploads/6433da09a9f741681119753.pdf.MNRE(Ministry of New and Renewa

281、ble Energy).2021.“Production Linked Incentive(PLI)Scheme:National Programme on High Effi-ciency Solar PV Modules.”Ministry of New and Renewable Energy.https:/mnre.gov.in/production-linked-incentive-pli/.Nalule,Victoria R.2020.“Social and Environmental Impacts of Mining.”In Mining and the Law in Afri

282、ca,5181.Cham,Switzerland:Springer International Publishing.https:/doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33008-8_3.Nate,Silviu,Yuriy Bilan,Mariia Kurylo,Olena Lyashenko,Piotr Na-pieralski,and Ganna Kharlamova.2021.“Mineral Policy within the Framework of Limited Critical Resources and a Green Energy Tran-sition.”

283、Energies 14(9):2688.https:/doi.org/10.3390/en14092688.Owen,John R.,Deanna Kemp,Alex M.Lechner,Jill Harris,Ruilian Zhang,and lonore Lbre.2023.“Energy Transition Minerals and Their Intersection with Land-Connected Peoples.”Nature Sustain-ability 6(2):20311.https:/doi.org/10.1038/s41893-022-00994-6.Pan

284、dey,Piyush Kant,Richa Sharma,Manju Roy,and Madhurima Pandey.2007.“Toxic Mine Drainage from Asias Biggest Copper Mine at Malanjkhand,India.”Environmental Geochemistry and Health 29:23748.https:/doi.org/10.1007/s10653-006-9079-4.PIB(Press Information Bureau).2017.“To Step Up Mining Explo-ration,PPP Mo

285、dels Need to Be Explored:Shri.Piyush Goyal.”Press Release.July 11.https:/pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=167310.PIB.2021.“National Statement by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi at COP26 Summit in Glasgow.”Press Release.November 1.https:/pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1768712.PIB.2

286、022a.“Cabinet Approves Indias Updated Nationally Deter-mined Contribution to Be Communicated to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.”Press Release.August 3.https:/pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1847812.PIB.2022b.“Indias Stand at COP-26.”Press Release.February 3.htt

287、ps:/pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1795071.PIB.2022c.“India Geared for Energy Transition and Climate Action.”February 25.https:/static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/specificdocs/documents/2022/feb/doc202222519401.pdf.PIB.2022d.“Cabinet Approves Intra-state Transmission System Green Energy Corridor

288、 Phase-II.”Press Release.January 6.https:/pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1788010.PIB.2023a.“Mines Ministry to Launch First Ever Tranche of Critical and Strategic Minerals Auction.”Press Release.November 28.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1980333.PIB.2023b.“Milestone in India and

289、 Australia Reach Critical Miner-als Investment Partnership.”Press Release.March 11.https:/pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1905863.PIB.2023c.“Strengthening of Mineral Supply Chains.”Press Release.August 7.https:/pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1946416.PIB.2023d.“Central Electr

290、icity Authority notifies the National Electricity Plan for the Period of 2022-32.”Press Release.May 31.https:/pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1928750.PIB.2024.“India Signs Agreement for Lithium Exploration&Mining Project in Argentina.”Press Release.January 15.pib.gov.in/PressRe-leaseIfra

291、mePage.aspx?PRID=1996380.Planning Commission.2011.Mineral Exploration and Development(Other than Coal&Lignite).New Delhi:Planning Commission,Government of India.26|Punia,Anita,Pawan Kumar Joshi,and Neelam Siva Siddaiah.2021.“Characterizing Khetri Copper Mine Environment Using Geospa-tial Tools.”SN A

292、pplied Sciences 3(2):174.https:/doi.org/10.1007/s42452-021-04183-6.Randive,Kirtikumar,and Sanjeevani Jawadand.2019.“Strate-gic Minerals in India:Present Status and Future Challenges.”Mineral Economics 32(3):33752.https:/doi.org/10.1007/s13563-019-00189-0.Ranjan,Ram.2019.“Assessing the Impact of Mini

293、ng on Deforesta-tion in India.”Resources Policy 60:2335.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2018.11.022.Rather,Zaki,Angshu Nath,and Rangan Banerjee.2021.Integration of Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure with Distribution Grid:Global Review,Indias Gap Analysis and Way Forward.New Delhi:GIZ(Deuts

294、che Gesellschaft fr Internationale Zusammenarbeit)and NITI Aayog.https:/changing-transport.org/wp-content/uploads/2023_Executive_Summary_Integration_of_Electric_Ve-hicle_Charging.pdf.Ray,Surya Sarathi.2023.“Non-coal Minerals:Integrated Players Benefit from Reforms.”The Financial Express,October 6.ht

295、tps:/ Countries Finish Mapping Critical Minerals Vulnerabilities.”InnovationAus.Com.https:/www.inno- to Discuss Joint Investments in Chips,Critical Minerals.”Nikkei Asia.https:/ Taruna Idnani.2022.Roadmap to Indias 2030 Decarbonization Target.New Delhi:TERI(The Energy and Resources Institute).https:

296、/www.teriin.org/sites/default/files/files/Roadmap-to-India-2030-Decarbonization-Target.pdf.Shell and TERI.2021.India:Transforming to a Net-Zero Emissions Energy System:Scenarios Sketch.https:/www.shell.in/promos/energy-and-innovation/india-scenario-sketch/_jcr_content.stream/1617850096430/4dc1d51b4d

297、29c3dfea47f0a57e9eef62000a021b/india-transforming-to-a-net-zero-emissions-energy-system-scenario-sketch-report.pdf.Singh,Vaibhav Pratap,Kanika Chawla,and Saloni Jain.2020.Financing Indias Transition to Electric Vehicles.New Delhi:Council on Energy,Environment and Water(CEEW).https:/www.ceew.in/cef/s

298、olutions-factory/publications/CEEW-CEF-financing-india-transition-to-electric-vehicles.pdf.Srivastava,Nidhi,and Atul Kumar.2022.“Minerals and Energy Interface in Energy Transition Pathways:A Systematic and Compre-hensive Review.”Journal of Cleaner Production 376:134354.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.jclep

299、ro.2022.134354.U.S.DOE(U.S.Department of Energy).2024.“What Are Critical Ma-terials and Critical Minerals?”Critical Minerals&Materials Program.https:/www.energy.gov/cmm/what-are-critical-materials-and-critical-minerals.Valero,Alicia,Antonio Valero,Guiomar Calvo,Abel Ortego,Sonia Ascaso,and Jose-Luis

300、 Palacios.2018.“Global Material Require-ments for the Energy Transition.An Exergy Flow Analysis of Decar-bonisation Pathways.”Energy 159:117584.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2018.06.149.Wrtsil.2021.“Wrtsil and LUT University Joint Study Emphasises Investments in Flexible Generation Technologies fo

301、r Indias Energy Transition towards 100%Renewables by 2050.”Press Release.March 12.https:/ Tyagi,and Rishabh Jain.2023.How Can India Indigenise Lithium-Ion Battery Manufacturing?Formulating Strategies across the Value Chain.New Delhi:CEEW.https:/www.ceew.in/publications/how-can-india-indigenise-lithi

302、um-ion-bat-tery-cell-manufacturing-and-supply-chain.Weil,Marcel,Jens Peters,and Manuel Baumann.2020.“Stationary Battery Systems:Future Challenges Regarding Resources,Recy-cling,and Sustainability.”In The Material Basis of Energy Transitions,edited by Alena Bleicher and Alexandra Pehlken,7189.Cambrid

303、ge,MA:Academic Press.https:/doi.org/https:/doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819534-5.00005-2.WITS(World Integrated Trade Solution).2021.“Trade States by Product.”Database.https:/wits.worldbank.org/.WITS.2023.“Trade States by Product.”Database.https:/wits.worldbank.org/.Xia,Qifan,Debin Du,Wanpeng Cao,and Xi

304、ya Li.2023.“Who Is the Core?Reveal the Heterogeneity of Global Rare Earth Trade Struc-ture from the Perspective of Industrial Chain.”Resources Policy 82:103532.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2023.103532.Yashwant,Shailendra.2023.“Lithium in Jammu&Kashmir A Boon or a Curse?”Deccan Herald,February

305、15.https:/www.dec- New Three:How China Came to Lead Solar Cell,Lithium Battery and EV Manufacturing.”China Dialogue.https:/ Dependency of Renewable Energy Tech-nologies on Critical Resources.”In The Material Basis of Energy Transitions,edited by Alena Bleicher and Alexandra Pehlken,4970.Cambridge,MA

306、:Academic Press.https:/doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819534-5.00004-0WORKING PAPER|June 2024|27Critical minerals for Indias clean energy transitionZhou,Xuanru,Hua Zhang,Shuxian Zheng,and Wanli Xing.2022.“The Global Recycling Trade for Twelve Critical Metals:Based on Trade Pattern and Trade Quality Analy

307、sis.”Sustainable Pro-duction and Consumption 33:83145.https:/doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2022.08.011.Copyright 2024 World Resources Institute.This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.To view a copy of the license,visit http:/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

308、/10 G Street,NE|Washington,DC 20002|WRI.orgABOUT WRIWorld Resources Institute is a global research organization that turns big ideas into action at the nexus of environment,economic opportunity,and human well-being.Our challenge Natural resources are at the foundation of economic opportunity and hum

309、an well-being.But today,we are depleting Earths resources at rates that are not sustainable,endangering economies and peoples lives.People depend on clean water,fertile land,healthy forests,and a stable climate.Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a sustainable planet.We must address th

310、ese urgent,global challenges this decade.Our vision We envision an equitable and prosperous planet driven by the wise management of natural resources.We aspire to create a world where the actions of government,business,and communities combine to eliminate poverty and sustain the natural environment

311、for all people.Our approach COUNT IT We start with data.We conduct independent research and draw on the latest technology to develop new insights and recommendations.Our rigorous analysis identifies risks,unveils opportunities,and informs smart strategies.We focus our efforts on influential and emer

312、ging economies where the future of sustainability will be determined.CHANGE IT We use our research to inform government policies,business strategies,and civil society action.We test projects with communities,companies,and government agencies to build a strong evidence base.Then,we work with partners

313、 to deliver change on the ground that alleviates poverty and strengthens society.We hold ourselves accountable to ensure our outcomes will be bold and enduring.SCALE IT We dont think small.Once tested,we work with partners to adopt and expand our efforts regionally and globally.We engage with decisi

314、on-makers to carry out our ideas and elevate our impact.We measure success through government and business actions that improve peoples lives and sustain a healthy environment.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis working paper would not have been possible without the input,insights,and guidance of several people.The

315、 authors are grateful for each of their contributions.We thank the internal and external reviewers of this paper.Reviewers from WRI included Harsha Meenawat,Parveen Kumar,Sandhya Sundararagavan,Ke Wang,Melissa Barbanell,Yan Wang and Rafael Leonardo Munoz.The external reviewers for this working paper

316、 were Saon Ray(Professor,Economist,ICRIER),Kapil Narula(PhD Senior Analyst Breakthrough Agenda,UN High Level Climate Champions Team),Saloni Sachdeva Michael(Energy Specialist,India Clean Energy Transition),and Dipesh Kumar Dipu(PhDMineral and Energy Economics,2023,Colorado School of Mines).We would

317、also like to thank our colleagues Bharath Jairaj,Deepak Krishnan,Tirthankar Mandal,and Manu Mathai for their insights and suggestions on improving this paper and for their guidance and support.We are grateful for the support provided by WRIs science and research,editorial,and design teams.We also ex

318、tend our gratitude to Shivali Punhani and Shivani Shah for their efforts in effective communications.We thank Karthikeyan Shanmugam,Gowthami R,and Santhosh Mathew Paul for their support in a thorough copyediting and designing of this manuscript.The authors alone are responsible for the content of th

319、is working paper.Any omissions,errors,or inaccuracies are the authors own.ABOUT THE AUTHORSNiharika Tagotra(PhD)is a Senior Research Specialist with the Energy Program at the World Resources Institute India(WRII),where she works on the issues of Energy,Minerals,and Circularity.Abhinav Sharma(PhD)is

320、a Manager with the Energy Program at World Resources Institute,India,where he focuses on strengthening Indias clean energy transition efforts,primarily through the lens of institutions,political economy,and governance.Nidhi Srivastava is an independent law and policy consultant and a PhD scholar in Energy and Environment.T.S.Gowthami is a Senior Project Associate for the Energy Program at World Resources Institute India(WRII).Her primary area of work revolves around clean energy transitions in MSMEs and industrial decarbonization.