伯克希爾·哈撒韋Berkshire Hathaway（BRK-A）2019年年度報告（英文版）（144頁）.pdf

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1、BERKSHIREHATHAWAYINC. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Berkshires Performance vs. the S 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. 2 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: Berkshire earned $81.4 billion in 2019 according to generally

2、accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24 billion of operating earnings, $3.7 billion of realized capital gains and a $53.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold. Each of those

3、 components of earnings is stated on an after-tax basis. That $53.7 billion gain requires comment. It resulted from a new GAAP rule, imposed in 2018, that requires a company holding equity securities to include in earnings the net change in the unrealized gains and losses of those securities. As we

4、stated in last years letter, neither Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, nor I agree with that rule. The adoption of the rule by the accounting profession, in fact, was a monumental shift in its own thinking. Before 2018, GAAP insisted with an exception for companies whose business was

5、 to trade securities that unrealized gains within a portfolio of stocks were never to be included in earnings and unrealized losses were to be included only if they were deemed “other than temporary.” Now, Berkshire must enshrine in each quarters bottom line a key item of news for many investors, an

6、alysts and commentators every up and down movement of the stocks it owns, however capricious those fluctuations may be. Berkshires 2018 and 2019 years glaringly illustrate the argument we have with the new rule. In 2018, a down year for the stock market, our net unrealized gains decreased by $20.6 b

7、illion, and we therefore reported GAAP earnings of only $4 billion. In 2019, rising stock prices increased net unrealized gains by the aforementioned $53.7 billion, pushing GAAP earnings to the $81.4 billion reported at the beginning of this letter. Those market gyrations led to a crazy 1,900% incre

8、ase in GAAP earnings! Meanwhile, in what we might call the real world, as opposed to accounting-land, Berkshires equity holdings averaged about $200 billion during the two years, and the intrinsic value of the stocks we own grew steadily and substantially throughout the period. Charlie and I urge yo

9、u to focus on operating earnings which were little changed in 2019 and to ignore both quarterly and annual gains or losses from investments, whether these are realized or unrealized. Our advising that in no way diminishes the importance of these investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I exp

10、ect our equity holdings as a group to deliver major gains, albeit in an unpredictable and highly irregular manner. To see why we are optimistic, move on to the next discussion. The Power of Retained Earnings In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith, an obscure economist and financial advisor, wrote Common Stoc

11、ks as Long Term Investments, a slim book that changed the investment world. Indeed, writing the book changed Smith himself, forcing him to reassess his own investment beliefs. Going in, he planned to argue that stocks would perform better than bonds during inflationary periods and that bonds would d

12、eliver superior returns during deflationary times. That seemed sensible enough. But Smith was in for a shock. 3 His book began, therefore, with a confession: “These studies are the record of a failure the failure of facts to sustain a preconceived theory.” Luckily for investors, that failure led Smi

13、th to think more deeply about how stocks should be evaluated. For the crux of Smiths insight, I will quote an early reviewer of his book, none other than John Maynard Keynes: “I have kept until last what is perhaps Mr. Smiths most important, and is certainly his most novel, point. Well-managed indus

14、trial companies do not, as a rule, distribute to the shareholders the whole of their earned profits. In good years, if not in all years, they retain a part of their profits and put them back into the business. Thus there is an element of compound interest (Keynes italics) operating in favour of a so

15、und industrial investment. Over a period of years, the real value of the property of a sound industrial is increasing at compound interest, quite apart from the dividends paid out to the shareholders.” And with that sprinkling of holy water, Smith was no longer obscure. Its difficult to understand w

16、hy retained earnings were unappreciated by investors before Smiths book was published. After all, it was no secret that mind-boggling wealth had earlier been amassed by such titans as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, all of whom had retained a huge portion of their business earnings to fund growth an

17、d produce ever-greater profits. Throughout America, also, there had long been small-time capitalists who became rich following the same playbook. Nevertheless, when business ownership was sliced into small pieces “stocks” buyers in the pre-Smith years usually thought of their shares as a short-term

18、gamble on market movements. Even at their best, stocks were considered speculations. Gentlemen preferred bonds. Though investors were slow to wise up, the math of retaining and reinvesting earnings is now well understood. Today, school children learn what Keynes termed “novel”: combining savings wit

19、h compound interest works wonders. * * * * * * * * * * * * At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and ever- growing sums of money. In o

20、ur deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshires depreciation charges have aggregated $65 billion whereas the companys internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled $121 billion. R

21、einvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority. In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest m

22、anagers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price. When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us

23、to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards. Whichever way we go controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market Berkshires financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the

24、 business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand. 4 In our controlled companies, (defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares), the earnings of each business flo

25、w directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get. In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? Theyre working hard and

26、creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshires reported earnings. At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what well call this “non- recognition of earnings” important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of

27、a magnitude that we lay out for you below. Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees and our share, so to speak, of

28、the earnings the investees retain and put to work. Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshires share of the companys futu

29、re earnings. Yearend Ownership Berkshires Share (in millions) CompanyDividends(1)Retained Earnings(2) American Express18.7%$ 261$ 998 Apple5.7%7732,519 Bank of America10.7%6822,167 Bank of New York Mellon9.0%101288 Coca-Cola9.3%640194 Delta Airlines11.0%114416 J.P. Morgan Chase1.9%216476 Moodys13.1%

30、55137 U.S. Bancorp9.7%251407 Wells Fargo8.4%705730 Total$3,798$8,332 (1) Based on current annual rate. (2) Based on 2019 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid. Obviously, the realized gains we will eventually record from partially owning each of these companies will not neatly correspon

31、d to “our” share of their retained earnings. Sometimes, alas, retentions produce nothing. But both logic and our past experience indicate that from the group we will realize capital gains at least equal to and probably better than the earnings of ours that they retained. (When we sell shares and rea

32、lize gains, we will pay income tax on the gain at whatever rate then prevails. Currently, the federal rate is 21%.) It is certain that Berkshires rewards from these 10 companies, as well as those from our many other equity holdings, will manifest themselves in a highly irregular manner. Periodically

33、, there will be losses, sometimes company-specific, sometimes linked to stock-market swoons. At other times last year was one of those our gain will be outsized. Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshires value. Mr. Smith got it

34、right. 5 Non-Insurance Operations Tom Murphy, a valued director of Berkshire and an all-time great among business managers, long ago gave me some important advice about acquisitions: “To achieve a reputation as a good manager, just be sure you buy good businesses.” Over the years Berkshire has acqui

35、red many dozens of companies, all of which I initially regarded as “good businesses.” Some, however, proved disappointing; more than a few were outright disasters. A reasonable number, on the other hand, have exceeded my hopes. In reviewing my uneven record, Ive concluded that acquisitions are simil

36、ar to marriage: They start, of course, with a joyful wedding but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either partys hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift. Applying those images to corporate acquisitions, Id

37、 have to say it is usually the buyer who encounters unpleasant surprises. Its easy to get dreamy-eyed during corporate courtships. Pursuing that analogy, I would say that our marital record remains largely acceptable, with all parties happy with the decisions they made long ago. Some of our tie-ups

38、have been positively idyllic. A meaningful number, however, have caused me all too quickly to wonder what I was thinking when I proposed. Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint: As the years pass, the “poor” busi

39、ness tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshires capital. Meanwhile, our “good” businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. Because of these contrasting trajector

40、ies, the assets employed at Berkshires winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital. As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshires original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required near

41、ly all of Berkshires capital. For some time, therefore, Berkshires non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually, though, we acquired a spread of “good” businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion o

42、f our capital. Today, we have most of your money deployed in controlled businesses that achieve good-to-excellent returns on the net tangible assets each requires for its operations. Our insurance business has been the superstar. That operation has special characteristics that give it a unique metri

43、c for calibrating success, one unfamiliar to many investors. We will save that discussion for the next section. In the paragraphs that follow, we group our wide array of non-insurance businesses by size of earnings, after interest, depreciation, taxes, non-cash compensation, restructuring charges al

44、l of those pesky, but very real, costs that CEOs and Wall Street sometimes urge investors to ignore. Additional information about these operations can be found on pages K-6 K-21 and pages K-40 K-52. Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) the two lead dogs of Berkshires non- insuranc

45、e group earned a combined $8.3 billion in 2019 (including only our 91% share of BHE), an increase of 6% from 2018. Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts,

46、 had aggregate earnings in 2019 of $4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018. The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned $1.9 billion last year, up from the $1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2

47、018. 6 The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns and there are many had aggregate earnings of $2.7 billion in 2019, down from $2.8 billion in 2018. Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to $17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the $17.2 b

48、illion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results. * * * * * * * * * * * * I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshires operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets o

49、il additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol. The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizols business. Even so, both the companys property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive. But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Heres the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company