1、T H E STAT E O FSOUTHEAST ASIA2023SURVEY REPORTThe authors of the report are researchers at the ASEAN Studies Centre,ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.We thank Muhammad Afiq Hajis,Chee Ming Wee,Damon,Qiu Jiahuiand Neo Hui Yun Rebecca for their invaluable assistance.The report can be cited as:Seah,S.et al.

2、,The State of Southeast Asia:2023 Survey Report (Singapore:ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute,2023)THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:2023 SURVEY REPORT is published by the ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and available electronically at www.iseas.edu.sgIf you have any comments or enquiries

3、 about the survey,please email us at asciseas.edu.sgPublished on 9 February 2023ISSN 27375110(Digital)ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute30 Heng Mui Keng TerraceSingapore 119614Tel:(65)6870 4509Fax:(65)6778 1735REPORT COMPILED AND WRITTEN BYSharon SeahJoanne LinMelinda MartinusSithanonxay SuvannaphakdyPham

4、Thi Phuong ThaoCONTENTSABOUT THE SURVEYSURVEY HIGHLIGHTSMETHODOLOGY124SECTION ISECTION IISECTION IIISECTION IVSECTION VSECTION VIRespondents ProfileRegional Outlook and Views of International Developments Major Powers Regional Influence and LeadershipUS-China Rivalry and Impact on Southeast AsiaPerc

5、eptions of TrustSoft Power5824364455ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute(formerly Institute of Southeast Asian Studies)is an autonomous organisation established in 1968.It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political,security,and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wi

6、der geostrategic and economic environment.The Institutes research programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies(RES),Regional Social and Cultural Studies(RSCS)and Regional Strategic and Political Studies(RSPS).The Institute is also home to the ASEAN Studies Centre(ASC),the Temasek History R

7、esearch Centre(THRC)and the Singapore APEC Study Centre.The ASEAN Studies Centre(ASC)was established in 2008 to research on issues pertaining to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)as an institution and a process.Through research,publications,conferences,media engagement and outreach ac

8、tivities,ASC seeks to promote greater understanding of ASEAN and to contribute toward regional cooperation and integration.The Centre conducts studies and provides inputs to stakeholders on issues and matters that call for collective ASEAN actions and responses,especially those pertinent to the ASEA

9、N Community building process.The ASC is the first institutional Recipient of the 2020 ASEAN Prize,a prestigious award to honour outstanding achievements of individuals or organisations who have made meaningful contributions to ASEAN.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20231ABOUT THE SURVEYGoing into its 5th

10、 edition,The State of Southeast Asia survey continues to gauge the views and perceptions of Southeast Asians on geopolitical developments affecting the region,key international affairs and how ASEANs Dialogue Partners have engaged with the region over the preceding year.The objective of the survey i

11、s to present a snapshot of the prevailing attitudes among those in a position to inform or influence policy.The survey is not meant to present a definitive view of issues in the region.This years survey was conducted over a period of eight weeks from 14 November 2022 to 6 January 2023.The survey was

12、 offered in seven language options English,Bahasa Indonesia,Burmese,Khmer,Lao,Thai and Vietnamese.A total of 1,308 respondents from ten Southeast Asian countries took part in the survey.There are six sections in the survey.Section I covers the profile of the respondents by nationality,affiliation an

13、d age.Section II deals with questions on the regional outlook and viewpoints on international affairs in the past year.Section III covers regional influence and leadership of major and middle powers.Section IV deals with ASEANs options in the changing regional political-security architecture.Section

14、 V measures perceptions of trust among Southeast Asians towards five countries China,US,Japan,the European Union and India.Section VI gauges levels of soft power in the region based on travel and tertiary education choices.The questions and results have been reorganised for logical flow and optimal

15、reporting.The figures in this report have been rounded up or down to the nearest one decimal point.SURVEY REPORT21Almost three years since COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic,Southeast Asia has moved beyond the health concerns of the pandemic to focus on socio-economic impacts that confront them

16、,the effects of climate change and evolving geopolitical tensions.Unemployment and economic recession(59.5%),impacts of climate change(57.1%),the widening of socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity as well as military tensions(tied at 41.9%)are the regions most pressing challenges.Terrorism

17、continues to rank last(11.3%).2Southeast Asians remain most concerned about ASEAN being slow and ineffective,thus not being able to cope with political and economic developments(82.6%).They are also concerned that ASEAN is becoming an arena for major power competition in which its member states may

18、become proxies of major powers(73.0%).In the same vein,60.7%are worried about ASEANs disunity.Fears that ASEAN is unable to recover from the pandemic is ranked last(37.2%).3Increased tensions in the Taiwan Strait and unresolved disputes with China are the biggest potential flashpoints affecting the

19、region.43.3%of the respondents fear that the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait will destabilise the region.28.7%feel that ASEAN countries will be forced to take sides while 15.5%feel that it will reduce economic cooperation with either China or Taiwan.Only 3.4%of the respondents say that

20、it will not affect the region at all.4Nearly two-thirds of the respondents(61.5%)support the accession of Timor-Leste to ASEAN.Only 15.8%disagree and 22.7%are not sure.Of those who approve,close to half(48.7%)believe that it will enhance ASEANs unity and centrality.One-third(34.4%)of those who disap

21、prove feel that it will slow down ASEANs economic integration.SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS43.3%28.7%15.5%9.1%3.4%Destabilise the regionASEAN countries will be forced to take sides Reduce economic cooperation with either China or TaiwanASEAN will benefit from the relocation of industry to the regionNot affect t

22、he region at all Not Sure22.7%15.8%No61.5%YesASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments,becoming irrelevant in the new world order82.6%2022ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxies

23、73.0%70.1%61.5%49.0%ASEAN is unable to recover from the pandemicASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited60.7%2023Unemployment and economic recession59.5%20222023Climate change and more intense and frequent weather events57.1%49.8%37.0%75.4%Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity Inc

24、reased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints41.9%The COVID-19 pandemics threat to healthTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202335Majority of respondents(82.9%)express their concern over the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Increase in energy and food prices(58.3%),erosion of trust in a rules-base

25、d order and violation of national sovereignty(25.9%),and increase in existing divisions within ASEAN(7.4%)are the most serious impacts on Southeast Asia.646.5%of the respondents feel that the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)s overall impact and effectiveness is likely to b

26、e positive.11.7%disagree while 41.8%are uncertain.30.4%of those who are positive about IPEF feel that it will complement existing ASEAN initiatives while 33.9%of those who are negative feel that it will worsen US-China competition.33.5%of those who are uncertain expect to see more updates from the n

27、egotiations.7China continues to be seen as the most influential economic(59.9%)and political-strategic(41.5%)power in the region.However,Chinas growing influence is not well-received by the region.64.5%of those who view China as the most influential economic power and 68.5%of those who see China as

28、most influential in the political and strategic sphere express their concern about its expanding influence.8If ASEAN were forced to choose between the two major powers,two-thirds of respondents(61.1%)will cast their lot with the US.China as a choice dropped from 43.0%to 38.9%in 2023.However,when the

29、 respondents are assessed by nationality,majority of respondents from Brunei,Malaysia and Indonesia will favour China over the US.59.9%15.0%10.5%14.6%202361.1%38.9%ChinaUS202257.0%43.0%ChinaUSVery concerned 47.9%Somewhat concerned 35.0%Neutral12.3%Not very concernedNot at all concernedPositive46.5%N

30、ot sure41.8%Negative11.7%41.5%13.1%31.9%13.5%2.2%2.7%Positive46.5%Not sure41.8%Negative11.7%Positive46.5%Not sure41.8%Negative11.7%Most Influential Economic PowerMost Influential Political and Strategic PowerOthersASEANChinaThe United StatesSURVEY REPORT4METHODOLOGYAPPRECIATIONThe regions challenges

31、 have become increasingly complex with each passing year and the number of questions to be surveyed have also increased in tandem.This years survey questions were carefully designed and curated with the help of a panel of experts.Putting aside branching questions,the survey comprised 54 questions in

32、 total which takes approximately 30 to 40 minutes to complete.It was conducted both online and offline using a mixed sampling method.A total of 1,308 Southeast Asians completed the survey.Majority of the respondents 1,055 self-identified Southeast Asians took the survey online while another 253 were

33、 polled using Computer-Assisted Personal Interview(CAPI)methods with the assistance of a panel provider.We would like to extend our deepest appreciation to our institutional partners Dr.Asyurah Salleh and Ms Nafisa Halim of Global Awareness&Impact Alliance(GAIA)of Brunei for helping us to promote th

34、is survey in their foreign policy circles.We are also grateful for the unstinting assistance from the ASEAN Studies Centre interns,Mr Muhammad Afiq Hajis and Mr Chee Ming Wee,Damon,in the collection,cleaning and weighting of the survey data.We also want to extend our thanks to the various ISEAS rese

35、archers who helped craft,Respondents came from 5 affiliation categories:(a)academia,think-tankers and researchers;(b)business or finance representatives;(c)civil society,NGO or media representatives;(d)government officials;and(e)regional or international organisations personnel.A 10%weighting averag

36、e was applied to each countrys responses to calculate the average figures for ASEAN as a whole.This is to ensure that the responses of each country are represented by equal proportion,given that ASEANs decision-making processes are based on each country having equal say,regardless of geographical or

37、 population size.Final analysis of regional sentiment was conducted on the weighted data set.A strict set of criteria during the data cleaning process was applied to maintain data quality and integrity.curate,and refine earlier drafts of the Survey.In addition,we would like to give a special shout-o

38、ut to two of ISEAS most dedicated Research Officers Ms Qiu Jiahui and Ms Rebecca Neo for rendering their invaluable assistance when we needed it the most.Last but not least,we wish to extend our sincere appreciation to the 1,308 respondents for taking their time to complete this Survey.Your collecti

39、ve voice is demonstrative of the ASEAN Community-In-Action.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20235SECTION I:Respondents ProfileNATIONALITYThis section features the background of the survey respondents,including their nationality,affiliation and age distribution.No weighting was applied in this section.A t

40、otal of 1,308 respondents from ten ASEAN member states participated in this survey.Singapore led with the highest number of respondents at 208(15.9%),followed by Thailand at 144(11.0%)and Vietnam at 136(10.4%).The breakdown for the rest of the countries is:Cambodia(10.2%),Malaysia(9.5%),Indonesia(9.

41、3%),Brunei(9.2%),Myanmar(8.8%),Laos(8.2%),and the Philippines(7.6%).Q1 What is your nationality?3.2%4.8%20.9%7.6%7.8%2.6%8.1%15.9%11.0%10.4%9.2%10.2%8.8%23.9%9.3%8.2%9.5%13.2%7.0%8.6%20222023SURVEY REPORT6CountryAcademia,Think-Tanks,or Research InstitutionsBusiness or FinanceGovernmentCivil Society,

42、Non-Government Organisations,or MediaRegional or International OrganisationsASEAN34.8%24.7%17.7%18.3%4.5%Brunei42.5%7.5%25.0%25.0%0.0%Cambodia24.6%41.8%14.9%15.7%3.0%Indonesia46.3%14.0%7.4%29.8%2.5%Laos32.7%19.6%16.8%22.4%8.4%Malaysia41.1%28.2%11.3%14.5%4.8%Myanmar32.2%28.7%26.1%13.0%0.0%Philippines

43、32.3%19.2%23.2%20.2%5.1%Singapore32.2%24.5%14.4%21.2%7.7%Thailand33.3%27.8%22.2%7.6%9.0%Vietnam30.9%36.0%15.4%13.2%4.4%AFFILIATIONThe largest affiliation group this year came from Academia,Think-Tanks,or Research Institutions(34.8%),followed by ASEANs private sector(Business of Finance)(24.7%),and C

44、ivil Society,Non-Government Organisations,or Media(18.3%).Q2 What is your affiliation?4.5%24.7%17.7%34.8%18.3%Civil Society,Non-Government Organisations,or MediaAcademia,Think-Tanks,or Research InstitutionsBusiness or FinanceGovernmentRegional or International OrganisationsGovernment was presented b

45、y 17.7%of respondents.The smallest representation came from respondents affiliated with Regional or International Organisations(4.5%).THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20237Country18-2121-3536-4546-60Above 60ASEAN7.4%40.4%26.7%18.9%6.7%Brunei5.0%47.5%35.8%11.7%0.0%Cambodia14.9%41.0%23.9%18.7%1.5%Indonesia

46、5.8%44.6%25.6%19.0%5.0%Laos20.6%37.4%26.2%15.0%0.9%Malaysia4.8%41.1%16.1%27.4%10.5%Myanmar3.5%30.4%43.5%20.0%2.6%Philippines7.1%50.5%14.1%17.2%11.1%Singapore1.9%27.9%21.6%26.9%21.6%Thailand2.8%36.1%33.3%19.4%8.3%Vietnam7.4%47.1%26.5%14.0%5.1%AGEIn terms of age distribution,the largest age group rema

47、ined the 21-35 years old(40.4%).This is followed by the 36-45 years old group(26.7%).These two groups are the most economically productive and well-informed age groups in Southeast Asia.The Q3 Which age group do you belong to?21-3536-4546-60Above 6018-217.4%6.7%26.7%40.4%18.9%third largest group is

48、aged between 46-60 years old(18.9%),followed by those aged between 18-21 years old(7.4%)and lastly,those above 60 years old(6.7%).SURVEY REPORT857.1%This section examines the key challenges and main preoccupations of the region of the preceding year.Weighting is applied from this section onwards in

49、order to provide trend analysis.SECTION II Regional Outlook and Views on International DevelopmentsTOP THREE CHALLENGES FACING SOUTHEAST ASIANearly three years after the start of the global pandemic,the region began emerging from COVID-19s shadow around the middle of 2022.Starting with Cambodias ear

50、ly lifting of restrictions in March 2022,almost all the countries in the region opened their borders to trade and travel by July 2022.By this time,public health concerns had eased with regional governments choosing to live endemically with COVID-19.Majority of Southeast Asians(59.5%)fear unemploymen

51、t and economic recession coming out of the pandemic last year.Major geopolitical and economic developments such as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia which sparked an increase in energy and food prices meant that a fast recovery was not possible.A cost-of-living crisis preoccupied much of the publics

52、 minds as commodities crunch and inflationary pressures reared their ugly heads.Unemployment and recessionary concerns are particularly elevated in Indonesia at 70.2%,Cambodia at 69.4%and Malaysia at 63.7%.57.1%of Southeast Asians say that more frequent and intense weather events is the regions seco

53、nd biggest challenge.76.8%of Philippine respondents say that climate change is their biggest threat,overtaking unemployment and recession,as the pain of destruction is felt most acutely from Typhoon Nalgae at the end of October 2022.Besides the Philippines,climate change is also the city-state Singa

54、pores top challenge at 60.1%.Brunei and Vietnam express similarly strong worries about the climate threat at 74.2%and 64.7%respectively.Climate change is also Malaysias and Indonesias second-ranked challenge at 61.3%and 60.3%respectively.Widening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity and i

55、ncreased military tensions from potential flashpoints tie at third place(41.9%)on the list of top regional challenges.This is perhaps reflective of the rapidly changing geopolitical and economic environment that is felt across the world,not just in Southeast Asia.According to The Sustainable Develop

56、ment Goals Report 2022,income inequality within countries have increased by about one per cent on average,in emerging market and developing countries,reversing the gains made at the beginning of this millennium.At the country level,Brunei and Vietnam feel most acutely about the security threats aris

57、ing from potential conflict over flashpoints such as the South China Sea,Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.SURVEY REPORT8Unemployment and economic recession59.5%20222023Climate change and more intense and frequent weather events(droughts,floods,cyclones,rising sea levels,etc.)49.8%37.0%75.4%Wid

58、ening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparity Increased military tensions arising from potential flashpoints(i.e.South China Sea,Taiwan Strait,Korean Peninsula)41.9%The COVID-19 pandemics threat to healthTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202392022CountryDeteriorating human rights conditionsDomesti

59、c political instabilityIncreased military tensions arising from potential flashpointsClimate change and more intense and frequent weather eventsTerrorismThe COVID-19 pandemics threat to healthUnemployment and economic recessionWidening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparityASEAN22.6%34.3%35

60、.6%37.0%12.5%75.4%49.8%32.8%Brunei11.3%18.9%35.8%50.9%1.9%81.1%58.5%41.5%Cambodia14.8%42.0%42.0%23.5%11.1%80.2%51.9%34.6%Indonesia20.6%35.9%29.8%49.6%7.6%67.9%51.9%36.6%Laos18.2%18.2%6.8%29.5%6.8%88.6%77.3%54.5%Malaysia20.0%50.4%28.9%26.7%11.1%78.5%57.8%26.7%Myanmar76.6%58.0%33.7%9.4%35.1%58.3%22.0%

61、6.9%Philippines10.3%17.8%51.2%52.0%24.5%84.0%37.8%22.5%Singapore19.8%40.1%46.4%45.5%7.7%69.4%29.3%41.9%Thailand20.5%43.6%31.6%29.1%12.0%75.2%51.3%36.8%Vietnam13.9%18.1%49.3%53.5%7.6%70.8%60.4%26.4%2023CountryDeteriorating human rights conditionsDomestic political instabilityIncreased military tensio

62、ns arising from potential flashpointsClimate change and more intense and frequent weather eventsTerrorismUS-China decouplingUnemployment and economic recessionWidening socio-economic gaps and rising income disparityASEAN16.5%35.6%41.9%57.1%11.3%36.2%59.5%41.9%Brunei8.3%33.3%75.0%74.2%10.8%23.3%49.2%

63、25.8%Cambodia20.9%14.9%41.1%52.2%0.7%38.8%69.4%61.9%Indonesia17.4%38.0%31.4%60.3%15.7%30.6%70.2%36.4%Laos23.4%47.7%38.3%50.5%11.2%47.7%61.7%19.6%Malaysia10.5%50.8%26.0%61.3%4.8%35.5%63.7%47.6%Myanmar32.2%51.3%18.3%29.6%41.7%20.9%59.1%47.0%Philippines16.2%20.2%50.5%76.8%12.1%25.3%60.6%38.4%Singapore5

64、.8%31.7%45.2%60.1%4.8%58.2%45.2%49.0%Thailand23.6%37.5%28.0%41.7%9.7%38.2%62.5%59.0%Vietnam6.6%30.1%64.7%64.7%1.5%44.1%53.7%34.6%Q4 What are the top 3 challenges facing Southeast Asia?(check 3 responses)SURVEY REPORT10TOP THREE CONCERNS ABOUT ASEANSoutheast Asians continue to express their disappoin

65、tment with the effectiveness of the regions top organisation-ASEAN.82.6%of Southeast Asians say that the regional organisation is“slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments”,a drastic 12.5 percentage point jump from 70.1%in 2022.The sense that ASEAN is s

66、imply reactive to external developments,unable to effect change,and becoming irrelevant in the new world order is felt strongest by Vietnam at 93.4%and Singapore at 89.9%.Of the group,Laos is least critical at 70.1%although this remains the top concern for Laos.The second-ranked challenge is the dan

67、ger of ASEAN becoming an arena of major power competition and the fear that its member states may become major power proxies as expressed by 73.0%of respondents.For Cambodia,this concern ranks at the top at 84.3%ahead of concerns of ASEAN being slow and ineffective.This concern may be directly relat

68、ed to external pressures felt by Cambodia as ASEAN Chair in 2022.The sense that ASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited is shared by nearly two-thirds of respondents(60.7%).This may be related to a few issues that tested ASEAN unity.First,ASEAN countries adopted different country positions on the i

69、nvasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022.This is evident in the different country voting positions at the UN and the absence of a strong regional response.Second,ASEANs lack of unified response to the Myanmar crisis that started with the 2021 coup has not gone unnoticed by observers.Myanmar(72.

70、2%)and Singapore(70.2%)gave the worst marks on ASEANs unity scorecard.ASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments,becoming irrelevant in the new world order82.6%2022ASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may b

71、ecome major power proxies73.0%70.1%61.5%49.0%ASEAN is unable to recover from the pandemicASEAN is becoming increasingly disunited60.7%2023THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:2023112022CountryASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxiesASEAN is be

72、coming increasingly disunitedASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary peopleASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developmentsASEAN is unable to overcome current pandemic challengesASEAN61.5%48.2%39.0%70.1%49.0%Brunei60.4%52.8%39.6%71.7%45.3%Camb

73、odia56.8%64.2%37.0%51.9%46.9%Indonesia64.9%45.8%45.8%64.9%48.1%Laos79.5%27.3%22.7%70.5%79.5%Malaysia54.8%41.5%45.9%71.1%58.5%Myanmar33.1%33.7%61.1%90.6%40.0%Philippines65.5%52.5%26.8%74.3%56.5%Singapore67.6%60.4%27.5%79.7%35.6%Thailand59.8%47.9%51.3%65.8%38.5%Vietnam72.9%55.6%31.9%61.1%41.0%2023Coun

74、tryASEAN is becoming an arena of major power competition and its member states may become major power proxiesASEAN is becoming increasingly disunitedASEAN is elitist and disconnected from ordinary peopleASEAN is slow and ineffective,and thus cannot cope with fluid political and economic developments

75、,becoming irrelevant in the new world orderASEAN is unable to recover from the pandemicASEAN73.0%60.7%46.6%82.6%37.2%Brunei80.0%42.5%37.5%88.3%51.7%Cambodia84.3%59.7%44.8%70.9%40.3%Indonesia73.6%54.5%59.5%86.8%25.6%Laos40.2%63.6%66.4%70.1%59.8%Malaysia72.6%60.5%53.2%80.6%33.1%Myanmar55.7%72.2%59.1%7

76、7.4%35.7%Philippines76.8%57.6%39.4%84.8%41.4%Singapore83.2%70.2%31.7%89.9%25.0%Thailand72.9%56.9%51.4%84.0%34.7%Vietnam90.4%69.1%22.8%93.4%24.3%Q5 What are your top 3 concerns about ASEAN?(check 3 responses)SURVEY REPORT12The 5PC exposes ASEAN disunity CountryThe 5PC is fundamentally flawed in addre

77、ssing complex issuesThe 5PC exposes ASEAN disunity I am neutral about the 5PC The 5PC will not work with the intransigence of the State Administration Council(Junta)The 5PC is the most suitable option under these circumstancesASEAN19.6%13.7%31.4%21.7%13.5%Brunei11.7%10.8%48.3%17.5%11.7%Cambodia4.5%3

78、.0%56.0%9.7%26.9%Indonesia24.0%6.6%23.1%28.1%18.2%Laos11.2%10.3%61.7%8.4%8.4%Malaysia16.9%16.1%29.0%26.6%11.3%Myanmar35.7%29.6%8.7%16.5%9.6%Philippines22.2%11.1%28.3%23.2%15.2%Singapore14.4%8.7%24.0%41.8%11.1%Thailand27.1%23.6%16.7%26.4%6.3%Vietnam28.7%17.6%18.4%18.4%16.9%Two years since the coup of

79、 1 February 2021,Myanmar remains in a state of paralysis.ASEAN respondents appear to hold mixed views about the problem.When asked which statement best described their views about ASEANs Five-Point Consensus(5PC)ASEANs guiding response to bring about peace and reconciliation in Myanmar a third of re

80、spondents(31.4%)say they are neutral about the 5PC.Laos(61.7%),Cambodia(56.0%)and Brunei(48.3%)are among the most agnostic ASEAN member states concerning ASEANs approach to resolve Myanmars problems.The latter two were ASEAN Chairs in the past two years and had appointed Special Envoys to address th

81、e issue.Laos will take over ASEAN Chair position in 2024.Among those who are of the view that the 5PC will not work because of the intransigence of the junta,Singapore respondents express the strongest view at 41.8%,double the regional average of 21.7%.Conversely,only 8.4%of Lao respondents think th

82、at the juntas intransigence is a problem.It is also not surprising that another point of view that the design of the 5PC as“fundamentally flawed in addressing complex issues”is ranked third by 19.6%of regional respondents.This view forms Myanmar respondents top choice ASEANS FIVE-POINT CONSENSUS(5PC

83、)ON MYANMARQ6 Choose the statement that best reflects your view about ASEANs Five-Point Consensus(5PC)on Myanmar:at 35.7%whereas only 4.5%of Cambodia respondents viewed this way.As ASEAN Chair last year,Cambodia respondents are either mostly neutral about the 5PC at 56.0%or think that it is the“most

84、 suitable option under these circumstances”at 26.9%.I am neutral about the 5PC 31.4%The 5PC will not work with the intransigence of the State Administration Council(Junta)21.7%The 5PC is fundamentally flawed in addressing complex issues19.6%The 5PC is the most suitable option under these circumstanc

85、es13.5%13.7%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:20231320229.8%202219.6%202224.4%202315.2%37.8%2022Q7 To move the Myanmar issue forward,ASEAN should:MOVING THE MYANMAR ISSUE FORWARD Slightly more than a third of regional respondents(38.1%)want to see ASEAN engage in independent dialogue with all key stakehol

86、ders,including with the shadow National Unity Government,to build trust.This is a small 0.3%increase from 37.8%of respondents who chose this option as their top choice last year.Another 18.0%of respondents want to see ASEAN utilise harder methods such as suspension and targeted sanctions to increase

87、 the costs of non-compliance for the junta.Among this group of respondents,Indonesia respondents express the strongest view at 24.0%whereas only 1.9%of Lao respondents would choose punitive actions.15.2%of regional respondents,compared to just 8.4%last year,want to stay out of Myanmars domestic poli

88、tics.This option is tied at third place with a desire to see greater coordinated international action.It is noteworthy that 47.0%of Cambodia and 43.0%of Lao respondents prefer the non-interference option as their top choice in moving the Myanmar issue forward.The percentage of respondents who expres

89、s confidence in seeing a coordinated and unified response with international partners fell nearly a ten-percentage point from 24.4%in 2022 to 15.1%in 2023.The inability of the UN to pass any meaningful resolution on the situation in Myanmar strengthened this view.Engage in independent dialogue with

90、all key stakeholders in MyanmarMount a coordinated and unified response with international partners38.1%2023202315.1%202318.0%202313.7%20228.4%Utilise harder methods to effectively curtail the SACExpel Myanmar from ASEANNot interfereCountryEngage in independent dialogue with all key stakeholders,inc

91、luding the National Unity Government,in Myanmar to build trust Mount a coordinated and unified response with international partners Utilise harder methods to effectively curtail the SACExpel Myanmar from ASEANNot interfere 2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN37.8%38.1%24.4%15.1%19.6%18.0%9.

92、8%13.7%8.4%15.2%Brunei50.9%34.2%24.5%15.0%15.1%23.3%5.7%22.5%3.8%5.0%Cambodia43.2%17.2%21.0%9.0%16.0%13.4%4.9%13.4%14.8%47.0%Indonesia42.7%50.4%24.4%12.4%22.1%24.0%6.9%9.9%3.8%3.3%Laos36.4%40.2%31.8%12.1%2.3%1.9%6.8%2.8%22.7%43.0%Malaysia34.8%41.1%15.6%15.3%19.3%20.2%16.3%16.1%14.1%7.3%Myanmar22.0%3

93、6.5%9.1%18.3%43.4%15.7%21.4%7.8%4.0%21.7%Philippines38.8%41.4%38.5%18.2%11.5%21.2%4.5%15.2%6.8%4.0%Singapore33.3%34.6%23.9%19.7%23.9%20.2%14.4%18.8%4.5%6.7%Thailand39.3%34.7%26.5%18.1%21.4%21.5%10.3%20.1%2.6%5.6%Vietnam36.8%50.7%28.5%12.5%20.8%18.4%6.9%10.3%6.9%8.1%SURVEY REPORT14CountryDestabilise

94、the region ASEAN countries will be forced to take sides Reduce economic cooperation with either China or TaiwanASEAN will benefit from the relocation of industry to the regionNot affect the region at all ASEAN43.3%28.7%15.5%9.1%3.4%Brunei10.8%23.3%39.2%23.3%3.3%Cambodia68.7%14.2%6.0%8.2%3.0%Indonesi

95、a43.0%24.8%23.1%6.6%2.5%Laos42.1%28.0%15.9%5.6%8.4%Malaysia39.5%29.8%16.1%8.9%5.6%Myanmar42.6%45.2%3.5%3.5%5.2%Philippines39.4%30.3%20.2%8.1%2.0%Singapore47.1%32.2%12.5%6.7%1.4%Thailand38.9%41.7%9.0%8.3%2.1%Vietnam61.0%17.6%9.6%11.8%0.0%Q8 How will the outbreak of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait af

96、fect the region?(choose the most important option)THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN TAIWAN STRAITSoutheast Asians do not believe that the region will remain unscathed in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.43.3%believe that such an event will destabilise the region.Another 28.7%fear that ASEAN countrie

97、s will be forced to take sides.A small percentage of 15.5%believe that economic cooperation with either China or Taiwan will be affected while an even smaller proportion of 9.1%think that ASEAN may benefit from the relocation of industries to Southeast Asia.The largest group of deniers who think tha

98、t such an event will have no effect on Southeast Asia at all come from Laos(8.4%)whereas there are no deniers in Vietnam(0.0%).At the country level,it is interesting that largest group of Brunei respondents(39.2%)are more concerned with the reduction of economic cooperation with China and Taiwan whe

99、reas Myanmar(45.2%)and Thailand(41.7%)were more concerned with being forced to take sides.Of those who think that ASEAN might benefit from an outbreak of hostilities,Brunei topped the charts at 23.3%.The other seven ASEAN countries believe that regional instability is the worst consequence for South

100、east Asia.43.3%28.7%15.5%9.1%3.4%Destabilise the regionASEAN countries will be forced to take sides Reduce economic cooperation with either China or TaiwanASEAN will benefit from the relocation of industry to the regionNot affect the region at all THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202315CountryOppose the

101、use of force using diplomatic measures Impose sanctions on the aggressorFacilitate military support for TaiwanAdopt a neutral positionShow support for ChinaASEAN45.6%11.9%6.3%33.5%2.7%Brunei21.7%12.5%12.5%52.5%0.8%Cambodia23.1%9.0%3.0%56.0%9.0%Indonesia66.1%9.1%2.5%22.3%0.0%Laos15.9%12.1%5.6%59.8%6.

102、5%Malaysia52.4%12.1%4.0%29.0%2.4%Myanmar54.8%18.3%4.3%19.1%3.5%Philippines54.5%12.1%20.2%13.1%0.0%Singapore58.2%11.1%2.9%24.0%3.8%Thailand48.6%14.6%4.2%31.9%0.7%Vietnam61.0%8.1%3.7%27.2%0.0%RESPONSE TOWARDS CONFLICT IN TAIWAN STRAITIn another hypothetical question on possible responses that their co

103、untries can take in the event of hostilities,the largest group of Southeast Asians(45.6%)believe that their governments should oppose the use of force using diplomatic measures.Seven ASEAN countries,with the exception of Brunei,Cambodia and Laos,choose this as their top option.Of this group,66.1%of

104、Indonesia respondents expressed the strongest support for an active diplomatic approach followed by 61.0%of Vietnam and 58.2%of Singapore respondents.A third of respondents(33.5%)feel that maintaining a neutral position is important.Brunei(52.5%),Cambodia(56.0%)and Laos(59.8%)prefer a neutral positi

105、on over taking diplomatic measures.There is little appetite in the region for imposing sanctions on the aggressor(11.9%),facilitating military support for Taiwan(6.3%)or showing support for China(2.7%).Interestingly,showing support for China is not an option for Indonesia,Philippine or Vietnam respo

106、ndents at all.On the other hand,20.2%of Philippine respondents will support facilitating military support for Taiwan.A conflict over the Taiwan Strait carries the most immediate and serious consequences on the Philippines just by geographical proximity alone.It is also the most likely US ally in the

107、 region to be asked to facilitate support for US forces.Q9 What should your country do if conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait?(choose one option)Oppose the use of force using diplomatic measures Adopt a neutral positionImpose sanctions on the aggressorFacilitate military support for TaiwanShow

108、support for China45.6%33.5%11.9%6.3%2.7%SURVEY REPORT16CountryYesNoNot sureASEAN61.5%15.8%22.7%Brunei48.3%45.0%6.7%Cambodia93.3%1.5%5.2%Indonesia67.8%7.4%24.8%Laos53.3%8.4%38.3%Malaysia61.3%10.5%28.2%Myanmar27.8%48.7%23.5%Philippines69.7%10.1%20.2%Singapore62.5%11.1%26.4%Thailand64.6%6.3%29.2%Vietna

109、m66.2%9.6%24.3%Q10 Should Timor-Leste join ASEAN?TIMOR-LESTES ADMISSION INTO ASEANASEAN gave in-principle approval for Timor-Leste to join as its 11th member at the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits that concluded in mid-November 2022.Overwhelmingly,61.5%of ASEAN respondents support Timor-Lestes membershi

110、p.The strongest expression of support came from Cambodia at 93.3%and the Philippines at 69.7%.67.8%from Indonesia supported their closest neighbour while nearly a quarter of Indonesia respondents(24.8%)were unsure over admitting Timor-Leste as a new member.61.5%15.8%Not Sure22.7%NoYesThe strongest o

111、pposition is from Myanmar at 48.7%followed by Brunei at 45.0%whereas Laos is most unsure of a new member joining at 38.3%.Although 26.4%of Singapore respondents remain unsure,only 11.1%expressed outright opposition.The lack of ASEAN consensus over Timor-Lestes application to join ASEAN has been freq

112、uently attributed to Singapore in the past.THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202317CountryNot change anything in ASEANSlow down ASEANs economic integrationComplicate the consensus-based decision-making processIncrease disunity among ASEAN member statesASEAN29.8%34.4%28.8%7.0%Brunei66.7%14.8%16.7%1.9%Cambo

113、dia0.0%50.0%50.0%0.0%Indonesia11.1%66.7%22.2%0.0%Laos88.9%11.1%0.0%0.0%Malaysia15.4%46.2%38.5%0.0%Myanmar41.1%44.6%7.1%7.1%Philippines40.0%20.0%40.0%0.0%Singapore8.7%30.4%30.4%30.4%Thailand11.1%44.4%44.4%0.0%Vietnam15.4%15.4%38.5%30.8%CountryEnhance ASEANs unity and centralityIncrease intra-regional

114、 trade and investmentNot change anything in ASEANASEAN48.7%39.9%11.4%Brunei46.6%43.1%10.3%Cambodia55.2%37.6%7.2%Indonesia56.1%28.0%15.9%Laos45.6%49.1%5.3%Malaysia40.8%44.7%14.5%Myanmar34.4%53.1%12.5%Philippines50.7%42.0%7.2%Singapore42.3%36.9%20.8%Thailand45.2%41.9%12.9%Vietnam70.0%22.2%7.8%IMPACTS

115、OF TIMOR-LESTES ADMISSION INTO ASEANOf the respondents who are supportive of Timor-Lestes admission,48.7%say that a new member will enhance ASEANs unity and centrality.Another 39.9%are confident that Timor-Lestes membership will increase intra-regional trade and investment.Only 11.4%are of the view

116、that nothing will change in ASEAN.Majority of Vietnam respondents(70.0%)are optimistic that Timor-Lestes membership will enhance ASEAN unity and centrality,much higher than the ASEAN average of 48.7%.Of those who oppose Timor-Lestes admission,one third(34.4%)are of the view that ASEANs economic inte

117、gration will slow down because of Timor-Leste whereas another 29.8%say that nothing will change in ASEAN,followed closely behind by 28.8%who believe that ASEANs consensus-based decision-making process will be complicated by Timor-Lestes membership.Only 7.0%believe that such a move will increase disu

118、nity among member states.66.7%of Indonesia respondents in this category are of the view that a slowdown in economic integration will take place.Q11 In my opinion,the admission of Timor-Leste will:SURVEY REPORT18CountryVery concernedSomewhat concernedNeutralNot very concernedNot at all concernedASEAN

119、47.9%35.0%12.3%2.7%2.2%Brunei64.2%16.7%7.5%4.2%7.5%Cambodia52.2%28.4%15.7%1.5%2.2%Indonesia61.2%28.1%6.6%2.5%1.7%Laos14.0%44.9%36.4%3.7%0.9%Malaysia41.9%37.9%16.9%2.4%0.8%Myanmar27.0%51.3%13.9%1.7%6.1%Philippines71.7%22.2%4.0%2.0%0.0%Singapore51.9%35.6%7.7%3.8%1.0%Thailand38.2%50.7%6.9%3.5%0.7%Vietn

120、am56.6%33.8%7.4%1.5%0.7%RUSSIAS INVASION OF UKRAINEDespite a tepid reaction from ASEAN to Russias invasion of Ukraine,respondents in the region realised how serious an unprovoked military event was,even if it was a continent away.Nearly half of the regional respondents(47.9%)say that they are“very c

121、oncerned”about Russias invasion of Ukraine and another 35.0%saying that they are“somewhat concerned”.Majority(53.6%)of those who say that they are“very concerned”are respondents with civil society,NGO and media affiliations as compared to other affiliations.This may be a reflection of the more inter

122、nationalist leanings of this affiliation group.A small percentage(12.3%)remain“neutral”with even smaller minorities saying they are“not very concerned”(2.7%)or“not at all concerned”(2.2%).At the country level,the Philippines express the greatest concern with 71.7%saying that they are“very concerned”

123、followed by Brunei at 64.2%and Indonesia at 61.2%.Lao respondents form the largest group of those who are neutral at 36.4%with only 14.0%saying they were“very concerned”.Q12 How concerned are you about Russias invasion of Ukraine?Very concerned 47.9%Somewhat concerned 35.0%Neutral12.3%Not very conce

124、rnedNot at all concerned2.2%2.7%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202319CountryIncreases energy and food prices causing economic hardship Erodes trust in a rules-based order and violation of national sovereignty Increases existing divisions within ASEAN Worsen tensions between US and ChinaDoes not affect

125、Southeast AsiaASEAN58.3%25.9%7.4%5.2%3.2%Brunei38.3%19.2%24.2%9.2%9.2%Cambodia61.2%27.6%3.0%5.2%3.0%Indonesia73.6%20.7%0.8%4.1%0.8%Laos52.3%31.8%8.4%1.9%5.6%Malaysia62.1%16.9%9.7%9.7%1.6%Myanmar52.2%28.7%9.6%2.6%7.0%Philippines70.7%23.2%4.0%1.0%1.0%Singapore48.6%40.9%3.4%5.8%1.4%Thailand65.3%17.4%7.

126、6%8.3%1.4%Vietnam58.8%32.4%2.9%4.4%1.5%,Q13 What is the most serious impact of Russias invasion of Ukraine on Southeast Asia?IMPACTS OF RUSSIAS INVASION OF UKRAINE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA58.3%of Southeast Asians feel that the most serious impact of Russias invasion of Ukraine is in the increase in energy

127、and food prices.Overwhelmingly,73.6%of Indonesians feel this way due to the countrys dependence on food grain and fertiliser imports from Ukraine and Russia.Majority of the Philippine respondents(70.7%)feel equally vulnerable to this impact followed by Thailand at 65.3%.These economies are highly de

128、pendent on commodity imports from both countries involved in the conflict.The disruption of Ukrainian wheat supplies to the region was widely reported as was the disruption of fertiliser supplies from Russia last year.Indonesian President Joko Widodos visit to Russia to push for an opening of the Bl

129、ack Sea route and subsequently his efforts at the G20 certainly put the spotlight on the commodities crunch faced by many Indonesians.Beyond these bread-and-butter issues,what stands out in particular is the level of importance put on a possible erosion of trust in the rules-based order.Though equal

130、ly impacted by food and energy prices,40.9%of Singapore respondents say that erosion of trust is the second most serious impact of the invasion.This is followed by 32.4%of Vietnam respondents who think the same way.Interestingly nearly a quarter of Brunei respondents think that an erosion of trust i

131、s less of an issue than the fear that an invasion can worsen existing divisions within ASEAN.For 9.7%of Malaysia respondents,the third ranked impact is the possibility of worsening tensions between China and the US.3.2%25.9%5.2%58.3%7.4%SURVEY REPORT20CountryStrongly ApproveApproveNeutralDisapproveS

132、trongly DisapproveASEAN17.8%33.8%31.3%11.1%6.0%Brunei11.7%55.0%21.7%6.7%5.0%Cambodia70.9%19.4%9.0%0.7%0.0%Indonesia12.4%38.8%31.4%12.4%5.0%Laos3.7%30.8%52.3%11.2%1.9%Malaysia9.7%29.8%48.4%8.1%4.0%Myanmar10.4%46.1%23.5%8.7%11.3%Philippines17.2%25.3%38.4%13.1%6.1%Singapore32.7%35.6%23.6%6.3%1.9%Thaila

133、nd4.2%22.2%28.5%26.4%18.8%Vietnam5.1%35.3%36.0%17.6%5.9%The converse is true where the Thai government received the highest disapproval ratings from 45.2%of respondents.Majority of Lao respondents(52.3%)dont care one way or another about their governments response.Similarly,the biggest proportion of

134、 Malaysia respondents(48.4%)are neutral about their governments response.APPROVAL OF GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE TO RUSSIAS INVASION OF UKRAINEAcross the region,51.6%of Southeast Asians either“approve”or“strongly approve”of their governments response to the Russian invasion.Among countries,the highest leve

135、l of approvals come from 90.3%of Cambodia respondents for their governments response whereas Thai respondents give their government the lowest approval levels at merely 26.4%.The Singapore government also enjoyed support from 68.3%of respondents who say that they either“approve”or“strongly approve”o

136、f the response.Singapore is the only country in the region to impose limited sanctions on Russia.Q14 Do you approve of your governments response to Russias invasion of Ukraine?Strongly Disapprove or Disapprove 17.1%Neutral31.3%Strongly Approveor Approve51.6%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202321CountryP

137、ositiveNegativeNot sureASEAN46.5%11.7%41.8%Brunei68.3%8.3%23.3%Cambodia31.3%18.7%50.0%Indonesia34.7%13.2%52.1%Laos35.5%8.4%56.1%Malaysia40.3%15.3%44.4%Myanmar60.9%11.3%27.8%Philippines58.6%8.1%33.3%Singapore37.5%16.8%45.7%Thailand41.7%11.8%46.5%Vietnam55.9%5.1%39.0%VIEWS ON THE US-LED INDO-PACIFIC E

138、CONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR PROSPERITY(IPEF)In May 2022,the United States launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)with 14 countries,including seven ASEAN members(Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam)and six other countries,namely Australia,Fiji,

139、India,Japan,the Republic of Korea,and New Zealand.The IPEF aims to promote resilience,sustainability,inclusiveness,economic growth,fairness,and competitiveness for partner economies.46.5%of Southeast Asians view the IPEF favourably for their countries while 11.7%of respondents perceive it negatively

140、.The remaining 41.8%of respondents are not sure about the impact of IPEF.Among ASEAN-IPEF countries,the perceived positive impact of IPEF is largest in Brunei(68.3%),followed by the Philippines(58.6%)and Vietnam(55.9%).It is moderate in Thailand(41.7%)and Malaysia(40.3%),and relatively low in Singap

141、ore(37.5%)and Indonesia(34.7%).In contrast,the perceived negative impact of IPEF is largest in Singapore(16.8%),followed by Malaysia(15.3%),and Indonesia(13.2%).Its negative impact is of less concern for Vietnam,the Philippines,and Brunei.Q15 The overall impact and effectiveness of the US-led Indo-P

142、acific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)is likely to be:Positive46.5%Not sure41.8%Negative11.7%Positive46.5%Not sure41.8%Negative11.7%SURVEY REPORT22REASONS FOR POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS IPEFCountryIt will add value to my countrys relations with the US It will complement existing

143、 ASEAN initiatives It will signal US commitment to be economically engaged in the regionIt will strengthen global trade governanceCountryIt will not offer market access for my country It will worsen US-China competition It will hasten the US-China decoupling processIt will complicate my countrys rel

144、ations with ChinaASEAN24.3%30.4%31.3%14.1%ASEAN28.4%33.9%24.2%13.4%BN14.6%52.4%24.4%8.5%BN30.0%30.0%40.0%0.0%KH14.3%42.9%33.3%9.5%KH64.0%16.0%12.0%8.0%ID19.0%16.7%45.2%19.0%ID31.3%43.8%18.8%6.3%LA36.8%28.9%18.4%15.8%LA33.3%33.3%11.1%22.2%MY20.0%30.0%42.0%8.0%MY10.5%63.2%26.3%0.0%MM47.1%20.0%14.3%18.

145、6%MM30.8%30.8%23.1%15.4%PH22.4%32.8%24.1%20.7%PH0.0%50.0%25.0%25.0%SG21.8%30.8%30.8%16.7%SG20.0%37.1%25.7%17.1%TH23.3%33.3%36.7%6.7%TH35.3%35.3%17.6%11.8%VN23.7%15.8%43.4%17.1%VN28.6%0.0%42.9%28.6%The top three reasons among Southeast Asian respondents who take a positive attitude towards the IPEF i

146、nclude:US commitment to be economically engaged in the region(31.3%),complementarity with existing ASEAN initiatives(30.4%),and value-adding to their countrys bilateral relations with the US(24.3%).The largest group who think that the IPEF will signal the US commitment to be economically engaged in

147、the region come from Indonesia(45.2%),Vietnam(43.4%),and Malaysia(42.0%).Perceptions that the IPEF will complement existing ASEAN initiatives are higher in Brunei,Cambodia(non-IPEF partner),the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand than the regional average.Respondents in the remaining ASEAN countries

148、perceive less complementary of a role of IPEF for ASEAN initiatives.Interestingly,ASEAN respondents who think that the IPEF will add value to their countrys relations with the US are highest in non-IPEF partners such as Laos(36.8%)and Myanmar(47.1%).The role of the IPEF in strengthening global trade

149、 governance is perceived to be relatively low,accounting for only 14.1%of ASEAN respondents with positive attitudes towards the IPEF.The top three reasons among Southeast Asians who hold a negative attitude towards the IPEF include:an increase in the US-China competition(33.9%),lack of market access

150、(28.4%),and acceleration of the US-China decoupling process(24.2%).Respondents who think that the IPEF will worsen US-China competition are most found in Malaysia(63.2%),the Philippines(50.0%),and Indonesia(43.8%)where they are significantly higher than the ASEAN average.The perception that the IPEF

151、 will not offer market access for their countries is highest among ASEAN-IPEF countries in Thailand(35.3%),followed by Indonesia(31.3%)and Brunei(30.0%).ASEAN respondents who think that the IPEF will hasten the US-China decoupling process are most notable in Vietnam(42.9%),Brunei(40.0%),and Malaysia

152、(26.3%).The negative impact of IPEF on countries bilateral relations with China is perceived to be low,accounting for only 13.4%of ASEAN respondents with negative attitudes towards the IPEF.Q16 I feel that Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)is positive because.(choose the most impor

153、tant reason)PositiveNegative596 respondents who chose“positive”in Q15Q17 I feel that Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)is negative because.(choose the most important reason)159 respondents who chose“negative”in Q15THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202323It depends on what emerges from th

154、e negotiationsThere is little information availableIt depends on Chinas counter-actionsIt does not come with access to the US marketI am not interested 15.8%27.2%12.5%9.0%35.5%CountryThere is little information availableIt depends on what emerges from the negotiationsIt depends on Chinas counter-act

155、ionsIt does not come with access to the US marketI am not interested ASEAN27.2%35.5%12.5%9.0%15.8%Brunei17.9%28.6%17.9%17.9%17.9%Cambodia28.4%23.9%6.0%4.5%37.3%Indonesia25.4%34.9%7.9%14.3%17.5%Laos23.3%33.3%11.7%1.7%30.0%Malaysia30.9%38.2%14.5%12.7%3.6%Myanmar21.9%21.9%25.0%6.3%25.0%Philippines33.3%

156、51.5%9.1%0.0%6.1%Singapore24.2%46.3%4.2%16.8%8.4%Thailand32.8%40.3%13.4%4.5%9.0%Vietnam34.0%35.8%15.1%11.3%3.8%Q18 I am not sure about the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity(IPEF)becauseREASONS FOR UNSURE ATTITUDE TOWARDS IPEFThe top three reasons among Southeast Asian respondents who in

157、dicated that they are unsure about the IPEF in the previous question include:uncertainty of future negotiations outcomes(35.5%),lack of information(27.2%),and disinterest(15.8%).Respondents who hedge their views on the outcomes of the negotiations are highest in the Philippines(51.5%),Singapore(46.3

158、%),and Thailand(40.3%).The first round of IPEF negotiations on the four IPEF pillars,namely trade,supply chains,clean energy and tax and anti-corruption,was conducted in December 2022 in Brisbane,Australia.The United States Trade Representative(USTR)aims to conclude IPEF negotiations within 18 month

159、s.The proportion of unsure respondents due to lack of information varies across countries,ranging from 17.9%in Brunei to 32.8%in Thailand and 34.0%in Vietnam.Understandably,the 15.8%of ASEAN respondents who are not interested in IPEF are mostly found in the non-IPEF countries of Cambodia,Laos and My

160、anmar.Other reasons for unsure attitude towards the IPEF include concerns about Chinas counter-actions to the IPEF and the lack of access to the US market.553 respondents who chose“not sure”in Q15SURVEY REPORT24This section focuses on the strategic and economic influence of major powers in the regio

161、n as well as their leadership credibility on global issues such as free trade and upholding international law.SECTION III:Major Powers Regional Influence and LeadershipMOST INFLUENTIAL ECONOMIC POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIAChina continues to be regarded as the most influential economic power by 59.9%of th

162、e respondents.However,its influence has declined significantly from 76.7%in 2022 following strict COVID-related mobility restrictions.The reduction in rating is recorded across all ASEAN countries except for Thailand and Indonesia.ASEANs economic influence has doubled from 7.6%in 2022 to 15.0%in 202

163、3,amidst the US-China trade tensions.A year after the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force,the perception of ASEANs economic standing has increased considerably across all Southeast Asian countries,especially Laos(with an increase of more than ten-fold).The United

164、 States has gained ground from 9.8%in 2022 to 10.5%in 2023 although its ranking fell to third place.Its economic influence has gained significant recognition from 77.7%31.9%ASEAN20232022China20232022The US20232022100%I am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing reg

165、ional economic influence75%50%25%0%64.4%22.3%35.5%68.1%68.1%202259.9%15.0%10.5%202314.6%7.6%76.7%9.8%5.9%ASEANChinaThe United States20232022Others65.7%34.3%39.1%22.3%60.9%64.5%64.4%35.6%Brunei,Myanmar,and the Philippines.Middle powers,including Australia,the EU,India,Japan,the ROK,and the UK,have al

166、l gained traction in their economic standing.The region continues to be worried about Chinas regional economic influence,with 64.5%of respondents expressing this view,while 35.5%welcome it(a level comparable to 2022).Several countries,including Cambodia,Laos,Malaysia,Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam

167、,have recorded greater concerns about Chinas economic rise.Similar to the findings in previous years,most respondents welcome the growing regional economic influence of ASEAN(60.9%)and the US(65.7%),although concerns about ASEANs economic influence have increased in most countries compared to 2022.T

168、HE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202325CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United StatesThe United Kingdom202220232022202320222023202220232022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN7.6%15.0%0.5%2.7%76.7%59.9%1.7%4.2%0.1%0.7%2.6%4.6%0.5%1.0%9.8%10.5%0.5%1.3%BN9.4%10

169、.0%0.0%5.8%84.9%44.2%0.0%7.5%0.0%4.2%1.9%12.5%0.0%2.5%1.9%6.7%1.9%6.7%KH9.9%19.4%0.0%0.7%84.0%75.4%1.2%1.5%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%4.9%2.2%0.0%0.7%ID13.7%19.0%1.5%0.0%67.9%71.1%0.0%1.7%0.0%0.0%5.3%3.3%1.5%0.0%8.4%5.0%1.5%0.0%LA2.3%29.9%0.0%16.8%86.4%20.6%6.8%16.8%0.0%0.0%0.0%6.5%0.0%1.9%4.5%5.6%0.0%

170、1.9%MY11.1%12.1%0.0%0.8%72.6%65.3%1.5%2.4%0.0%0.0%3.0%2.4%0.0%1.6%11.9%13.7%0.0%1.6%MM2.6%4.3%0.0%0.9%83.4%72.2%1.4%1.7%0.0%0.9%4.3%5.2%1.4%0.0%6.0%13.9%0.9%0.9%PH6.3%25.3%0.8%1.0%65.8%36.4%2.8%2.0%0.0%0.0%5.3%7.1%0.8%1.0%18.3%26.3%0.3%1.0%SG3.6%10.6%0.0%0.5%81.1%70.7%1.4%1.4%0.0%1.0%1.8%1.9%0.0%0.5

171、%12.2%13.5%0.0%0.0%TH7.7%8.3%1.7%0.7%69.2%74.3%0.9%2.8%0.9%0.7%4.3%3.5%1.7%0.0%13.7%9.0%0.0%0.7%VN9.7%11.0%0.7%0.0%71.5%69.1%0.7%4.4%0.0%0.0%0.7%3.7%0.0%2.2%16.7%9.6%0.0%0.0%CountryASEANChinaThe United StatesI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional eco

172、nomic influenceI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influenceI am worried about its growing regional economic influenceI welcome its growing regional economic influence202220232022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN22.3%39.1%77.7%60.

173、9%64.4%64.5%35.6%35.5%31.9%34.3%68.1%65.7%BN40.0%16.7%60.0%83.3%55.6%13.2%44.4%86.8%0.0%12.5%100.0%87.5%KH0.0%53.8%100.0%46.2%29.4%50.5%70.6%49.5%25.0%66.7%75.0%33.3%ID33.3%56.5%66.7%43.5%60.7%50.0%39.3%50.0%45.5%50.0%54.5%50.0%LA0.0%31.3%100.0%68.8%65.8%72.7%34.2%27.3%100.0%50.0%0.0%50.0%MY0.0%40.0

174、%100.0%60.0%55.1%61.7%44.9%38.3%37.5%35.3%62.5%64.7%MM44.4%20.0%55.6%80.0%87.3%79.5%12.7%20.5%23.8%18.8%76.2%81.3%PH4.0%44.0%96.0%56.0%76.4%83.3%23.6%16.7%13.7%26.9%86.3%73.1%SG25.0%27.3%75.0%72.7%73.9%61.9%26.1%38.1%25.9%21.4%74.1%78.6%TH33.3%75.0%66.7%25.0%66.7%86.0%33.3%14.0%18.8%46.2%81.3%53.8%V

175、N42.9%26.7%57.1%73.3%72.8%86.2%27.2%13.8%29.2%15.4%70.8%84.6%Q19 In your view,which country/regional organisation is the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia?Q20 What is your view of this economic powers influence on your country?187 respondents who chose the“ASEAN”option in Q19;810 res

176、pondents who chose the“China”option in Q19;136 respondents who chose the“The US”option in Q19SURVEY REPORT26MOST INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIAChina remains the most influential and strategic power in Southeast Asia(41.5%),followed by the US(31.9%)and ASEAN(13.1%).While

177、China retains its top position,its influence has declined significantly from 54.4%in 2022,reducing its lead over the growing political and strategic influence of the US and ASEAN.An increasing number of Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia,Myanmar,the Philippines,and Singapore are choosing

178、the US over China.The reduction in the perception of Chinas political and strategic influence is most palpable among Laos(-44.2%)and Myanmar(-30.9%)respondents.Similar to the sentiments of previous years,the region is generally worried about Chinas growing regional political and strategic influence(

179、68.5%),although the extent of wariness has decreased over the past two years(down from 76.4%in 2022 and 86.5%in 2021).Brunei(94.4%)followed by Cambodia(47.4%)has shown the greatest acceptance of Chinas influence.Similar to past trends,respondents welcomed ASEANs(59.7%)and the US(55.8%)growing region

180、al political and strategic influence.However,despite the acceptance,regional respondents are increasingly cautious about ASEAN(a two-fold increase)and the US(6.8%increase)political and strategic influence in their countries.The Philippines(66.7%),Myanmar(60.0%),and Thailand(76.9%)are most apprehensi

181、ve of ASEANs growing influence.ASEAN20232022China20232022The US20232022100%75%50%25%0%64.4%37.4%31.5%68.1%62.6%202241.5%13.1%31.9%202313.5%11.2%54.4%29.7%4.6%ASEANChinaThe United States20232022Others55.8%44.2%40.3%19.9%59.7%80.1%68.5%76.4%23.6%I am worried about its growing regional political and st

182、rategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influenceTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202327CountryASEANChinaThe United StatesI am worried about its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influenceI am worried a

183、bout its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influenceI am worried about its growing regional political and strategic influenceI welcome its growing regional political and strategic influence2022202320222023202220232022202320222023

184、20222023ASEAN19.9%40.3%80.1%59.7%76.4%68.5%23.6%31.5%37.4%44.2%62.6%55.8%BN16.7%0.0%83.3%100.0%81.0%5.6%19.0%94.4%27.8%31.3%72.2%68.8%KH0.0%37.5%100.0%62.5%45.9%52.6%54.1%47.4%64.3%58.3%35.7%41.7%ID33.3%33.3%66.7%66.7%66.0%61.1%34.0%38.9%50.0%67.4%50.0%32.6%LA33.3%42.1%66.7%57.9%78.8%63.6%21.2%36.4%

185、50.0%42.9%50.0%57.1%MY11.1%33.3%88.9%66.7%62.3%72.7%37.7%27.3%51.5%57.1%48.5%42.9%MM57.1%60.0%42.9%40.0%93.5%84.8%6.5%15.2%21.7%28.1%78.3%71.9%PH12.1%66.7%87.9%33.3%88.5%86.7%11.5%13.3%24.0%29.5%76.0%70.5%SG0.0%20.0%100.0%80.0%90.7%69.6%9.3%30.4%21.2%39.0%78.8%61.0%TH22.2%76.9%77.8%23.1%76.9%95.5%23

186、.1%4.5%46.9%61.5%53.1%38.5%VN13.3%33.3%86.7%66.7%80.3%93.0%19.7%7.0%17.0%27.0%83.0%73.0%CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United StatesThe United Kingdom202220232022202320222023202220232022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN11.2%13.1%0.8%3.0%54.4%41.5%0

187、.8%4.9%0.2%0.9%1.4%1.9%0.6%1.7%29.7%31.9%0.8%1.1%BN22.6%4.2%1.9%7.5%39.6%45.0%0.0%9.2%0.0%5.0%0.0%5.8%1.9%7.5%34.0%13.3%0.0%2.5%KH7.4%6.0%0.0%0.7%75.3%72.4%0.0%3.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%17.3%17.9%0.0%0.0%ID16.0%24.8%3.1%1.7%38.2%29.8%2.3%5.0%0.8%0.8%1.5%1.7%1.5%0.8%35.1%35.5%1.5%0.0%LA13.6%17.8%0.

188、0%14.0%75.0%30.8%0.0%17.8%0.0%0.9%2.3%0.0%0.0%2.8%9.1%13.1%0.0%2.8%MY20.0%21.8%1.5%3.2%51.1%35.5%0.7%0.8%0.0%0.0%0.7%1.6%0.0%0.8%24.4%33.9%1.5%2.4%MM2.0%4.3%0.0%0.9%70.9%40.0%1.1%1.7%0.0%0.0%3.4%1.7%2.3%0.0%19.7%49.6%0.6%1.7%PH8.3%18.2%0.3%0.0%37.0%30.3%1.3%3.0%0.3%0.0%1.8%2.0%0.0%2.0%51.0%44.4%0.3%

189、0.0%SG4.1%12.0%0.0%1.0%48.2%33.2%0.0%2.4%0.0%2.4%0.0%1.0%0.0%0.0%46.8%48.1%0.9%0.0%TH7.7%9.0%0.9%0.7%55.6%45.8%2.6%2.8%0.9%0.0%2.6%1.4%0.0%2.8%27.4%36.1%2.6%1.4%VN10.4%13.2%0.7%0.7%52.8%52.2%0.0%2.9%0.0%0.0%2.1%3.7%0.7%0.0%32.6%27.2%0.7%0.0%Q22 What is your view of this political and strategic power

190、s influence on your country?168 respondents who chose the“ASEAN”option in Q21;546 respondents who chose the“China”option in Q21;429 respondents who chose“The US”option in Q21 Q21 In your view,which country/regional organisation has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia?SURVEY

191、REPORT28202230.1%US24.6%China15.5%ASEANNew Zealand 2.0%India 0.4%Australia 1.4%ROK 1.1%UK 1.8%9.0%Japan14.1%EULEADERSHIP IN CHAMPIONING GLOBAL FREE TRADEThe world economy continues to be turbulent as it battles inflation,soaring energy prices,supply chain disruptions,and the ongoing US-China competi

192、tion.Amidst all these,the regions confidence in ASEANs leadership in global free trade soared from 15.5%in 2022 to 23.5%in 2023,placing it in the top spot ahead of the US(21.9%)and the EU(17.6%).As the US-China rivalry intensifies,the regions confidence in the two major powers decreased significantl

193、y,while confidence in ASEAN and other middle powers increased.The entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the diversification of production sites from China to Southeast Asia may have resulted in greater confidence in ASEAN.The significant increase in suppor

194、t for ASEANs economic leadership comes from Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,and Singapore.On the other hand,China saw a significant reduction in confidence from Cambodia and Laos,while the US experienced a considerable loss of confidence from Indonesia,Malaysia,Singapore,and Thailand despite launching the I

195、ndo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity involving these countries.202323.5%ASEAN21.9%US17.6%EUUK 4.3%India 1.2%New Zealand 3.0%ROK 1.6%Australia 3.0%9.2%Japan14.8%ChinaTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202329CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United

196、 KingdomThe United StatesASEAN15.5%1.4%24.6%14.1%0.4%9.0%2.0%1.1%1.8%30.1%Brunei39.6%3.8%11.3%7.5%0.0%17.0%7.5%0.0%1.9%11.3%Cambodia2.5%0.0%71.6%6.2%0.0%3.7%0.0%1.2%0.0%14.8%Indonesia25.2%2.3%25.2%12.2%0.8%6.1%2.3%0.8%1.5%23.7%Laos6.8%0.0%61.4%6.8%0.0%9.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%15.9%Malaysia11.1%0.7%21.5%16.3%

197、0.0%6.7%1.5%2.2%2.2%37.8%Myanmar5.1%1.1%3.1%18.3%0.0%10.9%1.7%5.1%3.4%51.1%Philippines25.3%2.8%2.0%17.8%0.5%12.8%1.5%0.3%3.0%34.3%Singapore11.7%2.3%10.8%17.6%0.0%8.1%2.7%0.0%3.2%43.7%Thailand12.8%0.9%22.2%20.5%1.7%7.7%2.6%0.9%2.6%28.2%Vietnam15.3%0.0%16.7%17.4%0.7%8.3%0.0%0.7%0.7%40.3%20222023Countr

198、yASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN23.5%3.0%14.8%17.6%1.2%9.2%3.0%1.6%4.3%21.9%Brunei36.7%3.3%6.7%20.0%3.3%3.3%11.7%1.7%5.8%7.5%Cambodia5.2%1.5%35.8%18.7%0.0%5.2%0.0%0.0%0.7%32.8%Indonesia43.0%2.5%18.2%10.7%0.8%10.7%2.5

199、%3.3%5.8%2.5%Laos26.2%10.3%14.0%25.2%0.0%4.7%2.8%0.0%2.8%14.0%Malaysia28.2%5.6%16.9%15.3%0.0%8.9%4.0%4.0%1.6%15.3%Myanmar8.7%0.0%9.6%7.0%3.5%13.9%0.9%0.9%2.6%53.0%Philippines27.3%1.0%5.1%17.2%0.0%15.2%0.0%2.0%2.0%30.3%Singapore25.5%3.8%17.3%17.3%1.4%6.3%5.8%1.4%2.4%18.8%Thailand14.6%2.1%17.4%21.5%2.

200、1%9.0%2.8%0.7%18.8%11.1%Vietnam19.9%0.0%6.6%22.8%0.7%14.7%0.0%1.5%0.0%33.8%Q23 Who do you have the most confidence in to champion the global free trade agenda?SURVEY REPORT30202236.6%US13.6%China16.8%ASEAN7.7%Japan16.6%EUUK 3.4%India 0.1%Australia 1.9%ROK 0.8%New Zealand 2.4%LEADERSHIP IN MAINTAININ

201、G RULES-BASED ORDER AND UPHOLDING INTERNATIONAL LAWThe US retained its position as the regions top choice in maintaining a rules-based order and upholding international law at 27.1%,albeit with a decline from 36.6%in 2022.The EU regained the regions confidence as its share increased from 16.6%to 23.

202、0%,elevating it to second place this year.Although ASEANs position declined(from 2nd to 3rd rank),it has gained 4.2 percentage points to 21.0%in 2023.The effect of the US-China rivalry continues to be felt as both major powers suffered a decline in confidence from Southeast Asian countries.Chinas ra

203、ting fell significantly from 13.6%in 2022 to only 5.3%in 2023,possibly due to the consequence of its“no limits”partnership with Russia and the failure to condemn the country following its invasion of Ukraine.While most regional respondents have reduced their confidence in China,the biggest decline c

204、ame from Cambodia,with ratings falling from a high of 65.4%last year to a low of 2.2%this year,casting its confidence in the US and the EU(as their top supporter)instead.Apart from Cambodia,the US continues to enjoy confidence from Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,and Vietnam.The EU received a high

205、er percentage share of confidence from all regional countries except Indonesia and Myanmar.Similarly,confidence in ASEAN increased among all Southeast Asian countries except for Laos.202327.1%US23.0%EU21.0%ASEANChina 5.3%ROK 0.8%Australia 3.4%India 1.0%New Zealand 2.9%6.9%UK8.6%JapanTHE STATE OF SOU

206、THEAST ASIA:2023312022CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN16.8%1.9%13.6%16.6%0.1%7.7%2.4%0.8%3.4%36.6%Brunei28.3%7.5%1.9%13.2%0.0%9.4%5.7%3.8%13.2%17.0%Cambodia2.5%0.0%65.4%7.4%0.0%3.7%1.2%0.0%0.0%19.8%Indonesia32.

207、8%1.5%11.5%22.9%0.0%7.6%2.3%0.0%1.5%19.8%Laos38.6%0.0%9.1%13.6%0.0%27.3%0.0%0.0%2.3%9.1%Malaysia9.6%3.0%14.8%18.5%0.0%3.7%1.5%0.7%0.7%47.4%Myanmar5.1%1.1%1.4%16.9%0.0%5.1%1.7%2.9%4.9%60.9%Philippines23.0%3.8%0.3%16.5%0.0%7.0%2.5%0.5%3.0%43.5%Singapore6.8%0.9%4.1%18.9%0.0%2.3%0.9%0.5%4.1%61.7%Thailan

208、d9.4%0.0%16.2%27.4%0.9%6.0%7.7%0.0%2.6%29.9%Vietnam11.8%1.4%11.8%11.1%0.0%4.9%0.7%0.0%1.4%56.9%Q24 Who do you have the most confidence in to provide leadership to maintain the rules-based order and uphold international law?CountryASEANAustraliaChinaThe European UnionIndiaJapanNew ZealandRepublic of

209、KoreaThe United KingdomThe United StatesASEAN21.0%3.4%5.3%23.0%1.0%8.6%2.9%0.8%6.9%27.1%Brunei30.8%5.8%2.5%20.0%0.8%14.2%5.0%2.5%10.8%7.5%Cambodia4.5%0.0%2.2%38.8%0.0%4.5%0.7%0.0%0.7%48.5%Indonesia43.8%0.8%6.6%16.5%0.0%9.9%1.7%2.5%6.6%11.6%Laos14.0%17.8%5.6%29.0%0.0%6.5%8.4%0.0%11.2%7.5%Malaysia26.6

210、%4.8%6.5%19.4%0.0%10.5%3.2%0.8%4.0%24.2%Myanmar12.2%0.0%7.0%6.1%6.1%11.3%2.6%0.0%2.6%52.2%Philippines27.3%0.0%2.0%16.2%0.0%10.1%3.0%1.0%4.0%36.4%Singapore15.9%2.9%10.6%24.5%1.4%5.8%2.4%0.5%4.8%31.3%Thailand12.5%1.4%9.0%32.6%0.0%6.9%2.1%0.7%22.9%11.8%Vietnam22.1%0.7%1.5%26.5%1.5%6.6%0.0%0.0%1.5%39.7%

211、2023SURVEY REPORT3212.2%Strongly Disagree or DisagreeCountryStrongly AgreeAgreeNeutralDisagreeStrongly DisagreeASEAN13.8%36.6%37.4%8.5%3.7%Brunei10.8%53.5%23.3%5.8%6.7%Cambodia8.2%11.9%67.2%7.5%5.2%Indonesia14.9%36.4%33.9%12.4%2.5%Laos3.7%25.2%60.7%9.3%0.9%Malaysia8.1%41.9%38.7%7.3%4.0%Myanmar14.8%4

212、6.1%25.2%10.4%3.5%Philippines28.3%33.3%31.3%4.0%3.0%Singapore14.9%35.6%29.8%11.5%8.2%Thailand17.4%35.4%31.9%11.8%3.5%Vietnam16.9%47.1%31.6%4.4%0.0%Q25 Strengthening of the Quad is positive and reassuring for Southeast Asia.VIEWS ON THE QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE(QUAD)The Quadrilateral Security

213、Dialogue(QUAD)between Australia,India,Japan,and the US continues to strengthen and boost its cooperation through regular leaders summits and strategic cooperation.Despite concerns that the QUAD may undermine ASEAN centrality,50.4%of regional respondents agree or strongly agree that the strengthening

214、 of the mini-lateral group will be constructive for the region.This view is supported by Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam.Only 12.2%of the respondents disagree or strongly disagree,a slight decline from 13.1%in 2022.Among those,Singapore(19.7%),Thailan

215、d(15.3%)and Indonesia(14.9%)are the most pessimistic.The number of neutral respondents has increased from 28.5%to 37.4%,among whom,Cambodia(67.2%)and Laos(60.7%)form the majority.50.4%Neutral37.4%Strongly Agree or AgreeTHE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202333CountryBe beneficial to the regionBe complement

216、ary to ASEAN effortsForce countries to choose sidesThreaten ASEAN centrality and compete with ASEAN-led mechanismsProvoke ChinaASEAN31.0%37.8%10.4%13.9%6.8%Brunei23.9%21.7%31.5%18.5%4.3%Cambodia22.7%27.3%11.4%34.1%4.5%Indonesia25.0%53.8%5.0%15.0%1.3%Laos42.9%31.0%14.3%9.5%2.4%Malaysia27.6%44.7%3.9%1

217、0.5%13.2%Myanmar31.4%37.2%14.0%4.7%12.8%Philippines39.7%42.6%2.9%8.8%5.9%Singapore28.8%33.6%11.6%16.4%9.6%Thailand31.6%35.7%8.2%13.3%11.2%Vietnam36.6%50.5%1.1%8.6%3.2%IMPACTS FROM COOPERATION WITH THE QUADQ26 Cooperation with the Quad will:40%31.0%37.8%10.4%13.9%6.8%0%Threaten ASEAN centrality and c

218、ompete with ASEAN-led mechanismsProvoke ChinaBe beneficial to the regionBe complementary to ASEAN effortsForce countries to choose sides20%As the Indo-Pacific region continues to gain prominence and the QUAD stepping up its cooperation,ASEAN remains ambivalent in cooperating with the mini-lateral gr

219、ouping.The largest group(37.8%)of Southeast Asians(especially those from Indonesia and Vietnam)feel that cooperation with the QUAD will be complementary to ASEAN efforts.31.0%of the respondents feel that it will be beneficial for the region the top option for Lao respondents.Among those who are less

220、 optimistic,13.9%feel that the QUAD will threaten ASEAN centrality and compete with ASEAN-led mechanisms mainly supported by respondents from Cambodia.10.4%believe that the QUAD will force countries to choose sides(the top choice for Brunei respondents),while 6.8%perceive that the QUAD will provoke

221、China,supported mainly by respondents from Malaysia and Myanmar.SURVEY REPORT34CountryNo ConfidenceLittle ConfidenceNo CommentConfidentVery ConfidentASEAN15.4%29.1%28.0%21.7%5.7%Brunei5.0%16.7%20.8%47.5%10.0%Cambodia4.5%11.9%34.3%28.4%20.9%Indonesia17.4%42.1%21.5%16.5%2.5%Laos1.9%17.8%45.8%31.8%2.8%

222、Malaysia7.3%37.1%30.6%21.0%4.0%Myanmar47.8%20.9%23.5%6.1%1.7%Philippines16.2%36.4%29.3%15.2%3.0%Singapore14.4%29.8%32.2%18.3%5.3%Thailand15.3%36.8%20.1%21.5%6.3%Vietnam24.3%41.9%22.1%11.0%0.7%Q27 How confident are you that Chinas Global Security Initiative(GSI)will benefit the region?CONFIDENCE TOWA

223、RDS CHINAS GLOBAL SECURITY INITIATIVE(GSI)The Global Security Initiative(GSI)was proposed by China in 2022 to promote common and sustainable security.It focuses on the principle of“indivisible security”by opposing the pursuit of security at the expense of others and rejecting“group or bloc confronta

224、tions”according to Chinese President Xi Jinping.Viewed by observers as an initiative to counter western security narratives and to increase Chinas global influence,44.5%of regional respondents express little or no confidence that it will benefit the region.27.4%feel confident or very confident,while

225、 28.0%of respondents have no comment.The confident and very confident views are more pronounced among respondents from Brunei and Cambodia,while those from Indonesia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Thailand,and Vietnam are less confident.Among respondents who feel that the GSI will benefit the region,32.8%a

226、re of the view that it will complement other security initiatives in the region,while a close 30.3%of respondents feel that it will promote a balance of power in the region.23.8%believe that the GSI principles are positive and reassuring.For those less confident of the GSI,the top concern is the pot

227、ential increase in tensions between the US and China(33.1%),followed closely by the perennial concern that it will force ASEAN countries to take sides(32.9%).No Confidence 15.4%Little Confidence 29.1%No Comment 28.0%Confident21.7%VeryConfident5.7%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202335CountryGSI principl

228、es are positive and reassuringIt will complement other security initiatives in the regionIt will promote a balance of power in the regionIt will strengthen the international rules-based orderASEAN23.8%32.8%30.3%13.1%Brunei15.9%43.5%36.2%4.3%Cambodia37.9%39.4%15.2%7.6%Indonesia21.7%30.4%21.7%26.1%Lao

229、s27.0%29.7%32.4%10.8%Malaysia12.9%38.7%35.5%12.9%Myanmar44.4%22.2%22.2%11.1%Philippines11.1%38.9%38.9%11.1%Singapore22.4%28.6%40.8%8.2%Thailand20.0%37.5%22.5%20.0%Vietnam25.0%18.8%37.5%18.8%CountryIt will destabilise the regionIt will increase tensions between US and ChinaIt will force ASEAN countri

230、es to take sidesIt will disrupt the international rules-based orderASEAN16.8%33.1%32.9%17.3%Brunei15.4%23.1%46.2%15.4%Cambodia18.2%31.8%31.8%18.2%Indonesia13.9%37.5%31.9%16.7%Laos28.6%33.3%28.6%9.5%Malaysia12.7%43.6%32.7%10.9%Myanmar48.1%26.6%13.9%11.4%Philippines3.8%40.4%25.0%30.8%Singapore6.5%25.0

231、%43.5%25.0%Thailand10.7%36.0%37.3%16.0%Vietnam10.0%33.3%37.8%18.9%Q28 Chinas Global Security Initiative(GSI)will benefit the region because.(choose the most important reason)584 respondents who chose the“Little Confidence”and“No Confidence”options in Q27Q29 Chinas Global Security Initiative(GSI)will

232、 NOT benefit the region because.(choose the most important reason)358 respondents who chose the“Confident”and“Very Confident”options in Q27SURVEY REPORT36CountryASEAN has to seek out“third parties”to broaden its strategic space and optionsASEAN should enhance its resilience and unity to fend off pre

233、sssure from the two major powersASEAN should continue its position of not siding with China or the USASEAN has to choose between one of the two major powers as remaining neutral is impractical20222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN16.2%18.1%46.1%45.5%26.6%30.5%11.1%6.0%Brunei17.0%21.7%50.9%37.5%28.3%3

234、2.5%3.8%8.3%Cambodia11.1%32.1%44.4%20.1%30.9%37.3%13.6%10.4%Indonesia18.3%14.0%52.7%46.3%22.1%33.1%6.9%6.6%Laos13.6%10.3%50.0%37.4%27.3%44.9%9.1%7.5%Malaysia15.6%12.9%35.6%44.4%36.3%37.9%12.6%4.8%Myanmar16.6%21.7%25.1%46.1%27.7%25.2%30.6%7.0%Philippines13.3%17.2%63.5%59.6%17.8%19.2%5.5%4.0%Singapore

235、18.0%16.8%38.3%45.2%36.9%33.7%6.8%4.3%Thailand17.1%17.4%49.6%56.9%20.5%23.6%12.8%2.1%Vietnam21.5%16.9%50.7%61.0%18.1%17.6%9.7%4.4%This section examines ASEANs sentiments and options in the unfolding power competition in the region,especially the deepening rivalry between China and the United States.

236、SECTION IV:US-China Rivalry and Impact on Southeast AsiaASSESSING ASEANS“NON-CHOICE”Similar to the findings of the last two years,Southeast Asian respondents continue to favour the option of enhancing ASEANs resilience and unity to fend off pressure from the two major powers(45.5%)as a more proactiv

237、e response.This option is most pronounced among respondents from Vietnam(61.0%)a significant increase from 2022 and the Philippines(59.6%).The second most popular or traditional option of ASEAN continuing its position of not siding with China or the US has increased slightly from 26.6%in 2022 to 30.

238、5%in 2023,and is the top choice for Lao respondents.This is followed by the option of ASEAN seeking out“third parties”to broaden its strategic space and options(18.1%),with Cambodias increase being the most significant.The option of ASEAN choosing sides between one of the two major powers as remaini

239、ng neutral is impractical remains the least popular option at 6.0%,falling significantly from 11.1%in 2022,reflecting the regions renewed desire for ASEAN to remain neutral.Q30 ASEAN is caught in the crossfire as Beijing and Washington compete for influence and leadership in Southeast Asia.How shoul

240、d ASEAN best respond?2023202245.5%18.1%30.5%6.0%46.1%16.2%26.6%11.1%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202337202361.1%38.9%ChinaUSCountryChinaThe United States2022202320222023ASEAN43.0%38.9%57.0%61.1%Brunei64.2%55.0%35.8%45.0%Cambodia81.5%26.9%18.5%73.1%Indonesia44.3%53.7%55.7%46.3%Laos81.8%41.1%18.2%58.9%

241、Malaysia43.0%54.8%57.0%45.2%Myanmar8.0%32.2%92.0%67.8%Philippines16.5%21.2%83.5%78.8%Singapore22.1%38.9%77.9%61.1%Thailand42.7%43.1%57.3%56.9%Vietnam26.4%22.1%73.6%77.9%ASEANS FUTURE:CHINA OR THE UNITED STATES?The US popularity among Southeast Asian respondents continues to increase(from 57.0%in 202

242、2 to 61.1%in 2023)compared to 38.9%of the respondents who chose China further widening the popularity gap between the major powers.Country-level data reveals a significant shift in the attitude among ASEAN countries.The US has gained significant positive perceptions from Cambodia(18.5%to 73.1%)and L

243、aos(18.2%to 58.9%),while support from the respondents of six ASEAN Q31 If ASEAN were forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals,which should it choose?countries fell,with Myanmar and Singapore being the most significant.China continues to enjoy popular support from Bruneis responden

244、ts(55.0%),and has gained greater support from Malaysia(54.8%)and Indonesia(53.7%).While the majority of Myanmar respondents has chosen the US over China,the percentage share for China has increased nearly four-fold from 8.0%in 2022 to 32.2%in 2023.202257.0%43.0%ChinaUSSURVEY REPORT38CountryAustralia

245、The European UnionIndiaJapanRepublic of KoreaThe United Kingdom202220232022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN10.3%9.3%40.2%42.9%5.1%11.3%29.2%26.6%6.8%3.2%8.4%6.8%Brunei20.8%8.3%30.2%54.2%0.0%6.7%20.8%19.2%9.4%6.7%18.9%5.0%Cambodia6.2%1.5%48.1%79.9%9.9%6.0%13.6%9.0%8.6%0.0%13.6%3.7%Indonesia1

246、0.7%7.4%40.5%38.8%3.8%9.9%31.3%36.4%6.9%4.1%6.9%3.3%Laos4.5%16.8%36.4%42.1%2.3%13.1%47.7%18.7%6.8%1.9%2.3%7.5%Malaysia5.9%10.5%49.6%31.5%6.7%12.9%23.0%27.4%6.7%4.8%8.1%12.9%Myanmar6.3%12.2%46.0%14.8%1.7%21.7%26.6%39.1%11.4%1.7%8.0%10.4%Philippines19.0%7.1%34.5%33.3%3.0%4.0%34.5%39.4%1.8%4.0%7.3%12.1

247、%Singapore9.9%18.3%39.2%38.9%5.0%10.6%35.1%25.5%5.9%1.9%5.0%4.8%Thailand8.5%6.3%41.9%42.4%7.7%16.0%25.6%21.5%6.8%6.9%9.4%6.9%Vietnam11.1%4.4%35.4%52.9%11.1%11.8%33.3%29.4%4.2%0.0%4.9%1.5%BROADENING ASEANS STRATEGIC OPTIONSQ32 If ASEAN were to seek out“third parties”to hedge against the uncertainties

248、 of the US-China strategic rivalry,who is your preferred and trusted strategic partner for ASEAN?The European Union(EU)and Japan continue to be in the leading positions for regional respondents in hedging against the uncertainties of the US-China strategic rivalry.42.9%of the respondents chose the E

249、U,followed by 26.6%for Japan.India,which was ranked last in 2022,doubled its ratings from 5.1%in 2022 to 11.3%in 2023 to take the third spot.This is followed by Australia(9.3%),the United Kingdom(6.8%),and the Republic of Korea(3.2%).Among the six dialogue partners of ASEAN,only the EU and India saw

250、 an increase in their percentage share.The EU is the top choice for all regional countries,except for Myanmar and the Philippines,whose respondents favour Japan most.Cambodia respondents support for the EU has increased considerably from 48.1%in 2022 to 79.9%in 2023.Confidence in India increased acr

251、oss all ASEAN countries except for Cambodia.Indias strategic autonomy coupled with key milestones such as the 30th anniversary of ASEAN-India dialogue relations in 2022 which led to an elevation to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership status,and Indias G20 Presidency in 2023 are possible reasons crea

252、ting greater visibility for the nation.50%25%0%11.3%9.3%42.9%26.6%10.3%5.1%29.2%40.2%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202339CountryWorsen significantlyWorsenRemain the sameImproveImprove significantly2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN8.2%5.2%12.4%11.9%32.9%44.2%31.0%30.4%15.6%8.3%Brunei0.0%5.0

253、%5.7%5.8%20.8%37.5%52.8%47.5%20.8%4.2%Cambodia6.2%1.5%0.0%2.2%9.9%18.7%42.0%43.3%42.0%34.3%Indonesia3.1%3.3%11.5%11.6%32.1%43.8%39.7%33.9%13.7%7.4%Laos2.3%0.0%2.3%7.5%11.4%64.5%38.6%24.3%45.5%3.7%Malaysia6.7%2.4%11.9%9.7%43.7%49.2%29.6%31.5%8.1%7.3%Myanmar40.6%20.0%25.4%28.7%23.7%28.7%7.7%17.4%2.6%5

254、.2%Philippines10.0%9.1%30.8%24.2%31.5%38.4%24.3%24.2%3.5%4.0%Singapore4.1%1.0%12.2%9.1%61.7%59.1%19.8%24.0%2.3%6.7%Thailand5.1%2.8%9.4%6.9%39.3%47.2%34.2%33.3%12.0%9.7%Vietnam4.2%6.6%14.6%13.2%54.9%55.1%20.8%24.3%5.6%0.7%THE FUTURE OF CHINAS RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIESQ33 Following the 20th Ch

255、inese Communist Party Congress and other recent geopolitical developments,how do you see your countrys relations with China evolving in the next three years?Following the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress and other recent geopolitical developments surrounding China,the largest group of Southeast

256、 Asian respondents(44.2%)view that their relations with China will remain the same.The number of respondents who expect their bilateral relations with China to improve or improve significantly decreased from 46.6%in 2022 to 38.7%in 2023.Lao respondents had the most significant decline in their optim

257、ism from 84.1%in 2022 to 28.0%in 2023.Cambodia respondents are the most positive with 77.6%expecting an improvement in their relations with China.The number of respondents who chose“worsen”(11.9%)and“worsen significantly”(5.2%)has decreased from 2022,possibly due to Chinas proactive engagement with

258、ASEAN countries.There is a significant shift of perceptions towards the status quo,especially among respondents from Laos.202317.1%46.6%20.6%32.9%44.2%38.7%2022SURVEY REPORT4038.8%202226.4%202246.2%2022CountryChinas use of economic tools and tourism to punish my countrys foreign policy choicesChinas

259、 mistreatment of its minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang and its handling of Hong KongChinas strong-arm tactics in Taiwan,the South China Sea and the MekongChinas tacit support for Russian invasion of UkraineChinas growing economic dominance and political influence in my countryChinas interference in m

260、y countrys domestic affairs(including influence over the ethnic Chinese citizens of my country)20222023202220232022202320232022202320222023ASEAN38.8%32.9%26.4%24.4%46.2%33.3%27.1%50.7%44.3%37.9%38.0%Brunei23.1%9.7%46.2%21.0%56.4%66.1%61.3%51.3%27.4%23.1%14.5%Cambodia50.0%21.2%17.6%26.0%33.8%19.2%32.

261、7%50.0%52.9%48.5%48.1%Indonesia28.6%24.0%41.4%42.0%48.6%36.0%14.0%50.0%44.0%31.4%40.0%Laos43.2%43.3%18.9%16.7%24.3%20.0%26.7%75.7%36.7%37.8%56.7%Malaysia49.0%27.1%17.6%35.4%56.9%52.1%16.7%33.3%50.0%43.1%18.8%Myanmar33.3%26.9%19.4%19.2%16.7%7.7%26.9%69.4%61.5%61.1%57.7%Philippines27.9%28.6%18.0%17.9%

262、71.2%32.1%35.7%55.0%50.0%27.9%35.7%Singapore63.3%56.3%26.5%17.2%51.0%34.4%25.0%18.4%21.9%40.8%45.3%Thailand40.7%41.9%24.1%16.1%48.1%27.4%17.7%53.7%62.9%33.3%33.9%Vietnam28.9%50.0%34.2%32.4%55.3%38.2%14.7%50.0%35.3%31.6%29.4%Q34 What could potentially worsen your positive impression of China?(check 2

263、 responses)THE FUTURE OF CHINAS RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIESAmong those who believe future relations will improve,the largest group of respondents(44.3%)sees Chinas growing economic dominance and political influence in their countries as a potential problem.This view is the top choice for respo

264、ndents from Cambodia(52.9%),Indonesia(44.0%),Malaysia(50.0%),Myanmar(61.5%),the Philippines(50.0%),and Thailand(62.9%).The second top concern of this optimistic group(38.0%)is that“Chinas interference in my countrys domestic affairs(including influence over the ethnic Chinese citizens of my country)

265、”.This is the top concern for respondents from Myanmar(57.7%).This is followed by concern over“Chinas strong-arm tactics in Taiwan,the South China Sea,and the Mekong”(33.3%)which is the top concern for respondents from Brunei(66.1%)and Malaysia(52.1%),both of whom are claimant states in the South Ch

266、ina Sea.Following closely behind as the fourth overall concern is“Chinas use of economic tools and tourism to punish my countrys foreign policy choices”at 32.9%,which is the top concern for respondents from Singapore(56.3%)and Vietnam(50.0%).Chinas tacit support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine(w

267、hich is a new option this year),ranked highly for Brunei respondents at 61.3%.508 respondents who chose the“Improve”and“Improve significantly”options in Q33Use of economic tools and tourism to punish my countrys foreign policy choicesMistreatment of its minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang and its handl

268、ing of Hong KongStrong-arm tactics in Taiwan,the South China Sea and the MekongTacit support for Russian invasion of UkraineGrowing economic dominance and political influence in my countryInterference in my countrys domestic affairs(including influence over the ethnic Chinese citizens of my country)

269、27.1%32.9%202324.4%202333.3%202344.3%202338.0%2023202337.9%202250.7%2022THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202341CountryChina should resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international lawChina should make bilateral trade truly mutually beneficial by addressing trade i

270、mbalancesDeepen mutual understanding by enhancing people-to-people relationsChina should respect my countrys sovereignty and not constrain my countrys foreign policy choicesThe fault lines between my country and China cannot be bridged2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN64.6%59.8%33.3%47.4%

271、14.8%31.7%77.3%54.2%10.0%7.0%Brunei66.7%38.5%33.3%23.1%0.0%46.2%100.0%61.5%0.0%30.8%Cambodia80.0%20.0%20.0%80.0%20.0%40.0%80.0%60.0%0.0%0.0%Indonesia63.2%72.2%52.6%61.1%15.8%11.1%57.9%55.6%10.5%0.0%Laos50.0%12.5%50.0%50.0%0.0%75.0%100.0%37.5%0.0%25.0%Malaysia52.0%73.3%36.0%33.3%28.0%20.0%72.0%73.3%1

272、2.0%0.0%Myanmar42.9%60.7%29.0%75.0%26.8%51.8%74.0%12.5%27.3%0.0%Philippines94.5%84.8%19.6%33.3%4.9%9.1%79.1%66.7%1.8%6.1%Singapore72.2%85.7%13.9%23.8%25.0%23.8%80.6%61.9%8.3%4.8%Thailand35.3%57.1%52.9%64.3%23.5%28.6%70.6%50.0%17.6%0.0%Vietnam88.9%92.6%25.9%29.6%3.7%11.1%59.3%63.0%22.2%3.7%THE FUTURE

273、 OF CHINAS RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES Q35 What can China do to improve relations with your country?(check 2 responses)210 respondents who chose the“Worsen”and“Worsen significantly”options in Q33The top desire for regional respondents with a pessimistic view of relations(59.8%)is for China to

274、resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international law although this option recorded a slight decline from 64.6%the year before.This is the top choice for Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Vietnam all of whom(except Singapore)have competing claim

275、s with China in the South China Sea.A close second sentiment for this group of respondents(54.2%)is“China should respect my countrys sovereignty and not constrain my countrys foreign policy choices”.This is the top choice for respondents from Brunei,and Malaysia(tied with the top option).The third-r

276、anked option“China should make bilateral trade mutually beneficial by addressing trade imbalances”at 47.4%is the top preference for respondents from Cambodia,Myanmar,and Thailand.This option saw a 14 percentage point jump from 33.3%in 2022.There is a significant increase in preference for China to d

277、eepen mutual understanding by enhancing people-to-people relations from 14.8%in 2022 to 31.7%in 2023.This option is the top choice for respondents from Laos and has seen a considerable increase in percentage points from respondents in Brunei,Cambodia,and Myanmar.64.6%33.3%14.8%77.3%10.0%China should

278、 resolve all territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international lawChina should make bilateral trade truly mutually beneficial by addressing trade imbalancesDeepen mutual understanding by enhancing people-to-people relationsChina should respect my countrys sovereignty and

279、not constrain my countrys foreign policy choicesThe fault lines between my country and China cannot be bridged31.7%54.2%7.0%59.8%47.4%SURVEY REPORT42202225.7%45.8%21.7%32.4%39.4%CountryDecreased significantlyDecreasedRemained unchangedIncreasedIncreased significantly202220232022202320222023202220232

280、0222023ASEAN5.6%4.7%16.1%21.0%32.4%34.9%38.9%33.6%6.9%5.8%Brunei1.9%2.5%11.3%9.2%34.0%39.2%47.2%42.5%5.7%6.7%Cambodia14.8%1.5%23.5%3.0%34.6%20.9%23.5%45.5%3.7%29.1%Indonesia4.6%5.0%17.6%16.5%40.5%47.1%32.8%29.8%4.6%1.7%Laos6.8%0.9%15.9%9.3%34.1%61.7%43.2%27.1%0.0%0.9%Malaysia6.7%1.6%13.3%25.0%40.7%3

281、6.3%31.9%33.9%7.4%3.2%Myanmar3.4%12.2%12.0%53.0%28.0%17.4%45.4%15.7%11.1%1.7%Philippines6.0%4.0%22.0%17.2%37.0%31.3%30.0%44.4%5.0%3.0%Singapore2.7%2.4%9.0%12.0%27.5%35.6%47.3%43.3%13.5%6.7%Thailand4.3%6.9%12.0%26.4%29.9%34.0%41.0%27.8%12.8%4.9%Vietnam4.9%9.6%24.3%38.2%18.1%25.7%47.2%26.5%5.6%0.0%ASS

282、ESSING US ENGAGEMENT IN THE REGIONMore than a third(39.4%)of respondents perceive that the level of US engagement with Southeast Asia has increased or increased significantly.Although this is the prevailing opinion,there is a decrease in the expectation(-6.4%)compared to 2022.This optimism is expres

283、sed by respondents from Brunei,Cambodia,the Philippines,and Singapore.The most significant increase is among Cambodian respondents from 27.2%to 74.6%and the most significant decrease in optimism is Myanmar,falling from 56.5%to 17.4%.A significant percentage of respondents(34.9%)viewed that the level

284、 of US engagement with Southeast Asia has remained unchanged,considering that the Bidens Administration is at its midterm mark.This is a slight increase from 2022 and is the top choice for respondents from Indonesia and Laos.There is a slight increase in percentage of respondents who are less optimi

285、stic(choosing decreased significantly/decreased)from 21.7%in 2022 to 25.7%in 2023.This is the predominant view among respondents from Myanmar,Thailand,and Vietnam.There is however a significant decline in pessimism regarding the level of US engagement among respondents from Cambodia and Laos,possibl

286、y due to President Bidens visit to Cambodia in November and the special ASEAN-US Summit in May last year.Q36 At the mid-term mark of the Biden Administration,the level of US engagement with Southeast Asia has.202334.9%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202343CountryNo ConfidenceLittle ConfidenceNo CommentC

287、onfidentVery Confident2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN6.4%6.4%26.4%25.6%24.6%20.9%34.7%35.6%7.9%11.6%Brunei5.7%2.5%43.4%14.2%24.5%40.8%24.5%34.2%1.9%8.3%Cambodia9.9%1.5%27.2%13.4%29.6%8.2%23.5%49.3%9.9%27.6%Indonesia6.1%13.2%30.5%38.0%23.7%17.4%35.1%28.9%4.6%2.5%Laos11.4%0.9%27.3%11.2%5

288、0.0%39.3%11.4%47.7%0.0%0.9%Malaysia9.6%2.4%24.4%33.9%22.2%22.6%31.1%36.3%12.6%4.8%Myanmar4.3%21.7%11.1%15.7%23.4%9.6%42.3%11.3%18.9%41.7%Philippines4.0%3.0%25.3%25.3%13.3%9.1%50.0%51.5%7.5%11.1%Singapore4.5%6.7%28.4%36.5%18.0%17.8%41.0%32.7%8.1%6.3%Thailand4.3%4.9%30.8%37.5%18.8%13.9%38.5%33.3%7.7%1

289、0.4%Vietnam4.2%6.6%16.0%30.1%22.2%30.1%50.0%30.9%7.6%2.2%Q37 How confident are you of the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security?IS THE US A RELIABLE STRATEGIC PARTNER?47.2%of respondents are confident or very confident of the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional s

290、ecurity an increase from 42.6%in 2022.This follows a series of high-level summits in Washington D.C.and Phnom Penh between President Biden and the ASEAN leaders,as well as several new security initiatives for the region as part of the 45th anniversary of ASEAN-US dialogue relations in 2022.Responden

291、ts from Brunei,Cambodia,Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,and Thailand expressed confidence as their top choice.Similar to the findings in 2022,32.0%of respondents expressed little or no confidence.However,there is a shift in positions among regional countries with more respondents from Indonesi

292、a,Singapore,and Vietnam choosing this option as their top choice(instead of Cambodia and Brunei in 2022).2023202232.0%47.2%42.6%32.8%24.6%20.9%SURVEY REPORT44CountryNo ConfidenceLittle ConfidenceNo CommentConfidentVery Confident2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN24.8%19.0%33.3%30.8%15.1%20

293、.7%20.1%25.3%6.7%4.2%Brunei7.5%5.0%60.4%16.7%15.1%17.5%17.0%59.2%0.0%1.7%Cambodia8.6%2.2%8.6%16.4%8.6%27.6%44.4%43.3%29.6%10.4%Indonesia12.2%19.8%38.9%38.0%19.8%19.8%21.4%16.5%7.6%5.8%Laos4.5%0.9%36.4%15.9%34.1%39.3%22.7%40.2%2.3%3.7%Malaysia20.0%8.9%31.1%39.5%11.9%22.6%28.9%28.2%8.1%0.8%Myanmar77.1

294、%53.9%11.7%26.1%9.4%12.2%1.7%7.0%0.0%0.9%Philippines31.5%26.3%50.5%36.4%9.3%16.2%8.8%15.2%0.0%6.1%Singapore35.6%15.9%34.2%40.4%14.0%15.9%14.9%21.2%1.4%6.7%Thailand21.4%20.1%26.5%36.8%17.9%18.8%24.8%18.8%9.4%5.6%Vietnam29.9%36.8%34.7%41.9%11.1%16.9%16.0%3.7%8.3%0.7%202215.1%26.8%202358.1%49.8%20.7%29

295、.5%CHINAThis section measures the levels of trust in the major powers to“do the right thing”in the wider interests of the global community.SECTION V:Perceptions of TrustClose to half of respondents(49.8%)have either“little confidence”(30.8%)or“no confidence”(19.0%)in China to“do the right thing”to c

296、ontribute to global peace,security,prosperity and governance.Only 29.5%are either“confident”or“very confident”that China will step up to the plate.Overall,the percentage of distrust of China has dwindled from 58.1%in 2022 to 49.8%this year.Among those who trust China,47.6%attribute this to Chinas“va

297、st economic resources and strong political will to provide global leadership”.18.7%agree that China is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law.Meanwhile,12.7%agree that Chinas military power is an asset for global security and another 12.7%think that their countrys po

298、litical culture and worldviews are compatible with Chinas.Only 8.3%think that the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress(CCPC)has made China stronger and more stable(new option).Levels of distrust towards China are higher than levels of trust in all ASEAN member states,except Brunei,Cambodia,and Laos

299、.The distrust levels are most pronounced in Myanmar(80.0%),Vietnam(78.7%),the Philippines(62.7%),Indonesia(57.8%),Thailand(56.9%),and Singapore(56.3%).Meanwhile,the share of distrust towards China in Laos is only 16.8%,significantly lower than the ASEAN average of 49.8%.Among those who distrust Chin

300、a,41.4%think that Chinas economic and military power can be used to threaten their countrys interest and sovereignty.This view is shared strongly in Vietnam(65.4%),the Philippines(62.9%),Cambodia(44.0%),Malaysia(41.7%),Indonesia(35.7%),and Singapore(35.0%).Among this group,26.6%think that China is n

301、ot a reliable power,followed by 12.7%who feel that Chinas future stability has become more uncertain after the 20th CCPC.Another 11.3%express worry that China is distracted with its internal affairs.Q38 How confident are you that China will“do the right thing”to contribute to global peace,security,p

302、rosperity,and governance?THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202345CountryChina has vasteconomic resourcesand the political will to provide global leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware compatible with the ChinasChina is aresponsiblestakeholderthat respectsand championsinternational lawChin

303、as militarypower is an assetfor global peace and securityI respect China andadmire its civilisationand cultureThe 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress has made China stronger and more stable2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN43.8%47.6%15.7%12.7%13.6%18.7%13.1%12.7%13.8%8.3%Brunei88.9%39.7

304、%0.0%5.5%0.0%39.7%0.0%9.6%11.1%5.5%Cambodia30.0%19.4%18.3%27.8%23.3%13.9%18.3%26.4%10.0%12.5%Indonesia26.3%81.5%5.3%0.0%15.8%11.1%21.1%7.4%31.6%0.0%Laos27.3%36.2%45.5%14.9%9.1%10.6%9.1%27.7%9.1%10.6%Malaysia42.0%69.4%6.0%0.0%30.0%13.9%10.0%11.1%12.0%5.6%Myanmar50.0%66.7%33.3%22.2%0.0%0.0%0.0%11.1%16

305、.7%0.0%Philippines62.9%38.1%5.7%19.0%5.7%23.8%2.9%19.0%22.9%0.0%Singapore50.0%43.1%19.4%17.2%11.1%20.7%5.6%12.1%13.9%6.9%Thailand35.0%48.6%12.5%20.0%15.0%20.0%30.0%2.9%7.5%8.6%Vietnam25.7%33.3%11.4%0.0%25.7%33.3%34.3%0.0%2.9%33.3%CountryChina does nothave the capacityor political will forglobal lead

306、ershipChinas future stability has become more uncertain after the 20th Chinese Communist Party CongressMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible withChinasI am concerned thatChina is distractedwith its internalaffairs and thuscannot focus onglobal concerns and issuesChinas economic

307、and military power could be used to threaten my countrys interests and sovereignty.I do not consider China a reliable power2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN8.4%12.7%7.6%7.9%11.4%11.3%49.6%41.4%23.0%26.6%Brunei2.8%26.9%11.1%15.4%8.3%15.4%50.0%23.1%27.8%19.2%Cambodia7.1%20.0%0.0%4.0%14.3%1

308、6.0%71.4%44.0%7.1%16.0%Indonesia4.5%14.3%13.4%15.7%28.4%12.9%40.3%35.7%13.4%21.4%Laos16.7%11.1%11.1%5.6%16.7%11.1%38.9%33.3%16.7%38.9%Malaysia11.6%20.0%7.2%8.3%8.7%15.0%49.3%41.7%23.2%15.0%Myanmar14.1%3.3%7.1%5.4%5.5%5.4%47.9%31.5%25.4%54.3%Philippines4.0%8.1%4.9%8.1%2.7%4.8%70.7%62.9%17.7%16.1%Sing

309、apore8.4%10.3%3.9%10.3%5.8%11.1%38.1%35.0%43.9%33.3%Thailand10.7%8.5%10.7%3.7%16.1%15.9%39.3%41.5%23.2%30.5%Vietnam4.3%4.7%6.5%2.8%7.5%5.6%50.5%65.4%31.2%21.5%384 respondents who chose the“Confident”and“Very Confident”options in Q38 Q39 Why do you trust China?659 respondents who chose the“Little Con

310、fidence”and“No Confidence”options in Q38Q40 Why do you distrust China?SURVEY REPORT46CountryNo ConfidenceLittle ConfidenceNo CommentConfidentVery Confident2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN4.9%5.2%21.2%23.9%25.4%19.9%42.0%40.3%6.5%10.7%Brunei9.4%3.3%28.3%15.8%32.1%48.3%28.3%21.7%1.9%10.8%

311、Cambodia3.7%0.7%12.3%10.4%24.7%2.2%58.0%36.6%1.2%50.0%Indonesia6.1%12.4%24.4%35.5%26.0%14.9%40.5%33.1%3.1%4.1%Laos2.3%0.9%20.5%5.6%45.5%28.0%27.3%63.6%4.5%1.9%Malaysia4.4%4.0%20.7%27.4%17.0%21.0%43.7%40.3%14.1%7.3%Myanmar3.4%15.7%16.3%46.1%21.7%21.7%49.4%14.8%9.1%1.7%Philippines3.5%2.0%24.3%22.2%12.

312、5%14.1%50.8%51.5%9.0%10.1%Singapore5.4%5.8%25.7%27.9%24.8%15.4%35.6%41.8%8.6%9.1%Thailand7.7%2.8%23.1%26.4%24.8%18.1%38.5%44.4%6.0%8.3%Vietnam2.8%4.4%16.7%21.3%25.0%15.4%47.9%55.1%7.6%3.7%26.1%25.4%48.5%THE EUROPEAN UNIONThe European Unions trust rating has remained strong and increased moderately t

313、his year.The number of respondents having confidence in the EU to“do the right thing”has risen from 48.5%in 2022 to 51.0%this year but the share of distrust has also increased.The highest levels of trust towards the EU are shared strongly by respondents from Cambodia (86.6%),Laos(65.5%),the Philippi

314、nes(61.6%),Vietnam(58.8%),and Thailand(52.7%).Myanmar,in particular,sees a big decline in its trust towards the EU from 58.5%in 2022 to 16.5%this year.Myanmar and Indonesia are the only countries where the distrust level outstripped the trust level.The regions positive view towards the EU is largely

315、 attributed to its leadership in championing human rights and climate change which is considered an asset for global peace and security(38.1%).This view is more pronounced in Cambodia(46.6%),Malaysia(44.1%),Brunei(43.6%),Laos(42.9%),and Thailand(42.1%).Among this cohort,30.9%also think that the EU i

316、s a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law(no change from 2022).Q41 How confident are you that the EU will“do the right thing”to contribute to global peace,security,prosperity,and governance?In the group of EU sceptics,33.4%express concern that the EU does not have the

317、 capacity or political will for global leadership,an increase from 26.7%in 2022.This view is shared strongly by respondents from Vietnam(60.0%),Singapore(52.9%),Cambodia(46.7%),and Brunei(34.8%).2022202329.1%19.9%51.0%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202347CountryThe EU does nothave the capacityor politi

318、cal will forglobal leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible withthe EUsI am concerned thatthe EU is distractedwith its internalaffairs and thuscannot focus onglobal concerns and issuesThe EUs stanceon environment,human rights,andclimate changecould be usedto threaten myco

319、untrys interestand sovereigntyI do not consider the EU a reliable power2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN26.7%33.4%12.4%9.2%30.1%29.4%17.7%14.5%13.1%13.5%Brunei25.0%34.8%10.0%13.0%25.0%30.4%5.0%8.7%35.0%13.0%Cambodia0.0%46.7%0.0%13.3%46.2%26.7%38.5%6.7%15.4%6.7%Indonesia25.0%22.4%12.5%10.

320、3%32.5%20.7%17.5%29.3%12.5%17.2%Laos20.0%28.6%50.0%0.0%20.0%28.6%10.0%14.3%0.0%28.6%Malaysia35.3%25.6%2.9%7.7%26.5%25.6%20.6%23.1%14.7%17.9%Myanmar33.3%15.5%14.5%18.3%30.4%38.0%2.9%9.9%18.8%18.3%Philippines18.9%16.7%9.0%16.7%38.7%37.5%19.8%25.0%13.5%4.2%Singapore59.4%52.9%2.9%1.4%27.5%25.7%4.3%5.7%5

321、.8%14.3%Thailand11.1%31.0%11.1%2.4%36.1%40.5%33.3%16.7%8.3%9.5%Vietnam39.3%60.0%10.7%8.6%17.9%20.0%25.0%5.7%7.1%5.7%CountryThe EU has vasteconomic resourcesand the political willto provide globalleadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware compatible with the EUsThe EU is aresponsiblestak

322、eholderthat respectsand championsinternational lawThe EUs militarypower is an assetfor global peace and securityI respect Europe andadmire its civilisationand culture2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN19.4%19.1%4.5%6.4%30.9%30.9%38.4%38.1%6.8%5.4%Brunei25.0%15.4%0.0%17.9%6.3%12.8%62.5%43.6

323、%6.3%10.3%Cambodia22.9%7.8%10.4%3.4%31.3%33.6%31.3%46.6%4.2%8.6%Indonesia21.1%24.4%3.5%2.2%29.8%28.9%42.1%40.0%3.5%4.4%Laos21.4%20.0%7.1%7.1%28.6%25.7%35.7%42.9%7.1%4.3%Malaysia12.8%11.9%2.6%8.5%44.9%30.5%29.5%44.1%10.3%5.1%Myanmar27.3%26.3%4.4%0.0%18.5%47.4%36.6%26.3%13.2%0.0%Philippines20.5%29.5%2

324、.5%6.6%35.6%24.6%37.7%31.1%3.8%8.2%Singapore9.2%12.3%2.0%5.7%49.0%44.3%34.7%33.0%5.1%4.7%Thailand15.4%19.7%9.6%9.2%25.0%28.9%44.2%42.1%5.8%0.0%Vietnam18.8%23.8%2.5%3.8%40.0%32.5%30.0%31.3%8.8%8.8%384 respondents who chose the“Little Confidence”and“No Confidence”options in Q41Q43 Why do you distrust

325、the EU?671 respondents who chose the“Confident”and“Very Confident”options in Q41Q42 Why do you trust the EU?SURVEY REPORT48CountryNo ConfidenceLittle ConfidenceNo CommentConfidentVery Confident2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN20.0%12.1%27.8%32.1%35.6%30.2%16.0%22.7%0.6%3.0%Brunei20.8%5.8

326、%35.8%50.1%35.8%10.8%7.5%25.0%0.0%8.3%Cambodia21.0%14.2%19.8%38.1%42.0%38.1%17.3%8.2%0.0%1.5%Indonesia20.6%19.8%33.6%33.9%35.9%22.3%9.9%21.5%0.0%2.5%Laos25.0%0.9%4.5%4.7%59.1%66.4%11.4%27.1%0.0%0.9%Malaysia28.1%8.9%28.1%30.6%23.7%35.5%17.8%21.0%2.2%4.0%Myanmar22.9%36.5%32.0%29.6%36.6%22.6%7.7%9.6%0.

327、9%1.7%Philippines6.5%3.0%28.8%35.4%29.5%21.2%33.5%35.4%1.8%5.1%Singapore26.1%14.9%41.0%35.6%25.7%25.5%6.8%21.2%0.5%2.9%Thailand23.1%12.5%29.1%32.6%29.1%27.8%17.9%25.0%0.9%2.1%Vietnam5.6%4.4%25.7%30.1%38.9%31.6%29.9%33.1%0.0%0.7%INDIAIndia has enjoyed a significant increase in trust levels this year(

328、25.7%)compared to last year(16.6%).But doubts about India are still pronounced overall(44.2%),especially in Myanmar(66.1%),Brunei(55.9%),Indonesia(53.7%),Cambodia(52.3%),Singapore(50.5%),and Thailand(45.1%).Meanwhile,the Philippines is the only country whose level of trust(40.5%)outstripped the leve

329、l of distrust(38.4%).Of the cohort that trusts India,25.4%(a decline from 37.1%in 2022)believe that it is a responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law.This view is shared strongly in Vietnam(43.5%),Brunei(35.0%),and Singapore(34.0%).What is surprising is the three-fold inc

330、rease from 6.6%in 2022 to 18.2%in 2023 in the confidence that Indias military power is an asset for global peace and security.Among those who distrust India,34.6%believe that India is distracted with its internal and sub-continental affairs and thus cannot focus on global concerns.This view is more

331、pronounced in Brunei(76.1%),the Philippines(44.7%),Vietnam(40.4%),and Thailand(35.4%).An almost equal proportion of respondents(33.6%)also raise concerns that India does not have the capacity or political will for global leadership.Q44 How confident are you that India will“do the right thing”to cont

332、ribute to global peace,security,prosperity,and governance?202235.6%16.6%202347.8%44.2%25.7%30.2%THE STATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA:202349CountryIndia does nothave the capacityor political will forglobal leadershipMy countrys politicalculture and worldvieware incompatible with IndiasI am concerned thatIndia

333、 is distractedwith its internalaffairs and thuscannot focus onglobal concerns and issuesIndias economic andmilitary power couldbe used to threatenmy countrys interestsand sovereigntyI do not consider India a reliable power2022202320222023202220232022202320222023ASEAN38.0%33.6%6.5%4.8%32.4%34.6%1.9%6.3%21.1%20.7%Brunei20.0%1.5%3.3%9.0%36.7%76.1%0.0%9.0%40.0%4.5%Cambodia45.5%45.7%15.2%1.4%18.2%4.3%3