1、Strategies for Coal Transition in KoreaThe IEA examines the full spectrum of energy issues including oil,gas and coal supply and demand,renewable energy technologies,electricity markets,energy efficiency,access to energy,demand side management and much more.Through its work,the IEA advocates policie

2、s that will enhance the reliability,affordability and sustainability of energy in its 31 member countries,11 association countries and beyond.This publication and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory,to the delimitation of international fro

3、ntiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory,city or area.Source:IEA.International Energy Agency Website:www.iea.orgIEA member countries:AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzech RepublicDenmarkEstoniaFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLithuaniaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNew Z

4、ealandNorwayPolandPortugalSlovak RepublicSpainSwedenSwitzerlandRepublic of TrkiyeUnited KingdomUnited StatesThe European Commission also participates in the work of the IEAIEA association countries:ArgentinaBrazilChinaEgyptIndiaIndonesiaMoroccoSingaporeSouth AfricaThailandUkraineINTERNATIONAL ENERGY

5、AGENCYStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Abstract PAGE|3 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Abstract This report was commissioned by Koreas Ministry of Trade,Industry and Energy and carried out jointly by the International Energy Agency(IEA)and the Korea Energy Economics Institute.The objective of the study was to

6、provide high-level policy recommendations on Koreas clean energy transition from coal in the power sector.The report covers a detailed review of policy and market developments around Koreas transition to net zero.The scope of the report includes all sectors of the economy,industry and all the region

7、s across the world,where we extract the main recommendations that are applicable to the case of Korea.Currently,the power sector is the largest CO2-emitting sector and coal is the single biggest source of CO2 emissions,as it is the backbone of many electricity systems.Thus,coal power plants have bee

8、n a target for reaching net zero emissions by 2050 for long time.Korea has firm objectives to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050,aiming to accelerate the clean energy transition of coal power plants.Policy recommendations were formulated around two priorities:affordable and secure supply of electrici

9、ty and people-centred transition.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Ackknowledgements PAGE|4 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Acknowledgements,contributors and credits The report was jointly prepared by the International Energy Agency(IEA)and the Korea Energy Economics Institute(KEEI)at the request of Koreas Mini

10、stry of Trade,Industry and Energy,with the objective of providing high-level policy recommendations to attain the countrys net zero objectives.The report was designed and directed by Carlos Fernndez Alvarez,(acting)Head of the IEA Gas,Coal and Power(GCP)Markets Division.The lead authors of the repor

11、t were Carlos Fernndez Alvarez and Jeong YuJin.Keisuke Sadamori,Director of Energy Markets and Security at the IEA,and Dr Yongduk Pak provided expert comments and senior guidance.Tae-Yoon Kim provided invaluable advice,comments and suggestions throughout the process.Rachael Moore and Ilkka Hannula p

12、rovided useful input and advice for the analysis.Javier Jorquera Copier supported the publication of the report.The authors would like to thank Dr.Sang Lim Lee and Dr.Sung Sam Chung from KEEI for their detailed and constructive feedback on the report.Finally,the authors are grateful to the IEA Commu

13、nications and Digital Office,notably Astrid Dumond and Therese Walsh,for their support in producing and promoting this report,and Erin Crum for editing the report.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Table of contents PAGE|5 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Table of contents Executive summary.6 Chapter 1.Coal in cl

14、ean energy transitions.10 Coal in the net zero transition in the global context.10 A new context for the net zero transition.15 Status of coal phase-down pledges.20 The outlook for coal use and emissions.22 Lessons from past transitions.31 Chapter 2.Current transition policy for the coal-fired power

15、 sector in Korea.45 Status of Koreas coal-fired power generation.45 Coal phase-down progress.51 Relevant policies on coal-fired power generation.55 Survey for coal phase-down policy.61 Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transition in Korea.70 Applications to Korea.72 Follow the

16、 principles of a people-centred transition.74 Ensure security and affordability of the electricity system.85 Consider conversion of coal power plants to low-emissions assets.89 References.100 General annex.102 Abbreviations and acronyms.102 Units of measurement.103 Strategies for Coal Transition in

17、Korea Executive summary PAGE|6 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Executive summary CO2 emissions from coal are at the centre of the climate and energy debate Coal is the largest energy source for electricity generation,steel making and cement production,three indispensable ingredients of modern life.At the same time,co

18、al is the largest source of CO2 emissions,responsible for around 40%of energy-related emissions.This puts coal at the centre of the energy and climate debate.The fight against climate change entered a new phase in 2015 with the historic Paris Agreement,in which 195 countries and the European Union p

19、ledged to keep the temperature increases well below 2C,preferably below 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.Despite the strong signal given by the Paris Agreement,CO2 emissions have not decreased since then,with the exception of 2020,in which the pandemic induced a temporary decline.In 2021,a strong re

20、bound resulted in emissions surpassing 2019 levels to set a new record high.The same year,the International Energy Agency(IEA)published its first net zero roadmap,in which a narrow but possible pathway was identified to lead the global energy sector to carbon neutrality by 2050.In November 2022,the

21、IEA published Coal in Net Zero Transitions:Strategies for Rapid,Secure and People-Centred Change;its analyses and conclusions will be one of the sources of this report.In particular,chapter 1 of this report draws mainly from Coal in Net Zero Transitions report.The electricity sector of advanced econ

22、omies must lead the race to net zero Globally,two-thirds of coal and therefore the associated emissions from it are used for power generation,and the rest is mostly for industrial purposes,mainly steel,and to a lesser extent,cement.In addition,in the electricity sector there are a variety of low-car

23、bon technologies that can replace coal,unlike in sectors such as steel,in which there are no commercially available technologies to replace coal at scale today.For these two reasons,the electricity sector should be the first sector to move to net zero emissions.Moreover,given that part of the strate

24、gy for the net zero transition is the increasing electrification of the transport and industrial sectors,such a strategy can be successful only if the electricity sector is net or close to net zero.The energy transition requires important investments,which are more challenging and more costly due to

25、 higher cost of capital for emerging and developing economies than for mature economies.Therefore,the electricity sector of mature economies must Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Executive summary PAGE|7 IEA.CC BY 4.0.lead the transition to net zero.Following that line,it is necessary to expl

26、ore the opportunities and challenges of the transition to zero of coal power generation in Korea and which policies can help in this regard.The challenges of transition of coal power in Korea Koreas energy sector relies on coal up to some extent.The IEA has developed a Coal Transition Exposure Index

27、,with which we assess the challenges faced by the countries when transitioning away from coal,which reflects that Korea is not highly dependent on coal.As Korean coal production is very limited,the country relies mostly on coal imports to meet its demand.At a national level,coal makes up 27%of total

28、 energy use.More than two-thirds of coal consumption is concentrated in the power sector followed by the iron and steel sector which account for most of the balance.Driving down coal-related emissions in the power sector in Korea will be essential for wide energy-sector decarbonisation in the countr

29、y,as they account for three-quarters of national power sector CO2 emissions(and about a third of overall energy use).Presently,coal accounts for a third of the Korean power generation mix(closely followed by gas with 29%and nuclear with 27%).Renewables,on the other hand,make up about 7%of electricit

30、y generation in Korea.The 57 operational coal power plants(29 of them in Chungnam province)add up to 37 GW of coal-based generation capacity(among the top 10 in the world),and averaging 21 years of lifetime,it can be considered a moderately young coal-fired generation fleet.Moreover,the Korean coal-

31、fired generation sector employs over 50 000 workers(considering both permanent and temporary jobs).Lock-in effects due to remaining uncovered capital of coal-fired plants,a relatively low share of renewable electricity in the power sector,and re-employment needs mark clear challenges for a quick tra

32、nsition away from unabated coal power in Korea.Korea is already making some progress towards phasing down emissions from coal.Coal-fired generation declined from 240 TWh(42%of the power mix)in 2018 to 200 TWh in 2021(34%of the mix),due to coal plant closures in 2017-2021 being offset by increases in

33、 nuclear,gas and,to a lesser extent,renewable output.Plans are already in place(for example,in Chungnam province)to address workers relocation and tax revenue issues.More broadly,the Korean government has implemented relevant policies that impact coal-fired generation,such as the 3rd National Master

34、 Plan for Energy and the 9th Basic Plan for Long-Term Electricity Supply and Demand(BPLE),which aimed to ban construction of new coal power plants and retire(or convert)ageing inefficient units.Further,the Korean government unveiled 2050 carbon-neutral scenarios and aims to base its coal phase-down

35、ambition on a legal framework and compensation arrangements.As per the Korean government,nuclear power expansion will be an essential driver of emissions reductions,as planned in the 10th BPLE.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Executive summary PAGE|8 IEA.CC BY 4.0.An ad-hoc survey performed i

36、n Korea among 2 000 adults found that climate change is perceived by Koreans as the main challenge for the humankind,but only the third main challenge for Korea,after socio-economic disparity and ageing population.The government is the most important player in the transition,followed by business,pub

37、lic and municipalities.More than 90%of the participants were aware of the carbon neutrality pledge,but less than one-quarter knew the exact date to achieve it.Concerns about electricity security and price were identified as the main challenges.Around 70%of participants supported the coal transition

38、despite the challenges.More than 90%think that the coal transition must go hand in hand with just transition policies.Policy action in Korea can be a significant driver for a successful transition away from unabated coal use To face the complexities entailed in a successful transition away from unab

39、ated coal use,policy makers in Korea must design and implement a well-studied set of policies.These measures should enable the country to unlock opportunities presented by the clean energy transition,while avoiding unintended consequences of phasing down unabated coal use,such as severe employment a

40、nd economic impacts,particularly in labour-intensive regions with regard to coal.Many lessons can be obtained from experiences across the world as other countries progress in the transition and also,in particular regarding just transitions,from the past.Promote a people-centred transition from coal

41、power A people-centred transition away from unabated coal should ensure fair treatment to workers and communities,opportunities for re-employment or alternative employment,compensation schemes,and sustainable production pathways.Korea should seek engagement and create governance schemes involving st

42、akeholders directly affected by coal closures,but also other parties such as from academia and civil society.Social safety net expansions,retraining and job relocation programmes for coal power plant workers and their communities will be essential to ensure that nobody is left behind.Establishing cl

43、ear long-term energy transition strategies would foster investment in promising technologies,such as electric mobility and renewable energy,resulting in stable job creation opportunities.Another crucial goal should be to carefully design the policy set to avoid regressive distributional impacts.Ensu

44、re security and affordability of electricity supply Electricity security and affordability are two essential components for a successful clean energy transition,and this is no exception in the case of Korea.Coal power plants not only provide electricity,but also contribute to system adequacy and fle

45、xibility and provide inertia to the grid.IEA analysis shows that those services can also be provided by low-emissions assets and storage technologies,which combined with other Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Executive summary PAGE|9 IEA.CC BY 4.0.measures such as energy efficiency can suppor

46、t a transition to a more sustainable power grid without significant increases in electricity bills.Other tools such as demand response can enable the Korean power system in the future to avoid resorting to high-emissions generation to meet demand.Additionally,enhancements in electricity market desig

47、n,for example on capacity and flexibility payments,can help to provide enough incentives for dispatchable assets to contribute to the system,particularly those that will see fewer operating hours per year than in the past.Finally,investments in enabling infrastructure such as transmission and distri

48、bution capacity will be crucial;this requires social engagement,especially when seeking to speed up the approval processes while still ensuring compliance with legal and social procedures.Make the most out of existing coal assets Repurposing existing coal power plant sites presents several potential

49、 benefits,such as longer asset utilisation,mitigation of impacts on jobs and tax revenues,enhanced security of supply,and making use of existing grid connections that may otherwise take a long time to be established for new plants.Coal-fired plants can be retrofitted to use carbon capture,utilisatio

50、n and storage technologies,helping to decrease their emissions substantially while keeping some of their advantages such as flexibility and ability to provide ancillary services.Other low-emissions conversion possibilities include retrofitting coal power plants to co-fire coal with biomass or ammoni

51、a,for which there are already successful projects around the world.Additionally,coal plants could be repurposed to host a small modular reactor for nuclear electricity generation.As the upfront costs and technology readiness for these options vary,policy makers and industry will have to carefully de

52、cide which option is best for each plant intended to be repurposed.Early retirements could also be a feasible solution in some cases,to then potentially repurpose their sites for other ends.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|10 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapt

53、er 1.Coal in clean energy transitions Coal in the net zero transition in the global context Introduction For some time,climate change has been identified as one of the main challenges the world is facing.Despite decades of significant international efforts,it was not until 2015 when a legally bindin

54、g international treaty was adopted by the practical totality of the countries of the world,as 195 countries plus the European Union signed the Paris Agreement,with the goal of limiting global warming to well below 2 C,preferably to 1.5 C,compared with pre-industrial levels.The Paris Agreement is a h

55、istorical milestone in the climate negotiations process.However,the analyses of the International Energy Agency(IEA)showed that the pledges as expressed in the nationally determined contributions of the countries were far from what was needed to lead the trajectory that the agreement actually pursue

56、d.Climate ambitions have been gaining momentum since the Paris Agreement was signed,with a growing number of countries pledging to reach carbon neutrality or net zero emissions by mid-century or soon afterwards.However,with the exception of the decline driven by the Covid-19 outbreak and associated

57、lockdowns and economic recession,global greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions have continued to increase.Actually,the rebound of over 2 Gt CO2 emissions in 2021 is the biggest increase ever,making 2021 the all-time high at that time,with preliminary figures suggesting that 2022 would mark a new high.Turning

58、the trajectory around requires reductions in emissions from all fuels,including from oil and gas.However,a rapid decline in unabated coal use is inevitably a central feature of all pathways to a more sustainable energy system.Coal is the most carbonintensive fossil fuel and is responsible for a larg

59、er share of global GHG emissions than any other source of energy 15 Gt CO2 in 2021.However,global coal demand and its CO2 emissions have been stagnant,at or close to its highest level for a decade.With over 95%of global coal consumption occurring in countries that have pledged to reach net zero,gove

60、rnments and other stakeholders need to move quickly to decrease emissions.Global coal use is heavily concentrated in a small number of countries,in which coal plays a crucial role in their energy sector in particular,electricity,and also in the industry and the wider economy.Strategies for Coal Tran

61、sition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|11 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Specifically in the electricity system,the deployment of renewables and other clean alternatives is vital to replace coal power plants,although it should be accompanied by adequate infrastructure such as grids and energ

62、y storage in order to secure a reliable energy supply.Share of coal in electricity generation and coal policies IEA.All rights reserved Impacts of the clean energy transition relative to coal are country-specific.It varies depending on the level of coal in the national energy mix,resource endowments

63、,the structure of the labour market and the acceptance of local society.In order to assess the challenges the countries face in the transition process,the IEA developed the Coal Transition Exposure Index(CTEI),a typology of major coal-producing and-consuming countries exposure to the global clean en

64、ergy transition.The CTEI maps out which countries are dependent on coal and in what ways.It is structured with four key categories and two indicators for each category.0%20%40%60%80%100%South AfricaIndiaPolandMoroccoKazakhstanChinaIndonesiaPhilippinesAustraliaViet NamMalaysiaCambodiaChinese TaipeiKo

65、reaTrkiyeJapanUkraineGermanyUnited StatesRussiaCanadaMexicoUnited KingdomNational plan to phase out coalAgreed internationally to phasedown coalNet zero emissions target but nocoal commitmentStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|12 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Ener

66、gy dependence on coal is its share in the energy mix and in electricity generation.This category gives a direction of what it will take for a country to reduce coal use.Development gap is quantified by GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity and total final energy consumption per capita.I

67、t provides an approximate idea for a countrys future rate of energy demand growth and its financial and technological capacities.A country with rapidly increasing energy demand will have to expand clean energy supply as fast as demand in order to avoid increased coal use.Economic dependence is the s

68、hare of coal in total goods exports and the share of coal produced domestically compared with total coal consumption.Domestic production of a sizeable share of coal demand is likely to see coal playing a larger role in the economy than for a country that imports coal.Lock-in quantifies the challenge

69、 of potential early retirement of assets that have not been fully depreciated.Two indicators used are the capacity-weighted ages of a countrys integrated steel mills and its coal-fired power plants.The raw data of each indicator were normalised in order to assign a total score to generate the index.

70、From least to most,Botswana,South Africa,India,Viet Nam,the Peoples Republic of China(hereafter“China”),Mongolia and Indonesia have a particularly heavy and multifaceted dependence on coal,the biggest among the worlds countries.Scores have been calculated for a selection of countries that represent

71、more than 90%of global coal production and consumption.The 15 largest coal producers and 15 largest coal consumers are included.Coal Transition Exposure Index and its components IEA.All rights reserved Korea,despite its medium to high coal dependency in the power generation mix,is a developed econom

72、y without a significant domestic coal-mining sector,and therefore is 123456CanadaUnited StatesJapanGermanyRussiaKoreaBangladeshAustraliaPolandTrkiyeKazakhstanPakistanColombiaZimbabweBotswanaSouth AfricaIndiaViet NamChinaMongoliaIndonesiaNormalised CTEI scoreLock-inEconomicdependenceDevelopmentgapEne

73、rgydependenceStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|13 IEA.CC BY 4.0.not among the most impacted countries,but this does not mean that a coal transition for Korea is going to be a simple task.Coal mining a particularly labour-intensive sector is usual

74、ly concentrated in few regions even in large producing countries.Therefore,it is important to consider the regional aspect of transitions.Regions such as Shanxi in China,Mpumalanga in South Africa and East Kalimantan in Indonesia have a strong density of jobs,companies and tax revenues linked to coa

75、l mining,and this needs to be addressed in a very particular way.In the case of the coal power sector,the labour intensity is lower and might need less intervention,but the social aspects of the transition have to be properly addressed.The second chapter of this report analyses the regional distribu

76、tion of plants and jobs in Korea.In the Net Zero by 2050 report,the IEA clearly states that the clean energy transition is for and about people.Indeed,workers of the fossil fuel industry are the most recognisable vulnerable element in the transition to net zero.But this is not just about workers,and

77、 this is why the IEA has widened the concept of just transition,with a focus on workers,towards the people-centred transition,which incorporates all the principles of just transition,but tries to be more inclusive.It means that the citizens,not only those linked to coal or the fossil fuel industry,m

78、ust be recognised as active participants of the transition for at least two very good reasons.First,because this is the fair way to do it.Second,because without peoples engagement and support,the clean energy transition will derail.After the publication of Net Zero by 2050 in May 2021,the World Ener

79、gy Outlook(WEO),the IEAs flagship publication,included the Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario within its long-term scenarios,taking into account the latest information about energy markets and technologies.The NZE Scenario identifies four priorities in order to keep the door to 1.5 C open in th

80、e current decade.The priorities are clean electricity,energy efficiency,prevention of methane leaks and technology innovation.The acceleration in the first three areas can be done with existing technologies with adequate policy and financing support.However,almost half of emissions reductions in the

81、 NZE Scenario come from technologies which are not commercially available today,mainly linked to heavy industries and long-distance transportation,the sectors in which electrification is the most challenging.Technology innovation is therefore a key element in achieving global climate goals and ensur

82、ing a smooth transition in the electricity system.In November 2021,the 26th Conference of the Parties(COP26)concluded the Glasgow Climate Pact,which included a call on the parties to“accelerate efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power”.In parallel to COP26,46 countries and more than 30

83、subnational governments and organisations signed the Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement,in which signatories recognised the need to accelerate the transition from unabated coal power Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|14 IEA.CC BY 4.0

84、.generation to clean energy.The statement comprises four points,of which point two is especially relevant,as it includes the commitment to achieve a transition away from unabated coal power generation in the 2030s or soon afterwards for major economies and in the 2040s or soon afterwards globally.Th

85、e signatories of the statement include big consumers of coal,such as Germany,Indonesia,Kazakhstan,Korea,Poland and Viet Nam.As coal is the single largest CO2-emitting fuel and the backbone of many electricity systems,especially in emerging and developing economies,unabated coal was one of the main t

86、opics of discussion in Glasgow.From the discussions,it was evident that the world needs clear strategies and strong policies in order to rapidly reduce coal emissions.In the case of emerging and developing economies,international support is also needed to face the consequences throughout the economy

87、 of transitioning away from unabated coal.In Glasgow,it was also clear that the gap between pledges and targets versus reality and data was increasing.In order to help narrow the ambition gap,in the run-up to COP27,the IEA launched a report,Coal in Global Net Zero Transitions:Strategies for Rapid,Se

88、cure and People-Centred Change,with the purpose of giving clear guidance for countries to reduce coal-related emissions,focusing particularly on emerging economies,a people-centred transition and practical recommendations to make progress in this decade.The analyses and conclusions extracted from Co

89、al in Global Net Zero Transitions,together with complementary research made on Korea,constitute the foundations of this report.The report mainly focuses on coal use in the electricity sector in Korea,and thus contains relatively limited discussions on the two important aspects identified in the Coal

90、 in Global Net Zero Transitions report.a)Coal transitions in industry:While the power sector is the largest consumer of coal,rapidly reducing coal use in the energy system also requires actions in the industry sector,which consumes a large amount of coal.For some of those industries there are no cur

91、rent technologies at scale to replace coal use.Moreover,some of the industrial emissions come from the process itself,regardless of the fuel used in production.While carbon capture,utilisation and storage(CCUS)can provide some abatement of emissions,there is still a big technological gap to be cover

92、ed by innovation.b)International financial support to aid coal transitions in emerging and developing economies(EMDEs):One of the main barriers for the energy transition is the lack of investment in EMDEs.Financial and technological support for EMDEs needs to be an important pillar of the coal trans

93、ition strategies in advanced economies,including Korea.Our analyses suggest that with strong international co-operation,the world can achieve the energy transition more smoothly than in a segmented world.In many markets,coal has been seen as a relatively cheap fuel,and its position in the electricit

94、y sector is often shielded from market competition by long-term power purchase agreements or other instruments.However,the tight supply amid the current Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|15 IEA.CC BY 4.0.energy crisis as well as inflation in the

95、input costs of coal production are driving up coal prices.The global fleet of coal power plants saw unprecedented growth in the last two decades driven by developments in Asia.A number of EMDEs have very young fleets,in which large amounts of capital remain unrecovered.For example,the average age of

96、 the coal fleet in China is only 13 years,12 years in Indonesia,and 8 years in Viet Nam.The average age of Koreas coal power plants is 21 years.An estimated 8.4 million people are employed in coal production,processing,transport and power generation around the world.Many of these jobs,in particular

97、those related to mining and processing,are very localised and the coal sector is deeply embedded in the local economies of producing regions.In the case of Korea,the majority of coal-related jobs are concentrated in import terminals,transportation and coal power plants.The IEA adopts the concept of

98、people-centred transitions,which is a broader concept than just transitions.In any case,the common element of both approaches is the support for workers and communities impacted by the transition.The closure of coal power plants may have a significant impact on communities,which needs to be carefull

99、y addressed.There are also many considerations around the closure of coal mines,given the high labour-intense nature of coal mining and some other peculiarities.Global coal demand rebounded strongly in 2021 to 5 650 Mtce as economies recovered from the pandemic and coal-fired power generation reache

100、d a historic high in 2021.The global energy crisis in 2022 sharpened energy security concerns,and several countries have announced plans to extend the use of coal in the near term,although long-term strategies towards net zero have remained firm.Against this backdrop,it is essential to understand th

101、e factors underpinning todays high levels of coal consumption and what lessons can be drawn from countries that have successfully reduced reliance on coal,and to find ways to align near-term energy security imperatives with longer-term energy transition goals.A new context for the net zero transitio

102、n Coal and energy security Energy commodities in the global market rose to record prices in 2022 as a result of market imbalances and supply chain disruptions following the Covid-19 pandemic and that were exacerbated by the Russian Federations(hereafter,“Russia”)invasion of Ukraine.Prices of natural

103、 gas in Europe have been regularly above USD 40/MBtu for more than one year,which is more than double the oil price on an energy-equivalent basis.International coal has also seen unprecedented price levels,higher than USD 400/tonne,more than tripling the average price of the 2010s.In turn,high price

104、s of natural gas and coal have led to high electricity prices in many markets.The global energy crisis is hurting entire economies more severely in the EMDEs.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|16 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Energy prices in global markets,2020-

105、2022 IEA.All rights reserved.Note:TTF MA=Title Transfer Facility month-ahead;LNG=liquefied natural gas.Coal is the most abundant fossil fuel and reserves would be enough to satisfy 100 years of global consumption with current levels.The United States is estimated to have the largest coal reserves wi

106、th more than 200 Gt,followed by China,Russia,Australia and India.The low energy density of coal,less versatility than other fossil fuels and air pollution issues have driven the substitution of coal in transportation and residential heating,meaning that its direct use is overwhelmingly directed to t

107、he electricity and some industrial sectors.In 2022,importing countries have faced extremely high prices,but the aggregate costs of coal to the energy system have not increased as much:in countries that use domestic coal,prices are often lower than in international markets.Price changes in internatio

108、nal markets have a strong impact in countries that import almost all of their coal such as Korea and Japan.Global coal demand has been stable for over a decade Total coal accounts for around a quarter of the worlds total energy supply,which is at its highest-ever level.Energy supply from coal has be

109、en between 5 200 Mtce(155 EJ)and 5 650 Mtce(165 EJ)each year since 2010,oscillating by 3%around a central value of 5 500 Mtce depending on annual changes in economic growth,weather and energy markets.Contrary to some accounts of the imminent end of coal or of a coal renaissance,coal demand has been

110、surprisingly stable for more than a decade despite many changes in the global economy and energy sector.100 500 9001 3001 7002 1002 500Sep-20 Dec-20 Mar-21 Jun-21 Sep-21 Dec-21 Mar-22 Jun-22 Sep-221 September 2020=100TTF MAGermanpowerAsianspotLNGEUimportedcoalNorthSeaBrentStrategies for Coal Transit

111、ion in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|17 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Global total energy supply from coal,2000-2021 IEA.All rights reserved.Note:CAAGR=compounded annual average growth rate.Nonetheless,coal has been increasingly in the spotlight for policy makers,investors and activists.This

112、 is not surprising given that more than 95%of global coal consumption occurs in countries that have net zero emissions pledges,albeit on different timescales and varying levels of legal status.Despite all these commitments,unabated coal demand has not yet entered into a structural decline.Share of g

113、lobal coal consumption covered by net zero emissions pledges,by target date and status IEA.All rights reserved.1 0002 0003 0004 0005 0006 00020002005201020152021Mtce2011-21 CAAGR 0.3%2000-11 CAAGR 4.7%20%40%60%80%100%2050 or before20602070No pledgeNo pledgeAnnouncedIn policydocumentIn lawStrategies

114、for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|18 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Emerging market and developing economies increasingly dominate coal use Coal is unique among fuels in the unparalleled dominance of a single country:China,which accounts for over 55%of global coal demand.Ch

115、inas power sector alone accounts for one-third of global coal demand.Indeed,Chinas coal-fired power generation is larger than total generation in any country.China is also the largest coal producer by far,mining roughly half of global output,and the largest coal importer.Despite Chinas impressive de

116、ployment of clean energy technologies,coal still accounts for more than half of Chinas energy supply and almost two-thirds of electricity generation.The second-largest coal-consuming country is India,accounting for over 10%of global coal demand.Coal is also the cornerstone of Indias electricity gene

117、ration,accounting for around three-quarters of total generation.India has around 45%of the coal share in the total energy supply mix,which is lower than in China(around 60%),owing to Indias lower level of coal-intensive industrial energy demand.Together,China and India account for two-thirds of glob

118、al coal demand.EMDEs as a whole accounted for over 80%in 2021,up from less than half in 2000.Coal demand in advanced economies has declined by about one-third over the last two decades.The United States now accounts for around 6%of global coal demand and the European Union for around 4%.The picture

119、is slightly different in per capita terms,due to the large population and lower energy demand per capita in EMDEs.In the early 2000s,the United States consumed nearly 2.5 tce,or 80 GJ,of coal per capita.As a result of a modest decline in total energy demand,and a substantial switch to natural gas an

120、d renewables,the United States total coal demand per capita has more than halved over the last two decades,and is now well below Chinas.Despite the large size of Indias total coal demand,in per capita terms it consumes only around 0.45 tce(13 GJ),still less than half the level of the United States.N

121、onetheless,the decline in the European Unions consumption of coal means that per capita coal demand in the European Union is close to that of India today(around 0.5 tce or 15 GJ).Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|19 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Regional share i

122、n global coal demand and regional coal demand per capita,2000-2021 IEA.All rights reserved.Note:Other EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies excluding China and India;Other AEs=advanced economies excluding the United States and the European Union.Coal use is deeply embedded in few sectors Co

123、als stable position in the global energy mix has been driven by its role in power generation,which accounts for two-thirds of total coal demand.Although low-emissions sources of electricity generation,-i.e.renewables and nuclear-as a group have recently overtaken it,coal is still the single largest

124、source of electricity generation,responsible for 36%of total electricity generation.The share of coal in the generation mix has been slowly decreasing as the share of electricity in total energy has been rising.The industry sector accounts for almost one-third of global coal demand.In particular,coa

125、l is the dominant source of energy used to make two essential products for modern civilisation:steel and cement.The iron and steel sector accounts for around 16%of total coal demand.Coal is the largest source of energy for cement production with a share of over 50%due to its low cost and high availa

126、bility.2 0004 0006 000200020102021MtceChinaIndiaOther EMDEUnited StatesEuropean UnionOther AECoal demand by region123200020102021tceDemand per capitaStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|20 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Global coal demand by sector and coal share in

127、 energy demand by sector,2000-2021 IEA.All rights reserved.Notes:For end-use sectors the right panel shows the share of coal in the sectors total final consumption.For the power sector it shows the share of coal-fired electricity in total generation.Power generation accounts for two-thirds of total

128、coal demand;coal is the dominant energy source for steel and cement manufacturing.The surge in coal-fired capacity additions since 2000 was unprecedented.Between 2000 and 2021,the total installed capacity of coal-fired generation almost doubled,from about 1 100 GW to almost 2 200 GW.Even taking acco

129、unt of growing population,the expansion represents the fastest increase in the global installed capacity of coal-fired generation since the birth of this technology.The rapid growth in coal-fired generation capacity in the 2000s was largely driven by EMDEs,particularly in the Asia Pacific region and

130、 especially in China.The world now has a large stock of young coal-fired power plants,which must be made compatible with the pathway to net zero emissions.Status of coal phase-down pledges An increasing number of countries have made net zero emissions pledges or adopted policies to reduce coal use i

131、n the power sector.Since the Paris Agreement was signed,21 countries have committed to fully phase down coal within a fixed time frame.EU climate policies were significant in reducing coals share of power generation,which has accelerated the transition from coal in the region.Among Group of 20(G20)c

132、ountries,only 5 have a full coal phase-down target:Canada,France,Germany,Italy and the United Kingdom.Emissions from the coal-fired power sectors of these five countries take up less than 0.8%of global emissions.By August 2022,only four countries had completed their phase-downs,Austria in 2020,Belgi

133、um in 2016,Portugal in 2021 and Sweden in 2020.Though the current high gas prices and scarcity are obliging some countries to rely on coal more than previously expected,no major changes have been perceived so far regarding coal phase-down plans.The main 10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%200020102021Pow

134、erIron and steelCementOther industryBuildingsOtherCoal demand by sector20%40%60%80%100%200020102021Coal share in demand by sectorStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|21 IEA.CC BY 4.0.changes are that in France and the United Kingdom,the full phase-d

135、own might be delayed one year or so,and in Austria the Mellach coal power plant could be connected again to the grid,delaying its coal phase-down for few years,if it ever works.However,the capacity of the plant is only 240 MW.Seven large countries with a net zero emissions target remain without a co

136、al phase-down plan:Brazil,China,India Japan,Korea,South Africa and the United States.In any case,Group of Seven(G7)countries committed to achieving carbon neutrality in the power sector by 2035 and an eventual phase-down of unabated coal power generation.In the United States,carbon neutrality in the

137、 power system by 2035 implies the end of unabated coal power generation by that date or earlier.Other countries from the G20,most notably Russia,do not have a net zero target yet.Several countries made announcements in 2021 to retire their coal power plant fleet ahead of time,which includes Chile,Hu

138、ngary and the United Kingdom.Share of coal in the power mix(%)Countries Target date IEA Net Zero by 2050 target Coals share in the national power supply(2020)Share of coal in national CO2 emissions(2019)Most power generation coal from domestic mines Austria 2020 2050 3%8.6%No Belgium 2017 No 3%5.8%N

139、o Canada 2030 2050 5%7.2%Yes Chile 2040 2050 31%32.9%No Denmark 2028 2050 11%11.2%No Finland 2029 2035 8%27.6%No France 2022 2050 1%3.6%No Germany 2038 2045 26%28.0%Yes Greece 2028 No 13%22.8%Yes Hungary 2025 2050 11%11.9%Yes Ireland 2025 2050 5%7.5%No Israel 2030 No 28%32.2%No Italy 2025 2050 5%7.1

140、%No Netherlands 2029 2050 8%13.4%No New Zealand 2030 2050 5%8.9%Yes Portugal 2021 2050 5%11.6%No Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|22 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Countries Target date IEA Net Zero by 2050 target Coals share in the national power supply(2020)Sh

141、are of coal in national CO2 emissions(2019)Most power generation coal from domestic mines Romania 2032 No 17%25.3%Yes Slovak Republic 2030 2050 7%11.5%Yes Spain 2030 2050 2%6.2%No Sweden 2020 2045 1%8.0%No United Kingdom 2024 2050 2%3.3%No During COP23 in 2017,Canada and the United Kingdom launched

142、the Powering Past Coal Alliance(PPCA),with the goal of accelerating the transition from unabated coal power generation.The PPCA shares memberships with national and subnational governments and business and international organisations.In addition to most of the countries listed in the table above,the

143、 following countries have joined the PPCA:Albania,Angola,Costa Rica,Croatia,El Salvador,Ethiopia,Fiji,Latvia,Liechtenstein,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Marshall Islands,Mexico,Niue,the Republic of North Macedonia(hereafter,“North Macedonia”),Peru,Senegal,Switzerland,Tuvalu,Uruguay and Vanuatu.Among them,onl

144、y Croatia,Mexico,North Macedonia,Peru and Senegal generate some electricity from coal.During COP26 came the Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement,with the goal of accelerating the transition of unabated coal power generation.These international agreements also include provisions on just tr

145、ansitions,attraction of private finance,energy security,and utilities and grids.The outlook for coal use and emissions This report uses the latest scenarios from the IEA Global Energy and Climate Model,developed for the World Energy Outlook 2022(WEO-2022).The WEO-2022 includes detailed analysis of t

146、he energy sector transformation of each of the scenarios listed below.The sections below focus on the implications for coal markets,emissions and the role of CCUS.The Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)assumes that all climate commitments made by governments around the world,including nationally determi

147、ned contributions(NDCs)and longer-term net zero pledges,will be met in full and on time,regardless of whether these pledges are currently backed by detailed implementing laws,policies and regulations.The Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario sets out a narrow but achievable pathway for the global

148、energy sector to achieve net zero Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|23 IEA.CC BY 4.0.CO2 emissions by 2050.In this scenario,advanced economies take the lead,but all regions achieve very rapid reductions in energy sector CO2 emissions in order to

149、enable the global energy sector to reach net zero by 2050.The Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS)takes a more conservative and granular approach,integrating sector-by-sector analysis of the impacts of established and announced policies and regulations.It does not assume that net zero emissions pledges a

150、re met in full and on time unless they are backed up by specific policy measures.Coal demand The drop in coal demand in 2020 was more than offset by a strong rebound in 2021,taking it very close to its all-time high.In 2022,demand for coal was expected to increase marginally as nations attempted to

151、fulfil rising energy demand while contending with slower economic development.Despite the energy crisis had a strong impact on many variables,expectations were confirmed and after a moderate growth,coal demand reached a new all-time high in 2022.Demand for coal is projected to fall structurally in a

152、ll of our scenarios starting in the current decade,but the speed of this decline is highly dependent on the stringency of climate legislations.In STEPS,the need for coal declines by just under 10%to 2030 and by 30%by 2050.While industry coal demand declines moderately,the majority of the drop takes

153、place in the power sector,which is concentrated mostly in advanced economies.Coal demand by scenario and sector,2010-2050 IEA.All rights reserved.Note:Other includes the small amounts of coal consumed in the buildings and transport sectors,and in the other energy transformation sector.Power includes

154、 both electricity and heat production.1 0002 0003 0004 0005 0006 000200020102020203020402050Total coal demandMtceSTEPS APSNZE STEPS APSNZEOtherIndustryPowerCoal demand by sector203020502021STEPAPSNZEStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|24 IEA.CC BY

155、4.0.In the APS,total coal demand falls by around 20%to 2030 and by 75%to 2050.The electricity sector experiences the largest declines through 2030 as renewable energy and other low-emissions sources start to displace coal.Just slightly slower than the pace of increase in the worlds coal demand betwe

156、en 2000 and 2010,total coal use declines by just over 2%annually from now until 2030.After 2030,global coal demand shrinks at an annual pace of more than 5%,which is quicker than the rate at which industrialised economies reduced their coal consumption over the previous decade.Given net zero commitm

157、ents for 2050 and a relatively slower pace of energy demand growth(electricity consumption increases by 2%per year to 2030),coal use in advanced economies falls by almost 75%to 2030.Electricity consumption grows faster in EMDEs(nearly 3.5%per year through to 2030),and many nations have committed to

158、achieving net zero emissions at a later timing,by 2060 or 2070.As a result,between 2021 and 2030,coal use for power generation decreases by 10%,with China experiencing a 10%decline and India experiencing a 15%increase.These patterns are a result of the two countries divergent rates of economic devel

159、opment,with Chinas mature economy experiencing slower increases in both GDP and energy demand than India.By 2050,coal use in the electricity sectors of EMDEs has been reduced by more than half.Coal demand by region in power and industry,2010-2050 IEA.All rights reserved.In industry,options to substi

160、tute coal are at a lower technological maturity than in the power sector.In the APS,coal use in advanced economies decreases by around 20%to 2030,largely due to energy and material efficiency measures.By 2030,Chinas demand for coal will have decreased by roughly 20%as the market for raw materials su

161、ch as steel starts to become saturated.In other emerging market and developing 1 0002 0003 0004 00020102020203020402050ChinaIndiaOther EMDEUnited StatesEuropean UnionOther AENZE(global)PowerMtce20102020203020402050IndustryStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transit

162、ions PAGE|25 IEA.CC BY 4.0.nations,coal demand in the industry sector increases by roughly 5%to 2030 as demand for steel and cement production continues to grow.Global industry demand for coal falls by more than 60%by 2050.Both the electricity and industry sectors see declines in coal demand in the

163、APS,initially led by reductions in advanced economies.Declines in the NZE Scenario are much steeper.In the NZE Scenario,global coal demand falls by 45%to 2030 and by 90%to 2050 to 540 Mtce.Declines are led by the electricity sector,where coal use is reduced by nearly 55%between 2021 and 2030 as low-

164、emissions sources of generation dramatically ramp up.The use of coal with CCUS Coal facilities equipped with CCUS can produce low-emissions power,industrial products(steel,cement)and hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels.CCUS provides an opportunity for countries with large coal resources to continue to

165、 produce domestic energy resources,preserve existing strategic assets and cushion the impacts of transitions on coal-dependent communities,while reducing emissions.The development of coal-related CCUS applications has been limited to date.There are five CCUS projects in operation globally that captu

166、re around 5 Mt CO2 each year from coal-based applications.This amounts to around 13%of current global capture capacity.As seen in the table below,China has three operating projects in the coal-based chemicals,power and fertiliser sectors,although the largest single facility is in the United States.O

167、perating coal-related commercial-scale CCUS facilities and their applications Country Project Project promoter Application Capacity(Mt/yr)China Nanjing Chemical Industries CCUS project Sinopec Chemicals 0.2 Qilu Petrochemical Plant Sinopec Chemicals 1 Guohua Power Jinjie China Energy Power 0.15 Cana

168、da Boundary Dam CCS Saskpower Power 1 United States Great Plains Synfuel Plant Dakota Gas Fuel supply 3 Notes:CCS=carbon capture and storage.Projects are considered commercial-scale if they have an annual capture capacity of 0.1 Mt CO2 or greater.The Nanjing Chemical Industries CCUS project and Qilu

169、 Petrochemical Plant use coal as their primary feedstock.Source:IEA Tracking,(Cai,Lin,&Ma,2020)and corporate communications.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|26 IEA.CC BY 4.0.As of December 2022 there were 18 coal-related CCUS projects currently

170、under development:12 are in the power sector,3 are in industry and 3 are for fuel supply.China is developing 7 projects,the United States is developing 5,and the remainder are in Australia,Japan,India,Indonesia and Russia.If all 18 projects were to be fully developed,they would capture around 30 Mt

171、CO2 each year by 2030.In the APS,around 53 Mt CO2 is captured from coal facilities in 2030 and 1 300 Mt CO2 is captured in 2050.In the power sector,CCUS is retrofitted onto coal plants to support emissions reductions while allowing existing plants to continue to operate;this is especially important

172、in developing economies in Asia which have a very large fleet of young coal-fired power plants.In industry,coal use with CCUS continues mainly in steel and cement production and is concentrated in EMDEs such as China,India and Russia.Around 30%of global coal in 2050 in the APS is equipped with CCUS.

173、In the NZE Scenario,there is a much faster ramp-up in coal CCUS to 2030(when 260 Mt CO2 is captured from coal plants)but volumes captured in 2050 are slightly lower than levels in the APS.This is because the NZE Scenario sees more fuel-switching away from coal,the faster retirement of coal-fired ass

174、ets and a much greater role for renewable power generation.More than three-quarters of coal use in 2050 in the NZE Scenario is equipped with CCUS.The current pipeline of under-construction and proposed projects would provide around 70%of the CO2 captured from coal CCUS in 2030 in the APS and less th

175、an 15%in the NZE Scenario.Making up the difference will require strong policy support.Coal CCUS is important in the APS and NZE Scenario,especially in EMDEs.CCUS is used with 30%of coal in the APS in 2050 and 70%in the NZE Scenario.CO2 capture capacity by scenario,sector and fuel IEA.All rights rese

176、rved.400 8001 2001 600APS NZEAPS NZEPowerIndustryFuel supplyCoal-based CO capture capacity2 0004 0006 0008 000APS NZEAPS NZECoalNatural gasProcess emissionsOtherTotal CO capture capacityMt CO2030205020302050Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|27 IE

177、A.CC BY 4.0.Accelerating the deployment of coal CCUS In order for CCUS projects to successfully contribute to emissions reduction goals,governments and industry need to commit to long-term funding and investments to make CCUS technology more cost-effective and available.This includes investing in re

178、search and development and creating public-private partnerships to develop and deploy CCUS projects.In addition,policy incentives and regulations need to be implemented to encourage the uptake of CCUS technology and create a supportive environment for investment and deployment of these projects.In t

179、he NZE Scenario,projects need to capture more than 90%of the CO2 emissions arising from coal combustion or conversion;GHG emissions associated with the extraction,processing and transport of coal need to be kept to a minimum;and the end product needs to have a lower emissions intensity than the prod

180、uct it is replacing.Coal-producing regions and countries can still employ CCUS to manufacture low-emissions hydrogen,hydrogen-based fuels and chemicals,as well as to reduce emissions from existing assets through retrofits.In order to accelerate the deployment of CCUS,countries must make sure they ha

181、ve the proper legal and regulatory frameworks in place and support assessments of CO2 storage potential.Increased economies of scale and affordable transport and storage costs can result from the development of shared CO2 transport and storage infrastructure.In various nations and regions,including

182、China,Europe and the United States,shared infrastructure is being built.In Canada,shared infrastructure has been operating since 2020 as a result of the Alberta Carbon Trunk Line Project.In turn,coal-based CCUS deployments can assist in the establishment of a common CO2 transit and storage infrastru

183、cture.The deployment of coal CCUS installations can produce volumes of centralised CO2 emissions and this in turn can act as an anchor for the development of wider CO2 transport networks and storage hubs.Emissions of different routes of hydrogen production IEA.All rights reserved.-200-100 0 100 200

184、300 400Nocapture95%captureNocapture60%capture95%captureNocapture95%captureWindPVGridJapanGridIndiaConversionUpstream emissionsg CO-eq/MJBiomassElectrolysisCoalNatural gasStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|28 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Greenhouse gas emissions

185、and air pollution CO2 emissions In 2021,coal combustion accounted for around 40%(15 Gt CO2)of all global energy-related CO2 emissions.In 2021,China and India produced more than two thirds of the worlds coal-related CO2 emissions,followed by the United States,the European Union,Russia,Japan and South

186、 Africa.In all scenarios,total energy sector emissions peak in the present decade,with coal playing a significant role in this pattern.According to the STEPS,emissions from coal fall by 1.5 Gt CO2 by 2030,more than offsetting increases in combustion emissions from oil and gas and from industrial pro

187、cess emissions.After 2030,coal emissions continue to decline,falling by another 3.8 Gt CO2 by 2050.In the APS,all fuel emissions are expected to decrease by 2030 although coal leads the way with a 20%decrease from 2021 levels.By 2030,this drop is roughly half as large as the reductions in emissions

188、from oil,natural gas and industrial processes combined.Coal emissions decrease between 2021 and 2030 at a 3%annual pace(as opposed to a 1%annual fall in the STEPS),and by 7%between 2030 and 2050.In contrast,coal emissions increased at a rate of 4.5%per year from 2000 to 2010 during the economic boom

189、.Coal emissions are 80%lower in 2050 than 2021 levels.CO2 emissions by source and scenario IEA.All rights reserved Up to 2030,roughly two-thirds of the emissions reductions in the APS come from coal reductions.This highlights the need to reduce coal use if countries are to reach their net zero emiss

190、ions targets and expanding the range of affordable alternatives to coal in the power sector,which makes up the majority of coal use.Due to the rapid transition-100 10 20 30 4020212030 20502030 20502030 2050CoalOilNaturalgasOtherGt COSTEPSAPSNZEStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal i

191、n Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|29 IEA.CC BY 4.0.to clean energy technologies,particularly solar PV and wind,advanced economies see the largest reductions in emissions over the period to 2030.Between 2021 and 2030,advanced economies cut annual coal emissions by about 2 Gt CO2(a reduction of nearly 7

192、0%).In EMDEs,the near-term trend is tempered by rapid electricity demand growth and the additional space given by longer-term net zero pledges(e.g.2060 for China and 2070 for India).Coal emissions in EMDEs decline by 1.3 Gt CO2 between 2021 and 2030(a 10%reduction).The rapid growth of low-emissions

193、sources of generation to 2030 lays the foundation for a much stronger reduction in emissions from coal thereafter,and emissions from coal are reduced by more than 4 Gt CO2 in the 2030s and around 3 Gt CO2 in the 2040s.In the NZE Scenario,emissions from all fossil fuels decline substantially by 2030.

194、Coal leads the way,given its high emissions intensity and the competitiveness of lowemissions alternatives in the electricity sector.Emissions from coal drop by half from 2021 to 2030,driven by the rapid rise of lowemissions sources of electricity generation.Coal mine methane emissions Methane emiss

195、ions are responsible for around 30%of the current rise in global average temperatures;rapid and sustained reductions are key to limiting nearterm global warming.Coal mine operations released around 43 Mt of methane into the atmosphere in 2021,close to onethird of total energyrelated methane emission

196、s.This is equivalent to around 1.3 Gt CO2eq,more than all the CO2 emissions from Europes power sector.Coal seams naturally contain methane(referred to as coal mine methane),which can be released during or after mining operations in a number of ways.Absent mitigation measures,methane emissions tend t

197、o be higher for underground mines than for surface mines.Underground mines,which accounted for about 60%of total coal production in 2021,were responsible for around 80%of total coal mine methane emissions.We estimate that it is technically possible to avoid around half of global methane emissions fr

198、om coal operations today,and more than 90%of abatement potential is associated with underground coal mines.For operating mines,ventilation air methane can be directed to processes such as blending or oxidation to make it usable as an energy source,for instance to heat mine facilities or to dry coal.

199、Thermal or catalytic oxidation technologies can be used even with low methane concentrations(between 0.25%and 1.25%)and reduce over 50%of associated emissions.Air pollution Polluted air causes serious diseases,damages natural habitats,and reduces the health and yield of farmed crops.Around 3 million

200、 premature deaths were attributable Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|30 IEA.CC BY 4.0.to ambient air pollution in 2021,85%of which occurred in EMDEs,primarily in Asia.Additionally,2.4 million premature deaths were attributed in 2021 to household

201、 air pollution,primarily from the traditional use of biomass for cooking and concentrated mainly in Africa.Public healthcare systems are further burdened by air pollution,which also constrains economic growth.Different fuels are responsible for various air pollutant emissions.Over 60%of the sulphur

202、dioxide emissions in 2021 came from burning coal,80%of the nitrogen oxide emissions were from burning oil,and burning biomass caused around three-quarters of fine particulate matter(PM2.5)emissions.Risk of lockedin CO2 emissions from existing coal plants The current fleet of relatively young coalfir

203、ed power plants risks locking in CO2 emissions for decades to come.To measure the risks,the IEA developed a plantbyplant assessment of the remaining technical lifetime of coalfired power plants in operation at the start of 2022 and analysed the potential associated emissions from these plants throug

204、h to the year 2100.Total coalfired power plant capacity today stands at a little under 2 185 GW and is made up of around 9 000 units with an average age of 20 years per unit.If existing plants continue to operate at current levels and without CCUS retrofits or cofiring with lowemissions fuels over t

205、he rest of their technical lifetime,330 Gt CO2 emissions could be emitted from 2022 to 2100,with the Asia Pacific region contributing almost 90%.The 330 Gt of emissions would account for twothirds of the remaining cumulative emissions budget of 500 Gt consistent with a 50%chance of limiting average

206、global temperature warming to below 1.5 C.Emissions for the period from 2022 to 2030 alone could be as high as 90 Gt,and,if unchecked,cumulative emissions to 2060 from the existing coal plant fleet could exceed all coal plant emissions to date.Industrial facilities using coal are similarly long-live

207、d:for coaldependent heavy industries such as steel and cement,the year 2050 is just one investment cycle away.Average lifetimes for emissionsintensive industry sector assets such as blast furnaces and cement kilns are around 40 years,but plants often undergo a major refurbishment after about 25 year

208、s of operation.Around 60%of steel production facilities globally and half of cement kilns will undergo investment decisions this decade,which to a large degree will shape the outlook for coal use in heavy industry.Without any modification to their current mode of operation,these existing assets woul

209、d generate 66 Gt CO2 emissions through their remaining lifetime.Together with the existing coal-fired fleet,emissions from existing coal assets on their own would tip the world across the 1.5 C limit.A variety of existing technologies offer options to reduce emissions from existing coalfired power p

210、lants in ways that best fit the particular circumstances.They include:repurposing coal plants to focus on flexibility;retrofitting with CCUS technology;retrofitting to cofire with low-emissions fuels such as ammonia or biomass;and retiring them early.Against a baseline of coal plants continuing to o

211、perate as they have in the Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|31 IEA.CC BY 4.0.recent past,the cumulative CO2 emissions savings to 2050 in the APS is close to 100 Gt.Repurposing accounts for 60%of these reductions,with early retirements the second

212、largest contributor to cutting emissions(33%of the total),followed by CCUS retrofits and cofiring with other fuels.Lessons from past transitions A number of countries have already seen major transitions in their coal sectors over the past 60 years.While each countrys coal transition must be assessed

213、 through the prism of its unique circumstances and historical context,a survey of past transitions provides some valuable lessons for the future.In this section,we focus on lessons from coal transition experiences in the power sector.Transitions in coal demand have often happened relatively quickly

214、A number of countries have already seen a peak in unabated coal in their total energy supply with subsequent decline.Among them,we focus here on the countries that meet the following criteria:sustained:the peak in coal demand was sustained across at least ten years,and total unabated coal demand was

215、 at least 10%below the peak in the most recent annual data substantial:coal accounted for at least 10%of total energy supply in the peak year growth-compatible:GDP growth was positive in the ten years immediately following the peak.These criteria leave a sample of 22 countries with coal peaks that w

216、ere sustained,substantial and growth-compatible.A number of countries in the former Soviet Union are among those that do not meet these criteria:their coal transitions were driven by a collapse in their GDP after 1990,and they do not qualify as growth-compatible.What were the patterns related to the

217、 peaks in unabated coal demand?The median peak occurred at a GDP per capita of around USD 21 000 in purchasing power parity(PPP)terms,and GDP grew at a robust 3.3%per year in the ten years following the peak in unabated coal.Today China and India are the biggest consumers of coal:the median peak in

218、our historical sample compares with a GDP per capita in 2021 of USD 19 500 in China,and a little more than USD 7 000 in India(in PPP terms).For the median country,the coal peak occurred at a point when total energy demand was essentially saturated,growing only 0.2%per year in the ten years following

219、 the peak.This compares with 0.05%per year in China in the APS over the next decade and 2.3%per year in India.Within ten years of the peak of unabated coal demand,the median country saw coal demand fall by roughly one-third.Within 20 years,the median country saw a Strategies for Coal Transition in K

220、orea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|32 IEA.CC BY 4.0.halving of unabated coal demand.These trends are roughly in line with the speed of the decline in global unabated coal demand after it peaks in the APS.Historical trends in unabated coal demand,1960-2020,compared with the Announce

221、d Pledges Scenario,2020-2050 IEA.All rights reserved.Historical transitions away from coal have occurred roughly as fast as the global transition seen in the APS.The figure below looks at historical examples in 33 countries of decade-long transitions away from unabated coal in the power sector.It sh

222、ows the decline in coal generation,growth in the main alternative source and change in total electricity demand,all expressed as a percentage of total generation from all sources at the start of the ten-year transition period.Most coal transitions were driven by the growth of wind and solar PV or of

223、 natural gas,although a smaller number were driven by growth in hydropower or nuclear power.The largest number of observed coal transitions in the electricity sector were driven by the growth of wind and solar PV.These transitions typically took place in economies where the rate of total electricity

224、 generation growth was often modest or even negative:the median rate of demand growth during the ten years after the peak was 0.2%per year,and the median rate of solar PV and wind growth relative to total generation at the start of the period was 1%per year.This highlights the critical importance of

225、 scaling up renewables fast enough to substitute away from coal,particularly where there is rapid demand growth in EMDEs.It is also worth noting that although wind and solar replaced a larger share of the energy provided by coal than other fuels,they did not provide a substitute for the system servi

226、ces provided by coal.The median rate of electricity demand growth in natural gas-driven transitions was higher than in the transition to solar PV and wind(1.9%per year versus 0.2%per 20%40%60%80%100%-100102030Total coal demand index(peak year=100%)Year index(peak year=0)33rd-66thpercentile25th-75thp

227、ercentileMedianAPSStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|33 IEA.CC BY 4.0.year),and the median rate of growth of the main substitute fuel source(natural gas)was also higher(1.6%per year).Decadal episodes of coal transitions in electricity generation,a

228、s a percent of total generation in the start year,1960-2019 IEA.All rights reserved.Historical transitions were largely unanticipated Policies to manage socio-economic impacts came too late Some countries have experienced large declines in coal production activities.Governments have often intervened

229、 to sustain domestic coal production,but these interventions have rarely been effective in the longer term.For example,Germany provided over EUR 280 billion in subsidies for coal production from 1958 to 2018,but domestic production remained uneconomic and continued to decline in the long run.Similar

230、ly,Poland provided subsidies for coal production of around USD 25 billion between 1990 and 2016 together with almost USD 1.5 billion per year for coal miners pensions.As in Germany,these subsidies failed to halt a gradual decline in production.In some cases,governments gave companies one-time transf

231、ers to make needed upfront investments in mechanisation and productivity improvements,though many operations then slid back into deficit.In other cases,nationalisations and privatisations injected new capital but could not compensate in the long run for mines with geological conditions that led to h

232、igh production costs.When coal transitions have come,whether or not after attempts to sustain production,they have not always been anticipated by policy makers,and have often taken place without wide-ranging efforts to help those affected in coal mining regions.Governments have frequently provided s

233、ome compensation to affected workers when coal mining jobs have been lost,but initial responses have sometimes proved relatively ineffective,-40%-20%0%20%40%60%80%100%CoalSolar and windNatural gasNuclearHydroDemandSolar and windNatural gasNuclear HydroTen-year changeStrategies for Coal Transition in

234、 Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|34 IEA.CC BY 4.0.and have only later been supplemented by additional measures to support broader community and economic development in response to emerging socio-economic challenges.In the United Kingdom,for example,workers who lost their jobs w

235、hen mines were closed in the 1980s were offered redundancy payments lasting up to a year,and were eligible for unemployment and incapacity benefits.But it was not until 1997 that the government established the Coalfields Task Force and enacted measures to redevelop coal communities.These included ef

236、forts to reclaim mine land at over 100 coal sites for productive use such as housing and industry,and to channel European Union funding towards support for local infrastructure,businesses and vocational training.The Welsh Development Agency sought from the outset to attract investment and create job

237、s,but new infrastructure projects were generally not located in the counties where unemployment was the highest.To take another example,in the United States,many Appalachian coal mining counties took advantage of local grants and investments provided by the Appalachian Regional Commission to build t

238、heir own transition strategies focused on education or economic diversification.For instance,Athens County in Ohio launched a cross-county retraining programme to help former coal miners and their families find well-paid jobs outside the mining industry after the closure of the last coal mine in 200

239、2.Coal mining counties have also benefited from broader infrastructure development support from the Tennessee Valley Authority since the 1930s and later from the Appalachian Development Highway System.In 2015,President Barack Obama added to the help available by launching the Partnerships for Opport

240、unity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization(POWER)Plus Plan to provide funding for economic diversification,job creation and employment in Appalachia.Funding was also allocated for the clean-up of abandoned mines and for schools,public health services and cultural amenities to attract investment

241、 and diversify local economies.However,this package was designed and implemented long after coal production and employment in Appalachia had begun to decline.Coal regions were often left with profound and long-lasting socio-economic scars The measures taken to support coal miners and communities in

242、the face of closures and job losses have often not been able to compensate for the socio-economic challenges associated with coal transitions.Decades after the transitions began,coal mining communities still lag behind much of the rest of their respective countries.Across the United Kingdom,for exam

243、ple,every former coal region still sees lower job density than the nationwide average.In many regions,the employment rate is 5-10%below the level in south-east England.In Wales in particular,where around 20%of Welsh working-age males lost their jobs during the 1980s,mine closures led to a rise Strat

244、egies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|35 IEA.CC BY 4.0.in poverty and to people moving away from the affected counties.The failure to attract new heavy industry with blue-collar jobs into former coalfields led to many miners being unable to find new jobs.

245、Differences in selected socio-economic indicators between Appalachian Basin counties and the rest of the United States,1970-2020 IEA.All rights reserved.Note:Computations draw on county-level data except for GDP data for 2000 and before,which is available only by state.Source:Bureau of Economic Anal

246、ysis(2022).In the United States,the loss of jobs in the coal mining industry has had broad socio-economic impacts.Appalachia,once the cornerstone of the countrys energy supply,has seen coal mining jobs decline from over 500 000 to just 30 000 over the last century.It has struggled for decades with h

247、igh levels of poverty and with public health crises,and its employment and GDP growth lag behind the rest of the country.As in other coal regions around the world,access to alternative opportunities was hampered by geographic isolation and lack of infrastructure.As a result,it proved difficult for a

248、 large mining workforce to find other blue-collar jobs,especially against the background of a nationwide decline in manufacturing jobs.People-centred transitions Employment In 2019,almost 8.4 million people worked in coal value chains,including 6.3 million in supply(both production and transportatio

249、n)and 2.1 million in power generation.These numbers include our best estimate of informal workers as well as those formally employed.Jobs in coal supply and in coalfired power generation account for around 0.25%of total global employment,but they tend to be concentrated in areas around coal mines wh

250、ere entire communities may be dependent on income generated in the-2.0%-1.5%-1.0%-0.5%0%0.5%Employment inmining,manufacturing andconstructionGross domesticproductGovernmenttransfers per capita1970s1980s1990s2000s2010sDifferences in CAAGRDecadeStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in

251、 Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|36 IEA.CC BY 4.0.coal industry.In these regions,coal revenues are critically important for the operation of many other businesses and industries and hence for the jobs they provide.Today coal supply jobs are concentrated in Asia,with 3.4 million coal workers in China,1

252、.4 million workers in India,and around 470 000 workers in Indonesia.In recent years,some key coal producers have seen declining employment as labour productivity has improved,in part because of increasing mechanisation.For example,China reduced coal mining employment by almost 2.5 million jobs betwe

253、en 2013 and 2019 while maintaining production volumes.The largest number of coal supply jobs are in mining,the most labourintensive part of the value chain,but the transportation,washing and processing of coal also provide many jobs.An estimated 740 000 workers were employed in coalrelated power sec

254、tor jobs in China in 2019.This compares with around 150 000 in Europe and over 80 000 in North America,where these jobs have been declining in recent years.Coal jobs in power generation involve tasks such as operating and maintaining existing plants,constructing new capacity,and manufacturing compon

255、ents such as boilers,turbines and generators.Employment in the coal value chain by region and as a share of global employment,2019 IEA.All rights reserved.Countries with net zero emissions targets currently account for more than 95%of coal consumption and employment along coal value chains.In the AP

256、S,total coal employment declines from 8.4 million in 2019 to 6.1 million in 2030.Some of this decline is due to a fall in coal production and consumption as countries make progress towards their net zero emissions targets.It also reflects improvements in productivity and increased mechanisation.1 2

257、3 4Rest of worldNorth AmericaAfricaEuropeOther Asia PacificIndiaChinaMillion employeesProductionTransportationPower generationCoal employment by regionGlobal employmentCoalOther energyStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|37 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Despite an

258、increase in employment at coal plants with CCUS,coal employment sees a sharper decline than either oil or natural gas employment,making it an area of particular concern in terms of just transitions policies.The decline in coal sector jobs forms part of a broader shift in energy sector employment to

259、clean energy,which increases from around 32 million jobs in 2019 to 54 million jobs in 2030,thanks in particular to increasing numbers of jobs focused on delivering lowemissions power generation and improving enduse efficiency.Of the 21 countries with the highest rankings on the IEA CTEI,17 have mad

260、e net zero commitments or incorporated net zero emissions objectives in law,and 11 have undertaken or executed plans to phase down or limit their usage of coal.It is notable that only five countries,which represent a mere 4%of the worlds coal workers,have implemented,announced or initiated discussio

261、ns on just transition policies for the coal workers and communities affected by transitions away from coal.This suggests that there is an urgent need for more countries to consider how best to help those individuals and communities that stand to lose coal-related jobs,especially in those regions tha

262、t are most dependent on coal.Coverage of coal phase-down targets and just transition policy in 21 selected coal-dependent countries IEA.All rights reserved.A framework for best practice people-centred transition policies An important first step before the transition starts is comprehensive stakehold

263、er engagement with the goal of reaching broad consensus around the transition.Mapping existing human resources and infrastructure in affected communities can be useful in identifying alternative industries that could make the most of local comparative advantage.Several countries,including Canada,the

264、 Czech Republic,Germany,South Africa and Spain,have convened national task forces or commissions to 25%50%75%100%Share ofcountriesShare ofoutputShare ofworkersShare ofcountriesShare ofoutputShare ofworkersNo net zero or coal transition targetUnder discussionNet zero target,no coal-specific targetAnn

265、ouncedIn law with fundingCoal phase-down targetsJust transition policiesStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|38 IEA.CC BY 4.0.estimate the financial implications of socio-economic challenges and provide policy recommendations.After establishing a ti

266、meline for coal transition,the next step is to agree on a set of just transition policies.Such policies need to address three objectives,which in the end offer tailored support to the people,local communities and economies:supporting workers and companies directly affected by the energy transition,i

267、ncluding through inclusive policy-making processes developing alternative industries and stimulating macroeconomic growth in the region to provide additional opportunities for local workers and companies promoting environmental rehabilitation in the affected region to enhance its attractiveness and

268、growth potential,and fostering local culture and identity to strengthen social cohesion and improve quality of life.Coverage of just transition policies designed in the context of coal phase-down in selected countries Canada Germany Korea Poland South Africa Net zero or carbon neutrality target 2050

269、 2045 2050 2050*2050 National coal phase-out target 2030 2035 2050 2049*Support for workers Direct payments and compensation Training,reskilling,career services Support for industry development and economic diversification in coal communities Coal decommissioning or retrofits Clean energy industries

270、 Non-energy industries Holistic support for coal communities Environmental rehabilitation Community identity and cohesion Policy enacted with funding Policy announced or recommended by just transition commission*Reflects the EU objective of carbon neutrality by 2050.*Applies only to hard coal mining

271、.Notes:Both national and subnational policies are included.Broader labour market policies are not included.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|39 IEA.CC BY 4.0.In acknowledgement of the fact that expedited coal phase-downs typically occur over a sh

272、ort period of time and are concentrated in certain places,many governments have developed measures to supplement standard labour regulations for coal workers.These policies cover early retirement options,welfare payments,and short-term income support programmes such as severance packages.In Germany,

273、the government permits tax-free income support and a subsidy for health insurance for workers laid off from the coal business.Several governments provide support with job searches,career counselling,and reskilling and training.For example,the Canadian Coal Transition Initiative,established in 2018,p

274、rovides USD 27 million over five years for economic diversification and skills development,and has established transition centres in coal regions.It is complemented by a related Coal Transition Infrastructure Fund providing another USD 116 million for coal communities through 2025.Some governments h

275、ave also introduced measures to stimulate economic growth in coal-dependent regions.This is especially important in EMDEs where many coal mining regions have high dependence on the coal industry.In order to create realistic plans and initiatives,effective economic development strategies should caref

276、ully consider regional comparative advantage while also looking at the best ways to increase connectivity.So far,fewer governments have introduced measures that aim to enhance the local quality of life and social cohesion including environmental restoration in a comprehensive manner.However,such mea

277、sures can be helpful in boosting employment and attracting capital.Furthermore,people-centred transition policies also need to be tailored to affected communities and people in terms of age and gender.Coal miners tend to be older on average than the workforce as whole the median age of coal miners i

278、s 44 in the United States,42 in India and 37 in South Africa but they span a wide range,so government spending should be divided strategically between enabling early retirements and providing career services and retraining.Regarding the gender aspects of people-centred transition,coal miners are pre

279、dominantly male,but job losses have repercussions for women,too.In the past,more women have joined the labour force during and following coal transitions to bolster household income,primarily by taking on low-paying employment in the services sector.Interviews also reveal that men who lose their emp

280、loyment in the coal industry are unwilling to take on housework and instead choose to stick with labour-intensive manual jobs.Given this,there is a justification for governments to offer more childcare services and to extend career services to all members of households with coal miners throughout th

281、e transitions.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|40 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Employment in coal mining by country and by gender,2019 IEA.All rights reserved The age profile of coal workers is a critical variable in just transition policies The age profile of

282、 coal workers is important when considering people-centred transitions since it provides information on the natural retirement rate of workers and the number of those in the workforce who are likely to be economically active until a specific retirement age.The IEA uses labour market surveys to build

283、 a model of the age profile of coal miners in India,South Africa,Indonesia and China,which together account for the majority of global coal mining employment.The IEA models a natural retirement timeline for these workers by using a range of retirement ages between 55 and 60 to take into account diff

284、erences in retirement ages between countries and between formal and informal workers.We then compared this natural retirement rate to the level of employment required in the APS and the NZE Scenario.20%40%60%80%100%United StatesIndonesiaIndiaSouth AfricaColombiaPolandGermanyMenWomenShare of womenin

285、totalemploymentCoal mining employmentStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|41 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Natural retirement rates for coal mining workers in India,South Africa,Indonesia and China compared with coal mining employment levels in the Announced Pledge

286、s and Net Zero Emissions Scenarios India IEA.All rights reserved South Africa IEA.All rights reserved 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 9001 0002021202420272030Thousand emmployeesNaturalretirement at 60Naturalretirement at 55APSNZE 10 20 30 40 50 60 702021202420272030Thousand employeesNaturalretiremen

287、t at 60Naturalretirement at 55APSNZEStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|42 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Indonesia IEA.All rights reserved China IEA.All rights reserved The level of coal demand and employment seen in the APS implies that about 710 000 workers woul

288、d need to retire early by 2030 in four major coal-producing countries.Despite the fact that many coal regions in EMDEs have young,active populations that need jobs,this analysis of the natural retirement rate of coal workers leaves no room for new workers to enter the sector.This emphasises the nece

289、ssity of creating alternate development pathways for regions dependent on coal in order to diversify local economies,while also focusing on the individuals currently working in the sector.50 100 150 200 250 3002021202420272030Thousand employeesTypicalretirement at 60Typicalretirement at 55APSNZE 500

290、1 0001 5002 0002 5002021202420272030Thousand employeesNaturalretirement at 60Naturalretirement at 55APSNZEStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|43 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Financing the coal transition Financing the coal transition lies at the intersection of a

291、 number of energy and development challenges,making integrated approaches critical.Even though there is a number of cost-competitive clean technologies that can replace coal,a rapid transition away from the most polluting assets will not occur at the required pace without a strong policy effort and

292、adequate financing.In that sense,public finance,public policy and international co-operation all play crucial roles in accelerating the change.In many industrial applications,zero-emissions substitutes for coal are still in their infancy,thus innovation and demonstration projects must take a front s

293、eat in the near future in order to bring costs down.Compared with the power sector,these initial investments have a different risk profile and a considerably greater need for public funding and support.In the power sector,three-quarters of the USD 6 trillion investment to transition away from coal g

294、oes into renewables,grids and energy storage.The economic forces that underpin new generation investments encourage the use of private capital.By replacing coal assets with mature and affordable renewable technologies,emissions can be reduced while simultaneously bringing down overall system costs a

295、nd costs to consumers.There is more than USD 1 trillion of unrecovered capital in todays fleet of coalfired power plants,meaning that their owners often stateowned enterprises have a strong stake in their continued operation.Emissions from the plants may be locked in by inflexible power purchase agr

296、eements,which remunerate plants regardless of their operation.In Viet Nam,for example,such contracts govern the operation of around half the fleet.Since most coal plants are effectively protected from market competition,their exit needs to be secured by other means in order to support the expansion

297、of low-emissions sources.The IEA evaluates a variety of options available to governments to end this impasse,such as direct regulation,market-based solutions and financial mechanisms.The common denominator is that they alter the incentives facing coal plant owners so that they operate more flexibly,

298、retrofit with CCUS,co-fire with low-emissions fuels or retire.Governments and financial institutions have made an increasing number of declarations in recent years to limit or forbid funding and investment in the coal industry.Nearly all of the multilateral development banks and export credit organi

299、sations have imposed tight lending requirements or outright bans on projects involving coal.The financial sector,where numerous institutional investors,pension funds,banks,insurance firms and others have pledged to cut or eliminate their engagement in coal,is providing additional momentum for restri

300、cting coal funding.Banks pledges to lessen their ties to the coal industry mostly take the form of lending limits,larger initiatives to decarbonise their loan books and a rise in the proportion of loans given to green assets.Similarly,in bond markets,there has been a rapid growth in sustainable Stra

301、tegies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 1:Coal in Clean Energy Transitions PAGE|44 IEA.CC BY 4.0.issuances by capital providers in key markets,particularly in Europe where sustainable finance regulations are most advanced,and investors seek to reduce fossil fuel lending unless it is associated w

302、ith achieving sustainability targets.Effective and fair coal transitions will require global co-operation,public financial support and integrated approaches that take into account the social components.Unintended consequences might result from poorly planned or fragmented interventions;for instance,

303、retiring one coal plant without a holistic strategy may encourage others to operate more.There is also considerable scope for innovative financing to help bring down the total cost of the coal transition.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal

304、 transition in Korea PAGE|45 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Chapter 2.Current transition policy for the coal-fired power sector in Korea Status of Koreas coal-fired power generation In the first half of 2022,Koreas total installed capacity amounted to 134 237 MW,and power generation to 291 531 GWh.Gas takes the larg

305、est share of 30.7%(41 201 MW)in the installed capacity,followed by coal(27.6%;37 088 MW),renewables(19.8%;26 581 MW)and nuclear(17.3%;23 250 MW).Gas has been the most dominant source of Koreas installed capacity over the last five years,followed by coal with a decreasing share.Nuclear has been the t

306、hird-largest capacity until renewables took over its place in 2022.Installed capacity by energy source(in MW,%)2018.H1 2019.H1 2020.H1 2021.H1 2022.H1 Total installed capacity 117 205 121 147 127 338 131 069 134 237 Nuclear 21 850 21 850 23 250 23 250 23 250 Share 18.6 18.0 18.3 17.7 17.3 Coal 36 87

307、7 37 063 37 053 36 798 37 088 Share 31.5 30.6 29.1 28.1 27.6 Gas 37 853 38 225 41 170 41 170 41 201 Share 32.3 31.6 32.3 31.4 30.7 Renewables 11 695 15 252 17 861 22 478 26 581 Share 10.0 12.6 14.0 17.1 19.8 Oil 4 230 4 057 2 101 2 159 960 Share 3.6 3.3 1.6 1.6 0.7 PSH 4 700 4 700 4 700 4 700 4 700

308、Share 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.5 Others 1 203 514 457 Share 0.9 0.4 0.3 Note:PSH=pumped storage hydropower.Source:Monthly Electricity Statistics(476th,488th,500th,512th,524th),KEPCO Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transition in Korea PAGE|46

309、IEA.CC BY 4.0.Installed capacity by energy source(in MW,%)IEA.All rights reserved Note:RE=renewable energy.Source:Monthly Electricity Statistics(476th,488th,500th,512th,524th),KEPCO.In the first half of 2022,coal accounted for the largest share of 31.1%(90 657 GWh)in the generation mix,followed by n

310、uclear(29.7%;86 681 GWh),gas(28.5%;82 985 GWh)and renewables(9.2%;26 800 GWh).Coal has been the dominant source of power generation in the last five years despite a decreasing share.The shares of nuclear and gas have been slightly increasing with fluctuations.Power generation by energy source(in GWh

311、,%)2018 2019 2020 2021 2022.H1 Total power generation 570 647 563 040 552 162 576 809 291 531 Nuclear 133 505 145 910 160 184 158 015 86 681 Share 23.4 25.9 29.0 27.4 29.7 Coal 238 967 227 384 196 333 197 966 90 657 Share 41.9 40.4 35.6 34.3 31.1 Gas 152 924 144 355 145 911 168 378 82 985 Share 26.8

312、 25.6 26.4 29.2 28.5 Renewables 35 598 36 392 36 527 43 096 26 800 Share 6.2 6.5 6.6 7.5 9.2 Oil 5 740 3 292 2 255 2 354 1 196 Share 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 PSH 3 911 3 458 3 271 3 683 1 834 Share 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Others 2 249 7 681 3 316 1 378 Share 0.4 1.4 0.6 0.5 Source:Monthly Electricity Statist

313、ics(524th),KEPCO Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transition in Korea PAGE|47 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Power generation by energy source(in GWh,%)IEA.All rights reserved Source:Monthly Electricity Statistics(524th),KEPCO.Korea has a relatively hig

314、h share of power generation from coal.In 2021,coal-fired power generation accounted for 34.3%in Koreas energy mix,which was a larger share than that of France,Italy and the United Kingdom.Australia had a 52.84%share of coal-fired power generation followed by Korea,Germany(29.1%),Japan(28.55%)and the

315、 United States(22.75%).While Australia and Germany have been rapidly reducing the share of coal in recent years,Korea started to reduce the share of coal only since 2020 after a continued increase from 1992.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the c

316、oal transition in Korea PAGE|48 IEA.CC BY 4.0.The share of power generation from coal in key OECD member countries(%)IEA.All rights reserved Note:OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.Source:Enerdata,.As of 2022,57 domestic coal-fired power units are in operation and 4 units ar

317、e under construction.Chungnam has the largest share with 29 units,followed by Gyeongnam(14),Gangwon(6),Incheon(6)and Jeonnam(2).In the first half of 2022,coal accounted for the largest share of 31.1%in the generation mix.Coal-fired power units by province(2022)Status Province(no.of units)Name of uni

318、ts Installed capacity(MW)Note In operation Chungnam(29)Dangjin-1-10 6 040 Taean-1-10 6 100 Boryung-3-8 3 050 Shin Boryeong-1-2 2 038 Gyeongnam(14)Samcheonpo-3-6 2 120 Hadong-1-8 4 000 Goseong High-1-2 2 080 Gangwon(6)Bukpyung-1-2 1 190 Samcheok Green Power-1-2 2 044 Donghae-1-2 400 Incheon(6)Yeonghe

319、ung-1-6 5 080 0 20 40 60 80 1001991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021GermanyFranceUKItalyUSJapanKoreaAustraliaStrategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transit

320、ion in Korea PAGE|49 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Status Province(no.of units)Name of units Installed capacity(MW)Note Jeonnam(2)Yeosu-1-2 668 Under construction Gangwon(4)Gangneung Anin Thermal-1-2 2 080 Construction period:May 2017 Mar 2023 Operator:Gangneung Eco Power Samcheok Thermal-1-2 2 100 Construction per

321、iod:Aug 2018 Apr 2024 Operator:Samcheok Blue Power Source:KFEM&Monthly Electricity Statistics(524th),KEPCO.Current coal-fired power plants in Korea(2022)Source:KFEM.Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transition in Korea PAGE|50 IEA.CC BY

322、4.0.As of 2022,the Southern Power Corporation has the largest installed capacity among the five largest power corporations,followed by Western Power Corporation,Midland Power Corporation,East-West Power Corporation and South-East Power Corporation.Power generation market in Korea(2022)Category South

323、-East Power Midland Power Western Power Southern Power East-West Power Hydro&Nuclear Power Others Total Installed capacity(MW)9 279 10 757 11 456 11 476 9 564 28 621 53 084 134 237 Market share(%)6.9 8.0 8.5 8.5 7.1 21.3 39.7 100.0 Power generation(GWh)21 871 22 691 20 839 24 893 18 569 88 954 93 71

324、4 291 531 Market share(%)7.5 7.8 7.1 8.5 6.4 30.5 32.3 100.0 Revenue(KRW hundred million)32 498 35 400 30 696 40 603 29 615 49 049 156 087 373 947 Market share(%)8.7 9.5 8.2 10.9 7.9 13.1 41.7 100.0 Notes:KRW=Korean won.Exchange rate:1 Korean won(KRW)=USD 0.00076(as of 08 March 2023).Source:Half-yea

325、r Report,Korea East-west Power,2022.8.16.Coal takes the largest share in the installed capacity of the five largest power corporations.In case of South-East Power,coal plays a dominant role with a capacity of 7 869 MW.The installed coal capacity of East-West Power has installed coal capacity of 6 40

326、0 MW,Midland Power of 6 106 MW,Western Power of 6 100 MW and Southern Power of 6 044 MW.Power corporations installed capacity and power generation by energy source Energy source South-East Power Midland Power Western Power Southern Power East-West Power Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Ins

327、talled capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Coal 7 869 19 414 6 106 14 758 6 100 14 626 6 044 15 697 6 440 13 472 Oil-352 Gas-1 400 508-Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea

328、 Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transition in Korea PAGE|51 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Energy source South-East Power Midland Power Western Power Southern Power East-West Power Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Po

329、wer generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)Installed capacity(MW)Power generation(GWh)IGCC 922 1 565 4 310 7 262 3 387 4 220 5 061 8 342 2 972 4 413 Internal combustion-80 156-Renewables and others 488 892 261 515 569 1 486 371 854 152 332 Note:IGCC=integrated gasification combine

330、d cycle.Source:Monthly Electricity Statistics(524th),KEPCO.The number of workers in the sector excluding the plant workers amounts to 22 306(including the primary contractors).In other words,each of the almost 60 units employs around 372 workers on average.While these units could potentially retain

331、57%their employees through converting coal to liquefied natural gas(LNG),the outcome may vary significantly by company and job responsibility.Coal phase-down progress Schematic diagram of a coal power plant IEA.All rights reserved Source:Policy Discussion on the implications of decarbonisation polic

332、ies on employment and a just energy transition Strategies for Coal Transition in Korea Chapter 3.High-level policy recommendations for the coal transition in Korea PAGE|52 IEA.CC BY 4.0.Employment in the coal-fired power generation sector Category Employment Type of company Features Generation opera

333、tion 12 090 5 power corporations Regular workers of power corporations operate main components such as the generator,turbine and boiler,and supervise partner companies and subsidiaries.They work in rotation and can be relocated.Fuel management and pollution control 2 283 Private companies KEPCOs KPS and KEPID have high levels of expertise with patented technologies and large-scale operations natio