1、WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK2024APRSteady but Slow:Resilience amid DivergenceINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUNDWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSteady but Slow:Resilience amid Divergence2024APRINTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND2024 International Monetary FundCover and Design:IMF CSF Creative Solutions DivisionComposition:Absolute

2、 Service,Inc.;and AGS,An RR Donnelley CompanyCataloging-in-Publication DataIMF LibraryNames:International Monetary Fund.Title:World economic outlook(International Monetary Fund)Other titles:WEO|Occasional paper(International Monetary Fund)|World economic and financial surveys.Description:Washington,

3、DC:International Monetary Fund,1980-|Semiannual|Some issues also have thematic titles.|Began with issue for May 1980.|1981-1984:Occasional paper/International Monetary Fund,0251-6365|1986-:World economic and financial surveys,0256-6877.Identifiers:ISSN 0256-6877(print)|ISSN 1564-5215(online)Subjects

4、:LCSH:Economic developmentPeriodicals.|International economic relationsPeriodicals.|Debts,ExternalPeriodicals.|Balance of paymentsPeriodicals.|International financePeriodicals.|Economic forecastingPeriodicals.Classification:LCC HC10.W79HC10.80 ISBN 979-8-40025-589-2(English Paper)979-8-40025-613-4(E

5、nglish ePub)979-8-40025-604-2(English Web PDF)Disclaimer:The World Economic Outlook(WEO)is a survey by the IMF staff pub-lished twice a year,in the spring and fall.The WEO is prepared by the IMF staff and has benefited from comments and suggestions by Executive Directors following their discussion o

6、f the report on April 3,2024.The views expressed in this publication are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMFs Executive Directors or their national authorities.Recommended citation:International Monetary Fund.2024.World Economic OutlookSteady but Slow:Resilie

7、nce amid Divergence.Washington,DC.April.Publication orders may be placed online,by fax,or through the mail:International Monetary Fund,Publication ServicesP.O.Box 92780,Washington,DC 20090,USATel.:(202)623-7430 Fax:(202)623-7201E-mail:publicationsimf.orgwww.bookstore.imf.orgwww.elibrary.imf.orgErrat

8、aApril 30,2024This web version of the WEO has been updated to reflect the following changes to the version published online on April 16,2024:-On page 24,2nd column,last sentence:“efficiency gains from loss of specialization”was corrected to“efficiency losses from declines in specialization”-On page

9、28,2nd column,1st paragraph and sentence:“25 basis points above headline”was corrected to“25 basis points above baseline”-On page 135,1st column and line:“from 2024 onward to determine the price of oil and gas revenues but sets the benchmark”was corrected to“from 2024 onward but sets the benchmark”I

10、nternational Monetary Fund|April 2024iiiAssumptions and Conventions viiiFurther Information xData xiPreface xiiForeword xiiiExecutive Summary xviChapter 1.Global Prospects and Policies 1Disinflation amid Economic Resilience 1The Outlook:Steady Growth and Disinflation 7Risks to the Outlook:Broadly Ba

11、lanced 16Globally Consistent Risk Assessment of the World Economic Outlook Forecast 19Policies:From Fighting Inflation to Restocking Fiscal Arsenals 20Box 1.1.Fragmentation Is Already Affecting International Trade 24Box 1.2.Risk Assessment Surrounding the World Economic Outlooks Baseline Projections

12、 25Commodity Special Feature:Market Developments and the Power of Prices 29References 41Chapter 2.Feeling the Pinch?Tracing the Effects of Monetary Policy through Housing Markets 43Introduction 43Monetary Tightening and Real Estate:Context and Stylized Facts 45The Housing Channels of Monetary Policy

13、 Transmission 47Housing Channels Vary Significantly across Countries 49Housing Channels May Have Weakened in Many Countries 55Policy Implications 57Box 2.1.Interest Rate Pass-Through in Europe 58Box 2.2.Chinas Monetary Policy and the Housing Market 60References 61Chapter 3.Slowdown in Global Medium-

14、Term Growth:What Will It Take to Turn the Tide?65Introduction 65Insights from Medium-Term Forecasts 67How Did We Get Here?68Where Is Growth Heading?75Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 77Box 3.1.Allocative Efficiency:Concept,Examples,and Measurement 79Box 3.2.Distributional Implications of Mediu

15、m-Term Growth Prospects 80Box 3.3.The Potential Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Global Productivity and Labor Markets 82References 84CONTENTSWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCEivInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024Chapter 4.Trading Places:Real Spillovers from G20

16、Emerging Markets 87Introduction 87G20 Emerging Markets in the Global Economy 90Aggregate Spillovers in the Short Term 93Spillovers from Trade and Global Value Chains 95Can the Other G20 Emerging Markets Support Global Growth?101Conclusions and Policy Implications 102Box 4.1.Industrial Policies in Em

17、erging Markets:Old and New 104Box 4.2.Capital Flows to G20 Emerging Markets and the Allocation Puzzle 105Box 4.3.Spillovers from G20 Emerging Markets to Sub-Saharan Africa 106References 107Statistical Appendix 111Assumptions 111Whats New 111Data and Conventions 112Country Notes 113Classification of

18、Economies 115General Features and Composition of Groups in the World Economic Outlook Classification 115Table A.Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP,Exports of Goods and Services,and Population,2023 117Table B.Advanced Economies by Subgroup 118Table C.Eur

19、opean Union 118Table D.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region and Main Source of Export Earnings 119Table E.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region,Net External Position,Heavily Indebted Poor Countries,and Per Capita Income Classification 120Table F.Economies with Exceptional

20、Reporting Periods 122Table G.Key Data Documentation 123Box A1.Economic Policy Assumptions underlying the Projections for Selected Economies 133List of Tables 137Output(Tables A1A4)138Inflation(Tables A5A7)145Financial Policies(Table A8)150Foreign Trade(Table A9)151Current Account Transactions(Tables

21、 A10A12)153Balance of Payments and External Financing(Table A13)160Flow of Funds(Table A14)164Medium-Term Baseline Scenario(Table A15)167World Economic Outlook Selected Topics 169IMF Executive Board Discussion of the Outlook,April 2024 179TablesTable 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projec

22、tions 10Table 1.2.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections at Market Exchange Rate Weights 12Table 1.2.1.Fiscal Impulse Relative to Baseline 26Table 4.1.Sectors in G20 Economies with the Largest Employment Spillovers 100CONTENTSvInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024CONTENTSAnnex Table 1.1

23、.1.European Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 35Annex Table 1.1.2.Asian and Pacific Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 36Annex Table 1.1.3.Western Hemisphere Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,

24、and Unemployment 37Annex Table 1.1.4.Middle East and Central Asia Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 38Annex Table 1.1.5.Sub-Saharan African Economies:Real GDP,Consumer Prices,Current Account Balance,and Unemployment 39Annex Table 1.1.6.Summary of World Real

25、per Capita Output 40Online TablesStatistical AppendixTable B1.Advanced Economies:Unemployment,Employment,and Real GDP per CapitaTable B2.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Real GDPTable B3.Advanced Economies:Hourly Earnings,Productivity,and Unit Labor Costs in ManufacturingTable B4.Emerging Ma

26、rket and Developing Economies:Consumer PricesTable B5.Summary of Fiscal and Financial IndicatorsTable B6.Advanced Economies:General and Central Government Net Lending/Borrowing and General Government Net Lending/Borrowing Excluding Social Security SchemesTable B7.Advanced Economies:General Governmen

27、t Structural BalancesTable B8.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:General Government Net Lending/Borrowing and Overall Fiscal BalanceTable B9.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:General Government Net Lending/BorrowingTable B10.Selected Advanced Economies:Exchange RatesTable B11.Emerging M

28、arket and Developing Economies:Broad Money AggregatesTable B12.Advanced Economies:Export Volumes,Import Volumes,and Terms of Trade in Goods and ServicesTable B13.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:Total Trade in GoodsTable B14.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Source of Exp

29、ort Earnings:Total Trade in GoodsTable B15.Summary of Current Account TransactionsTable B16.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Summary of External Debt and Debt ServiceTable B17.Emerging Market and Developing Economies by Region:External Debt by MaturityTable B18.Emerging Market and Developing

30、 Economies by Analytical Criteria:External Debt by MaturityTable B19.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Ratio of External Debt to GDPTable B20.Emerging Market and Developing Economies:Debt-Service RatiosTable B21.Emerging Market and Developing Economies,Medium-Term Baseline Scenario:Selected E

31、conomic IndicatorsFiguresFigure 1.1.Global Inflation Falling as Output Grows 2Figure 1.2.Performance in 202223 Compared with Projections at Time of Cost-of-Living Crisis 2Figure 1.3.Domestic-and Foreign-Born Workers in the Labor Force 3Figure 1.4.Supply-Chain Pressures and Red Sea Tensions 3WORLD EC

32、ONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCEviInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024Figure 1.5.Global Energy Price and Oil Supply 4Figure 1.6.Near-Term Inflation Expectations Falling 4Figure 1.7.Labor Markets Cooling 5Figure 1.8.Decomposition of Inflation Drivers 5Figure 1.9.Monetary Tig

33、htening:Nominal and Real 6Figure 1.10.Savings from the Pandemic:Declining 7Figure 1.11.Sovereign Bond Spreads in Emerging Market and Developing Economies 7Figure 1.12.Elevated Debt and Deficits 8Figure 1.13.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Projections 8Figure 1.14.Growth Outlook:Broadly Stable 9Figure 1.1

34、5.Inflation Outlook:Falling 13Figure 1.16.Inflation Closer to Target 14Figure 1.17.Global Trade Outlook:Stable 14Figure 1.18.Current Account and International Investment Positions 15Figure 1.19.Forecasts for Global GDP and GDP per Capita 15Figure 1.20.Geopolitical Risk and Oil Prices 16Figure 1.21.S

35、harper-than-Expected Fiscal Adjustment in the Euro Area,201015 17Figure 1.22.Confidence in Government,Parliament,and Political Parties 18Figure 1.23.AI Performance on Human Tasks 19Figure 1.24.Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment 21Figure 1.25.Drivers of Sovereign Debt Ratings in Emerging Market and Develo

36、ping Economies 22Figure 1.1.1.Fragmentation Affecting Trade 24Figure 1.2.1.Distribution of Forecast Uncertainty around Global GDP Growth and Inflation Projections 25Figure 1.2.2.Impact of Scenarios on GDP Level and Headline Inflation 27Figure 1.SF.1.Commodity Market Developments 29Figure 1.SF.2.Vola

37、tility of Commodity Prices 30Figure 1.SF.3.Herfindahl Index by Commodity,2021 31Figure 1.SF.4.Common versus Idiosyncratic Factors in Commodity Demand and Supply 32Figure 1.SF.5.Cumulative Supply and Demand Responses to a 1 Percent Price Increase 33Figure 2.1.Nominal Policy Rates in Advanced Economie

38、s and Emerging Markets 45Figure 2.2.Nominal House Prices in Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets 46Figure 2.3.Commercial Real Estate Prices 46Figure 2.4.Evolution of House Prices and Consumption in the Postpandemic Tightening Cycle 47Figure 2.5.The Housing Channels of Monetary Policy 47Figure 2.6

39、.Heterogeneity in Mortgage Market Characteristics 49Figure 2.7.Differential Effects of Monetary Policy Depending on Mortgage Market Characteristics 50Figure 2.8.Differential Effects of Monetary Policy on Consumption Depending on Shares of Fixed-Rate Mortgages 51Figure 2.9.Effects of Monetary Policy

40、on Consumption 52Figure 2.10.Differential Effects of Monetary Policy Depending on Local Housing Market Characteristics 53Figure 2.11.Differential Effects of Monetary Policy on House Prices Depending on Supply Restrictions 54Figure 2.12.Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Transmission 55Figure 2.13.Chan

41、ges in the Share of Fixed-Rate Mortgages 56Figure 2.14.Changes in Monetary Policy Transmission 56CONTENTSviiInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024CONTENTSFigure 2.1.1.Pass-Through to Bank Interest Rates over Time 58Figure 2.1.2.Pass-Through and Share of Households with Mortgages(202123)59Figure 2.1.

42、3.Changes in Mortgage Service Costs after European Central Bank Hikes 59Figure 2.2.1.China:Short-Term Market Interest Rates and House Price Growth 60Figure 3.1.Five-Year-Ahead Real GDP Growth Projections,200029 66Figure 3.2.Five-Year-Ahead Real GDP Forecast by Country:April 2008 versus April 2024 67

43、Figure 3.3.Five-Year-Ahead Real GDP Forecast by Regions,2008,2019,and 2024 67Figure 3.4.Contribution of Components of GDP Growth,19952023 68Figure 3.5.Slowdown in the Growth of the Working-Age Population,2008 versus 2021 69Figure 3.6.Breakdown of Change in Labor Force Participation Rate,200821 69Fig

44、ure 3.7.Policies and Labor Force Participation by Gender and Age 70Figure 3.8.Real Business Investment in OECD Countries 70Figure 3.9.Net Investment Rates in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies 71Figure 3.10.Contribution of Firm-and Macro-Level Determinants to Changes in the Investment Rate since

45、 2008 71Figure 3.11.Contribution of Allocative Efficiency to Annual TFP Growth,200019 72Figure 3.12.Contribution of Allocative Efficiency to Annual TFP Growth,200019 73Figure 3.13.TFP Loss from Misallocation,by Sector Type,2019 73Figure 3.14.Dispersion of Firm Productivity,200019 74Figure 3.15.Count

46、ries Structural Allocative Efficiency and Policies 74Figure 3.16.Medium-Term Growth Projections of Potential Employment 75Figure 3.17.Impact of Various Factors on Global Medium-Term Growth 76Figure 3.2.1.GDP Convergence between Countries,200028 80Figure 3.2.2.Global Inequality,19952028 80Figure 3.2.

47、3.GDP Growth and Welfare Drivers before and after the COVID-19 Pandemic 81Figure 3.3.1.Employment Shares by AI Exposure and Complementarity 82Figure 3.3.2.Impact of AI on TFP and Output in the United Kingdom 83Figure 4.1.Five-Year-Ahead GDP Growth 88Figure 4.2.Correlation of Idiosyncratic Growth Sur

48、prises between Advanced Economies and G20 Emerging Markets 88Figure 4.3.The Growing Footprint of G20 Emerging Markets in Trade and Investment 90Figure 4.4.G20 Emerging Market Financial Integration 91Figure 4.5.G20 Emerging Market Presence in Global Value Chains and Commodities Can Amplify Spillovers

49、 92Figure 4.6.Growth in G20 Emerging Markets Is Becoming Less Volatile and Less Driven by Foreign Shocks 93Figure 4.7.Aggregate Spillovers from G20 Countries 94Figure 4.8.Growth Spillovers from G20 Emerging Markets by Region 95Figure 4.9.Firm-Level Spillovers 96Figure 4.10.Impact of Spillovers on GD

50、P by G20 Emerging Markets 97Figure 4.11.Changes in Sectoral Value Added and Prices 99Figure 4.12.What Is the Global Impact from a G20 Emerging Market Upside Scenario on Real GDP?102Figure 4.1.1.The Rise of Domestic Subsidies and Their Impact on Exports 104Figure 4.2.1.Capital Flows to Emerging Marke

51、ts:Revisiting the Allocation Puzzle 105Figure 4.3.1.Role of G20 Emerging Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 106International Monetary Fund|April 2024viiiA number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World Economic Outlook(WEO).It has been assumed that real effective excha

52、nge rates remained constant at their average levels during Jan-uary 30,2024February 27,2024,except for those for the currencies participating in the European exchange rate mechanism II,which are assumed to have remained constant in nominal terms relative to the euro;that estab-lished policies of nat

53、ional authorities will be maintained(for specific assumptions about fiscal and monetary pol-icies for selected economies,see Box A1 in the Statistical Appendix);that the average price of oil will be$78.61 a barrel in 2024 and$73.68 a barrel in 2025;that the three-month government bond yield for the

54、United States will average 5.2 percent in 2024 and 4.1 percent in 2025,that for the euro area will average 3.5 percent in 2024 and 2.6 percent in 2025,and that for Japan will average 0.0 percent in 2024 and 0.1 percent in 2025;and that the 10-year government bond yield for the United States will ave

55、rage 4.1 percent in 2024 and 3.7 percent in 2025,that for the euro area will average 2.5 percent in 2024 and 2.6 percent in 2025,and that for Japan will average 1.0 percent in 2024 and 1.1 percent in 2025.These are,of course,working hypotheses rather than forecasts,and the uncertainties surrounding

56、them add to the margin of error that would,in any event,be involved in the projections.The estimates and projections are based on statistical information available through April 1,2024.The following conventions are used throughout the WEO:.to indicate that data are not available or not applicable;be

57、tween years or months(for example,202324 or JanuaryJune)to indicate the years or months covered,including the beginning and ending years or months;and /between years or months(for example,2023/24)to indicate a fiscal or financial year.“Billion”means a thousand million;“trillion”means a thousand bill

58、ion.“Basis points”refers to hundredths of 1 percentage point(for example,25 basis points are equivalent to of 1 percentage point).Data refer to calendar years,except in the case of a few countries that use fiscal years.Please refer to Table F in the Statistical Appendix,which lists the economies wit

59、h exceptional reporting periods for national accounts and government finance data for each country.For some countries,the figures for 2023 and earlier are based on estimates rather than actual outturns.Please refer to Table G in the Statistical Appendix,which lists the latest actual outturns for the

60、 indicators in the national accounts,prices,government finance,and balance of payments for each country.What is new in this publication:Ecuadors fiscal sector projections are excluded from publication for 202429 because of ongoing program discussions.Vietnam has been removed from the Low-Income Deve

61、loping Countries(LIDCs)group and added to the Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies(EMMIEs)group.For West Bank and Gaza,data for 202223 previously excluded from publication pending methodological adjust-ments to statistical series are now included.Projections for 202429 are excluded from publi

62、cation on account of the unusually high degree of uncertainty.ASSUMPTIONS AND CONVENTIONSaSSUMpTIONS aND CONvENTIONSixInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024aSSUMpTIONS aND CONvENTIONSIn the tables and figures,the following conventions apply:Tables and figures in this report that list their source as

63、“IMF staff calculations”or“IMF staff estimates”draw on data from the WEO database.When countries are not listed alphabetically,they are ordered on the basis of economic size.Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals shown reflect rounding.Composite data are provided for vari

64、ous groups of countries organized according to economic characteristics or region.Unless noted otherwise,country group composites represent calculations based on 90 percent or more of the weighted group data.The boundaries,colors,denominations,and any other information shown on maps do not imply,on

65、the part of the IMF,any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.As used in this report,the terms“country”and“economy”do not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice.As used her

66、e,the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.International Monetary Fund|April 2024xCorrections and RevisionsThe data and analysis appearing in the World Economic Outlook(WEO)are compiled by the

67、 IMF staff at the time of publication.Every effort is made to ensure their timeliness,accuracy,and completeness.When errors are discovered,corrections and revisions are incorporated into the digital editions available from the IMF website and on the IMF eLibrary(see below).All substantive changes ar

68、e listed in the online table of contents.Print and Digital EditionsPrintPrint copies of this WEO can be ordered from the IMF bookstore at imfbk.st/540746.DigitalMultiple digital editions of the WEO,including ePub,enhanced PDF,and HTML,are available on the IMF eLibrary at http:/www.elibrary.imf.org/A

69、PR24WEO.Download a free PDF of the report and data sets for each of the charts therein from the IMF website at www.imf.org/publications/weo or scan the QR code below to access the WEO web page directly:Copyright and ReuseInformation on the terms and conditions for reusing the contents of this public

70、ation are at www.imf.org/external/terms.htm.FURTHER INFORMATIONInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024xiThis version of the World Economic Outlook(WEO)is available in full through the IMF eLibrary(www.elibrary.imf.org)and the IMF website(www.imf.org).Accompanying the publication on the IMF website is

71、 a larger com-pilation of data from the WEO database than is included in the report itself,including files containing the series most frequently requested by readers.These files may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.The data appearing in the WEO are compiled by the IMF staff at

72、 the time of the WEO exercises.The histor-ical data and projections are based on the information gathered by the IMF country desk officers in the context of their missions to IMF member countries and through their ongoing analysis of the evolving situation in each country.Historical data are updated

73、 on a continual basis as more information becomes available,and structural breaks in data are often adjusted to produce smooth series with the use of splicing and other techniques.IMF staff estimates continue to serve as proxies for historical series when complete information is unavailable.As a res

74、ult,WEO data can differ from those in other sources with official data,including the IMFs International Financial Statistics.The WEO data and metadata provided are“as is”and“as available,”and every effort is made to ensure their timeliness,accuracy,and completeness,but these cannot be guaranteed.Whe

75、n errors are discovered,there is a concerted effort to correct them as appropriate and feasible.Corrections and revisions made after publication are incorporated into the electronic editions available from the IMF eLibrary(www.elibrary.imf.org)and on the IMF website(www.imf.org).All substantive chan

76、ges are listed in detail in the online tables of contents.For details on the terms and conditions for usage of the WEO database,please refer to the IMF Copyright and Usage website(www.imf.org/external/terms.htm).Inquiries about the content of the WEO and the WEO database should be sent by mail or on

77、line forum(telephone inquiries cannot be accepted):World Economic Studies DivisionResearch DepartmentInternational Monetary Fund700 19th Street,NWWashington,DC 20431,USAOnline Forum:www.imf.org/weoforumDATAInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024xiiThe analysis and projections contained in the World E

78、conomic Outlook are integral elements of the IMFs surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member countries,of developments in international financial markets,and of the global economic system.The survey of prospects and policies is the product of a comprehensive interdepartmental r

79、eview of world economic developments,which draws primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through its consultations with member countries.These consultations are carried out in particular by the IMFs area departmentsnamely,the African Department,Asia and Pacific Department,European Department,

80、Middle East and Central Asia Department,and Western Hemisphere Department together with the Strategy,Policy,and Review Department;the Monetary and Capital Markets Department;and the Fiscal Affairs Department.The analysis in this report was coordinated in the Research Department under the general dir

81、ection of Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas,Economic Counsellor and Director of Research.The project was directed by Petya Koeva Brooks,Deputy Director,Research Department,and Daniel Leigh,Division Chief,Research Department.Aqib Aslam,Division Chief,Research Department and Head of the Spillovers Task Force,

82、supervised Chapter 4.The primary contributors to this report are Hany Abdel-Latif,Hippolyte Balima,Nina Biljanovska,Mehdi Benatiya Andaloussi,Alessia De Stefani,Andrs Martin Fernndez,Nicolas Fernandez-Arias,Ashique Habib,Toh Kuan,Nan Li,Chiara Maggi,Rui Mano,Dirk Muir,Alberto Musso,Jean Marc Natal,D

83、iaa Noureldin,Cedric Okou,Carolina Osorio Buitron,Galip Kemal Ozhan,Andrea Pescatori,Adina Popescu,Andrea F.Presbitero,Alexandre B.Sollaci,and Robert Zymek.Other contributors include Maryam Abdou,Gavin Asdorian,Jared Bebee,Christian Bogmans,Luis Brandao-Marques,Ariadne Checo de los Santos,Yaniv Cohe

84、n,Shan Chen,Gabriela Cugat,Eduardo Espuny Diaz,Wenchuan Dong,Angela Espiritu,Rebecca Eyassu,Pedro de Barros Gagliardi,Michael Gottschalk,Ziyan Han,Carlos van Hombeeck,Keiko Honjo,Henry Hoyle,Amir Kermani,Camara Kidd,Eduard Laurito,Jungjin Lee,Weili Lin,Jesper Lind,Barry Liu,Estelle Xue Liu,Xiaomeng

85、Mei,Jorge Alberto Miranda Pinto,Florian Misch,Prachi Mishra,Carlos Morales,Joseph Moussa,Cynthia Nyanchama Nyakeri,Emory Oakes,Minnie Park,Manasa Patnam,Manuel Perez-Archila,Ilse Pertsegaele,Ivan Petrella,Clarita Phillips,Rafael Portillo,Ervin Prifti,Evgenia Pugacheva,Tianchu Qi,Shrihari Ramachandra

86、,Daniela Rojas,Lorenzo Rotunno,Michele Ruta,Martin Stuermer,Marina Tavares,Nicholas Tong,Petia Topalova,Pablo Vega Olivares,Isaac Warren,Yarou Xu,Gianluca Yong,Dennis Zhao,Jiaqi Zhao,Canran Zheng,Dian Zhi,and Liangliang Zhu.Gemma Rose Diaz from the Communications Department led the editorial team fo

87、r the report,with production and editorial support from Michael Harrup,and additional assistance from Lucy Scott Morales,James Unwin,Nancy Morrison,Grauel Group,and Absolute Service,Inc.The analysis has benefited from comments and suggestions by staff members from other IMF departments,as well as by

88、 Executive Directors following their discussion of the report on April 3,2024.However,estimates,projections,and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or to their national authorities.PREFACEInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024xiiiGloba

89、l Economy Remains Resilient despite Uneven Growth;Challenges Lie AheadThe global economy remains remarkably resil-ient,with growth holding steady as inflation returns to target.The journey has been eventful,starting with supply-chain disruptions in the aftermath of the pandemic,a Russian-initiated w

90、ar on Ukraine that triggered a global energy and food crisis,and a considerable surge in inflation,followed by a globally synchronized monetary policy tightening.Yet,despite many gloomy predictions,the world avoided a recession,the banking system proved largely resilient,and major emerging market ec

91、onomies did not suffer sudden stops.Moreover,the inflation surgedespite its severity and the associated cost-of-living crisisdid not trigger uncontrolled wage-price spirals(see October 2022 World Economic Outlook).Instead,almost as quickly as global inflation went up,it has been coming down.On a yea

92、r-over-year basis,global growth bottomed out at the end of 2022,at 2.3 percent,shortly after median headline inflation peaked at 9.4 percent.According to our latest projections,growth for 2024 and 2025 will hold steady around 3.2 percent,with median headline inflation declining from 2.8 percent at t

93、he end of 2024 to 2.4 percent at the end of 2025.Most indicators point to a soft landing.Markets reacted exuberantly to the prospect of cen-tral banks exiting from tight monetary policy.Financial conditions eased,equity valuations soared,capital flows to most emerging market economies excluding Chin

94、a have been buoyant,and some low-income countries and frontier economies regained market access(see the April 2024 Global Financial Stability Report).Even more encouraging,we now estimate that there will be less economic scarring from the pandemicthe projected drop in output relative to prepandemic

95、projectionsfor most countries and regions,especially for emerging market econo-mies,thanks in part to robust employment growth.Astonishingly,the US economy has already surged past its prepandemic trend.Resilient growth and faster disinflation point toward favorable supply developments,including the

96、fading of earlier energy price shocks,the striking rebound in labor supply supported by strong immi-gration flows in many advanced economies.Decisive monetary policy actions,as well as improved mone-tary policy frameworks,especially in emerging market economies,have helped anchor inflation expecta-t

97、ions.As Chapter 2 of this report argues,however,the transmission of monetary policy may have been more muted this time around in countries such as the United States,where an increased share of fixed-rate mortgages and lower household debt levels since the global financial crisis may have limited the

98、 drag on aggregate demand up to now.Despite these welcome developments,numerous challenges remain,and decisive actions are needed.First,while inflation trends are encouraging,we are not there yet.Somewhat worryingly,the most recent median headline and core inflation numbers are pushing upward.This c

99、ould be temporary,but there are reasons to remain vigilant.Most of the progress on inflation came from the decline in energy prices and goods inflation below its historical average.The latter has been helped by easing supply-chain frictions,as well as by the decline in Chinese export prices.But serv

100、ices inflation remains highsometimes stubbornly soand could derail the disinflation path.Bringing inflation down to target remains the priority.Second,the global view can mask stark divergence across countries.The exceptional recent performance of the United States is certainly impressive and a majo

101、r driver of global growth,but it reflects strong demand factors as well,including a fiscal stance that is out of line with long-term fiscal sustainability(see April 2024 Fiscal Monitor).This raises short-term risks to the disinflation process,as well as longer-term fiscal and financial stability ris

102、ks for the global economy since it risks pushing up global funding costs.Something will have to give.In the euro area,growth will pick up this year,but from very low levels,as the trailing effects of tight FOREWORDWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCExivInternational Monet

103、ary Fund|April 2024monetary policy and past energy costs,as well as planned fiscal consolidation,weigh on activity.Contin-ued high wage growth and persistent services inflation could delay the return of inflation to target.However,unlike in the United States,there is scant evidence of overheating an

104、d the European Central Bank will also need to carefully calibrate the pivot toward monetary easing to avoid an excessive growth slowdown and inflation undershoot.While labor markets appear strong,that strength could prove illusory if European firms have been hoarding labor in anticipation of a picku

105、p in activity that does not materialize.Chinas economy is affected by the enduring down-turn in its property sector.Credit booms and busts never resolve themselves quickly,and this one is no exception.Domestic demand will remain lackluster for some time unless strong measures and reforms address the

106、 root cause.Public debt dynamics are also of concern,especially if the property crisis morphs into a local public finance crisis.With depressed domestic demand,external surpluses could rise.The risk is that this will further exacerbate trade tensions in an already fraught geopolitical environment.At

107、 the same time,many other large emerging market economies are performing strongly,sometimes even benefiting from a reconfiguration of global supply chains and rising trade tensions between China and the United States.As Chapter 4 of this report documents,these countries footprint on the global econo

108、my is increasing,and they will play an ever larger role in supporting global growth in years to come.A troubling development is the widening divergence between many low-income developing countries and the rest of the world.For these economies,growth is revised downward,whereas inflation is revised u

109、p.Worse,in contrast with most other regions,scarring estimates for low-income developing countries,includ-ing some large ones,have been revised up,suggesting that the poorest countries are still unable to turn the page from the pandemic and cost-of-living crises.In addition,conflicts continue to res

110、ult in loss of human lives and raise uncertainty.For these countries,invest-ing in structural reforms to promote growth-enhancing domestic and foreign direct investment,and strength-ening domestic resource mobilization,can help manage borrowing costs and reduce funding needs while achieving developm

111、ent goals.Efforts must also be made to improve the human capital of their large young populations.Third,even as inflation recedes,real interest rates have increased,and sovereign debt dynamics have become less favorable in particular for highly indebted emerging markets.Countries should turn their s

112、ights toward rebuilding fiscal buffers.Credible fiscal consoli-dations help lower funding costs and improve financial stability.In a world with more frequent adverse supply shocks and growing fiscal needs for safety nets,climate adaptation,digital transformation,energy security,and defense,this shou

113、ld be a policy priority.Yet this is never easy,as the April 2023 World Economic Outlook documented:fiscal consolidations are more likely to succeed when credible and when implemented while the economy is growing,rather than when markets dictate their conditions.In countries where inflation is under

114、control,and that engage in a credible multiyear effort to rebuild fiscal buffers,monetary policy can help support activity.The successful 1993 US fiscal consolidation and monetary accommodation episode comes to mind as an example to emulate.Fourth,medium-term growth prospects remain historically wea

115、k.Chapter 3 of this report takes an in-depth dive into the different drivers of the slow-down.The main culprit is lower total factor pro-ductivity growth.A significant part of the decline comes from increased misallocation of capital and labor within sectors and countries.Facilitating faster and mor

116、e efficient resource allocation can help boost growth.Much hope rests on artificial intelligence(AI)delivering strong productivity gains in the medium term.It may do so,but the potential for serious disruptions in labor and financial markets is high.Harnessing the potential of AI for all will requir

117、e that countries improve their digital infrastructure,invest in human capital,and coordinate on global rules of the road.Medium-term growth prospects are also harmed by rising geoeconomic fragmentation and the surge in trade restrictive and industrial policy mea-sures since 2019.Global trade linkage

118、s are already changing as a result,with potential losses in efficiency.But the broader damage is to global cooperation and multilateralism.Finally,huge global investments are needed for a green and climate-resilient future.Cutting emissions is compatible with growth,as is seen in recent decades duri

119、ng which growth has become much less emis-sions intensive.Nevertheless,emissions are still rising.A lot more needs to be done and done quickly.Green investment has expanded at a healthy pace in advanced FOREWORDxvInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024FOREWORDeconomies and China.Cutting harmful fossi

120、l fuel subsidies can help create the necessary fiscal room for further green investments.The greatest effort must be made by other emerging market and developing econo-mies,which need to massively increase their green investment growth and reduce their fossil fuel invest-ment.This will require techn

121、ology transfer by other advanced economies and China,as well as substantial financing,much of it from the private sector,but some of it concessional.On these questions,as well as on so many others,there is little hope for progress outside multilateral frameworks and cooperation.Pierre-Olivier Gourin

122、chas Economic CounsellorInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024xviEconomic activity was surprisingly resilient through the global disinflation of 202223.As global inflation descended from its mid-2022 peak,economic activity grew steadily,defying warnings of stagflation and global recession.Growth in

123、employment and incomes held steady,reflecting supportive demand developmentsincluding greater-than-expected government spending and household consumptionand a supply-side expan-sion amid,notably,an unanticipated boost to labor force participation.The unexpected economic resilience,despite significan

124、t central bank interest rate hikes aimed at restoring price stability,also reflects the ability of households in major advanced economies to draw on substantial savings accumulated during the pandemic.In addition,as Chapter 2 explains,changes in mortgage and housing markets over the prepandemic deca

125、de of low interest rates moderated the near-term impact of policy rate hikes.As inflation converges toward target levels and central banks pivot toward policy easing in many economies,a tightening of fiscal policies aimed at curbing high government debt,with higher taxes and lower government spendin

126、g,is expected to weigh on growth.Global growth,estimated at 3.2 percent in 2023,is projected to continue at the same pace in 2024 and 2025.The forecast for 2024 is revised up by 0.1 per-centage point from the January 2024 World Economic Outlook(WEO)Update,and by 0.3 percentage point from the October

127、 2023 WEO.The pace of expansion is low by historical standards,owing to both near-term factors,such as still-high borrowing costs and with-drawal of fiscal support,and longer-term effects from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russias invasion of Ukraine;weak growth in productivity;and increasing geoeconomi

128、c fragmentation.Global headline inflation is expected to fall from an annual average of 6.8 per-cent in 2023 to 5.9 percent in 2024 and 4.5 percent in 2025,with advanced economies returning to their inflation targets sooner than emerging market and developing economies.The latest forecast for global

129、 growth five years from nowat 3.1 percentis at its lowest in decades.The pace of convergence toward higher living standards for middle-and lower-income countries has slowed,implying a persistence in global economic disparities.As Chapter 3 explains,the relatively weak medium-term outlook reflects lo

130、wer growth in GDP per person stemming,notably,from persistent structural frictions preventing capital and labor from moving to productive firms.Chapter 4 indicates how dimmer prospects for growth in China and other large emerging market economies,given their increasing share of the global economy,wi

131、ll weigh on the prospects of trading partners.Risks to the global outlook are now broadly bal-anced.On the downside,new price spikes stemming from geopolitical tensions,including those from the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza and Israel,could,along with persistent core inflation where labor

132、markets are still tight,raise interest rate expectations and reduce asset prices.A divergence in disinflation speeds among major economies could also cause currency movements that put financial sectors under pressure.High interest rates could have greater cooling effects than envisaged as fixed-rate

133、 mortgages reset and households contend with high debt,causing financial stress.In China,without a comprehensive response to the troubled property sector,growth could falter,hurting trading partners.Amid high government debt in many economies,a disruptive turn to tax hikes and spending cuts could we

134、aken activity,erode confidence,and sap support for reform and spending to reduce risks from climate change.Geoeconomic fragmenta-tion could intensify,with higher barriers to the flow of goods,capital,and people implying a supply-side slowdown.On the upside,looser fiscal policy than nec-essary and as

135、sumed in projections could raise economic activity in the short term,although risking more costly policy adjustment later on.Inflation could fall faster than expected amid further gains in labor force partic-ipation,allowing central banks to bring easing plans forward.Artificial intelligence and str

136、onger structural reforms than anticipated could spur productivity.As the global economy approaches a soft landing,the near-term priority for central banks is to ensure that inflation touches down smoothly,by neither easing policies prematurely nor delaying too long EXECUTIVE SUMMARYExECUTIvE SUMMaRy

137、xviiInternational Monetary Fund|April 2024ExECUTIvE SUMMaRyand causing target undershoots.At the same time,as central banks take a less restrictive stance,a renewed focus on implementing medium-term fiscal consoli-dation to rebuild room for budgetary maneuver and priority investments,and to ensure d

138、ebt sustainability,is in order.Cross-country differences call for tailored policy responses.Intensifying supply-enhancing reforms would facilitate inflation and debt reduction,allow economies to increase growth toward the higher prepandemic era average,and accelerate convergence toward higher income

139、 levels.Multilateral cooperation is needed to limit the costs and risks of geoeconomic fragmentation and climate change,speed the transition to green energy,and facilitate debt restructuring.International Monetary Fund|April 20241Disinflation amid Economic ResilienceEconomic activity was surprisingl

140、y resilient during the global disinflation of 202223.Growth in employ-ment and incomes has held steady as favorable demand and supply developments have supported major economies,despite rising central bank interest rates aimed at restoring price stability.As inflation converges toward target levels

141、and central banks pivot toward policy easing,a tightening of fiscal policies aimed at curbing high government debt levels,with higher taxes and lower government spending,is expected to weigh on growth.The pace of expansion is also expected to remain low by historical standards as a result of factors

142、 including the long-term consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic,Russias invasion of Ukraine,weak growth in productivity,and increasing geoeco-nomic fragmentation.In late 2023,headline inflation neared its prepandemic level in most economies for the first time since the start of the global inflation s

143、urge(Figure 1.1).In the last quarter of 2023,headline inflation for advanced economies was 2.3 percent on a quarter-over-quarter annualized basis,down from a peak of 9.5 percent in the second quarter of 2022.For emerging market and developing economies,inflation was 9.9 percent in the last quarter o

144、f 2023,down from a peak of 13.7 percent in the first quarter of 2022,but this average was driven by high inflation in a few countries;for the median emerging market and devel-oping economy,inflation declined to 3.9 percent.This progress notwithstanding,inflation is not yet at target in most economie

145、s.As global inflation descended from its peak,economic activity grew steadily,defying warnings of stagflation and global recession.During 2022 and 2023,global real GDP rose by a cumulative 6.7 percent.That is 0.8 percentage point higher than the forecasts made at the time of the October 2022 World E

146、conomic Outlook(WEO)(Figure 1.2).The United States and several large emerging market and middle-income economies displayed the greatest overperformance,with aggregate demand supported by stronger-than-expected private consumption amid still-tightthough easinglabor markets.Households in advanced econ

147、omies supported their spending by drawing down accumulated pandemic-era savings.Larger-than-expected government spending further supported the expansion of aggregate demand in most regions.The overall budgetary stancemeasured by the structural fiscal balancewas more expansionary than expected,on ave

148、rage.Among large economies,the additional budgetary support,compared with October 2022 WEO forecasts,was estimated at 2 per-cent of GDP in the United States and 0.2 percent of GDP in the euro area,whereas in China,1 the fiscal stance was mildly tighter than expected,by 0.7 per-cent of GDP.The euro a

149、rea also displayed the smallest upside growth surprise,reflecting weak consumer sen-timent and the lingering effects of high energy prices.In parallel,global headline inflation declined broadly in line with expectations,averaging just 0.1 percentage point more than predicted in the October 2022 WEO

150、for 2022 and 2023.However,in lower-income coun-tries,inflation was on average higher than expected,reflecting cases in which pass-through into domestic prices from international food,fuel,and fertilizer costs,as well as from currency depreciation,was greater than expected.Price pressures in some low

151、er-income countries were significant.These factors also caused these economies to grow more slowly than expected,suggesting a negative supply shock.In China,inflation fell unexpectedly,with the decrease reflecting sharply lower domestic food prices and pass-through effects on underlying(core)inflati

152、on.The resilience in global economic activity was com-patible with falling inflation thanks to a postpandemic expansion on the supply side.A greater-than-expected rise in the labor force amid robust employment growth supported activity and disinflation in advanced economies and several large emergin

153、g market and middle-income economies.The labor force expansion reflected,in some economies,increased inflows of 1Chinas deficit and public debt numbers cover a narrower perimeter of the general government than the IMF staffs estimates in China Article IV reports(see IMF 2024 for a reconciliation of

154、the two estimates).CHAPTER1GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIESWORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE2International Monetary Fund|April 2024WorldAEsEMDEsFigure 1.1.Global Inflation Falling as Output Grows1.Headline Inflation(Percent,month-over-month,SAAR)40481216Jan.2018Jan.19Jan.

155、20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.242.Core Inflation(Percent,month-over-month,SAAR)40481216Jan.2018Jan.19Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.243.Real GDP(Index,2020:Q4=100)2018:Q119:Q120:Q121:Q122:Q123:Q123:Q4859095100105110115Sources:Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Panels 1 and 2 plot the median of a

156、 sample of 57 economies that accounts for 78 percent of World Economic Outlook world GDP(in weighted purchasing-power-parity terms)in 2023.Vertical axes are cut off at 4 percent and 16 percent.Panel 3 plots the median of a sample of 44 economies.The bands depict the 25th to 75th percentiles of data

157、across economies.“Core inflation”is the percent change in the consumer price index for goods and services,excluding food and energy(or the closest available measure).AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;SAAR=seasonally adjusted annual rate.GovernmentPrivateLabor forc

158、eParticipation rateFigure 1.2.Performance in 202223 Compared with Projections at Time of Cost-of-Living Crisis(Percent deviation from October 2022 WEO projection,unless noted otherwise)1.Cumulative GDP Growth1012USEMxCHNWorldAEsChinaEALIDCs2.Inflation Rate(Percentage points)210123USEMxCHNWorldAEsChi

159、naEALIDCs3.Government and PrivateConsumption4202468USEMxCHNWorldAEsChinaEALIDCs4.Fixed Capital FormationUSEMxCHNWorldAEsChinaEALIDCs432101235.Employment21012345USEMxCHNWorldAEsChinaEALIDCs6.Labor Force andParticipation RateUSEMxCHNWorldAEsChinaEALIDCs321012Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Figure r

160、eports latest estimates for cumulative growth in 2022 and 2023 in deviation from October 2022 WEO forecast in all panels except panel 2,which reports the difference between average inflation in 2022 and 2023 and the corresponding October 2022 WEO forecasts.Panel 6 does not include India due to missi

161、ng data.AEs=advanced economies;EA=euro area;EMxCHN=emerging market and middle-income economies excluding China;LIDCs=low-income developing countries;WEO=World Economic Outlook.CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES3International Monetary Fund|April 2024migrants,with faster growth in the foreign-bor

162、n than in the domestic-born labor force since 2021(Figure 1.3),as well as higher labor force participation rates.Excep-tions to this pattern include China,where labor market weakness,in the context of subdued demand,was broad based across sectors,and lower-income countries,where supply-side challeng

163、es held job creation back.Greater-than-expected additions to the stock of phys-ical capital,with business investment responding to the strength in product demand,further bolstered the supply side in most regions,with exceptions including the euro area,where interest-rate-sensitive business investmen

164、t,particularly in manufacturing,was subdued.A resolution of pandemic-era supply-chain problems allowed delivery times to decline and transportation costs to decrease(Figure 1.4).After attacks on commer-cial shipping in the Red Seathrough which 11 per-cent of global trade flowsglobal transportation c

165、osts increased,reflecting the rerouting of cargo from the Suez Canal to the Cape of Good Hope and continued trade disruptions from climate extremes in the Panama Canal,but remained well below their 202122 levels and have recently declined.The price of energy fell faster than expected from its peak(F

166、igure 1.5),in part as a result of increased non-OPEC(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)oil production and increased natu-ral gas output,most notably in the United States.Rising exports of Russian oil on account of the expanding non-Western-aligned oil tanker fleet carrying Russian oi

167、l and Russias setting up its own maritime insurance added further to the world energy supply.Inflation(and Expectations)in DeclineThe fall in headline inflation since 2022 reflects the fading of relative price shocksnotably those to energy pricesas well as lower core inflation.The decline in energy

168、prices reflects not only increased global energy supply,but also the effects of tight monetary policies.The monetary tightening by central banks in major advanced economies during 202223 may have contributed strongly to lowering energy prices owing to its high degree of synchronization and US:Foreig

169、n bornUS:Domestic bornCanada:Foreign bornCanada:Domestic bornUK:Foreign bornUK:Domestic bornEuro area:Foreign bornEuro area:Domestic bornFigure 1.3.Domestic-and Foreign-Born Workers in the Labor Force(Index,January 2019=100)1.North America9095100105110115120125Jan.2019Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.242

170、.Europe9095100105110115120125Jan.2019Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Sources:Eurostat;Haver Analytics;US Bureau of Labor Statistics;and IMF staff calculations.Global supply-chain pressure indexWorld container index(right scale)Suez CanalCape of Good HopeFigure 1.4.Supply-Chain Pressures and Red Sea Te

171、nsions1.Supply-Chain Pressures and Shipping Costs(Standard deviation from average value;thousands of USdollars a 40-foot container,right scale)40481216202468Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Feb.242.Transit Trade Volume(Percent,year-over-year change using monthly averages)50250255075100Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22J

172、an.23Jan.24Sources:Federal Reserve Bank of New York;Haver Analytics;IMF,PortWatch;and IMF staff calculations.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE4International Monetary Fund|April 2024the associated effect on curbing world energy demand(as in the analysis of Auclert and o

173、thers 2023).Core inflation has declined as a result of the fading of effects of pass-through from past shocks to headline inflation,as well as because labor market pressures have eased.Pass-through effects include the effects of past relative price shocksnotably those to the price of energy and supp

174、ly shifts in various industrieson prices and costs in other industries through supply-chain inputs and wage demands.Near-term inflation expectations are an important pass-through channel because of their implications for both wage and price setting(see Chapter 2 of the October 2023 WEO)and have decl

175、ined toward target levels in both advanced economies and emerging market and developing economies(Figure 1.6),although mea-sures of financial-market-based inflation expectations have recently shown signs of a pickup in the US.Longer-term inflation expectations have remained anchored,despite the stri

176、ng of large shocks since 2020with decisive communication and action by central banks safeguarding the credibility of their infla-tion targetsand contributed little to recent movements in core inflation.Labor markets remain tight,especially in the United States,but the recent decline in the ratio of

177、vacancies to the number of unemployed people amid a rise in unemployment rates suggests an easing across several economies(Figure 1.7).Nominal wage growth has generally remained contained in advanced econo-mies since 2022,especially in the euro area,implying a moderation in real(inflation-adjusted)w

178、ages.Real wages are now close to or slightly below the level they were on before the pandemic in these economies.Wage-price spiralsin which prices and wages acceler-ate together for a sustained periodhave generally not taken hold.Nevertheless,wages at the bottom of the wage distribution have risen f

179、aster than the average since the start of the pandemic,compressing the distribution.The roles of these factors in reducing core infla-tion have diverged across major economies.IMF staff analysis(Figure 1.8)suggests that the rapid fading of pass-through from past relative price movementsin particular

180、 from energy price shockshas played a larger role in the euro area and the United Kingdom than in the United States in reducing core inflation(the staffs methodology was the same as that used in Dao and others 2023).In the United States,labor market tightness and,more broadly,strong macroeconomic Ac

181、tualOctober 2022 WEO forecastActualOctober 2022 IEA forecastFigure 1.5.Global Energy Price and Oil Supply1.Energy Price(Index,2016=100)01002003004002019:Q420:Q421:Q422:Q423:Q42019:Q420:Q421:Q422:Q423:Q42.World Oil Supply(Million barrels a day)9095100105Sources:International Energy Agency(IEA);and IM

182、F staff calculations.Note:Forecasts for the energy price index and oil supply come from the October 2022 World Economic Outlook(WEO)and October 2022 IEA Oil Market Report,respectively.AEs 12 months aheadAEs long termEMDEs 12 months aheadEMDEs long term02468Sources:Consensus Economics;and IMF staff c

183、alculations.Note:The figure shows median inflation expectations,computed based on Consensus Forecast surveys of professional forecasters,for respective groups of economies.The 12-month-ahead inflation expectations are constructed as the weighted sum of forecasts for the current and next calendar yea

184、r(see Buono and Formai 2018).“Long term”denotes 10-year-ahead expectations.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.Jan.18Jan.19Jan.20Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Jan.2017Figure 1.6.Near-Term Inflation Expectations Falling(Percent)CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES5Inter

185、national Monetary Fund|April 2024conditions,which partly reflect the effects of earlier fiscal stimulus as well as strong private consumption,are the main source of remaining upward pressure on underlying inflation.In the United Kingdom,labor market tightness predating the pandemic may partly explai

186、n why inflation has been higher than in the US or euro area following the onset of the pandemic(see Haskel,Martin,and Brandt 2023).Accordingly,IMF staff estimates of the gap between actual and potential output levels in 2023 are positive for the United States,at 0.7 percent,and negative for the euro

187、 area and for the United Kingdom,at 0.3 percent.LatestLowest pointLatestPeakAEsUSEuro areaFigure 1.7.Labor Markets Cooling1.Unemployment Rates(Percent)2.Vacancy-to-Unemployment Ratios(Percent)3.Real Wage(Index,2017:Q1=100)AUSCANEAJPNKORGBRUSABRAHUNINDMEXPOLTUR0.00.51.01.52.02.5AUSCANGBRUSAEurope1001

188、05110115120Sources:Haver Analytics;International Labour Organization;Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;US Bureau of Economic Analysis;US Bureau of Labor Statistics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:In panel 1,Indias unemployment in urban areas is from Periodic Labor Force Survey d

189、ata.In panel 2,Europe includes Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Croatia,Cyprus,the Czech Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,The Netherlands,Poland,Portugal,Romania,the Slovak Republic,Slovenia,Spain,and Sweden.In panel 3,the“real wage”is

190、the nominal wage divided by the consumer price index and is defined on a per worker basis.Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization(ISO)country codes except for EA(euro area).AEs=advanced economies.2017:Q118:Q119:Q120:Q121:Q122:Q123:Q1 23:Q30246810Headline inflatio

191、n shocksUnderlying(core)inflationPass-through effectsLonger-term expectationsLabor market tightnessResidualFigure 1.8.Decomposition of Inflation Drivers(Percentage point deviation from December 2019;three-month average inflation,annualized)1.United States8404884048Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Jan

192、.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.242.Euro Area404812404812Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Dec.23Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Dec.233.United KingdomJan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Dec.23Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Dec.234048121640481216Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Underlying(core)inflation denotes weighted median inf

193、lation.Methodology is as in Dao and others(2023)and Ball,Leigh,and Mishra(2022).WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE6International Monetary Fund|April 2024Interest Rates Restrictive,but Set to FallTo counter rising inflation,major central banks have raised policy interest

194、 rates to levels estimated as restric-tive.As a result,mortgage costs have increased and credit availability is generally tight,resulting in diffi-culties for firms refinancing their debt,rising corporate bankruptcies,and subdued business and residential investment in several economies.The commercia

195、l real estate sector,including office markets,is under espe-cially strong pressure in some economies,with rising defaults and lower investment and valuations,reflect-ing the combined effects of higher borrowing costs and the shift toward remote work since the pandemic(see the April 2024 Global Finan

196、cial Stability Report).However,despite concerns,a global economic downturn caused by a sharp rise in policy rates has not materialized,for several reasons.First,some central banksincluding the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserveraised their nominal interest rates after inflation expectatio

197、ns started to rise,resulting in lower real rates that initially supported economic activ-ity(Figure 1.9).The Bank of Japan has continued to keep policy rates near zero,resulting in a steady decline in real interest rates.By contrast,the central banks of Brazil,Chile,and several other emerging market

198、 and developing economies raised rates relatively quickly,resulting in earlier increases in real interest rates.Second,households in major advanced economies were able to draw on substantial savings accumulated during the pandemic to limit the impact of higher borrow-ing costs on their spending(Figu

199、re 1.10).2 Third,as Chapter 2 explains,changes in mortgage and housing markets over the prepandemic decade of low interest rates have limited the drag of the recent rise in policy rates on household consumption in several economies.The average maturity and share of mortgages subject to fixed rates i

200、ncreased,moderating the near-term impact of rate hikes.At the same time,there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of the monetary policy pass-through to mortgages and housing markets across countries.Nevertheless,the cooling effects of high policy rates are intensifying in several economies.F

201、ixed-rate mortgages are resetting,the stock of pandemic savings 2Estimates of the stock of excess household savingsthe accumu-lation of savings beyond the prepandemic trendcome with a range of uncertainty but generally show a consistent pattern across meth-odological approaches,with the stock declin

202、ing in major advanced economies since 2022.Estimates based on a linear trend show a less pronounced drop in excess household savings for some economies.available to soften the impact on households has declined in advanced economies,and with inflation expectations falling,real policy rates are rising

203、 even where central banks have not changed nominal rates.At the same time,with inflation moving toward targets,market expectations that policy rates will decline have generally contributed to a decline in long-term borrowing rates,rising equity markets,and an easing in overall global financial condi

204、tions since last October,although funding is still more expen-sive than before the pandemic(see the April 2024 Global Financial Stability Report).Central banks that raised policy rates earlier,including those in Brazil and Chile,have already cut them substantially since United StatesEuro areaJapanOt

205、her AEsChinaBrazilChileOther EMDEsFigure 1.9.Monetary Tightening:Nominal and Real(Percent)1.Nominal Policy Rate02468101214Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.242.Real Policy Rate8404812Jan.2020Jan.21Jan.22Jan.23Jan.24Sources:Bank for International Settlements;Consensus Economics;Haver Analytics;and IMF st

206、aff calculations.Note:Sample includes 16 AEs and 65 EMDEs.“Other”aggregates are medians.Real rates are calculated by subtracting 12-month-ahead inflation expectations,computed based on Consensus Forecast surveys of professional forecasters,from nominal policy rates.The 12-month-ahead inflation expec

207、tations are constructed as the weighted sum of forecasts for the current and next calendar years(see Buono and Formai 2018).AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies.CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES7International Monetary Fund|April 2024the second half of 2023.With

208、 expectations of lower interest rates in advanced economies,the appetite for assets in emerging market and developing economies has picked up,and sovereign spreads on risk-free government debt have fallen from their July 2022 peaks toward their prepandemic levels(Figure 1.11).Accordingly,more govern

209、ments that earlier faced severe funding shortages are accessing international debt markets this year.Elevated Debt BurdensDebt-to-GDP ratios,which increased sharply during the pandemic,remain elevated,and large budget deficits continue to raise the debt burden in many economies(see the April 2024 Fi

210、scal Monitor).Interest payments on debt have also increased as a share of government revenues(Figure 1.12),crowding out necessary growth-enhancing budgetary invest-ments.In low-income countries,interest payments are estimated to average 14.3 percent of general government revenues in 2024,about doubl

211、e the level 15 years ago.To rebuild budgetary room for maneu-ver and curb the rising path of debt,the fiscal policy stance is expected to tighten in 2024 and beyond,with higher taxes and lower government spending in several advanced and emerging market and devel-oping economies.This shift is expecte

212、d to weigh on near-term economic activity.The Outlook:Steady Growth and DisinflationLatest projections are for the global economy to continue growing at a similar pace as in 2023 during 202425 and for global headline and core inflation to decline steadily.There is little change in the fore-cast for

213、global growth since the January 2024 WEO Update,with some adjustments for major economies(Tables 1.1 and 1.2),including a further strengthening in the projection for the United States,offset by modest downward revisions across several other economies.The forecast for global growth remains higher,how

214、ever,than in the October 2023 WEO.The outlook for inflation is broadly similar to that in the October 2023 WEO,with a downward revision for advanced economies,offset by an upward revision for emerging market and developing economies.Medium-term prospects for growth in world output and trade remain t

215、he lowest in decades,with the pace of convergence toward higher living standards slowing for middle-and lower-income countries.The baseline forecasts for the global economy are predicated on a number of projections for global commodity prices,interest rates,and fiscal policies(Figure 1.13):Commodity

216、 price projections:As explained in the Commodity Special Feature in this chapter,prices of fuel commodities are projected to fall in 2024 United StatesUnited KingdomEuro areaCanadaAustraliaFigure 1.10.Savings from the Pandemic:Declining(Percent of GDP)42024681012142019:Q420:Q421:Q422:Q423:Q4Sources:

217、de Soyres,Moore,and Ortiz 2023;and IMF staff calculations.Note:Excess savings are calculated as the deviation from the predicted saving rate using a Hamilton trend.Accumulation starts in the first quarter of 2020.Euro area comprises France,Germany,Italy,and Spain.201719January 2024July 2022Figure 1.

218、11.Sovereign Bond Spreads in Emerging Market and Developing Economies(Basis points;distribution by economy group)05001,0001,5002,0002,500EmergingAsiaEmergingEuropeLACME&CASSASources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.;and IMF staff calculations.Note:For each region,the box denotes upper and lower quartiles and b

219、lack marker shows median.Whiskers show maximum and minimum values within the boundary of 1.5 times the interquartile range from the upper and lower quartiles.Y-axis is cut off at 2,500 basis points.LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;ME&CA=Middle East and Central Asia;SSA=sub-Saharan Africa.WORLD EC

220、ONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE8International Monetary Fund|April 2024by,on average,9.7 percent,with oil prices fall-ing by about 2.5 percent.The decreases reflect abundant spare capacity and strong non-OPEC+(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun-tries plus selected n

221、onmember countries,including Russia)supply growth.Coal and natural gas prices are expected to continue declining from their ear-lier peaks,by 25.1 percent for coal and 32.6 per-cent for natural gas in 2024,with the gas market becoming increasingly balanced on account of new supply,dampened demand,an

222、d high storage levels.The forecast for nonfuel commodity prices is broadly stable in 2024,with prices for base metals expected to fall by 1.8 percent,on account of weaker industrial activity in Europe and China.Food commodity prices are predicted to decline by 2.2 percent in 2024.Compared with those

223、 in the January 2024 WEO Update,forecasts for food prices have been revised slightly downward,driven by expectations of abundant global supplies for wheat and maize.Monetary policy projections:With inflation pro-jected to continue declining toward targets and longer-term inflation expectations remai

224、ning anchored,policy rates of central banks in major advanced economies are generally expected to start declining in the second half of 2024(Figure 1.13).Among major central banks,by the fourth quarter of 2024,the Federal Reserves policy rate is expected to have declined from its current level of ab

225、out USAEs excl.USChinaEMMIEs excl.ChinaLIDCs1.General Government Debt(Percent of GDP)0204060801001201402005101520242.General Government Interest Payment(Percent of general government revenue)04812162005101520243.General Government Fiscal Balance(Percent of GDP)161284048200510152024Source:IMF staff c

226、alculations.Note:AEs=advanced economies;EMMIEs=emerging market and middle-income economies;excl.=excluding;LIDCs=low-income developing countries.Figure 1.12.Elevated Debt and DeficitsUnited StatesEuro areaJapanUnited KingdomFigure 1.13.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Projections1.Policy Rates in Selected

227、 Advanced Economies(Percent,quarterly average)1012345672022:Q123:Q124:Q125:Q126:Q127:Q128:Q128:Q42.Change in Structural Primary Fiscal Balance,202326(Percent of potential GDP)1.51.00.50.00.51.01.52.020232425262023242526Advanced economiesEmerging market anddeveloping economiesSource:IMF staff calcula

228、tions.Note:In panel 2,the structural primary fiscal balance is the cyclically adjusted primary balance corrected for a broader range of noncyclical factors,such as changes in asset and commodity prices.CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES9International Monetary Fund|April 20245.4 percent to 4.6 p

229、ercent,the Bank of England to have reduced its policy rate from about 5.3 percent to 4.8 percent,and the European Central Bank to have reduced its short-term rate from about 4.0 percent to 3.3 percent.For Japan,policy rates are projected to rise gradually,reflecting growing confidence that inflation

230、 will sustainably converge to target over the medium term despite Japans history of deflation.Fiscal policy projections:Governments in advanced economies are expected to tighten fiscal policy in 2024(Figure 1.13)and,to a lesser extent,in 202526.Among major advanced economies,the structural fiscal-ba

231、lance-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise by 1.9 percentage points in the United States and by 0.8 percentage point in the euro area in 2024.In emerging market and developing economies,the projected fiscal stance is expected to be,on average,broadly neutral in 2024,with a tightening of about 0.2 percen

232、tage point pro-jected for 2025.Growth Outlook:Stable but SlowGlobal growth,estimated at 3.2 percent in 2023,is projected to continue at the same pace in 2024 and 2025(Table 1.1).The projection for 2024 is revised up by 0.1 percentage point from the January 2024 WEO Update,and by 0.3 percent-age poin

233、t with respect to the October 2023 WEO forecast(Figure 1.14).Nevertheless,the projection for global growth in 2024 and 2025 is below the historical(200019)annual average of 3.8 percent,reflecting restrictive monetary policies and withdrawal of fiscal support,as well as low underlying productiv-ity g

234、rowth.Advanced economies are expected to see growth rise slightly,with the increase mainly reflecting a recovery in the euro area from low growth in 2023,whereas emerging market and developing economies are expected to experience stable growth through 2024 and 2025,with regional differences.Growth F

235、orecast for Advanced EconomiesFor advanced economies,growth is projected to rise from 1.6 percent in 2023 to 1.7 percent in 2024 and 1.8 percent in 2025.The forecast is revised upward by 0.2 percentage point for 2024 compared with the January 2024 WEO Update projections and remains the same for 2025

236、.The 2024 upgrade reflects a revi-sion to US growth,while an upward revision to the US broadly offsets a similar downward revision to the euro area in 2025.In the United States,growth is projected to increase to 2.7 percent in 2024,before slowing to 1.9 per-cent in 2025,as gradual fiscal tightening

237、and a softening in labor markets slow aggregate demand.For 2024,an upward revision of 0.6 percent-age point since the January 2024 WEO Update reflects largely statistical carryover effects from a stronger-than-expected growth outcome in the fourth quarter of 2023,with,in addition,some of the stronge

238、r momentum expected to per-sist into 2024.Growth in the euro area is projected to recover from its low rate of an estimated 0.4 percent in 2023,which reflected relatively high exposure to the war in Ukraine,to 0.8 percent in 2024 and 1.5 percent in 2025.Stronger household consumption,as the effects

239、of the shock to energy prices subside and a fall in inflation supports growth in real income,is expected to drive the recovery.The pace of recovery WorldAEsEMDEsEmerging AsiaEmerging EuropeLACME&CASSAFigure 1.14.Growth Outlook:Broadly Stable(Percent;solid=April 2024 WEO,dashes=October 2023 WEO)1.AE

240、and EMDE Growth01234520232425262728292.EMDE Growth by Region01234562023242526272829Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:AE=advanced economy;EMDE=emerging market and developing economy;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;ME&CA=Middle East and Central Asia;SSA=sub-Saharan Africa;WEO=World Economic Outlo

241、ok.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE10International Monetary Fund|April 2024Table 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)ProjectionsDifference from January 2024 WEO Update1Difference from October 2023 WEO12023202420

242、252024202520242025World Output3.23.23.20.10.00.30.0Advanced Economies1.61.71.80.20.00.30.0United States 2.52.71.90.60.21.20.1Euro Area0.40.81.50.10.20.40.3Germany0.30.21.30.30.30.70.7France0.90.71.40.30.30.60.4Italy0.90.70.70.00.40.00.3Spain2.51.92.10.40.00.20.0Japan 1.90.91.00.00.20.10.4United King

243、dom0.10.51.50.10.10.10.5Canada1.11.22.30.20.00.40.1Other Advanced Economies21.82.02.40.10.10.20.1Emerging Market and Developing Economies4.34.24.20.10.00.20.1Emerging and Developing Asia5.65.24.90.00.10.40.0China5.24.64.10.00.00.40.0India37.86.86.50.30.00.50.2Emerging and Developing Europe3.23.12.80

244、.30.30.90.3Russia3.63.21.80.60.72.10.8Latin America and the Caribbean 2.32.02.50.10.00.30.1Brazil2.92.22.10.50.20.70.2Mexico3.22.41.40.30.10.30.1Middle East and Central Asia2.02.84.20.10.00.60.3Saudi Arabia0.82.66.00.10.51.41.8Sub-Saharan Africa 3.43.84.00.00.10.20.1Nigeria2.93.33.00.30.10.20.1South

245、 Africa0.60.91.20.10.10.90.4MemorandumWorld Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates2.72.72.70.10.00.30.0European Union0.61.11.80.10.10.40.3ASEAN-544.14.54.60.20.20.00.1Middle East and North Africa1.92.74.20.20.00.70.3Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies54.44.14.10.00.00.20.1Low-Income Developin

246、g Countries54.04.75.20.20.10.30.1World Trade Volume(goods and services)0.33.03.30.30.30.50.4ImportsAdvanced Economies1.02.02.80.70.41.00.4Emerging Market and Developing Economies2.04.94.10.00.30.50.6ExportsAdvanced Economies0.92.52.90.10.30.60.4Emerging Market and Developing Economies0.13.73.90.40.4

247、0.50.3Commodity Prices(US dollars)Oil616.42.56.30.21.51.81.4Nonfuel(average based on world commodity import weights)5.70.10.41.00.02.80.3World Consumer Prices76.85.94.50.10.10.10.1Advanced Economies84.62.62.00.00.00.40.2Emerging Market and Developing Economies78.38.36.20.20.20.50.0Source:IMF staff e

248、stimates.Note:Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during January 30,2024February 27,2024.Economies are listed on the basis of economic size.The aggregated quarterly data are seasonally adjusted.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1 Difference based on rounded

249、 figures for the current,January 2024 WEO Update,and October 2023 WEO forecasts.2 Excludes the Group of Seven(Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,United Kingdom,United States)and euro area countries.3 For India,data and forecasts are presented on a fiscal year basis,and GDP from 2011 onward is based o

250、n GDP at market prices with fiscal year 2011/12 as a base year.4 Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.5 Vietnam is removed from the Low-Income Developing Countries group and added to the Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies group.The reported differences from January 2024

251、 and October 2023 are for Low-Income Developing Countries excluding Vietnam and Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies including Vietnam.CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES11International Monetary Fund|April 2024is revised downward by 0.3 percentage point for Germany for both 2024 and 2025

252、amid persistently weak consumer sentiment,although this adjustment is largely offset by upgrades for several smaller econ-omies,including Belgium and Portugal.Among other advanced economies,growth in the United Kingdom is projected to rise from an esti-mated 0.1 percent in 2023 to 0.5 percent in 202

253、4,as the lagged negative effects of high energy prices wane,then to 1.5 percent in 2025,as disinflation allows financial conditions to ease and real incomes to recover.In Japan,output is projected to slow from an estimated 1.9 percent in 2023 to 0.9 per-cent in 2024 and 1 percent in 2025,owing to fa

254、ding of one-off factors that supported growth in 2023,including a surge in inbound tourism.Table 1.1.Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections(continued)(Percent change,unless noted otherwise)Q4 over Q49ProjectionsDifference from January 2024 WEO Update1Difference from October 2023 WEO12023

255、202420252024202520242025World Output3.23.23.10.10.00.0.Advanced Economies1.61.91.70.30.00.4.United States 3.12.11.80.60.10.7.Euro Area0.11.41.40.10.20.0.Germany0.20.71.80.40.11.0.France0.71.11.50.30.30.4.Italy0.60.70.60.60.40.5.Spain2.01.92.10.10.00.1.Japan 1.31.70.50.10.00.7.United Kingdom0.21.51.3

256、0.90.50.7.Canada0.91.82.30.10.10.3.Other Advanced Economies21.72.22.50.40.50.0.Emerging Market and Developing Economies4.54.34.10.00.00.4.Emerging and Developing Asia5.75.14.60.40.10.4.China5.44.44.10.00.10.3.India36.86.46.41.40.31.3.Emerging and Developing Europe4.13.22.81.20.10.7.Russia4.82.61.21.

257、20.21.4.Latin America and the Caribbean 1.52.12.60.40.01.1.Brazil2.23.01.50.40.10.2.Mexico2.51.91.80.00.40.0.Middle East and Central Asia.Saudi Arabia4.33.15.90.30.50.9.Sub-Saharan Africa.Nigeria2.93.52.50.20.40.1.South Africa0.91.31.20.10.10.7.Memorandum World Growth Based on Market Exchange Rates2

258、.72.72.60.20.00.1.European Union0.41.71.70.30.60.1.ASEAN-544.25.23.10.00.40.6.Middle East and North Africa.Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies54.54.34.10.00.10.4.Low-Income Developing Countries5.Commodity Prices(US dollars)Oil64.46.05.50.10.60.3.Nonfuel(average based on world commodity impor

259、t weights)0.20.80.40.70.20.1.World Consumer Prices75.85.43.60.10.20.6.Advanced Economies83.12.42.00.10.00.2.Emerging Market and Developing Economies78.08.05.00.30.21.4.6 Simple average of prices of UK Brent,Dubai Fateh,and West Texas Intermediate crude oil.The average price of oil in US dollars a ba

260、rrel was$80.59 in 2023;the assumed price,based on futures markets,is$78.61 in 2024 and$73.68 in 2025.7 Excludes Venezuela.See the country-specific note for Venezuela in the“Country Notes”section of the Statistical Appendix.8 The assumed inflation rates for 2024 and 2025,respectively,are as follows:2

261、.4 percent and 2.1 percent for the euro area,2.2 percent and 2.1 percent for Japan,and 2.9 percent and 2.0 percent for the United States.9 For world output,the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 90 percent of annual world output at purchasing-power-parity weights.For emerg

262、ing market and developing economies,the quarterly estimates and projections account for approximately 85 percent of annual emerging market and developing economies output at purchasing-power-parity weights.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE12International Monetary Fund|

263、April 2024Growth Forecast for Emerging Market and Developing EconomiesIn emerging market and developing economies,growth is expected to be stable at 4.2 percent in 2024 and 2025,with a moderation in emerging and developing Asia offset mainly by rising growth for economies in the Middle East and Cent

264、ral Asia and for sub-Saharan Africa.Low-income developing coun-tries are expected to experience gradually increasing growth,from 4.0 percent in 2023 to 4.7 percent in 2024 and 5.2 percent in 2025,as some constraints on near-term growth ease.Growth in emerging and developing Asia is expected to fall

265、from an estimated 5.6 percent in 2023 to 5.2 percent in 2024 and 4.9 percent in 2025,a slight upward revision compared with the January 2024 WEO Update.Growth in China is projected to slow from 5.2 percent in 2023 to 4.6 percent in 2024 and 4.1 percent in 2025 as the positive effects of one-off fact

266、orsincluding the postpandemic boost to consumption and fiscal stimulusease and weakness in the property sector persists.Growth in India is projected to remain strong at 6.8 percent in 2024 and 6.5 percent in 2025,with the robustness reflecting continu-ing strength in domestic demand and a rising wor

267、king-age population.Growth in emerging and developing Europe is projected at 3.2 percent in 2023 and 3.1 percent in 2024,with an easing to 2.8 percent in 2025,an upward revision of 0.5 percentage point for 2023 and 0.3 percentage point for 2024 and 2025 since January.The moderation reflects a prospe

268、c-tive decline of growth in Russia from 3.2 percent in 2024 to 1.8 percent in 2025 as the effects of high investment and robust private consumption,supported by wage growth in a tight labor market,fade.In Trkiye,growth is projected at 3.1 percent in 2024 and 3.2 percent in 2025,with economic activit

269、y strengthening in the second half of 2024 as monetary tightening ends and consumption starts to recover.In Latin America and the Caribbean,growth is pro-jected to decline from an estimated 2.3 percent in 2023 to 2.0 percent in 2024 before rising again to 2.5 percent in 2025,an upward revision of 0.

270、1 per-centage point for 2024 since January.In Brazil,growth is expected to moderate to 2.2 percent in 2024 on the back of fiscal consolidation,lagged effects of still-tight monetary policy,and a smaller contribution from agriculture.In Mexico,growth is projected at 2.4 percent in 2024,supported by a

271、 fiscal expansion,before declining to 1.4 percent in 2025 as the government is expected to tighten the fiscal stance.The forecast for Mexico is revised downward on account of weaker-than-expected out-comes for end-2023 and early 2024,with a contrac-tion in manufacturing.Table 1.2.Overview of the Wor

272、ld Economic Outlook Projections at Market Exchange Rate Weights(Percent change)ProjectionsDifference from January 2024 WEO Update1Difference from October 2023 WEO12023202420252024202520242025World Output2.72.72.70.10.00.30.0Advanced Economies1.61.81.80.30.10.40.0Emerging Market and Developing Econom

273、ies4.24.04.00.00.00.20.1Emerging and Developing Asia5.45.04.60.10.00.40.0Emerging and Developing Europe2.93.12.80.30.31.00.3Latin America and the Caribbean 2.21.92.50.10.10.30.2Middle East and Central Asia1.62.64.30.20.10.80.4Sub-Saharan Africa 3.23.64.00.10.10.30.1MemorandumEuropean Union0.50.91.70

274、.10.10.40.3Middle East and North Africa1.42.54.30.30.10.90.4Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies24.24.03.90.10.00.20.1Low-Income Developing Countries24.04.75.20.20.10.30.1Source:IMF staff estimates.Note:The aggregate growth rates are calculated as a weighted average,in which a moving average

275、of nominal GDP in US dollars for the preceding threeyears is used as the weight.WEO=World Economic Outlook.1 Difference based on rounded figures for the current,January 2024 WEO Update,and October 2023 WEO forecasts.2 Vietnam is removed from the Low-Income Developing Countries group and added to the

276、 Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies group.Thereported differences from January 2024 and October 2023 are for Low-Income Developing Countries excluding Vietnam and Emerging Market and Middle-Income Economies including Vietnam.CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES13International Monetary Fu

277、nd|April 2024 Growth in the Middle East and Central Asia is pro-jected to rise from an estimated 2.0 percent in 2023 to 2.8 percent in 2024 and 4.2 percent in 2025,with a downward revision of 0.1 percentage point for 2024 from the January 2024 projections.The revision reflects a downward adjustment

278、in the 2024 growth forecast for Iran driven by lower non-oil activity and oil revenues,as well as for a number of smaller economies.In sub-Saharan Africa,growth is projected to rise from an estimated 3.4 percent in 2023 to 3.8 per-cent in 2024 and 4.0 percent in 2025,as the negative effects of earli

279、er weather shocks subside and supply issues gradually improve.The forecast is unchanged for 2024 from the January 2024 WEO Update,as a downward revision to Angola owing to a contraction in the oil sector is broadly offset by an upward revision to Nigeria.Inflation Outlook:Declining at Different Spee

280、dsGlobal headline inflation is expected to fall from an annual average of 6.8 percent in 2023 to 5.9 per-cent in 2024 and 4.5 percent in 2025(Table 1.1).A more front-loaded decline is expected for advanced economies,with inflation falling by 2.0 percent-age points in 2024,while it declines in 2025 o

281、nly in emerging market and developing economies.Advanced economies are also expected to return sooner to rates near their prepandemic(201719)average,with inflation averaging 2.0 percent in 2025,about a year before emerging market and developing economies are expected to return to their prepan-demic

282、average near 5.0 percent(Figure 1.15).At the same time,a great deal of differentiation is expected among emerging market and developing economies,with the inflation forecast rangingamong the five regionsfrom only 2.4 percent for emerging and developing Asia,reflecting subdued inflation in China as w

283、ell as in Thailand,to 18.8 percent for emerging and developing Europe,reflecting elevated inflation in Trkiye.The global inflation forecast is revised upward by 0.1 percentage point in 2024 from the January 2024 projections.This reflects unchanged projections for advanced economieswith decreases in

284、the euro area,Japan,and the United Kingdom compensated by an increase in the United Statesand an upside revision of 0.2 percentage point in emerging market and devel-oping economies,mainly on account of increases in Iran and a few other low-income countries.The fall in global inflation in 2024 refle

285、cts a broad-based decline in global core inflation.This dynamic differs from that in 2023,when global core inflation fell a little on an annual average basis and headline inflation declined mainly on account of lower fuel and food price inflation.In 2024,core inflation is expected to fall by 1.2 per

286、centage points after con-tracting by just 0.2 percentage point in 2023.As is the case for headline inflation,the fall in core infla-tion is faster for advanced economies.The drivers of declining core inflation differ by country but include WorldAEsEMDEsWorldAEsEMDEsEmerging AsiaEmerging EuropeLACME&

287、CASSAFigure 1.15.Inflation Outlook:Falling(Percent;solid=April 2024 WEO,dashes=October 2023 WEO)1.Headline Inflation02468101220171819202122232425262.Core Inflation024681020171819202122232425263.Headline Inflation by EMDE Region0510152025302017181920212223242526Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Core

288、 inflation excludes volatile food and energy prices.AEs=advanced economies;EMDEs=emerging market and developing economies;LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean;ME&CA=Middle East and Central Asia;SSA=sub-Saharan Africa;WEO=World Economic Outlook.WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIv

289、ERgENCE14International Monetary Fund|April 2024the effects of still-tight monetary policies,a related softening in labor markets,and fading pass-through effects from earlier declines in relative prices,notably in that of energy.Among economies with an inflation target,headline inflation is projected

290、 to be 0.5 percentage point above target(or the midpoint of the target range)for the median economy by the third quarter of 2024 on a quarter-over-quarter basis(Figure 1.16).For advanced economies,however,the median gap between actual and target is expected to be just 0.3 percentage point by the thi

291、rd quarter of 2024,implying a faster return to target levels than in emerging market and develop-ing economies.Most economies are expected to reach levels within a quarter of a percentage point of their targets(or the midpoints of their target ranges)by the second quarter of 2025.World Trade Outlook

292、:Stable,in Line with OutputWorld trade growth is projected at 3.0 percent in 2024 and 3.3 percent in 2025,with revisions of a 0.3 percentage point decrease for 2024 and 2025 compared with January 2024 projections.Trade growth is expected to remain below its historical(200019)annual average growth ra

293、te of 4.9 percent over the medium term,at 3.2 percent in 2029.This projection implies,in the context of the relatively low outlook for economic growth,a ratio of total world trade to GDP(in current dollars)that averages 57 percent over the next five years,broadly in line with the evolution in trade

294、since the global financial crisis(Figure 1.17).Even as world trade-to-GDP ratios remain relatively stable,significant shifts in trade patterns are taking place,with increasing fractures along geopolitical lines,espe-cially since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022.IMF staff analysis ind

295、icates that growth in trade flows between geopolitical blocs has declined significantly since then compared with growth of trade within blocs(Box 1.1).This reallocation of trade flows is occurring in the context of rising cross-border trade restrictions,with about 3,200 new restrictions on trade in

296、2022 and about 3,000 in 2023,up from about 1,100 in 2019,according to Global Trade Alert data,and increased concerns about supply-chain resilience and national security.Meanwhile,global current account balancesthe sums of absolute surpluses and deficitsare expected to continue narrowing in 2024,as i

297、n 2023,following their significant increase in 2022(Figure 1.18).The rise in current account balances in 2022 reflected con-tributions from elevated commodity prices,triggered by Russias invasion of Ukraine,the uneven recovery from the pandemic,and the rapid tightening of US monetary policy.Over the

298、 medium term,global bal-ances are expected to narrow gradually as the contribu-tion of these factors wanes.Creditor and debtor stock positions are estimated to have increased in 2023,Figure 1.16.Inflation Closer to Target(Percentage points;distribution of deviation from inflation target)202468102023

299、:Q223:Q424:Q224:Q425:Q225:Q4Sources:Central bank websites;Haver Analytics;and IMF staff calculations.Note:The figure shows the distribution of the deviations of year-over-year inflationfrom the inflation target or the inflation target midpoint for 61 economies.The lineshows the median,and the shaded

300、 area indicates the interquartile range.Total tradeGoods tradeSource:IMF staff calculations.Note:Trade is defined as sum of exports and imports.Global trade and GDP for ratio calculation are in current US dollars.Dashes indicate April 2024 World Economic Outlook forecasts.Globalfinancialcrisis203040

301、50607019808590952000051015202529Figure 1.17.Global Trade Outlook:Stable(Percent of GDP)CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES15International Monetary Fund|April 2024with valuation losses in debtor economies and gains in creditor economies more than offsetting narrowing current account balances.Thes

302、e positions are expected to stabilize over the medium term.In some economies,gross external liabilities remain large from a historical perspective and pose risks of external stress.Medium-Term Growth Outlook:Low by Historical StandardsThe latest forecast for global growth in 2029 is 3.1 percent.This

303、 medium-term forecastunchanged since the October 2023 WEOis at its low-est in decades(Figure 1.19).It is lower than the medium-term projection of 3.6 percent made just before the onset of the pandemic(at the time of the January 2020 WEO Update),the 4.9 percent medium-term projection made just before

304、 the onset of the global financial crisis(at the time of the April 2008 WEO),and the historical(200019)annual average 3.8 percent for actual global growth.3The gradual erosion in global growth prospects reflects factors beyond a more slowly rising global population.The bulk of the decline reflects a

305、 fall in prospective growth in GDP per person,which is down from a medium-term forecast of 3.9 percent made before the global financial crisis to 2.1 per-cent in the latest projections(Figure 1.19,panel 2).3The latest projection of global growth over the medium term,which is based on the aggregation

306、 of IMF staff forecasts at the country level,is broadly consistent with the assessment in Chapter 3 based on an analysis of recent trends in global capital and labor accumulation and in total factor productivity.European creditorsEuropean debtorsChinaUnited StatesJapanOthersOil exportersDiscrepancy1

307、.Global Current Account Balance321012307091113151719212325272005292.Global International Investment Position30201001020302005070911131517192123252729Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:European creditors are Austria,Belgium,Denmark,Finland,Germany,Luxembourg,The Netherlands,Norway,Sweden,and Switzerl

308、and;European debtors are Cyprus,Greece,Ireland,Italy,Portugal,Slovenia,and Spain;oil exporters are Algeria,Azerbaijan,Iran,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,Nigeria,Oman,Qatar,Russia,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates,and Venezuela.Figure 1.18.Current Account and International Investment Positions(Percent of glo

309、bal GDP)WorldAdvanced economiesEmerging market and developing economies1.Projections for Real GDP Growth 024682.Projections for Real GDP per Capita Growth 024682000051015202420000510152024Source:IMF staff calculations.Note:Horizontal axis refers to the year in which the five-year-ahead forecasts are

310、 made.Each forecast is from the World Economic Outlook published in April of the corresponding year.Figure 1.19.Forecasts for Global GDP and GDP per Capita(Percent;five-year-ahead projections)WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOKSTEaDy bUT SLOW:RESILIENCE aMID DIvERgENCE16International Monetary Fund|April 2024The

311、contraction in per person growth prospects is especially pronounced for emerging market and developing economies,implying a slower pace of con-vergence toward higher per person income and per-sistent global disparities in living standards.Among advanced economies,the decline in medium-term prospects

312、 is driven by countries other than the United States.Chapter 3 diagnoses the slowdown in global growth over the past two decades and concludes that most of it reflects lower growth in total fac-tor productivity(efficiency in the use of labor and capital).Among major economies,the drivers of this slo

313、wdown include declining labor force participation amid population aging,weaker business investment,andmost importanta drag on growth result-ing from persistent structural frictions that prevent resources from being allocated to more productive firms.As Chapter 4 explains,dimmer prospects for growth

314、in China and other large emerging market economies that together make up an increasing share of the global economy will weigh on the prospects of trading partners and transmit through the worlds highly integrated supply chains.Ongoing geoeco-nomic fragmentationthe policy-driven reversal of cross-bor

315、der economic integrationis expected to affect the medium-term outlook by limiting international flows of goods,services,capital,and workers and so reduce scope for efficiency gains from specialization,economies of scale,and compe-tition(see Aiyar and others 2023 and Gopinath and others 2024).Risks t

316、o the Outlook:Broadly BalancedRisks to the global economic landscape have diminished since October 2023,leading to a broadly balanced distribution of possible outcomes around the baseline projection for global growth,from a clear downside tilt in the April 2023 WEO and the October 2023 WEO.With infl

317、ationary pressures abating more swiftly than expected in many countries,risks to the inflation outlook are now also broadly balanced.Overall,there is scope for further favorable surprises,but numerous adverse risks pull the distribution of outcomes in the opposite direction.Prominent risks and uncer

318、tainties surrounding the outlook are now discussed,and a model-based analysis that quantifies risks to the global outlook and plausible scenarios follows in Box 1.2.Downside RisksDespite the surprisingly resilient global economic performance since October 2023,several adverse risks to global growth

319、remain plausible:New commodity price spikes amid regional conflicts:The conflict in Gaza and Israel could escalate fur-ther into the wider region.Continued attacks in the Red Sea and the ongoing war in Ukraine risk gener-ating additional supply shocks adverse to the global recovery,with spikes in fo

320、od,energy,and transporta-tion costs.Further geopolitical tensionsincluding a possible reescalation of the war in Ukrainecould also constrain cross-border flows of food,fuel,and fertilizer,causing additional price volatility and undermining business and consumer sentiment(Figure 1.20).As the risk ana

321、lysis in Box 1.2 high-lights,such geopolitical shocks could complicate the ongoing disinflation process and delay central bank policy easing,with negative effects on global economic growth.Overall,such adverse supply shocks may affect countries asymmetrically,with particularly acute effects on lower

322、-income countries where food and energy constitute a large share of household expenditure.Persistent inflation and financial stress:A slower-than-expected decline in core inflation in major economies as a result,for example,of per-sistent labor market tightness or renewed tensions Geopolitical risk,

323、30-day moving averageBrent crude oil price(right scale)050100150200250300350400010020030040050060070080019889398200308131823Figure 1.20.Geopolitical Risk and Oil Prices(Index,19852019=100;US dollars a barrel,right scale)Sources:Caldara and Iacoviello 2022;and Haver Analytics.Note:The Geopolitical Ri

324、sk Index is constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello(2022)to measure adverse geopolitical events and associated risks based on automated text search results of the electronic archives of several newspapers covering geopolitical tensions.CHAPTER 1 gLObaL PROSPECTS aND POLICIES17International Monetary Fu

325、nd|April 2024in supply chains could trigger a rise in interest rate expectations and a fall in asset prices,as in early 2023.Furthermore,as Chapter 2 explains,the risk that the cooling effects of past monetary tighten-ing are yet to come is plausible,especially where fixed-rate mortgages are resetti

326、ng and household debt is high.Such developments could increase defaults in many sectorsnotably including com-mercial real estate and firmsand raise risks to financial stability(see Chapter 1 of the April 2024 Global Financial Stability Report).They could also trigger flight-to-safety capital flows,t

327、ighten global financial conditions,and strengthen the US dollar and so reduce global growth.Chinas recovery faltering:In the absence of a compre-hensive restructuring policy package for the troubled property sector in China,a larger and more pro-longed drop in real estate investment could occur,acco

328、mpanied by expectations of future house prices declining,reduced housing demand,and a further weakening in household confidence and spending,with implications for global growth.Unintended fiscal tightening on account of local government financing constraints could amplify the impact.As Box 1.2 illus

329、trates,in such a scenario,the slowdown in domestic demand could cause disinflationary pressures to intensify,resulting in sustained low inflation or deflation.Spillovers to Chinas trading partners in such a scenario are estimated to be,on balance,negative,with effects through weaker demand for tradi

330、ng-partner products outweighing gains from lower commodity prices;global current account imbalances may increase as a result.The authorities policy responses could significantly mitigate the economic costs of such developments if they include accelerating the exit of nonviable property developers,pr

331、omoting the completion of housing projects,and resolving the debt risks of local governments.Additional monetary policy easing,especially through lower interest rates,as well as expansionary fiscal measuresincluding funding of unfinished housing and support to vulnerable householdscould further supp

332、ort demand and ward off deflationary risks.Disruptive fiscal adjustment and debt distress:Fis-cal consolidation is necessary in many advanced and emerging market and developing econo-mies to curb debt-to-GDP ratios and rebuild capacity for weathering future shocks.But an excessively sharp shift to t

333、ax hikes and spending cuts,beyond what is currently envisaged,could result in slower-than-expected growth and reduce reform momentum.Countries that lack a credible medium-term consolidation plan could face adverse market reactions or increased risks of debt distress that force harsh adjustment.The experience of euro area economies during 201015 illustrates how con-cerns about debt sustainability c