ITIF：美國全球數字經濟大戰略（英文版）（62頁）.pdf

1、INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY over attitudes and policies toward leading information technology and Internet firms; and over technology leadership and competitiveness. Indeed, for many countries and regions, advancement of their own IT and digital firms, sometimes involving active steps to hobble foreign c

2、ompetitors, especially American firms, has become a centerpiece of economic policy. (The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) defines digital economy industries as more than just Internet companies; they include firms involved in the entire “stack” of information technology (IT),

3、including chip design, semiconductors, hardware, software, e- commerce, and Internet services.) In this world, the United States as the global IT and digital leader has struggled to articulate and advocate for a coherent and strategic response. All too often, U.S. thinking about privacy, tech platfo

4、rms, national security, and Internet and artificial intelligence (AI) governance is siloed and bifurcated. During the Clinton and second Bush administrations, U.S. policymakers believed that the rest of the world would emulate what was obviously the superior U.S. digital policy system, and they work

5、ed toward that end. But Chinas unprecedented success in IT and digital industries, coupled with a questioning of the desirability of a U.S.-style light-touch digital regulation and the rise of U.S. “big tech” companies, has meant that the United States can no longer rely principally on persuasion to

6、 convince others of the economic and innovation advantages of its approach. When that reality started to crystalize, the Obama administration made advancing the global “open Internet” one of its top global digital policy goals. Unfortunately, many countries have grown distrustful of the U.S. governm

7、ent, especially after the Snowden revelations showed the degree to which U.S. intelligence agencies were leveraging digital technologies for surveillance. Despite some reforms and engagement by the Obama administration, the last decade has seen INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY search engines are used by every

8、one). 2. They are also a communication technology, which means that they impact what people see and hear, and who with and how they communicate, and thus have a broad political and social impact. 3. They have a potentially broader impact on jobs than most prior technology systems. It is these aspect

9、s that add complexity to the global digital system, as it means that the technology systems links nations, firms, and people more closely together, often in ways that conflict with individual country norms and rules. WHERE DO NATIONS STAND? As noted, nations have long competed for leadership or at l

10、east competence in the propulsive industries of the day. So where do leading nations/regions stand when it comes to IT and digital? America Leads Since the development of computing in the 1930s, the United States has led the world in IT, with a succession of leading companies. The particular nature

11、of the IT innovation system played to U.S. strengths. Unlike some sectors and technologies wherein innovation could be pursued more incrementally by incumbent firms, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY then limit access to the Chinese market of foreign firms while supporting domestic firms with a panoply of supp

12、ort, including grants, low-cost and preferential financial loans, tax breaks, discriminatory government procurement and other tools; and finally, supporting “going out” to gain market share outside of China. China made arguably the most important digital strategy decision in the history of the IT in

13、dustry. It decided it would not let the giant U.S. dot-comsespecially Google, Facebook, and Amazonjust set up shop and dominate the Chinese market. Chinas first step was to attract foreign investment. In the early 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping opened up the Chinese economy to foreign investment, its mai

14、n economic development strategy sought principally to induce foreign multinationals to shift relatively low- and moderate-value production to China.16 Chinas second step was to attempt to learn from foreign companies, in part by having them train Chinese executives, scientists, and engineers, and al

15、so by forcing them to transfer technology as a condition of market entry. Since roughly 2000, when China joined the WTO, it has deployed an array of unfair and often WTO-illegal tactics, including currency manipulation, massive subsidies, and limits on imports in order to both attract foreign establ

16、ishments and support domestic manufacturers, especially in the IT sector. The third step was to support Chinese companies in their efforts to copy and incorporate foreign technology while building up domestic capabilities. One important marker for the transition from INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 70 percen

17、t for robots and robot core components; 60 percent for big data; 60 percent for IT for smart manufacturing; and 50 percent for industrial software.19 Transitioning from “fast follower” to “global leader” in innovation is extremely difficult. And while China is among the leaders in some areas such as

18、 telecommunications equipment, it is farther away in others such as semiconductorsbut is closing the gap. (See figure 1.) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY limitations on the export of data; taxes on U.S. digital companies sales (digital services taxes); geo-blocking prohibitions; regulating video platforms as

19、 traditional audiovisual providers; government funding of technology alternatives (e.g., the Quaero search engine, the GAIA-X cloud project); establishing EU-approved “data intermediaries” as an alternative to U.S. tech firms; mandates for paying newspapers to list their articles in search results;

20、limits on price discounts by e-commerce retailers; requirements to take down information from the web (“right to be forgotten”); charging foreign firms more for access to EU government data; massive fines for privacy, content, and other digital violations; onerous regulatory restrictions on the use

21、of data; and many others.30 There are multiple reasons for Europe lagging behind in IT and digital, especially in developing EU-headquartered firms (most U.S. tech firms actually invest significantly in EU operations, including R all relatively mature technologies wherein new entrants will have a di

22、fficult time penetrating because current offerings are so good and because scale economies and network advantages make entry difficult. The United Kingdom has performed a bit better, with a rich history of at least inventing, if not exploiting, IT (for example, Deep Mind). Structurally, the EU conti

23、nues to suffer from a number of challenges, including limited venture capital funding, a relatively weak higher education system for computer science, and too many small firms that do not scale.38 In addition, even though the EU has made considerable progress since 1992 in establishing a single mark

24、et, and more recently, a “digital single market,” it still has not completed the task. And even with that, language differences make it harder for firms to scale quickly across Europe, leading them to lag behind Chinese and U.S. competitors.39 Because of a lack of synchronized layers of laws and reg

25、ulations (in other words, regulatory fragmentation) across member states, and a digital single market that remains more theory than reality, the EU has been unable to nurture data-driven business models through a large domestic market. There are still divergences in IP rules, licensing arrangements,

26、 and regulatory enforcement, as well as obstacles to the efficient delivery of online goods. Fragmentation prevents scale for companiesin a digital economy in which successful players are those that can harness network effects. Europe also lagged because its firms did not embrace the IT “ecosystem-b

27、ased” business models. For example, in 2006, Nokia was the leading cell phone maker in the world. Within just a few years, Apple was dominant and Nokias cell phone business was dead. This was in large part because Apple was able to leverage technology to create a unique customer experience through a

28、 product-service, ecosystem-based business model. In addition, the EU generally put an emphasis on mechanical engineering at the expense of software capabilities, even as Marc Andreesen famously stated that “software is eating the world.”40 In addition, Europe has not been able to generate an enviro

29、nment in which enough new firms emerge and then reach global scale. In 2000, for example, there were 30 major IT companies started since 1950 and still strong in the United States, compared with just 3 in Europe.41 Europe has even convinced itself that its array of heavy-handed, precautionary-based

30、digital economy regulations, rather than being a drag on innovation, are actually a spur to it. The kinds of disruptive change needed to succeed in the digital economy goes against the nature of Europe. America was settled principally by Europeans who wanted out from under the yoke of feudal hierarc

31、hy and limitations. The ones that remained were less entrepreneurial and more committed to the status quo. As Servan-Schreiber wrote, “Behind the success of American industry lies the talent for accepting and mastering change.”42 It appears no different today, with 41 percent of Americans strongly a

32、greeing that in general they are willing to take risks, compared with 8 percent in Spain and 10 percent in Germany.43 As Servan-Schreiber alluded, behind the success of the American tech economy lies the embrace of change and innovation. In contrast, the EU has embraced the “precautionary principle”

33、 wherein virtually every new innovation is approached from a “glass half empty” view, with the INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY treating it not as a direct cause of alarm, but as a valuable societal warning sign.”47 Strict and stifling digital regulations dont just come from a deep-seated commitment to the pr

34、ecautionary principle; they come from the fact that Europe remains a social-democratic society wherein markets, businesses (especially large and U.S. businesses), and technologies are suspect, government is privileged, and so-called “civil society” groups are presumed to represent the public interes

35、t. Moreover, these regulations come from a long-standing concern in Europe over employment, where job loss is something to be avoided, and policymakers have struggled to bring unemployment rates down to U.S. levels, in large part because unemployment benefits and other income support systems are so

36、generous that many people choose to stay out of the labor market longer than they otherwise would and many firms are virtually prohibited from dismissing workers. None of this, of course, is to say that the correct alternative is libertarianism, despite the fact that some EU officials believe this i

37、s the overriding U.S. governing philosophy. It is to say that the only way a nation or region has any chance of succeeded globally in the digital economy is to adopt a balanced approach to regulation that privileges both innovation and social protection. This means recognizing that no one right or i

38、nterest (such as privacy) should define a INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY supported by rigorous screening, testing, and promotion (something few other developing nations did). This painstaking process of doing the work hard on the low end of commodity IT markets first, and then working their way up was based

39、 on humility, patience and hunger (something Europe lacks). The second stage involved “the effective diffusion of imported technology within an industry and across industries.” The third stage: involved local efforts to assimilate, adapt, and improve imported technology and eventually to develop one

40、s own technology. These efforts are crucial to augmenting technology transfer and expediting the acquisition of technological capability. Technology may be transferred to a firm from abroad or through local diffusion, but the ability to use it effectively cannot. This ability can only be acquired th

41、rough indigenous technological effort.50 This painstaking process of doing the work hard on the low end of commodity IT markets first, and then working their way up, was based on humility, patience, and hunger (something Europe lacks today). The final stage is to become global innovation leaders, wi

42、th all four (leaving aside Hong Kong) regions working to achieve. As Lim wrote: Firms in catching-up countries that have successfully acquired, assimilated, and sometimes improved mature foreign technologies may aim to repeat the process with higher-level technologies in the transition stage in adva

43、nced countries. Many industries in the first tier of catching-up countries (e.g., Taiwan and Korea) have arrived at this stage. If successful, they may eventually accumulate indigenous technological capability to generate emerging technologies in the fluid stage and challenge firms in the advanced c

44、ountries. 51 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY they mark the networks of human relationships, where families and workers and travelers come together. That is the web view. It is a map not of separation, marking off boundaries of sovereign power, but of connection.64 As does NYUs Jeff Jarvis: We also see global

45、ization not only in commerceaffecting jobs and economiesbut also in social interaction. Thus, borders are challenged and so are nations. Is this challenge a reason why we see the rise of nationalism? We see now that wars can be fought with data and without national armies or weapons. We see that vir

46、tual currencies can challenge the monetary power of nations. Will the nation-state as we know it survive intact?65 In this notion, competing nation states are not the problem and in fact are structurally weakened in the digital age. Rather, the challenge is from amorphous networked systems. This is

47、fanciful to say the least. The telegraph and telephone no more did away with the need for a Westphalian view than the Internet does now. Notwithstanding some individuals who commit cybercrime, it is still governments that take or support actions that most directly impact U.S. national interests, and

48、 it will continue to be. When a nation state truly wants to affect change on the Internet, it can do so. The question at the heart of this report is how nation states such as the United States go about articulating and advocating for their preferred approach to Internet governancenot whether they sh

49、ould be trying at all. The telegraph and telephone no more did away with the need for a Westphalian view than the Internet does now. An associated branch of this Internet exceptionalist view is that the United States and other democracies should be focused on challenging the so-called authoritarian

50、Internet: the use of digital technologies to limit freedom. For example, Cohen and Fontaine warned, “In Zimbabwe, for instance, the Chinese AI company CloudWalk is helping develop a national facial recognition system, giving the local government a powerful new tool for political control.”66 But the