金融知識、教育和建議在財務和退休計劃決策中的作用.pdf

1、The Role of Financial Literacy,Education,and Advice in Financial and Retirement Planning DecisionsPierre-Carl MichaudHEC Montral and NBERLittle need for fin.literacy in a world on auto-pilotFast forward to todayYou are now(mostly)in controlBasic financial knowledge is lacking for manySource:Klapper,

2、Lusardiand Oudheusden(2016)Is thata problem?Likely makes decision-making more difficultLinked(with some attempts at causality)to retirement planningLinked to a number of other less desirable outcomes(higherfees,lower returns,less diversification,higher borrowing costs)The difficulty of the normative

3、 benchmarkDefining poor decisions ishardAlready at financial level,irrespective of preferences,requires huge amounts of data about present and future,lots of uncertaintyWith heterogeneouspreferences,occasions for unambiguous classification of mistakes are rare(mostlybudget constraint arbitrage oppor

4、tunities)Policy ToolboxEDUCATION AND INFORMATIONCHOICEARCHITECTUREADVICEDECISION AIDSWe lack an integrated frameworkfor choosing Whichtoolunderwhichcircumstances?Knowledge gaps Is acquiring knowledge costly?Heterogeneous optimal decisions Can we predict what is optimal for each individual given data

5、?Behavioral biases Even if the individual knows the optimal decision,are there biases thatmay lead to sub-optimal outcomes(present-bias,procrastination)?SomeexamplesfromCanadaCanada:Many claim public pension as early as possible(Age 60)To foster higher annuitization,policymakers in Canada want to pr

6、ovoke more delaysFraction claiming CPP-QPP at age 60Source:Longitudinal Administrative DataBank.Delays Optimal for All?Distribution of Life expectancyat 60Several factors can make claiming at age 60 optimal(from financial perspective)Lower life expectancyTaxesMeans-testing of benefitsNormative bench

7、mark even more complicated:BequestsLeisureLiquidity constraintsOther preference factorsSource:Glenzeret al.(2023)Claiming Delays Not Financially Profitable for Everyone Proposal to increase minimum age to 62 In one simulation study,we find that gain by delaying to 62 But one quarter loose,lower inco

8、me,singles,lower life expectancy How to increase delays for the right group?Delay to 62OutcomeAverage Gain1 236$Fraction Win72.5%Gain for Winners2 816$Fraction Loose27.5%Loss for Losers-2 984$Source:Michaud et al.(2020)ExperimentalStudy3000 Canadians 55-59Stated-preference vignettes with elicitation

9、 of claiming ageDesign to Vary Incentives,Education Treatment and Framing TreatmentsGlenzer,Michaud and Staubli(2023,NBER 30398)Frames,Incentives,and Education:Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension ClaimingExperimental DesignEffectivenessvs.Desirability Framing has largest effects o

10、n behavior But no clear gain(many loosers and winners)Education has little effect in aggregate on delays But positive financial gains What is the policy objective?EducationFramingEffect on Delays+for pessimists-for optimists+Effect on Financial Gain+NoneAdviceand Familiarity DAstous,Gemmo and Michau

11、d(2023,NBER 30205)The Qualityof Financial Advice:WhatInfluences Client Recommendations?Experiment with 1044 financialplanners fromCanada.Vignettes in four domains:retirement saving,investment,long-termcare and decumulationExample:Investment VignetteWhenSegregatedFundfeeslowerthanMutualFundfeesComple

12、mentarity between Advice and Financial Literacy Some interesting questions to understand better the market for advice:On the demand side,does the willingness-to-pay for advice increase or decrease with financial literacy?On the supply side:does the marginal cost of providing advice decreases with th

13、e financial literacy of the client?How about the marginal benefit to the advisor?Understanding the value of advice requires a proper framework involving these complementaritiesHow do Investors Value Financial Education?Gemmo,Michaud and Mitchell(2023,NBER 31682)Selection intoFinancial Education and

14、Effects on Portfolio Choice Incentivizedexperiment with 2000 respondentsWillingness to Pay Elicitation Random assignment to eligible and non-eligible If eligible(BDM elicitation):State a willingness to pay between 0 and 5$,w.Probabilityget treatment is w/5 Random draw to assign to treatment.In the e

15、nd,three groups:non-eligibles,eligibles not treated and eligibles treated.Differences between eligibles treated and untreatedpotentially non-random.Can study selection Higher FL score,higher WTP Higher Self-assessed FL,lowerWTP Perceived Ability to Apply Information increased WTP Expect Higher Retur

16、n in Task 2 increases WTPEducation Treatmentand Outcomes We provide training on:Diversification Risk-adjusted returns(Sharpe ratios)What is the outcome of interest?Can look at use of heuristics(moving away from 1/N,return chasing)Can look at distance to Efficient frontier(RML and RSL)?But limitedcha

17、racterization,welfare depends on risk aversion(preferences)Elicit using Multiple Price List Risk Aversion.Weight change in allocation by conditionnal distribution of risk aversion.Pr(welfare gain)and E(welfare gain).Difference-in-Differenceand IV Intent-to-Treat:DD-ITT(compare eligibles to non-eligi

18、bles)Average effect on Treated:DD-ATT(compare treated to untreated)IV-ATT(use eligibility as instrument)Exploiting the WTP The(scaled)WTP is the probability of being treated Idea:Two respondents with the same WTP:one treated and one untreated.Compare outcomes.Matching strategy Those with higher WTP

19、gain moreTake awaysFinancial literacy is limited in the population despite an increasingly larger responsibility put on consumersVarious tools can be used to improve decisionmaking.The desirability of each depends on a number of considerations.Evaluating how choices improve is a difficult task,especially when preferences are heterogeneousThe market for advice and education probably workswell for those who know what they dont know,and can apply advice-education.What about others?