Attested TLS and formalization.pdf

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1、Enhanced Security in Transport Layer using Remote Attestation Attested TLS and FormalizationYogesh Deshpande Principal Engineer,ArmMuhammad Usama Sardar Research Associate,TU DresdenAttested TLS and FormalizationSecurity and Data ProtectionThe Transport Layer Security(TLS)handshake protocol allows a

2、uthentication of one or both peers using static,long-term credentialsIn some cases,it is also required to ensure that the peer runtime environment is in secure stateAttested TLS introduces a series of protocol extensions to the TLS 1.3 Handshake that enables binding of TLS authentication key to a re

3、mote attestation sessionWhat is Attested TLS?Need for Attested TLS?PKI Certificates used in TLS handshake are good at conveying a(network)identity of a serviceRemote Attestation is good at conveying the security state of a service,i.e.whether the execution environment is trustworthy?We can combine t

4、hem efficiently to get the security benefits of bothProposed Design uses Remote Attestation information as a first-class credentialsin a TLS HandshakeAttestation information(Evidence or Results),from any scheme,carried as extensions alongside X.509 certificate or using a new certificate typeThis app

5、roach has following benefitsBetter security Smaller attack surfaceBetter performance No need to run channel establishment and remote attestation sequentiallyProposed DesignAugmented TLS v1.3 HandshakeClientServerClient Hello(supported cipher suites,aTLS extension(s),Key ShareServer Hello(chosen ciph

6、er suite,aTLS extension(s),Key share,Certificate,Certificate Verify,FinishedCertificate(Optional),Certificate Verify(Optional),FinishedSecure data channelCERTIFICATEPRIVATE IDENTITY KEYATTESTATIONCREDENTIALEDGE DEVICESERVICEIoT/Edge Device OnboardingPRIVATE IDENTITY KEYCERTIFICATELOCAL DEVICECLOUD W

7、ORKLOAD ATTESTATIONCREDENTIALConfidential ComputingUse CasesOpen-source End to End System Prototype operated under CCC Attestation SIGConsists of Interconnected Docker Containers to simulate entire SystemAttester is TPM 2.0Fully symmetrical(both Client AND/OR Server can be the Attester)https:/ stand

8、ards and Open-Source LinksDescriptionLinkIETF TLS Extension drafthttps:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fossati-tls-attestation/IETF EAT based Key Attestation Tokenhttps:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bft-rats-kat/Conceptual Message Wrapper(CMW)drafthttps:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ftbs-rats-ms

9、g-wrap/CCC Project Repositoryhttps:/ https:/munity/Project Veraisonhttps:/ least 15 different attacks on TLS protocolExplicit requirement for IETF TLS WG Non-trivial extension of TLSHigh-assurance applicationsNeed for Formal VerificationApproach for Formal VerificationOutdated verification artifacts

10、 Very few commentsMissing validation Usability/Debugging informationChallenges in Formal VerificationCurrent Community ContributorsArmTU Dresden LinaroSiemensIntuitBarkhausen InstituteHuaweiJoin us via:Via Slack #attested-tls Participate via Weekly Community meeting 10AM CET every MondayZoom Meeting Details:Meeting linkMeeting ID:953 6922 6563Passcode:040439Secure channel via attested TLS Veraison as attestation verifierPARSEC for abstraction of various RoTsNext F2F hackathon events:Linaro Connect IETF 120 HackathonCall to ActionThank you!