麥肯錫（McKinsey）：成本和可能帶來的影響（英文版）（61頁）.pdf

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1、January 2022Executive summaryThe net-zero transitionWhat it would cost, what it could bring McKinsey Global Institute in collaboration with McKinsey Sustainability and McKinseys Global Energy &Materials and Advanced Industries PracticesMcKinsey Global InstituteSince its founding in 1990, the McKinse

2、y Global Institute (MGI) has sought to develop a deeper understanding of the evolving global economy. As the business and economics research arm of McKinsey & Company, MGI aims to help leaders in the commercial, public, and social sectors understand trends and forces shaping the global economy.MGI r

3、esearch combines the disciplines of economics and management, employing the analytical tools of economics with the insights of business leaders. Our “micro-to-macro” methodology examines microeconomic industry trends to better understand the broad macroeconomic forces affecting business strategy and

4、 public policy. Recent reports have assessed the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the future of work, productivity and growth, and consumer demand; prioritizing health; the social contract; Black economic mobility; the global balance sheet; the Bio Revolution; physical climate risk; and the impact o

5、f corporations on economies and households.MGI is led by McKinsey & Company senior partners James Manyika and Sven Smit, who serve as co-chairs, and Chris Bradley, Kweilin Ellingrud, Marco Piccitto, Olivia White, and Jonathan Woetzel, who serve as directors. Michael Chui, Mekala Krishnan, Anu Madgav

6、kar, Jan Mischke, JaanaRemes, Jeongmin Seong, and Tilman Tacke are MGI partners. Project teams are led by the MGI partners and include consultants from McKinsey offices around the world. These teams draw on McKinseys global network of partners and industry and management experts. The MGI Council is

7、made up of McKinsey leaders and includes Hemant Ahlawat, Michael Birshan, Andrs Cadena, SandrineDevillard, AndrDua, Katy George, Rajat Gupta, Eric Hazan, Solveigh Hieronimus, AchaLeke, ClarisseMagnin, Jurica Novak, Gary Pinkus, Hamid Samandari, Sha Sha, Oliver Tonby, and EckartWindhagen. The Council

8、 members help shape the research agenda, lead high-impact research, and share the findings with decision makers around the world. In addition, leading economists, including Nobel laureates, advise MGI research. In collaboration with McKinsey Sustainability and the Global Energy & Materials and Advan

9、ced Industries practices McKinsey Sustainability is the firms client-service platform with the goal of helping all industry sectors transform to get to net zero by 2050 and to cut carbon emissions by half by 2030. McKinseySustainability seeks to be the preeminent impact partner and adviser for our c

10、lients, from the board room to the engine room, on sustainability, climate resilience, energy transition, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). We leverage thought leadership, innovative tools andsolutions, top experts, and a vibrant ecosystem of industry associations and knowledge partne

11、rships to lead a wave of innovation and economic growth that safeguards our planet and advances sustainability. McKinseys Global Energy & Materials Practice serves clients in industries such as oil and gas, mining, steel, pulp and paper, cement, chemicals, agriculture, and power, helping them on the

12、ir most important issues in strategy, operations, marketing and sales, organization, and other functional topics. In addition, MineLens, MineSpans, and Energy Insights, specialist divisions within the practice, offer fundamental insight into commodity market dynamics. The practice serves many of the

13、 top global players, including corporations and state-owned enterprises, and works with more than 80 percent of the largest mining companies and 90 percent of the largest oil and gas companies worldwide.McKinseys Advanced Industries Practice brings together three well-established global industry pra

14、ctices with roots in technically complex design and manufacturing: Automotive & Assembly, Aerospace & Defense, and Advanced Electronics / Semiconductors. Our global network of deeply experienced industrials partners works with industry executives to address issues including strategy, organization, o

15、perations, technology, marketing, sales, and risk. We focus on core operating capabilities and help clients take a long-term, through-cycle view of the evolving competitive landscape. We work with many high-performing iconic industrial companies around functional, business unit, and enterprise trans

16、formations to accelerate revenue generation, technology integration, operations design, and margin and cash flow improvements.The net-zero transitionWhat it would cost, what it could bring AuthorsMekala Krishnan, BostonHamid Samandari, New YorkJonathan Woetzel, ShanghaiSven Smit, AmsterdamDaniel Pac

17、thod, New YorkDickon Pinner, San FranciscoTomas Nauclr, StockholmHumayun Tai, New YorkAnnabel Farr, MontrealWeige Wu, New YorkDanielle Imperato, BrusselsJanuary 2022PrefaceMore than 10,000 years of continuous and accelerating progress have brought human civilization to the point of threatening the v

18、ery condition that made that progress possible: the stability of the earths climate. The physical manifestations of a changing climate are increasingly visible across the globe, as are their socioeconomic impacts. Both will continue to grow, most likely in a nonlinear way, until the world transition

19、s to a net-zero economy, and unless it adapts to a changing climate in the meantime. No wonder, then, that an ever-greater number of governments and companies are committing to accelerate climate action.At present, though, the net-zero equation remains unsolved: greenhouse gas emissions continue una

20、bated and are not counterbalanced by removals, nor is the world prepared to complete the net-zero transition. Indeed, even if all net-zero commitments and national climate pledges were fulfilled, research suggests that warming would not be held to 1.5C above preindustrial levels, increasing the odds

21、 of initiating the most catastrophic impacts of climate change, including the risk of biotic feedback loops. Moreover, most of these commitments have yet to be backed by detailed plans or executed. Nor would execution be easy: solving the net-zero equation cannot be divorced from pursuing economic d

22、evelopment and inclusive growth. It would require a careful balancing of the shorter-term risks of poorly prepared or uncoordinated action with the longer-term risks of insufficient or delayed action. Indeed, a more disorderly transition could impair energy supply and affect energy access and afford

23、ability, especially for lower-income households and regions. It could also have knock-on impacts on the economy more broadly, potentially creating a backlash that would slow down the transition.None of these challenges should come as a surprise. Achieving net zero would mean a fundamental transforma

24、tion of the world economy, as it would require significant changes to the seven energy and land-use systems that produce the worlds emissions: power, industry, mobility, buildings, agriculture, forestry and other land use, and waste. To bring about these changes, nine key requirements (encompassing

25、physical building blocks, economic and societal adjustments, and governance, institutions, and commitment) would need to be fulfilled against the backdrop of many economic and political challenges. This means addressing dozens of complex questions, including: what is the appropriate mix of technolog

26、ies that need to be deployed to achieve emissions reductions while staying within a carbon budget, limiting costs, and delivering required standards of performance? Where are supply chain and infrastructure bottlenecks most likely to occur? Where might physical constraints, whether related to the av

27、ailability of natural resources or the scale-up of production capacity, limit the pace of the transition? What levels of spending on physical assets would the transition require? Who would pay for the transition? How would the transition affect companies markets and operations? What would it spell f

28、or workers and consumers? What opportunities and risks would it create for companies and countries? Andhow could consumers be encouraged to make changes to consumption and spending habits that will be necessary to ensure the transition?In this report, we attempt to answer some of these questions, na

29、mely, those pertaining to the economic and societal adjustments. We provide estimates of the economic changes that would take place in a net-zero transition consistent with 1.5C of warming. We seek to build and expand upon the vast external literature on the net-zero transition, in order to offer a

30、more detailed and granular view of the nature and magnitude of the economic changes that it would entail. As a result, our estimates of the annual spending on physical assets for a net-zero transition exceed to a meaningful degree the $3 trillion$4.5 trillion total spending estimates that previous a

31、nalyses have produced. iiMcKinsey & CompanyThis report is a first-order analysis of a hypothetical 1.5C scenario. As such, it has several limitations.First, it is not clear whether a 1.5C scenario is achievable in the first place, nor what pathway the world would take to achieve it if it were. Indee

32、d, some believe that 1.5C is already out of reach, given the current trajectory of emissions and their potential to activate climatic feedback loops, as well as prevailing challenges with revamping energy and land-use systems. This research does not take a position on such questions. Instead, it see

33、ks to demonstrate the economic shifts that would need to take place if the goal of 1.5 degrees is to be attained through a relatively orderly transition between now and 2050.Second, this report is by nature and necessity limited in its scope. In particular it does not focus on such issues as technol

34、ogy breakthroughs, physical constraints related to scale-up capacity and the availability of natural resources, delayed-transition costs, the role of adaptation, or other imponderables or uncertainties, nor have we yet modeled the full range of economic outcomes likely under a net-zero transition. A

35、s a result, it is likely that real outcomes will diverge from these estimates, particularly if the net-zero transition takes a more disorderly path or restricting warming to 1.5C proves unachievable. Spending requirements could be higher, for example due to the additional investment needed to mainta

36、in flexibility and redundancy in energy systems, or heightened physical risks and commensurate adaptation costs. Third, this report does not explore the critical question of who pays for the transition. What is clear is that the transition will require collective and global action, particularly as t

37、he burdens of the transition would not be evenly felt. The prevailing notion of enlightened self-interest alone is unlikely to be sufficient to help achieve net zero, and the transition would challenge traditional orthodoxies and require unity, resolve, and ingenuity from leaders.Wenonetheless hope

38、that our scenario-based analysis will help decision makers refine their understanding of the nature and the magnitude of the changes the net-zero transition would entail and the scale of response needed to manage it. We also hope that our attempts to describe as accurately as we can the challenges t

39、hat lie ahead are seen as what they are: acall for more thoughtful and more decisive action, urgency, and resolve.The report is joint research by McKinsey Sustainability, McKinseys Global Energy and Materials Practice, McKinseys Advanced Industries Practice, and the McKinsey Global Institute. McKins

40、ey has long focused on issues of environmental sustainability, dating to client studies in the early 1970s. We developed our global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve in 2007, updated it in 2009, and have since conducted national abatement studies in countries including Brazil, China, Germany, Indi

41、a, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Recent research on which we build in this publication includes the January 2020 report Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts, a January 2021 article, “Climate math: Whatit takes to limit warming to 1.5C,” a

42、nd two October2021 articles, “Our future lives and livelihoods: Sustainable and inclusive and growing” and “Solvingthe net-zero equation: Ninerequirements for a more orderly transition.” This research was led by Mekala Krishnan, a McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) partner in Boston; Hamid Samandari, a

43、 McKinsey senior partner in New York; Jonathan Woetzel, asenior partner and MGI director in Shanghai; Sven Smit, a senior partner in Amsterdam and co-chair of MGI; Daniel Pacthod, a senior partner in New York; Dickon Pinner, a senior partner in San Francisco; Tomas Nauclr, a senior partner in Stockh

44、olm; and Humayun Tai, asenior partner in New York. Theresearch team was led in different periods by Annabel Farr, DanielleImperato, Johanneke Tummers, Sophie Underwood, and Weige Wu. Teammembers: Wouter van Aanholt, Rishi Arora, Carolyne Barker, Ryan Barrett, Anna Benkeser, MlanieBru, GeneChang, Jon

45、as DeMuri-Siliunas, William Dsilets, JuliaDhert, SpencerDowling, WilliamEdwards-Mizel, Karina Gerstenchlager, JakobGraabak, Chantal de Graaf, PragunHarjai, LauraHofstee, JaniaKesarwani, Dhiraj Kumar, Joh Hann Lee, Youting Lee, Diego Miranda, IanMurphy, PritRanjan, ShresthSanghai, Lex Razoux Schultz,

46、 Ruben Robles, Kevin Russell, Nick Thiros, BenD.Thomas, SarahVargese, Colin Varn, and Jan-Paul Wiringa. iiiThe net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringWe are indebted to our academic advisers: Martin Baily, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Rakesh Mohan, president and d

47、istinguished fellow, Centre for Social and Economic Progress; and Laura D. Tyson, distinguished professor of the graduate school at the Haas School of Business, UniversityofCalifornia, Berkeley.We would also like to thank other advisers who challenged our thinking and added new insights: Laveesh Bha

48、ndari, senior fellow, Centre for Social and Economic Progress; DavidBlood, co-founder and senior partner of Generation Investment Management; MarkCarney, United Nations special envoy for climate action and finance; SpencerGlendon, founder, Probable Futures; Cameron Hepburn, director, Smith School of

49、 Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford; Ronan Hodge, technical lead, implementation, GlasgowFinancial Alliance for Net Zero; Jules Korstenhorst, chief executive officer, RMI; Claire ONeill, co-chair, World Business Council for Sustainable Development Imperatives Advisory Board; Jeremy

50、 Oppenheim, founder and senior partner of SYSTEMIQ; MichaelThompson, chief economist, UK Committee on Climate Change; Nigel Topping, UNHigh Level Climate Action Champion; and, at the Woodwell Climate Research Center, Philip Duffy, president and executive director, Christopher Schwalm, senior scienti

51、st, and climate risk program director, Richard Birdsey, senior scientist, Richard Houghton, senior scientist emeritus, and Wayne Walker, associate scientist.While we benefited greatly from the variety of perspectives we gathered from these experts and advisers, our views have been independently form

52、ed and articulated in this report.Many colleagues at McKinsey provided valuable insight and support. We thank ElaineAlmeida, Daniel Aminetzah, Paolo DAprile, Vicente Assis, Pedro Assuno, NikhilAti, MarceloAzevedo, Mark Azoulay, Deston Barger, Chantal Beck, FrankBekaert, DonatellaBellone, Fabian Bill

53、ing, Emily Birch, Brodie Boland, LyesBouchene, IvoBozon, JamesBragg, Giorgio Bresciani, Julian Conzade, Felipe Child, JulienClaes, RoryClune, XavierCostantini, Peter Crispeels, Luis Cunha, Thomas Czigler, NicolasDenis, RajatDhawan, Julien Diederichts, Dirk Durinck, Joseba Eceiza, JasonEis, Karel Elo

54、ot, Hauke Engel, Fernando Ferrari-Haines, David Fine, LucianoDiFiori, LoriFomenko, Tracy Francis, PeterGaius-Obaseki, Paul Gargett, Godart vanGendt, Will Glazener, LutzGoedde, StephanGorner, Rajat Gupta, AlastairHamilton, EricHannon, ViktorHanzlik, StephanieHauser, Kimberly Henderson, Ruth Heuss, So

55、lveighHieronimus, ChristianHoffmann, Duko Hopman, Jerry van Houten, EricHuang, Thomas Hundertmark, Focko Imhorst, Kartik Jayaram, Alex Kazaglis, ArjenKersing, Naina Khandelwal, SomeshKhanna, Gassan Al-Kibsi, Tim Koller, Masahiro Komatsubara, GautamKumra, Alexandre Lichy, Connie Jordan, Sean Kane, Jo

56、shua Katz, AdamKendall, SajalKohli, TasukuKuwabara, Elena Kuznetsova, Nick Leung, Cindy Levy, Guangyu Li, JohannesLneborg, AnuMadgavkar, Rachid Majiti, JukkaMaksimainen, PeterMannion, James Manyika, Sebastien Marlier, RyanMcCullough, Tapio Melgin, Tilman Melzer, DanielMikkelsen, Timo Moller, Vitaly

57、Negulayev, Jesse Noffsinger, Lok-Mal Nys, GlenOKelly, Asutosh Padhi, Alex Panas, John Parsons, Maria Persson, AlexanderPfeiffer, Harald Poeltner, Carter Powis, Pradeep Prabhala, JohnPratt, Sebastian Reiter, DemianRoelofs, Matt Rogers, Robert Samek, Aditya Sanghvi, GregorySantoni, TarekEl Sayed, Patr

58、ick Schaufuss, Patrick Schulze, Liz Hilton Segel, Suvojoy Sengupta, NestorSepulveda, Marcus Sieberer, Vivien Singer, Bram Smeets, BenSnyder, KenSomers, Peter Spiller, Dan Stephens, Jack Stephenson, Antoine Stevens, MattStone, CarlosTanghetti, Ozgur Tanrikulu, Pankaj Tanwar, Karl Tojic, Oliver Tonby,

59、 Andreas Tschiesner, MagnusTyreman, Alex Ulanov, Bryan Vadheim, Thomas Vahlenkamp, FrancescaVentimiglia, Shally Venugopal, StevenVercammen, Maurits Waardenburg, AmyWagner, DaanWalter, JohnWarner, Alexander Weiss, Jake Wellman, Pawel Wilczynski, Robert Wilson, MarkusWilthaner, MaaikeWitteveen, Hao Xu

60、, Yuito Yamada, Dee Yang, and Benedikt Zeumer.ivMcKinsey & CompanyThe report was edited and produced by Peter Gumbel, MGIs editorial director, and JoshRosenfield, an executive editor with McKinsey Publishing, together with VasudhaGupta, MGIs editorial operations manager, senior graphic designers Mar

61、isaCarder, AnandSundarRaman, and Patrick White, data visualization editors Chuck Burke, RichJohnson, and MattPerry, and picture editor Diane Rice. Kristen Jennings, global external relations director for McKinseySustainability, and Rebeca Robboy, MGIs director of external communications, helped diss

62、eminate and publicize the report. JanetMichaud and Nathan Wilson created the digital version of this report, and Lauren Meling produced and disseminated digital assets. We are grateful to Gitanjali Bakshi, TimBeacom, AmandaCovington, Ashley Grant, DeadraHenderson, and Malgorzata Rusiecka for their s

63、upport.This report contributes to our mission to help business and policy leaders understand the forces transforming the global economy. As with all MGI research, it is independent and has not been commissioned or sponsored in any way by any business, government, or other institution. January 2022vT

64、he net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringIn brief The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring Governments and companies are increasingly committing to climate action. Yet significant challenges stand in the way, not least the scale of economic transformatio

65、n that a net-zero transition would entail and the difficulty of balancing the substantial short-term risks of poorly prepared or uncoordinated action with the longer-term risks of insufficient or delayed action. In this report, we estimate the transitions economic effects on demand, capital allocati

66、on, costs, and jobs to 2050 globally across energy and land-use systems that produce about 85 percent of overall emissions and assess economic shifts for 69 countries. Our analysis is not a projection or a prediction and does not claim to be exhaustive; it is the simulation of one hypothetical, rela

67、tively orderly path toward 1.5C using the Net Zero 2050 scenario from the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), to provide an order-of-magnitude estimate of the economic transformation and societal adjustments associated with net-zero transition. We find that the transition would be univ

68、ersal, significant, and front-loaded, with uneven effects on sectors, geographies, and communities, even as it creates growth opportunities:Capital spending on physical assets for energy and land-use systems in the net-zero transition between 2021 and 2050 would amount to about $275 trillion, or $9.

69、2 trillion per year on average, an annual increase of as much as $3.5 trillion from today. To put this increase in comparative terms, the $3.5 trillion is approximately equivalent, in 2020, to half of global corporate profits, one-quarter of total tax revenue, and 7 percent of household spending. An

70、 additional $1 trillion of todays annual spend would, moreover, need to be reallocated from high-emissions to low-emissions assets. Accounting for expected increases in spending, as incomes and populations grow, as well as for currently legislated transition policies, the required increase in spendi

71、ng would be lower, but still about $1 trillion. The spending would be front-loaded, rising from 6.8 percent of GDP today to as much as 8.8 percent of GDP between 2026 and 2030 before falling. While these spending requirements are large and financing has yet to be established, many investments have p

72、ositive return profiles (even independent of their role in avoiding rising physical risks) and should not be seen as merely costs. Technological innovation could reduce capital costs for net-zero technologies faster than expected.In this scenario, the global average delivered cost of electricity wou

73、ld increase in the near term but then fall back from that peak, although this would vary across regions. As the power sector builds renewables and transmission and distribution capacity, the fully loaded unit cost of electricity production, accounting for operating costs, capital costs, and deprecia

74、tion of new and existing assets, in this scenario could rise about 25 percent from 2020 until 2040 and still be about 20 percent higher in 2050 on average globally. Cost increases in the near term could be significantly higher than those estimated here, for example, if grid intermittency issues are

75、not well managed. The delivered cost could also fall below 2020 levels over time because of the lower operating cost of renewablesprovided that power producers build flexible, reliable, and low-cost grids. The transition could result in a gain of about 200 million and a loss of about 185 million dir

76、ect and indirect jobs globally by 2050. This includes demand for jobs in operations and in construction of physical assets. Demand for jobs in the fossil fuel extraction and production and fossil-based power sectors could be reduced by about nine million and four million direct jobs, respectively, a

77、s a result of the transition, while demand for about eight million direct jobs would be created in renewable power, hydrogen, and biofuels by 2050. While important, the scale of workforce reallocation may be smaller than that from other trends including automation. Displaced workers will nonetheless

78、 need support, training, and reskilling through the transition.While the transition would create opportunities, sectors with high-emissions products or operationswhich generate about 20 percent of global GDPwould face substantial effects on demand, production costs, and employment. In the NGFS Net Z

79、ero 2050 scenario, coal production for energy use would nearly end by 2050, and oil and gas production volumes would be about 55 percent and 70 percent lower, respectively, than today. Process changes would increase production costs in other sectors, with steel and cement facing increases by 2050 of

80、 about 30 and 45 percent, respectively, in the scenario modeled here. Conversely, some markets for low-carbon products and support services would expand. For example, demand for electricity in 2050 could more than double from today. Poorer countries and those reliant on fossil fuels are most exposed

81、 to the shifts in a net-zero transition, although theyhave growth prospects as well. These countries are more susceptible to changes in output, capital stock, and employment because exposed sectors make up relatively large parts of their economies. Exposed geographies including in sub-Saharan Africa

82、 and India would need to invest 1.5 times or more than advanced economies as a share of GDP todayto viMcKinsey & Companysupport economic development and build low-carbon infrastructure. The effects within developed economies could be uneven, too; for instance, more than 10 percent of jobs in 44 US c

83、ounties are in fossil fuel extraction and refining, fossil fuelbased power, and automotive manufacturing. At the same time, all countries will have growth prospects, from endowments ofnatural capital such as sunshine and forests, and through their technological and human resources.Consumers may face

84、 additional up-front capital costs and have to spend more in the near term on electricity if cost increases are passed through, and lower-income households everywhere are naturally more at risk. Consumer spending habits may also be affected by decarbonization efforts, including the need to replace g

85、oods that burn fossil fuel, liketransportation vehicles and home heating systems, and potentially modify diets to reduce high-emissions products like beef and lamb. The up-front capital spending for the net-zero transition could yield lower operating costs over time for consumers. For example, total

86、 cost of ownership for EVs is expected to be lower than ICE cars in most regions by 2025.Economic shifts could be substantially higher under a disorderly transition, in particular because of higher-order effects not considered here. The economic and social costs of a delayed or abrupt transition wou

87、ld raise the risk of asset stranding, worker dislocations, and a backlash that delays the transition. Even under a relatively gradual transition, if the ramp-down of high-emissions activities is not carefully managed in parallel with the ramp-up of low-emissions ones, supply may not be able to scale

88、 up sufficiently, making shortages and price increases or volatility a feature. Much therefore depends on how the transition is managed.For all the accompanying costs and risks, the economic adjustments needed to reach net zero would come with opportunities and prevent further buildup of physical ri

89、sks. Incremental capital spending on physical assets creates growth opportunities, in connection with new low-emissions products, support services, and their supply chains. Most importantly, reaching net-zero emissions and limiting warming to 1.5C would reduce the odds of initiating the most catastr

90、ophic impacts of climate change, including limiting the risk of biotic feedback loops and preserving our ability to halt additional warming. Government and business would need to act together with singular unity, resolve, and ingenuity, and extend their planning and investment horizons even as they

91、take immediate actions to manage risks and capture opportunities. Businesses would need to define, execute, and evolve decarbonization and offsetting plans for scope 1 and 2 emissions and potentially expand those plans to include scope 3 emissions, depending on the nature of their operations, and th

92、e materiality, feasibility, and need of doing so. Over time, they would need to adjust their business models as conditions change and opportunities arise; integrate climate-related factors into decision-making processes for strategy, finance, and capital planning, among others; and consider leading

93、action with others in their industry or ecosystem of investors, supply chains, customers, and regulators. Financial institutions in particular have a pivotal role to play in supporting large-scale capital reallocation, even as they manage their own risks and opportunities. Governments and multilater

94、al institutions could use existing and new policy, regulatory, and fiscal tools to establish incentives, support vulnerable stakeholders, and foster collective action. The pace and scale of the transition mean that many of todays institutions would need to be revamped and new ones created to dissemi

95、nate best practices, establish standards and tracking mechanisms, drive capital deployment at scale, manage uneven impacts, and support further coordination of efforts. The goal of this research is to provide stakeholders with an in-depth understanding of the nature and magnitude of the economic and

96、 societal adjustments a net zero transition would entail. Our hope is that this analysis provides leaders with the tools to collectively secure a more orderly transition to net-zero by 2050. The findings serve as a clear call for more thoughtful and decisive action, taken with the utmost urgency. Th

97、e rewards of the net-zero transition would far exceed the mere avoidance of the substantial, and possibly catastrophic, dislocations that would result from unabated climate change, or the considerable benefits they entail in natural capital conservation. Besides the immediate economic opportunities

98、they create, they open up clear possibilities to solve global challenges in both physical and governance-related terms. These include the potential for a long-term decline in energy costs that would help solve many other resource issues and lead to a palpably more prosperous global economy. More imp

99、ortantly, they presage decisive solutions to age-old global economic and political challenges as the result of the unprecedented pace and scale of global collaboration that such a transition would have required. And while the immediate tasks ahead may seem daunting, human ingenuity can ultimately so

100、lve the net-zero equation, just as it has solved other seemingly intractable problems over the past 10,000 years. The key issue is whether the world can muster the requisite boldness and resolve to broaden its response during the upcoming decade that will in all likelihood decide the nature of the t

101、ransition.viiThe net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringSix characteristics of the net-zero transitionAll carbon dioxide and methane emissions today come from seven energy and land-use systems.Capital spending on physical assets for energy and land-use systems will need to rise

102、by $3.5 trillion per year for the next 30 years, to an annual total of:Developing countries and fossil fuel-rich regions are more exposed to the net-zero transition compared with other geographies.Some industry sectors are also more exposed.Percentage of GDP generated by sectors with highest degree

103、of exposureAs high-emissions assets are ramped down and low-emissions ones ramped up in the transition, risks include rising energy prices, energy supply volatility, and asset impairment.PowerIndustryMobilityBuildingsAgricultureForestryWaste$3.5 trillionIncrease in spending on low-emissions assets v

104、s. today$2 trillionContinued spending on low-emissions assets$1 trillionSpending reallocated from high- to low-emissions assets$2.7 trillionContinued spendingon high-emissions assetsCountries with lower GDP per capitaCountrieswith highertransitionexposureSize =population20%$9.2 trillionEstimates bas

105、ed on Net Zero 2050 scenario from Network for Greening the Financial System, which has an even chance of limiting warming to 1.5C, a hypothetical scenario, not a prediction or projection. See technical appendix for further details on approach.1 Universal2 Signifcant4 Uneven5 Exposed to risksIndiaChi

106、naBrazilUSCurrent spendingNew spendingEmitters of:Carbon dioxideMethaneSize = Share of total of each greenhouse gas emitted202125 30402050Global capital spending in the transition could rise in the short term before falling back.3 Front-loaded8.8% of global GDP in 2026302020spending level0%6.8%Cumul

107、ativespending of around$275trillionAbout 7.6%of global GDP across 202150$2.1 trillionValue in power assets alone that could be stranded by 2050Decarbonizing processes and productsReplacing high-emissions products and processes with low-emissions onesNew oferings to aid decarbonizationIncluding suppl

108、y chain inputs, infrastructure, and support servicesThe shift to a net-zero emissions world will create opportunities for businesses and countries. These could be in three areas:6 Rich in opportunitycVictor Andrade/Getty Images: EyeEmAs of this writing, in December 2021, more than 70 countries accou

109、nting for more than 80 percent of global CO emissions and about 90 percent of global GDP have put net-zero commitments in place, as have more than 5,000 companies, as part of the United Nations Race to Zero campaign.1 Yet even if all the existing commitments and national climate pledges were fulfill

110、ed, estimates suggest that warming would exceed 1.5C above preindustrial levels, increasing the odds of initiating the most catastrophic impacts of climate change, including biotic feedback loops.2 Moreover, most of these commitments have yet to be supported by detailed plans or executed. Nor will e

111、xecution be trivial, as it would require a careful balancing of shorter- and longer-term risks.Today, while the imperative to reach net-zero is increasingly recognized, the net-zero equation is not solved. This state of affairs should not be surprising, given the scale of the task at hand. Achieving

112、 net-zero emissions by 2050 would entail a fundamental transformation of the global economy. To bring about these changes, nine key requirements encompassing the three categories of physical building blocks, economic and societal adjustments, and governance, institutions, and commitment would need t

113、o be fulfilled against the backdrop of many economic (for example, inflation) and political challenges (for example, polarization within and among countries).3 In this report, we focus on the second category, namely, understanding the nature and extent of the economic and societal adjustments. We si

114、mulate the global shifts in demand, capital allocation, costs, and jobs that would take place between now and 2050 in the context of a net-zero transition, examining potential gains and opportunities as well as losses and costs. Our analysis covers the energy and land-use systems that produce about

115、85 percent of overall emissions and takes a closer look at how the transition might affect 69 countries. This analysis is not a projection or a prediction; it provides point estimates of specific economic transformations likely under a given hypothetical net-zero transition scenario fromthe Network

116、for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), an organization set up by central banks and supervisors in December 2017 with the goal of strengthening the global response to climate change. (We describe our methodology and its limitations in Box E1, “Our research methodology: Approach, scenarios, limitat

117、ions, and uncertainties.”) This scenario has an even chance of limiting warming to 1.5C; however, it is not clear whether the world will be able tokeep the temperature increase to that level, or which of numerous pathways it may take inan effort to do so. This research does not take a position on su

118、ch questions. Instead, it seeks todemonstrate the economic shifts that would need to take place if the goal of 1.5degrees isto be attainable and a relatively orderly transition achieved. 1 Includes countries that have achieved their net-zero targets, or have put them in law, in policy documents, or

119、made a declaration or a pledge. Net Zero Tracker, Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, Data-Driven EnviroLab, NewClimate Institute, and Oxford Net Zero, 2021. GDP data for 2019 from World Development Indicators Data Bank, World Bank. Emissions data for 2018 from Emissions Database for Global Atmosp

120、heric Research (EDGAR), v6.0, May 2021. “Race to Zero campaign,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.2 Based on policies currently enacted into law, UNEP, Climate Action Tracker, and the International Energy Agency project that warming will be 2.62.7C by 2100. In alternate scenario

121、s, where current net-zero targets and 2030 pledges are fully implemented, these organizations project that warming would be restricted between 2.1 and 2.2C. IEA lowers this estimate to 1.8C if targets that are still under discussion are also fully implemented. Emissions gap report 2021: Theheatis on

122、, UNEP, 2021; Warming projections global update, Climate Action Tracker, November 2021; and World energy outlook 2021, International Energy Agency, October 2021. Estimates from the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) similarly suggest that if current implemented policies continue, appro

123、ximately 1,250 additional gigatons of CO would enter the atmosphere by 2050, breaching the limit that scientists consider necessary to keep warming below 1.5C. Based on an analysis of the NGFS Current Policies scenario, using the REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1/4.2 model. Seealso Climate change 2021: The physical

124、 science basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2021.3 Mekala Krishnan, Tomas Nauclr, Daniel Pacthod, Dickon Pinner, Hamid Samandari, Sven Smit, and Humayun Tai, “Solving the net-zero equation: Nine requirements for a

125、more orderly transition,” McKinsey & Company, October 2021.Executive summary 1The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringBox E1 1 NGFS says this scenario “limits global warming to 1.5C through stringent climate policies and innovation, reaching net-zero CO emissions around 2050,

126、 giving at least a 50 percent chance of limiting global warming to below 1.5 C by the end of the century, with no or low overshoot ( 0.1 C) of 1.5 C in earlier years.” We use the REMIND-MAgPIE scenario from NGFS (2021 release), which allows a CO budget of about 440 gigatons (Gt) after 2020.2 For fur

127、ther details, see NGFS Scenarios Portal and Climate Scenarios Database, NGFS, June 2021.3 For further discussion of the uncertainties associated with modeling physical risks, see Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts, McKinsey Global Institute, January 2020.Our resear

128、ch methodology: Approach, scenarios, limitations, and uncertainties We assess the net-zero transition along two dimensions: sectors and geographies. For the first, we examine energy and land-use systems that account for about 85 percent of global emissions: power, industry (steel and cement producti

129、on), mobility (inparticular, road transportation), buildings, agriculture and food, and forestry and other land use. We also looked at fossil fuels that supply energy to many of these systems. For the geographic dimension, we analyze effects in depth in 69countries, which make up about 95 percent of

130、 global GDP. We chose not to develop our own transition scenarios and rely instead on widely used scenarios created by other institutions. Specifically, we analyze potential effects under the Net Zero 2050 scenario defined by the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). This hypothetical sc

131、enario mirrors global aspirations to cut emissions by about half by 2030 and to net zero by 2050 (Exhibit E1). It reaches net-zero CO emissions by 2050 for the economy as a whole; this means there are some low residual gross CO emissions in hard-to-abate sectors and some regions that are counterbala

132、nced by CO removals. Wechose to work with the NGFS scenarios because they cover all major energy and land-use systems in a coherent manner, provide regional granularity, are designed for use in risk and opportunity analysis, and are becoming the standard scenarios used by financial institutions, reg

133、ulators, and supervisors.1In some cases, as a counterfactual for comparison, we also use the NGFS Current Policies scenario. This scenario projects the greenhouse gas emissions that would occur if only todays mitigation policies remain in place (based on an NGFS assessment of policies as of the star

134、t of 2020), and it anticipates a little over 3C of warming by 2100.2 The comparison allows us to account for how other factors such as GDP growth or population growth could affect the economy between now and 2050. We also collaborated with Vivid Economics to use the two NGFS scenarios to generate mo

135、re granular sector variables where needed (for example, sales of new automobiles), in a manner that was based on and compliant with the NGFS scenarios. In such cases, we still refer to the specific sector variable as being based on the relevant NGFS scenario.We performed the analysis as follows. Fir

136、st, we used the NGFS scenarios and downscaling by Vivid Economics to quantify changes in important variables in each energy and land-use system (for example, changes in power production by source). Thedownscaling was done to provide sectoral or technological granularity where not available from NGFS

137、. We used this to assess changes in demand, and then assessed the implications for capital stock and investment, producer and consumer costs, and employment based on information about decarbonization technologies and their capital and operating costs, labor intensity, and effects on value chains. Wh

138、ere possible, we used region-specific costs and labor assumptions, as well as expected technology learning curves over time, based on McKinsey analysis. Limitations of our approach and uncertainties. We recognize the limitations of the NGFS scenarios, as with any transition scenario, given that this

139、 is an emerging field of research. First, while some variables are explored at the sector level, the scenarios sometimes do not provide enough detail to explore how different types of activities will be affected, thus requiring downscaling to achieve the necessary sectoral granularity. Second, the m

140、odels underpinning the NGFS scenarios may not capture important dynamics or constraints within a sector. For example, the model we used favors more economy-wide use of biomass in energy and industry (for example, hydrogen production) than may be considered feasible in other sector-specific decarboni

141、zation pathways. Third, although the models do capture ongoing learning and technological innovation, they may fail to sufficiently anticipate the emergence of disruptive technologies that may change decarbonization pathways and lower cost trajectories faster than anticipated. Fourth, while some NGF

142、S scenarios have begun to incorporate damages from physical risks in the economic modeling, further work is needed to fully integrate physical risks into the decarbonization pathways. Asa result, we have focused here on scenarios that do not incorporate physical risk. This approach also allows us to

143、 focus our analysis on the effects of the transition alone.3 Finally, the scenarios reflect climate policies and technological trends in place before the COVID-19 pandemic and climate negotiations and pledges at COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021.Our analysis largely consists of an analysis of first-

144、order effects. Various uncertainties could influence the magnitude of outcomes highlighted here. While some of these factors could result in lower outcomes than those sized in this research, some factors suggest that additional costs and effects will likely occur as the transition unfolds. By the sa

145、me token, the costs of physical climate risks could likely prove higher than those described here. 2McKinsey & CompanyKey uncertainties include the following: Warming scenario and emissions pathway. A higher warming scenario (for example, 2.0C above preindustrial levels) may lead to smaller transiti

146、on effects than a 1.5C warming scenario, given the lower degree of emissions reduction and deviation from todays production and consumption patterns it entails (though physical risks would naturally be higher). Sectors decarbonization actions and activity levels. Because the focus of our work is ass

147、essing the nature and magnitudeof economic shifts and not identifying decarbonization actions, we used a prespecified net-zero scenario from NGFS. It is feasible that an alternate technology mix could result in lower costs and different shifts than those described here, and that further technologica

148、l innovation could result in a different pathway with lower costs. It is also feasible that the path the world undertakes to decarbonize is different from the one described here. An alternate scenario may consist of more use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and a focus on decarbonizi

149、ng the hydrocarbon value chain, for example, this could happen if capture costs fall, regulatory frameworks are put in place to incentivize CCS use, and markets mature for recycled CO as a material feedstock.4 Magnitude of direct and indirect socioeconomic effects. Some effects could be larger than

150、described here, for example, if executing the transition is more complex than the scenario here suggests, and additional capital spending is needed to maintain flexibility and redundancy in energy systems. If supply of key materials or low-emissions sources of energy does not keep up with demand, th

151、is could result in shortages and price increases, which we have not considered in our quantification. Higher-order effects could magnify risks and increase costs, particularly in the short term. For example, depending on how the transition is financed, the effects on the overall economy could be sub

152、stantially higher than sized here. Finally, effects could also be larger under an abrupt or delayed transition. Economic and societal adjustments needed for the transition. Costs and investments could be higher than sized here, for example to implement social support schemes to aid economic and soci

153、etal adjustments. Similarly, additional costs may arise from delays, setbacks, and urgently needed adaptation measures, particularly if restricting warming to 1.5C proves not to be possible. For our analysis, we quantify the scale of first-order effects and describe qualitatively the adjustments nee

154、ded.Aspects we did not cover. Topics we did not cover include the likelihood, validity, and comparative costs associated with various decarbonization scenarios; the comparative merits of different emissions-reduction technologies; constraints to implement and deploy decarbonization technologies (for

155、 example, scaling up supply chains); the actions needed to drive and incentivize decarbonization; quantification of higher-order economic effects of the transition, including on output, growth, value pools, valuations, trade flows, and human well-being; relative costs and merits of decarbonization a

156、nd adaptation; and impacts that could result from physical climate hazards. We use benchmarks from the external literature and our past research to describe these latter possibilities. As discussed above, our analysis here represents first-order estimates. Fully quantifying the costs of rising physi

157、cal risks and the transition is complex. It would require estimating impacts from rising physical risks and the cost of adaptation actions, building robust estimates of the impact of the net-zero transition on the economy that takes into account the higher-order effects described above, and doing so

158、 over time and while grappling with the various uncertainties described previously.Full details of our methodology are in the technical appendix. 4 For more on CCS, see also chapter 1.Box E1 (continued)3The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringBox E1 (continued)Exhibit E110035

159、0500150300200250400202050254030205040035045100150200250300350403520201552530452050-10-50102025303540Our analysis uses the Net Zero 2050 scenario from the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS).1.The net-zero scenario is based on the NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario using REMIND-MAgPIE from the

160、2021 release of NGFS (phase 2). 2.CO2emissions from energy use in residential and commercial buildings.3. CO2emissions from energy use in transportation sector (road, rail, shipping, and aviation).4. CO2emissions from energy use in industry and industrial process emissions, energy conversion excludi

161、ng electricity, fugitive emissions from fuels, and emissions from carbon dioxide transport and storage.5.Total CO2emissions captured through bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BECCS). BECCS is deployed across multiple energy systems (eg, electricity generation, hydrogen production, and industry).

162、6. Methane emissions from energy use.7.Methane emissions from energy conversion including electricity and fugitive emissions from fuels.8. Methane emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land use.9. Methane emissions from all other sources (eg, waste).Net Zero 2050 scenario pathway from NGFS

163、1CO2emissions, billion metric tonsMethane emissions, million metric tonsEnd-use sectors6Supply of energy7Agriculture, forestry, and other land use8Other9PowerBuildings2Mobility3Industry4Agriculture, forestry, and other land useCO2removal5Note: This is based on the NGFS database. Todays emissions may

164、 vary across other emissions databases depending on the methodology used.Source: Network for Greening the Financial System scenario analysis 2021 phase 2 (Net Zero 2050 scenario) REMIND-MAgPIE model; McKinsey Global Institute analysisNet emissionsNet emissions4McKinsey & CompanyOutcomes may well exc

165、eed our estimates here, particularly if the net-zero transition takes a disorderly path or if it proves impossible to restrict warming to 1.5C (see Box E2, “Who will pay for the transition?”). We nonetheless hope such an exercise will help decision makers refine their understanding of the nature and

166、 the magnitude of the changes the net-zero transition would entail, and the scale of response needed to manage it.Six characteristics of the net-zero transition emerge from our scenario-based analysis. First,the transition would be universal. Indeed, net-zero emissions can be achieved if and only if

167、 all energy and land-use systems that contribute to emissions are decarbonized, as these contributions are significant in all cases. All economic sectors and all countries would need to participate. Second, the scale of the required economic transformation would be significant. In particular, we est

168、imate that the cumulative capital spending on physical assets for the net-zero transition between 2021 and 2050 would be about $275 trillion. This means that spending would need to rise from about $5.7 trillion today to an annual average of $9.2 trillion through 2050, an increase of $3.5 trillion. A

169、ccounting for expected increases in spending, as incomes and populations grow, as well as for currently legislated transition policies, the required increase inspending would be lower, but still about $1 trillion. Third, these effects would be front-loaded: spending would need to rise to almost 9 pe

170、rcent of GDP between 2026 and 2030 from about 7 percent today before falling. Likewise, we estimate that the delivered cost of electricity (across generation, transmission, distribution, and storage, and including operating costs, capital costs, and depreciation of existing and new assets) would ris

171、e by about 25 percent between 2020 and 2040 in the scenario modeled here before falling from that peak, although this would vary across regions. Fourth, the transition would be felt unevenly among sectors, geographies, and communities, resulting in greater challenges for some constituencies than oth

172、ers. Fifth, the transition is laden with short-term risks, even as the transition will help manage long-term physical risks. If poorly managed, it could increase energy prices, with implications for energy access and affordability, especially for lower-income households and regions. Itwould also hav

173、e knock-on effects on the economy more broadly. If not well managed, thereis a risk that the transition itself would be derailed. Sixth is that, despite the challenges with making economic and societal adjustments, the transition would give rise to growth opportunities across sectors and geographies

174、and, critically, it would help avoid the buildup of physical risks. This research aims to highlight the nature and magnitude of the economic transformation that a net-zero transition would require. While the challenges ahead are large, the findings of this research should be seen for what they are:

175、a call for more thoughtful, decisive, and urgent action to secure a more orderly transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. Everyone would have a role to play, including governments, businesses, and individuals. Toease stakeholders adjustments to these effects, governments and businesses will likely

176、need to adopt a long-term perspective and coordinate action in a spirit of unity, resolve, and cooperation and, at the same time, take near-term actions to manage their own risks and capture opportunities. This research is a call for more thoughtful, decisive, and urgent action.5The net-zero transit

177、ion: What it would cost, what it could bringBox E2 Who will pay for the transition? As discussed later in this report, the spending needed on physical assets for the net-zero transition is significant. Itrepresents a substantial scale-up of spending relative to todays levels. It is also capital that

178、 will be spent very differently relative to today, with capital reallocated away from high-emissions assets and toward low-emissions ones. While some of this spending would eventually yield a return, various challenges with raising capital at this scale will need to be effectively managed. These inc

179、lude addressing technological uncertainty of investment, managing risk/return trade-offs, driving capital flows to developing countries, and ensuring demand for this capital exists in the sectors and geographies in which emissions reduction is most needed.This raises the question of how to best pay

180、for the transition. Various aspects to consider include who provides the financing (for example, public versus private actors, and the mix of financing provided by developed and developing countries), how capital is raised (for example, debt versus equity, through taxes on companies or consumers), a

181、nd various combinations thereof. For example, public financing can come through raising taxes on companies, carbon taxes, taxes on consumers, or through taking on debt, to name a few approaches.In deciding the optimal approach to financing the transition, stakeholders will need to consider three fac

182、tors. First, which approach would raise capital at the speed and scale needed, and incentivize the deployment of this capital. Second, how financing can best include principles of equity, including what equity would require based on the history of emissions and who has the ability to pay. And finall

183、y, what are broader knock-on consequences of different financing approaches. The latter is especially important, because it can profoundly influence the socioeconomic consequences of a net-zero transition. First, some ways of raising capitalfor example, taxes on consumerscould curtail spending in ot

184、her parts of the economy if not balanced, for example, with fiscal stimulus elsewhere. This in turn could have knock-on effects on corporate revenues for affected sectors, on job creation, and on growth more broadly. Second, the source of financing could exacerbate existing inequalities if not caref

185、ully managed. Developing countries, for example, may find it challenging to raise the capital needed for the transition on their own. Third, the type of financing could have a role in influencing the pace of the net-zero transition. Certain technologies, such as electric vehicle (EV) charging infras

186、tructure, may require public financing at scale to reach the speed of deployment needed to achieve net-zero. The results presented here do not factor in these considerations, as our focus is on sizing the magnitude of the need. However, the question of “who pays” is unavoidable as stakeholders under

187、take the economic transformation needed for the net-zero transition, and do so with the consequences mentioned above in mind.6McKinsey & CompanyNet-zero emissions can be achieved only through a universal transformation of energy and land-use systems To stabilize the climate and limit physical climat

188、e risks, climate science tells us that it is necessary to reduce the addition of GHGs to the atmosphere to net zero (see Box E3, “Physical risks will continue to build up until net zero is achieved”). Seven energy and land-use systems act as direct sources of global emissions (Exhibits E2 and E3).4

189、One systemforestry and other land usealso acts as a natural sink for carbon dioxide and would need to increase its rate of emissions absorption. The systems and their emissions footprints are the following: Power, consisting of electricity and heat generation: 30 percent of CO emissions, and 3 perce

190、nt of nitrous oxide (NO) emissions5 Industry, consisting of various industrial processes, including production of steel, cement, and chemicals, and extraction and refining of oil, gas, and coal: 30 percent of CO emissions, 33 percent of methane emissions, 8 percent of NO emissions Mobility, consisti

191、ng of road, aviation, rail, maritime, and other forms of transportation: 19 percent of CO emissions, and 2 percent of NO emissions Buildings, including heating and cooking: 6 percent of CO emissions Agriculture, consisting of direct on-farm energy use and emissions from agricultural practices and fi

192、shing: 1 percent of CO emissions, 38 percent of methane emissions, and 79 percent of NO emissions Forestry and other land use, primarily land cover change: 14 percent of CO emissions, 5 percent of methane emissions, and 5 percent of NO emissions Waste, consisting of solid waste disposal and treatmen

193、t, incineration, and wastewater treatment: 23 percent of methane emissions, 3 percent of NO emissionsCarbon dioxide in each case is emitted through the combustion of fossil fuels to produce energy (oil, gas, and coal), as well as through non-energy emissions (for example, emissions associated with i

194、ndustrial processes like the reduction of iron ore to produce steel and with deforestation). Based on current accounting methodologies, energy-related emissions make up as much as 83 percent of carbon dioxide emissions.64 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2020; “Energy use,” FAOSTAT; EMIT

195、database, McKinsey Sustainability Insights, September 2021; and McKinsey Global Energy Perspectives. 5 Heat generation includes heat from combined heat and power plants.6 Notably, this is based on the current system of emissions measurement, in which forestry emissions in particular are considered a

196、s net emissions, considering their role as both sources and sinks of greenhouse gases. Considering only their role as gross sources of emissions, and accounting for second-order effects of deforestation, would substantially increase the contribution of forestry as sources of emissions. For further d

197、etails, see chapter 3.Reaching net-zero emissions will require a transformation of the global economy.7The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringBox E31 Noah S. Diffenbaugh and Christopher B. Field, “Changes in ecologically critical terrestrial climate conditions,” Science, vol

198、ume 341, number 6145, August 2013; Seth D. Burgess, Samuel Bowring, and Shu-zhong Shen, “High-precision timeline for Earths most severe extinction,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, volume111, number 9, March 2014.2 Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impact

199、s, McKinsey Global Institute, January 2020.3 Climate change 2021: The physical science basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2021.4 See Box 1 in Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts, M

200、cKinsey Global Institute, January 2020.5 Making estimates of this kind is challenging, and we have not attempted to do so in our research. The ranges here come from a review of the literature focused on quantifying the various impacts of physical climate effects on real GDP or GDP growth. For detail

201、ed sources, see chapter 1 and the bibliography. 6 “Summary for policymakers,” in Climate change 2021: The physical science basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report, IPCC, 2021.7 Emissions data for other greenhouse gases are less frequently reported. In 2019, annual emiss

202、ions were 364 megatons of methane (CH), and 10 megatons of nitrous oxide (NO). See also Global Carbon Budget, 2021; EMIT database by McKinsey Sustainability Insights, September 2021. For more on the impact of the pandemic, see Corinne Le Qur et al., Temporary reduction in daily global CO emissions d

203、uring the COVID-19 forced confinement, Global Carbon Project, March 2021.8 Restricting future net emissions to 1,1501,350 GtCO would result in a 5067 percent probability of limiting warming to 2.0C. At current emissions rates, the carbon budget for 1.5C of warming would be exceeded in approximately

204、the next decade, and the 2.0C budget would be exceeded in about three decades.9 H. Damon Matthews et al., “Focus on cumulative emissions, global carbon budgets, and the implications for climate mitigation targets,” Environmental Research Letters, volume 13, number 1, January 2018.Physical risks will

205、 continue to build up until net zero is achieved As average temperatures rise, acute hazards such as heat waves and floods increase in frequency and severity, and chronic hazards, such as drought and rising sea levels, intensify.1 These hazards and changes could lead to rising, nonlinear, and system

206、ic socioeconomic impacts, as described in our 2020 report on physical climate risk.2 Mostrecently, the Sixth Assessment Report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR6) reaffirmed that continued GHG emissions will result in increasingly severe consequences for the Ea

207、rth system and, potentially, abrupt and catastrophic changes that might occur as the climate passes tipping points.3 As physical climate risk spreads, it could trigger broader economic, financial, and social disruptions.4 Estimates suggest that failing to limit the rise of greenhouse gas emissions c

208、ould affect between 2 and 20 percent of global GDP by 2050 under a high-emissions (RCP 8.5) scenario.5 The wide range reflects the intrinsic difficulty in making these estimates. The effect of hard-to-predict biotic feedback loops (for example, the thawing of permafrost) or knock-on economic effects

209、 (for example, from impacts on financial valuations) could push losses well beyond the high-end estimate. To stabilize the climate and limit physical climate risks, climate science tells us that it is necessary to reduce the addition of GHGs to the atmosphere to net zero and limit warming to 1.5C ab

210、ove preindustrial levels to reduce the odds of initiating the most dangerous and irreversible effects of climate change.6 Global emissions of carbon dioxide are about 40 gigatons (GtCO) today. Emissions of CO have risen significantly since 1970, though the rate of growth has slowed in recent years.7

211、 The IPCC AR6 report estimated that restricting all future net CO emissions to 400500 Gt, combined with substantial decreases in emissions of short-lived GHGs like methane, would result in a 50 to 67 percent probability of limiting warming to 1.5C above preindustrial levels.8 At current emissions ra

212、tes, the carbon budget for 1.5C of warming would thus likely be exceeded within about the next decade. Climate science tells us that the Earth system will continue to change along the journey to net zero and that some changes will continue even after we have stopped the planet from warming; thus, ac

213、tions to reduce emissions will also need to go hand-in-hand with adaptation.9 Decisions taken over the next decade will thus be crucial.8McKinsey & CompanyExhibit E2PowerIndustryMobilityBuildingsAgricultureForestry and other land useEnergy use accounts for 83 percent of the CO emitted across energy

214、and land-use systems.CO emissions per fuel and energy and land-use system, 2019, shareSource: EMIT database by McKinsey Sustainability Insights (September 2021, data for 2019); International Energy Agency; McKinsey Global Energy Perspectives; McKinsey Global Institute analysis1.Includes all fossil f

215、uel CO sources as well as short-cycle emissions (eg, large-scale biomass burning, forest fires). Power includes emissions from electricity and heat generation (i.e., from combined heat and power plants); Industry includes various industrial processes, including production of steel, cement, and chemi

216、cals, and extraction and refining of oil, gas, and coal; Mobility includes emissions from road, aviation, rail, maritime, and other forms of transportation; Buildings includes emissions from heating, cooking, and lighting of commercial and residential buildings; Agriculture includes emissions from d

217、irect on-farm energy use and fishing; Forestry includes net flux of CO from land use and land cover change but not the opportunity cost of lost carbon capture. The global CO emissions in this exhibit represent the total emissions of the full sectors, not of the subsectors considered in this report.

218、Based on 2019 emissions.2.In addition to energy-related CO emissions, anthropogenic emissions include industry process emissions and deforestation.Note: This is based on the McKinsey EMIT database that draws on a variety of bottom-up sources. Depending on the emissions database used, data per sector

219、 and the economy as a whole may vary. Figures may not sum to 100% because of rounding. 2040107080901005030010203040600OilCoal31%17%17%35%Natural gasNon-energy2Emissions, billion metric tons per yearSource of emissions, % share9The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringEffective

220、 decarbonization actions include shifting the energy mix away from fossil fuels and toward zero-emissions electricity and other low-emissions energy carriers such as hydrogen; adapting industrial and agricultural processes; increasing energy efficiency and managing demand for energy; utilizing the c

221、ircular economy; consuming fewer emissions-intensive goods; deploying carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCS) technology; and enhancing sinks of both long-lived and short-lived greenhouse gases. Avoiding deforestation and enabling forest restoration are particularly important for restoring an

222、d enhancing GHG sinks.7 Recent McKinsey research on what it would take to achieve a 1.5C pathway examined a range of scenarios and found that the above actions would need to be deployed across all sectors in the economy and would require emissions-reduction efforts beginning today.87 Estimates sugge

223、st that over a 30-year period, a tree can store an additional 60 to 85 percent as much carbon as is released when the tree is cut down or burned, and that overall secondary emissions and forgone carbon sequestration resulting from deforestation can be three to nine times higher than the direct emiss

224、ions alone. Research indicates that forgone carbon sequestration and forest degradation are highly underestimated in current evaluations of deforestation emissions. For details, see chapters 1 and 3.8 Kimberly Henderson, Dickon Pinner, Matt Rogers, Bram Smeets, Christer Tryggestad, and Daniela Varga

225、s, “Climate math: What a 1.5-degree pathway would take,” McKinsey & Company, April 2020. See also “Curbing methane emissions: How five industries can counter a major climate threat,” McKinsey & Company, September 2021.Exhibit E3Share of emissions1per energy and land-use system, 2019, %Power and indu

226、stry are major energy consumers and together generate about 60 percent of CO2emissions.Source: EMIT database by McKinsey Sustainability Insights (September 2021, data for 2019); McKinsey Global Institute analysis1.Includes all fossil fuel CO sources as well as short-cycle emissions (eg, large-scale

227、biomass burning, forest fires). Power includes emissions from electricity and heat generation (i.e., from combined heat and power plants); Industry includes various industrial processes, including production of steel, cement, and chemicals, and extraction and refining of oil, gas, and coal; Mobility

228、 includes emissions from road, aviation, rail, maritime, and other forms of transportation; Buildings includes emissions from heating, cooking, and lighting of commercial and residential buildings; Agriculture includes emissions from direct on-farm energy use and fishing; Forestry includes net flux

229、of CO from land use and land cover change but not the opportunity cost of lost carbon capture; Waste includes emissions from solid waste disposal and treatment, incineration, and wastewater treatment. The global CO emissions in this exhibit represent the total emissions of the full sectors, not of t

230、he subsectors considered in this report. Based on 2019 emissions.2.Forestry and other land use.Note: This is based on the McKinsey EMIT database that draws on a variety of bottom-up sources. Depending on the emissions database used, data per system and the economy as a whole may vary. Figures may no

231、t sum to 100% because of rounding. Subsectors share of system emissions, %PowerIndustryMobilityBuildingsAgricultureForestry2 Electricity Heat973 Steel Cement Oil and gas ex-traction Chemicals Coal mining Other26201512620 Road Aviation Maritime Rail Other751311110% of county employment in the examine

232、d sector28McKinsey & CompanyFinally, even if the pathway chosen is relatively orderly, given the scale of the transformation required, supply may not be able to scale up sufficiently, making shortages and price increases or volatility a feature. Rapidly scaling up demand for low-emissions assets and

233、 other products needed for the transition, without corresponding scale-up of supply, could lead to supply/demand imbalances, shortages, price increases, and inflation.32 As already noted, a mismatch or mistiming between the ramping down of high-emissions activities and the ramping up of low-emission

234、s activities could create energy price volatility and issues with reliability that could potentially result in a backlash that delays the transition. Another risk is that stakeholders maintain two parallel energy systems in a manner that is inefficient and not cost effective. Thus the transformation

235、 of the energy system needs to be carefully managed. And there may be other constraints, including accessing the volume of financing required in the initial phases of the transition when many of the investments would be front-loaded.There could also be other costs incurred and investment needed beyo

236、nd those mentioned in this report, for example related to the reskilling of workers, or economic diversification efforts. A key area where additional spend would be needed is related to adaptation investments. Adaptation action is needed to manage a continually increasing level of physical risk, irr

237、espective of the decarbonization measures required to achieve net-zero emissions. Keyadaptation measures include actions to protect people and assets, for example installing “gray” infrastructure such as sea walls, building resilience and backups in systems with actions like increasing global invent

238、ories and diversifying supply chains, and reducing exposure where necessary, for example by relocating assets from regions.To illustrate the difference between transition pathways, we analyzed two NGFS scenarios consistent with limiting warming to less than 2.0C from preindustrial levels. In the “Be

239、low-2C scenario,” where emissions reductions start immediately on a pathway to 2.0C of warming, our analysis suggests that only a relatively small amount of additional coal power capacity is added, about $150 billion between 2020 and 2050. Of this, $100 billion would be prematurely retired or underu

240、tilized. But in the scenario where emissions reductions toward 2.0C warming start later, a substantially larger amount of capacity would be added; as much as $600 billion would be invested in coal-power capacity, with as much as $400 billion prematurely retired or underutilized. Perhaps the greatest

241、 risk from delaying emissions reductions is physical climate risk. Thelonger it takes to initiate emissions reduction, the more of the worlds remaining carbon budget would be used upleaving less time to cut emissions and increasing the risk that warming is not restricted to 1.5C or even 2.0C.While s

242、ignificant, these economic adjustments would create growth opportunities and prevent further buildup of physical riskThe changing demand outlook combined with the $3.5 trillion in incremental annual spending on physical assets in the NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario, noted above, would create substantial

243、 growth opportunities for companies and countries in the near term. We describe the opportunities for countries later in this summary. The opportunities for companies are in the three main areas described below. 32 For example, see “The raw materials challenge: How the metals and mining sector will

244、be at the core of enabling the energy transition,” McKinsey & Company, January 2022. The research describes a scenario based on the current pipeline of projects and without measures to incentivize further supply, in which copper and nickel demand in 2030 could exceed supply by 5 million to 8 million

245、 and 700,000 to one million metric tons, respectively. See also 2022 global outlook: Thrivingin a new market regime, Blackrock Investment Institute, 2022.29The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringDecarbonized forms of legacy products and processes: Companies that reduce the e

246、missions intensity of their processes and products could gain advantages as the transition progresses. In some cases, decarbonizing processes and products can make them more cost-effective. For example, improving the energy efficiency of heating systems in steel plants lowers both emissions and oper

247、ating costs. Even when decarbonizing adds to operating costs, companies can benefit from taking this stepfor instance, if consumers are willing to pay more for low-carbon products or if companies are subject to carbon-pricing mandates.Low-emissions products and processes that replace established hig

248、h-emissions options: Carmakers might produce EVs instead of ICE vehicles, for example. Steelmakers can implement low-carbon production processes such as direct reduced ironelectric arc furnaces (DRI-EAF) powered by green hydrogen.33 Utilities might set up wind or solar farms to generate renewable el

249、ectricity, while energy companies could introduce biofuels and hydrogen. Inputs, physical capital, infrastructure, and support services: New offerings will be needed to support production in the other two categories. These offerings include inputs such as lithium and cobalt for battery manufacturing

250、, physical capital such as solar panels and batteries, and infrastructure such as EV charging stations and hydrogen refueling stations.34 Technical services such as forest management, engineering and design, and power-system integration will help with the management of low-carbon assets. Services su

251、ch as financing, risk management, certification, emissions measurement and tracking solutions, and worker training will also be needed. The incremental capital spending on physical assets, which we estimate at about 3 percent of GDP annually through 2050, as discussed previously, and the broader eco

252、nomic transformations under a net-zero transition would have another essential feature: most importantly, reaching net-zero emissions and limiting warming to 1.5C would prevent the buildup of physical risks and reduce the odds of initiating the most catastrophic impacts of climate change, including

253、limiting the risk of biotic feedback loops and preserving the ability to halt additional warming.3533 DRI is produced from the chemical reduction of iron ore into iron by either a reducing gas or elemental carbon produced from natural gas or coal, which can be used as an input, along with high-grade

254、 steel scrap, in the EAF method of steel production. Steel production in integrated blast furnaces or basic oxygen furnaces today uses iron ore and requires coal as a reductant. See Christian Hoffmann, Michel Van Hoey, and Benedikt Zeumer, “Decarbonization challenge for steel,” McKinsey & Company, J

255、une 2020.34 For example, see “The raw materials challenge: How the metals and mining sector will be at the core of enabling the energy transition,” McKinsey & Company, January 2022. The research finds that requirement for additional supply will come not only from relatively large-volume raw material

256、sfor example, copper for electrification and nickel for battery EVs, which are expected to see significant demand growth beyond their current applicationsbut also from relatively niche commodities, such as lithium and cobalt for batteries, tellurium for solar panels, and neodymium for the permanent

257、magnets used both in wind power generation and EVs. Some commoditiesmost notably steelwill also play an enabling role across technologies, as additional infrastructure is needed.35 See Box E3 in the executive summary, chapter 1, and the bibliography for a detailed list of the academic literature and

258、 broader discussion related to physical climate risks.Rapidly scaling up demand for low-emissions assets and other products needed for the transition, without corresponding scale-up of supply, could lead to supply shortages and price increases.30McKinsey & CompanySectors are unevenly exposed to the

259、transition; those with high-emissions products or operations would be especially affectedWe find that, while all sectors of the economy are exposed to a net-zero transition because of their participation in energy and land-use systems, some are more exposed than others. Thesectors with the highest d

260、egree of exposure directly emit significant quantities of greenhouse gases (for example, the coal and gas power sector) or sell products that emit greenhouse gases (such as the fossil fuel sector). Approximately 20 percent of global GDP is in these sectors. A further 10 percent of GDP is in sectors

261、with high-emissions supply chains, such as construction. Other sectors accounting for about 70 percent of GDP have less pronounced direct exposure. They are nevertheless dependent on the highly exposed sectors, for example through interconnected economic and financial systems, and therefore could be

262、 affected by the transition.In this section, we describe the economic shifts for some of the most affected sectors. Together they account for about 85 percent of global GHG emissions through their operations or products, and we present our analysis of the economic changes they would likely experienc

263、e in the Net Zero 2050 scenario.36 Fossil fuels. As noted earlier, combustion of fossil fuels produces 83 percent of global CO emissions. The sector is seeking to decarbonize its own emissions through energy efficiency, electrification, and managing fugitive methane emissions.37 At the same time, it

264、 faces significant demand shifts from potential shifts in the energy mix under a net-zero transition, with a reduction in demand for fossil fuels and growing demand for other energy sources such as electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels. In the scenario analyzed here, oil and gas production volumes in

265、2050 would be 55 percent and 70 percent lower, respectively, than today. Coalproduction for energy use would be nearly eliminated. Under the net-zero transition, demand for jobs within the fossil fuel extraction and production sector could be lower by about nine million direct jobs by 2050. Inrespon

266、se, McKinsey research suggests that a number of oil and gas companies are adapting to the low-carbon transition by becoming resource specialists, becoming diversified energy players, or turning themselves into low-carbon pure plays.38Power. To decarbonize, the global power sector would need to phase

267、 out fossil fuelbased generation and add capacity for low-emissions power to meet the additional demand arising from both economic development and the growing electrification of other sectors. Itwould require substantial annual capital spending from 2021 to 2050, which we estimateatabout $1 trillion

268、 in power generation, $820 billion in the power grid, and $120 billion in energystorage in the NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario. Opportunities would arise not only for power producers but also for providers of equipment, electricity-storage hardware, and related services. Our analysis suggests that by 20

269、50, under a net-zero transition, approximately six million direct jobs could be added in operations andmaintenanceforrenewable power andapproximately four million direct jobs could be 36 We estimate how much exposure these sectors have to the transition by measuring their direct emissions (scope 1 e

270、missions, which indicate exposure to potential demand shifts, investment needs, and cost changes from having to alter production processes), emissions from products (downstream scope 3, which may affect demand, for example, if consumers shift their preferences, and in turn also affect the capital in

271、vestments made by the sector and its costs), supply chain emissions (upstream scope 3, which may expose the sector to cost shifts as its core inputs are affected by the transition), and emissions from purchased electricity (scope 2 for electricity use, which could indirectly expose the sector to the

272、 effects of changes in the worlds energy mix).37 See Paul Gargett, Stephen Hall, and Jayanti Kar, “Toward a net-zero future: Decarbonizing upstream oil and gas operations,” McKinsey & Company, December 2019.38 Chantal Beck, Donatela Bellone, Stephen Hall, Jayanti Kar, and Dara Olufon, “The big choic

273、es for oil and gas in navigating the energy transition,” McKinsey & Company, March 2021.31The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringlostin fossil fuelbasedpower. The build-out of power infrastructure and the capital spending associated with the net-zero transition could produce

274、 as many as 27 million direct jobs in the early years of the transition, and about 16 million direct jobs associated with construction and manufacturing activity in 2050. Assetstranding could be large. Our analysis suggests that about $2.1 trillion of the sectors capital stock could be stranded by 2

275、050 in the Net Zero 2050 scenario.39 Eighty percent of this amount is todays capacity, while 20 percent is capacity that would be built between 2021 and 2050.40 Mobility. Our analysis of mobility focuses on the road transportation segment, which accounts for about 75 percent of all mobility emission

276、s.41 Decarbonization would involve replacing ICE vehicles with battery-electric vehicles or vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells. In the Net Zero 2050 scenario, annual spending would be $3.5 trillion on both vehicles and to build charging and fueling infrastructure between 2021 and 2050. About 13

277、 million direct ICE-related jobs would be lost in the Net Zero 2050 scenario, although some of this loss would be offset by gains of about nine million direct jobs related to EV manufacturing by 2050 with the difference between losses and gains driven in large part by the relatively higher productiv

278、ity of zero-emissions vehicle manufacturing. Industry. We focus on two sectors, steel and cement, that together account for approximately 14 percent of global CO emissions and 47 percent of industrys CO emissions.42 While technology pathways are still emerging, steel and cement production could be d

279、ecarbonized by installing CCS equipment or switching to processes or fuelssuch as hydrogenthat can have zero or low emissions. Production costs in both sectors could increase by more than 30 percent by 2050 compared with today, though this could be lower with continued innovation. Buildings. In the

280、net-zero scenario, the buildings sector would decarbonize by improving energy efficiencyfor example, through the use of insulationand by replacing fossil fuelpowered heating and cooking equipment with low-emissions systems. The average annual spending on physical assets between 2020 and 2050 would b

281、e $1.7 trillion per year. Decarbonization of buildings could result in a net gain of about half a million direct jobs by 2050 under a net-zero transition, driven by retrofitting buildings with insulation. Thebuildings sectors biggest adjustment during this transition would be managing the up-front c

282、apital costs for end consumers to retrofit equipment and aligning incentives across various stakeholders (such as building owners who invest capital and tenants who may see the benefits of reduced operating costs).43Agriculture and food. In the net-zero scenario analyzed here, agricultural emissions

283、 would be reduced as a result of producers deploying GHG-efficient farming practices, andsome consumers shifting their diets away from ruminant animals that generate significant quantitiesof methane.44 The scenario would also entail an increase in production of 39 Our definition of stranded assets r

284、epresents the cumulative value of prematurely retired and underutilized assets in 202050, undiscounted. We estimate it by first identifying the level of yearly depreciation that is expected given asset life and assumed economic life using data from the WRI Global Power Plant database as input. That

285、figure was multiplied by the fraction of assets that are underutilized relative to past average utilization rates (between 2005 and 2020) and summed across years.40 For more on the power sector, see Jason Finkelstein, David Frankel, and Jesse Noffsinger, “How to decarbonize global power systems,” Mc

286、Kinsey & Company, May 2020; and Rory Clune, Ksenia Kaladiouk, Jesse Noffsinger, and Humayun Tai, “A 2040 vision for the US power industry: Evaluating two decarbonization scenarios,” McKinsey & Company, February 2020.41 EMIT database, McKinsey Sustainability Insights, September 2021; data for 2019. F

287、or more on the mobility sector, see “Why the automotive future is electric,” McKinsey & Company, September 2021; Timo Moller, Asutosh Padhi, Dickon Pinner, and Andreas Tschiesner, “The future of mobility is at our doorstep,” McKinsey Center for Future Mobility, December 2019; and Eric Hannon, Tomas

288、Nauclr, Anders Suneson, and Fehmi Yuksel, “The zero-carbon car: Abating material emissions is next on the agenda,” McKinsey & Company, September 2020.42 EMIT database, McKinsey Sustainability Insights, September 2021; data for 2019. For more details on decarbonization of the steel sector, see Christ

289、ian Hoffmann, Michel Van Hoey, and Benedikt Zeumer, “Decarbonization challenge for steel,” McKinsey & Company, June 2020. For cement, see Thomas Czigler, Sebastian Reiter, Patrick Schulze, and Ken Somers, “Laying the foundation for zero-carbon cement,” McKinsey& Company, May 2020; and Thomas Hundert

290、mark, Sebastian Reiter, and Patrick Schulze, “Green growth avenues in the cement ecosystem,” McKinsey & Company, December 2021.43 For more on the building sector, see Paolo DAprile, Hauke Engel, Godart van Gend, Stefan Helmcke, Solveigh Hieronimus, Tomas Nauclr, Dickon Pinner, Daan Walter, and Maaik

291、e Witteveen, “How the European Union could achieve net-zero emissions at net-zero cost,” McKinsey & Company, November 2020.44 Agricultural practices are also tied to forestry emissions, as much of deforestation is driven by expansion of agricultural land. See discussion on forestry elsewhere in the

292、report.32McKinsey & Companyenergy crops to produce biofuels. As a result of these shifts, the net-zero transition would result in about 34 million direct jobs lost (predominately due to diminished production of ruminantmeat) and 61 million gained (related in large part to increased production of ene

293、rgy cropsand poultry) by 2050. This net gain of about 27 million direct jobs due to the transition is about 4 percent of the 720 million or so direct agriculture jobs today. These job shifts need to be considered against a long-standing trend in the agricultural sector of workers shifting to nonfarm

294、 work in addition to productivity, population, and income growth. Through 2050, more than $60 billion of annual capital spending would be needed to enable more emissions-efficient farming. Such investment need not all be new funds; repurposing existing subsidies and spending could cover a substantia

295、l amount of this cost.45 Forestry and other land use. This system contributes to an increase in CO emissions today from land clearing and deforestation. Reaching net zero in this scenario would involve halting deforestation and accelerating efforts to restore forests and other natural environments t

296、o serve as a net sink of emissions. Making these changes would require capital spending of $40 billion per year between 2021 and 2050 in the scenario analyzed here, about 75 percent of which would be spent in the next decade, primarily on acquiring and protecting land. Reducing deforestation would a

297、lso require managing adjustments to both commercial and subsistence-level farming activity (a substantial portion of deforestation is driven by expansion of agricultural land).46 Opportunities for economic gain might come from voluntary carbon markets and industries based on ecosystem services.47 Ne

298、w energy sectors (hydrogen and biofuels). The expansion of low-emissions energy technologies will create opportunities. Expanding capacity and infrastructure for other low-carbon fuels would require additional capital spending of about $230 billion per year between 2021 and 2050, in the scenario ana

299、lyzed here. We estimate that the hydrogen and biofuel sectors would create approximately two million direct jobs by 2050.The transition would unevenly affect lower-income and fossil fuel resourceproducing countriesand low-income consumers everywhereOur in-depth analysis of 69 countries focuses on fo

300、ur areas that can collectively help define a climate agenda: decarbonization actions and investment; managing transition exposures; capturing transition opportunities; and addressing physical risks. As discussed previously, low-income households across countries and regions would be most affected by

301、 a net-zero transition. Moreover, our analysis suggests that while all countries face some exposure to the transition, its effects would be unevenly distributed. Regions with lower GDP per capita and those with greater fossil fuel resources would need to invest more, relative to GDP, to reduce their

302、 emissions, build a low-emissions economy, and support economic development. 45 For more information, see Incentivizing food systems transformation, World Economic Forum and McKinsey & Company, January 2020. For more on the agriculture and food sector, see Justin Ahmed, Elaine Almeida, Daniel Aminet

303、zah, NicolasDenis, Kimberly Henderson, Joshua Katz, Hannah Kitchel, and Peter Mannion, “Agriculture and climate change: Reducing emissions through improved farming practices,” McKinsey & Company, April 2020.46 The state of the worlds forests 2020: Forests, biodiversity, and people, FAO, 2020.47 See

304、“Valuing nature conservation,” McKinsey & Company, September 2020.33The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringThese countries also have relatively greater shares of their jobs, GDP, and capital stock in sectors that would be most exposed to the transition. And some of them will

305、 face a double burdenbeing exposed both to the transition adjustments and to rising physical risks.48 This could challenge progress on economic development goals in these regions, bolstering the case for global cooperation. At the same time, the transition could create potential for economic growth

306、in many geographies. To better understand exposure and opportunities, we take a closer look at the 69 countries in our sample by dividing them into six archetypes based on the distribution of their most significant exposure across sectors and households.To manage exposure, each country can consider

307、taking actions of its own, such as investing in assets, funding worker-retraining programs, and supporting the growth of low-emissions sectors. Some countries are likely to face more difficult economic and societal adjustments than others. Collective action and solidarity would therefore help countr

308、ies meet challenges and ensure that the economic and societal adjustments needed for the net-zero transition are addressed. Enabling institutions would likely play an essential role in coordinating any such efforts.Developing countries and those with large fossil fuel sectors would likely spend more

309、 on physical assets, relative to GDP, on decarbonization and low-carbon growthIn the NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario, every country and region would spend to reduce emissions and develop low-emissions energy sources to power their economic growth.49 Theneed for capital expenditures varies considerably a

310、cross geographies given differences in their economies, and their decarbonization trajectories vary in the NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario. The worlds largest economiesthe United States, China, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdomwould account for about half of global spend on physical asse

311、ts and would spend about 6 percent of their combined GDP from 2021 to 2050. In developing regions, spend on energy and land would form a substantially larger share of national GDP: about 10 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, India and some other Asian countries, and Latin America (Exhibit E10). For deve

312、loping countries, higher projected rates of economic growth naturally create higher investment needs relative to GDP than in developed countries.50 In our analysis of the NGFS Current Policies scenario, spending in India, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America would total more than 9 percent of GDP.

313、Spending would increase to some extent from these levels in the net-zero scenario analyzed here. For example, in the Net Zero 2050 scenario, Indias capital requirements would be 11 percent of GDP, compared to the global average of about 7.5 percent of GDP. It would moreover be spent differently than

314、 in the Current Policies case. Some 60 percent of annual average investments in India would be on low-emissions assets under current policies compared to 80 percent in the NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario. Much of that capital would be used to reduce the use of existing coal power and expand low-emission

315、s electricity capacity. 48 For example, India faces the double burden of transition exposure and elevated physical risks. Our previous research suggests that by 2030 in India, 160 million to 200 million people could be living in urban areas with a nonzero annual probability of experiencing a lethal

316、heat wave, in a scenario where no adaptation or mitigation measures are implemented. Will India get too hot to work? McKinsey Global Institute, November 2020.49 Our analysis looks at both individual countries and multicountry regions because the NGFS scenarios provide some decarbonization trajectori

317、es at the regional level and others at the national level.50 Sub-Saharan Africa and India, for example, are expected to see real GDP growth of about 45 percent per year on average over the next 30 years, compared with 3 percent growth for China and 12 percent growth for developed regions in the NGFS

318、 scenario examined here.34McKinsey & CompanyExhibit E10As a percentage of GDP, fossil fuelproducing regions and developing countries would spend more than others on physical assets for energy and land-use systems.1.Estimation includes spend for physical assets across various forms of energy supply (

319、for example, power systems, hydrogen, and biofuel supply), energy demand (eg, for vehicles), and land use. This includes both what are typically considered “investments” in national accounts and spend, in some cases, on consumer durables such as personal cars. Scenario based on the NGFS Net Zero 205

320、0 scenario using REMIND-MAgPIE (phase 2). Based on analysis of systems that account for 85% of overall carbon dioxide equivalent (COe) emissions today. Our analysis includes a more comprehensive view of spending by households and businesses on assets that use energy, capital expenditures in agricult

321、ure and forestry, and some continued spend in high-emissions physical assets like fossil fuelbased vehicles and power assets. For further details, see technical appendix. 2.Our analysis divides high-emissions assets from low-emissions assets. High-emissions assets include assets for fossil fuel extr

322、action and refining, as well as fossil fuel power production assets without CCS; fossil fuel heat production, gray-hydrogen production; steel BOF; cement fossil fuel kilns; ICE vehicles; fossil fuel heating and cooking equipment; dairy, monogastric, and ruminant meat production. Low-emissions assets

323、 and enabling infrastructure include assets for blue-hydrogen production with CCS; green-hydrogen production using electricity and biomass; biofuel production; generation of wind, solar, hydro-, geothermal, biomass, gas with CCS, and nuclear power along with transmission and distribution and storage

324、 infrastructure; heat production from low-emissions sources such as biomass; steel furnaces using EAF, DRI with hydrogen, basic oxygen furnaces with CCS; cement kilns with biomass or fossil fuel kilns with CCS; low-emissions vehicles and supporting infrastructure; heating equipment for buildings run

325、 on electricity or biomass, including heat pumps; district heating connections; cooking technology not based on fossil fuels; building insulation; GHG-efficient farming practices; food crops, poultry and egg production; and land restoration. See technical appendix.3. CIS refers to the Commonwealth o

326、f Independent States.4. Includes, among others, South Korea and Southeast Asia.5.Includes, among others, the 27 European Union countries, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.Note: Figures may not sum to 100% because of rounding. Spending on physical assets for energy and land-use sys

327、tems under NGFS Net Zero 2050 scenario,1% of 202150 GDP251002051510.87.5Japan21.0Sub-Saharan AfricaLatin AmericaRussia, Ukraine,and the CIS3Middle East and North AfricaIndiaOther Asia4Europe5United StatesAustralia, Canada,and New ZealandChina4.2The world16.36.210.89.49.26.56.45.2High-emissions asset

328、s2Low-emissions assetsand enabling infrastructure2Share of global spending, %Average share of regional GDP, %57281510018.09.85.9Source: Network for Greening the Financial System 2021 (Net Zero 2050 scenarios) REMIND-MAgPIE model; Vivid Economics; McKinsey Center for Future Mobility Electrification M

329、odel (2020); McKinsey Hydrogen Insights; McKinsey Power Solutions; McKinseyMission Possible Partnership collaboration; McKinsey Sustainability Insights; McKinsey Agriculture Practice; McKinsey Nature Analytics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis35The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it

330、could bringFossil fuelbased economies would also have substantial spend on physical assets as a share of their GDP: above 15 percent in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia, Ukraine, and Commonwealth of Independent States such as Kazakhstan. Much of this spending would be continued spending on f

331、ossil fuel assets in the near term. However, even these economies would allocate half or more of their spending to low-emissions assets under a net-zero transition.While the relative scale of the spending on physical assets is substantially higher for developing and fossil fuelbased economies, this

332、alone is not an indicator of how difficult it will be for these regions to reach a low-emissions economy. Indeed, as mentioned previously, much of this spend is to be expected as they grow their economies and increase energy access. However, specific aspects of their net-zero transition could make d

333、eploying capital challenging for these regions.First, developing regions might face challenges in accessing capital markets. This may be particularly acute as they look to invest in low-emissions technologies, which may be harder to finance and come with different risk-return expectations. Second, a

334、s mentioned above, existing high-emissions assets in these economies are still relatively young; thus there may be less incentive to undertake low-carbon capital spending amid concerns about stranded assets. Third, there may not always be sufficient know-how and capacity on the ground to implement p

335、rojects. Fourth, concerns of other socioeconomic consequences from a net-zero transition, for example, job dislocations, could exist. Finally, because the economies of these countries rely on emissions-intensive sectors, government tax revenues and public spending may be more constrained under a net

336、-zero transition.51 Developing countries and fossil fuelproducing regions have relatively large exposure to the transition, raising concerns about growth and inequality Beyond spending on decarbonizing their existing assets and building low-emissions assets, economies will also need to transform und

337、er a net-zero transition. We assessed each countrys exposure to the transition by measuring the proportion of employment, economic production, and physical capital stock in exposed sectors today. It is important to note that current efforts undertaken by countries could reduce this exposure going fo

338、rward.52 According to our analysis, all countries now have some exposure to the transitionand, as discussed earlier, low-income households everywhere would be most exposed to any cost increases that feed through to consumers. The highest levels of exposure are in countries with relatively lower GDP

339、per capita, such as Bangladesh, India, and Kenya. These tend to be countries with relatively higher shares of jobs, GDP, and capital stock in sectors that are more exposed to the transitionwhich is to say, sectors with emissions-intensive operations, products, and supply chains (Exhibit E11). Signif

340、icant fossil fuel resource production also creates high exposure for some countries, such as Qatar, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Secondary effects from direct exposure could also extend to government tax revenues and exports, which are often linked with exposed sectors like fossil fuel extraction or st

341、eel (see Box E6, “Potential implications of the net-zero transition for trade flows”). Bycontrast, countries with higher GDP per capita tend to be less exposed because a majorityof their economies are in service sectors, which have relatively lower exposure.51 Similar conclusions were also reached b

342、y the IEA. See for example Financing clean energy transitions in emerging and developing economies, International Energy Agency, June 2021.52 To gauge each national economys exposure to the transition, we calculated a score ranging from 0 (no exposure) to 100 (full exposure). The score reflects the

343、share of each economys employment (jobs), production activity (GDP), and capital stock in sectors that are most exposed to the effects of the transitionfor example, sectors with high emissions in their operations, in the use of their products, or in their supply chains. For details, see chapter 4 an

344、d the technical appendix.36McKinsey & CompanyThus, for many lower-income and fossil fuelproducing countries, challenges associated with climate change could compound. These countries would need to balance multiple imperatives: decarbonizing their economies and funding associated capital expenditures

345、, managing exposure of large parts of their economies to a net-zero transition, and enabling economic development and growth, particularly by expanding access to affordable, secure energy. And, as noted earlier, these challenges will be aggravated for some lower-income countries by heightened physic

346、al climate risk, such as the growing probability of lethal heat waves in parts of India.53 Inequity concerns would grow as an issue, particularly as developing economies argue that they have contributed less than others to emissions and yet are being asked to shoulder a large burden in the net-zero

347、transition. 53 Will India get too hot to work? McKinsey Global Institute, November 2020.1. For further details, see Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts, McKinsey Global Institute, January 2020.2. Based on average share of jobs, GDP, and capital stock in exposed sect

348、ors. These sectors are identifed based on their scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions intensity. For further details, see technical appendix.Source: Oxford Economics; OECD; ILO; World Input-Output Database; IHS Connect; World Bank; International Energy Agency; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; India NSS-Employme

349、nt survey; China National Bureau of Statistics; UN; International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA); MINSTAT; INDSTAT; Global Solar Atlas; Global Wind Atlas; US Geological Survey; WEF; McKinsey Nature Analytics; Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research; McKinsey Global Energy Perspectives; I

350、PCC; OECD; IHS Global; Penn World Tables; McKinsey Global Institute analysisGDP per capita, $ thousandTransition exposure score (0 = no exposure, 100 = fully exposed)HotterSignifcantlyhotter andmore humidHotter andmore humidIncreasedwater stressDiverse climateLower risk Circle size =populationin mil

351、lionsArchetype of physical risk1,20060020090303160402015cCorrelation coefcient, r = 0.69BangladeshNigeriaPakistanJapanSaudiArabiaSouth KoreaUnited ArabEmiratesNorwayAustraliaMexicoQatarIndonesiaKenyaIndiaSpainBrazilChinaUnited StatesCanadaFranceGermanyRussiaUnited KingdomExhibit E11Countries with lo

352、wer GDP per capita and fossil fuel resource producers have higher transition exposures.Archetype of physical risk1 through transition exposure vs GDP per capita by country2 (logarithmic scale)37The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringBox E61 See Risk, resilience, and rebalanc

353、ing in global value chains, McKinsey Global Institute, August 2020.2 Daniel Moran et al., The carbon loophole in climate policy: Quantifying the embodied carbon in traded products, ClimateWorks Foundation, August 2018.Potential implications of the net-zero transition for trade flows Value chains hav

354、e grown in length and complexity in recent decades, and global trade has increased. Since 2000, the value of intermediate goods traded globally has tripled to more than $10 trillion annually.1 Increasing production of goods for export tends to increase a countrys own carbon emissions since most manu

355、facturing still involves carbon-emitting processes or energy use. For example, other researchers have estimated that in some manufacturing sectors, such as chemicals, textiles, leather, and apparel, 30 to 65 percent of the emissions in China and India are induced by foreign final demand.2 Another wa

356、y to think about this phenomenon is to regard exported goods as having their production emissions embedded or embodied in them. A look at the emissions that are embodied in goods traded across borders reveals that considerable quantities of CO are, in effect, moved internationally every year (Exhibi

357、t E12). As demand for high-emissions goods falls and demand for low-emissions goods increases, trade flows might shift as countries comparative advantages change. For example, shifts in consumer preferences or the presence of carbon taxes or other regulatory measures could produce advantages for cou

358、ntries that make products with low emissions intensity. Countriescould also pursue opportunities to meet growing overseas demand for new kinds of low-emissions goods or emerging decarbonization technologies. In some cases, decarbonization could raise production costs, which could make exports from c

359、ountries that take decarbonization action less competitive. All of these factors could result in shifting trade patterns in sectors such as electric vehicles, solar panels, and minerals, and they would need to be systematically addressed. The outlook for global trade flows thus remains uncertain, an

360、d outcomes could depend on many factors, including how consumer preferences and regulation evolve and what opportunities different regions decide to pursue. Inmaking strategic decisions, businesses may want to account for the ongoing discussion among countries of whether to implement border-adjustme

361、nt taxes that price carbon emissions into the value of traded goods and account for developments in broader regulation, consumer preferences, and evolving markets. In some cases, markets may well go from global to local; for example, global energy markets for oil and gas could transform to more loca

362、l or regional markets for power or hydrogen. Forsome countries, the net-zero transition could also provide opportunities to grow domestic industries and reduce imports of commodities like fossil fuels.38McKinsey & CompanyNote: Calculations are based on consumption-based accounting of emissions (also

363、 called carbon footprints). Consumption-based accounting accounts for emissions associated with imported and exported goods and reports the total emissions associated with fnal demand in each country. Exhibit above shows fows of embodied CO from each origin/emitter country to each destination/consum

364、er country.Source: Eora global supply chain database; McKinsey Global Institute analysisItalyGermanyFranceUKSpainThailandMexicoJapanCanadaSouthKoreaRussiaIndiaUSChina627814912777310810864995378511189775464456916042105451846499537851118977546445691604210545184Exhibit E12Goods traded internationally r

365、epresent signifcant cross-border fows of embedded CO2 emissions.Largest interregional fows of carbon embodied in trade, 2021, metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent39The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringCountries can use natural endowments or technological, human, and ph

366、ysical resources to harness the transitions growth potential All countries have opportunities to tap into the transitions potential for growth and secure advantages, through their endowments of natural capital such as sunshine and wind and through the availability of technological, human, and physic

367、al capital.54Countries could benefit from the transition if they possess rich stocks of natural capital such as ample sunlight and wind, forestland, mineral resources, and CO sequestration potential (see Exhibit E13 for one example for solar and wind power potential, and chapter 4 for other examples

368、). Generally speaking, many developing countries have the natural resources to accommodate solar power production and forestry protection or restoration efforts, which could be supported by flows of capital through mechanisms such as voluntary carbon markets. And most countries, developing or otherw

369、ise, have at least some of the natural-capital endowments that would likely be in demand during the transition. For example, Australia and Saudi Arabia have extensive solar resources, Argentina and the United Kingdom have high wind power potential, and Chile and China have large reserves of minerals

370、. Some countries have already gained strong positions in the markets for sophisticated low-carbon goods, such as solar panels and EVs. Even so, these markets offer considerable growth potential, which should be accessible to countries with adequate technological capital. For example, South Korea has

371、 approximately 6,600 patents on technologies related to climate-change mitigation and human capital. Countries like China and Singapore have a high share of STEM graduates in the population, which provides an indication of the workforces technical skill. This in turn might be applied to developing s

372、olutions for the climate transition. A countrys physical capital, in the form of low-emissions infrastructure and industrial systems, could also create growth potential in a net-zero transition, for example, if consumers shift their preferences or carbon border taxes are applied. Even currently high

373、-emissions infrastructure could be a benefit if it can readily be retrofitted, for example, with alternate low-emissions fuel sources.54 For a more detailed list of potential endowments countries can tap into and data on the same, see chapter 4.All countries have opportunities to tap into the transi

374、tions potential for growth and secure advantages, through their endowments of natural capital such as sunshine and wind and through the availability of technological, human, and physical capital.40McKinsey & CompanyExhibit E13Countries could capture potential growth opportunities from the transition

375、 to net-zero emissions: Renewable power example.Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by McKinsey & Company.Source: Global Solar Atlas; Global Wind Atlas; McKinsey Global Institute analysis1.Calculated as the power output achievable by a typ

376、ical configuration of the utility scale PV system, taking into account GHI (global horizontal irradiation, or the total solar radiation that reaches a horizontal surface), the air temperature affecting the system performance, the system configuration, shading and soiling, and topographic and land-us

377、e constraints. 2.Calculated by downscaling large-scale forecasting data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. These data are then entered into the DTU Wind Energy modeling system to model local wind climates for a 250m grid across the globe.6.4Mean wind power density of 10% wi

378、ndiest areas at 100m height, watt per square meter1,300Average theoretical solar potential,1kilowatt-hour per square meter per day41The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringWe identify six main archetypes of countries, based on the common nature of their transition exposureTo

379、help illustrate how the net-zero transition might play out differentially across the globe, we have defined six archetypes of countries according to the nature and magnitude of their exposure across sectors and households. We use sector exposure to define country archetypes as a way to highlight the

380、 distinct economic and societal adjustments that countries may need to make under a net-zero transition, while noting that countries will face myriad specific issues that are not reducible to a single archetype. In each case, we also describe endowments that countries possess to help them capture tr

381、ansition opportunities, as well as their exposure to physical risks, where relevant. (See Exhibit E14 for the archetypes based on transition exposure and chapter 4 for further detail related to opportunities for countries to benefit from the transition and their physical risk exposure.)55 The follow

382、ing are the six archetypes:Fossil fuel resource producers. Countries in this category include Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Fossil fuel resourceproducing sectors account for a significant portio

383、n of GDP in these countries, ranging from 3 percent in Australia to 39 percent in Kuwait, and a large share of physical capitalan average of about 15 percent compared to 2 percent in the rest of the countries. The magnitude of exposure varies among countries in this grouping. For example, Saudi Arab

384、ia has about 25 percent of its GDP in fossil fuelproducing sectors, and Qatar has about one-third of its GDP and its capital stock in those sectors. Thatcompares with about 3 percent of GDP and 13 percent of capital stock in Australia. Forthe countries with higher shares in particular, various chall

385、enges could exist: the potential loss of government revenues from exposed sectors, the reallocation of capital spending from high- to low-emissions assets, and the potential need to diversify their economies. Many countries could also experience rising physical risks; countries in this grouping that

386、 are near the equator will become hotter and more humid as warming increases. At the same time, a net-zero transition offers opportunities that these countries can tap into, though capturing them and sufficiently compensating for loss in revenues and exports could also come with challenges. They gen

387、erally have high solar power or wind power potential, which they could use to develop capacity for renewable-energy generation and make green hydrogen. Somefossil fuel producers, for example those in the Middle East, also have relatively low levels of carbon intensity associated with their oil and g

388、as extraction and have relatively lowercosts; thus, they could be the last standing providers of the remaining fossil fuels needed in anet-zero economy, in the scenario modeled here. Emissions-intensive producers. Countries in this category include Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sout

389、h Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam. These countries derive sizable portions of their GDP, about 18 percent on average, from highly exposed sectors such as high-emissions manufacturing, fossil fuelbased power, and agriculture. Jobstend to be concentrated in agriculture (more than 20 per

390、cent), while much of their capital stock is in manufacturing and fossil fuelbased power. These countries would likely adjust to the transition mainly by decarbonizing industrial processes, expanding renewable-power capacity, and helping farmers adopt low-carbon practices or transition away from agri

391、culture. As discussed above, many of these countries will need to make substantial investment to decarbonize their economies and secure low-carbon growth. Ouranalysis suggests that these countries face a particular risk of asset stranding. Capital stock in these countries (coal-fired power plants, f

392、or example) is often newer than in advanced economies. Theaverage age of coal power plants in China and India is less than 15 years, compared with more than 30 in the United States.56 Lower-income countries may also find that some low-carbon technologies (for example, electric-arc furnaces for steel

393、 production and CCS equipment for steel or cement factories) remain too expensive to deploy or, in some cases, unready for large-scale deployment. 55 Climate risk and response: Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts, McKinsey Global Institute, January 2020.56 See World Energy Outlook 2021, Inter

394、national Energy Agency, December 2021.42McKinsey & CompanyWithout careful planning, however, they run the risk that continued spending on lower-cost, high-emissions assets could result in the need to prematurely retire or reduce utilization of these assets after only a few years as the world transit

395、ions to a net-zero path. At the same time, these countries will have potential to serve the growing markets for low-emissions goods. Asian countriesmany of which are included in this archetypemore broadly possess resources that could be conducive to low-emissions innovation.57 Capital spending for t

396、he transition would need to be complemented by investment in adaptation measures, since many countries in this archetype would become hotter, more humid, and more prone to flooding as warming increases.Agriculture-based economies. Countries in this group include Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, the Philippine

397、s, Senegal, and Sri Lanka. Agriculture is the primary source of employment and income for a large share of the population in these countries, accounting for up to about 55 percent of jobs and up to about 30 percent of GDP. An important adjustment for these countries will be adopting low-emissions fa

398、rming practices, which would require mobilizing millions of stakeholders. As discussed above, many of these countries are expected to invest substantially in new assets as they grow their economies, particularly related to the power sector; securing financing would thus be a key priority under a net

399、-zero transition. These countries also have significant potential to produce solar power and use forestland to generate carbon credits.58 Almost all of these countries are exposed to physical climate risk because rising heat and humidity affect their agricultural workforces, and also increase volati

400、lity of agricultural yields. Land-use-intensive countries. This group includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.59 In these countries, which have generally reached the early or middle stages of industrialization, the agri

401、culture and forestry sectors together represent significant shares of GDP (more than 5 percent), jobs (more than 10 percent), and capital stock (more than 5 percent). Theywould have to balance land-use needs with protection of forests and would have to support communities whose livelihoods depend on

402、 them. The contribution of other sectors such as fossil fuel production, power, and industry to GDP, jobs, and capital stock is also sizable for some countries in the archetype, like Brazil, which could also therefore be exposed to issues described for other archetypes. With their stocks of natural

403、capital, these countries would have growth potential in sectors such as renewable energy, minerals needed for the transition, and forest management; reforestation and afforestation projects could generate valuable carbon credits and ecosystem services.Downstream-emissions manufacturers. Countries in

404、 this group include Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, and Sweden. The main exposure for these middle-to-high-income countries relates to the manufacturing of goods, such as automobiles and industrial machinery, that cou

405、ld experience falling demand in their current form because they use fossil fuelbased energy. Countries in this category could manage their exposure to shifts in demand for these products by reinventing products and supply chains. Many make large investments in R&D, which position them well to develo

406、p and commercialize low-emissions technologies. 57 See Climate risk and response in Asia, McKinsey Global Institute, November 2020.58 For additional opportunities for African countries, see also Lynn Bouchene, Ziyad Cassim, Hauke Engel, Kartik Jayaran, and Adam Kendall, “Green Africa: A growth and r

407、esilience agenda for the continent,” McKinsey & Company, October28,2021.59 As described above, countries could fall into multiple archetypes. A large share of the economy of Brazil, for example, is related to fossil fuels, and would also be exposed to the types of issues described for that archetype

408、.43The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringExhibit E14Countries transition exposure by archetype, scoreBased on the nature of their exposure to the net-zero transition, countries can be grouped into six archetypes. (1 of 2)Area of exposure most relevant to archetypeLowHighSou

409、rce: Oxford Economics; OECD; ILO; World Input-Output Database; IHS Connect; World Bank; International Energy Agency; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; India NSS-Employment survey; China National Bureau of Statistics; MINSTAT; INDSTAT; McKinsey Global Institute analysis1.Averages rows within each archet

410、ype are based on a simple average of every country within that archetype, both those shown in rows and other countries in the archetype. For fossil-fuel producers, other countries include Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, UAE, and Venezuela; for emissions-intensive producers, Banglade

411、sh, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey; for agriculture-based economies, Morocco and the Philippines; for land-use-intensive countries, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Malaysia, Panama, and Uruguay; for downstream emissions manufacturers, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech R

412、epublic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden; and for services-based economies, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland.2.Simple average of the share of GDP, jobs, and capital stock in the sectors with highest exposure to

413、 the net-zero transition.Note: Colors in each column based on relative quartiles within each column rather than across columns. Countries are allocated to an archetype to illustrate specific transition exposures they may experience. However, any given countryespecially those with large diversified e

414、conomiescould face some of the exposures highlighted for other archetypes. Low = below 1st quartile; high = above 3rd quartile. For exposed sectors included, see technical appendix.Transition exposure archetypesExample countries1Transition exposure score2Producers of fossil fuel energy2Fossil fuelde

415、pendent products2Emitters in core operationsUsers of inputs from emitters2Household scope 1 emissions per capitaPower and industry2Mobility2Agriculture, forestry, and other land use2Fossil fuel resource producersQatarNigeriaSaudi ArabiaRussiaCanadaAverageEmissions-intensive producersVietnamIndiaChin

416、aUkraineIndonesiaAverageAgriculture-based economiesKenyaGhanaSri LankaSenegalAverage44McKinsey & CompanyExhibit E16Countries transition exposure by archetype, scoreTransition exposure archetypesExample countries1Transition exposure score2Producers of fossil fuel energy2Fossil fueldependent products2

417、Emitters in core operationsUsers of inputs from emitters2Household scope 1 emissions per capitaPower and industry2Mobility2Agriculture, forestry, and other land use2Land-use-intensive countriesPeruBrazilArgentinaAverageDown-stream-emissions manu-facturersMexicoSouth KoreaJapanGermanyAverageServices-

418、based economiesNew ZealandGreeceUnited KingdomUnited StatesFranceAverageBased on the nature of their exposure to the net-zero transition, countries can be grouped into six archetypes. (2 of 2)Area of exposure most relevant to archetypeLowHighSource: Oxford Economics; OECD; ILO; World Input-Output Da

419、tabase; IHS Connect; World Bank; International Energy Agency; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; India NSS-Employment survey; China National Bureau of Statistics; MINSTAT; INDSTAT; McKinsey Global Institute analysis1.Averages rows within each archetype are based on a simple average of every country with

420、in that archetype, both those shown in rows and other countries in the archetype. For fossil-fuel producers, other countries include Australia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Norway, Oman, UAE, and Venezuela; for emissions-intensive producers, Bangladesh, Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey; for a

421、griculture-based economies, Morocco and the Philippines; for land-use-intensive countries, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Malaysia, Panama, and Uruguay; for downstream emissions manufacturers, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and

422、 Sweden; and for services-based economies, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland.2.Simple average of the share of GDP, jobs, and capital stock in the sectors with highest exposure to the net-zero transition.Note: Colors in each column ba

423、sed on relative quartiles within each column rather than across columns. Countries are allocated to an archetype to illustrate specific transition exposures they may experience. However, any given countryespecially those with large diversified economiescould face some of the exposures highlighted fo

424、r other archetypes. Low = below 1st quartile; high = above 3rd quartile. For exposed sectors included, see technical appendix.Exhibit E14 (continued)45The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringServices-based economies. Countries in this group include Belgium, Denmark, Finland,

425、France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries have high GDP per capita and derive most of their economic output from service sectors, so their overall exposure to net-zero transition

426、adjustments is low. However, in certain regions and sectors, exposure could be high. These countries also tend to have high consumer emissions1.6 tons per capita on average, compared to 0.9 tons per capita on average for other countriesand will therefore need to induce behavioral changes in their po

427、pulations and incur up-front capital costs in order to decarbonize (although, as discussed previously, this could come with long-term benefits, such as lower total cost of ownership). These countries could use their ample natural, technological, and human capital to develop new low-emissions industr

428、ies or provide services, such as financial or information services, in support of the transition. Stakeholders will need to act with singular unity, resolve, and ingenuity, and toward equitable, long-term outcomes to support the economic transformation a net-zero transition entails The transition to

429、 net zero we have outlined in this report will require economies and societies to make significant adjustments. Many of these adjustments can be best supported through coordinated action involving governments, businesses, and enabling institutions, and by extending planning and investment horizons.

430、This action would need to be taken in a spirit of unity for two key reasons: first, the universal nature of the transition means that all stakeholders will need to play a role. Every country and sector contributes to emissions, either directly or indirectly, through its role in global production and

431、 consumption systems. Second,the burdens of the transition will not be evenly felt, and, for some stakeholders, the costs will be much more difficult to bear than for others. This is all the more challenging because contributions to emissions have not been even across stakeholder groups. Thus,withou

432、t a real effort to address these effects in a spirit of fairness, it appears unlikely that the most affected stakeholders would be either able or willing to do their share to advance the transition.Challenges could compound for many lower-income and fossil fuelproducing countries, which would need t

433、o balance multiple imperatives.46McKinsey & CompanyThe following three categories of action stand out:60 Catalyzing effective capital reallocation and new financing structures, including through scaling up climate finance, developing new financial instruments and markets, including voluntary carbon

434、markets, deploying collaborations across the public and private sectors, and managing risk to stranded assets Managing demand shifts and near-term unit cost increases for sectors through building awareness and transparency around climate risks and opportunities, lowering technology costs with R&D, n

435、urturing industrial ecosystems, collaboration across value chains to reduce or pass through cost increases from the transition, and sending the right demand signals and creating incentives for the transition Establishing compensating mechanisms to address socioeconomic impacts, through economic dive

436、rsification programs, reskilling and redeployment programs for affected workers, and social support schemesAs these actions are undertaken, individual leaders will need to both consider risks and opportunities to their organizations and to their stakeholders, and determine the role they can play in

437、supporting the necessary adjustments for all. We consider more detailed actions and the role of stakeholders below.Companies can consider integrating climate considerations into their strategies and their decision-making frameworks. Companies have begun to develop comprehensive plans for achieving n

438、et-zero emissions and to integrate those plans into their strategies, combining elements of what might be called “offense” (such as entering new markets, funding R&D, and participating in innovation ecosystems) and “defense” (divesting businesses and retrofitting high-emissions assets to lower their

439、 emissions).61 As they embark on this journey, they can consider the following steps: Articulate and communicate a coherent case for change and upskill employees to help drive their organizations toward net-zero goals while also supporting broader economic and societal adjustments. As they initiate

440、action, most CEOs will want to communicate a coherent case for change and take visible ownership of the sustainability agenda. Develop ongoing capabilities to make granular, holistic, and dynamic assessments of transition-related risks and opportunities in order to capture shifts in regulations, inv

441、estor preferences, consumer behaviors, and competition. To stay abreast of new developments and emerging possibilities, organizations are likely to need new capabilities, data, infrastructure, and talent. A key part of this will also be better tracking of scope 1, 2, and 3emissions, including throug

442、h the use of digital tools to increase transparency of emissions in companies own operations and in their supply chains. 60 The actions described in this section specifically relate to the economic and societal adjustments needed for the transition, given the scope of this research. An effective res

443、ponse to climate change, we believe, will involve not only making economic and societal adjustments to deal with the effects of the net-zero transition, but also meeting the other fundamental requirements described previously. We identify seven categories of actions. Leaders can understand and commi

444、t to the transition, including understanding the fundamentals of climate science and the transition and making personal and professional commitments; assess and plan their actions, including through building risk assessment capabilities and establishing decarbonization plans; reduce and remove emiss

445、ions in accordance with these plans; conserve and regenerate natural capital to support decarbonization; adapt and build resilience to manage the physical risk that is already locked in; and reconfigure and grow, for example by reallocating capital and ramping down high-carbon businesses while scali

446、ng low-carbon ones; and seek to engage and influence their communities, across their investors, customers, suppliers, peers, and regulators. While the actions described in this section are specific to the economic and societal adjustments needed for the transition, they fall into the various categor

447、ies listed above. See Mekala Krishnan, Tomas Nauclr, Daniel Pacthod, Dickon Pinner, Hamid Samandari, Sven Smit, and Humayun Tai. “Solving the net-zero equation: Nine requirements for a more orderly transition,” McKinsey & Company, October 2021.61 Daniel Pacthod and Dickon Pinner, “Time is running ou

448、t for business leaders who dont have a net zero strategy,” Fortune, April 22, 2021.47The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bring Define decarbonization and offsetting plans and update them as competitive, financial, and regulatory conditions change. This would include scope 1 an

449、d 2 emissions (with priority given to “no regret” actions such as improving energy efficiency and making decarbonization investment with positive returns). Where feasible, needed, and material, and depending on the nature of their operations, businesses can expand these plans to include scope 3 emis

450、sions.62 Create a portfolio of agile business strategies consistent with these decarbonization plans and with the risks and opportunities emerging in a net-zero economy. They can then put these plans in place as conditions change and opportunities arise. For companies, repositioning themselves could

451、 involve investing in new physical assets and reallocating capital, redesigning products, or building new low-emissions businesses. Integrate climate-related factors into key business decisions for strategy, risk management, finance and capital planning, R&D, operations (including supplier managemen

452、t and procurement), organizational structure and talent management, pricing, marketing, and investor and government relations. Consider if and where to take a leadership position in the companys industry and its ecosystem of investors, supply chains, customers, and regulators. Financial institutions

453、 can support large-scale capital reallocation, even as they manage their individual risks and opportunities. In the near term, they will need to consider assessing and disclosing their risks and measuring and committing to reduce their financed emissions. Over time, they will need to translate these

454、 commitments into actions that lower emissions. Relevant practices for financial institutions to consider include the following: Rethinking conventions for risks and returns. Some decarbonization projects are likely to have longer-than-normal payback periods. This possibility may compel financial in

455、stitutions to adjust their criteria for which projects they finance. Assessing and disclosing climate risks. For example, various regulators and supervisors already require banks to conduct climate-risk assessments, and more are planning to start these assessments. Measuring and reducing financed em

456、issions. Financial institutions are increasingly making pledges to align their portfolios with 1.5C or 2.0C warming targets or to achieve net-zero financed emissions by a certain date. They have started translating these commitments into targets for sectors and geographies. Given that emissions ulti

457、mately are from counterparties, financial institutions may find it helpful to support the transition plans of those counterpartiesfor instance, by offering new financial solutions, advising them on emissions-abatement methods, and introducing partnership opportunities. Over time, translating these c

458、ommitments into actions that lower emissions, including expanding the range of climate-finance products and services (for example, funding for low-emissions power projects, new financial instruments to support negative emissions or nature-based solutions, and well-governed voluntary carbon markets).

459、6362 For purposes of this report, “scope 1” emissions are direct greenhouse emissions that occur from sources that are controlled or owned by an organization; “scope 2” emissions are associated with the purchase of electricity, steam, heat, or cooling. “Scope 3” emissions are the result of activitie

460、s from assets not owned or controlled by the reporting organization but that the organization indirectly impacts in its value chain; thus “scope 3” emissions result from emissions across an organizations value chain that are not within the organizations scope 1 and 2 boundary. See Greenhouse gases a

461、t EPA, United States Environmental Protection Agency.63 Voluntary carbon markets would include markets for avoidance credits (for example, to prevent forests from being cut down) and for removal credits (for example, from afforestation or direct air capture). For further details, see Final report, T

462、askforce on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets, January 2021.48McKinsey & CompanyGovernments and multilateral institutions could consider the use of existing and new policy, fiscal, and regulatory tools to establish incentives, support vulnerable stakeholders, and foster collective action. Public-sect

463、or organizations have a unique role in managing uneven effects on sectors and communities. Among other options, they could consider the following: Assess exposure to risks and opportunities, develop decarbonization plans, and create net-zero strategies (similar to businesses). This would include gov

464、ernments bringing climate considerations into decisions about such matters as urban planning, infrastructure development, and tax and subsidy regimes in an effort to anticipate future dynamics, as well as efforts to increase awareness of and transparency about climate risks and opportunities. One ma

465、jor adjustment that governments may need to make is developing new low-emissions industries as demand wanes for fossil fuels and emissions-intensive industries. Use policy measures and regulation to encourage decarbonization investment across sectors (for example, consider where and how to best use

466、subsidies, grants, demand signals, and carbon taxes, to name a few). They can also play a role in accelerating research and development that would lower technology costs. Governments could establish multilateral and government funds to support low-carbon investment, and manage stranded-asset risk. I

467、nstitute reskilling, redeployment, and social-support programs for workers and manage negative effects on lower-income households. Collaborate with other stakeholders to drive collective action. For example, governments can catalyze private-sector action to build new low-emissions industries in vari

468、ous ways; strategies might include setting road maps and convening stakeholders. Enabling institutions such as standard setters, industry groups, and civil-society coalitions will be critical in coordinating action across sectors and geographies. Although individual actions by companies and governme

469、nts can support a wide range of stakeholders during the transition, these actions may not be enough to meet all stakeholder needs. The pace and scale of the transition mean that many of todays institutions may need to be revamped, and new institutions created to disseminate knowledge, support capita

470、l deployment, manage uneven effects, and organize collective action. Enabling institutions could play valuable roles in developing and enforcing governing standards, tracking and market mechanisms (for example, related to the measurement of emissions or climate finance), convening stakeholders and f

471、acilitating collaboration (for example, to arrange collective investment or organize the build-out of infrastructure), and giving a voice to vulnerable workers and communities. As they initiate action, most CEOs will want to communicate a coherent case for change and take visible ownership of the su

472、stainability agenda.49The net-zero transition: What it would cost, what it could bringIndividuals will need to manage their own exposure to the transition and can play powerful roles as consumers and citizens. They can begin by continuing to learn about the effects of both ongoing climate change and

473、 the net-zero transition that they may experience as consumers or workers. The goal of net-zero emissions can only be reached if people adopt new behaviors and consumption patterns, such as switching to electric vehicles, and renovating or retrofitting homes for energy efficiency. Civic discourse ha

474、s an important role to play: an informed, engaged public that recognizes the imperative for a net-zero transition could spur decisive and transformative action on the part of government and business leaders. The economic transformation required to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 will be massive i

475、n scale and complex in execution. The transition would bring substantial shifts in demand, capital allocation, costs, and jobs, which will be challenging to a wide range of stakeholders, not least because they will be distributed unevenly. Yet the costs and dislocations that would result from a more

476、 disorderly transition to net-zero emissions would likely be far greater, and the transition would prevent the further buildup of physical risks. The findings of this research serve as a clear call for more thoughtful and decisive action, taken with the utmost urgency, to secure a more orderly trans

477、ition to net zero by 2050. It is important not to view the transition as only onerous; the required economic transformation will not only create immediate economic opportunities but also open up the prospect of a fundamentally transformed global economy with lower energy costs, and numerous other be

478、nefitsfor example, improved health outcomes and enhanced conservation of natural capital. Actions by individual companies and governments, along with coordinated action to support more vulnerable sectors, geographies, and communities, could help support the needed economic and societal adjustments.

479、Moreover, the level of global cooperation that such a transition will ultimately require could serve as both a model and a basis for solving a broader array of global challenges. Daunting as the task may seem, it is fair to assume that human ingenuity would ultimately rise to the challenge of achiev

480、ing net zero, just as it has solved other seemingly intractable problems over the past 10,000 years. The key issue is whether the world can muster the requisite boldness and resolve to broaden its response during the upcoming decade, which will, in all likelihood, decide the nature of the transition

481、. It is important not to view the transition as only onerous; the required economic transformation will not only create immediate economic opportunities but also open up the prospect of a fundamentally transformed global economy with lower energy costs, and numerous other benefits.50McKinsey & Company