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1、On the Road to Net ZeroASEAN+3REGIONALECONOMIC OUTLOOK2023This report is produced by the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office(AMRO)for the use of AMRO members.It has been reviewed and approved for publication by the Executive Committee of AMRO.Any interpretations or conclusions expressed are not ne
2、cessarily those of AMRO members.By making any designation of or reference to a particular terri-tory or geographical area,or by using the term“member”or“country”in this report,AMRO does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.Nothing herein shall con
3、stitute or be considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of AMRO,all of which are specifically reserved.The factual information covers data for the period up to 28 February 2023,except when stated otherwise.2023 ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office ISSN:2529-7538P
4、rinted in SingaporeASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office10 Shenton Way,#15-08 MAS Building Singapore 079117 enquiryamro-asia.orgwww.amro-asia.orgiiASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Table of ContentsForewordAcknowledgments AbbreviationsChapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges HighlightsI.
5、Recent Developments and OutlookA Bumpy Transition to the“New Normal”Domestic Demand Leads the WayExports Face HeadwindsA Partial Labor Market RecoveryHigh(er)InflationHere to Stay?Credit Growth SlowsFinancial Markets SeesawII.Risks to the OutlookIII.AMRO Staff Macroeconomic Forecasts for 202324IV.Po
6、licy ConsiderationsPolicy SpacePolicy PositionsAppendix:Selected Key Macroeconomic and Financial IndicatorsReferencesChapter 2.On the Road to Net ZeroHighlightsI.IntroductionII.Out with the Old:Macroeconomic Implications of Moving Away from Fossil FuelsWill Inflation Go Up?Will Exports Suffer?What a
7、bout Stranded Assets?Will Economic Growth Be Stunted?III.In with the New:Growth Opportunities of Moving Towards Carbon NeutralityClean EnergyElectric VehiclesEnergy StorageCritical MineralsCarbon Capture,Utilization,and StorageCarbon OffsetsIV.(How)Can Finance Pave the Way?Green FinanceTransition Fi
8、nanceV.Summary and Policy ImplicationsReferencesixxxi123381122232426293335354248505253545860697578828294101104106110115116120122125ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023iiiBoxesBox 1.1Living with COVID-19:The Long and Winding Road for the Plus-3 Economies5Box 1.2Chipping Away at Chinas Advance:How W
9、ill US Trade Restrictions Affect ASEAN+3s Semiconductor Sector?16Box 1.3The Return of Travel and Tourism19Box 1.4Tug of War:Rising Geopolitical Risks and ASEAN+331Box 1.5Fiscal Stress in ASEAN+337Box 1.6Monetary Policy Frameworks in ASEAN+341Box 1.7Fiscal Policy in the Medium Term44Box 2.1ASEAN+3 Mi
10、tigation Targets under the Paris Agreement57Box 2.2Carbon Taxes in Japan and Singapore64Box 2.3Emissions Trading Schemes in the Plus-366Box 2.4What Will the European Unions Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Mean for ASEAN+3 Exports?72Box 2.5Vietnams Solar Energy Boom87Box 2.6(Hydro)Powering Lao PDR
11、s Energy Trade89Box 2.7Chinas Electric Vehicle Leapfrog99Box 2.8Carbon Offsets:From Kyoto to Paris113Box 2.9Monetizing ASEANs Forests114Annex.Developments in ASEAN+3 Economies Brunei DarussalamCambodiaChinaHong Kong,ChinaIndonesiaJapanKoreaLao PDRMalaysiaMyanmarThe PhilippinesSingaporeThailandVietna
12、m132133136139142145148151154157160163166169172ivASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023FiguresFigure 1.1.United States and Euro Area:Real GDP Growth and Headline Inflation3Figure 1.2.Selected ASEAN+3:Real GDP Growth3Figure 1.3.ASEAN+3:Daily COVID-19 Cases4Figure 1.4.ASEAN+3:Business Cycle Positions,2
13、0234Figure 1.5.Selected ASEAN+3:Aggregate Real GDP Growth,by Expenditure Category8Figure 1.6.Selected ASEAN+3:Real Private Consumption Growth and Contribution to GDP Growth9Figure 1.7.Selected ASEAN+3:Mobility Outside the Residence9Figure 1.8.Selected ASEAN+3:Retail Sales Growth10Figure 1.9.Selected
14、 ASEAN+3:Services Sales Growth10Figure 1.10.Selected ASEAN+3:Real and Nominal Wages10Figure 1.11.Selected ASEAN+3:Consumer Confidence10Figure 1.12.Selected ASEAN+3:Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Contribution to GDP Growth10Figure 1.13.Selected ASEAN+3:Growth of Credit to Private Nonfinancial
15、 Corporations10Figure 1.14.World:Semiconductor Billings,Trade Volume,and Electronics New Orders11Figure 1.15.China:Fixed Asset Investment,by Sector11Figure 1.16.Selected ASEAN+3:Business Investment Prospects11Figure 1.17.ASEAN+3:Goods Export Growth12Figure 1.18.Selected ASEAN+3:Goods and Services Ex
16、port Growth13Figure 1.19.World and Selected ASEAN+3:Global Supply Chain Pressure and Manufacturing Price Indices13Figure 1.20.Selected ASEAN+3:Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index13Figure 1.21.Selected ASEAN+3:Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Indices,by Component13Figure 1.22.ASEAN+3:Growth in E
17、xports of Services,by Category14Figure 1.23.Selected ASEAN+3:Foreign Direct Investment14Figure 1.24.Selected ASEAN+3:Foreign Direct Investment,by Regional Grouping14Figure 1.25.ASEAN+3:Aggregate Inward FDI Announcements14Figure 1.26.ASEAN+3:Aggregate Inward FDI Announcements,by Regional Grouping14Fi
18、gure 1.27.ASEAN+3:Aggregate Inward FDI Announcements,by Sector15Figure 1.28.Selected ASEAN+3:Change in Employment from Q4 2019,by Industry22Figure 1.29.Selected ASEAN+3:Nominal Wages,by Economy22Figure 1.30.Selected ASEAN+3:Labor Force Participation Rate23Figure 1.31.Selected ASEAN+3:Employment Leve
19、l23Figure 1.32.Selected ASEAN+3:Unemployment Rate23Figure 1.33.ASEAN+3:Consumer Price Inflation24Figure 1.34.World:Commodity Prices24Figure 1.35.Selected ASEAN+3:Growth in Credit to Private Nonfinancial Sector25Figure 1.36.Selected ASEAN+3:Banking Sector Nonperforming Loan Ratios25Figure 1.37.ASEAN+
20、3:Reported and Estimated“Hidden”Corporate and Household Nonperforming Loan Ratios,as of Q3 202226Figure 1.38.Selected ASEAN+3:Nonresident Portfolio Investment,Q1Q3 202226Figure 1.39.ASEAN+3:Exchange Rates27Figure 1.40.ASEAN+3:Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves28Figure 1.41.ASEAN+3:Adequacy of Foreign C
21、urrency Reserves28Figure 1.42.ASEAN+3:Reserve Assets28Figure 1.43.ASEAN-4 and Korea:Capital Flows at Risk29Figure 1.44.Regional Risk Map,March 202330Figure 1.45.ASEAN+3:GDP Growth Forecasts under AMRO Staff Scenarios 34ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023vFigure 1.46.ASEAN+3:Projected GDP Growth R
22、anges,202324 35Figure 1.47.ASEAN+3:Fiscal Balances42Figure 1.48.Selected ASEAN+3:Contribution to the Change in Fiscal Balance,FY202343Figure 1.49.Selected ASEAN+3:Fiscal Impulse,FY202343Figure 1.50.Selected ASEAN+3,United States and Euro Area:Policy Interest Rates46Figure 1.51.Selected ASEAN+3:Headl
23、ine Consumer Price Inflation46Figure 2.1.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Greenhouse Gas and Carbon Dioxide Emissions54Figure 2.2.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Greenhouse Gas and Carbon Dioxide Emissions per Capita55Figure 2.3.ASEAN+3:Net Zero Targets55Figure 2.4.ASEAN+3 and World:Carbon Dioxide Emis
24、sions,by Sector,201958Figure 2.5.ASEAN+3 and World:Carbon Dioxide Emissions,by Energy Subsector,201958Figure 2.6.Selected ASEAN+3 and World:Share of Fossil Fuels in Primary Energy Consumption,202159Figure 2.7.ASEAN+3 and World:Carbon Intensity of Energy Mix,202159Figure 2.8.Selected ASEAN+3:Fossil F
25、uel Subsidies,202160Figure 2.9.Selected Economies:Carbon Prices,202262Figure 2.10.Selected ASEAN+3:Inflation Projections under Transition Scenarios63Figure 2.11.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade,201870Figure 2.12.Selected Economies:Carbon Pricing
26、,202170Figure 2.13.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Emissions Intensity,201971Figure 2.14.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Degree of Exposure to Stranded-Asset Risk,201976Figure 2.15.ASEAN+3:Fossil Fuel Exports,20202176Figure 2.16.ASEAN+3:Power Generation from Fossil Fuels and Emissions Intensity76Figur
27、e 2.17.World:Unextractable Fossil Fuel Reserves to Limit Global Warming by 205076Figure 2.18.Selected ASEAN+3:Fossil Fuel Rents by Fuel Type,202077Figure 2.19.Selected Economies:Embedded Emissions in Fossil Fuel Reserves of Listed Companies,202277Figure 2.20.ASEAN+3:Bank Exposure to Transition Risks
28、,202177Figure 2.21.ASEAN+3:Primary Energy Consumption versus GDP Per Capita80Figure 2.22.ASEAN+3:Energy Intensity of GDP81Figure 2.23.Selected Economies:Projected Energy Supply and Energy Mix81Figure 2.24.ASEAN+3:Renewable Net Capacity Additions84Figure 2.25.World:Levelized Costs of Electricity,by S
29、elected Technology85Figure 2.26.ASEAN+3:Renewable Electricity Generation85Figure 2.27.ASEAN+3:Renewable Energy Installed Capacity,202185Figure 2.28.ASEAN+3:Renewable Technology Mix85Figure 2.29.ASEAN+3:Implied Compound Annual Growth Rate of Renewables Share to Achieve Announced Target85Figure 2.30.W
30、orld:Top 15 Exporters of Solar and Wind Energy Products,20202186Figure 2.31.World:Operational Nuclear Capacity,202191Figure 2.32.Selected Economies:Share of Nuclear Power in Electricity Generation,202191Figure 2.33.Japan and Korea:Cumulative Carbon Emissions Avoided by Nuclear Power Since 199091Figu
31、re 2.34.Selected ASEAN+3:Readiness for Advanced Nuclear Development,202292Figure 2.35.Selected ASEAN:Public Support for Nuclear Energy Development,201892Figure 2.36.World:Top Ten Exporters of Nuclear Reactors,202192Figure 2.37.Hydrogen Energy Technologies93Figure 2.38.ASEAN+3:Operational Projects fo
32、r Clean Hydrogen,by Technology Type,as of October 202293Figure 2.39.ASEAN+3:Upcoming Projects for Clean Hydrogen,as of October 202294Figure 2.40.Electric Vehicles,Electrified Vehicles,and Zero-Emission Vehicles95viASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Figure 2.41.ASEAN+3:Carbon Emissions from Transp
33、ort96Figure 2.42.ASEAN+3:Number of Motor Vehicles96Figure 2.43.World:Electric Vehicle Stocks and Sales,by Economy96Figure 2.44.Selected Economies:Electric Car Registrations and Sales96Figure 2.45.Selected ASEAN:Electric Vehicle Adoption Rate,202196Figure 2.46.ASEAN-6:Powertrain Preferences,September
34、October 202296Figure 2.47.Selected Economies:Electric Mobility Readiness,202297Figure 2.48.Global Electric Vehicle Market,by Main Producer,202198Figure 2.49.Energy Storage Technologies101Figure 2.50.World:Projected Annual Electric Vehicle Battery Demand101Figure 2.51.World:Grid-Scale Battery Storage
35、 Capacity Additions101Figure 2.52.World:Top 10 Electric Vehicle Battery Producers102Figure 2.53.World:Actual and Projected Installed Energy Storage Capacity103Figure 2.54.Lithium-ion Battery Price 103Figure 2.55.World:Projected Growth in Demand for Critical Minerals,202040105Figure 2.56.World:Major
36、Producers of Critical Minerals,2020105Figure 2.57.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Average Age of Existing Coal Plants,2020107Figure 2.58.Carbon Recycling:Potential Applications107Figure 2.59.Selected ASEAN+3:Estimated Carbon Storage Resources107Figure 2.60.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:CCS Readiness
37、 Index,2021109Figure 2.61.The Carbon Offset Credit Ecosystem111Figure 2.62.ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies:Nonretired Voluntary Carbon Offset Credits,by Host Economy,July 2022111Figure 2.63.ESG-Labeled Bonds115Figure 2.64.World:Annual Issuance of Labeled Bonds,by Region116Figure 2.65.ASEAN+3:Annual I
38、ssuance of Labeled Bonds,by Jurisdiction116Figure 2.66.ASEAN+3:Green Bond Issuance117Figure 2.67.Carbon Performance Alignment with Paris Agreement Benchmarks in 2030,by Sector120Figure 2.68.ASEAN+3:Outstanding Transition Bonds121Figure 2.69.ASEAN+3:New Issuances of Transition Bonds121Figure 1.1.1.AS
39、EAN+3:Daily COVID-19 Cases6Figure 1.1.2.ASEAN+3:Vaccination Coverage Status7Figure 1.1.3.Japan:COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage7Figure 1.1.4.ASEAN+3:COVID-19 Booster Dose Administration7Figure 1.1.5.Korea:COVID-19 Daily Cases and Vaccination Coverage7Figure 1.2.1.China:Top Partners for Semiconductor Im
40、ports,20172117Figure 1.2.2.World:Top Ten Semiconductor Importers and Exporters,20172117Figure 1.2.3.China:Import Growth18Figure 1.2.4.ASEAN,Hong Kong,Japan,and Korea:Semiconductor Trade with China and the United States,20172118Figure 1.3.1.ASEAN+3:International Travel Restrictions20Figure 1.3.2.Sele
41、cted ASEAN+3:International Flight Arrivals20Figure 1.3.3.Selected ASEAN+3:Tourist Arrivals20Figure 1.3.4.Selected ASEAN+3:Tourist Receipts21Figure 1.3.5.Selected ASEAN:Target and Actual Tourist Arrivals21Figure 1.3.6.Selected ASEAN:Share of Tourist Arrivals,by Source Economy21Figure 1.4.1.World:Geop
42、olitical Risk32ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023viiFigure 1.4.2.ASEAN+3:Sources of Geopolitical Risks and Key Channels of Impact to Growth32Figure 1.4.3.World:Trade Uncertainty32Figure 1.4.4.ASEAN+3:Monthly FDI Announcements32Figure 1.5.1.ASEAN+3:Government Debt38Figure 1.5.2.ASEAN+3:Contributi
43、on to Change in Government Debt Ratio,FY20192238Figure 1.5.3.Selected ASEAN+3:Primary Balance and Needed Fiscal Adjustment38Figure 1.5.4.ASEAN+3:Gross Financing Needs38Figure 1.5.5.ASEAN+3:Contribution to Change in Gross Financing Needs from FY20192239Figure 1.5.6.Selected ASEAN+3:Additional Interes
44、t Payments due to 2022 Policy Rate Hikes,FY202339Figure 1.5.7.ASEAN+3:Short-Term Fiscal Sustainability Indicator39Figure 1.7.1.Selected ASEAN+3:Medium-Term Fiscal Balance Projections45Figure 1.7.2.Selected ASEAN+3:Medium-Term Government Debt Projections45Figure 1.7.3.ASEAN+3:Old-age Population45Figu
45、re 1.7.4.Selected ASEAN+3:Infrastructure Investment Gap,20234045Figure 2.2.1.Japan:Carbon Tax65Figure 2.2.2.Singapore:Carbon Tax65Figure 2.3.1.Japan:Tokyo ETS Excess Emission-Reduction Credit Prices68Figure 2.3.2.Korea:ETS Allowance Prices68Figure 2.3.3.China:Daily Emission Allowance Prices68Figure
46、2.4.1.Selected ASEAN+3:Exports of CBAM Products to the European Union,201922 Average73Figure 2.4.2.ASEAN+3:Estimated Impact of CBAM on GDP and Exports to the European Union,203073Figure 2.4.3.ASEAN+3:Exports of CBAM Products,20192274Figure 2.5.1.Selected Economies:Installed Solar Photovoltaic Capaci
47、ty88Figure 2.5.2.ASEAN+3:Electricity Production from Solar Photovoltaics,2021 88Figure 2.5.3.Vietnam:Feed-in Tariff Rates,202188Figure 2.6.1.Top Ten Economies:New Installed Renewable Hydropower Capacity,20192190Figure 2.6.2.ASEAN+3:Installed Renewable Hydropower Capacity,202190Figure 2.6.3.ASEAN:Ele
48、ctricity Trade Balance,20202190Figure 2.6.4.Lao PDR:Electricity Exports90Figure 2.6.5.Lao PDR:Planned Hydropower Projects,by Economy of Sponsor,202090Figure 2.7.1.China:Electric Vehicle Industrial Ecosystem100Figure 2.7.2.China:Publicly Available Electric Vehicle Charging Points100Figure 2.7.3.China
49、:Electric Car Sales100Figure 2.7.4.China:Electric Vehicle Exports100viiiASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023TablesTable 1.1.ASEAN+3:AMRO Staff Growth and Inflation Estimates and Forecasts,202324(Percent,year-on-year)34Table 1.2.ASEAN+3:Assessment of Policy Space,202336Table 1.3.ASEAN+3 Policy Matr
50、ix:AMRO Staff Assessment of Current Policy Stance and Recommendations47Table 2.1.ASEAN+3:Commitments to Reduce Reliance on Coal59Table 2.2.Selected ASEAN+3:Status of Carbon Pricing Policies61Table 2.3.ASEAN:Energy Access and Energy Efficiency Targets82Table 2.4.ASEAN+3:Commitments on Renewable Energ
51、y83Table 2.5.ASEAN+3:Renewable Energy Policies84Table 2.6.Selected ASEAN+3:Policy Developments Related to Nuclear Energy,as of December 202292Table 2.7.Selected ASEAN+3:Targets for Electric Vehicle Adoption and Production98Table 2.8.ASEAN+3:Carbon Capture,Utilization,and Storage Facilities and Proje
52、cts,as of November 2022108Table 2.9.ASEAN+3:Key Carbon Capture,Utilization,and Storage Policies and Initiatives109Table 2.10.ASEAN+3:Green Bond Developments118Table 2.11.ASEAN+3:Green Finance Incentives and Policy Measures119Table 2.12.ASEAN+3:Key Regional Cooperation Initiatives on Climate Change M
53、itigation 124Table 1.6.1.ASEAN+3:Monetary Policy Frameworks41Table 2.1.1.ASEAN+3:Nationally Determined Contributions57ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023ixForeword2022 could have been a bad year for the ASEAN+3 region but it turned out to be relatively good.The year started with two major shocks:
54、a massive wave of COVID-19 infection and the Russia-Ukraine conflict which escalated into a crisis and sent commodity prices skyrocketing across the world.The Omicron variant threatened to shut down the regions economies once again and derail their nascent economic recovery,just like the Delta varia
55、nt did in 2021.However,it did not because Omicron,although highly infectious,turned out to be quite mild and the population was well protected against severe illnesses by the high vaccination rates in most countries.As a result,the authorities initially imposed some mild restrictions to contain the
56、spread of the virus.By Q2,most containment measures had been removed,including border controls,and the economies were fully opened.The Ukraine crisis resulted in supply disruptions that caused fuel,grain,and other commodity prices to spike,leading to rising inflation across the world.This led the Fe
57、deral Reserve and other major central banks to raise their policy rates sharply to contain the rapid rise in inflation.The higher interest rates led to a massive sell-off in financial markets,a strong US dollar,and large capital outflows from emerging markets.The tightening financial condition was a
58、 major threat to recovery in the region.However,thanks to strong economic fundamentals and skillful macroeconomic management,the region was relatively resilient and the economies grew robustly during the year.An exception to the robust recovery of the regional economies was China which pursued a dyn
59、amic zero COVID-19 policy and imposed strict containment measures in response to the sporadic outbreaks across the country during the year,causing the economy to stall.In early December,however,the virus was reclassified as a mild disease and the authorities lifted almost all restrictions.Infections
60、 spiked across the country immediately but has since subsided and the economy is expected to rebound strongly this year.Chapter 1 of the AREO report is devoted to analyzing the risks and vulnerabilities facing the region and assessing the outlook.Although the region performed well in 2022,it began 2
61、023 with strong headwinds and uncertainties.The Ukraine crisis is ongoing and could escalate further with spillovers to the rest of the world.Inflation has come off its peak but it remains elevated and sticky.This has become a major challenge for central banks,especially those committed to bringing
62、down inflation to the 2 percent target level.The Fed and the ECB may be forced to raise their policy rates much higher and keep it higher for longer,causing their economies to weaken sharply,reducing their demand for imports.This would be a major drag on the open economies of the region which are hi
63、ghly dependent on exports.Fortunately,the expected strong rebound of China will provide a much-needed boost to the rest of the region and cushion the downside risk.Even in the region,the battle against inflation is not over yet.Some economies are still struggling with high and sticky inflation and p
64、olicymakers must decide on what course of action to take.Should they continue to tighten policies to bring inflation under control or should they ease policies now to support their economies against the strong headwinds?The trade-off between inflation and growth has never been more acute.Chapter 2 o
65、f the AREO report is,as usual,devoted to some longer-term structural issues that are of macro-critical importance.This year,in light of COP26,we have decided to focus on the topic of climate change,an existential issue for the region and the world.This is a very broad topic so we have decided to foc
66、us on the issue of climate change mitigation,taking stock of the commitments by the regional economies under the Paris Agreement to cap global warming to 2 percent or less.We analyze the challenges as well as the opportunities of transitioning to net zero emission and the implications for finance in
67、 making the transition.Todays complex and rapidly evolving global landscape has made the work of AMRO more important and urgent,and AMRO has recently formulated our new long-term institutional strategy toward 2030SD2030to guide our journey into the future.AMRO will continue to make surveillance a co
68、rnerstone and AMRO must enhance our analytical and surveillance capacity to come up with ideas and strategies to address the challenges ahead.We are living in precarious times.There are both short-term conjunctural risks as well as long-term existential challenges to the global economy;yet the world
69、 has never been more divided.The region must stay united and pull together to secure its macroeconomic and financial resilience and stability.Hoe Ee KhorChief EconomistxASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023AcknowledgmentsThis report provides AMRO staffs assessment of conjunctural and structural iss
70、ues facing the ASEAN+3 region.It covers the short-term risks,vulnerabilities,and challenges facing member economies,as well as the policies taken by or policy options available to their authorities.It also presents staff studies on the longer-term issues pertinent to sustained economic growth in the
71、 region.The report has been reviewed by the Executive Committee of AMRO.The analysis in this report was coordinated by the Regional Surveillance team led by Ling Hui Tan;it also draws on the surveillance work of the AMRO country teams.The report was reviewed and cleared by Chief Economist,Hoe Ee Kho
72、r.It has also benefited from the guidance of AMRO Director Kouqing Li and other members of the Senior Management team.Contributors to the report are Andriansyah,Jinho Choi,Megan Wen Xi Chong,Chiang Yong(Edmond)Choo,Diana del Rosario,Thanh Thi Do,Aziz Durrani,Tanyasorn Ekapirak,Suan Yong Foo,Laura Gr
73、ace Gabriela,Paolo Hernando,Marthe M.Hinojales,Xu(Kimi)Jiang,Catharine Tjing Yiing Kho,Wee Chian Koh,Vanne Khut,Ming Han(Justin)Lim,Byunghoon Nam,Thi Kim Cuc Nguyen,Yoki Okawa,Prashant Pande,Ton Long Quch,Anthony Chia Kiat Tan,Ling Hui Tan,Liyang(Alex)Tang,Heung Chun(Andrew)Tsang,Jade Vichyanond,Wan
74、wisa May Vorranikulkij,Trung Thanh Vu,Siang Leng Wong,Fan Zhai,and Hongyan Zhao;with input from Kevin Chun Chau Cheng,Seung Hyun(Luke)Hong,Sumio Ishikawa,Jae Young Lee,Li Lian Ong,and Runchana Pongsaparn.Megan Wen Xi Chong provided research support.Chiang Yong(Edmond)Choo coordinated production of t
75、he publication,with editorial assistance from James Unwin;Jie Qin,Karen Wilkinson,John Cramer,Andrea Abellon,and Hui Shan Seah coordinated communications and outreach;Karen Chua provided liaison support with member authorities.The authors would like to thank members of AMROs Advisory Panel,chaired b
76、y Daikichi Momma,for their useful input;ASEAN+3 central bank and finance ministry participants at the 2023 AMRO AREO Brainstorming Session for their insightful observations on country and regional developments;and member authorities for their constructive comments.Finally,the views expressed in this
77、 report are those of AMRO staff and do not,in any way,implicate ASEAN+3 members.ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023xiAbbreviationsA6.4ERArticle 6,paragraph 4,emission reductionADBAsian Development BankACX AirCarbon Exchange(Singapore)AREOASEAN+3 Regional Economic OutlookASEANAssociation of Southe
78、ast Asian NationsASEAN-4Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,and ThailandASEAN-5Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,and SingaporeASEAN-6Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Thailand,Singapore,and VietnamBCAborder carbon adjustmentBEVbattery electric vehicleCARcapital adequacy ratioCBAMCarbon Bor
79、der Adjustment Mechanism(European Union)CBIClimate Bonds InitiativeCCScarbon capture and storageCCUScarbon capture,utilization,and storageCDMClean Development MechanismCERcertified emissions reductionCEVclean energy vehicleCfaRcapital flows at riskCHIPSCreating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semicond
80、uctors(United States)CIXClimate Impact X(Singapore)CNYChinese yuanCOPUnited Nations Climate Change Conference of the PartiesCORSIACarbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International AviationCOVID-192019 coronavirus diseaseEECEastern Economic Corridor(Thailand)EGATElectricity Generating Authorit
81、y of ThailandEITEenergy-intensive,trade-exposed sector EORenhanced oil recoveryESGenvironmental,social,and governanceETSemissions trading scheme/system EUEuropean UnionEVelectric vehicleFCEVfuel cell electric vehicleFCPFForest Carbon Partnership FacilityFDIforeign direct investmentFITfeed-in tariffF
82、SSshort-term fiscal sustainabilityFYfiscal yearGDPgross domestic productGEMGlobal Economic ModelGHGgreenhouse gasGWgigawattGWhgigawatt-hourHEVhybrid electric vehicleHKMAHong Kong Monetary AuthorityIAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency IBCIndonesia Battery Corporation ICAOInternational Civil Aviatio
83、n OrganizationICEinternal combustion engineICMAInternational Capital Market AssociationICTinformation and communications technologyIEAInternational Energy AgencyIFCInternational Finance CorporationIMFInternational Monetary FundIPCCIntergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeIRENAInternational Renewable
84、 Energy Agency ITMOinternationally transferred mitigation outcomeJPYJapanese yenxiiASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023KRWKorean wonkWhkilowatt-hourMASMonetary Authority of SingaporeMETIMinistry of Economy,Trade,and Industry(Japan)MICE meetings,incentives,conventions and exhibitions MtCO2emillion(
85、metric)ton of carbon dioxide equivalentMWhmegawatt-hourMYRMalaysian ringgitNDCNationally Determined ContributionNEERnominal effective exchange rateNEVnew energy vehicleNGFSNetwork for the Greening of the Financial SystemNPLnon-performing loanOECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
86、PBCPeoples Bank of ChinaPHEVplug-in hybrid electric vehiclePlus-3China(including Hong Kong),Japan,KoreaPMIPurchasing Managers IndexPPPpurchasing power parityR&Dresearch and developmentREDD+Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation REERreal effective exchange rateREErare earth elem
87、entROSATOMState Atomic Energy Corporation(Russia)S&PStandard and PoorsSMICSemiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation(China)SRISustainable and Responsible Investment(Malaysia)tCO2(metric)ton of carbon dioxidetCO2e(metric)ton of carbon dioxide equivalent TSMCTaiwan Semiconductor Manufacturi
88、ng CompanyUNEPUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeUNFCCCUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUSUnited StatesUSDUS dollarVREvariable renewable energy ZEVzero-emission vehicleFor brevity,Brunei Darussalam is referred to as Brunei,and Hong Kong,China is referred to as Hong Kong in the t
89、ext.Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges2ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Highlights The post-pandemic“recovery”year of 2022 was beset by new challenges as the region was buffeted by multiple external shocks.In early 2022,when most economies were battling the highly transmissible Om
90、icron variant of COVID-19,the Russia-Ukraine conflict escalated into a crisis and sent global commodity prices soaring to multiyear highs.Record high inflation and the release of pent-up consumer demand forced faster and sharper monetary policy tightening in the United States.By the second half of t
91、he year,tighter financial market conditions had significantly slowed the growth momentum in advanced economies.Geopolitical tensions intensified throughout the year,while relentless waves of COVID-19 infections disrupted economic reopening efforts in some economies,especially China.Overall,the ASEAN
92、+3 region grew at 3.2 percent in 2022.The lifting of COVID-19 containment measures led to a surge in consumer spending and investment,helping to offset the drag on exports in the second half of the year.Meanwhile,inflation in the region rose to 6.5 percent in 2022,due mainly to supply disruptions ca
93、used by the Ukraine crisis,the release of pent-up demand in advanced economies,and the lingering impact of supply chain bottlenecks.Timely administrative and policy measures helped to prevent inflation in the ASEAN+3 region from spiraling higher.In financial markets,the US Federal Reserves aggressiv
94、e rate hikes led to a sharp spike in risk aversion,currency depreciations,and large portfolio capital outflows from the region in the first three quarters of 2022.By October,the outlook for portfolio capital flows in the region had improved on market expectations that the US Federal Reserve would sl
95、ow the pace of rate increases in 2023.Looking ahead,growth in ASEAN+3 is expected to be anchored by domestic demand as economic recovery gains traction.The regions goods export growth is projected to weaken as global demand slows.However,this will be counterbalanced to some extent by the strengtheni
96、ng of services exports(notably tourism)as border restrictions are lifted throughout the region.AMRO staff forecast the region to grow at a faster pace of 4.6 percent in 2023,driven by strong recovery in the Plus-3 economies,especially China.Headline inflation is forecast at 4.5 percent in 2023,lower
97、 than in 2022.In 2024,growth is expected to be sustained at 4.5 percent,and inflation to moderate to 3.0 percent.The growth outlook for ASEAN+3 is fraught with uncertainties.The most immediate risk is the possibility of another shock to global energy prices should the ongoing Ukraine crisis escalate
98、.At the same time,if tightening financial conditions trigger a much sharper US economic slowdown than currently envisaged,spillovers to the rest of the world would be significant.A global energy shock in conjunction with a global economic slowdown would be a major blow to the region.In China,prolong
99、ed weakness in the real estate sector would weigh on consumer and investor confidence and could hinder the economys recovery,dragging down regional growth.The possible emergence of more virulent COVID-19 variants is still a risk.In the medium term,further deepening of the strategic rivalry between t
100、he United States and China could fragment the global economy into ideological blocs and undermine the regions growth prospects.Policymakers in the region are largely ending the extraordinary stimulus measures introduced during the pandemic and shifting to restoring policy buffers.Rising inflation an
101、d a less supportive global economic landscape have compelled monetary policy tightening in some economies,while maintaining targeted fiscal support to safeguard growth.ASEAN+3 authorities will continue to face sharp policy tradeoffs and difficult policy decisions in the year ahead.A calibrated polic
102、y mix,drawing on a range of policy tools,will be essential to navigate the challenges of 2023.Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges3I.Recent Developments and OutlookThis chapter was written by Anthony Chia Kiat Tan and Catharine Tjing Yiing Kho(co-anchors),Chiang Yong(Edmond)Choo,Megan We
103、n Xi Chong,Diana del Rosario,Laura Grace Gabriela,Marthe M.Hinojales,Byunghoon Nam,Prashant Pande,Ton Long Quch,Liyang(Alex)Tang,Siang Leng Wong,and Hongyan Zhao,with input from AMRO country desk economists.Source:National authorities via Haver Analytics.Note:US inflation refers to annual change in
104、the personal consumption expenditure price index.Source:National authorities via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Aggregate GDP is calculated using purchasing power parity(PPP)weighted average.Selected ASEAN refers to Brunei,Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietn
105、am.Cambodia,Lao PDR,and Myanmar are excluded due to data unavailability.A Bumpy Transition to the“New Normal”The post-pandemic“recovery”year of 2022 was fraught with challenges.The year began with most regions battling the highly contagious Omicron variant of COVID-19.Then,the Russia-Ukraine conflic
106、t broke out in February and escalated into a crisis,sending global commodity prices to multiyear highs.The confluence of record high inflation rates and the release of pent-up consumer demand forced faster and sharper monetary policy tightening in the United States,rattling global financial markets.
107、By the second half of the year,tighter financial market conditions amid stubbornly high inflation slowed growth momentum in advanced economies(Figure 1.1).Geopolitical tensions intensified throughout the year,aggravating financial market volatility and deepening investor uncertainty.On top of these
108、new challenges,relentless waves of COVID-19 infections continued to disrupt economic reopening efforts of some economies,notably China.Growth in the Plus-3 economies in 2022 was impacted by recurring COVID-19 outbreaks,high inflation,and idiosyncratic domestic factors(Figure 1.2).Plus-3 economies fa
109、ced three large waves of infections in 2022(Figure 1.3).Economic activities in China and Hong Kong were constrained by stringent pandemic containment measures which lasted until early December.COVID-19 cases surged in both economies when the strict containment measures were lifted.Japan removed most
110、 domestic containment policies in March and Korea did so in April,despite both having high caseloads.However,border restrictions in Japan remained in place for most of the year(Box 1.1).Figure 1.1.United States and Euro Area:Real GDP Growth and Headline Inflation(Percent,year-on-year)Figure 1.2.Sele
111、cted ASEAN+3:Real GDP Growth(Percent,year-on-year)-15-10-5051015Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4202020212022US GDP growthEuro area GDP growthUS inflation-10-505101520Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4202020212022Plus-3Selected ASEAN The spike in global energy prices resulted in high inflation and weaker terms of trad
112、e for the net energy-importing Plus-3 economies.Fiscal support to dampen the passthrough of high energy prices to households and businesses weighed on government budgets that were already strained by more than two years of pandemic support.Growth in China was further weakened by a prolonged slowdown
113、 in the property sector and financial stability concerns.The Hong Kong economy was heavily affected by the continued border closure with mainland China and the resulting loss of goods and services export revenue.Meanwhile,Japan and Korea were confronted with sharp currency depreciations,in part due
114、to the aggressive interest rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve and strengthening of the US dollar.The ASEAN region grew more firmly than the Plus-3 in 2022,thanks to a strong rebound in domestic demand and net exports.High COVID-19 vaccination coverage(for both primary and booster doses)allowed ASE
115、AN economies to stay on a reopening course despite the large wave of Omicron infections at the beginning of the year.COVID-19 infections declined significantly in the middle of the year(except in Singapore),with economies like Cambodia,Lao PDR,and Myanmar reporting fewer than 25 daily cases by the e
116、nd of the year.The reopening of borders to international tourists also helped to boost growth in tourism-dependent economies.4ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Source:Johns Hopkins University via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Data as of 28 February 2023.Source:AMRO staff estimates
117、.Note:“Early cycle”indicates that GDP growth is below trend and the output gap is negative and narrowing.“Mid-cycle”indicates that growth is around trend and the output gap is positive and widening.“Late cycle”indicates that growth is above trend and the output gap is positive and narrowing.“Downtur
118、n”indicates that growth is below trend and the output gap is negative and widening.Asterisk(*)indicate changes in position relative to 2022.China,Korea,and Singapore were assessed to be in mid-cycle in 2022;Indonesia,the Philippines,and Vietnam were assessed to be in early cycle in 2022.Most of ASEA
119、N+3 is currently in the early phase of the business cycle.The negative output gap is narrowing in most of the regions economies,but real GDP remains below trend levels,reflecting some economic scarring from the pandemic.China is back in the early cycle position with a negative but narrowing output g
120、ap due to disruption caused by COVID-19 outbreaks and stresses in the property market.Indonesia and Vietnam transitioned from early cycle to mid-cycle on widening positive output gaps and tightening labor markets,supported by robust growth momentum continuing into 2023.The Philippines is assessed to
121、 be in mid-cycle with a widening positive output gap following continued growth on multiple fronts,including manufacturing and domestic tourism.Meanwhile,export-oriented Korea and Singapore,which rebounded strongly in 2021,have moved from mid-cycle in 2022 to late cycle as external demand slows down
122、(Figure 1.4).Figure 1.3.ASEAN+3:Daily COVID-19 Cases(Thousand persons,seven-day average)Figure 1.4.ASEAN+3:Business Cycle Positions,2023Three or More Infection WavesFewer than Three Infection Waves010020030040050001020304050607080Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23SingaporeChinaHong KongJapan(right axis)
123、Korea(right axis)0501001502002503000102030405060Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23CambodiaBruneiLao PDRMyanmarIndonesiaMalaysiaThailandVietnam(right axis)EarlyMidLateDownturnBruneiCambodiaChina*Hong KongJapanLao PDRMalaysiaMyanmarThailand Indonesia*Philippines*Vietnam*Korea*Singapore*5Chapter 1.Macroeco
124、nomic Prospects and ChallengesBox 1.1:Living with COVID-19:The Long and Winding Road for the Plus-3 EconomiesPlus-3 economies transitioned to living with COVID-19 in different ways.The emergence of new subvariants led to two large new surges of Omicron-variant infections in 2022 after the initial wa
125、ve of infections subsided in the previous year(Figure 1.1.1,top panel).Daily new cases in the Plus-3 in the second half of the year far surpassed those in ASEAN,even after adjusting for population size(Figure 1.1.1,bottom panel).Yet,Japan and Korea reopened earlier than China and Hong Kong despite h
126、aving reported significantly higher numbers of cases and lower vaccination coverage(Figure 1.1.2).Accelerated administration of booster doses was key to Japans reopening.The spike in infections led to the declaration of a quasi-state of emergency in 34 of Japans 47 prefectures in the first quarter o
127、f 2022.In response,the government accelerated its roll-out of booster doses,which began in December 2021.Within 100 days,32.5 percent of the population had received a booster,compared to only 10.9 percent when the primary dose was rolled out(Figure 1.1.3).Japans booster dose coverage is higher than
128、elsewhere in the region(Figure 1.1.4).With the high vaccination rate,authorities were able to gradually relax containment measures,and all quasi-emergency measures were lifted by the end of the first quarter of 2022.Borders were opened to international travelersfirst to a limited number of guided to
129、ur groups in June 2022,then to all travelers in October 2022.Korea relied on its high vaccination rate and strong health care system in reopening.New cases surpassed 600,000 per day in March 2022the highest in the world at the timebut death rates remained among the lowest globally,thanks in part to
130、the countrys high vaccine coverage:more than 80 percent of the population was vaccinated and more than half had received their booster doses by then(Cha 2022)(Figure 1.1.5).The health care system was reinforced in January 2022 with the addition of small hospitals to manage an expected surge in cases
131、(CNA 2022).Korea scaled back social distancing measures in April 2022,allowing private gatherings,lengthening business hours of restaurants and cafes,and resuming public events.Outdoor mask mandates were lifted in September 2022 and an end to indoor ones followed in January 2023.Travel restrictions
132、were also eased,with quarantine rules for international arrivals removed on 8 June and pre-departure test requirements for most inbound travelers lifted on 3 September.Chinas COVID-19 cases were contained by stringent controls that remained in place until early December 2022.The dynamic zero-COVID a
133、pproach in China was characterized by mass testing and city-wide lockdowns.Numerous cities,such as Chengdu,Guangzhou,Shanghai,and Zhengzhou,were placed under lockdown after cases were reported.With steadily rising testing and vaccination capacity,quarantine durations for close contacts and internati
134、onal travelers were shortened in November and removed completely the following month(Xinhua 2022).After the reopening of the economy on 7 December,there was an uptick in cases.However,the number of infections and COVID-related hospitalizations declined throughout January 2023,auguring well for the t
135、ransition to a COVID-19 endemic state(The Straits Times 2023).The same applied in Hong Kong.Hospitals were reportedly overwhelmed in the first quarter of 2022 as COVID-19 cases spiked(Agence France-Presse 2022).Vaccine hesitancy among the elderlyonly a quarter of the population aged 80 and above wer
136、e vaccinated as of January 2022contributed to the high fatality ratio for this age group.Hong Kong authorities tightened border controls and increased mass community testing,sewage surveillance,and contact tracing in response.By September,more than 90 percent of the population was fully vaccinatedup
137、 from This box was written by Megan Wen Xi Chong and Catharine Tjing Yiing Kho.6ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Figure 1.1.1.ASEAN+3:Daily COVID-19 Cases(Thousand cases,seven-day average)ASEAN+3(New cases per million persons,seven-day average)Plus-3(New cases per million persons,seven-day aver
138、age)02004006008001,0001 Jan 202119 Aug 20216 Apr 202222 Nov 2022ASEANChinaHong KongJapanKoreaOmicron waveDelta wave0100200300400500600Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Plus-3ASEAN0102030405005001,0001,5002,0002,5003,000Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Japan and KoreaChina and Hong Kong(right axis)Source:Johns Hopkins
139、University via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:ASEAN=Brunei,Cambodia,Indonesia,Lao PDR,Malaysia,Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand,and Vietnam;Plus-3=China,Hong Kong,Japan,and Korea.70 percent in Marchand the health care system was no longer overstrained.On 14 December,Hong Kong
140、 relaxed its COVID-19 measures,including scrapping the use of its LeaveHomeSafe tracking app and removing social distancing requirements for restaurants and public gatherings.On-and post-arrival COVID-19 testing of international visitors was abolished on 29 December.While all Plus-3 economies have n
141、ow reopened,the challenge is to stay open.A negative pre-departure test remains necessary for entry to China and Hong Kong.Inbound visitors to Japan have to show proof of having received at least three vaccine doses,or a negative COVID-19 test within 72 hours of departure.Korea removed its indoor ma
142、sk mandate on 30 January 2023,but maintains a seven-day isolation rule for those who have tested positive for COVID-19.High vaccination coverage and resilient health care systems should help the Plus-3 economies stay on the economic reopening path.7Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and ChallengesFig
143、ure 1.1.3.Japan:COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage(Cumulative doses per 100 persons)Figure 1.1.5.Korea:COVID-19 Daily Cases and Vaccination Coverage(New cases per million persons,seven-day average;cumulative doses per 100 persons)Figure 1.1.4.ASEAN+3:COVID-19 Booster Dose Administration(Cumulative doses
144、per 100 persons)0204060801001201400100200300Days since vaccination program beganPrimary doseBooster dose78808284868802,5005,0007,50010,000Jan-22Apr-22Jul-22Oct-22Jan-23New casesVaccination coverage(right axis)0204060801001201400200400Days since booster program beganChinaHong KongJapanKoreaBruneiCamb
145、odiaIndonesiaMalaysiaMyanmarPhilippinesThailandSingaporeVietnamSource:Our World in Data via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Source:Johns Hopkins University via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Source:Our World in Data via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Data for Lao PDR a
146、re unavailable.Figure 1.1.2.ASEAN+3:Vaccination Coverage Status(Percent of population)18.7-24.7-44.8 50.4 82.5 79.8 62.6 58.0 58.8 90.6 82.575.7 64.1 51.6 63.5 71.4 74.8 81.2 83.4 85.7 87.3 73.5 87.5 90.8 87.8 100.0 67.9 69.3 73.9 78.2 79.5 82.9 84.4 86.5 91.1 91.9 92.1 92.3 92.4 100.0 -20 40 60 80
147、100 120 140 160 180PhilippinesMyanmarIndonesiaLao PDRThailandMalaysiaJapanKoreaCambodiaChinaVietnamHong KongSingaporeBruneiVaccinated with booster doseFully vaccinated Vaccinated with one doseWith booster dosesPercentage of population:With at least one doseFully vaccinatedSource:Our World in Data vi
148、a Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Data are up to 28 February 2023.Percent of fully vaccinated population shows the number of people who received all doses prescribed by the vaccination protocol(e.g.,one dose of a single-dose vaccine,or two doses of a two-dose vaccine).In the event of di
149、screpancy between data from Our World in Data and national authorities,data from national authorities take precedence.8ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Domestic Demand Leads the WayDomestic demand anchored the regions recovery in 2022.The lifting of COVID-19 containment measures released pent-u
150、p demand,which led to a surge in consumer spending and investment.Private sector spending was robust throughout 2022,offsetting the drag from net exports in the second half of the year(Figure 1.5).Growth momentum,measured by quarter-on-quarter growth of seasonally adjusted GDP growth,weakened toward
151、 the second half of the year,weighed down by the slowdown in external demand.The pace of recovery was also held back by recurring virus outbreaks,increased costs of living,and higher borrowing costs.Extension of policy measures such as cash vouchers and price subsidies for households and credit supp
152、ort for firms was crucial to maintaining consumer and investor confidence,supporting domestic demand.Private consumption has been the key driver of growth.ASEAN economies benefited from rapid progress in mass vaccinations which protected the population against severe illnesses,enabling authorities t
153、o loosen mobility restrictions and reopen borders(Figure 1.6).Mobility outside the residencei.e.,movements to groceries and pharmacies,retail and recreation facilities,transit stations,and workplacessurpassed pre-pandemic levels in the region as retailers welcomed the return of consumer spending(Fig
154、ure 1.7 and Figure 1.8).Hong Kong,Japan,and Korea allowed mobility to return close to pre-pandemic levels in 2022,even as they faced recurrent waves of infections throughout the year.Spending on services,which were heavily restricted during the pandemic,picked up too(Figure 1.9).Policy measures to s
155、timulate the domestic economysuch as consumption vouchers in Hong Kong and domestic tourism subsidies in Japan and Thailandalso supported private consumption.In China,private consumption is expected to recover with the economy having moved on from its dynamic zero-COVID policy and as its labor marke
156、t improves.Consumption was subdued in the last three quarters of 2022 due to a slump in consumer confidence amid recurring COVID-19 outbreaks and the property market downturn.In early December,China reclassified COVID-19 as a mild disease and lifted some of its most stringent containment measures,su
157、ch as mass testing and quarantine for those infected,contact tracing,differentiating high and low infection risk areas,and requiring asymptomatic and mild cases to isolate in medical facilities.A massive surge in infections across the country followed that relaxation and led to a sharp drop in consu
158、mer spending as people stayed home to avoid becoming infected.However,with the surge in cases having largely subsided,private consumption will likely rebound strongly in the second quarter in 2023.Robust holiday spending during this years Spring Festival bodes well for the strength of the recovery.1
159、 An improvement in labor market conditionspurchasing managers index(PMI)employment subindices picked up in December 2022 and January 2023could further reinforce consumer confidence and contribute toward the revival of consumption domestically.Figure 1.5.Selected ASEAN+3:Aggregate Real GDP Growth,by
160、Expenditure Category(Percentage points,year-on-year)-10-50510Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q42019202020212022Private consumptionGovernment consumptionGross fixed capital formationChanges in inventoriesNet exportsStatistical discrepancyReal GDP growth(y-o-y)Real GDP growth(q-o-q,sa)Source:National au
161、thorities via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates and calculation.Note:Selected ASEAN+3 includes Brunei,Hong Kong,Indonesia,Japan,Korea,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.Data are unavailable for Cambodia,China,Lao PDR,Myanmar,and Vietnam.q-o-q,sa=quarter-on-quarter,seasonally adjusted
162、;y-o-y=year-on-year.Q4 2022 data for Brunei are estimated by AMRO staff.1/According to figures from Chinas Ministry of Culture and Tourism,domestic tourism revenue for 2127 January 2023 reached CNY 375.8 billion,almost three-quarters of the spending during the Spring Festival in 2019(China Daily 202
163、3).Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges9Figure 1.6.Selected ASEAN+3:Real Private Consumption Growth and Contribution to GDP Growth(Percent,year-on-year;percentage points,year-on-year)Figure 1.7.Selected ASEAN+3:Mobility Outside the Residence(Percentage change from baseline,five-day movin
164、g average)Source:National authorities via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Data for China refer to consumptions contribution to year-on-year GDP growth.Data are unavailable for Cambodia,Lao PDR,Myanmar,and Vietnam.ASEAN-5=Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Thailand.Source:G
165、oogle COVID-19 Community Mobility reports via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Baseline refers to the median value of the corresponding day in the period 3 January to 6 February 2020.Mobility outside the residence refers to aggregated mobility data for places such as groceries and pharma
166、cies,retail and recreation facilities,transit stations,and workplaces.Google discontinued the data after 15 October 2022.ASEAN-5=Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore and Thailand;CLMV=Cambodia,Lao PDR,Myanmar,and Vietnam.For the rest of the region,private consumption is expected to remain fi
167、rm although inflation and household debt could weigh on consumer sentiment.The sharp rise in fuel and food prices has raised the cost of living in the rest of ASEAN+3.While price subsidies and import tariff cuts have partially contained rising prices,purchasing power continues to be eroded as wages
168、have not kept up with inflation(Figure 1.10).Monetary policy normalization has also raised borrowing costs and increased the debt burden of households.The confluence of these headwinds could dampen consumer sentiment and reduce discretionary spending(Figure 1.11).Domestic investment has continued to
169、 improve across most of the region,although at a slower pace.The resumption of economic activities and the easing of supply-side constraints have supported gross fixed capital formation,especially for ASEAN economies(Figure 1.12).While interest rates have increased in response to the US Federal Rese
170、rves rate hikes and rising inflation pressures,credit conditions remain generally supportive(Figure 1.13).However,downcycles in the global semiconductor sector and global trade have cooled investment prospects for the regions electronics industry as pandemic-propelled demand for consumer electronics
171、 has wound down(Blanchard and Wu 2022)(Figure 1.14).The exception is China,where real estate fixed asset investments contracted sharply in 2022 after regulatory measures were introduced to curb excessive leverage in the sector.The suspension of projects by distressed property developers has led to a
172、 decline in real estate investment(Figure 1.15).Uncertainty over the extent and severity of spillovers from the property sector to the broader economy also weighed on investor sentiment.However,the adjustment in the policy stance late last year should provide some relief to vulnerable developers and
173、 restore homebuyers confidence and stability in the market.While real estate investment will likely take time to recover,the government is determined to increase spending on infrastructure and manufacturing assets in the next few years,especially in growth areas such as digital-economy infrastructur
174、e,renewable energy,and electric vehicles(Chapter 2).In addition,the reopening of Chinas borders could see more direct investment from overseas returning to the economy.Looking ahead,a weaker global economy with higher borrowing costs could hinder investment recovery.Business confidence in the region
175、 deteriorated toward the second half of 2022 in tandem with increased concerns over recession in advanced economies(Figure 1.16).While investor sentiments in China improved significantly at the start of 2023,additional interest rate hikes in the region could exacerbate firms already rising debt burd
176、ens and reduce credit demand.Slower credit growth and worsening debt servicing capacity for businesses could consequently limit the recovery in capital expenditure in the region.-15-10-5051015-15-10-50510152019202020212022China(right axis)Hong Kong,Japan,and KoreaASEAN-5 and Brunei-60-50-40-30-20-10
177、0102030Feb-20Jun-20Oct-20Feb-21Jun-21Oct-21Feb-22Jun-22Oct-22Hong Kong,Japan,and KoreaASEAN-5CLMV10ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Figure 1.8.Selected ASEAN+3:Retail Sales Growth(Percent,year-on-year,three-month moving average)Figure 1.9.Selected ASEAN+3:Services Sales Growth(Percent,year-on-y
178、ear)Source:National authorities via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Calculated based on local currency values for all economies except Indonesia and Thailand(volume).Colors indicate the size and direction of change:the deeper the shade of red,the larger the negative change,with the dark
179、est shade indicating a decrease of more than 30 percent year-on-year;the deeper the shade of green,the larger the positive change,with the darkest shade indicating an increase of more than 30 percent year-on-year.Source:National authorities via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Calculatio
180、ns are based on the volume of restaurant receipts(Hong Kong);services sector revenues(Malaysia);business receipts index for services(Singapore);and services production index(Thailand).China2.7Hong Kong0.4Indonesia1.2Japan4.1Korea3.9Malaysia23.8Philippines21.4Singapore8.0Thailand1.2Vietnam16.7=3020Ec
181、onomy202020211020 5 years)Legend:Low impactHigh impactLikelihoodImminencePerennial RisksClimate change transitionNatural disastersCyber attacksMore virulent COVID-19 variantSharper slowdown in USHeightened geopolitical tensionsSlower-than-expected recovery in ChinaMedium impactSpike in energy prices
182、Source:AMRO staff.Note:The Regional Risk Map characterizes the key risk factors facing the ASEAN+3 region in three dimensions:(1)the likelihood of the risk materializinglow,medium,or highalong the vertical axis;(2)the imminence of the riskshort term(up to two years),medium term(two to five years),or
183、 long term(more than five years)along the horizontal axis;and(3)the growth impact should the risk materializelow,medium,or highdenoted by the color of the circle.Perennial risksi.e.,recurring risks,the impact of which are not easily gaugedare identified in the dotted circle on the top right corner.t
184、he result could be global fragmentation into ideological blocs,which will have ramifications for regional trade and investment.There could be further segmentation of trade,with far-reaching consequences for global supply chains.This could hurt the regions long-term growth prospects(Box 1.4).Climate
185、change,natural disasters and cyberattacks are perennial risks:Like the rest of the world,the region faces the risk of more frequent and/or extreme weather events due to climate change.Responding to climate-related(and non-climate related)natural disasters entails a direct fiscal burden.National comm
186、itments to adapt to and mitigate climate change will also have huge economic impacts and long-lasting,multigenerational consequences(Chapter 2).As the region is increasingly interconnected through digital platforms,risks of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure such as health systems,government ag
187、encies,and educational institutions,are increasing in frequency and severity.According to Check Point(2023),the global volume of cyberattacks increased by almost 40 percent in 2022 relative to the previous year,with the Asia-Pacific region experiencing almost 1,700 weekly attacks per organization.Ab
188、sent sufficient safeguards,a backlash against digitalization could occur,with negative implications for productivity gains and longer term growth.31Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and ChallengesBox 1.4:Tug of War:Rising Geopolitical Risks and ASEAN+3 The Ukraine crisis has highlighted the signific
189、ant role of geopolitical risks in shaping economic growth.While the main impact of the conflict has centered on Europe,its consequences have rippled around the worldin the form of rising commodity prices,supply chain bottlenecks,and disruption to people movement,financial flows,and cross-border inve
190、stment.Although ASEAN+3 has relatively few direct trade and investment links with Russia and Ukraine,and the conflicts initial impacts on global inflation and supply chains appear to have eased somewhat(Figure 1.19),a prolonged conflict lasting well beyond this year could shave about 1 percentage po
191、int off the regions GDP growth in 2023(AMRO 2022a).Geopolitical risks are higher now than in the last decade and will increasingly be a factor in the regions growth outlook(Figure 1.4.1).ASEAN+3 economies,with their deep cross-border linkages,are particularly exposed to geopolitical tensions that di
192、srupt global trade and supply chains.The repeated escalation in the US-China trade conflict during the Trump administration,which saw tariffs imposed on over USD 500 billion worth of goods in both economies,is one example(AMRO 2020).Between September 2018 and December 2019before the so-called Phase
193、One deal was announcedtotal exports from the region contracted significantly in value,after growing at an average rate of 10 percent(year-on-year)in the previous eight months.Recent policies by the US Biden administrationincluding the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors(CHIPS)and S
194、cience Act and the Inflation Reduction Act,both passed last year,as well as expanded export controls on Chinese high-tech firmshave ratcheted up tensions,creating negative spillovers to other ASEAN+3 exporters and forcing“like-minded allies”to announce similar policies.1 Intensifying tensions in the
195、 Middle East,or an escalation of the Ukraine crisis that involves more parties could cause prices of key commodities to spike once again.Increased or threatened military action elsewhere could also upend ASEAN+3 cross-border trade and economic activity,especially if they lead to prolonged or severe
196、disruptions to major shipping lanes or airspaces(Figure 1.4.2).Geopolitical tensions lead to economic fragmentation and heightened policy uncertainty,which erodes market confidence,lowers investment,and hurts the regions long-term growth prospects.While silver linings could emerge from the Ukraine c
197、risis and US-China strategic rivalry in the long-termin the form of reinvigorating the global shift away from fossil fuel dependence and fast-tracking Chinas climb toward self-sufficiency in critical technologiesthe costs of geopolitical tensions far outweigh any perceived benefits,especially for th
198、e ASEAN+3 region.Reconfiguration of existing supply chains is complex,costly,and time-consuming,and it increases trade and logistics costs for all parties involved(AMRO 2021).Uncertainty about trade policy induces a“wait-and-see”approach that postpones new investment or expansion plans,leading to lo
199、wer FDI flows and employment creation that can stagnate for years,as shown in Figure 1.4.3 and Figure 1.4.4(Cerdeiro,Kothari,and Redl 2022).Geopolitical tensions and their attendant uncertainty also stifle innovation,reducing knowledge exchange and productivity(Astvansh,Deng,and Habib 2022).The 2022
200、 US export controls have already slowed down the pace of new semiconductor plant construction and expansions in China,and are impeding access to a deep pool of highly skilled Chinese-American researchers,engineers,and scientists,with advanced expertise obtained from years of working in the United St
201、ates(Box 1.2)(Bloomberg News 2022).In the current geopolitical context,ASEAN+3 needs to remain committed to free trade and closer regional integration now more than ever.Economic resilience for the ASEAN+3 means strengtheningrather than shying away fromlinkages with one 1/The Inflation Reduction Act
202、 includes an electric vehicle(EV)tax credit of up to USD 7,500 per purchase,provided final assembly is done in North Americawhich weakens the competitiveness of EV makers in other countries,notably Korea.The Act also places restrictions on sourcing minerals used in batteries from China and other“for
203、eign entities of concern”and requires qualifying EV batteries to have 100 percent North American content by 2028(Forbes 2022).This box was written by Marthe M.Hinojales and Hongyan Zhao.32ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Figure 1.4.1.World:Geopolitical Risk(Index,100=19852019)Figure 1.4.3.World
204、:Trade Uncertainty(Index)Figure 1.4.4.ASEAN+3:Monthly FDI Announcements(Number;billions of US dollars)Figure 1.4.2.ASEAN+3:Sources of Geopolitical Risks and Key Channels of Impact to Growth0100200300400500Jan-00Oct-05Jul-11Apr-17Jan-239/11 attacksIraq WarRussias annexation of CrimeaUS and North Kore
205、a tensionsUkraine crisis020406080Q1 2015Q3 2016Q1 2018Q3 2019Q1 2021Q3 2022United StatesChinaWorld trade uncertaintyNew round of US tariffs called off in anticipation of a trade dealA series of tariffs by the US and China goes into effectNews about semiconductor trade restrictions by the US on China
206、 emerge01020300200400600Jan-18Aug-18Mar-19Oct-19May-20Dec-20Announced projectsCapital expenditure of announced projects(right axis)US tariffs on more than USD125 billion worth of goods from China begin;China announces planned tariffsTruce agreed at G20Phase One trade deal signedUS increases tariff o
207、n goods from China worth USD 200 billionSource:Caldara and Iacoviello(2022).Note:Data refer to the three-month moving average of the index,which is based on a count of newspaper articles that discuss geopolitical tensions.The higher the index,the higher the measure of geopolitical risk.Source:Ahir,B
208、loom,and Furceri(2022).Note:Q=quarter.The world trade uncertainty index is constructed by counting the number of times“uncertainty”is mentioned in proximity to a word related to trade in Economist Intelligence Unit(EIU)country reports.It is equally weighted average and scaled by total number of word
209、s in the EIU country reports,multiplied by 100,000.Source:Orbis Crossborder;AMRO staff calculations.Note:Data refer to six-month moving averages.Source:AMRO staff.Trade-especially in electronics and technology products;foreign direct investment in affected sectors;reconfiguration of existing supply
210、chains Inflation-from oil supply shocks Inflation-from energy and commodity supply shocks;supply chain bottlenecks,disruption to people movement and financial flows Trade-from lower import demand in key trade partners affected by the escalation of the conflict Trade,transport and logistics,travel an
211、d tourism activitiesUS-China tech rivalry,strategic competitionMiddle East tensionsUkraine crisisMilitary action in key territoriesanother and the rest of the world.The threat of climate change requires a coordinated global and regional approach(Chapter 2),while increased regional cooperation and co
212、ordination is needed to make the most of many of the ASEAN+3s post-pandemic growth drivers and opportunities:digitalization,modern services,cross-border payments and settlements,as well as regional supply chain security(AMRO 2022b).Strong policy signals that reaffirm the regions deep and long-standi
213、ng commitment to free trade and openness will help decrease market uncertainty,reduce new sources of tension,and ensure that allespecially emerging and developing economiescan continue to reap the economic and social benefits of globalization.Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges33The glo
214、bal economy is projected to expand at a more moderate pace in 2023 as growth slows in the United States and the euro area.Tighter financial conditions following successive monetary policy tightening rounds in 2022 will weigh on consumption and investment in the advanced economies.While global food a
215、nd commodity prices have peaked,inflation remains high.The US Federal Reserve is therefore likely to continue raising the federal funds rate in 2023,albeit by smaller amounts and at a slower pace.The Ukraine crisis is expected to persist.On the positive side,global supply chain pressures eased consi
216、derably in the second half of 2022 and are likely to improve in 2023.The relaxation of COVID-19 containment policies,including the removal of cross-border travel restrictions by China in January 2023,should stimulate regional travel and tourism activity.However,outbound tourism from China will not r
217、ecover immediately as cautious tourists may opt not to leave the country for now.The pace of recovery will also be affected by capacity constraints in international air travel and in the hospitality and tourism sectors of receiving economies.Travel and tourism activity is consequently projected to r
218、emain below pre-pandemic levels until 2024.AMRO staff expect the ASEAN+3 region to grow at a faster pace of 4.6 percent in 2023,despite the challenging global environment.The improvement in the regions growth mainly reflects the expected economic recovery in the Plus-3 economies,where growth is fore
219、cast to pick up from 2.6 percent in 2022 to 4.5 percent in 2023.Growth in the ASEAN region is expected to moderate from 5.6 percent in 2022 to 4.9 percent in 2023(Table 1.1).Plus-3.China and Hong Kong are expected to lead the rebound with the removal of COVID-19 containment measures and the full reo
220、pening of their economies.The surge in infections across China following the removal of containment measures will subside and the economy is expected to rebound strongly by the second quarter.The reopening of the land border between mainland China and Hong Kong will provide a strong boost to Hong Ko
221、ngs exports of goods and services.GDP growth in Japan is expected to improve slightly,while GDP growth in Korea is expected to come down,mainly due to weaker external demand.ASEAN.GDP in Indonesia,Malaysia,the Philippines,Singapore,and Vietnam is forecast to grow at a slower pace due to weaker exter
222、nal demand as a result of the economic slowdown in the United States and Europe.The negative outlook for merchandise exports will be partially counterbalanced by the recovery of travel and tourism.The return of Chinese tourists is expected to give regional tourism a major boost in 2023,particularly
223、in Cambodia and Thailand.Growth in Brunei and Myanmar will be driven mainly by domestic consumption and a revival of investment spending.The regions GDP growth is forecast to be sustained at 4.5 percent in 2024.Growth in the Plus-3 economies is likely to be slower than in 2023,at 4.3 percent,mainly
224、on account of the normalization of growth in China and Hong Kong.However,ASEAN is projected to expand at a faster rate of 5.2 percent,compared to 4.9 percent in 2023,as continued strengthening of domestic demand is supplemented by an expected recovery in external demand,which should provide a boost
225、to the regions manufacturing exports and tourism earnings.To complement the baseline forecast,AMRO staff simulated adverse and upside scenarios to illustrate the potential impact of the risk factors presented in the Regional Risk Map(Figure 1.44).The simulations were run using Oxford Economics Globa
226、l Economic Model(GEM),which covers all ASEAN+3 economies with an underlying data set that is updated every month.3AMRO staffs adverse scenario puts the regions GDP growth at 3.9 percent in 2023 and 3.6 percent in 2024(Figure 1.45 and Figure 1.46).This is premised on a rise in global inflation,a shar
227、p growth slowdown in the United States and weaker-than-expected recovery in China,and the emergence of a more virulent COVID-19 strain in the region.If the Ukraine crisis escalates,global energy prices could surge in the second half of 2023.The rise in energy prices would spill over to other commodi
228、ties through increased transportation and production costs,leading to higher inflation globally.In the United States,an inflation III.AMRO Staff Macroeconomic Forecasts for 2023243/The model consists of a system of equations with macroeconomic variables that include GDP and its components,prices,exc
229、hange rates,and interest rates.The GEM is essentially an error-correction model that estimates how quickly a variable returns to its equilibrium state after a shock;hence,it estimates both the short-term and long-term effects of the shock on the variable.In the short term,the model assumes sticky fa
230、ctor prices and aggregate demand-determined output.In the long term,the model assumes that prices adjust fully,and the equilibrium is determined by supply factors such as productivity,labor,and capital.For this exercise,only the short-term estimates are presented.34ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook
231、2023Table 1.1.ASEAN+3:AMRO Staff Growth and Inflation Estimates and Forecasts,202324(Percent,year-on-year)Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;and AMRO staff estimates and forecasts.Note:Myanmars growth numbers are based on its fiscal year,which runs from 1 October to 30 Septembe
232、r.e=estimates;f=forecast.spike could prompt the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates further,causing an even sharper slowdown in the economy and further depressing export demand for ASEAN+3 goods and services.The emergence of a more virulent COVID-19 variant in the region would lead to greater cau
233、tion among households and businesses and discourage private sector spending.This could also impact outbound tourism from China,an important source of revenue for the rest of the ASEAN+3 region.AMRO staffs upside scenario puts the regions GDP growth at 5.2 percent in 2023 and 5.3 percent in 2024.In t
234、his scenario,global inflation continues to moderate.Dissipating inflation pressure,alongside firm wage growth and a still-high stock of savings,allows US consumers to increase spending,providing a boost to exports of goods and services from ASEAN+3.Existing vaccines remain effective against new subv
235、ariants of COVID-19,supporting a stable resumption of economic activities within the region.Figure 1.45.ASEAN+3:GDP Growth Forecasts under AMRO Staff Scenarios(Percent,year-on-year)ASEAN+3Plus-3ASEAN3.93.65.25.36.13.24.64.50246820212022 e2023 f2024 f3.83.35.25.16.82.64.54.30246820212022 e2023 f2024
236、f4.24.55.25.83.15.64.95.20246820212022 e2023 f2024 fSource:National authorities via Haver Analytics;Oxford Economics Global Model;AMRO staff estimates.Note:e=estimates;f=forecast.EconomyGDP GrowthInflation2022e2023f2024f2022e2023f2024fASEAN+33.24.64.56.54.73.0Plus-32.64.54.32.92.32.1 China3.05.55.22
237、.02.02.5 Hong Kong-3.54.33.01.92.32.5 Japan1.01.21.12.51.51.1 Korea2.61.72.35.13.32.2ASEAN5.64.95.27.95.73.4 Brunei-1.22.82.63.72.51.7 Cambodia5.05.96.75.43.33.1 Indonesia5.35.05.34.24.63.0 Lao PDR4.04.15.023.011.44.2 Malaysia8.74.25.23.33.21.9 Myanmar1.22.22.818.214.08.0 Philippines7.66.26.55.85.93
238、.8 Singapore3.62.02.66.15.83.7 Thailand2.64.14.36.12.82.1 Vietnam8.06.87.13.23.02.5Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges35Figure 1.46.ASEAN+3:Projected GDP Growth Ranges,202324(Percent,year-on-year)Source:Oxford Economics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:BN=Brunei;CN=China;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indone
239、sia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MY=Malaysia;MM=Myanmar;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.02468VNPHKHCNIDHKLATHMYBNMMSGKRJP2023-adverse2023-upside2024-adverse2024-upsideHeadline inflation in ASEAN+3 is projected to be 4.7 percent in 2023,lower than in 2022.Excluding Lao
240、PDR and Myanmarwhich are likely to continue experiencing high inflation on account of currency depreciationinflation in the rest of the region is expected to be a more moderate 3.4 percent in 2023(Table 1.1).Most economies in the region should see lower inflation compared to last year,as global comm
241、odity and food prices come down with softer global demand.Only Hong Kong,Indonesia,and Myanmar are expected to see higher inflation in 2023,due to stronger demand pressures(Hong Kong);price increases for several types of subsidized fuel(Indonesia);and sustained currency depreciation(Myanmar).Inflati
242、on is expected to normalize toward its long-term trend in 2024 given that global energy and food prices are projected to stabilize.Supply bottlenecks are likely to ease as production activity resumes following the full reopening of economies.Cost-push inflation pressures are therefore likely to diss
243、ipate by 2024.Looking ahead,climate change mitigation commitments,such as carbon pricing and efforts to shift away from fossil fuels,may place more upward pressure on inflation in the medium term(Chapter 2).As economic recovery in ASEAN+3 gains traction,the regions policymakers have largely ended th
244、e extraordinary stimulus measures introduced during the pandemic and are shifting to restoring policy buffers.Rising inflation and a less supportive global economic landscape have compelled the authorities in some economies to tighten monetary policy while maintaining targeted fiscal support to safe
245、guard growth.ASEAN+3 authorities will continue to face sharp policy tradeoffs and difficult policy decisions in the year ahead.A calibrated policy mix drawing on a range of policy tools will be essential to fulfill multiple policy objectives.Fiscal space in ASEAN+3 has generally narrowed.Public debt
246、-to-GDP ratios have risen across the region,as authorities in some economies raised the public debt ceiling(Malaysia and Thailand)or temporarily suspended the budget deficit ceiling(Indonesia)in order to accommodate additional fiscal outlays in 202022.Although growth improved in 2022,the higher debt
247、 burdenreflecting higher interest payments and amortizationtranslated into higher gross financing needs(Box 1.5).AMRO staffs assessment is that fiscal space remains moderate to ample in most ASEAN+3 economies,but continues to be limited in Japan,Lao PDR,and Myanmar(Table 1.2).In light of rising infl
248、ation,most central banks in the region started to rebuild monetary policy space by raising policy interest rates in 2022.Some central banks(Korea and the Philippines)went further to tighten monetary policyraising the policy rate above its neutral levelto rein in inflation and anchor inflation expect
249、ations.In other economies(Indonesia,Malaysia,and Thailand),policy interest rates have been raised but overall monetary conditions remain accommodative,given existing economic slack.AMRO staffs assessment is that at the end of 2022,monetary policy space was moderate in most ASEAN+3 economies and limi
250、ted in Cambodia,Japan,Lao PDR,and Myanmar(Box 1.6).IV.Policy ConsiderationsPolicy Space36ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Table 1.2.ASEAN+3:Assessment of Policy Space,2023Source:AMRO staff,based on Poonpatpibul and others(2020).Note:This framework does not take into account the ability and capa
251、city of monetary authorities to undertake unconventional monetary policy.Policy spaceFiscalAmpleModerateLimitedMonetary AmpleModerateSingaporeChinaIndonesiaKoreaMalaysiaPhilippinesThailandVietnamLimitedBruneiHong KongCambodiaJapanLao PDRMyanmar37Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and ChallengesBox 1.
252、5:Fiscal Stress in ASEAN+3Government debt-to-GDP ratios jumped during the pandemic and have continued to rise in most of the regions economies(Figure 1.5.1).Debt accumulation over the past three years was driven mainly by sizeable primary deficits.Off-budget stimulus spending also contributed to inc
253、reasing government debt in Thailand,while exchange rate depreciation inflated the debt ratio in local currency terms in economies with high external debt exposure such as Lao PDR(Figure 1.5.2).In some economies,substantial fiscal adjustments would be needed to stabilize the debt ratio(Figure 1.5.3).
254、Gross financing needs have correspondingly increased.The sum of budget deficits and funds required to roll over debt maturing in 2023 have risen(Figure 1.5.4 and Figure 1.5.5).Interest rate increases would further add to existing debt burdens(Figure 1.5.6),while depreciation against creditor currenc
255、ies such as the US dollar would increase the cost burden for economies with large external obligations.These developments have brought to the fore the importance of assessing fiscal sustainability risks across the region.Various factors can affect fiscal sustainability risks,including:Fiscal vulnera
256、bilities.Large fiscal deficits and high government debt may raise concerns about fiscal sustainability.Sizeable financing needs may cause financing stress,especially when market conditions are not favorable.Suboptimal debt structure(e.g.,a high share of external debt and short-term debt)would increa
257、se vulnerability to rollover,exchange rate,and interest rate risks.External sector vulnerabilities.External shocks could propagate to fiscal sustainability risks in economies with weak current accounts,high external debt,and narrow external buffers.Domestic macroeconomic and financial conditions.Eco
258、nomic recession may widen the real interest rate-growth rate differential and jeopardize debt sustainability.A sharp depreciation of the local currency would inflate the nominal value of external debt and increase the debt service burden for economies with high external debt obligations.Global econo
259、mic situation.Global economic and financial market developments could trigger fiscal sustainability risks in economies that are exposed to the global economy through real and financial channels.The degree of fiscal stress in ASEAN+3 economies can be assessed using the short-term fiscal sustainabilit
260、y(FSS)indicator.Following Baldacci and others(2011),fiscal crisis events are defined as episodes of outright fiscal distress(e.g.,public debt default or restructuring,need for large-scale IMF support,hyperinflation)and extreme financing problems(e.g.,spikes in sovereign bond spreads).In these cases,
261、fiscal solvency is endangered and the government is forced to alter its policies to regain fiscal sustainability.The FSS indicator is based on a set of 27 indicators that have been proven to perform well in detecting upcoming situations of fiscal stress,including the fiscal balance,government debt,g
262、ross financing needs,external debt,real GDP growth,inflation,exchange rate depreciation,commodity price index,and the Chicago Board Options Exchange volatility index(AMRO,forthcoming).AMRO staff assessment using the FSS indicator suggests that fiscal stress has risen in more than half of ASEAN+3 eco
263、nomies since the onset of the pandemic.The FSS indicators for Brunei,Cambodia,China,Hong Kong,Japan,Korea,Lao PDR,and Singapore rose above the threshold in 2022.This does not necessarily mean that a fiscal stress event is imminent,only that close monitoring and careful macro-fiscal management are re
264、quired to reduce the risk of one in 2023(Figure 1.5.7).Reasons for the increase in fiscal stress can be traced to unfavorable global conditions in 2022,which included economic slowdown,commodity price hikes,and volatile financial market conditions(Hong Kong,Japan,Korea,and Singapore);large fiscal de
265、ficits(China);domestic macroeconomic weakness(Brunei);and weak external positions(Cambodia and Lao PDR).This box was written by Byunghoon Nam.38ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Figure 1.5.1.ASEAN+3:Government Debt(Percent of GDP)Figure 1.5.4.ASEAN+3:Gross Financing Needs(Percent of GDP)05010015
266、0200250JPSG020406080100KHCNHKIDKRLAMYMMPHTHVNFY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022e-505101520BNKHCNHKIDJPKRLAMYMMPHSGTHVNFY2019FY2020FY2021FY2022eSource:National Authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Brunei is not shown as it has virtually zero government debt.CN=China;e=estimate;FY=
267、fiscal year;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MM=Myanmar;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Gross financing needs for Lao PDR(LA)include its original debt s
268、ervice amount without debt restructuring(the government has been in debt restructuring negotiations with bilateral creditors since 2021).BN=Brunei;CN=China;e=estimate;FY=fiscal year;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR:MM=Myanmar;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;
269、TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Figure 1.5.2.ASEAN+3:Contribution to Change in Government Debt Ratio,FY201922(Percent of GDP)Figure 1.5.3.Selected ASEAN+3:Primary Balance and Needed Fiscal Adjustment(Percent of GDP)-20-1001020304050KHCNHKIDJPKRLAMYPHSGTHVNPrimary deficitReal GDP growthExchange rateOtherChang
270、es in government debt-8-6-4-2024KHCNIDJPKRLAMYPHTHVNPrimary balance in FY2015-FY2019Primary balance in FY2022Debt-stabilizing primary balance in FY2023Fiscal adjustment needed in FY2023Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Brunei is excluded as there is v
271、irtually zero government debt.CN=China;FY=fiscal year;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:The debt-stabilizing primary bala
272、nce in FY2023 is the primary balance that would maintain the debt ratio at the end of FY2022.The fiscal adjustment needed in FY2023 is defined as the difference between the actual primary balance in FY2022 and the debt-stabilizing primary balance in FY2023,which captures how much the primary balance
273、 should change in FY2023 compared to FY2022 to stabilize the debt ratio.CN=China;FY=fiscal year;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.39Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and ChallengesFigure 1.5.5.ASEAN+3:Contribution to Change in Gro
274、ss Financing Needs from FY201922(Percent of GDP)Figure 1.5.7.ASEAN+3:Short-Term Fiscal Sustainability IndicatorFSSContribution to FSSFigure 1.5.6.Selected ASEAN+3:Additional Interest Payments due to 2022 Policy Rate Hikes,FY2023(Percent of GDP)-10-50510KHCNHKIDJPKRLAMYMMPHSGTHVNPrimary balanceIntere
275、st paymentsPrincipal paymentReal GDP growthGDP deflatorChange in GFN0.00.20.40.60.81.01.2201020152020Japan201020152020Korea201020152020Singapore201020152020Hong Kong0.00.10.2IDKRMYPHTHSource:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimatesNote:For Brunei,there is no issuance of
276、 debt to finance fiscal needs;CN=China;GFN=gross financing needs;HK=Hong Kong;FY=fiscal year;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MM=Myanmar;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.N
277、ote:For simulation purposes,the policy rates in 2023 are assumed to remain the same as in January 2023.Bond coupon rates are assumed to move in parallel with the policy rates.FY=fiscal year;ID=Indonesia;KR=Korea;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;TH=Thailand.0.00.20.40.60.81.01.22019202020212022Cambodia2019
278、202020212022Lao PDR2019202020212022Myanmar2019202020212022VietnamFiscal PositionFinancing ConditionDebt ProfileExternal PositionMacro SituationGlobal EconomyFSSFSSThreshold0.00.20.40.60.81.01.22019202020212022Japan2019202020212022Korea2019202020212022Singapore2019202020212022Hong Kong40ASEAN+3 Regio
279、nal Economic Outlook 2023FSS0.00.20.40.60.81.01.2201020152020Brunei201020152020China201020152020Indonesia201020152020Malaysia201020152020Philippines201020152020ThailandContribution to FSSContribution to FSSFSS0.00.20.40.60.81.01.2201020152020Cambodia201020152020Lao PDR201020152020Myanmar201020152020
280、Vietnam0.00.20.40.60.81.01.22019 2020 2021 2022Brunei2019202020212022China2019202020212022Indonesia2019202020212022Malaysia2019202020212022Philippines2019202020212022Thailand0.00.20.40.60.81.01.22019202020212022Cambodia2019202020212022Lao PDR2019202020212022Myanmar2019202020212022VietnamFiscal Posit
281、ionFinancing ConditionDebt ProfileExternal PositionMacro SituationGlobal EconomyFSSFSSThresholdSource:National authorities,IMF,World Bank via Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:The short-term fiscal sustainability indicator(FSS)is a composite indicator based on 27 indicators reflecting the fi
282、scal position,external position,macroeconomic and financial market conditions,as well as global economic conditions.The optimal thresholds are indicated by the horizontal dotted lines.A higher(lower)value of FSS(relative to the threshold)implies higher(lower)short-term risk of a fiscal stress event.
283、BN=Brunei;CN=China;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MM=Myanmar;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.41Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and ChallengesBox 1.6:Monetary Policy Frameworks in ASEAN+3ASEAN+3 economies have adopted a wide range o
284、f monetary policy frameworks to achieve their price,financial,and external stability objectives(Table 1.6.1).Brunei and Hong Kong have a hard exchange rate peg similar to a currency board system;hence,they have no monetary policy autonomy.Cambodia,China,Lao PDR,and Vietnam have de facto soft exchang
285、e rate pegs,with an explicit or implicit exchange rate anchor for monetary policy.Singapore centers its monetary policy on the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate.Cambodia and Lao PDR are highly dollarized economies.Five economiesIndonesia,Japan,Korea,the Philippines,and Thailandhave an
286、 inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy,while Malaysia has no explicitly stated nominal anchor and monitors various indicators in conducting monetary policy.Monetary policy space is assessed by AMRO staff based on a four-block approach that accounts for:(1)the degree of monetary policy au
287、tonomy;(2)the distance of the prevailing monetary policy rate from the zero lower bound;(3)external sustainability and reserve buffers to deal with shocks;and(4)financial imbalances and the ability to address them using macroprudential tools(Poonpatpibul and others 2020).For Cambodia,Lao PDR,Myanmar
288、,and Vietnam,the assessment of monetary policy space also takes into account the level of dollarization and data limitations in key financial stability indicators.Table 1.6.1.ASEAN+3:Monetary Policy FrameworksSource:IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions(AREAER)database
289、;Poonpatpibul and others(2020);AMRO staff compilation.Note:n.a.=not applicable.“Other managed arrangement”(Myanmar)refers to an exchange rate arrangement that does not meet the criteria for any of the AREAR categories;arrangements characterized by frequent shifts in policies may fall into this categ
290、ory.This box was written by Anthony Chia Kiat Tan.EconomyDe Facto Exchange Rate ClassificationMonetary Policy FrameworkPolicy Interest Rate(s)BruneiCurrency boardExchange rate anchor against the Singapore dollarn.a.Hong KongCurrency boardExchange rate anchor against the US dollarn.a.CambodiaStabiliz
291、ed arrangement Exchange rate anchor against the US dollarn.a.SingaporeStabilized arrangementExchange rate anchor against a basket of currenciesn.a.VietnamCrawl-like arrangement Exchange rate anchor against the US dollarState Bank of Vietnam refinancing rate,discount rate,overnight lending interest r
292、ate in interbank electronic payment.Lao PDRCrawl-like arrangementOther monetary framework(de facto exchange rate anchor against the US dollar)PhilippinesFloating Inflation targeting Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas overnight reverse repurchase rateChinaOther managed arrangement Monetary aggregate target(
293、de facto exchange rate anchor against a basket of currencies)Peoples Bank of China repo rate,reverse repo rate,loan prime rate,standing lending facility,and medium-term lending facility rates.MyanmarOther managed arrangementMonetary aggregate target(reserve money)IndonesiaFloatingFlexible inflation
294、targeting Bank Indonesia seven-day reverse repo rate KoreaFloatingInflation targetingBank of Korea base rate MalaysiaFloatingOther monetary frameworkBank Negara Malaysia overnight policy rateThailandFloatingFlexible inflation targeting Bank of Thailand one-day bilateral repurchase transaction rate J
295、apanFree floatingInflation targetingBank of Japan short-term policy interest rate and 10-year Japan Government Bond yield42ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Table 1.3 summarizes AMRO staff assessments and recommendations regarding the policy stance in ASEAN+3 economies.With fiscal space signific
296、antly smaller,most authorities in the region are planning to shift toward fiscal consolidation in 2023.Fiscal deficits widened in half of the regions economies in 2022 and narrowed in the other half(Figure 1.47).The variation largely reflected differences in the speed of economic recovery,unwinding
297、of spending on pandemic support,and restructuring of spending programs,as well as idiosyncratic factors such as commodity price windfalls(Brunei and Indonesia).Fiscal balances are budgeted to improve in most economies in 2023,in anticipation of robust revenue growth and withdrawal of pandemic-relate
298、d spending(Figure 1.48).As a result,the fiscal stance in 2023 is assessed to be contractionary in half of the regions economies.(Figure 1.49).The speed and magnitude of fiscal consolidation would depend on country-specific economic circumstances,policy priorities,and constraints.In the near term,som
299、e economies still need continued fiscal support,especially where rising inflation has substantially increased the cost of living or where there has been a resurgence of COVID-19 and economic recovery has not fully taken hold.Economic recovery is often uneven,and vulnerable groups and sectors may sti
300、ll require support.At the same time,although some fiscal policy space remains in most economies,it is crucial to rebuild fiscal buffers to prepare for future shocks and to address medium-and longer-term challenges(Box 1.7).For non-reserve currency economies heavily reliant on external financing,a so
301、und fiscal position is especially critical for their sovereign credit rating,which affects financing costs of not only the government but also the private sector.Fiscal consolidation should be addressed first through resource reallocation and supported by fiscal reform.Fiscal adjustment should start
302、 by tapering broad-based emergency measures based on the strength of the economic recovery and the abatement of the pandemic.Expanded social safety nets should provide continued support to vulnerable groups and sectors lagging in the recovery,while time-bound,targeted support could be employed to fi
303、ll gaps in social protection coverage.Fiscal policy should stand ready to take the lead in dealing with economic difficulties if downside risks materialize,especially where limitations on monetary policy apply.In any case,the support should be temporary and selective,and efforts to rebuild the fisca
304、l buffer should be resumed once the risk factors subside.Policy PositionsFiscal policyFigure 1.47.ASEAN+3:Fiscal BalancesSource:National Authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Fiscal year(FY)is April to March for Brunei,Hong Kong,Japan,and Singapore;October to September f
305、or Thailand and Myanmar;January to December for the other economies.BN=Brunei;CN=China;e=estimate;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MM=Myanmar;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.-20-15-10-50BNKHCNHKJPKRIDLAMYMMPHSGTHVNFY2019FY2020FY2021FY2
306、022eChapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges43Figure 1.48.Selected ASEAN+3:Contribution to the Change in Fiscal Balance,FY2023(Percent of GDP)Figure 1.49.Selected ASEAN+3:Fiscal Impulse,FY2023(Percent of GDP)Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimates.Note:B
307、udget data are unavailable for Myanmar.The fiscal balance for Singapore is based on the overall budget surplus/deficit,excluding capitalization and depreciation of nationally significant infrastructure from the overall fiscal position.BN=Brunei;CN=China;FY=fiscal year;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Ja
308、pan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR,MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Source:National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics;AMRO staff estimate.Note:AMRO defines fiscal impulse as the estimated change in the structural primary balance.A negative fiscal impulse implies
309、 a contractionary fiscal stance.The change in primary expenditure is defined as the annual difference in expenditure excluding interest payments,as a percentage of GDP.A negative sign implies that primary expenditure grows slower than nominal GDP.Budget data are unavailable for Myanmar.BN=Brunei;CN=
310、China;FY=fiscal year;HK=Hong Kong;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;ID=Indonesia;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.-16-12-8-4048BNKHCNHKIDJPKRLAMYPHSGTHVNContribution of GDP deflatorContribution of real GDP growthContribution of expenditure decreaseContribution of revenue in
311、creaseChange in fiscal balance-6-4-2024KHCNHKIDJPKRLAMYPHSGTHVNFiscal impulseChange in primary expenditure to GDP ratio44ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Box 1.7:Fiscal Policy in the Medium TermAcross the region,fiscal deficits are envisaged to gradually return to pre-pandemic levels in the med
312、ium term(Figure 1.7.1).Government debt-to-GDP ratios will plateau or slightly decline over time(Figure 1.7.2).The planned restoration of fiscal space will enable fiscal policy to play a bigger role in supporting growth against shocks,minimizing the scarring effects of the pandemic,and addressing exi
313、sting and emerging structural challengese.g.,population aging,infrastructure gaps,climate change,and digitalization.In the next 10 years,several ASEAN+3 economies are projected to become so-called post-aged(or super-aged)societies,with more than 20 percent of the population above the age of 65(Figur
314、e 1.7.3).The additional fiscal costs for health care spending in 2032 compared to 2022 are estimated to range from under 1 percent of GDP(in China,Japan,and Thailand)to over 2 percent of GDP(in Hong Kong,Korea,and Singapore).As noted in the thematic chapter of the ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2
315、022,the regions emerging and developing economies face sizeable investment needs for both traditional and new infrastructure(AMRO 2022b).The infrastructure gap is estimated to be 0.30.9 percent of GDP in emerging-market economies,and 1.14.2 percent of GDP in low-income economies,on average,in 202340
316、(Figure 1.7.4).ASEAN+3 authorities should prepare clear medium-term fiscal consolidation plans.For accountability and credibility,specific targetsfor the fiscal deficit and/or the government debt ratioshould be presented together with realistic macroeconomic projections and feasible policy measures
317、to achieve them.The targets and measures should be aligned with country-specific economic and fiscal circumstances.For example,economies with low tax-to-GDP ratios may put more emphasis on improving revenue collection in their medium-term consolidation plan.To safeguard growth momentum,revenue-enhan
318、cing measures should prioritize strengthening tax administration and compliance before introducing new taxes or raising tax rates.Expenditure measures,such as rationalizing distortionary subsidies and improving the efficiency of spending programs,would also be important aspects of fiscal adjustment(
319、Andriansyah and Hong 2022).Governments should also consider reinstating fiscal rules relaxed during the pandemic or introducing new fiscal rules to guide the fiscal consolidation targets.1Post-pandemic fiscal policy normalization will provide the opportunity to revisit overall resource allocation ac
320、ross diverse policy priorities.Restructuring of spending programs should be based on rigorous assessment of existing and new programs,which would help redirect resources toward high-priority programs while strengthening role-sharing between the public and private sectors to better mobilize available
321、 resources.1/Indonesia has reinstated its budget deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP after relaxing it for three years from 2020 to 2022.Thailand increased its public debt ceiling from 60 percent of GDP to 70 percent in 2021.Malaysia increased its public debt ceiling from 55 percent of GDP to 60 per
322、cent in 2020,and 65 percent in 2021;in addition,the Malaysian government has created a special account for the COVID-19 fund,which allows it to bypass the golden rule of government spending and borrow for this account.Meanwhile,Korea has proposed a fiscal rule limiting the fiscal deficit excluding s
323、ocial security funds to below 3 percent of GDP.This box was written by Byunghoon Nam.45Chapter 1.Macroeconomic Prospects and ChallengesFigure 1.7.1.Selected ASEAN+3:Medium-Term Fiscal Balance Projections(Percent of GDP)Figure 1.7.3.ASEAN+3:Old-age Population(Percent of total population)Figure 1.7.4.
324、Selected ASEAN+3:Infrastructure Investment Gap,202340(Percent of GDP)Figure 1.7.2.Selected ASEAN+3:Medium-Term Government Debt Projections(Percent of GDP)-10-8-6-4-2024HKIDJPKRMYPHFY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025FY2026FY2027FY2028FY2015FY2019(actual)051015202530354045JP KR HK SG TH CN VN BNID MY PH KH LA MM
325、2023203320432053Aging SocietyAged SocietyPost-aged Society02468SGJPKRIDCNMYTHPHVNKHMMCurrent trendInvestment needInvestment gap1902002102203040506070FY2019aFY2021aFY2023FY2025FY2027IDKRPHJP(right axis)Source:National authorities;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Fiscal balance projections are as announced b
326、y authorities.FY=fiscal year;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KR=Korea;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines.Data for FY202228 are AMRO staff estimates.Source:United Nations;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Old-age population refers to those of ages 65 years and above.An economy is classified as an aging society if
327、 the share of old-age population in the total population is 7 percent to 14 percent,an aged society if the share is 15 percent to 19 percent,and a post-aged society if the share is 20 percent and above.BN=Brunei;CN=China;HK=Hong Kong;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;LA=Lao PDR;MM=Myanmar;M
328、Y=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Source:Global Infrastructure Outlook;AMRO staff calculations.Note:The investment gap is defined as the difference between the infrastructure investment projected for 202340,based on current trends and the infrastructure investment needed
329、to match the performance of the best-performing peers.CN=China;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KH=Cambodia;KR=Korea;MM=Myanmar;MY=Malaysia;PH=Philippines;SG=Singapore;TH=Thailand;VN=Vietnam.Source:National authorities;AMRO staff estimates.Note:Debt ratio projections are as announced by authorities.a=actual;FY
330、=fiscal year;ID=Indonesia;JP=Japan;KR=Korea;PH=Philippines.46ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook 2023Monetary policy should remain tight in economies where inflation is above-target.In Korea and Singapore,a rapidly narrowing output gap and firming labor market prompted more preemptive monetary policy
331、tightening to rein in inflation pressures in 2022.The Bank of Korea tightened policy at a more aggressive pace,raising its policy(“base”)rate well above pre-pandemic levels(Figure 1.50).The Monetary Authority of Singapore acted preemptively and has progressively recentered the mid-point and raised t
332、he slope of the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate policy band since October 2021.While inflation pressures have largely eased,headline inflation remains higher than the pre-pandemic average in these two economies(Figure 1.51).In the Philippines,the central bank raised its policy rate
333、to curb rising inflation and the emergence of second-round effects.Given these three economies mid-and late-cycle positions(as shown in Section I),AMRO staff recommends that their central banks maintain a tight monetary policy stance until inflation pressures subside.Monetary conditions can remain accommodative in economies with negative output gaps.As noted earlier,Indonesia,Malaysia,and Thailand
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