聯合國環境規劃署：2023年生產差距報告（英文版）（126頁）.pdf

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1、2023Production Gap Report 2023Phasing down or phasing up?Top fossil fuel producers plan even more extraction despite climate promisesAbout This ReportThis is the fourth edition of the Production Gap Report,first issued in 2019.The report tracks the misalignment between governments planned fossil fue

2、l production and global production levels con-sistent with limiting global warming to 1.5C or 2C.The report represents a collaboration of several research and academic institutions,including inputs and reviews from more than 80 experts from 30 countries spanning the Global North and Global South.The

3、 report is externally peer-reviewed,with additional guidance and support from the United Nations Environment Programme,and review by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changes government focal points.This years report features two major updates to the production gap analysis,drawing

4、on the new mitigation scenarios database compiled for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes Sixth Assessment Report and changes in government plans and projections since August 2021.The report also provides individual country profiles for 20 major fossil-fuel-producing countries,evaluating

5、governments latest climate ambitions and their plans,policies,and strategies that support fossil fuel production or the transition away from it.The production gap analysis is based on recent and publicly accessible plans and projections for fos-sil fuel production published by governments and affili

6、ated institutions.Other information presented throughout the report,such as details on fossil fuel investments and policies is supported by a mix of government,intergovernmental,peer-review,and other research sources listed in the references.The report and its materials can be accessed online at htt

7、ps:/productiongap.org/2023report.CitationThis document may be cited as:SEI,Climate Analytics,E3G,IISD,and UNEP.(2023).The Production Gap:Phasing down or phasing up?Top fossil fuel producers plan even more extraction despite climate promises.Stockholm Environment Institute,Climate Analytics,E3G,Inter

8、national Institute for Sustainable Development and United Nations Environment Programme.https:/doi.org/10.51414/sei2023.050Photo CreditsGetty Images.November 2023 by Stockholm Environment Institute This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit p

9、urposes,without special permission from the copyright holder(s)provided acknowledgement of the source is made.No use of this publica-tion may be made for resale or other commercial purpose,without the written permission of the copyright holder(s).Production Gap Report 2023 iiiWe would like to thank

10、the following contributors for their input:Asterisk(*)connotes lead author.Parentheses indicate institutional affiliation.Steering Committee Manfredi Caltagirone(United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP),Andrea Guerrero Garca(Growald Climate Fund),Niklas Hagelberg(UNEP),Joana Portugal Pereira(Feder

11、al University of Rio de Janeiro(UFRJ),Youba Sokona(University College London(UCL).AuthorsChapter 1Ploy Achakulwisut(Stockholm Environment Institute(SEI)and Michael Lazarus(SEI).Chapter 2Ploy Achakulwisut*(SEI),Neil Grant(Climate Analytics),Cline Guivarch(CIRED),Michael Lazarus(SEI),Steve Pye(UCL),Ro

12、berto Schaeffer(UFRJ).Chapter 3Ploy Achakulwisut(SEI),Aisha Al-Sarihi(Middle East Institute,National University of Singapore),Raja Asvanon(SEI),Jesse Burton(E3G),Patricio Calles Almeida(SEI),Laura Cameron(International Institute for Sustainable Development(IISD),Kristian Coates Ulrichsen(Rice Univer

13、sity),Vanessa Corkal(IISD),Bruno S.L.Cunha(UFRJ),Rebecca Draeger(UFRJ),Dimas Fauzi(SEI),Emily Ghosh(SEI),Kamila Godzinska(E3G),Gang He(City University of New York),Frank Jotzo(The Australian National University),Brd Lahn(University of Oslo),Michael Lazarus(SEI),Yury Melnikov(independent sustainable

14、energy consultant;UNECE Task Force on Hydrogen),Tatiana Mitrova(Columbia University),Yacob Mulugetta(UCL),Anisha Nazareth(SEI),James Ogunleye(Carbon Limits Nigeria),Serik Orazgaliyev(Nazarbayev University),Julia Paletta Crespo(UFRJ),Steve Pye(UCL),Leo Roberts(E3G),Alexandre Szklo(UFRJ),Roberto Schae

15、ffer(UFRJ),Aliya Sembayeva(Sustainable Development Solutions Network;Nazarbayev University),Tom Swann(The Sunrise Project),Jos Vega Arajo(SEI).ReviewersThe following people reviewed one or more sections of this report:Sheila Aggarwal-Khan(UNEP),Alaa Al Khourdajie(Imperial College),Yerdaulet Abuov,Yo

16、usef M.Al-Abdullah(Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research(KSIR),Osamah Alsayegh(KSIR),Andrzej Ancygier(Climate Analytics),Tabar Arroyo Currs(TAC Energy Concepts),Jonathan Banks(Clean Air Task Force),Olivier Bois von Kursk(IISD),Elina Brutschin(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis),

17、Michael Burger(Columbia Law School),John Christensen(UNEP),Mohammed Dahiru Aminu(Clean Air Task Force),Brook Dambacher(Uplift),Nandini Das(Climate Analytics),Knut Einar Rosendahl(Norwegian University of Life Sciences),Courtney Freer(Emory University),Lisa Fischer(E3G),Claire Fyson(Climate Analytics)

18、,Ricardo Gorini(International Renewable Energy Agency),Neil Grant(Climate Analytics),Richard Halsey(IISD),Kathryn Harrison(University of British Columbia),Laury Haytayan(Natural Resource Governance Institute(NRGI),Sarah Heck(Climate Analytics),Hauke Hermann(ko-Institut),Andrea Hinwood(UNEP),Thomas H

19、oulie(Climate Analytics),Jean Jiang(SEI),Daniel Jones(Uplift),Natalie Jones(IISD),Maarten Kappelle(UNEP),Hongyou Lu(Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory),Yury Melnikov(independent sustainable energy consultant,UNECE Task Force on Hydrogen),Alfredo Miranda-Gonzlez(Clean Air Task Force),Gaylor Montma

20、sson-Clair(Trade&Industrial Policy Strategies),Victor Maxwell(Climate Analytics),Claire OManique(Oil Change International),Natalia Ortiz(SEI),Sandeep Pai(Swaniti Initiative),Katrine Petersen(E3G),Angela Picciariello(IISD),Deborah Ramalope(Climate Analytics),Alison Reeve(Grattan Institute),Carley Rey

21、nolds(Climate Analytics),Allie Rosenbluth(Oil Change International),Lorne Stockman(Oil Change International),Claudia Strambo(SEI),Maxim Titov,Fabby Tumiwa(Institute for Essential Services Reform),Sergey Vakulenko(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),Jorge Villarreal(Iniciativa Climtica de Mxi

22、co),Paola Yanguas Parra(Technische Universitt Berlin).Acknowledgementsiv Production Gap Report 2023Project CoordinationPloy Achakulwisut(SEI)and Michael Lazarus(SEI)served as coordinating lead authors for this report.Emily Ghosh(SEI)served as coordinator of the country profiles in Chapter 3.Editing

23、and CommunicationsStephen Graham(independent)and Lynsi Burton(SEI)led the reports editing.Lynsi Burton and Ulrika Lamberth(SEI)led the reports outreach and communications.Design and LayoutThe report cover was designed by UNEP.The report interior was designed by One Visual Mind.Mia Shu(SEI)designed s

24、ome report figures.Ploy Achakulwisut(SEI)designed the website.TranslationsION Translations provided translations of the Executive Summary in Arabic,Indonesian,Chinese,French,Russian,and Spanish.Thanks also to:John Christensen(UNEP),Maarten Kappelle(UNEP),Christophe McGlade(International Energy Agenc

25、y),Anne Olhoff(CONCITO Denmarks green think tank),Mark Radka(UNEP),Kaisa Uusimaa(UNEP),Patrick Heller(NRGI),and Emma Dahmani(NRGI);and national gov-ernment UNFCCC focal points and their colleagues who provided feedback on Chapter 3.Thanks to the KR Foundation,the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Aff

26、airs and Climate Policy,the Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors,and the Swedish International De-velopment Agency(Sida)for funding and supporting the work of the Production Gap Report.Production Gap Report 2023 vCarbon dioxide equivalent(CO2eq)The amount of carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions that would caus

27、e the same warming over a given time horizon as an emitted amount of greenhouse gases.Fossil fuel productionA collective term used in this report to represent processes along the fossil fuel supply chain,which includes locating,extracting,and processing,and delivering coal,oil,and gas to consumers.G

28、overnment plans and projections(GPP)A global pathway of future fossil fuel production estimated in this report,based on the compilation and assessment of re-cent national energy plans,strategy documents,and outlooks published by governments and affiliated institutions.This term was formerly called t

29、he“countries plans and projec-tions(CPP)”pathway in the 2021 PGR.Greenhouse gases(GHGs)Atmospheric gases that absorb and emit infrared radiation,trap heat,contribute to the greenhouse effect,and cause global warming.The principal GHGs are carbon dioxide(CO2),methane(CH4),and nitrous oxide(N2O),as we

30、ll as hydroflu-orocarbons(HFCs),perfluorocarbons(PFCs)and sulphur hexafluoride(SF6).Just transitionIn the context of climate policy,this refers to a shift to a low-carbon economy that ensures disruptions are mini-mized and benefits maximized for workers,commu-nities,consumers,and other stakeholders

31、who may be disproportionately affected.Long-term low-emission development strategies(LT-LEDS)Under the Paris Agreement and its accompanying decision,all countries are invited to communicate LT-LEDS by 2020,taking into account their common but differentiated responsi-bilities and respective capabilit

32、ies,in light of different national circumstances.Multilateral development bank(MDB)An international financial institution chartered by multiple countries to support economic and social development in lower-income countries.Nationally determined contributions(NDCs)Submissions by Parties to the Paris

33、Agreement that contain their stated ambitions to take climate change action towards achievement of the Agreements long-term goal of limiting global temperature increase to well below 2C,while pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5C.Parties are requested to communicate new or updated NDCs by 2

34、020 and every five years thereafter.Production gapThe discrepancy between governments planned/projected fossil fuel production and global production levels consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C or 2C.Stranded assetsAssets that suffer from unanticipated or premature write-offs or downward revaluat

35、ions,or that are converted to liabilities,as the result of a low-carbon transition or other environ-ment-related action.SubsidyA financial benefit accorded to a specific interest(e.g.an individual,organization,company,or sector)by a government or public body.Glossaryvi Production Gap Report 2023AR6

36、Sixth Assessment Report (from the IPCC)Bcf Billion cubic feetBcm Billion cubic metersBECCS Bioenergy with carbon capture and storageCCS Carbon capture and storageCCUS Carbon capture,utilization,and storageCDR Carbon dioxide removalCO2 Carbon dioxide CO2eq Carbon dioxide equivalent COP Conference of

37、the Parties (to the UNFCCC)C Degrees CelsiusDACCS Direct air carbon capture and storageEJ ExajouleEU European UnionG7 Group of SevenG20 Group of TwentyGDP Gross domestic productGHG Greenhouse gasGPP Government plans and projectionsGt Gigatonne(billion tonnes)IAM Integrated assessment modelIEA Intern

38、ational Energy AgencyIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeJETP Just Energy Transition PartnershipLNG Liquefied natural gasLT-LEDS Long-term,low-emission development strategiesMb/d Million barrels per dayMt Million tonnesNDC Nationally determined contributionNZE Net Zero by 2050 pathway for

39、the energy sector(from the IEA)OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentPGR Production Gap ReportSOE State-owned enterpriseTcm Trillion cubic metersUAE United Arab EmiratesUN United NationsUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUK United Kingdom of Great Britai

40、n and Northern IrelandUS United States of AmericaAbbreviationsProduction Gap Report 2023 viiClimate change has battered the worlds most vulnerable for years.Now,wealthier nations and communities find themselves taking hits as heatwaves,droughts,wildfires and storms grow.The whole world is clinging t

41、o the handrails on a boat that is lurching through increasingly turbulent seas.Nobody is safe.The escalating frequency and intensity of these events are a direct result of anthropogenic climate change,which is driven by humanitys addiction to fossil fuels.By committing to limiting global temperature

42、 rise through the Paris Agreement,governments have shown they understand this.They have shown they want to change.Yet,as this report shows,the addiction to fossil fuels still has its claws deep in many nations.Governments are planning to produce,and the world is planning to consume,over double the a

43、mount of fossil fuels in 2030 than is consistent with the pathway to limiting global temperature rise to 1.5C.These plans throw the global energy transition into question.They throw humanitys future into question.Governments must stop saying one thing and doing another,especially as it relates to th

44、e production and consumption of fossil fuels.Powering economies with clean and efficient energy is the only way to end energy poverty and bring down emissions at the same time.Starting at COP28,nations must unite behind a managed and equitable phase-out of coal,oil and gas to ease the turbulence ahe

45、ad and benefit every person on this planet.The recent global energy crisis and the worsening climate crisis have a common root:our excessive dependence on fossil fuels.This root must now be severed to achieve real energy security and climate security.From the latest IPCC report to the latest climate

46、 disaster headlines,the message is clear:Governments must lead a swift and just transition away from fossil fuels towards clean energy.And yet as this years report shows,the worlds governments still,in aggregate,plan on increasing coal production out to 2030 and increasing oil and gas production out

47、 to at least 2050.Most have pledged net-zero emissions by mid-century:a necessary target,but one that can only become a reality if translated into concrete plans and actions to reduce production and use of coal,oil,and gas.Wealthier countries that are less dependent on fossil fuels for livelihoods a

48、nd revenues will need to reduce faster.Other countries will require support.And none want to act alone.Thats why all eyes will be on govern-ments as they convene in Dubai this December to take on the long-overdue work of phasing out fossil fuels fairly and equitably.ForewordMns Nilsson Executive Dir

49、ector Stockholm Environment InstituteInger Andersen Executive Director United Nations Environment Programmeviii Production Gap:2023 ReportProduction Gap Report 2023 1ContentsAcknowledgements.iiiGlossary.vAbbreviations .viForeword.viiExecutive Summary .21.Introduction.102.The Production Gap.16 2.1 Th

50、e fossil fuel production gap.17 2.2 A breakdown of the government plans and projections(GPP)pathway.22 2.3 Global coal,oil,and gas reduction pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C .24 2.4 Policy implications I:why a global fossil fuel phase-out is needed to limit warming to 1.5C.27 2.5 Po

51、licy implications II:why an equitable transition away from fossil fuels is important but at risk.30 2.6 Conclusions.333.Government plans and policies for fossil fuel production .34 China.46 United States of America.48 Russian Federation.50 Saudi Arabia.52 Australia.54 Indonesia.56 India.58 Canada.60

52、 United Arab Emirates.62 Qatar.64 South Africa.66 Norway.68 Brazil.70 Kazakhstan.72 Kuwait.74 Mexico.76 Nigeria.78 Colombia.80 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .82 Germany.84References.87Appendix available onlineExecutive Summary2 Production Gap:2023 ReportKey FindingsGovernments

53、,in aggregate,still plan to produce more than double the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C.The persistence of the global production gap puts a well-managed and equitable energy transition at risk.Taken together,government plans and projections woul

54、d lead to an increase in global coal production until 2030,and in global oil and gas production until at least 2050.This conflicts with government commitments under the Paris Agreement,and clashes with expectations that global demand for coal,oil,and gas will peak within this decade even without new

55、 policies.Major producer countries have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions and launched initiatives to reduce emissions from fossil fuel production,but none have committed to reduce coal,oil,and gas production in line with limiting warming to 1.5C.Governments should be more transparent in their p

56、lans,projections,and support for fossil fuel production and how they align with national and international climate goals.There is a strong need for governments to adopt near-and long-term reduction targets in fossil fuel production and use to complement other climate mitigation targets and to reduce

57、 the risks of stranded assets.Given risks and uncertainties of carbon capture and storage and carbon dioxide removal,countries should aim for a near total phase-out of coal production and use by 2040 and a combined reduction in oil and gas production and use by three-quarters by 2050 from 2020 level

58、s,at a minimum.The potential failure of these measures to develop at scale calls for an even more rapid global phase-out of all fossil fuels.An equitable transition away from fossil fuel production must recognize countries differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.Governments with greater tra

59、nsition capacity should aim for more ambitious reductions and help finance the transition processes in countries with limited capacities.Production Gap Report 2023 3Executive SummarySoon after the release of the 2021 Production Gap Report,governments agreed to accelerate efforts towards“the phasedow

60、n of unabated coal power”at the 26th Conference of the Parties(COP)to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)in Glasgow.It was a significant milestone in the history of international climate governance:for the first time,an explicit reference to fossil fuels appeared in a C

61、OP decision text.Yet since that time,the production and use of fossil fuels have reached record high levels.If global carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions of which close to 90%stem from fossil fuels continue at the current pace,the world could exceed the remaining emissions budget compatible with a 50%chanc

62、e of limiting long-term warming to 1.5C by 2030.Both global CO2 emissions and fossil fuel production need to peak and swiftly decline to keep the Paris Agreements temperature goal within reach.Informed by the latest sci-entific evidence,this report identifies global pathways for coal,oil,and gas pro

63、duction from now until 2050 that are consistent with this goal.It then assesses governments plans,projections,and policies for fossil fuel production and how aligned or misaligned they are with respect to these pathways.Figure ES.1The fossil fuel production gap the difference between governments pla

64、ns and projections and levels consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C and 2C,as expressed in units of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel extraction and burning remains large and expands over time.(See details in Chapter 2 and Figure 2.1.)Government plans&projections Stated policies Announced

65、 pledges 2C-consistent 1.5C-consistentGlobal fossil fuel production4030201002020203020402050GtCO2eq/yrThe Production Gap4 Production Gap Report 2023The reports main findings are as follows:Since it was first quantified in 2019,the global production gap has remained largely unchanged.Despite encourag

66、ing signs of an emerging clean energy transition,the worlds governments still plan to produce more than double the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C.The production gap is the difference between govern-ments planned fossil fuel production and global

67、 pro-duction levels consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5C or 2C.This years production gap assessment features two major updates.First,the“government plans and projections”global pathway reflects how major fossil-fuel-producing countries have adjusted their coal,oil,and gas production targe

68、ts in light of developments since late 2021,including a global energy crisis and increased climate mitigation ambitions.Second,global pathways for fossil fuel production consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C or 2C have been updated using the new scenario database compiled for the Working Group II

69、I contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)s Sixth Assessment Report(AR6).The resulting analysis finds that,in aggregate,governments are planning on producing around 110%more fossil fuels in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C,and 69%more than would

70、be consistent with limiting warming to 2C,as shown in Figure ES.1.The mag-nitude of the production gap is also projected to grow over time:by 2050,planned fossil fuel production is 350%and 150%above the levels consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C or 2C,respectively.The global levels of fossil fu

71、el production implied by governments plans and projections,taken together,also exceed those implied by their stated climate mitigation policies and implied by their announced climate pledges as of September 2022,as modelled by the International Energy Agency.As discussed below,few countries have dev

72、eloped fossil fuel production projections that are aligned with their national climate goals or with limiting warming to 1.5C.Many major fossil-fuel-producing governments are still planning near-term increases in coal production and long-term increases in oil and gas production.In total,government p

73、lans and projections would lead to an increase in global production until 2030 for coal,and until at least 2050 for oil and gas,creating increasingly large production gaps over time.To be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C,global coal,oil,and gas supply and demand must instead decline rapidly

74、and substantially between now and mid-century.However,the increases estimated under the government plans and projections pathways would lead to global production levels in 2030 that are 460%,29%,and 82%Government plans&projections Stated policies Announced pledges 2C-consistent 1.5C-consistent108642

75、02020203020402050Coal ProductionEJ/yrGt/yr2020203020402050Oil Production200150100500200150100500200150100500120100806040200EJ/yrMb/d2020203020402050Gas Production6543210EJ/yrTcm/yrFigure ES.2Government plans and projections would lead to an increase in global coal production until 2030,and in global

76、 oil and gas production until at least 2050.(See details in Chapter 2 and Figure 2.2.)Production Gap Report 2023 5higher for coal,oil,and gas,respectively,than the median 1.5C-consistent pathways,as shown in Figure ES.2.The disconnect between governments fossil fuel production plans and their climat

77、e pledges is also apparent across all three fuels.The size and nature of the global production gap also raise the question of how it can be closed in a managed and equitable way,especially given that countries are expected to uphold“the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilit

78、ies and respective capabili-ties,in light of different national circumstances”under the UNFCCC framework.As explored in the 2020 Production Gap Report and informed by emerging literature on this topic,an equitable transition should recognize that countries circumstances differ widely depending on th

79、eir financial and institutional capacity,as well as their level of socioeconomic depen-dence on fossil fuel production.Based on these principles,one might expect higher-income countries and those less dependent on fossil fuel production to lead the transition,while lower-capacity countries will requ

80、ire assistance and finance to pursue alternative low-carbon and climate-re-silient development pathways.However,the combined levels of coal,oil,and gas produc-tion being planned/projected by 10 high-income countries alone would already exceed 1.5C-consistent pathways for each fuel by 2040.Similarly,

81、the trajectories of oil and gas production being planned and projected by 12 countries with relatively lower levels of economic dependence on their production would exceed the respective 1.5C-con-sistent pathways by 2040(see Section 2.5).Without active dialogue and engagement between higher-and lowe

82、r-in-come countries,these inequities may continue to exist and to erode trust in global cooperation on climate action.In addition to government plans and projections for fossil fuel production that inform the global production gap analysis in Chapter 2,this report also reviews,in Chapter 3,the clima

83、te ambitions and fossil fuel production policies and strategies of 20 major producer countries:Australia,Brazil,Canada,China,Colombia,Germany,India,Indone-sia,Kazakhstan,Kuwait,Mexico,Nigeria,Norway,Qatar,the Russian Federation,Saudi Arabia,South Africa,the United Arab Emirates,the United Kingdom of

84、 Great Britain and Northern Ireland(UK),and the United States of Amer-ica(US).Altogether,these countries account for 82%of production and 73%of consumption of the worlds fossil fuel supply.The status of discourses and policies towards a managed and equitable transition away from fossil fuel producti

85、on in these countries is also evaluated.While 17 of the 20 countries profiled have pledged to achieve net-zero emissions,and many have launched initiatives to reduce emissions from fossil fuel production activities,most continue to promote,subsidize,support,and plan on the expansion of fossil fuel p

86、roduction.None have committed to reduce coal,oil,and gas production in line with limiting warming to 1.5C.As shown in Table ES.1,some countries are planning on increasing their coal production until 2030,banking on continued and growing domestic and international coal markets.Meanwhile,the majority

87、of oil and gas producers anticipate increasing their production between 2021 and 2030,and some until 2050.The war in Ukraine,the ensuing pressures on global energy supply,and record high prices for internationally traded gas have further spurred plans for and investment in liquefied natural gas infr

88、astructure by exporters and importers alike.Many countries are promoting gas as a“bridge”or“transition”fuel,but with no apparent plans to transition away from it.Eight countries profiled in Chapter 3 project relatively flat or increasing gas production from 2021 until 20352050.However,gas could hind

89、er or delay the transition to renewable energy systems by locking in fossil-fuel-based systems and institutions.Moreover,despite some local air pollution benefits when substituting for coal,advances in the quantification of methane leak-age along the gas supply chain have substantially reduced the e

90、xpected climate benefits of replacing coal with gas(see Chapter 3).In recent years,many governments have launched ini-tiatives to reduce emissions from fossil fuel production activities.As shown in Table ES.1,14 of the 20 countries profiled in Chapter 3 have signed onto the Global Meth-ane Pledge to

91、 collectively reduce global methane emis-sions from all sources by 30%by 2030 compared to 2020 levels.Six major oil-and gas-producing countries,all of which are among the 20 profiled in Chapter 3,have also launched the Net Zero Producers Forum aimed at reducing emissions from the sector.Such efforts

92、,while important,are also deeply insufficient.In the pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C explored in this report,global methane emissions from the energy sector decline by more than 60%between 2020 and 2030.Fur-thermore,and perhaps most importantly,these initiatives fail to recognize t

93、hat reducing fossil fuel production itself is also needed to limit warming to 1.5C.6 Production Gap Report 2023Table ES.1A large majority of countries profiled in this report have made net-zero pledges and signed onto the Global Methane Pledge and the Glasgow Statement on international finance.Most

94、are also planning to increase oil and gas production,and some are planning to increase coal production,until 2030.(See details in Chapter 3 and Tables 3.23.3.)CountryStatus of national net-zero commitment;net-zero target yearSignatory of Global Methane PledgeSignatory of Glasgow StatementPlanned cha

95、nge in annual fossil fuel production for 2030 relative to 2021(EJ)CoalOilGasAustralia In law 20500.20b0.7Brazil NDC objective 2050No data5.21.0dCanada In law2050 No data3.00.6ChinaNDC objective 20605.302.6ColombiaIn law20501.70.10GermanyIn law20450.500.1IndiaNDC objective 207010.7No dataNo dataIndon

96、esiaIn strategy document20602.50.21.1KazakhstanIn strategy document20600.20.40.1dKuwaitPolitical pledge 2050(oil&gas sector)2060(rest of economy)No production2.10.1MexicoNo commitmentNo data1.40.6NigeriaIn law2060No data1.32.6dNorwayNo commitmentaNo data0.50.3QatarNo commitmentNo productionNo data3.

97、9cRussian FederationIn strategy document20603.22.93.3Saudi ArabiaPolitical pledge2060No production5.51.3South AfricaIn strategy document2050No dataNo dataNo dataUAENDC objective 2050No production1.8c0.4bUKIn law2050No data0.70.6USIn policy document20505.15.22.5a Norway has committed to a“low-emissio

98、n society”by 2050 in its 2018 Climate Change Act,with 9095%emission reduction targets.b Planned change for 2028,furthest year for which data is available.c Planned change for 2027,furthest year for which data is available.d Excluding gas that is re-injected,consumed by producers,and/or flared.Source

99、s:Net Zero Tracker(2023)and own analyses(see Chapter 3).Production Gap Report 2023 7Governments should be more transparent in their plans,projections,and support for fossil fuel production and how they align with national and international climate goals.Governments play a central role in setting the

100、 direction of future fossil fuel production.State-owned entities control half of global production for oil and gas and over half for coal.Governments existing targets,policies,and support for fossil fuel production help to influence,legitimize,and enable continued investments in domestic and interna

101、-tional fossil fuel projects,which are undermining the tran-sition to renewable energy and global climate mitigation efforts.At the same time,many fossil fuel projects planned and under development are now at risk of becoming stranded assets as the world decarbonizes and global demand for coal,oil,a

102、nd gas are expected to peak and de-cline within this decade,even without additional policies.Nevertheless,there are some encouraging signs of movement.Thirty-four countries,including four profiled in Chapter 3(Table ES.1),have signed onto the Glasgow Statement on International Public Support for the

103、 Clean Energy Transition to end international public financing for“unabated”fossil fuel projects by the end of 2022 and to redirect investments into clean energy.It is important to note though that while the term“unabated”(see Box 2.1)is being increasingly used in policy commitments related to fossi

104、l fuel reductions,it is often highly contested,poorly defined,and open to interpretation regarding the required rate of carbon capture for abatement.Since the 2021 Production Gap Report,two more coun-tries(Canada and China)in addition to Germany and Indonesia have begun to develop scenarios for dome

105、s-tic fossil fuel production that are consistent with national or global net-zero or carbon-neutrality targets.Meanwhile,discourses on just transitions for fossil-fuel-dependent workers and economies are advancing in many countries,though these are still mostly limited to coal-fired power generation

106、.Among the 20 countries profiled,Colombia recently signed on to an international initiative targeted at phasing out fossil fuel production(see Table 3.2).There is a need for governments to adopt both near-and long-term reduction targets for fossil fuel production and use to complement other climate

107、mitigation benchmarks and reduce the risks of stranded assets.Countries with greater transition capacity should aim for faster reductions than the global average.The current misalignment of climate ambitions and fossil fuel production plans undermines efforts to reduce fossil fuel use and emissions

108、by sending mixed signals about countries intentions and priorities and by locking in new fossil fuel production infrastructure that will make the 8 Production Gap Report 2023energy transition more costly,difficult,and disruptive.The almost-exclusive focus of climate policy on the demand for fossil f

109、uels and on the territorial emissions associated with their combustion over the past decades has proven to be insufficient.Ultimately,the global energy landscape is shaped by both demand and supply.A well-managed energy transition will thus require plans and actions to reduce both fossil fuel produc

110、tion and consumption in a coordinated fashion.Combining targets and policies to actively phase out fossil fuel production with other important climate mitigation and just transition measures such as reducing fossil fuel consumption,expanding renewable energy,reducing methane emissions from all sourc

111、es,and targeting invest-ments and social protection for affected communities can reduce the costs of decarbonization,promote policy coherence,and ensure that renewables replace,rather than add to,fossil fuel energy.The long-term,cost-optimized mitigation scenarios selected and analysed in this repor

112、t from the IPCC AR6 database suggest that,to limit warming to 1.5C,global coal,oil,and gas production should decline rapidly and substantially between now and mid-century,in parallel with other key mitigation strategies.The selected scenarios differ substantially with respect to their reliance on ca

113、rbon capture and storage(CCS)and carbon dioxide removal(CDR).The median 1.5C-con-sistent global fossil fuel production pathways shown in Figures ES.1ES.2 assume that,by mid-century,2.1 billion tonnes of CO2 per year(GtCO2/yr)of fossil-fuel-combus-tion emissions will be captured and stored,2.2 GtCO2/

114、yr of atmospheric CO2 will be sequestered by conventional land-based CDR methods(afforestation,reforestation,and management of existing forests),and over 3 GtCO2/yr will be sequestered by novel CDR methods(CCS coupled to bioenergy or direct air capture),on average.However,there are large uncertainti

115、es in the technical,economic,and institutional feasibility of developing and deploying novel CDR and fossil-CCS technologies at the extensive scale envisioned in these scenarios.Around 80%of pilot CCS projects over the last 30 years have failed,with annual capacity from operational projects resultin

116、g in dedicated CO2 storage currently amounting to less than 0.01 GtCO2/yr(see Section 2.4).There are also widespread concerns around the potential negative impacts arising from extensive land-use for conventional or novel CDR,which could affect biodiversity,food security,and the rights of Indigenous

117、 peoples and traditional land users.Given risks and uncertainties of CCS and CDR,countries should aim for a near total phase-out of coal production and use by 2040 and a combined reduction in oil and gas production and use by three-quarters by 2050 from 2020 levels,at a minimum.The potential failure

118、 of these measures to become sufficiently viable at scale,the non-climatic near-term harms of fossil fuels,and other lines of evidence,call for an even more rapid global phase-out of all fossil fuels.While the above reduction targets are derived from 1.5C-consistent scenarios that align with taking

119、a pre-cautionary approach to limiting reliance on CCS and CDR,they still assume that these measures will become avail-able at scale to some degree(see Section 2.4).Ultimately,the pace and extent of the required reductions in global coal,oil,and gas production will also depend on many normative and v

120、alues-based choices.For example,one mitigation scenario that relies only on conventional CDR and no CCS coupled to fossil fuels,bioenergy,or direct air capture sees reductions in global oil and gas production of 90%and 85%,respectively,between 2020 and 2050.There are additional compelling reasons to

121、 strive for an even faster global phase-out of all fossil fuels.Research has found that the committed emissions of CO2 expected to occur over the lifetime of existing fossil-fuel-producing infrastructure already exceed the remaining carbon bud-get for a 50%chance of limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100.

122、This implies that no new coal mines and oil and gas fields can be developed unless existing infrastructure is retired early,a task that is hard to achieve in practice.Moreover,fossil fuel extraction and burning are asso-ciated with many near-term and localized non-climatic social,economic,and enviro

123、nmental harms that are rarely accounted for in climate mitigation scenarios,including the ones analysed in this report(see Section 2.4).Continued production and use of coal,oil,and gas are not compatible with a safe and livable future.Achieving net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050 requires governments to

124、commit to,plan for,and implement global reductions in the production of all fossil fuels alongside other climate mitigation actions,beginning now.Production Gap:2023 Report 91Introduction10 Production Gap:2023 ReportProduction Gap Report 2023 11This report examines how governments particularly those

125、 responsible for producing much of the worlds coal,oil,and gas are reckoning with the need to rapidly tran-sition away from fossil fuel production.While the global energy landscape is shaped by both demand and supply,this report series focuses on the latter,given its notable absence in national and

126、international climate policymak-ing until recent years.The report assesses governments plans and projections for coal,oil,and gas production and the extent to which,taken together,they exceed levels consistent with the Paris Agreements goal of“holding the increase in global average temperature to we

127、ll below 2C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels”(Paris Agreement,2015,art.2.1).This misalignment,referred to as the“production gap”,is a metric that this report series has tracked since 2019.In the two years since the

128、 last report was released,the global energy landscape has shifted significantly.On top of supply chain disruptions in part due to extreme weather events and a rapid economic rebound following the COVID-19 pandemic the outbreak of war in Ukraine catalysed a global energy crisis and a global food cris

129、is(IEA,2023c).Oil prices rose to almost USD 140 per barrel,a level last seen in 2008(Brower,2022).These develop-ments prompted countries to rethink their energy plans,bringing the geopolitical risks of fossil fuel dependence into sharp focus.Energy security emerged as a top policy concern for many c

130、ountries,especially those reliant on fossil fuel imports or facing growing energy needs.On the one hand,oil and gas companies increased their upstream investments by 39%to nearly USD 500 billion in 2022 worldwide,the highest level since 2014(IEF&S&P Global,2023).Some major energy companies have aban

131、doned or slowed plans to reduce oil and gas produc-tion and shift investments towards renewables(Bousso&Adomaitis,2023;Reed,2023;Visavadia,2023).On the other hand,the energy crisis has helped to accel-erate the broader transition to clean sources.For example,the global pace of vehicle electrificatio

132、n has vastly exceed-ed prior expectations(IEA,2023b).In Europe,renewable power capacity is expected to double over the 20222027 period(IEA,2023c).Australia and the United States of America passed landmark climate laws in 2022,China is on track to double its wind and solar energy capacity by 2025 ins

133、tead of 2030,and India earmarked over USD 4 bil-lion for clean energy in its national budget(Mei et al.,2023;REN21,2023).Since 2021,several Just Energy Transition Partnerships(JETPs)have been launched,with wealthier governments committing tens of billions of US dollars to support the shift away from

134、 fossil fuels in four emerging and developing countries(see Box 3.2).Thirty-four coun-tries and five public finance institutions have committed to end international public finance for fossil fuels and priori-tize clean energy(see Chapter 3).Despite these encouraging signs,the overall size of the pro

135、duction gap,particularly out to 2030,has not discern-ibly changed since the first assessment in 2019.1.IntroductionFor over a century,energy from fossil fuels has helped to deliver jobs,revenue,and economic growth around the world.Consequently,most governments view coal,oil,and gas as sources of geo

136、political power,energy security,and development.Forgoing such resources as will be nec-essary to retain a liveable climate is neither easy nor conventional.Thus,it is not surprising that many governments continue to support,finance,and expand fossil fuel production.However,such policies are irreconc

137、ilable with global climate commitments and the plummeting cost of renewable energy.Amid growing calls from citizens and scientists for a fossil-fuel-free future,it is important for governments to recognize that while energy is essential to the fabric of society,fossil fuels are not.12 Production Gap

138、 Report 2023Governments offer various rationales for continuing to support and expand fossil fuel production:meeting expected demand;reducing dependency and foreign exchange costs on imports;generating revenue for government services through taxes and royalties;follow-ing through on legal obligation

139、s under existing statutes and treaties;or confidence in winning out as one of the last producers in a dwindling market.Some also argue that producing their countrys oil and gas with relatively lower upstream emissions will lead to an overall reduc-tion in global greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions.However,

140、research shows that curtailing production of fossil fuels,especially oil,will reduce global consumption and thereby also reduce global GHG emissions,regardless of who the producer is and after accounting for substitution by other producers(Erickson&Lazarus,2018;Prest et al.,2023).While these rationa

141、les for supporting fossil fuels may have merit in some limited circumstances,wide adoption of such policies results in the persistent production gap identified in this report.This gap“locks in”unsustainable levels of fossil fuel production that impede the energy transition and undermine climate goal

142、s in the near term.In the longer term,economies and communities risk seeing costly fossil fuel investments turn into liabilities,as markets for coal,oil,and gas shrink and prices drop(Mercure et al.,2018).The president of COP28 and head of the United Arab Emirates national oil company has acknowledg

143、ed that“phasing down fossil fuels is inevitable and essential”(Alkousaa,2023).Indeed,all fossil fuels must be effectively phased out to secure a safe and liveable future.The scientific evidence on this is clear.The production and use of fossil fuels are the predominant driver of the climate emergenc

144、y,ac-counting for close to 90%of human-made carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions(Friedlingstein et al.,2022).If global GHG emissions continue at current levels,the remaining“car-bon budget”of allowable emissions for a 50%chance of limiting warming to 1.5C is likely to be exceeded by 2030(Forster et al.,2023

145、).Furthermore,the CO2 emissions expected to occur over the lifetime of existing fossil fuel infrastructure already exceeds the remaining 1.5C carbon budget(IPCC,2023;Tong et al.,2019;Trout et al.,2022).This leaves no room for new coal mines,oil and gas fields,or fossil-fuel-burning power plants,unle

146、ss existing infrastructure is retired early(IEA,2022).Production Gap Report 2023 13Finally,carbon capture and storage(CCS)technologies which can be coupled to fossil fuel combustion to reduce CO2 emissions,or coupled to bioenergy or direct air capture to remove CO2 from the atmosphere could play a r

147、ole in addressing residual emissions for hard-to-transi-tion sectors.However,they are not a free pass to carry on with business as usual.Even if all CCS facilities planned and under development worldwide become operational,only around 0.25 GtCO2 would be captured in 2030(IEA,2023a),less than 1%of 20

148、22 global CO2 emissions(Liu et al.,2023).The track record for CCS deployment has been poor to date,with around 80%of pilot projects ending in failure over the past 30 years(Wang et al.,2021).Counting on these largely unproven and relatively costly technolo-gies being rolled out at scale is thus a po

149、tentially risky and dangerous strategy.Beyond climate,there are many other social,economic,and environmental reasons to accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuel production.The extraction and distribution of coal,oil,and gas are associated with toxic pollution and harms to public health,human rights v

150、iolations and environmental injustices,and ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss.The adverse impacts on communities living near oil and gas extraction“sacrifice zones”,where they are exposed to routine flaring and other sources of air and water pollution,have been documented from the shale fie

151、lds of the US to the Niger Delta of Nigeria,with studies showing increased risks of pre-term birth,respira-tory and skin diseases,cancer,and premature death(Clark et al.,2022;Cushing et al.,2020;Nwosisi et al.,2021).The communities exposed to these harmful impacts are often Indigenous people,communi

152、ties of colour,or low-wealth communities(Donaghy et al.,2023;Gonzalez et al.,2023).Over the past decade,at least 1,733 land and environ-mental defenders,many of whom are from Indigenous communities,have been killed while trying to protect their land from extractive industries(Global Witness,2022).Fu

153、rthermore,while fossil fuel extraction can result in eco-nomic and development benefits,they are not guaranteed.Dependency on oil and gas production and export has deepened the indebtedness,corruption,and instability of many lower-and middle-income countries(Frynas&Buur,2020;Gaventa,2021;Ross,2012).

154、While countries have signed on to numerous climate targets and initiatives to reduce emissions and promote clean energy,few have agreed to limit fossil fuel expansion,or supported initiatives to manage its decline,beyond committing to phase down“unabated”coal power.Over 100 countries have now pledge

155、d or proposed net-zero emissions targets and also endorsed the Global Methane Pledge to cut methane emissions by 30%from 2020 to 2030,while 48 countries are part of the Powering Past Coal Alliance(Net Zero Tracker,2023;US Department of State,2022).Furthermore,the COP28 presidency is advancing new ta

156、rgets,including tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency and hydrogen pro-duction by 2030,as well as ending the use of“unabated”fossil fuels by mid-century(Al Jaber,2023;Civillini,2023;Reuters&Lo,2023).To date,only about a dozen countries are members or endorsers of two init

157、iatives to facilitate the managed phase-out of fossil fuel production:the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance or the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty.Except for Colombia,the worlds top 35 fossil fuel producers are not among these countries.14 Production Gap Report 2023Given the persistence of the produc

158、tion gap,and the urgency of limiting climate damages,now is the time for countries to acknowledge that focusing on emissions alone is insufficient.As this report and other analyses show,the production of fossil fuels must also decline at a rapid pace(see Chapter 2).Planning for a well-managed declin

159、e in the production of,and reliance on,fossil fuels is critical to ensuring an effective and equitable energy tran-sition.Key steps in that direction are for countries to in-crease their investments in renewable energy and to align their fossil fuel production plans and projections with the Paris Ag

160、reements temperature goal,as well as with their own net-zero commitments.As discussed in this report,several major fossil fuel producers have begun to develop such production projections.While still limited to scenario exercises at this stage,they nonetheless signal change and provide a positive exa

161、mple that other countries can follow.Progress here would pave the way towards implementing ambitious and concrete policies for a just transition away from fossil fuels.Countries can restrict the development of new oil and gas fields and new coal mines,redirect subsidies,adopt near-and long-term targ

162、ets to reduce the production and use of coal,oil,and gas,and provide support to affected communities and workers.Reduction targets for fossil fuel production can serve as an important complement to existing emissions reduction goals.How-ever,as with tackling climate change itself,phasing out fossil

163、fuels is a collective problem that requires govern-ments to cooperate a particular challenge given the highly competitive nature of international fossil fuel mar-kets,the incentives to increase production,and countries differentiated responsibilities and capacities to transition(Kartha et al.,2018;P

164、ye et al.,2020).As discussed in the 2020 Production Gap Report and elsewhere,not all countries can phase out fossil fuels at the same pace.Countries that have higher financial and institutional capacity and are less dependent on fossil fuel production can transition most rapidly,while those with low

165、er capacity and higher dependence will require greater international support.They will require assistance and finance to pursue alternative development models,which can help break cycles of fossil fuel dependency and indebtedness,and forge new,climate-resilient paths to prosperity(Sokona et al.,2023

166、;Steadman et al.,2023;Winkler et al.,2022).The recently launched JETPs,which span long-time coal-dependent and coal-exporting coun-tries(Indonesia and South Africa)as well as a potential emerging oil and gas producer(Senegal),are an important innovation in this direction(See Box 3.2).Finally,closing

167、 the production gap will require transparent,verifiable,and consistent information on countries plans and support for fossil fuel production.As underscored in the 2021 Production Gap Report,such information is currently incomplete,inconsistent,and scattered;instead,governments should share this info

168、rmation as part of their regular reporting under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.The impacts of climate change,long predicted by scien-tists,are now manifesting and wreaking havoc in every cor-ner of the planet.The fast-shrinking carbon budget means that all countries must

169、rapidly diversify or leapfrog their en-ergy needs and economies away from fossil fuels(CSO Eq-uity Review,2021;Dubash,2023;Sokona et al.,2023).The task is unprecedented but not impossible(IPCC,2022).It will require political will,determined implementation,and international cooperation,especially to

170、provide support to lower-income countries.As a starting point,governments should name and confront the challenge at COP28 and beyond:the need to phase out all fossil fuels,starting now.The remainder of this years report is split across two chapters.Chapter 2 provides an updated assessment of the glo

171、bal production gap and explores the global coal,oil,and gas reduction pathways that would be consistent with the Paris Agreements long-term temperature goal.Chap-ter 3 homes in on 20 major fossil-fuel-producing countries,profiling their governments climate ambitions and existing plans,policies,and s

172、trategies that support fossil fuel pro-duction or the transition away from it.While forgoing fossil resources will not be easy and for many countries there is disappointingly little to report on transition plans it will be essential if we are to avoid the worst impacts of the climate crisis.Producti

173、on Gap:2023 Report 1516 Production Gap:2023 Report2The Production Gap In aggregate,governments plan to produce,in 2030,around 110%more fossil fuels than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C(i.e.more than double),and 69%more than would be consistent with limiting warming to 2C.These glob

174、al production gaps grow wider out to 2050.Government plans and projections would lead to an increase in global coal production until 2030,and in global oil and gas production until at least 2050.These production levels correspond in 2030 to 460%more coal,29%more oil,and 82%more gas than global level

175、s consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C.For each fossil fuel,the combined levels of production being planned by 10 high-income countries alone would already exceed global 1.5C-consistent pathways by 2040,putting an equitable transition at risk.Cost-optimized mitigation scenarios suggest that,to l

176、imit warming to 1.5C,global coal,oil,and gas production and use should decline rapidly and substantially,starting now,alongside other key mitigation strategies such as expanding renewable energy and reducing methane emissions from all sources.There is a strong need for governments to establish near-

177、and long-term reduction targets for fossil fuel production and use to complement other climate mitigation benchmarks and reduce the risks of stranded assets.Countries with greater transition capacity should aim for faster reductions than the global average.Given risks and uncertainties of carbon cap

178、ture and storage and carbon dioxide removal,countries should at a minimum aim for a near total phase-out of coal production and use by 2040 and a combined reduction in oil and gas production and use by three-quarters by 2050 from 2020 levels.The potential failure of these measures to develop at scal

179、e calls for an even more rapid global phase-out of all fossil fuels.Key MessagesProduction Gap Report 2023 17The 20222023 global energy crisis subsequently high-lighted the geopolitical risks of fossil fuel dependence,helping to fast-track the deployment of renewable tech-nologies and to bring peak

180、coal,oil,and gas demand into sight(IEA,2023c).At the same time,global fossil-fuel-derived carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions reached a record high in 2022(Friedlingstein et al.,2022).And although the disconnect between the continued expan-sion of fossil fuels and climate mitigation ambition is gaining inc

181、reasing visibility and attention,few national governments are committing to and planning for a man-aged reduction of coal,oil,and gas production in line with a net-zero future.This chapter assesses the collective implications of governments national outlooks for fossil fuel produc-tion between now a

182、nd 2050 at a global level.Section 2.1 quantifies the fossil fuel production gap:the discrepancy between the global levels of fossil fuel production implied by government plans and projections and the levels con-sistent with limiting global warming to 1.5C or 2C.This represents a comprehensive re-ana

183、lysis of the production gap that incorporates updated government projections as well as new mitigation scenarios assembled in the Working Group III(WGIII)contribution to the Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)s Sixth Assess-ment Report(AR6)(IPCC,2022).Section 2.2 discusses the major tre

184、nds and drivers of the gap and how it has changed compared to the 2021 assessment.Explored next in Section 2.3 are the global reduction pathways of coal,oil,and gas production that would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C,including their sensitivity to the success of other climate mitigatio

185、n measures.Section 2.4 then explores the policy implications of these findings and other lines of evidence to derive recommended global re-duction targets for fossil fuel production.Section 2.5 ends with a discussion of why an equitable transition away from fossil fuel production is at risk.2.1 The

186、fossil fuel production gapThe analysis of the global production gap rests on the determination of two elements.The first is the pathway of fossil fuel production implied by the plans and projections of national governments.The second is the pathway of fossil fuel production consistent with the Paris

187、 Agree-ments goal of“holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C”(Paris Agreement,2015,art.2.1).The first element relies on a compilation of government plans and projections for future

188、fossil fuel production,featuring the most recent national outlooks from 19 of the 20 major fossil-fuel-producer countries individually profiled in Chapter 3(outlooks for South Africa were not available)as of August 2023.Together,these 19 countries accounted for around 80%of global fossil fuel produc

189、-tion,on a primary energy basis,1 in 2021.Their combined production trajectories are scaled up to a global estimate,based on these countries projected future shares of global production(see Section 2.2 and the reports Ap-pendix,available online).The result is the estimated global“government plans an

190、d projections”(GPP)pathway.2 This updated GPP pathway therefore reflects to the varying 2.The Production Gap Since the release of the 2021 Production Gap Report,the political landscape for fossil fuels has begun to shift.After decades of negotiations,the first direct call to address fossil fuels mad

191、e it into a cover decision text of the Conference of Parties(COP)to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC).At COP26 in late 2021,governments committed to accelerate efforts towards“the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”,tho

192、ugh they did not agree to address oil and gas or the production of fossil fuels(UNFCCC,2021).1 Coal,oil,gas production can be quantified in terms of physical units(e.g.barrels of oil),the amount of contained energy(e.g.exajoules),or the amount of greenhouse gases released during production activitie

193、s and combustion.Primary energy represents the amount of energy that can be harvested directly from fossil fuels prior to any conversion.18 Production Gap Report 2023extent captured within each of the underlying projections how these governments have adjusted their fossil fuel production targets in

194、light of the evolving global energy landscape,national and international fossil fuel demand expectations,climate mitigation policies and pledges,and other factors.3The second element pathways for global fossil fuel pro-duction consistent with the Paris Agreements tempera-ture goal is derived from lo

195、ng-term greenhouse gas(GHG)mitigation scenarios generated by process-based integrated assessment models(IAMs).4 This analysis relies on the mitigation scenarios compiled by the IPCC AR6 WGIII,focusing on two scenario categories:“C1”,which limits warming to 1.5C in 2100 with a likelihood great-er tha

196、n 50%,with no or limited overshoot throughout the 21st century;5 and“C3”,which limits peak warming throughout the 21st century to 2C with a likelihood great-er than 67%(Byers et al.,2022;IPCC,2022).One of the modelled outputs of these scenarios is“primary energy supply”from coal,oil,and gas.Since th

197、is variable typically accounts for both energy and non-energy uses of fossil fuels(see Appendix),it is interpreted as total fossil fuel production intended for all uses.There are a wide variety of modelling approaches and assumptions underlying different C1 and C3 scenarios,which have important impl

198、ications for the resulting fossil fuel reduction pathways(Achakulwisut et al.,2023).Con-sequently,a three-step scenario-selection approach has been developed and applied here.First,the majority of the AR6-assessed scenarios rely on extensive carbon dioxide removal(CDR),mostly through bioenergy combi

199、ned with carbon capture and storage(BECCS)and afforestation/reforestation(A/R)(Creutzig et al.,2021;Fuss et al.,2018).Based on a systematic litera-ture review,Fuss et al.(2018)estimated upper“sustain-able”limits of 5 billion tonnes of CO2 per year(GtCO2/yr)for BECCS and 3.6 GtCO2/yr for A/R by mid-c

200、entury,due to their negative side-effects such as competition for land and loss of biodiversity.Thus,C1 and C3 scenarios relying on BECCS and A/R exceeding these levels were excluded.Second,most IAMs do not adequately capture real-world constraints on regional CO2 storage potential and injection rat

201、es,which influence model reliance on CCS coupled to fossil fuel use(fossil-CCS),BECCS,and direct air carbon capture and storage(DACCS)(Grant et al.,2022).Therefore,a mid-century limit of 8.6 GtCO2/yr for total CCS has also been imposed,based on the“invest-able”CCS potential as estimated by Grant et

202、al.(2022)when accounting for real-world financial,contractual,and institutional constraints.Finally,scenarios have been selected only if they feature immediate rather than delayed climate action,6 and if they are compatible with achieving net-zero GHG emissions by 2100.Reaching net-zero GHGs will le

203、ad to declining long-term temperatures,which can limit the long-term impacts of climate change(IPCC,2023).The selected 36 C1 scenarios are classified as“1.5C-consistent”and the 64 C3 scenarios as“2C-consistent”,in keeping with previous editions of the Production Gap Reports to define pathways consis

204、tent with two different temperature outcomes(SEI et al.,2019,2020,2021).(See detailed methods in the Appendix;and see Box 2.1 for CCS,CDR,and abatement terminology.)The“1.5C-consistent”set is arguably most aligned with the Paris Agreements long-term temperature goal and its other objectives based on

205、 the rationale and interpretation proposed by Schleussner et al.(2022),while the“2C consistent”set is arguably not compatible with limiting warming to“well below”2C and does not align with the 1.5C temperature limit.7 Given this,the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pacts emphasis on the 1.5C limit,and the sig-n

206、ificant amplification of adverse climate impacts at 2C 2 The GPP pathway was called the“countries plans and projections(CPP)”pathway in the 2021 Production Gap Report.3 There are varying levels of detail,certainty,and intent associated with fossil fuel production targets published by governments and

207、 affiliated institutions.These targets are collectively referred to here as“plans and projections”.Governments take a variety of factors into consideration in assembling these plans and projections,including the state of each countrys fossil fuel reserves,the evolution of technologies and costs of e

208、xtraction,the presence of subsidies and regulations,foreseeable dynamics of domestic and international demand,and/or national and international climate mitigation ambitions.Where available,the over-arching assumptions underlying a given countrys projections are described in each of the country profi

209、les featured in Chapter 3 or in the Appendix.4 Process-based IAMs project cost-optimized mitigation pathways under what-if assumptions or subject to pre-defined outcomes such as carbon budget constraints consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5C with a certain likelihood,through modelling link

210、ages and trade-offs between energy,land use,climate,economy,and development(Wilson et al.,2021).5 C1 scenarios also limit peak warming to 2C throughout the 21st century with close to,or more than,90%likelihood(IPCC,2022).C2 scenarios,which limit warming to 1.5C in 2100 with a likelihood greater than

211、 50%but exhibit high overshoot(i.e.exceeding 1.5C by 0.1C0.3C for up to several decades),are excluded from this analysis,given their extensive reliance on long-term carbon dioxide removal;see Section 2.4.6 Some scenarios in the AR6 database are designed to follow current policies or NDCs out to 2030

212、 before starting globally coordinated mitigation.These scenarios therefore do not truly explore cost-effective pathways to limit warming to a given temperature with action starting as soon as possible.Such“delayed action”scenarios are excluded,leaving only scenarios that give the models full flexibi

213、lity on the timing and extent of reductions in fossil fuel production.Production Gap Report 2023 19relative to 1.5C of warming(IPCC,2018;UNFCCC,2021),this report primarily focuses on results with respect to the 1.5C-consistent pathways.The production gap is the difference between the global level of

214、 fossil fuel production under the GPP pathway and that under the 1.5C-or 2C-consistent pathway in any given year,as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and summarized in Table 2.1.Two other global production pathways are shown in these figures:the pathway implied by governments stated climate mitigation po

215、licies and the pathway implied by governments announced climate pledges,both as of September 2022,as modelled by the International Energy Agency(IEA,2022c).8In Figure 2.1,the production gap is denominated in billions of tonnes of CO2 equivalent(GtCO2eq),representing the amount of GHG emissions expec

216、ted to be released from the production and combustion of extracted coal,oil,and gas.9,10 As shown,governments are planning on produc-ing,in 2030,more than double the amount of fossil fuels than would be consistent with the median 1.5C pathway 7 The Paris Agreement does not provide a precise definiti

217、on of what“well below 2C”means and how these temperature limits should be used in climate policymaking(Rogelj et al.,2017;Schleussner et al.,2016).However,it has been interpreted as limiting peak warming to below 2C with 90%likelihood(Schleussner et al.,2022),which translates to being“very likely”to

218、 limit warming to 2C in IPCC uncertainty language.This is higher than the 67%probability that the 2C-consistent scenarios achieve.8 The IEAs Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS)is“based on a detailed sector-by-sector review of the policies and measures that are actually in place or under development”.The

219、 Announced Pledges Scenario(APS)“assumes that governments will meet,in full and on time,all of the climate-related commitments that they have announced,including longer term net-zero emissions targets and pledges in nationally determined contribution(NDCs),as well as commitments in related areas suc

220、h as energy access”.Figure 2.1Global fossil fuel production under five pathways from 2015 to 2050,denominated in units of billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year(GtCO2eq/yr)the amount of GHG emissions expected to be released from the production and combustion of extracted coal,oil,and gas.For the

221、1.5C-and 2C-consistent pathways,the median and 25th75th percentile range(shaded)of all selected scenarios are shown.The black trend line shows historical 20152021 annual production;all other pathways are plotted at 5-year resolution.Government plans&projections(GPP)Stated policies(IEA STEPS)Announce

222、d pledges(IEA APS)2C-consistent 1.5C-consistentGlobal fossil fuel production4030201002020203020402050GtCO2eq/yrThe Production Gap20 Production Gap Report 2023(i.e.around 110%more),and 69%more than would be consistent with the median 2C pathway.These percent-ages translate to production gaps of 22 Gt

223、CO2eq and 17 GtCO2eq,respectively.The magnitude of the production gap is projected to increase over time,reaching around 29 GtCO2eq and 22 GtCO2eq,respectively,in 2050.Governments fossil fuel production plans and projections also exceed the global levels of production implied by their stated climate

224、 mitigation policies(solid gold line)by around 1116%between 2030 and 2050(Figure 2.1).Compared with the global production pathway implied by governments announced climate pledges(dashed gold line),the GPP pathway is 29%higher in 2030,and 110%higher in 2050.11The production gap can also be quantified

225、 in terms of its component fuels,as shown in Figure 2.2,given that each mitigation scenario outputs primary energy supply from coal,oil,and gas explicitly.In this figure,the amounts of fossil fuel production under the five different pathways are calculated and shown in energy-based units.This enable

226、s a direct comparison of the levels of production under the GPP pathway and those under mitigation pathways as originally reported in exajoules by the latter.Among the selected 1.5C-consistent pathways,there is strong consensus that global coal,oil,and gas produc-tion decline rapidly and substantial

227、ly between now and mid-century under society-wide decarbonization efforts and falling fossil fuel demand.As a result,the median 1.5C-consistent pathway shows an almost total phase-9 Here,top-down emission factors for each fuel are calculated as the ratio of the global annual sum of GHG emissions fro

228、m fuel production and combustion to the global annual sum of fuel production based on IEA statistics for 20162020(the most recent five years of data available)(IEA,2023b,2023d).These factors account for total GHG emissions from fuel combustion plus CO2,CH4,and N2O emissions from production processes

229、;the IEA uses 100-year Global Warming Potentials(GWPs)from the IPCCs Fourth Assessment Report to calculate CO2-equivalent emissions(see Appendix for details).10 While methodological differences mean that the production gap quantification cannot be directly compared to the“emissions gap”assessments(U

230、NEP,2022),the production gap effectively represents the portion of the emissions gap attributable to fossil fuels.11 The IEA estimates that GHG emissions from all sources under its STEPS and APS scenarios would lead to a long-term temperature rise of around 2.5C and 1.7C by 2100,respectively(each wi

231、th a 50%probability)(IEA,2022c,p.107).Assuming all other GHG emission sources are equivalent,the levels of fossil fuel production under this reports GPP pathway are higher than those in the STEPS scenario and therefore would likely imply greater warming(unquantified here).Figure 2.2Global coal,oil,a

232、nd gas production under five pathways from 2015 to 2050,denominated in exajoules(EJ)per year.Physical units for each fossil fuel are displayed as secondary axes:billion tonnes per year(Gt/yr)for coal,million barrels per day(Mb/d)for oil,and trillion cubic meters per year(Tcm/yr)for gas.For the 1.5C-

233、and 2C-consistent pathways,the median and 25th75th percentile range(shaded)of selected mitigation scenarios are shown.The black trend lines show historical 20152021 annual production;all other pathways are plotted at 5-year resolution.10864202020203020402050Coal ProductionEJ/yrGt/yr2020203020402050O

234、il Production200150100500200150100500200150100500120100806040200EJ/yrMb/d2020203020402050Gas Production6543210EJ/yrTcm/yr Government plans&projections(GPP)Stated policies(IEA STEPS)Announced pledges(IEA APS)2C-consistent 1.5C-consistentProduction Gap Report 2023 21out of coal and deep reductions in

235、oil and gas production in this period.These reductions,and the relative contri-butions of different fossil fuels,are also contingent on the success of other mitigation strategies,including CDR and fossil-CCS deployment.As explored further in sections 2.3 and 2.4,even deeper fossil fuel reductions wo

236、uld be required if these methods fail to deliver at scale.In stark contrast,governments are in aggregate planning to increase oil and gas production out to at least 2050,creating ever-widening production gaps(Figure 2.2).The production gap for oil is 26 million barrels per day(Mb/d)in 2030 and 84 Mb

237、/d in 2050.The gap for gas is 2.2 tril-lion cubic meters(Tcm)in 2030 and 3.8 Tcm in 2050.This translates to oil and gas under the GPP pathway being around 29%and 82%higher than their respective levels under the median 1.5C-consistent pathway in 2030.By 2050,the respective percentages grow to 260%and

238、 210%.For coal,the GPP pathway show a short-term increase out to 2030 before a decline(Figure 2.2).Given that all of the selected 1.5C-consistent pathways show very rapid and deep reductions in coal between now and 2030,the production gap for coal is largest in magnitude in the near-term:6.9 billion

239、 tonnes of coal in 2030 and 4.8 billion tonnes in 2050.In relative terms,global coal production under the GPP pathway is around 460%higher in 2030 and 2400%higher in 2050 than the median 1.5C-consis-tent pathway.As shown in Figure 2.2,global coal,oil,and gas production levels under the GPP pathways

240、also each exceed levels implied by governments stated climate mitigation polices and announced pledges as modelled under the IEAs STEPS and APS scenarios,respectively.As detailed in Chapter 3,only a few countries have begun to consider the alignment of their fossil fuel production and export targets

241、 with national and international climate goals.Given that governments production plans and targets help to influence,legitimize,and justify continued investments in fossil fuel infrastructure,there is a real risk that current production plans are undermining the energy transition by exacerbating“car

242、bon lock-in”and entrench-ing fossil fuel dependence(Seto et al.,2016).At the same time,many of these planned production projects could also become stranded assets as the world decarboniz-es and fossil fuel extraction targets fail to reflect falling demand and changing sociopolitical realities(Kemfer

243、t et al.,2022;Semieniuk et al.,2022).This is especially true given that the committed emissions of CO2 expected to occur over the lifetime of existing fossil-fuel-production Table 2.1The fossil fuel production gaps in 2030,2040,and 2050.Shown values represent the differences between global productio

244、n levels under the GPP pathway and the median(and interquartile range,IQR,shown in brackets)levels under the selected 1.5C-and 2C-consistent pathways.Values are rounded to two significant figures.YearCoalOilGasTotalEJ/yr%EJ/yr%EJ/yr%GtCO2eq/yr%Production gap relative to 1.5C-consistent pathways2030

245、150(150160)460(390590)49 (3884)29 (1962)76(5285)82(4399)22(2026)110(85150)2040 130(120140)1200(4205100)93(70130)77 (49160)110 (100130)150 (120240)26(2231)190 (130340)2050 100 (77110)2400(2605800)160(130180)260(150440)130 (110150)210 (140390)29(2332)350(170600)Production gap relative to 2C-consistent

246、 pathways2030140 (120140)300(200370)28 (2040)15(1023)53(26170)26(1846)17(1520)69(5387)2040130(100140)790 (2301500)56(4067)35(2346)97(35190)57(23110)20(1524)110 (59150)2050100(67100)1300(1601900)110 (92120)100 (71120)120 (32190)67(20160)22(1525)150(67210)22 Production Gap Report 2023infrastructure al

247、ready exceed the remaining carbon bud-get for a 50%chance of limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100(IPCC,2023;Trout et al.,2022).Moreover,according to the latest IEA projections,global coal,oil,and gas demand are expected to peak within this decade even without any new climate policies(IEA,2023c).2.2 A br

248、eakdown of the government plans and projections(GPP)pathwayThis section discusses the individual plans and projec-tions of major fossil fuel producer countries that underlie the global coal,oil,and gas GPP pathways,and explores how the overall production gap has changed compared to the 2021 assessme

249、nt.The 2023 GPP pathways are informed by the plans and projections of 19 of the 20 major producer countries featured in Chapter 3(data were not available for South Africa;new countries compared to the 2021 production gap assessment are denoted with an asterisk):Australia,Brazil,Canada,China,Colombia

250、*,Germany,India,Indone-sia,Kazakhstan,Kuwait*,Mexico,Nigeria*,Norway,Qatar*,the Russian Federation,Saudi Arabia,the United Arab Emirates(UAE),the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland(UK),and the United States of America(US).Among these 19 countries,government plans and projections ar

251、e available for nine producer countries for coal(accounting for 93%of global production in 2021 on an energy basis),17 countries for oil(74%of global production),and 18 countries for gas(72%of global pro-duction).Figure 2.3 shows the individual contributions of these 19 countries to the global coal,

252、oil,and gas GPP pathways.The global values shown by the red lines are equivalent to the GPP pathways shown in Figure 2.2 and sum up to the total GPP pathway shown in Figure 2.1.These are estimat-ed by scaling the aggregated production levels of the 19 countries shown,based on their future shares of

253、global coal,oil,and gas production as modelled in IEA STEPS(IEA,2022c)(see Appendix for further details).12The global GPP pathways show that,compared with 2020 levels,annual oil and gas production are projected to increase by 27%and 25%by 2030,and by 29%and 41%by 2050,respectively.Annual coal produc

254、tion is project-ed to increase by 10%between 2020 and 2030,before falling by 41%between 2030 and 2050.Under the GPP pathways for each fuel,the planned/projected produc-tion levels by two to five major producer countries would account for around half of the global total between now and 2050.The near-

255、term increase in coal production is led by India,Indonesia,and the Russian Federation.Other countries(Australia,Colombia,and Kazakhstan)project relatively flat or slightly increasing levels of coal production between 2021 and 2030.The long-term decline in global coal pro-duction is led by China,whos

256、e domestic coal production is estimated to decrease steeply between 2030 and 2050 in alignment with the countrys 2060 carbon-neutrality goal(see Chinas country profile in Chapter 3).The projected near-term increase in oil is led by Brazil,Canada,the Russian Federation,Saudi Arabia,and the US.Of the

257、17 countries assessed,seven foresee relative-ly flat or increasing levels of annual oil production from 2021 until 20402050.For gas,the near-term increase is led by China,Nigeria,Qatar,the Russian Federation,and the US,while eight countries foresee relatively flat or increasing levels of annual gas

258、production from 2021 until 20352050.Projected long-term declines in oil and gas production in certain countries,such as Norway and the UK,are primarily due to resource depletion,rather than an active transition(see Chapter 3).It is challenging to directly compare the 2023 produc-tion gap to previous

259、 assessments for several reasons.This years assessment of global GPP pathways is more comprehensive,since it is informed by the plans and projections of four additional countries and now extends to 2050 compared to 2040 previously.The lack of regular,standardized reporting of fossil fuel production

260、projec-tions by countries is another confounding factor.13 Further-more,the mitigation scenarios assessed in AR6 represent a largely different ensemble and are therefore not directly comparable to those assessed in the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C(SR1.5)(Huppmann et al.,2019),which

261、were used in previous production gap anal-yses.Additional criteria applied in the mitigation scenario selection,as described above,also have implications for the resulting 1.5C-and 2C-consistent median pathways,especially for the latter.Given these considerations,only broad comparisons are drawn bel

262、ow for changes in the production gap with respect to the 1.5C-consistent path-way(see Appendix for details).12 For some countries and fuels,government plans and projections end before 2050.To extrapolate all countries projections to 2050,this analysis uses the percentage change for a given country a

263、nd fossil fuel as modelled under the IEAs STEPS.This scenario reflects existing policies as of 2022;thus,this is likely a conservative extrapolation approach,given that estimated global production under the GPP pathway is higher than under the STEPS(as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2).13 For example,so

264、me governments issue long-term national energy outlooks annually,which enables a direct,year-to-year comparison of their projections.However,many countries do not.In some cases,countries provide projections in different government documents and/or create new scenarios,which makes comparison over tim

265、e difficult.Production Gap Report 2023 23Figure 2.3Individual countries contributions(stacked area charts)to global production estimated under the GPP pathways(red lines).For each fuel,countries are plotted in order of decreasing cumulative 20202050 production,from bottom to top.The median 1.5C-and

266、2C-consistent global production pathways are overlaid(dashed blue and green lines).Annual coal,oil,and gas production are shown in energy units(exajoules,or EJ)on the primary axes,and in units of extraction-based CO2-equivalent emissions on the secondary axes(GtCO2eq/yr).(Throughout this report,glob

267、ally averaged emission factors are applied for each fuel in all countries.See the Appendix for details.)Global production pathways Government plans&projections(GPP)2C-consistent 1.5C-consistentEJ/yrEJ/yrEJ/yrGtCO2eq/yrGtCO2eq/yrGtCO2eq/yr202020302040205020202030204020502020203020402050Coal Productio

268、nOil ProductionGas Production2001501005002001501005002001501005001612840201510501050CountriesRest of worldGermanyKazakhstanColombiaUSAustraliaRussian FederationIndonesiaIndiaChinaCountriesRest of worldGermanyAustraliaIndonesiaUKColombiaNorwayNigeriaKazakhstanMexicoKuwaitChinaBrazilUAECanadaRussian F

269、ederationSaudi ArabiaUSCountriesRest of worldGermanyColombiaUKKuwaitKazakhstanMexicoBrazilIndonesiaUAENorwaySaudi ArabiaNigeriaCanadaAustraliaChinaQatarRussian FederationUS24 Production Gap Report 2023Compared with the 2021 assessment,the global pro-duction gap with respect to the median 1.5C-consis

270、tent pathway for coal is wider by 2030 and remains roughly the same for 2040.Almost half of the increase in the 2030 gap is due to an increase in the underlying gov-ernment projections.The remaining increase can be explained by a reduction in the modelled level of coal supply under the median 1.5C-c

271、onsistent pathway due to a faster coal phase-out in the selected AR6 versus SR1.5 mitigation scenarios.For 2040,the coal production gap has remained almost the same due to almost equivalent reductions in both the GPP and median 1.5C-consistent levels.For oil,the production gap in the 2023 assessment

272、 is narrower in both 2030 and 2040 under the 2023 as-sessment.This is mainly due to the median 1.5C-consis-tent pathway allowing a slightly slower oil decline,which is balanced by a much faster phase-out for coal and a slightly faster near-term reduction for gas.Meanwhile,the gas production gap wide

273、ns for 2030 and slightly decreas-es for 2040.The small increase in the 2030 gap is mainly because of the larger near-term gas reduction modelled in the median 1.5C-consistent pathway.The small decline for 2040 is mainly due to a decrease in the underlying government projections.In sum,these changes

274、largely cancel each other out to leave the overall production gap largely unchanged for both 2030 and 2040(i.e.differing by no more than 13 GtCO2eq/yr).2.3 Global coal,oil,and gas reduction pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5C As previously described,governments plans and pro-jections,t

275、aken together,would lead to global oil and gas production rising out to 2050,while coal increases out to 2030.This section explores in detail the global reduc-tion pathways of coal,oil,and gas production that would be consistent with limiting long-term warming to 1.5C,including their sensitivity to

276、the success of other climate mitigation strategies and other model assumptions.Mitigation scenarios generated by process-based IAMs,like those assembled for AR6 and analysed here,have become widely used to provide policy-relevant insights for how the worlds energy and land-use systems can be transfo

277、rmed in the most cost-effective way to limit global warming to a given temperature outcome(Kikstra et al.,2022;McLaren&Markusson,2020;Riahi et al.,2022;van Beek et al.,2020).Such scenarios generally model differ-ent combinations and extents of the following mitigation strategies to achieve net-zero

278、CO2 emissions:(1)reducing coal,oil,and gas supply and demand;(2)transforming agricultural and other land-use practices;(3)reducing energy and material consumption in end-use sectors;and(4)deploying fossil-CCS and CDR(see Box 2.1).Reduc-ing non-CO2 GHGs such as methane(CH4)is another important mitiga

279、tion lever(UNEP&CCAC,2021).The relative contributions of these mitigation options reflect differences in the underlying model framework,scenar-io design,and input parameters and assumptions such as technological performance and adoption,economic relationships,and cost optimization(Achakulwisut et al

280、.,2023;Harmsen et al.,2021).Figure 2.4 shows the global pathways for coal,oil,and gas production and six other variables modelled under different subsets of or individual scenarios within the se-lected 1.5C-consistent set.The pathways plotted in each figure panel are as follows:(1)the median pathway

281、(and percentile ranges)calculated using all of the 36 select-ed 1.5C-consistent scenarios;(2)the median pathway calculated from three scenarios that do not rely on CDR beyond their cumulative“feasible potential”based on expert consensus(Grant et al.,2021b),14 representing a low-CDR-reliance perspect

282、ive;and(3)three“illustrative mitigation pathways”(IMPs)chosen by IPCC AR6 WGIII to reflect different prominent mitigation strategies for lim-iting warming to 1.5C with no or limited overshoot(Riahi et al.,2022).15 Additionally,given its prominence in energy policy discourses,the figure also features

283、 the IEAs 2023 update of its net-zero emissions by 2050(NZE)scenario(IEA,2023c).Key statistics from Figure 2.4 are highlighted in Table 2.2,and detailed in Table A.5 in the Appendix.14 The cumulative 20202100 limits are 224 GtCO2 for afforestation,196 GtCO2 for BECCS,and 320 GtCO2 for DACCS.Surveyed

284、 experts were asked to consider the technical potential for each CDR method(e.g.geological CO2 storage capacity)as well as non-technical constraints such as sustainability(e.g.large-scale conversion of land to bioenergy crops)and societal and governance considerations(Grant et al.,2021b).15 IMP-LD f

285、eatures a strong emphasis on energy demand reduction(Grubler et al.,2018),IMP-Ren relies heavily on renewables deployment and electrification(Luderer et al.,2022),while IMP-SP achieves net-zero emissions in alignment with other sustainable development goals(Soergel et al.,2021).16 In this figure,met

286、hane(CH4)emissions from the energy sector are converted to CO2-equivalent emissions using 100-year time horizon Global Warming Potential values provided in Table 7.15 of the Working Group I contribution to the IPCC AR6:29.8 for fossil-CH4(IPCC,2021).Production Gap Report 2023 25Figure 2.420102050 gl

287、obal pathways of nine variables modelled under subsets of or individual 1.5C-consistent scenarios(see text for scenario descriptions):(ac)coal,oil,and gas production;(d)primary energy supply from non-biomass renewables;(e)CO2 emissions from the energy sector;(f)methane emissions from the energy sect

288、or;(g)CO2 emissions captured and stored from fossil fuel combustion(fossil-CCS);(h)CO2 captured and stored from bioenergy use(BECCS);and(i)CO2 removed and sequestered by land use practices.The units and number of scenarios(“n”)reporting each variable are shown inset(not all scenarios report each of

289、the variables shown).In panels ac,global coal,oil,and gas production under historical(black line)and GPP pathways(red line)are also shown.a.Coal Production b.Oil Production250200150100500250200150100500250200150100500EJ/yr(n=36)(n=36)(n=36)EJ/yrEJ/yr2010 20202030204020502010 20202030204020502010 202

290、0203020402050c.Gas Productiong.Fossil-CSSh.BECCS54321 054321 054321 0(n=28)(n=36)(n=31)GtCO2/yrGtCO2/yrGtCO2/yr2010 20202030204020502010 20202030204020502010 2020203020402050i.Land Use Sequestration Median 1.5C Median low-CDR 25th75th percentiles 5th95th percentiles IMP-LD IMP-Ren IMP-SP IEA NZEd.Re

291、newable Energy Supplye.Energy CO2 Emissions35030025020015010050040302010054321 0(n=36)(n=32)(n=32)EJ/yrGtCO2/yrGtCO2eq/yr2010 20202030204020502010 20202030204020502010 2020203020402050f.Energy CH4 Emissions Historical GPP26 Production Gap Report 2023203020402050VariableMedian pathwayMedian low-CDR p

292、athwayIMP-LDIEA NZEMedian pathwayMedian low-CDR pathwayIMP-LDIEA NZEMedian pathwayMedian low-CDR pathwayIMP-LDIEA NZEPercent change relative to 2020Coal production-78%-83%-75%-39%-92%-99%-90%-83%-97%-99%-98%-90%Oil production-10%-2%-47%-14%-35%-37%-75%-54%-67%-76%-90%-76%Gas production-29%-19%-47%-1

293、5%-43%-57%-75%-62%-54%-77%-85%-77%Combined oil and gas productiona-18%-9%-47%-15%-38%-46%-75%-58%-62%-77%-88%-76%Renewable energy supply220%240%250%210%490%600%410%590%690%910%500%840%Energy CO2 emissions-47%-40%-58%-31%-70%-74%-81%-81%-89%-93%-92%-100%Energy CH4 emissions-63%-65%No data-73%-79%-85%

294、No data-93%-90%-95%No data-98%Annual value(GtCO2/yr)Fossil-CCS0.510.4100.451.60.7001.32.10.5601.6BECCS0.310.2200.0671.60.4600.472.80.9100.78DACCSa0.0029000.0690.043000.300.25000.62Land use sequestration0.730.231.3N/Ab1.40.302.2N/Ab2.20.233.2N/Aba Not plotted in Figure 2.4.b The IEA NZE does not mode

295、l land-use systems,focusing only on energy.As such,it does not incorporate carbon sequestration via conventional land-based methods.Table 2.2Summary of values for variables under 1.5C-consistent pathways shown in Figure 2.4.Values are rounded to two significant figures.(For values from IMP-Ren and I

296、MP-SP,see the Appendix,Table A.5.)Production Gap Report 2023 27Also shown in panels ac of Figure 2.4 are the global coal,oil,and gas production estimated under the GPP pathways,illustrating the sensitivity of the production gap estimate relative to the chosen reference 1.5C-consistent pathway for ea

297、ch fuel.Under the median 1.5C-consistent pathway,global production of coal,oil,and gas intended for all uses decreases by 97%,67%,and 54%,respectively,between 2020 and 2050.These reductions are contingent upon the assumption that,by 2050:1)fossil fuel abatement technologies will be available and cos

298、t-effective at scale,resulting in 2.1 GtCO2 emitted annually from fossil fuel combustion being captured and stored;2)conventional and novel CDR measures(see Box 2.1)will remove and sequester around 5.2 GtCO2/yr from the atmosphere;and 3)roughly 20%of oil and 35%of gas produced will go towards non-en

299、ergy uses.17 In parallel,between 2020 and 2050,coal use without CCS is effectively phased out by 2040,while oil and gas use without CCS each decrease by close to 70%.Energy supply from non-biomass renew-ables increases almost eight-fold,making up 88%of the electricity mix by 2050.Global annual metha

300、ne emissions are reduced by 58%for all sources,and by 90%from fos-sil fuel production activities,by 2050 from 2020 levels.Three key insights emerge from this analysis of differ-ent 1.5C-consistent pathways.First,to stay on track to achieve net-zero CO2 emissions by mid-century and limit long-term wa

301、rming to 1.5C,global production of all three fossil fuels needs to decline substantially between now and 2050,in parallel with other key climate mitigation strategies such as reducing fossil fuel demand,increas-ing renewable energy generation,and reducing methane emissions from all sources,including

302、 oil and gas pro-duction activities.In particular,as can be seen from the pathways plotted in Figure 2.4,global coal,oil,and gas production each decrease from 2020 onwards regardless of whether a given pathway deploys fossil-CCS or not.Second,the extent of the modelled reductions in global coal,oil,

303、and gas production are particularly sensitive to assumptions around fossil-CCS and CDR potential.For example,the IMP-LD(low-energy demand)scenario does not rely on any CCS(coupled to fossil fuels,bioenergy,or direct air capture)due to concerns over innovation failure,investment risks,and public oppo

304、sition,and consequently charts out one of the fastest coal,oil,and gas reduction trajectories among the selected 1.5C-consistent sce-narios(though it does rely extensively on conventional CDR).Similarly,imposing“feasible potential”limits on the cumulative 20202100 levels of afforestation,BECCS,and D

305、ACCS(see footnote 14)would see much larger reductions in coal,oil,and gas between 20202050 than the median of all selected 36 scenarios,especially for gas(Figure 2.4 and Table 2.2).Third,reduction targets for coal,oil,and gas depend on and influence one another.For example,in the near-term out to 20

306、30,the IEA NZE models relatively slower coal and gas reductions than the median 1.5C-consistent pathway,but faster for oil.In the longer-term,the IEA NZE models relatively larger reductions in oil and gas but a more gradual coal phase-out.Therefore,it is important to establish near-and long-term red

307、uction targets for all three fossil fuels rather than focusing on coal alone,as in prior COP decision texts(UNFCCC,2021,2022)to stay on track to limiting warming to 1.5C.Ultimately,the pace and extent of the required reductions in global coal,oil,and gas production will also depend on many normative

308、 and values-based choices,which cannot be adequately informed by scenarios generated by cost-optimized IAMs alone(Smith et al.,2023;Stern et al.,2022;Stoddard et al.,2021).The global reduction targets in coal,oil,and gas production presented in this section,especially under the median 1.5C-consisten

309、t pathway,should be viewed as general guidelines for minimum-am-bition-setting rather than definitive benchmarks.Decision makers should also consider other lines of scientific evi-dence and weigh other factors.The latter include,for ex-ample,considering which decarbonization roadmaps may be more fea

310、sible to attain given real-world constraints,more desirable with respect to other important societal and environmental outcomes,and more precautionary in terms of safeguarding public and planetary health,as well as how to fairly share the remaining carbon budget in terms of fossil fuel extraction.Th

311、e next two sections ex-plore these issues further in order to derive recommend-ed targets for reductions in global fossil fuel production.17 These estimates are a rough approximation since the relevant variables are inconsistently reported by the scenarios.Non-energy uses can lead to either long-ter

312、m carbon storage in stable physical products or eventual combustion.For example,up to 40%of discarded plastics are burned globally(OECD,2022).Estimates suggest that around 0.02%of coal,8.02%of oil,and 1.86%of gas produced do not lead to eventual carbon emissions(Heede,2014).28 Production Gap Report

313、20232.4 Policy implications I:why a global fossil fuel phase-out is needed to limit warming to 1.5CThere are reasons to phase out all three fossil fuels even more quickly than modelled under the median 1.5C-con-sistent pathways plotted in Figures 2.12.2.This section explores four key reasons why an

314、accelerated phase-out may be necessary and desirable.First,even after applying the selection criteria described in Section 2.1 aimed at avoiding excessive CCS and CDR reliance,the majority of the 1.5C-consistent scenarios an-alysed in this report still assume that fossil-CCS and CDR can be deployed

315、at significant levels from 2030 onwards(Table 2.2).However,it remains highly uncertain whether these new technologies will become viable at scale(IEA,2022b;Smith et al.,2023).As described in the previous section,under the median 1.5C-consistent pathway,around 2.1 GtCO2/yr of fossil-fuel-combustion e

316、missions are captured and stored by 2050.However,the track record for CCS deployment has been very poor to date,with around 80%of pilot projects over the last 30 years ending in failure(Wang et al.,2021).The annual capacity from operational CCS projects that result in dedicated CO2 storage currently

317、 sum up to less than 0.01 GtCO2/yr(IEA,2023a).There is concern that a range of institutional,technical,and financial barriers will constrain CCS deployment(Grant et al.,2022;Lane et al.,2021),and rates of CCS deployment continue to fall below expectations and remain far below those modelled in IAMs(

318、IPCC,2023).Many of the scenarios modelling higher gas levels in the long-term are generated by IAMs that do not impose sufficient constraints on CO2 storage potential and injection rates(Achakulwisut et al.,2023).If fossil-CCS fails to scale to the levels envisaged by these scenarios,reductions in f

319、ossil fuel production and use need to be even faster.Likewise,if CDR deployment fails to scale to the levels envisaged by these scenarios,deeper cuts in fossil fuels would be required.In particular,the level of long-term gas production modelled in 1.5C-consistent scenarios is Box 2.1 Carbon dioxide

320、removal(CDR),carbon capture and storage(CCS),and fossil fuel abatementFollowing the State of Carbon Dioxide Removal report(Smith et al.,2023),CCS coupled to fossil fuel combustion is referred to in this report as fossil-CCS to distinguish it from the novel CDR methods of CCS coupled to bioenergy(BEC

321、CS)or direct air capture(DACCS).j To count as CDR,a method must be an interven-tion which captures CO2 from the atmosphere(Principle 1)and stores it for a long period of time(Principle 2).j CCS and carbon capture and utilization(CCU)are a set of industrial methods for the chemical capture of CO2 and

322、 its concentration into a pure stream,followed by its subsequent geological storage(CCS)or conversion into products(CCU).Where the CO2 comes directly from fossil fuels,this process does not meet Principle 1 and counts as an emissions reduction rather than CDR.CCS can,however,also be applied to CO2 s

323、treams gen-erated from biomass or directly from the air,in which cases the overall process meets both Principle 1 and Principle 2,and counts as CDR.Currently,carbon capture,utilization,and storage(CCUS)costs vary greatly by CO2 source,ranging from USD 13 to USD 342 per tonne of CO2(Bay-lin-Stern&Ber

324、ghout,2021).j Almost all current CDR of about 2 GtCO2/yr comes from conventional management of land (e.g.afforestation/reforestation,peatland and wetland restoration);only a tiny fraction 0.002 GtCO2/yr results from novel methods(e.g.BECCS,DACCS,ocean alkalinization)(Smith et al.,2023).Following the

325、 IPCC AR6 WGIII definition,fossil fuel abatement in this report refers to human interven-tions that reduces the release of GHGs from activi-ties during the fossil fuel lifecycle.This includes,for example,capturing 90%or more CO2 from coal-or gas-fired power plants,or 5080%of fugitive meth-ane emissi

326、ons from fossil-fuel-based energy supply(IPCC,2022).Production Gap Report 2023 29particularly sensitive to assumptions around fossil-CCS and CDR(see figure A.3 in the Appendix).Under the median 1.5C-consistent pathway,around 2.2 GtCO2/yr is sequestered by conventional land-based methods and around 3

327、.0 GtCO2/yr by novel methods(e.g.BECCS,DACCS)by 2050.Currently,almost all CDR comes from conventional methods(2 GtCO2/yr),with novel meth-ods contributing 0.002 GtCO2/yr(Smith et al.,2023).A precautionary approach would involve minimizing CDR reliance,given both the uncertainty in the feasibility of

328、 its large-scale deployment(Grant et al.,2021b;Smith et al.,2023)and potential negative impacts including land degradation,food insecurity,biodiversity loss,and water scarcity(Calvin et al.,2021;Fuss et al.,2018;IPCC,2022).As shown in Table 2.2,if only 1.5C-consistent scenarios that do not exceed th

329、e“feasible potential”limits of A/R,BECCS,and DACCS are considered(see footnote 14),the modelled 20202050 reductions become 99%,76%,and 77%for coal,oil,and gas,respectively.Even if CDR does successfully scale,using CDR to enable continued fossil fuel combustion is arguably a risky and sub-optimal cli

330、-mate mitigation strategy,and CDR should be viewed as a tool to address emissions from hard-to-transition sectors,rather than as an alternative to actual emission reductions(Grant et al.,2021a;Smith et al.,2023).Second,AR6-assessed mitigation scenarios generally do not adequately capture real-world

331、technology innovation,adoption,diffusion,and path-dependencies.However,the energy transition will be highly path-dependent,with the cost of key fuels and technologies changing as the energy transition develops(Aghion et al.,2019;Mercure et al.,2016).In particular,economies of scale mean that the cos

332、t of low-carbon technologies will continue to fall as their deployment expands.This could drive a virtuous cycle of coupled cost reductions and accelerated deployment,which few models account for(Grubb et al.,2021;Way et al.,2022).At the same time,fossil fuels will likely experi-ence diseconomies of

333、 scale as the infrastructure required for fossil fuel extraction,distribution,and consumption shrinks(Grubert&Hastings-Simon,2022;IMF,2023).This will likely increase the costs of maintaining fossil fuel infrastructure during what some researchers have called the“mid-transition”(2080%penetration of renewable systems),which could further accelerate the transition towards renewables and increase the