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1、A MORE CONTESTED WORLDaA PUBLICATIONOF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCILA M O R E C O N T E S T E D W O R L D2040TRENDSGLOBALMARCH 2021Image/Bigstock“Intelligence does not claim infallibility for its prophecies.Intelligence merely holds that the answer which it gives is the most deeply and objective

2、ly based and carefully considered estimate.”Sherman KentFounder of the Office of National EstimatesBastien Herve/UnsplashGLOBAL TRENDS 2040iiPierre-Chatel-Innocenti/UnsplashA PUBLICATION OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCILA M O R E C O N T E S T E D W O R L D2040TRENDSGLOBALMARCH 2021NIC 2021-02339

3、ISBN 978-1-929667-33-8To view digital version:www.dni.gov/nic/globaltrendsGLOBAL TRENDS 2040ivTABLE OF CONTENTSFOREWORDINTRODUCTION1|KEY THEMES6|EXECUTIVE SUMMARY11|THE COVID-19 FACTOR:EXPANDING UNCERTAINTYSTRUCTURAL FORCES16|DEMOGRAPHICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 23|Future Global Health Challenges30|EN

4、VIRONMENT42|ECONOMICS54|TECHNOLOGYEMERGING DYNAMICS68|SOCIETAL:DISILLUSIONED,INFORMED,AND DIVIDED78|STATE:TENSIONS,TURBULENCE,AND TRANSFORMATION 90|INTERNATIONAL:MORE CONTESTED,UNCERTAIN,AND CONFLICT PRONE107|The Future of Terrorism:Diverse Actors,Fraying International EffortsSCENARIOS FOR 2040 CHAR

5、TING THE FUTURE AMID UNCERTAINTY 110|RENAISSANCE OF DEMOCRACIES112|A WORLD ADRIFT114|COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCE116|SEPARATE SILOS118|TRAGEDY AND MOBILIZATION114v12014114266108REGIONAL FORECASTSTABLE OF GRAPHICSACKNOWLEDGEMENTSA MORE CONTESTED WORLDvFOREWORDWelcome to the 7th edition of the National Int

6、elligence Councils Global Trends report.Published every four years since 1997,Global Trends assesses the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment for the United States during the next two decades.Global Trends is designed to provide an analytic framework for policymaker

7、s early in each administration as they craft national security strategy and navigate an uncertain future.The goal is not to offer a specific prediction of the world in 2040;instead,our intent is to help policymakers and citizens see what may lie beyond the horizon and prepare for an array of possibl

8、e futures.Each edition of Global Trends is a unique undertaking,as its authors on the National Intel-ligence Council develop a methodology and formulate the analysis.This process involved numerous steps:examining and evaluating previous editions of Global Trends for lessons learned;research and disc

9、overy involving widespread consultations,data collection,and commissioned research;synthesizing,outlining,and drafting;and soliciting internal and ex-ternal feedback to revise and sharpen the analysis.A central component of the project has been our conversations with the world outside our security g

10、ates.We benefited greatly from ongoing conversations with esteemed academ-ics and researchers across a range of disciplines,anchoring our study in the latest theories and data.We also broadened our contacts to hear diverse perspectives,ranging from high school students in Washington DC,to civil soci

11、ety organizations in Africa,to business lead-ers in Asia,to foresight practitioners in Europe and Asia,to environmental groups in South America.These discussions offered us new ideas and expertise,challenged our assump-tions,and helped us to identify and understand our biases and blind spots.One of

12、the key challenges with a project of this breadth and magnitude is how to organize all the analysis into a story that is coherent,integrated,and forward looking.We constructed this report around two central organizing principles:identifying and assessing broad forces that are shaping the future stra

13、tegic environment,and then exploring how populations and leaders will act on and respond to the forces.Based on those organizing principles,we built the analysis in three general sections.First,we explore structural forces in four core areas:demographics,environment,economics,and technology.We selec

14、ted these areas because they are foundational in shaping future FOREWORDImage/BigstockGLOBAL TRENDS 2040vidynamics and relatively universal in scope,and because we can offer projections with a reasonable degree of confidence based on available data and evidence.The second sec-tion examines how these

15、 structural forces interact and intersect with other factors to affect emerging dynamics at three levels of analysis:individuals and society,states,and the inter-national system.The analysis in this section involves a higher degree of uncertainty because of the variability of human choices that will

16、 be made in the future.We focus on identifying and describing the key emerging dynamics at each level,including what is driving them and how they might evolve over time.Finally,the third section identifies several key uncer-tainties and uses these to create five future scenarios for the world in 204

17、0.These scenarios are not intended to be predictions but to widen the aperture as to the possibilities,exploring various combinations of how the structural forces,emerging dynamics,and key uncertain-ties could play out.When exploring the long-term future,another challenge is choosing which issues to

18、 cov-er and emphasize,and which ones to leave out.We focused on global,long-term trends and dynamics that are likely to shape communities,states,and the international system for decades and to present them in a broader context.Accordingly,there is less on other near-term issues and crises.We offer t

19、his analysis with humility,knowing that invariably the future will unfold in ways that we have not foreseen.Although Global Trends is necessarily more speculative than most intelligence assessments,we rely on the fundamentals of our analytic tradecraft:we construct arguments that are grounded in dat

20、a and appropriately caveated;we show our work and explain what we know and do not know;we consider alternative hypotheses and how we could be wrong;and we do not advocate policy positions or preferences.Global Trends reflects the National Intelligence Councils perspective on these future trends;it d

21、oes not represent the official,coordinated view of the US Intelligence Community nor US policy.We are proud to publish this report publicly for audiences around the world to read and consider.We hope that it serves as a useful resource and provokes a conversation about our collective future.Finally,

22、a note of gratitude to colleagues on the National Intelligence Council and the wider Intelligence Community who joined in this journey to understand our world,explore the future,and draft this report.The Strategic Futures Group National Intelligence Council March 2021A MORE CONTESTED WORLD1Key Theme

23、sINTRODUCTIONDURING THE PAST YEAR,THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAS REMINDED THE WORLD OF ITS FRAGILITY AND DEMONSTRATED THE INHERENT RISKS OF HIGH LEVELS OF IN-TERDEPENDENCE.IN COMING YEARS AND DECADES,THE WORLD WILL FACE MORE INTENSE AND CASCADING GLOBAL CHALLENGES RANGING FROM DISEASE TO CLIMATE CHANGE T

24、O THE DISRUPTIONS FROM NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND FINANCIAL CRISES.These challenges will repeatedly test the resilience and adaptability of communities,states,and the international system,often exceeding the capacity of existing systems and models.This looming disequilibrium between existing and future ch

25、allenges and the ability of institutions and systems to respond is likely to grow and produce greater contestation at every level.In this more contested world,communities are increasingly fractured as people seek security with like-minded groups based on established and newly prominent identities;st

26、ates of all types and in all regions are struggling to meet the needs and expectations of more connected,more urban,and more empowered populations;and the international system is more competitiveshaped in part by challenges from a rising Chinaand at greater risk of conflict as states and nonstate ac

27、tors exploit new sources of power and erode longstanding norms and institutions that have provided some stability in past decades.These dynamics are not fixed in perpetuity,however,and we envision a variety of plausible scenarios for the world of 2040from a democratic renais-sance to a transformatio

28、n in global cooperation spurred by shared tragedydepending on how these dynamics interact and human choices along the way.Image/BigstockGLOBAL TRENDS 20402FIVE THEMES APPEAR THROUGHOUT THIS REPORT AND UNDERPIN THIS OVERALL THESIS.GLOBAL CHALLENGESFirst,shared global challengesin-cluding climate chan

29、ge,disease,financial crises,and technology disruptionsare likely to manifest more frequently and intensely in almost every region and country.These challengeswhich often lack a direct human agent or perpetratorwill produce wide-spread strains on states and societies as well as shocks that could be c

30、atastrophic.The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic marks the most significant,singular global disruption since World War II,with health,economic,political,and security implications that will ripple for years to come.The effects of climate change and environmental degradation are likely to exacerbate food and

31、 water insecurity for poor countries,increase migration,precipitate new health challenges,and contribute to biodi-versity losses.Novel technologies will appear and diffuse faster and faster,disrupting jobs,industries,communities,the nature of power,and what it means to be human.Continued pressure fo

32、r global migrationas of 2020 more than 270 million persons were living in a country to which they have migrated,100 million more than in 2000will strain both origin and destination countries to manage the flow and effects.These challenges will intersect and cascade,including in ways that are difficu

33、lt to anticipate.National security will require not only defending against armies and arsenals but also withstanding and adapting to these shared global challenges.FRAGMENTATIONSecond,the difficulty of addressing these transnational challenges is compounded in part by increasing fragmentation within

34、 communities,states,and the international system.Paradoxically,as the world has grown more connected through communications technology,trade,and the movement of people,that very connectivity has divided and fragmented people and countries.The hyper-connected information environment,greater urbanizat

35、ion,and interdependent economies mean that most aspects of daily life,including finances,health,and housing,will be more connected all the time.The Internet of Things encompassed 10 billion devices in 2018 and is projected to reach 64 billion by 2025 and possibly many trillions by 2040,all monitored

36、 in real time.In turn,this connectivity will help produce new efficiencies,conveniences,and advances in living standards.However,it will also create and exacerbate tensions at all lev-els,from societies divided over core values and goals to regimes that employ digital repression to control populatio

37、ns.As these connections deepen and spread,they are likely to grow in-creasingly fragmented along national,cultural,or political preferences.In addition,people are likely to gravitate to information silos of people who share similar views,reinforcing beliefs and understanding of the truth.Meanwhile,g

38、lobalization is likely to endure but transform as economic and production networks shift and diversify.All together,these forces por-tend a world that is both inextricably bound by connectivity and fragmenting in different directions.DISEQUILIBRIUMThe scale of transnational challenges,and the emergi

39、ng implications of fragmen-tation,are exceeding the capacity of existing systems and structures,highlighting the third theme:disequilibrium.There is an increasing mismatch at all levels between challenges and needs with the systems and organizations to deal with them.The international systemin-cludi

40、ng the organizations,alliances,rules,and normsis poorly set up to address the com-pounding global challenges facing populations.Images/BigstockA MORE CONTESTED WORLD3The COVID-19 pandemic has provided a stark example of the weaknesses in international co-ordination on health crises and the mismatch

41、between existing institutions,funding levels,and future health challenges.Within states and societies,there is likely to be a persistent and growing gap between what people demand and what governments and corporations can deliver.From Beirut to Bogota to Brussels,people are increasingly taking to th

42、e streets to express their dissatisfaction with govern-ments ability to meet a wide range of needs,agendas,and expectations.As a result of these disequilibriums,old ordersfrom institutions to norms to types of governanceare strained and in some cases,eroding.And actors at ev-ery level are struggling

43、 to agree on new models for how to structure civilization.CONTESTATIONA key consequence of greater imbal-ance is greater contestation within communi-ties,states,and the international community.This encompasses rising tensions,division,and competition in societies,states,and at the international leve

44、l.Many societies are increas-ingly divided among identity affiliations and at risk of greater fracturing.Relationships be-tween societies and governments will be under persistent strain as states struggle to meet rising demands from populations.As a result,politics within states are likely to grow m

45、ore volatile and contentious,and no region,ide-ology,or governance system seems immune or to have the answers.At the international level,the geopolitical environment will be more competitiveshaped by Chinas challenge to the United States and Western-led interna-tional system.Major powers are jockeyi

46、ng to establish and exploit new rules of the road.This contestation is playing out across domains from information and the media to trade and technological innovations.ADAPTATIONFinally,adaptation will be both an imperative and a key source of advantage for all actors in this world.Climate change,fo

47、r ex-ample,will force almost all states and societies to adapt to a warmer planet.Some measures are as inexpensive and simple as restoring mangrove forests or increasing rainwater stor-age;others are as complex as building massive sea walls and planning for the relocation of large populations.Demogr

48、aphic shifts will also require widespread adaption.Countries with highly aged populations like China,Japan,and South Korea,as well as Europe,will face constraints on economic growth in the absence of adaptive strategies,such as automation and increased immigration.Technology will be a key avenue for

49、 gaining advantages through ad-aptation.For example,countries that are able to harness productivity boosts from artificial intelligence(AI)will have expanded economic opportunities that could allow governments to deliver more services,reduce national debt,finance some of the costs of an aging popula

50、-tion,and help some emerging countries avoid the middle-income trap.The benefits from technology like AI will be unevenly distributed within and between states,and more broadly,adaptation is likely to reveal and exacerbate inequalities.The most effective states are likely to be those that can build

51、societal consensus and trust toward collective action on adapta-tion and harness the relative expertise,capa-bilities,and relationships of nonstate actors to complement state capacity.GLOBAL TRENDS 20404This edition of Global Trends constructs its analysis of the future in several stages.First,we ex

52、amine structural forces in demographics,environment,economics,and technology that shape the contours of our future world.Second,we analyze how these structural forces and other factorscombined with human responsesaffect emerging dynamics in societies,states,and the international system.Third,we envi

53、sion five plausible scenarios for the distant future in 2040.The key themes discussed previously appear across these sections.STRUCTURAL FORCESEMERGING DYNAMICS SCENARIOS FOR 2040DEMOGRAPHICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENTSOCIETALRENAISSANCE OF DEMOCRACIESSlowing global population growth and a rising median

54、age will help some devel-oping economies,but rapidly aging and contracting populations will weigh on many developed economies.Decades of progress in education,health,and poverty reduction will be difficult to build on or even sustain.Pressure for migration is likely to increase.Many populations are

55、increasingly pessi-mistic and distrustful as they struggle to deal with disruptive economic,techno-logical,and demographic trends.Newly prominent identities,resurgent established allegiances,and a siloed information en-vironment are exposing fault lines within communities and states,undermining civi

56、c nationalism,and increasing volatility.Popu-lations are more informed and have greater ability to express their demands.The world is in the midst of a resurgence of open democracies led by the United States and its allies.Rapid technological advancements fostered by public-private partnerships in t

57、he United States and other democratic societies are transform-ing the global economy,raising incomes,and improving the quality of life for millions around the globe.In contrast,years of increasing societal controls and monitoring in China and Russia have stifled innovation.A MORE CONTESTED WORLD5A W

58、ORLD ADRIFT COMPETITIVE COEXISTENCESEPARATE SILOSTRAGEDY AND MOBILIZATIONENVIRONMENTSTATE TECHNOLOGYINTERNATIONALECONOMICSGLOBAL TRENDS OVERVIEWThe international system is directionless,chaotic,and volatile as international rules and institutions are largely ignored.OECD countries are plagued by slo

59、wer economic growth,widening societal di-visions,and political paralysis.China is taking advantage of the Wests troubles to expand its international influence.Many global challenges are unaddressed.The United States and China have prioritized economic growth and restored a robust trading relationshi

60、p,but this economic interdependence exists alongside competition over political influence,gover-nance models,technological dominance,and strategic advantage.The risk of major war is low,and international cooperation and technolog-ical innovation make global problems manageable.The world is fragmente

61、d into several economic and security blocs of varying size and strength,centered on the United States,China,the EU,Russia,and a few region-al powers,and focused on self-sufficiency,resiliency,and defense.Information flows within separate cyber-sover-eign enclaves,supply chains are reoriented,and int

62、erna-tional trade is disrupted.Vul-nerable developing countries are caught in the middle.A global coalition,led by the EU and China working with NGOs and revitalized multilateral institutions,is implementing far-reaching changes designed to address climate change,resource depletion,and poverty follo

63、wing a global food catastrophe caused by climate events and environ-mental degradation.Richer countries shift to help poorer ones manage the crisis and then transition to low carbon econ-omies through broad aid pro-grams and transfers of advanced energy technologies.Climate change will increasingly

64、ex-acerbate risks to human and national security and force states to make hard choices and tradeoffs.The burdens will be unevenly distributed,height-ening competition,contributing to instability,straining military readiness,and encouraging political movements.Governments will face mounting pres-sure

65、s from the combination of economic constraints;demographic,environmen-tal,and other challenges;and more empowered populations.A growing gap between public demands and what gov-ernments can deliver will raise tensions,increase political volatility,and threaten democracy.The mismatch may also spur new

66、 or shifting sources and models of governance.The pace and reach of technolog-ical developments will increase,transforming human experiences and capabilities while creating new tensions and disruptions for all ac-tors.Global competition for the core elements of technology supremacy will increase.Spi

67、n off technolo-gies and applications will enable rapid adoption.Power in the international system will evolve to include a broader set of sources,but no single state is likely to be positioned to dominate across all regions or domains.The United States and China will have the greatest influ-ence on

68、global dynamics,forcing starker choices on other actors,increasing jockeying over global norms,rules,and institutions,and heightening the risk of interstate conflict.Several global economic trends,including rising national debt,a more complex and fragmented trading environment,the global spread of t

69、rade in services,new employment disruptions,and the continued rise of powerful firms,are shaping condi-tions within and between states.Calls for more planning and regulation will intensify,particularly of large platform,e-commerce corporations.Image/Bigstock|Bagir Bahana/UnsplashGLOBAL TRENDS 20406S

70、TRUCTURAL FORCES SETTING THE PARAMETERSTrends in demographics and human develop-ment,environment,economics,and technology are laying the foundation and constructing the bounds of our future world.In some areas,these trends are becoming more intense,such as changes in our climate,the concentration of

71、 people in urban areas,and the emergence of new technologies.Trends in other areas are more uncertaingains in human development and economic growth are likely to slow and may even reverse in some areas,although a mix of factors could change this trajectory.The conver-gence of these trends will offer

72、 opportunities for innovation but also will leave some communities and states struggling to cope and adapt.Even apparent progress,such as new and advanced technologies,will be disruptive to many peoples lives and livelihoods,leaving them feeling inse-cure and forcing adaptation.The most certain tren

73、ds during the next 20 years will be major demographic shifts as global population growth slows and the world rapidly ages.Some developed and emerging economies,including in Europe and East Asia,will grow older faster and face contracting populations,weighing on economic growth.In contrast,some devel

74、oping countries in Latin America,South Asia,and the Middle East and North Africa benefit from larger working-age populations,offering opportunities for a de-mographic dividend if coupled with improve-ments in infrastructure and skills.Human development,including health,education,and household prospe

75、rity,has made historic improvements in every region during the past few decades.Many countries will struggle to build on and even sustain these successes.Past improvements focused on the basics of health,education,and poverty reduction,but the next levels of development are more difficult and face h

76、eadwinds from the COVID-19 pandem-ic,potentially slower global economic growth,aging populations,and the effects of conflict and climate.These factors will challenge gov-ernments seeking to provide the education and infrastructure needed to improve the produc-tivity of their growing urban middle cla

77、sses in a 21st century economy.As some countries rise to these challenges and others fall short,shifting global demographic trends almost certainly will aggravate disparities in economic opportunity within and between countries during the next two decades as well as create more pressure for and disp

78、utes over migration.In the environment,the physical effects of climate change are likely to intensify during the next two decades,especially in the 2030s.More Executive SummaryINTRODUCTIONA MORE CONTESTED WORLD7extreme storms,droughts,and floods;melting glaciers and ice caps;and rising sea levels wi

79、ll accompany rising temperatures.The impact will disproportionately fall on the developing world and poorer regions and intersect with environmental degradation to create new vulnerabilities and exacerbate existing risks to economic prosperity,food,water,health,and energy security.Governments,societ

80、ies,and the private sector are likely to expand adaptation and resilience measures to man-age existing threats,but these measures are unlikely to be evenly distributed,leaving some populations behind.Debates will grow over how and how quickly to reach net zero green-house gas emissions.During the ne

81、xt two decades,several global economic trends,including rising national debt,a more complex and fragmented trading environment,a shift in trade,and new employ-ment disruptions are likely to shape conditions within and between states.Many governments may find they have reduced flexibility as they nav

82、igate greater debt burdens,diverse trading rules,and a broader array of powerful state and corporate actors exerting influence.Large platform corporationswhich provide online markets for large numbers of buyers and sell-ercould drive continued trade globalization and help smaller firms grow and gain

83、 access to international markets.These powerful firms are likely to try to exert influence in political and social arenas,efforts that may lead gov-ernments to impose new restrictions.Asian economies appear poised to continue decades of growth through at least 2030,although po-tentially slower.They

84、are unlikely to reach the per capita gross domestic product(GDP)or economic influence of existing advanced econ-omies,including the United States and Europe.Productivity growth remains a key variable;an increase in the rate of growth could alleviate many economic,human development,and other challeng

85、es.Technology will offer the potential to mitigate problems,such as climate change and disease,and to create new challenges,such as job displacement.Technologies are being invent-ed,used,spread,and then discarded at ever increasing speeds around the world,and new centers of innovation are emerging.D

86、uring the next two decades,the pace and reach of technological developments are likely to increase ever faster,transforming a range of human experiences and capabilities while also creating new tensions and disruptions within and between societies,industries,and states.State and nonstate rivals will

87、 vie for leadership and dominance in science and technology with potentially cascading risks and implications for economic,military,and societal security.EMERGING DYNAMICSThese structural forces,along with other factors,will intersect and interact at the levels of societies,states,and the internatio

88、nal system,creating opportunities as well as chal-lenges for communities,institutions,corpo-rations,and governments.These interactions are also likely to produce greater contestation at all levels than has been seen since the end of the Cold War,reflecting differing ideolo-gies as well as contrastin

89、g views on the most effective way to organize society and tackle emerging challenges.Within societies,there is increasing fragmen-tation and contestation over economic,cultur-al,and political issues.Decades of steady gains in prosperity and other aspects of human de-velopment have improved lives in

90、every region and raised peoples expectations for a better future.As these trends plateau and combine with rapid social and technological changes,Image/BigstockGLOBAL TRENDS 20408large segments of the global population are becoming wary of institutions and govern-ments that they see as unwilling or u

91、nable to address their needs.People are gravitating to familiar and like-minded groups for communi-ty and security,including ethnic,religious,and cultural identities as well as groupings around interests and causes,such as environmental-ism.The combination of newly prominent and diverse identity all

92、egiances and a more siloed information environment is exposing and ag-gravating fault lines within states,undermining civic nationalism,and increasing volatility.At the state level,the relationships between societies and their governments in every region are likely to face persistent strains and ten

93、sions because of a growing mismatch be-tween what publics need and expect and what governments can and will deliver.Populations in every region are increasingly equipped with the tools,capacity,and incentive to agitate for their preferred social and political goals and to place more demands on their

94、 govern-ments to find solutions.At the same time that populations are increasingly empowered and demanding more,governments are coming under greater pressure from new challenges and more limited resources.This widening gap portends more political volatility,erosion of democracy,and expanding roles f

95、or alter-native providers of governance.Over time,these dynamics might open the door to more significant shifts in how people govern.In the international system,no single state is likely to be positioned to dominate across all regions or domains,and a broader range of actors will compete to shape th

96、e international system and achieve narrower goals.Acceler-ating shifts in military power,demographics,economic growth,environmental conditions,and technology,as well as hardening divisions over governance models,are likely to further ratchet up competition between China and a Western coalition led b

97、y the United States.Rival powers will jockey to shape global norms,rules,and institutions,while regional powers and nonstate actors may exert more influence and lead on issues left unattended by the major powers.These highly varied interactions are likely to produce a more conflict-prone and volatil

98、e geopolitical environment,under-mine global multilateralism,and broaden the mismatch between transnational challenges and institutional arrangements to tackle them.ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR 2040Human responses to these core drivers and emerging dynamics will determine how the world evolves during t

99、he next two decades.Of the many uncertainties about the future,we explored three key questions around condi-tions within specific regions and countries and the policy choices of populations and leaders that will shape the global environment.From these questions,we constructed five scenarios for alte

100、rnative worlds in the year 2040.How severe are the looming global challenges?How do states and nonstate actors en-gage in the world,including focus and type of engagement?Finally,what do states prioritize for the future?In Renaissance of Democracies,the world is in the midst of a resurgence of open

101、democ-racies led by the United States and its allies.Rapid technological advancements fostered A MORE CONTESTED WORLD9by public-private partnerships in the United States and other democratic societies are transforming the global economy,raising incomes,and improving the quality of life for millions

102、around the globe.The rising tide of economic growth and technological achieve-ment enables responses to global challenges,eases societal divisions,and renews public trust in democratic institutions.In contrast,years of increasing societal controls and monitoring in China and Russia have stifled inno

103、vation as leading scientists and entrepre-neurs have sought asylum in the United States and Europe.In A World Adrift,the international system is directionless,chaotic,and volatile as in-ternational rules and institutions are largely ignored by major powers like China,regional players,and nonstate ac

104、tors.Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)countries are plagued by slower eco-nomic growth,widening societal divisions,and political paralysis.China is taking advantage of the Wests troubles to expand its international influence,especially in Asia,but Beijing lacks the will and

105、 military might to take on global leadership,leaving many global challenges,such as climate change and instability in devel-oping countries,largely unaddressed.In Competitive Coexistence,the United States and China have prioritized economic growth and restored a robust trading rela-tionship,but this

106、 economic interdependence exists alongside competition over political influence,governance models,technological dominance,and strategic advantage.The risk of major war is low,and international coopera-tion and technological innovation make global problems manageable over the near term for advanced e

107、conomies,but longer term climate challenges remain.In Separate Silos,the world is fragmented into several economic and security blocs of varying size and strength,centered on the United States,China,the European Union(EU),Russia,and a couple of regional powers;these blocs are focused on self-suffici

108、ency,resiliency,and defense.Information flows within separate cyber-sovereign enclaves,supply chains are reoriented,and internation-al trade is disrupted.Vulnerable developing countries are caught in the middle with some on the verge of becoming failed states.Global problems,notably climate change,a

109、re spottily addressed,if at all.In Tragedy and Mobilization,a global coa-lition,led by the EU and China working with nongovernmental organizations and revital-ized multilateral institutions,is implementing far-reaching changes designed to address cli-mate change,resource depletion,and poverty follow

110、ing a global food catastrophe caused by climate events and environmental degra-dation.Richer countries shift to help poorer ones manage the crisis and then transition to low carbon economies through broad aid programs and transfers of advanced energy technologies,recognizing how rapidly these global

111、 challenges spread across borders.GLOBAL TRENDS 204010A MORE CONTESTED WORLD11THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC EMERGED GLOBALLY IN 2020,WREAKING HAVOC ACROSS THE WORLD,KILLING MORE THAN 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE AS OF EARLY 2021,DEVAS-TATING FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES,AND DISRUPTING ECONOMIES AND POLITI-CAL DYNAMICS WI

112、THIN AND BETWEEN COUNTRIES.PREVIOUS GLOBAL TRENDS EDITIONS FORECASTED THE POTENTIAL FOR NEW DISEASES AND EVEN IMAGINED SCENARIOS WITH A PANDEMIC,BUT WE LACKED A FULL PICTURE OF THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF ITS disruptive potential.COVID-19 has shaken long-held assumptions about resilience and adaptation

113、 and created new uncertainties about the economy,governance,geopolitics,and technology.To understand and assess the impact of this crisis,we examined and debated a broad range of our assumptions and assessments related to key global trends.We asked a series of questions:Which existing trends will en

114、dure,which trends are accelerating or decelerating because of the pandemic,and where are we likely to experience fundamental,systemic shifts?Are the disrup-tions temporary or could the pandemic unleash new forces to shape the future?Much like the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,the COVID-19 p

115、andemic is likely to produce some changes that will be felt for years to come and change the way we live,work,and govern domestically and internationally.How great these will be,however,is very much in question.ACCELERATING,SHARPENING SOME TRENDS The pandemic and corresponding national responses app

116、ear to be honing and accelerating several trends that were already underway before the outbreak.COVID-19 brought global health and healthcare issues into sharp relief,exposed and in some cases widened social fissures,underscored vast disparities in healthcare access and infrastructure,and interrupte

117、d efforts to combat other diseases.The pandemic also highlighted weaknesses in the international coordina-tion on health crises and the mismatch between existing institutions,funding levels,and future health challenges.The COVID-19 Factor:Expanding UncertaintyGiacomo Carra/UnsplashGLOBAL TRENDS 2040

118、12Catalyzing Economic Trends.Lockdowns,quarantines,and the closing of international borders have catalyzed some pre-existing economic trends,including diversification in global supply chains,increased national debt,and greater government intervention in economies.Moving forward,the character of glob

119、alization may retain some of the changes from this crisis period,and debt,particularly for developing economies,will strain national capacities for many years.Reinforcing Nationalism and Polarization.Nationalism and polarization have been on the rise in many countries,especially exclu-sionary nation

120、alism.Efforts to contain and manage the virus have reinforced nationalist trends globally as some states turned inward to protect their citizens and sometimes cast blame on marginalized groups.The response to the pandemic has fueled partisanship and polarization in many countries as groups argue ove

121、r the best way to respond and seek scape-goats to blame for spreading the virus and for slow responses.Deepening Inequality.The disproportionate economic impact of COVID-19 on low-income earners has caused them to fall further behind.When COVID-19 is finally controlled,many fam-ilies are likely to h

122、ave experienced further set-backs,especially those working in the service or informal sectors or who left the workforce to provide dependent carepredominantly women.The pandemic has exposed the digital divide within and between countries while spurring efforts to improve Internet access.Straining Go

123、vernance.The pandemic is straining government capacity for services and contributing to already low levels of trust in institutions in countries that have not effec-tively handled the response.The pandemic is exacerbating the confusing and polarized information environment that is undermining public

124、 confidence in health authorities,particu-larly in open societies.Illiberal regimes in some countries are using the pandemic as a pretext to more severely crack down on dissent and restrict civic freedoms,conditions that may outlive the disease.Highlighting Failed International Cooper-ation.The COVI

125、D-19 pandemic exposed the weaknesses and political cleavages in interna-tional institutions,such as the World Health Organization(WHO)and United Nations,and called into question countries ability and will-ingness to cooperate multilaterally to address common challenges beyond infectious disease,part

126、icularly climate change.The WHO,which has faced significant funding difficulties and resistance to mandatory surveillance regimes,is facing its gravest shock in nearly two de-cades.The crisis,however,may ultimately lead actors to make deeper reforms,standardize data collection and sharing,and forge

127、new public-private partnerships.Elevating the Role of Nonstate Actors.Non-state actors,ranging from the Gates Founda-tion to private companies,have been crucial to vaccine research or retrofitting equipment to mass produce medical supplies and personal protective equipment.Nonstate networks will com

128、plement national and intergovernmental action in future health crises,including early warning,treatment,facilitation of data-sharing,and vaccine development.WHILE OTHERS DECELERATE OR REVERSECOVID-19 is slowing and possibly reversing some longstanding trends in human develop-ment,especially the redu

129、ction of poverty and disease and closing gender inequality gaps.The longest lasting reversals may be in poverty reduction across Africa,Latin America,and South Asia,followed by losses in gender equal-ity.The resources devoted to fighting COVID-19 and social restrictions could reverse years of progre

130、ss against malaria,measles,polio,and other infectious diseases by consuming key financial,material,and personnel resources.The COVID-19 emergency may bring regions together in ways that previous crises have not.A MORE CONTESTED WORLD13Although European countries early in the crisis imposed restricti

131、ons on border traffic and ex-ports of critical medical supplies,the European Union has rallied around an economic rescue package and other emergency measures that could bolster the European integration project going forward.COVID-19 could also lead to re-direction of national budgets toward pandemic

132、 response and economic recovery,diverting funds from defense expenditures,foreign aid,and infrastructure programs in some coun-tries,at least in the near term.MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERSThe unanticipated second-and third-order effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have re-minded us how uncertain the futu

133、re isboth in the long and short term.As researchers and analysts,we must be ever vigilant,asking better questions,frequently challenging our assumptions,checking our biases,and looking for weak signals of change.We need to expect the unexpected and apply the lessons of this pandemic to our craft in

134、the future.Photo/BigstockSetting the Parameters14Demographic,environmental,economic,and technological devel-opments will shape the contours of the world we will live in during coming decades.These structural forcesboth individually and col-lectivelywill offer new benefits and opportunities for indiv

135、iduals,communities,and governments in every region to improve how we live,work,and prosper.In addition,the acceleration and intersection of these trends are fostering new or more intense challenges,straining the capacity of societies and governments to manage and adapt.After several decades of extra

136、ordinary gains in human development,many countries are likely to struggle to build on and even sustain these successes be-cause moving beyond the basics in education and healthcare is harder,especial-ly with larger populations and tighter resources.In addition,the physical effects of more extreme we

137、ather events,hotter temperatures,changing precipitation patterns,and rising sea levels will touch all countries but disproportionately will hurt the developing world and poorer regions.The pace and reach of technolog-STRUCTURAL FORCESImage/BigstockA MORE CONTESTED WORLD15ical developments during thi

138、s period are likely to increase and accelerate,transforming and improving a range of human experiences and capabilities while also creating new tensions and disruptions within and between societies,industries,and states.During the next two decades,several global economic trends,including rising sove

139、reign debt,new employment disruptions,a more complex and fragmented trading environment,and the rise of power-ful companies,are likely to shape conditions within and between states.These structural drivers may redound in unpredictable ways,affording some coun-tries the opportunity to rise to these c

140、hallenges and even prosper,while others,burdened by a confluence of less supportive trends,will struggle.Shifting global de-mographic trends almost cer-tainly will aggravate dispari-ties in economic and political opportunity within and between countries,strain governance,and fuel pressure for global

141、 migration during the next 20 yearsa pressure that will increase friction between states.State and nonstate rivals will compete for dominance in science and technology with poten-tially cascading risks and implications globally for economic,military,diplomatic,and societal security.Many governments

142、may find they have reduced flexibility as they navigate greater debt burdens,diverse trading rules,and a broader range of powerful state and corporate actors exerting influence.Meanwhile,Asian economies appear poised to continue decades of growth,at least through 2030,and are looking to use their ec

143、onomic and population size to influence international institutions and rules.DEMOGRAPHICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENTENVIRONMENTPhotos|Bigstock|Pexels|Chuttersnap/Unslpash ECONOMICSTECHNOLOGY16DEMOGRAPHICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENTKey TakeawaysSlowing population growth and a rising global median age are prese

144、nting poten-tial economic opportunities for some developing economies,but rapidly aging and contracting populations in some developed economies and China will weigh on economic growth.Relatively poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will account for al-most all global population growth

145、 during the next two decades and will be rapidly urbanizing at the same time,most likely overwhelming their capacity to provide the infrastructure and education systems necessary to fully harness their econom-ic growth potential.During the next two decades,demographic shifts and economic incentives

146、are likely to increase pressure for migration out of developing countries,mostly from Sub-Saharan Africa,and primarily into aging,developed countries.Conflict and climate disruptions will compound these broader migration trends.These demographic and human development trends will put pressure on gov-

147、ernments to increase public investment and control immigration,potentially fuel instability in some countries,contribute to a rising Asia,and add to the agenda of already strained international development institutions.STRUCTURAL FORCESPOPULATIONGrowthTrendingAGE STRUCTUREMedian agePOORPoor share of

148、populationMIDDLE CLASSMiddle-classshare of populationURBANIZATIONUrban share of populationShare of urbanpopulation in poor countriesWorking ageshare of populationShare of populationover 652000-20202020-2040Photo/BigstockA MORE CONTESTED WORLD17POPULATIONGrowthTrendingAGE STRUCTUREMedian agePOORPoor

149、share ofpopulationMIDDLE CLASSMiddle-classshare of populationURBANIZATIONUrban share of populationShare of urbanpopulation in poor countriesWorking ageshare of populationShare of populationover 652000-20202020-2040GLOBAL TRENDS 204018As birth rates remain low and the median age rises,most developed

150、and many emerging economies will see their populations peak and then start to shrink by 2040.SLOWING POPULATION GROWTH,AGING POPULATIONS During the next 20 years,the worlds popu-lation will continue to increase every year,adding approximately 1.4 billion people to reach an estimated 9.2 billion by 2

151、040,but the rate of population growth will slow in all regions.Population growth in most of Asia will decline quickly,and after 2040,the population will begin to contract.Although Indias pop-ulation growth is slowing,it will still overtake China as the worlds most populous country around 2027.As bir

152、thrates remain low and the median age rises,most developed and a handful of emerging economies will see their populations peak and then start to shrink by 2040,including China,Japan,Russia,and many European countries.In contrast,Sub-Saha-ran Africa will account for around two-thirds of global popula

153、tion growth and is poised to nearly double its current population by 2050,portending extensive strains on infrastructure,education,and healthcare.Aging:An Opportunity and a BurdenThe combination of fewer children per woman and people living longer will see the global population age rise from a media

154、n of about 31 years in 2020 to 35 in 2040.In middle-in-come countries,falling birthrates and older populations can facilitate human development improvements through an increased share of working age adults in the population,more female participation in the workforce,and increased social stability as

155、sociated with older cohorts.However,shifting age structures will challenge some governments,including some developing countries that are aging before reaching higher incomes,such as China and Eastern Europe,and poor countries with surg-ing youth cohorts that will struggle to build sufficient infrast

156、ructure.Older Populations.Rising old-age dependen-cy ratiosthe population age 65 and older relative to the working-age populationcan weigh on growth even with adaptive strate-gies,such as automation and increased immi-gration.In many older countries,including a number of advanced economies,the cohor

157、t over 65 is likely to approach 25 percent of the total population by 2040,up from only 15 percent as recently as 2010.Japan and South Korea are likely to reach median ages of more than 53 in 2040,up from 48 and 44 respec-tively.Europe is not far behind with a project-ed average median age of 47,and

158、 Greece,Italy,and Spain are likely to age faster.These countries are likely to see further productivity slowdown in the coming decades because older workers usually show fewer productivity gains and a greater share of national income will be diverted to pensions and health care for seniors.Working A

159、ge Populations.Countries with large working-age cohorts and relatively few young and old dependents have the potential for higher household savings that can be di-rected to investment in human development.During the next 20 years,South Asia,Latin America,and the Middle East and North Africa will be

160、in this window of high working-age populations relative to below-working-age and retired dependents.Sixty-eight percent of South Asias population will be of working SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA LIKELY TO DOMINATE POPULATION GROWTH IN COMING DECADESWORLD POPULATION:ANNUAL CHANGE BY REGION,1951-2100Source:Unite

161、d Nations Population Division.-2002040608010012021009080706050403020102000908070601951UN estimateUN forecast(medium scenario)Latin America and CaribbeanEurope,North America,and Russia/FSUEast Asia,Southeast Asia,and OceaniaSouth AsiaSub-Sarahan AfricaMiddle East and North Africa1988,peak year of add

162、ed population,93 millionMillion personsA MORE CONTESTED WORLD19age in 2040,up from an already elevated 66 percent in 2020.Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa probably will also benefit from peak working-age population propor-tions of above 65 percent in the coming 20 years.These oppor

163、tunities for higher poten-tial economic growth will occur only if those workers are adequately trained and can find jobs.South Asias ongoing challenges in job creation,technology adoption,and skills train-ing suggest that it will have difficulties fully leveraging its potential labor force.Youthful

164、Populations.During the next two decades,most countries with large youth pop-ulations will be challenged to meet the basic needs of their populations,particularly in light of the social volatility often associated with youth bulges.In Sub-Saharan Africa,the me-dian age is likely to rise only slightly

165、 to 22 by 2040,still well short of the median age thresh-old of 30 which is often associated with higher levels of human development.More than one-third of Sub-Saharan Africas population will be younger than 15 in 2040,compared with only 14 percent of the population in East Asia.Other populous count

166、ries that most likely will still be below the median age threshold in 2040 are Afghanistan,Egypt,and Pakistan.URBANIZATION CHANGING DEVELOPMENT NEEDS During the next 20 years,the success or failure of cities will shape opportunities and quality of life for a growing share of the worlds popula-tion.T

167、he urban population share is expected to rise from 56 percent in 2020 to nearly two-thirds by 2040,with nearly all of the growth in the developing world.Globally,large cities of more than 1 million residents have been growing at twice the rate of the overall pop-ulation,and nearly 30 percent of the

168、worlds GLOBAL TRENDS 204020URBANIZATION BY COUNTRY INCOME LEVELSource:United Nations.Percent share of global urban populationUrban centers in poor countries are expanding much more quickly than those in wealthier countries.In 1950,more than half of the worlds city-dwellers were in high-income countr

169、ies;by 2050,nearly half will be in poor countries.SHARE OF TOTAL GLOBAL URBAN POPULATION BY INCOME GROUP,1950-205002040608010050403020102000908070601950High-income countriesUpper-middle-income countriesLow and lower-middle-income countries combinedpopulation will live in such a large city by 2035,up

170、 from 20 percent in 2020,according to the United Nations(UN)projection.Some of the worlds least developed countries will have the worlds fastest growing urban populations.The number of urban residents in poor countries is likely to rise by 1 billion to more than 2.5 billion by 2040,according to UN P

171、opulation Division projections.Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will contribute nearly half and one-third respectively of the increase in poor country urbanization.Urbanization has historically been a key driver of economic development,as workers move into more productive jobs in cities and urban f

172、amilies benefit from better education and infrastructure.However,poorer countries that are rapidly urbanizing are likely to see a lower payoff from this virtuous cycle of de-velopment.Many developing country govern-mentseven working with the private sector and nongovernmental organizations(NGOs)will

173、 be challenged to fund the necessary urban transportation,public services,and educa-tion infrastructure.A 2017 World Bank study documented how urban areas in Sub-Saharan Africa often become stuck in a poverty trap in which insufficient worker skills and poor trans-portation networks have resulted in

174、 higher costs but lower incomes for workers.In addi-tion,birth rates in Sub-Saharan Africas cities are higher than in other developing regions,potentially aggravating unemployment over time by increasing the labor supply in cities more quickly than jobs can be created.These low-and lower-middle-inco

175、me countries will also be at greater risk for food insecuri-ty as they urbanize.They currently produce only one-third of the food per capita that upper-middle-and high-income countries produce,leaving many dependent on imports.Food distribution systems in these countries are under greater strain and

176、 are less resilient to shocks such as droughts or floods,and urban households lack access to subsistence farming opportunities.Environmental events are likely to have a greater human impact on newly urbanizing re-gions where dense populations are located on coasts and in other vulnerable areas,but p

177、ro-tective infrastructuremost importantly flood control and storm-hardy housinghas not kept pace.Booming cities of middle-income East,Southeast,and South Asia as well as the low-income urban areas of eastern and south-ern Africa are already exposed to the highest number of disasters per capita,based

178、 on sta-tistics from the Emergency Events Database.PROGRESS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENTSource:United Nations Population Division and Pardee Center University of Denver.Source:IHME and Pardee Center University of Denver.1Sub-Saharan Africa is also included in low-and middle-income countries data.Source:Barr

179、o-Lee and Pardee Center University of Denver.Sub-SaharanAfrica1HighincomeHighincomeHighincomeLow andmiddle incomeLow andmiddle incomeLow andmiddleincomeNumberof birthsDeaths as a percentof live birthsPercent of all adultsBIRTHS PER WOMAN OF CHILD-BEARING AGE(TOTAL FERTILITY RATE),1960-2040INFANT DEA

180、THS IN THE FIRST YEAR,1960-2040SECONDARY EDUCATION COMPLETION RATES,1960-20400123456740202000801960051015204020200080196002040608010040202000801960Sub-SaharanAfrica1Sub-SaharanAfrica1A MORE CONTESTED WORLD21ASSOCIATED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES Many countries will struggle to build on or even sust

181、ain decades of significant improve-ments in education,health,and poverty re-duction.During the past 20 years,at least 1.2 billion people were lifted out of povertythat is their income surpassed$3.20 a day,which is equivalent to the average poverty line in low-income countries.In addition,nearly 1.5

182、billion reached the middle-class income level of at least$10 a day through a virtuous cycle of economic growth and human develop-ment in every region.Basic improvements in healthcare,education,and gender equality generated rising per capita incomes and,in turn,the fiscal capacity for households and

183、governments to fund further improvements,especially in less developed countries.However,sustained progress in some coun-tries is likely to be more difficult during the coming two decades,particularly given the potential for slower and uneven economic growth.Many of the next levels of human developme

184、nt,including secondary and higher education and digital skills training,networked and efficient urban infrastructure,and improved opportunities for women and minority groups,require overcoming social impediments,improving political stabili-ty,and increasing government or private Yannis H/UnsplashGLO

185、BAL TRENDS 204022investment in public services.In much of the developing world,initial gains in human development focused on moving people out of subsistence farming into wage-earning jobs and making basic progress on health,educa-tion,and gender equality.In middle-income countries,these easier targ

186、ets have already been achievedinfant mortality,for example,is minimal and almost everyone receives pri-mary educationbut complex new challeng-es,such as pollution and noncommunicable disease,are arising.Given the rapid expansion of middle-income households during the past two decades,governments may

187、 struggle to meet the needs and expectations of a more urbanized,connected,and vastly expanded global middle class.Progress for Women.The world has seen remarkable progress in womens basic health and education in recent decades as well as an expansion of legal rights in many coun-tries.Birthrates in

188、 most developing econo-mies dropped to less than three children per woman of child-bearing age by 2020,and the age of first birth has risen,increasing the opportunities for education and work outside the home.Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the greatest outlier on this metric:birth-rates have dec

189、reased in recent years but still averaged 4.9 in 2020 and are likely to remain high.Maternal mortality has been reduced by more than one-third during the past 20 years,with South Asia accounting for most of the im-provement.Most developing economies have rapidly reduced the gap in educational attain

190、-ment for girls,although the average number of years of education for girls is still only 81 percent of the years for boys across Sub-Saha-ran Africa,a gap between that region and the rest of the developing world that is unlikely to close during the next two decades.The patriarchal societies of the

191、South Asia region and the Arab states exhibit the greatest gaps in overall gender equality in the home,at the workplace,and for medical care,and this shortfall is likely to continue for the next 20 years.Although women are the primary producers of food globally,they have limited or no rights to land

192、 ownership in many parts of the world.Subordination of women to men regardless of educational level is enshrined in family law in many parts of the Middle East,South Asia,and Sub-Saharan Africa.According to a 2020 UN review,women held only 25 per-cent of seats in national legislatures in 2020althoug

193、h that is twice the level in 2000held one quarter of corporate managerial posi-tions,and accounted for less than one-tenth of chief executive officers of major companies.Improved Childhood Survival and Welfare.In many countries the past two decades saw rapid advances in reducing malnutrition and inf

194、ant mortality,which is mostly because of decreases in preventable communicable dis-ease;there is little room for further dramatic improvements on this front.Progress will be especially slow in areas where conflict and cri-sis are on the rise.In the 1960s,13 percent of infants died in the first year

195、of life throughout the developing world;today it averages just over 3 percent in the developing world.The region with the greatest continuing challeng-es is Sub-Saharan Africa,where 5 percent of infants die within the first year,in large part because poverty and communicable disease rates remain hig

196、h.Expanding Access to Education.Educa-tional attainment is an extremely powerful,slow-moving driver of human development,with expanding education contributing to lifetime expected earnings.Globally,the pro-FUTURE GLOBAL HEALTH CHALLENGESAdvances in basic healthcare during the past few decades,such a

197、s wider availability of medicines and vac-cines and improvements in medical procedures,have reduced disease,improved overall health outcomes,and extended longevity for large numbers of people globally.During the next two decades,however,several health challenges are likely to persist and expand,in p

198、art because of population growth,urbanization,and antimicrobial resistance.Stalled Progress on Combating Infectious DiseaseInternational progress against tuberculosis and malaria has stalled in recent years.From 2015-19,the num-ber of cases of drug-resistant tuberculosis worldwide increased,and mala

199、ria cases declined just 2 percent,compared to 27 percent in the preceding 15 years,in part because of the leveling of international investments.Looking forward,longstanding,emerging,and re-emerging infectious diseases will continue to endanger individuals and communities.The incidence of new pandemi

200、cs also is likely to grow due to increased risk of new animal pathogens infecting humans and factors that enable spread,such as human mobility and population density.Growing Antimicrobial ResistanceResistance to antibiotic treatment is rising globally,due in part to overuse and misuse of antibiotics

201、 in livestock and antimicrobials in human medicine.Drug-resistant infections cause more than half a million deaths annual-ly,and the cumulative economic cost could reach$100 trillion between 2020 and 2050 because of productivity loss and the high cost of extended hospital stays or treatment.Rising L

202、evels of Noncommunicable DiseaseNoncommunicable diseases now cause the majority of deaths worldwideprincipally because of diabetes,cardiovascular disease,cancer,and chronic respiratory conditions such as asthma.Health experts project that by 2040,noncommunicable diseases could cause 80 percent of de

203、aths in low-income countries,up from 25 percent in 1990,due in part to longer life expectancies but also to poor nutrition,pollution,and tobacco use.In many countries,health systems are not adequately equipped to respond to this shift,which could increase human suffering.Periods of economic slowdown

204、 exacerbate those risks by straining public health systems and putting downward pressure on foreign assistance and private health investments.Increasing Strains on Mental Health,Especially Among YouthMental health and substance abuse disorders increased 13 percent during the past decade,principally

205、because of increases in population and life expectancy but also because of the disproportionate prevalence of mental illness among adolescents.Currently,between 10 and 20 percent of children and adolescents globally suffer from mental health disorders,and suicide is the third leading cause of death

206、among people between 15 and 19 years old.Health experts project that the economic cost of mental illness worldwide could exceed$16 trillion during the next 20 years,with much of the economic burden resulting from lost income and productivity as a result of chronic disability and premature death.Prel

207、iminary research suggests that because of the pandemic,people in every region will experience increased rates of mental distress caused by economic losses and social isolation stress disorder.Vera Davidova/UnsplashA MORE CONTESTED WORLD23GLOBAL TRENDS 204024portion of adults who have completed prima

208、ry education reached 81 percent in 2020,reflect-ing a rapid increase across most regions and income groups since the 1960s.This level of attainment varies across developing countries,from up to 92 percent of all adults in develop-ing countries in Latin America,East Asia and Pacific,and Europe down t

209、o only 60 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.Expanding access to secondary education,however,is likely to be harder for developing countries because of its relatively higher costs,higher dropout rates as some students choose work over education,and cultural factors such as early marriage that pull women

210、away from formal education.Educating a majority of the workforce to the secondary school level has historically been a driver for countries to achieve upper-middle-income status.Cur-rently,this majority threshold is reached in developing countries in Europe and Central Asia,East Asia and the Pacific

211、,and Latin Amer-ica,but only a quarter of the Sub-Saharan workforce has a secondary school education.Moreover,Sub-Saharan Africa is not likely to reach the threshold during the coming two decades because government,religious,and other private sector investment will struggle to keep up with populatio

212、n growth.This struggle will also dampen economic growth as workers,particularly those who choose early entry into the workforce over education,will lack the skills for higher paying jobs.South Asia is mak-ing better progress than Sub-Saharan Africa on this front and has the potential to reach the ke

213、y development threshold for secondary edu-cation by around 2040.RISING,SHIFTING GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASSESGlobally,the number of households falling into a broad definition of the middle class has soared in the past two decades,raising expectations for continued improvements.In 2020,approximately 36 perce

214、nt of the global population was in the middle class with annual incomes of$4,000-$40,000,up 13 percent-age points from 2000,judging from a World Bank database of income surveys.The largest growth in middle-class populations during 2000-18(the latest survey data available)by percentage of population

215、occurred in Russia,Turkey,Thailand,Brazil,Iran,China,Mexico,and Vietnam,in descending order.During the next two decades,the middle class is unlikely to grow at a similar pace,and devel-oping-country middle-income cohorts could well perceive that their progress is slowing.Across many countries,the hi

216、gh per capita in-come growth of the past 20 years is unlikely to be repeated,as global productivity growth falls and the working-age population boom ends in most regions.Global models of household income suggest that,under a baseline scenar-io,the middle class share of the global popula-tion will la

217、rgely remain stable during the next twenty years,although this outcome will be contingent on social and political dynamics.East Asia,and to a lesser extent South Asia,appear better positioned to achieve further in-creases in per capita income relative to other regions,thereby reducing to some extent

218、 their income,education,and life expectancy gap with advanced economies.These regions ben-efit from effective education systems,general-ly stable social networks,and competent gov-ernance.On the other hand,some developing countries,including several in Latin America,are at high risk of falling into

219、the middle-in-come trap in which inflation of take-home pay outpaces worker productivity,leading to a stagnation of economic growth.The problems in Latin Americas outlook stem in part from poor infrastructure and technology adoption and inadequate education systems.A MORE CONTESTED WORLD250204060801

220、00MIDDLE CLASS AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN THE 30 MOST POPULOUS COUNTRIES,2000 AND 20181Household debt data is not available.Source:World Bank,IMF.20182000Percent of population with$10/day-$110/day incomeHousehold debt as a percent of GDPMany large developing economies have seen their middle classes expan

221、d rapidly during the past 20 years.However,households in most advanced and developing economies have taken on increasing levels of debt as they have been squeezed by a higher cost of living.MIDDLE CLASS AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN THE 30 LARGEST COUNTRIES,2000 AND 2018FranceSouth KoreaUnited KingdomJapanG

222、ermanySpainItalyUnited StatesRussiaTurkeyThailandBrazilIran1ChinaMexicoColombiaVietnam1South AfricaPhilippines1IndonesiaMyanmarPakistanEgypt1IndiaBangladeshKenya1Ethiopia1Tanzania1Nigeria1DR Congo1Advanced economiesDeveloping economies020406080100In advanced economies,the middle class is contracting

223、 with many rising to higher in-comes and a smaller portion dropping below the poverty line.Moreover,the middle class in many countries is strained by rising costs for housing,healthcare,and education.The percent of the population falling below the national poverty line in advanced economies has incr

224、eased in 19 of 32 countries between 2007 and 2016,including in France,Germany,Italy,and Spain,while the majority of those that left the middle class across all advanced economies rose to higher income levels.This reflects the trend towards income polarization,in which the number of workers in low-in

225、come jobs and the number in high-income expands 010203040506070INCOME INEQUALITY BY COUNTRY1Largest by size of population,2020.Ranked by most recent estimate of income inequality.21990,2018,or nearest available data.Source:Standardized World Income Inequality Database.2018219902Gini coefficient(high

226、er indicates greater inequality)Income inequality is highest in developing economies,as measured by the Gini coefficient,but in many it has been stable or improving.Income inequality is relatively low overall in advanced economies,but it has been increasing in many of the largest advanced economies.

227、INCOME INEQUALITY TRENDS IN SELECTED LARGE COUNTRIES,1 1990 AND 20182South AfricaIndiaIndonesiaTanzaniaEgyptChinaUnited StatesVietnam SpainItalyBangladeshRussiaSouth KoreaJapanFranceGermanyColombiaBrazilMexicoKenyaNigeriaPhilippinesTurkeyThailandIranPakistanEthiopiaUnited KingdomCountries with incre

228、asing inequality Countries with decreasing inequality37=World average,20182GLOBAL TRENDS 204026Economic Inequality Here to StayThe factors contributing to the slowing of progress on human development will also contribute to the persistence of within-country income inequality.Around half of all count

229、ries experienced a widening gap between the rich and the poor between 1990 and 2018,including the worlds most powerful statesChina,India,Russia,and the United States.Mean-while,the large countries that experienced declines in inequality during these decades mostly remained above the global average f

230、or inequality.A number of structural causes combined to contribute to this growing inequality,including technologi-cal advancements that favored advanced educations and specialized skills while automating low-skill jobs;the outsourcing of many jobs and industries to developing economies;and an ideol

231、ogical shift toward market-driven solutions and away from redistributive,government policies.A MORE CONTESTED WORLD27at the same time.Most high-skill workers probably will continue to benefit from work-place technology,while middle-skill workers doing repetitive tasks that can be automated will face

232、 declining wages and job losses.Even some workers in high paid professions may see their earnings challenged by artificial intelligence(AI)and machine learning.House-hold debt has already soared across advanced economies in recent years because of these in-come strains and higher costs for healthcar

233、e,housing,and education.MIGRATION:PEOPLE ON THE MOVE Demographic trends and economic incentives will continue to drive large-scale migration during the next two decades.Although there is little certainty about the level of migration as government policies fluctuate,the push and pull factors for cros

234、s-border movements of people will endure globallyfeeding debates in destination countries over migration and aggravating social divisions in some areas.The past 20 years saw a large increase in cross-border migration,not only in absolute numbers but also as a percent of the global population.More th

235、an 270 million persons in 2020 were living in a country to which they had migrated,100 million more than in 2000,representing an increase of more than half a percent of the global population.Most migrants left their homes to pursue better economic prospects,but tens of millions were fleeing conflict

236、,crime,religious and social repression,and natural disasters.For the vast majority of migrants who are workers,migration flows clearly reflect wage differentials between countriesthe flows are from smaller,middle-income economies to larger,high-income economies.Almost two-thirds of migrants in 2019

237、originated from middle-income economies,and more than half migrated to high income countries for higher pay and to send remittances home.The fastest growth in emigration begins at around$4,000 per capita GDP,the point at which peo-ple have reached lower-middle-income and can afford to travel,and the

238、n begins to slow when per capita GDP reaches$10,000-$12,000 where people are nearing the World Banks definition of high income,making employment opportunities at home more attractive.Looking forward,rapid population growth al-most certainly will add to existing push factors in Sub-Saharan Africa,whi

239、le many other devel-oping countries are nearing the end of peak emigration.The population in the middle-in-come migration window of$4,000 to$10,000-$12,000 peaked around 2010 for several regions,including Latin America,Central Asia,and parts of Eastern Europe.East Asia,South-east Asia,and South Asia

240、 are also nearing or past the strongest period for this income push factor,but the percent of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa in this income window will continue to rise during the next 20 years.Greater need for workers in aging countries is a growing pull factor in European and Asian countries

241、.European countries had the largest total number of cross-border immigrants at the end of 2019 at nearly 70 million,according to 2020 UN statistics.One-third came from Eastern Europe,which had a working-age population that was peaking just as advanced European economies were beginning to rapidly age

242、.Aging European countries and Japan are expanding policies that provide visas for workers.During the coming 20 years,people fleeing di-sasters and conflict will continue to contribute to migration flows.UN and NGO data show that domestic civil and political turmoil have pushed 80 million people out

243、of their homes GLOBAL TRENDS 204028as of yearend 2019,of which about a third have migrated to other countries.BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND DISRUPTIONSThese demographic and human development trends will put pressure on governments to increase public investment and manage immi-gration,lead to instability

244、in some countries,in some ways contribute to a rising Asia,and add to the agenda of already strained international development institutions.Setbacks for Women,Children,and Minorities.The current pandemic exempli-fies the fragility of progress against poverty in some regions and the potential for reg

245、res-sion for women,minority groups,and others lower in economic,political,and social stat-ure.Although so far mortality in low-income countries,outside Latin America,has been lower than in the advanced economies,the economic impacts have been severe.Beyond overwhelmed healthcare systems and the nega

246、tive impact on income for millions of the near poor,broader disruptions include lack of or limited education and the diversion of med-ical resources from other priorities,including vaccinations and maternal health.Growing Pressure For Public Investment.Growing populations,especially middle classes i

247、n developing countries,are putting increased pressure on governments for the provision of public goods,such as affordable housing,ed-ucation,healthcare,and infrastructure.Poorly governed urban areas,especially those with access to infrastructure such as international ports or airports,are also ideal

248、 habitats for organized crime syndicates.Double-Edged Sword For Political Stability.Older populations tend to be less violent and ideologically extreme,thus reducing the risk of internal armed conflict.East Asia and Latin America will have a median age above 30,sug-gesting a potential for greater so

249、cial stability.Such populations also have strong preferenc-es for democracy;where authoritarian re-gimes remain,instability from so-called color revolutions is likely to persist.In addition,in countries with fast growing and youthful populations,the growing gap between the ex-pectations of growing u

250、rban cohorts and their governments ability to provide for their edu-cation,healthcare,and job opportunities has the potential to increase political instability.In such countries,recruitment to radical extrem-ist movements will be a major risk as well.Increased Debate Over Migration.Immi-grants can h

251、elp developed economies miti-gate the downsides of an aging population by improving economic productivity,providing services,and expanding the tax base.How-ever,countervailing pressures such as strong cultural preferences for maintaining national identity and ethnic homogeneity could con-tinue to fu

252、el an antimigrant backlash in many developed countries and increasingly in some developing and middle-income countries with declining workforces,such as China.As a result,many are likely to choose technological innovation and automation and limit migration to highly skilled labor.Within and between

253、countries,debates and division will continue over how much migration to allow and how to control flows.Some Shifts Could Benefit A Rising East.Many developing countries in Asia will either gain potential advantages from demographic trends or are relatively well positioned to over-come demographic he

254、adwinds.As a result per capita incomes and human development lev-els probably will rise more in Asia than in any other region.Most Asian countries will con-Photo/ShutterstockA MORE CONTESTED WORLD29tinue to have large working-age populations,high secondary-level graduation rates,and,for many,substan

255、tial investments in health and infrastructure that bolster levels of well-be-ing.The greatest variable is likely to be how China handles the demographic crunch it will see during the next two decadesthe deep decline in fertility from its one-child policy has already halted the growth of its labor fo

256、rce and will saddle it with a doubling of its pop-ulation over 65 during the next two decades to nearly 350 million,the largest by far of any country.Even if the Chinese workforce is able to rise closer to advanced-economy produc-tivity levels through improved training and automation,China remains i

257、n danger of hitting a middle-income trap by the 2030s,which may challenge domestic stability.Strained International Development Institutions.International institutions fo-cused on human development will face a more complicated operating environment as de-mands for their coordination efforts grow.Any

258、 increase in humanitarian and refugee crises stemming from natural and human-created causes will divert international resources from efforts to make systemic improvements in poverty and disease.The likely failure of many countries to meet the UNs 2030 Sustainable Development Goals will have the larg

259、est impact on middle-income societies where populations that have recently emerged out of poverty are demanding progress toward next levels of education,medical care,and environmental quality.Traditional providers of development assistance might not be able to keep up with needs.Shortfalls in multil

260、ateral development assistance could facilitate plans by China and other countries to gain advan-tage from financing critical urban infrastruc-ture in developing countries.ENVIRONMENTSTRUCTURAL FORCESPhoto/Pexels30Key TakeawaysDuring the next 20 years,the physical effects from climate change of highe

261、r tem-peratures,sea level rise,and extreme weather events will impact every country.The costs and challenges will disproportionately fall on the developing world,in-tersecting with environmental degradation to intensify risks to food,water,health,and energy security.There will be increased emphasis

262、on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to achieve net zero with new energy technologies and carbon dioxide removal techniques to meet the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.However,as the world gets closer to exceeding 1.5Cprobably within the next 20 yearscalls will incr

263、ease for geoengineering research and possible deploy-ment to cool the planet,despite possibly dire consequences.Debate will increase over how and how fast the world should reach net zero as countries face hard choices over how to implement drastic emissions cuts and adaptive measures.Neither the bur

264、dens nor the benefits will be evenly distributed within or between countries,heightening competition,contributing to instability,straining military readiness,and encouraging political discord.CLIMATECHANGEERODINGHUMANSECURITYINSTABILITYCONFLICTMITIGATIONADAPTATIONENERGYTECHNOLOGIESENVIRONMENTALDEGRA

265、DATIONSIMULTANEOUS DRIVERSPOLICY ACTIVITYKEY CHALLENGES/UNCERTAINTIESPaceUnequalburdensSocietal andgovernment changeGeoengineeringFood,water,energy securityHuman healthMore migrationLoss of natural capitalHigher temperaturesMelting ArcticExtreme weatherSea level riseLand degradation Water misusePoll

266、utionA MORE CONTESTED WORLD31CLIMATE CHANGE HERE AND INTENSIFYINGWe are living in a world already affected by climate change caused by growing human-in-duced concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.The world has warmed on average 1.1 degrees Celsius since the late 19th century,causing d

267、iminished glaciers and ice caps,higher sea levels,more intense storms and heat waves,and a more acidic ocean,according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.The past 10 years were the hottest on record,and every decade since the 1960s has been hotter than the previ-ous one.On the current

268、path,it is probable that within the next 20 years global warming will surpass 1.5C while heading toward 2C possibly by mid-century.Cumulative emis-sions already in the atmosphere will drive temperature increases in the next two de-cades even if emissions were to reach net zero immediately,according

269、to the US National Climate Assessment.Physical EffectsThe physical effects of a changing climate are likely to gradually intensify during the next two decades compared to the catastrophic impacts modeled for the latter half of the century,should temperature rise continue unabated.No country or regio

270、n will be immune from the physical effects of climate change and envi-ronmental degradation,but the impact will varysome regions will even see some mar-ginal benefits in the form of longer growing seasons.In general,developing countries will suffer more as they lack the capacity to adapt to climate

271、change and on average are more highly exposed to its effects.Melting Arctic and Sea Level Rise.Tempera-tures are warming at three times the global average in the Arctic largely as a result of feed-back loops from melting ice and snow cover.This has caused mass loss from ice sheets and glaciers as we

272、ll as reductions in sea ice extent The past ten years was the hottest on record,and every decade since the 1960s has been hotter than the previous one.GLOBAL RISE IN CARBON DIOXIDE AND AVERAGE TEMPERATURE188019001920+1.0+1.2Average surface temperaturein degrees Celsius+0.8+0.6+0.4+0.20-0.2This graph

273、 illustrates the change in global carbon dioxide concentrations in atmospheric parts per million and in global surface temperature in degrees Celsius relative to pre-Industrial average temperatures.Nineteen of the 20 warmest years have occurred since 2001,and 2020 tied for the hottest year on record

274、.Source:NASA GISS,NOAA NCEI,ESRL.https:/medialibrary.climatecentral.org/resources/national-and-global-emissions-sources-2020.TEMPERATURECARBONDIOXIDEGLOBAL TRENDS 204032Willian Justen de Vasconcellos/UnsplashGLOBAL RISE IN CARBON DIOXIDE AND AVERAGE TEMPERATURE19401960198020002020Atmospheric CO2 con

275、centrationsin parts per million400420380360340320300280This graph illustrates the change in global carbon dioxide concentrations in atmospheric parts per million and in global surface temperature in degrees Celsius relative to pre-Industrial average temperatures.Nineteen of the 20 warmest years have

276、 occurred since 2001,and 2020 tied for the hottest year on record.Source:NASA GISS,NOAA NCEI,ESRL.https:/medialibrary.climatecentral.org/resources/national-and-global-emissions-sources-2020.TEMPERATURECARBONDIOXIDEA MORE CONTESTED WORLD33and thickness.Globally,the sea level has risen an average of 8

277、 to 9 inches since the late 19th century;estimates of rise in the next 20 years range from another 3 to 14 inches,which would create additional problems for low lying coastal cities and islands.On land,thawing permafrost is likely to cause increasing dam-age to infrastructure,including transportatio

278、n systems,pipelines,and power plants.More Intense Heat Waves.Outside the Arc-tic,the fastest warming is projected to occur in central and eastern North America,central Europe,the Mediterranean region(including southern Europe,northern Africa and the Near East),western and central Asia,and southern A

279、frica.The tropics especially are expected to experience widespread extreme heatwaves.Extreme Weather and Weather Patterns.Warming temperatures are likely to create the atmospheric conditions for more intense and in some cases,more frequent natural disas-ters,including stronger hurricane-strength sto

280、rms,coastal flooding,storm surges,and droughts.Traditional weather patterns are also changingfor example,dry areas are ex-pected to become drier,wet areas will become wetter,and precipitation will be less frequent but more intense in some areas.ADDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION During the next two

281、 decades,population growth,rapid urbanization,and poor land and resource management will increasingly intersect with and exacerbate climate change effects in many countries,particularly in the developing world.With coastal cities growing,more people than ever will be threatened by a combination of s

282、torm surges and sea level rise that worsen existing coastal erosion.Land Degradation.The expansion and un-sustainable management of agriculture and forestry practices degrade land,and both con-tribute to and intensify the effects of climate change.A 2019 study found that global defor-estation and la

283、nd degradation each contribut-ed to about 10 percent of all human-induced greenhouse gas emissions by releasing carbon stored in the trees and the soil.Water Misuse.Poor water governance within and between states will remain the primary NARROWING CLIMATE UNCERTAINTIES Even though the Earths climate

284、is an extremely complex,interconnected system that is sensitive to small chang-es,increased data collection,computing power,and sophisticated modeling means that our understanding of climate change has become increasingly strong.Several areas of research are attempting to reduce uncertainty:Attribut

285、ion:Scientists are improving their ability to attribute specific events after the fact to climate change.This nascent field,known as extreme event attribution,could change how publics perceive the growing threat and provide a basis for developing countries or impact-ed communities to claim damages f

286、rom high emitting countries or their government.Feedback Loops:Scientists currently have a difficult time projecting when and to what extent positive feedback loops will drive further temperature increases and risk runaway warming.For example,the loss of reflective sea ice will reveal more of the oc

287、ean surface,which is dark and absorbs heat faster,in turn causing even more sea ice to melt.Another concerning feedback loop is methane,a powerful greenhouse gas that is released from wetlands,permafrost,and ocean hydrates in response to increased temperatures.GLOBAL TRENDS 204034driver of water str

288、ess during the next two decades.As precipitation declines or becomes more erratic,population growth,economic development,and continued inefficient irri-gation and agricultural practices will increase demand.In many river basins,upstream countries are building dams and altering water sources with lit

289、tle or no consultation with their downstream neighbors,such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,increasing the risk of conflict.Pollution.Although air and water pollution have decreased in many high-income coun-tries since a peak in the 20th century,they continue to grow globally as the number of

290、 middle-income countries has increased;for instance,80 percent of industrial and munic-ipal wastewaters are discharged untreated into waterways.Similar to other environmen-tal factors,air pollution and climate change influence each other through complex interac-tions in the atmosphere.Climate change

291、 will lead to more stagnation eventsstationary domes of hot air that can cause air pollutants to get trapped and persist in the lower atmo-sphereand will worsen air quality by increas-ing the frequency of wild fires.ERODING HUMAN SECURITY The physical impacts of a warmer world,combined with environm

292、ental degradation,are likely to lead to an array of human secu-rity challenges,primarily but not exclusively in developing countries in the near term.According to a 2018 study,36 percent of cities globally face acute environmental stress from droughts,floods,and cyclones;climate change will add to t

293、hese.These challenges will com-pound one another in coming years;as ex-treme events become more intense and more frequent,societies may struggle to recover from one event before the next one hits.Exacerbating Food and Water Insecurity.Changing precipitation patterns,rising tem-peratures,increased ex

294、treme weather events,and saltwater intrusion into soil and water systems from rising seas and storm surges are likely to exacerbate food and water insecu-rity in some countries during the next two decades.Regions that remain dependent on rain-fed agriculture will be particularly vul-nerable,such as

295、Sub-Saharan Africa,Central America,some areas of Argentina and Brazil,parts of the Andean region,South Asia,and Australia.By contrast,some higher latitude regions such as Canada,northern Europe,and Russia may benefit from global warming by lengthened growing seasons.Fisheries are also under threat f

296、rom severe overfishing that climate change will further stress through oxygen depletion,rapid warm-ing,and ocean acidification.Fishermen have to go further to catch fewer and smaller fish,potentially venturing into the territorial waters of other countries.In addition,warming ocean temperatures thre

297、aten to kill many more coral reefsalready they have declined by 30 to 50 percent,and at 1.5C warming,they could de-cline by 70 to 90 percentfurther threatening fishing and tourism industries.Threats to Human Health.Decreased water,air,and food quality,along with changes in disease vectors and water-

298、borne pathogens,all threaten human life.Death rates from pollution vary significantly across the worldtypically highest in middle-income countries in East and South Asia.In addition,extreme weather and disasters often kill people and disrupt health infrastructure and prevent access to care.Climate c

299、hange is expected to change the geographic range and in some cases frequency of disease outbreaks affecting humans,animals,and plants,including those A MORE CONTESTED WORLD35that are vector-borne(West Nile,malaria,Den-gue),waterborne(cholera),airborne(influen-za,hantavirus),and food-borne(salmonella

300、).Loss of Biodiversity.The variability among all living organismsknown as biodiversityis declining faster than at any point in human history,risking food and health security and undermining global resilience.Warming temperatures are likely to lead to the extinc-tion of plants and animals that can no

301、 longer survive in their traditional habitats or shift quickly to new locations as well as encourage the spread of invasive species that choke out native organisms.Increased Migration.Extreme weather events increase the risk of more environmen-tally-induced migration,which usually occurs within stat

302、es as affected populations move to nearby communities,often temporarily.Climate change probably will exacerbate this as sea level rise or extreme heat makes certain locales permanently uninhabitable,although mainly after 2040,possibly causing permanent migration and movement to other states.MITIGATI

303、ON GAINING TRACTIONEfforts to set a path toward net zero green-house gas emissions will intensify during the coming decade and spark increased debate about how and how soon to achieve this goal.The 2015 Paris Agreement set a global goal of limiting warming to less than 2C,preferably to 1.5C,and resu

304、lted in countries volunteer-ing modest targets to reduce or establish a peak for their emissions.Although developed country emissions have continued to decline largely because of increased energy efficien-cy and use of natural gas,and the COVID-19 pandemic also caused a brief drop in global emission

305、soverall emissions have continued to increase.This trend has led to a growing number of countries making more ambitious pledges to become carbon neutralsuch as Chile,the European Union(EU),Japan,New Zealand,and South Korea by 2050,and China by 2060.As climate modeling improves,divisions are likely t

306、o become more pronounced between those who advocate reaching net zero emis-sions over decades by transitioning to new technologies and those who argue that net zero must be achieved more quickly to pre-vent the worst outcomes.State pledges factor in advancements in technologies to mitigate emissions

307、 while boosting economic growth and assume that the worst effects of climate change can be avoided through a more gradual approach.Advocates of faster action argue that the window to avoid the cataclys-mic effects is closing and that more dramatic,immediate behavioral changes are required.Limiting t

308、he global temperature increase to 1.5C will require unprecedented changes in energy consumption and production to allow developing countries to grow their economies while not offsetting the carbon reductions from developed countries.Energy Transition UnderwayA critical aspect of the global debate an

309、d the ability to mitigate climate change is the speed of the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy.Even though fossil fuels will continue to supply the majority of energy needs during the next 20 years,wind and solar are almost certain to grow faster than any other energy source because o

310、f technological advances and falling costs,and nuclear power production may grow,particularly if new,safer designs emerge.Increasing energy efficiencies proba-bly will also reduce the rate of energy demand growth and the carbon intensity per unit of en-ergy used.A range of current and future tech-no

311、logical developmentsas well as regulatory and investment choices by governments,GLOBAL TRENDS 204036Billion tonsANNUAL TOTAL CO2 EMISSIONS,BY REGIONSource:Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center(CDIAC);Global Carbon Project(GCP).Note:Statistical differences included in the GCP dataset is not incl

312、uded here.OurWorldInData.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions CC BYInternational transportOceaniaAsia(excl.China and India)ChinaIndiaAfricaSouth AmericaNorth America(excl.USA)United StatesEurope(excl.EU-28)EU-2817511800185019001950201835302520151050This chart shows CO2 emissions from fossil fu

313、els and cement production onlyland use change is not included.A MORE CONTESTED WORLD37businesses,and consumerswill influence energy use in buildings,transportation,and power,which together account for a majority of global emissions.Many of these technolo-gies could also contribute to greater energy

314、resilience and self-sufficiency for states.Increased Efforts To Remove Carbon DioxideThe success of efforts to remove carbon diox-ide from the atmosphere will also be critical.The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that mitigating emissions alone almost certainly will not be enough

315、to limit warming to 1.5C,which increases the im-portance of technologies that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere to use it or store it underground.Most of the modeled path-ways to limit warming to 1.5C involve a sub-stantial expansion of carbon dioxide removal(CDR)primarily through afforestat

316、ion and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage(BECCS).Other technologies being researched include soil sequestration,ocean fertilization,and direct air capture.Research into and a push to deploy BECCSstill a nascent technol-ogyalmost certainly will increase because it is one of the few negative e

317、missions tech-nologies that exist because it uses carbon dioxide to grow biomass that is converted to usable energy while storing the carbon dioxide underground.Currently about 25 commercial-ly operational CDR projects offset a negligible amount of yearly emissions,and efforts to scale up CDR will f

318、ace policy,technological,and economic constraints absent market incentives.More countries may introduce a carbon tax,or a credit for removing carbon,in an effort to speed up CDR as well as broaden adoption of renewable energy technologies.Complementary Actions on Emissions Many more actors are likel

319、y to join internation-al and governmental efforts to address climate KEY EMERGING ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES The cost to build and operate new solar photovoltaic and wind-powered plants is broadly cheaper than equivalent fossil fuelfired power plants.Even more efficient,lower cost renewable technologies,su

320、ch as perovskite solar cells,are poised to transform and disrupt energy industries in the next two decades.Moreover,increasingly connected wind turbine technology is enabling massive and lower-cost offshore wind projects worldwide.China is the worlds largest producer and exporter of solar panels and

321、 wind turbines.Advanced energy storage will be needed to enable more renewables in grid systems and support broad deployment of electric vehicles.Lithium-ion batteries have seen large cost re-duction and performance improvements in recent years,and investments are also increasing in potentially safe

322、r,cheaper,more powerful,and longer duration alternatives.In the fu-ture,it is likely that advanced energy storage would allow for the development of decentralized and autonomous electrical grids that integrate batteries,renewable power sources,and electric vehicles and that potentially have no need

323、for backup from fossil fuels.Green hydrogenproduced through electrolysis with no by-productshas the potential to play a greater role in stor-ing excess solar and wind energy and helping to decarbonize heating,industry,and heavy transport.The industry is still in its infancy,but costs are expected to

324、 come down because countries with cheap renewable energy sources are particular-ly interested in it,such as Chile.Several companies are developing small modular nuclear reactors(SMRs),about one-third the size of traditional nu-clear reactors,which could lead to broader acceptance from countries trad

325、itionally opposed to nuclear projects because SMRs are smaller and safer.SMRs have the potential to provide power generation to remote areas,such as in Africa,which could help developing countries electrify their popula-tions without increasing emissions.In addition,SMRswhen combined with solar and

326、wind powercould help solve the problem of intermittency.GLOBAL TRENDS 204038and environmental challenges.Action at the local level has already increased,and a grow-ing number of companies have pledged to go carbon neutral.Some large asset managers have concluded that climate change threat-ens their

327、long-term returns and are requiring carbon emissions disclosures from firms in their portfolios or declining to invest in some fossil fuel projects.In 2018,nearly 10,000 cities and municipalities in 128 countries took some form of climate action,as did 6,225 companies headquartered in 120 countries,

328、represent-ing$36.5 trillion in revenue,larger than the combined gross domestic product(GDP)of the United States and China.Public-private part-nerships are becoming a preferred operating framework,partly a recognition that nonstate efforts are most effective when linked to state action.GROWTH OF RESI

329、LIENCE AND ADAPTATION In addition to efforts to reach net zero emis-sions,many countries and local communities will expand investment in adaptive infrastruc-ture and resilience measures.Some measures are as inexpensive and simple as restoring mangrove forests or increasing rainwater stor-age;others

330、are as complex as building mas-sive sea walls and planning for the relocation of large populations.A key challenge for these efforts will be funding for vulnerable commu-nitiesparticularly as governments face com-peting fiscal and political challenges and have to choose which communities to support.

331、Public-private partnerships are innovating new insurance approaches aimed at building resilience to climate risks,such as insuring natural assets like the Mesoamerican reef off Mexico or index-based weather insurance for local farmers in Kenya.These approaches rely on new data and machine learning t

332、echnolo-giessuggesting that as these technologies advance during the next 20 years,resilience mechanisms may become more sophisticated.Calls for GeoengineeringAs warming gets closer to exceeding the Paris Agreement goals,it is increasingly likely that states and nonstate actors will more aggres-sive

333、ly research,test,and possibly deploy geo-engineering measuresdeliberate large-scale interventions in the earths natural systemsto try to counteract climate change.Current research is largely focused on solar radiation management(SRM),an effort to cool the planet by reflecting the suns energy back into space.Stratospheric aerosol injection(SAI),a form of SRM that sprays particles in the strato-sphe