1、Adaptation Gap Report 2022Too Little,Too SlowClimate adaptation failure puts world at riskUNEP promotes environmentally sound practices globally and in its own activities.Our distribution policy aims to reduce UNEPs carbon footprint.2022 United Nations Environment Programme ISBN:978-92-807-3982-4 Jo

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4、se and extent of the reproduction,should be addressed to the Director,Communication Division,United Nations Environment Programme,P.O.Box 30552,Nairobi 00100,Kenya.DisclaimersThe designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion

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6、om content published by third parties.This may have been done to illustrate and communicate the authors own interpretations of the key messages emerging from illustrations or graphics produced by third parties.In such cases,material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion what

7、soever on the part of United Nations Environment Programme concerning the source materials used as a basis for such graphics or illustrations.Mention of a commercial company or product in this document does not imply endorsement by the United Nations Environment Programme or the authors.The use of i

8、nformation from this document for publicity or advertising is not permitted.Trademark names and symbols are used in an editorial fashion with no intention on infringement of trademark or copyright laws.The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect th

9、e views of the United Nations Environment Programme.We regret any errors or omissions that may have been unwittingly made.Maps,photos,and illustrations as specifiedSuggested citationUnited Nations Environment Programme(2022).Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too Slow Climate adaptation failure p

10、uts world at risk.Nairobi.https:/www.unep.org/adaptation-gap-report-2022Co-produced with:UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre and the World Adaptation Science Programme(WASP)Supported by:Adaptation Gap Report 2022Too Little,Too Slow Climate adaptation failureputs world at riskAdaptation Gap Report 2022:To

11、o Little,Too SlowIVAcknowledgementsThe United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP)would like to thank the reports Steering Committee members,the lead and contributing authors,the reviewers and the project coordination team for their contribution to the development of this report.The individuals menti

12、oned below contributed to the production of the report.Authors and reviewers contributed in their individual capacities and their affiliations are only mentioned for identification purposes.STEERING COMMITTEEEdith Adera(African Development Bank),Angela Andrade(Conservation International),Barbara Buc

13、hner(Climate Policy Initiative),Barney Dickson(UNEP),Omar El-Arini(Government of Egypt),Jian Liu(UNEP),Anil Markandya(Basque Centre for Climate Change),Youssef Nassef(Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC),Anne Olhoff(CONCITO Denmarks green think tank),Jyots

14、na Puri(International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD),Debra Roberts(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC and eThekwini Municipality),Cynthia Rosenzweig(NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and ColumbiaUniversity).AUTHORS,ORGANIZED BY CHAPTERChapter 1.Setting the scene Lead auth

15、ors:Alexandre Magnan(IDDRI),Mara del Pilar Bueno Rubial(CONICET Universidad Nacional de Rosario),Lars Christiansen(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Thomas Dale(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre).Chapter 2.Global progress on adaptation planning Lead authors:

16、Fatin Tawfig(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Motsomi Maletjane(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Michal Nachmany(Climate Policy Radar).Contributing authors:Maryam Navi(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Marcus Davies(Climate Policy Radar),Danny Waite(Climate Policy Radar).Chapter 3.Global progress on adaptation finance

17、Lead authors:Paul Watkiss(Paul Watkiss Associates),Dipesh Chapagain(Center for Development Research),Pieter Pauw(Eindhoven University of Technology),Georgia Savvidou(Chalmers University of Technology).Contributing authors:Blanche Butera(independent),Arjuna Dibley(University of Melbourne and Universi

18、ty of Oxford).Chapter 4.Global progress on adaptation implementationLead authors:Timo Leiter(Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment,London School of Economics and Political Science),Debora Ley(United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC),He

19、nry Neufeldt(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre).Contributing authors:Michael Knig(Frankfurt School of Finance and Management),Alcade C.Segnon(University of Abomey-Calavi),Georgia Savvidou(Chalmers University of Technology).Chapter 5.Effectiveness of adaptationLead authors:Chandni Singh(Indian Institute

20、 for Human Settlements),Nick Brooks(Garama 3C and University of East Anglia),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre).Contributing authors:Lea Berrang-Ford(University of Leeds),Robbert Biesbroek(Wageningen University),Edmond Totin(Universite Nationale dAgriculture,Benin),Adelle Thomas(Universi

21、ty of The Bahamas and Climate Analytics).Chapter 6.Synthesis on global adaptation progressLead authors:Alexandre Magnan(IDDRI),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Mara del Pilar Bueno Rubial(Universidad Nacional de Rosario),Lars Christiansen(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre).Contributing au

22、thors:Thomas Dale(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Timo Leiter(London School of Economics),Pieter Paw(Eindhoven University of Technology),Chandi Singh(Indian Institute of Human Settlements),Fatin Tawfig(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Paul Watkiss(Paul Watkiss Associates).REVIEWERSEdith Adera(African Deve

23、lopment Bank),Maria Teresa Abogado(UNEP),Portia Adade Williams(Council for Scientific and Industrial Research CSIR),Mozaharul Alam(UNEP),Tarek Alkhoury Abdul Ahaad(UNEP),Alice Anders(UNEP Finance Initiative UNEP FI),Angela Andrade(Conservation International),Ariadna Anisimov(IDDRI),Emilie Beauchamp(

24、International Institute for Sustainable Development IISD),Ruci Botei(UNEP),Dennis Bours(Adaptation Fund Technical Evaluation Reference Group),Barbara Buchner(Climate Policy Initiative),David Carlin(UNEP FI),Sander Chan(German Institute of Development and Sustainability),Hoon Chan(UN Capital Developm

25、ent Fund UNCDF),Alvin Chandra(UNEP),Sunungurai Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowVDominica Chingarande(Womens University in Africa),Brett Cohen(University of Cape Town),Bruce Currie-Alder(International Development Research Centre IDRC),Craig Davies(CADLAS),Angie Daz(IISD),Manishka De Mel

26、(Columbia University),Johanna Dichtl(UNEP FI),Barney Dickson(UNEP),Ophlie Clara Drouault(UNEP),Nokuthula Dube(independent),Omar El-Arini(Government of Egypt),Susannah Fisher(University College London),James Ford(University of Leeds),Francesco Gaetani(UNEP),Christopher Gordon(University of Ghana),Ann

27、e Hammill(IISD),Andrea Hinwood(UNEP),Alistair Hunt(University of Bath),Hans Olav Ibrekk(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs),Lili Ilieva(UNEP),Oscar Ivanova(UNEP),Jason Jabbour(UNEP),Maarten Kappelle(UNEP),Sumalee Khosla(UNEP),Thaddeus Idi Kiplimo(UNEP),Nicolina Lamhauge(Organisation for Economic

28、Co-operation and Development OECD),Jian Liu(UNEP),Natalia Lpez(UNEP),Anil Markandya(Basque Centre for Climate Change),Jade Maron(UNEP),Annett Moehner(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Marta Moneo(UNEP),Abdelmenam Mohamed(UNEP),Richard Munang(UNEP),Susan Mutebi-Richards(UNEP),Youssef Nassef(Secretariat of t

29、he UNFCCC),Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong(University of Denver),Anne Olhoff(CONCITO Denmarks green think tank),Gigi Owen(University of Arizona),Jean Palutikof(Griffith University),Angela Prias(UNEP),Jyotsna Puri(IFAD),Mikaela Rambali(OECD),Morgan Richmond(Climate Policy Initiative),Debra Roberts(IPCC and

30、 eThekwini Municipality),Erin Roberts(Climate Leadership Initiative),Cynthia Rosenzweig(NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies and Columbia University),Ghulam Muhammad Shah(International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development ICIMOD),Nicholas Simpson(University of Cape Town),Paul Smith(UNEP FI

31、),Maxime Souvignet(United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security UNU-EHS),Maria Tapia(Global Center on Adaptation GCA),Adelle Thomas(Climate Analytics),Kaisa Uusimaa(UNEP),Kees van der Geest(UNU-EHS),Mara Paula Viscardo Sesma(UNEP),Korinna von Teichman-Utesch(Secretariat of

32、the UNFCCC),Florian Waldschmidt(UNU-EHS),Yvonne Walz(UNU-EHS),Charlene Watson(Overseas Development Institute ODI),Romain Weikmans(Finnish Institute of International Affairs),Fleur Wouterse(Global Center on Adaptation GCA),Suyeon Yang(UNEP),Edoardo Zandri(UNEP),Jinhua Zhang(UNEP).EDITORSHenry Neufeld

33、t(Chief Scientific Editor,UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Lars Christiansen(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Thomas Dale(UNEP Copenhagen ClimateCentre).SECRETARIAT AND PROJECT COORDINATIONLars Christiansen(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Thomas Dale(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP

34、 Copenhagen Climate Centre),Kaisa Uusimaa(UNEP),Maarten Kappelle(UNEP),Edoardo Zandri(UNEP).COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIAUNEP:Matthew Bannon,Daniel Cooney,Katie Elles,Maria Vittoria Galassi,Miranda Grant,Nancy Groves,Artan Jama,Rune Kier,Michael Logan,Beverley McDonald,Duncan Moore,Pooja Munshi,Keishamaz

35、a Rukikaire,Nicolien Schoneveld-de Lange,Reagan Sirengo,Neha Sud,and several other members of the UNEP Communication Division.UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre:Monna Hammershy Blegvad,Lasse Hemmingsen,Mette Annelie Rasmussen.LANGUAGE EDITING AND TRANSLATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARYStrategic Agenda DESI

36、GN AND LAYOUTPhoenix Design Aid(figures),Strategic Agenda(layout),Beverley McDonald,UNEP(cover)THANKS ALSO TO:UNEP:Angeline Djampou,Niklas Hagelberg,Polina Koroleva,Abdelmenam Mohamed,Jane Muriithi,Paz Lpez-Rey,Lou Perpes,Pinya Sarasas,Nandita Surendran,Ying Wang.Finally,UNEP would like to thank the

37、 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency(SIDA),and the Belgian Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs,Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation for their support to the production of the 2022 edition of UNEPs Adaptation Gap Report.Adaptation Gap Re

38、port 2022:Too Little,Too SlowVIA village in Pakistan is devastated by flooding.In 2022,much of the country was severely inundated.Photo:Shutterstock/Saigh AneesAdaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowVIIContentsAcknowledgements IVGlossary VIIIForeword XIExecutive summary XIIChapter 1 Setting t

39、he scene 11.1 The climate policy context of the Adaptation Gap Report 2022 21.2 Status of global climate risk 31.3 Framing of the Adaptation Gap Report 2022 5Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planning 92.1 Introduction 102.2 Progress in national adaptation planning worldwide 112.3 Assessment o

40、f adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning 122.4 Promoting adaptationmitigation interlinkages in adaptation planning 15Chapter 3 Global progress on adaptation financing in developing countries 173.1 Introduction 183.2 The costs of adaptation and adaptation finance needs for developing count

41、ries 193.3 Overarching global estimates and trends in adaptation-related finance for developing countries 213.4 Interlinkages between mitigation and adaptation 243.5 Estimating the adaptation finance gap 24Chapter 4 Global progress on adaptation implementation 274.1 Introduction 284.2 Implemented ad

42、aptation actions in developing countries 284.3 Implemented adaptation actions in developed countries 304.4 Estimating the potential for risk reduction 304.5 Interlinkages between implementing adaptation and mitigation 32Chapter 5 Effectiveness of adaptation 375.1 Introduction 385.2 Illustrating adap

43、tation outcomes over time and space 405.3 Addressing gaps and shortcomings in adaptation practice 435.4 Principles for effective adaptation 445.5 Conclusions and recommendations 45Chapter 6 Synthesis on global adaptation progress 496.1 Overarching takeaways:are current adaptation efforts making a di

44、fference?506.2 Cross-chapter synthesis 51References 56Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowVIIIGlossary The entries in this glossary are primarily taken or modified from definitions provided by reports published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)or previous editions of t

45、he Adaptation Gap Report.Adaptation:The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.In human systems,adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.In some natural systems,human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its

46、 effects.(IPCC 20221).Adaptation costs:Costs of planning,preparing for,facilitating and implementing adaptation measures,including transaction costs(IPCC 20072).Adaptation gap:The difference between actually implemented adaptation and a societally set goal,determined largely by preferences related t

47、o tolerated climate change impacts and reflecting resource limitations and competing priorities(UNEP 20143).Adaptation limits:The point at which an actors objectives(or system needs)cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions(IPCC 20221).Hard adaptation limit:No adaptive action

48、s are possible to avoid intolerable risks.Soft adaptation limit:Options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks through adaptive action.Adaptive capacity:The ability of systems,institutions,humans and other organisms to adjust to potential damage,to take advantage of opportunities,or

49、to respond to consequences(IPCC 20221).Baseline:The state against which change is measured.It might be a current baseline,in which case it represents observable,present-day conditions.It might also be a future baseline,which is a projected future set of conditions excluding the driving factor of int

50、erest.Alternative interpretations of the reference conditions can give rise to multiple baselines(IPCC 20072).Climate-resilient development:The process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation measures to support sustainable development for all(IPCC20221).Co-benefits:A positive effec

51、t that a policy or measure aimed at one objective has on another objective,thereby increasing the total benefit to society or the environment(IPCC 20221).Exposure:The presence of people,livelihoods,species or ecosystems,environmental functions,services,and resources,infrastructure,or economic,social

52、,or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected(IPCC 20221).Hazard:The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend that may cause loss of life,injury,or other health impacts,as well as damage and loss to property,infrastructure,livelihoods,s

53、ervice provision,ecosystems and environmental resources(IPCC 20221).Impacts:The consequences of realized risks on natural and human systems,where risks result from the interactions of climate-related hazards(including extreme weather and climate events),exposure and vulnerability.Impacts generally r

54、efer to effects on lives;livelihoods;health and well-being;ecosystems and species;economic,social and cultural assets;services(including ecosystem services);and infrastructure.Impacts may be referred to as consequences or outcomes,and can be adverse or beneficial(IPCC 20221).Maladaptation:Actions th

55、at may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes,including via increased vulnerability to climate change,diminished welfare,or increased greenhouse gas emissions,now or in the future.Maladaptation is usually an unintended consequence(IPCC 20221).Mitigation(of climate change):A human

56、 intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases(IPCC 20221).Resilience:The capacity of social,economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance,responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function,identity and

57、structure.Resilience is a positive attribute when it maintains capacity for adaptation,learning and/or transformation(IPCC 20221).Risk:The potential for consequences where something of value is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain,recognizing the diversity of values.In the context of climate

58、change impacts,risks result from dynamic interactions between climate-related hazards with the exposure and vulnerability of the affected human or ecological system to the hazards(IPCC 20144;IPCC 20221).Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowIX1 https:/www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/rep

59、ort/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Annex-II.pdf.2 https:/www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4-wg2-app-1.pdf.3 https:/www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2014.4 https:/www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-AnnexII_FINAL.pdf.Trade-offs:A competition between different objectives within a decis

60、ion situation,where pursuing one objective will diminish achievement of other objective(s).A trade-off exists when a policy or measure aimed at one objective(e.g.reducing greenhouse gas emissions)reduces outcomes for other objective(s)(e.g.climate resilience,biodiversity conservation,energy security

61、)due to adverse side effects,thereby potentially reducing the net benefit to society or the environment(IPCC 20221).Vulnerability:The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected.Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and

62、 lack of capacity to cope and adapt(IPCC 20221).Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowXPhoto:Natalija Gormalova/Climate Visuals Countdown Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowXIClimate change is landing blow after blow upon humanity,as we saw time and again throughout 2022:most visc

63、erally in the catastrophic floods that put much of Pakistan under water.These are the kinds of climate impacts we are suffering at only 1.1C above pre-industrial temperatures.We are heading for much higher temperatures:2.8C by the end of the century,based on current policies.The international commun

64、ity must urgently reduce greenhouse gas emissions through a transformation of energy,industry,transport,food systems,financial systems and so much more.However,as the 2022 edition of UNEPs Adaptation Gap Report:Too Little,Too Slow finds,we must also urgently increase efforts to adapt to the impacts

65、of climate change that are already here and to those that are to come.The report finds that global efforts in adaptation planning,financing and implementation are increasing incrementally.However,they are not keeping pace with increasing climate risks.Yes,over 80 per cent of countries have at least

66、one national adaptation planning instrument in place.But funding to turn planning into action isnt following.International adaptation finance flows to developing countries reached USD 29 billion in 2020,an increase of 4 per cent from 2019.But up to USD 340 billion per year is needed by 2030,and far

67、more beyond.The adaptation finance gap in developing countries is likely five to ten times greater than current international adaptation finance flows and will only widen if we do not ramp up investments.This financial shortfall is cascading down to the implementation level,which remains inadequate

68、despite progress beingmade.The message of this report is clear:strong political will is needed to increase adaptation investments and outcomes.Nations need to back the strong words in the Glasgow Climate Pact,adopted in 2021,with strong action,starting at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh,Egypt.We need pedal

69、 to the metal acceleration in scientific research,innovative planning,finance and implementation and deeper internationalcooperation.If we dont want to spend the coming decades in emergency response mode,dealing with disaster after disaster,we need to get ahead of the game.We cannot use other global

70、 crises as excuses for inaction.Yes,the war in Ukraine,global supply shortages and the COVID-19 pandemic have all contributed to an energy and food security crisis.Costs of living are going through the roof across the world.But the temperature ranges we are currently looking at over the decades to c

71、ome even with mitigation will turn the climate impacts we are seeing now into knockout blows for generations to come.We must get serious about adapting to climate change.And we must do it now.Inger AndersenExecutive DirectorUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeForewordAdaptation Gap Report 2022:Too L

72、ittle,Too SlowXIIExecutive summaryClimate risks are increasing as global warming accelerates.Strong mitigation and adaptation are both key to avoiding hard adaptation limits.Climate impacts are increasing across the globe.A multi-year drought in the Horn of Africa,unprecedented flooding in South Asi

73、a,and severe summer heat and record-breaking droughts across multiple regions of the northern hemisphere,among others,point to mounting and ever-increasing climate risks.According to the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)Working Group II Sixth Assessment Report(IPCC WGII AR6),the

74、 world will face severe climate risks before the end of this century,even under low-emission scenarios(figureES.1).Ambitious,accelerated action to adapt to climate change is therefore paramount,together with strong mitigation efforts.However,even ambitious investment in adaptation cannot fully preve

75、nt climate change related impacts.Hence,dealing with losses and damages cannot be avoided and must be addressed adequately at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC)and at national levels.Figure ES.1 Reasons for Concern as assessed in IPCC WGII AR6Source:IPCC(2022).Climate

76、Change 2022:Impacts,Adaptation and Vulnerability.Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.Prtner,H.-O.,Roberts,D.C.,Tignor,M.,Poloczanska,E.S.,Mintenbeck,K.,Alegra,A.et al.(eds.).Cambridge,UK and New York,NY,USA:Cambridge Univer

77、sity Press.3056.doi:10.1017/9781009325844.Adaptation must not be sidelined because of large-scale,non-climate and compounding factors.The war in Ukraine,global supply shortages and the global COVID-19 pandemic have all contributed to an evolving energy and food security crisis,with the cost of livin

78、g as well as inflation surging in many countries across the world.However,unprecedented political will and many more long-term investments in adaptation are urgently needed to avoid the adaptation gap from widening.It is critical that the international climate community build on the Glasgow Climate

79、Pact,agreed during the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC(COP 26)in 2021,and deepen collective commitments on net-zero,adaptation,climate finance,and loss and damage.A.Global surface temperature change Increase relative to the period 185

80、01900B.Reasons for Concern(RFC)Impact and risk assessments assuming low to no adaptation2.03.04.01.51.00.02100205020001950Projections for different scenariosCSSP1-1.9SSP1-2.6(shade representing very likely range)SSP2-4.5SSP3-7.0(shade representing very likely range)SSP5-8.5RFC4Globalaggregateimpacts

81、RFC1Unique andthreatenedsystemsRFC2ExtremeweathereventsRFC3Distributionof impactsRFC5Large scalesingularevents5.0Confidence levelassigned to transitionrangeRisk/impactLowVery highVery highHighModerateUndetectable Historical average temperature increasein 20112020 was1.09C(dashed line),range 0.951.20

82、CTransition rangeExecutive SummaryXIIIFigure ES.2 Status of adaptation planning worldwide,as at 31 August 2022 Global efforts in adaptation planning,financing and implementation continue to make incremental progress but fail to keep pace with increasing climate risks.This calls for groundbreaking ac

83、celeration in scientific research,innovative planning,more and better finance and implementation,increased monitoring and evaluation,and deeper international cooperation.Current processes under the United Nations climate negotiations,including the GlasgowSharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global

84、goal on adaptation and the global stocktake,present an important opportunity to act upon the conclusions of this report and the IPCC WGII AR6.More than eight out of 10 countries now have at least one national adaptation planning instrument,and they are getting better and becoming more inclusive of d

85、isadvantaged groups.At least 84 per cent of Parties to the UNFCCC,up 5 per cent from last year,have established adaptation plans,strategies,laws and policies,and about half of those have two or more planning instruments in place(figure ES.2).More than a third of all 198 Parties to the UNFCCC have in

86、corporated quantified and time-bound targets,which are an increasing part of national adaptation planning.However,the majority of these targets do not capture the outcomes of adaptation action,such as the degree to which people and ecosystems are more resilient or less vulnerable to climate change.C

87、ountries are also increasing the implementability of adaptation planning instruments by defining objectives,determining time frames,considering future climate change,strengthening the science base,and improving the capacity and partnerships needed to ensure effective implementation.Moreover,nearly 9

88、0 per cent of planning instruments analysed display consideration for gender and/or historically disadvantaged groups,such as indigenous peoples.The adaptation finance gap in developing countries is likely five to 10 times greater than current international adaptation finance flows and continues to

89、widen.International adaptation finance to developing countries continues to rise,reaching US$28.6 billion in 2020.This represents a 34 per cent share of total climate finance to developing countries in 2020 and is a 4 per cent increase from 2019.Combined adaptation and mitigation finance flows in 20

90、20 fell at least US$17 billion short of the US$100billion pledged to developing countries,even by climate finance providers own accounting.If the annual increase from 2019 persisted in the coming years,the US$100billion target would not be met until 2025.This calls for significant acceleration in ad

91、aptation finance,especially if doubling of 2019 finance flows by 2025 is to be met,as the Glasgow Climate Pact urges.Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowXIVAccounting for inflation,estimated annual adaptation costs/needs are in the range of US$160340 billion by 2030 and US$315565 billion b

92、y 2050.This range is in line with new findings estimating finance needs of US$71billion per year between now and 2030 based on 76developing countries nationally determined contributions(NDCs)and national adaptation plans(NAPs)(figure ES.3).Based on this assessment,estimated adaptation cost/needs are

93、 currently between five and 10 times higher than international adaptation finance flows,and the adaptation finance gap continues to widen.Figure ES.3 Information on adaptation finance needs included in developing countries NDCs or NAPs Adaptation implementation is increasing but not keeping up with

94、climate impacts.The number and volume of adaptation actions supported through international climate funds(Adaptation Fund AF,Green Climate Fund GCF,and the Global Environment Facilitys GEF Least Developed Countries Fund LDCF and Special Climate Change Fund SCCF),multilateral finance and bilateral do

95、nor support continue to increase,though the rate may be slowing(figure ES.4).Actions are concentrated in the agriculture,water,ecosystems and cross-cutting sectors and primarily address rainfall variability,drought and flooding.However,without a step change in financial support,adaptation actions co

96、uld be outstripped by accelerating climate impacts,which would further widen the adaptation implementation gap.In addition,only three out of 10principal adaptation actions(reflecting around 40 per cent of the funding volume)reported by climate finance providers to the Organisation for Economic Co-op

97、eration and Development(OECD)are explicitly targeting climate risk reduction,while the degree to which all other actions address adaptation is unclear.Better labelling of financial support could help clarify its contribution to adaptation.Executive SummaryXVCurrent adaptation practice falls woefully

98、 short of what is required,but following best practices in adaptation planning and implementation can improve effectiveness.Adaptation actions remain largely incremental in nature,typically do not address future climate change,and may reinforce existing vulnerabilities or introduce new risks,particu

99、larly for the most vulnerable.The main reasons for these shortcomings are:inadequate involvement of stakeholders through elite capture of resources and exclusion of marginalized groups,including women,indigenous peoples and local communities inadequate attention to local contexts and ownership throu

100、gh genuine local participation in adaptation design and implementation retrofitting development activities as adaptation actions without specifically addressing climate risks,often resulting in marginal resilience benefits or maladaptation short-term focus and neglect of future climate risks resulti

101、ng in inadequate attention to the long-term viability of adaptation solutions narrow definitions of adaptation success that neglect diverse views regarding the purpose and effectiveness of adaptation interventions among those targeted and that miss elements encompassing social transformation and cli

102、matejustice inadequate metrics reflecting what is easily measurable but often difficult to validate and interpret in terms of climate risk reduction.Data to quantify adaptation effectiveness and adequacy are limited yet urgently needed,especially for higher levels of warming and complex or cascading

103、 risks.However,existing evidence shows that hybrid solutions addressing multiple dimensions of climate-related risks for example by bringing together climate information,infrastructure,and nature-based and institutional solutions tend to be more effective than single solutions.To be effective and ad

104、equate in the longer term,solutions must also be context-specific and address the root causes of vulnerability,such as underlying structural inequities and gendered disadvantages,in addition to reducing climate-related exposures and vulnerabilities to climate hazards.There are a number of general pr

105、inciples of good adaptation practice to ensure that adaptation actions are relevant,appropriate,sustainable,equitable and effective.These principles are quite consistent across the literature and can broadly be summarized as:genuine inclusion of stakeholders as well as local communities,indigenous p

106、eoples,women and other marginalized groups into decision-making and co-development of adaptation planning and implementation to reflect differing values,perspectives and interests and to produce equitable,fair and just adaptation outcomes transparency,accountability and predictability of support and

107、 integration of adaptation into national development priorities,strategies and the Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs)Figure ES.4 Number of new adaptation projects per start year,size and combined annual funding value under the Adaptation Fund,Green Climate Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fun

108、d and Special Climate Change Fund of the Global Environment Facility,as at 31 August 2022 01020304050602022(until August 31)2021202020192018201720162015201420132012201120102009200820072006Number of projectsExtrapolated 2022 valueUS$2550 millionUS$1025 million US$50 millionTotal value of projectsUS$0

109、.510 million0100200300400500600US$million35222020323548373029251913158811345315935113585221Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowXVI flexible programming and adaptative management of implementation to consider feedback and learnings and to enhance efficiencies investment in local capabilitie

110、s,capacity-building and democratic governance structures in support of climate risk management and empowerment for long-term sustainability consideration of future risks,including climate trajectories and uncertainties,to minimize unintended consequences and maladaptation,while enhancing adaptation

111、ambition integration of local,traditional,indigenous and scientific knowledge into design,implementation and monitoring and evaluation to enhance buy-in and ownership tackling inequalities and structural drivers of vulnerability in addition to reducing exposure and/or vulnerabilities to climate haza

112、rds to embark on climate-resilient development pathways.Paying attention to these principles when designing,implementing and assessing adaptation interventions increases the likelihood of effective,adequate and sustained outcomes(figure ES.5).Figure ES.5 An architecture of risk reduction,including p

113、rinciples,actions and outcomes that can be used as a basis for assessing actual or likely adaptation effectiveness Considering interlinkages of adaptation and mitigation action from the outset in planning,finance and implementation can enhance co-benefits.Strong mitigation action is needed to limit

114、global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels and avoid reaching most hard adaptation limits.Enhanced adaptation support is needed to minimize climate impacts,and more losses and damages will occur if mitigation is insufficiently ambitious.Given this interrelationship and to enhance synergies w

115、hile limiting trade-offs,this report devotes a section in the planning,finance and implementation chapters to adaptationmitigation interlinkages.Taking adaptation and mitigation jointly into account in planning,finance and implementation enhances opportunities for co-benefits,including ancillary and

116、 non-Enhanced resilience/reduced riskGood practices based on adaptation principles:Inclusion Co-production Transparency Equitability Devolved and adaptive governance Local ownership Knowledge and integration Avoiding maladaptation Addressing future risks Minimizing mitigation and development trade-o

117、ffs Flexible Addressing structural drivers of vulnerabilityReduced hazardsMitigation and adaptation actions that modify hazards directlyImproved human&ecosystem well-being,reduced losses and damages,compared with the no-adaptation baselineAdaptation action to reduce exposure to hazards(infrastructur

118、e,nature-based,behavioural,institutional)Action on structural drivers of vulnerability(power,inequality,marginalization,politics),improved institutions,governance and policiesReduced exposureReduced vulnerabilityPrinciplesActionsOutcomesExecutive SummaryXVIImarket benefits,and limits trade-offs and

119、maladaptation(such as hydropower reducing food security or irrigation increasing energy consumption).Moreover,some climate solutions effectively reduce climate risk and contribute to mitigation simultaneously(figure ES.6).However,while nature-based solutions such as planting and conserving mangroves

120、,restoring salt marshes or protecting peatlands effectively reduce climate risks and remove carbon from the atmosphere,accelerating climate change is also heavily affecting their ability to provide these climate services.Data from planning,finance and implementation show that adaptationmitigation co

121、-benefits are mainly sought in the agriculture,forestry,ecosystems,water and energy sectors.However,possible barriers,trade-offs and risks are frequently missed,and adaptation and mitigation actions are often implemented independent of each other.Addressing these shortcomings will be important to co

122、ntribute to the Paris Agreements article 2.1(c)goal of making finance flows consistent with low greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions and climate-resilient development.Figure ES.6 Aligning climate change mitigation and adaptation action:differences,synergies and trade-offs Source:Adapted from OECD(2021a).Str

123、engthening adaptation-mitigation linkages for a low-carbon,climate-resilient future.OECD Environment Policy Papers,No.23.Paris:OECD Publishing.https:/doi.org/10.1787/6d79ff6a-en.In summary,despite positive signs we must do much more towards net-zero climate-resilient development.Accelerating global

124、warming is increasing climate impacts and puts countries at serious risk of experiencing adaptation limits and intolerable losses and damages.Avoiding hard adaptation limits requires the urgent scaling-up of mitigation and for adaptation to go beyond incremental change.Although efforts in adaptation

125、 planning,finance and implementation are continuing to increase,significant acceleration and shifts in scale are needed to avoid the adaptation gaps from wideningfurther.Current adaptation practice falls woefully short of what is required,and following best practices in adaptation planning and imple

126、mentation is needed to improve effectiveness.Despite the potential for substantial co-benefits to be realized when considering adaptation-mitigation interlinkages from the outset,more must be done to overcome silos and avoid potential trade-offs.Large-scale,non-climate and compounding factors contin

127、ue to jeopardize adaptation investments and outcomes,and strong political will is needed for the international climate community to build on the Glasgow Climate Pact,agreed during COP 26 in 2021,and to deepen collective commitments on net-zero,adaptation,climate finance,and loss anddamage.Adaptation

128、 solutions that reduce exposure to climate hazards while simultaneously sequestering carbon(e.g.mangrove restoration that reduces coastal hazards;increasing urban green spaces to reduce urban heat island effect).Mitigation solutions that reduce GHG emissions or enhance carbon sequestration while sim

129、ultaneously reducing exposure to climate hazards(e.g.reforestation that reduces landslide hazard;hydroelectric power that reduces downstream flood or drought risk).Mitigation actions that increase exposure and vulnerability to climate change(e.g.hydropower investments in hazard-prone areas)Adaptatio

130、n actions that(e.g.air conditioninginvestments)and information required to inform policymakingDistinct stakeholdersDistinct distributional impacts(global mitigation vs.local adaptation benefits)ADAPTATIONMITIGATIONSYNERGIESDifferent knowledgeundermine mitigation effortsTRADE-OFFSDIFFERENCESXVIII11Se

131、tting the sceneChapter 1Lead authors:Alexandre Magnan(IDDRI),Mara del Pilar Bueno Rubial(CONICET Universidad Nacional de Rosario),Lars Christiansen(United Nations Environment Programme UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Thomas Dale(UNEP Copenhagen Climate Centre),Henry Neufeldt(UNEP Copenhagen Climate

132、Centre)Part of the Margerie Glacier,Alaska breaks off into the sea.Photo:Kimberly VardemanAdaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too Slow2Key messages According to the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)assessments,the world will face severe climate risks before the end of this cen

133、tury even under low-emission scenarios.This necessitates ambitious,accelerated action to adapt to climate change.Climate risks are increasing as global warming accelerates,and strong mitigation and adaptation are both key to avoiding hard adaptation limits.Even effective adaptation options cannot fu

134、lly prevent all climate-related losses and damages.Comprehensive responses mixing ambitious adaptation and ambitious mitigation are therefore essential to avoid adaptation limits and minimize losses and damages.Adaptation must take centre stage in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate C

135、hange(UNFCCC)negotiations to make progress on pledges made during the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC(COP 26)in Glasgow,in particular on financial means of adaptation implementation,the global goal on adaptation,the global stocktake a

136、nd exploring loss and damage.This priority must not be sidelined because of large-scale,non-climate and compounding factors,such as the war in Ukraine and evolving energy and food security issues.1.1 The climate policy context of the Adaptation Gap Report 2022 The world is experiencing an unpreceden

137、ted climate crisis that threatens to result in catastrophic outcomes at local to global scales,affecting key dimensions of human life and hindering the provision of global public goods,including peace and security,food security,health,sustainable energy supply and economic stability(IPCC 2022).This

138、increases the fragility of the most vulnerable communities and limits their ability to adapt in a context of insufficient mitigation action(UNEP 2021a;IPCC 2022).In light of the growing recognition of the magnitude of the threat to our society,adaptation has gained increasing prominence as a global

139、challenge with local,subnational,national,regional and global dimensions(article 7.2 of the Paris Agreement).It is now a core topic on domestic and international political agendas and is recognized as being of equal importance to climate change mitigation(Khan and Munira 2021).In the context of the

140、UNFCCC process,the Glasgow Climate Pact for instance,which was adopted at COP 26 in 2021,stresses the urgency of enhancing ambition of action and finance in terms of both mitigation and adaptation to address the gaps in implementing the long-term global goals.Hence,the outcomes of COP 26 include the

141、 delayed launch of the two-year GlasgowSharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation;the urgent call for developed countries to collectively at least double adaptation finance compared with 2019 levels by 2025;the establishment of the Santiago Network and the Glasgow Dialogue to ad

142、dress loss and damage;and the recognition of advances in the submission of adaptation communications(46 by August 2022)and national adaptation plans(NAPs)(UNFCCC 2022)as central instruments to communicate progress in adaptation actions and pledges towards the first global stocktake.The global stockt

143、ake will take centre stage in 2023,providing an overview of what has been achieved in terms of adaptation action and support,and coinciding with the completion of the work programme on the global goal on adaptation.To that end,assessing,measuring and tracking progress on adaptation at all levels is

144、of paramount importance but is underdeveloped(Schipper and Langston 2015;Berrang-Ford et al.2017;UNEP 2017;Brooks et al.2019;Magnan et al.2021a).One of the critical challenges is for each country to build an understanding of adaptation that makes use of the national communication and other reporting

145、 instruments to improve visibility of different efforts and actions(Beauchamp and Bueno 2021).Providing such national narratives is considered essential to allow for the global stocktake to contextualize current interventions and plans and to review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation actio

146、n and support towards achieving the global goal on adaptation.The global stocktake also entails assessing progress in averting,minimizing and addressing loss and damage,at both the institutional and financial levels,including economic and non-economic losses.To inform its progress,and in light of th

147、e severity and magnitude of the extreme events Chapter 1 Setting the scene3that have taken place recently and are having a significant impact on vulnerable developing countries,attention is focused on the outcomes of COP 27 which will take place in Egypt.Beyond the policy context of the UNFCCC,large

148、-scale non-climate and compounding factors are likely to jeopardize investments in adaptation in the short to medium term.The war in Ukraine,for example,is putting global energy and food security under pressure and could result in reduced adaptation support.Besides a decrease in resilience among pop

149、ulations affected by energy and food shortages,in particular among poor people and the most vulnerable populations,such large-scale non-climate compounding factors could also constrain the ability to respond to other climate hazards because finite resources are directed elsewhere.On the other hand,t

150、he COVID-19 pandemic,which disrupted adaptation planning and disaster risk reduction financing(UNEP 2021b),highlighted to governments the importance of addressing compound risks through integrated risk management approaches.Hence,lessons from the war in Ukraine could be to quickly minimize the depen

151、dence on fossil fuels through investments in renewable energy and to diversify staple crops through climate-adapted species and varieties to limit dependence on a small number of breadbasket regions and crops.1.2 Status of global climate risk Understanding the extent of current and future climate ri

152、sks on ecosystems,their services and societies is critical in order to contextualize knowledge on societal adaptation efforts.The IPCC Working Group II Sixth Assessment Report(IPCC WGII AR6)released this year provides a comprehensive assessment of climate risk levels for various regions and sectors,

153、and against contrasting warming scenarios ranging from+1.5C to+4C before pre-industrial levels,considering that we are already at+1.1C(IPCC 2022).The IPCC WGII AR6 uses Reasons for Concern(RFCs)to illustrate five types of aggregated,cross-system and global-scale climate risks associated with:unique

154、and threatened systems extreme weather events distribution of impacts global aggregate impacts and large-scale singular eventsFigure 1.1 Reasons for Concern as assessed in IPCC WGII AR6 Note:The figure shows the change in the levels of impacts and risks assessed for global warming of 0C5C global sur

155、face temperature change relative to the pre-industrial period(18501900)over the range.Source:IPCC(2022)A.Global surface temperature change Increase relative to the period 18501900B.Reasons for Concern(RFC)Impact and risk assessments assuming low to no adaptation2.03.04.01.51.00.02100205020001950Proj

156、ections for different scenariosCSSP1-1.9SSP1-2.6(shade representing very likely range)SSP2-4.5SSP3-7.0(shade representing very likely range)SSP5-8.5RFC4GlobalaggregateimpactsRFC1Unique andthreatenedsystemsRFC2ExtremeweathereventsRFC3Distributionof impactsRFC5Large scalesingularevents5.0Confidence le

157、velassigned to transitionrangeRisk/impactLowVery highVery highHighModerateUndetectable Historical average temperature increasein 20112020 was1.09C(dashed line),range 0.951.20CTransition rangeAdaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too Slow4Compared to the conclusions of the previous IPCC assessment re

158、port published in 2014,risk levels transition from high to very high in all RFCs(only two RFCs were regarded as very high in 2014)and at lower global warming levels(figure 1.1)(IPCC 2014,IPCC 2022,ONeill,van Aalst and Ibrahim 2022).This finding aligns with recent estimates aggregating the risk asses

159、sments developed in the 2018 and 2019 IPCC Special Reports(IPCC 2018;IPCC 2019a;IPCC 2019b),and stating that by 2100,the global climate risk will increase by two-to fourfold under global warming of 2C and 4C respectively(Magnan et al.2021b).Lastly,science shows that every additional increment of war

160、ming makes a difference,and exceeding 1.5C could trigger multiple tipping points that would fundamentally alter the Earths climate(McKay et al.2022).To strengthen the evidence of basic hydrometeorological information in support of climate impacts,particularly in small island developing states(SIDS)a

161、nd least developed countries(LDCs),the World Meteorological Organization(WMO),the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)and UNEP are investing in the Systematic Observations Financing Facility(SOFF)to overcome existing capacity gaps and rapidly implement the Global Basic Observing Network(see bo

162、x 1.1).The IPCC WGII AR6 also assessed eight representative key risks1 to describe“severe climate risks”and thereby illustrate“dangerous interference with the climate system”that the UNFCCC refers to in its founding document.The findings show that some large ecosystems,such as biodiversity hotspots,

163、regions with food and water insecurity(e.g.most of sub-Saharan Africa),warm water coral reefs,and arctic environments are already experiencing extreme and sometimes irreversible climate impacts.The IPCC WGII AR6 also warns that widespread and substantial climate risks will affect a growing number of

164、 systems over this century,including large and medium-sized urban systems in both hemispheres(Dodman et al.2022;IPCC 2022).Such risks are sometimes anticipated to occur well before the end of this century and even under a low-emission scenario aligning with the+1.5C/+2C temperature goals of the Pari

165、sAgreement.The assessment of adaptation efforts by the IPCC WGII AR6 also provides evidence that adaptation is taking place in all regions and sectors(Berrang-Ford et al.2021;IPCC 2022)and predominantly addresses water-,food-and poverty-related issues.The vast majority of these responses are taking

166、place at the local level(e.g.individuals,households and local governments).Beyond that,the scientific community raises seven main concerns(IPCC 2022;Magnan,Anisimov and Duvat 2022):1 Risks to low-lying coastal systems;terrestrial and marine ecosystems;critical infrastructure and networks;living stan

167、dards;human health;food security;water security;and peace and mobility(ONeill,van Aalst and Ibrahim 2022).1.The trends in observed impacts and projected risks,as well as the gradual reaching of adaptation limits,call for global mitigation and adaptation to be more strongly coupled.This is captured b

168、y the term climate-resilient development used in the IPCC WGII AR6 which describes a comprehensive climate response that builds on both synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation,in order to advance sustainable development under a changing climate.Climate-resilient development requir

169、es putting people and ecosystems at the centre,while recognizing the unequal challenges posed by climate impacts and risks,especially in developing countries.2.From a global perspective,current adaptation efforts are largely anticipated to remain incremental,meaning that they do not sufficiently cha

170、llenge the root causes of exposure and vulnerability(IPCC2022).3.There is agreement among the scientific community that the range of options for adaptation is shrinking with increasing warming(Haasnoot,Lawrence and Magnan 2021;IPCC 2022).As such,the still very high global trajectory of greenhouse ga

171、s(GHG)emissions will increasingly challenge the ability of societies to adapt in the near future.4.The scientific literature still provides little evidence of effective risk reduction resulting from implemented action(Berrang-Ford et al.2021).It therefore remains challenging to understand whether wh

172、at is implemented today will lead to long-term benefits in terms of climate risk reduction.Similar concerns have been raised in previous Adaptation Gap Reports(AGRs)(e.g.UNEP 2021b)and motivated the inclusion of a chapter dedicated to effectiveness in this edition(chapter 5).As a result,the risk of

173、maladaptation from current adaptation efforts should not be underestimated(UNEP 2019;IPCC 2022).5.Risk assessments emphasize that even ambitious adaptation cannot fully prevent climate-change-related impacts,even at low levels of warming for some high-risk regions(IPCC 2018;ONeill,van Aalst and Ibra

174、him 2022;IPCC 2022).This means that residual risks i.e.risks that remain despite adaptation and adaptation limits are expected to become closer and more fixed with climate change(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD 2021).In that respect,the IPCC WGII AR6 extensively discusses

175、 losses and damages to refer to the irreversible impacts caused by anthropogenic climate change,highlighting progress made in attribution science since the IPCCs Chapter 1 Setting the scene5Fifth Assessment Report(AR5),and deliberately distinguishing it from the term Loss and Damage in the Paris Agr

176、eement(article 8)and UNFCCC negotiations(Anisimov et al.2022;Boyd et al.2022).6.Risk will not play out on an individual basis:climate impacts cascade across interconnected systems in the form of domino effects;compounding risks are increasingly observed as a result of cumulative interactions between

177、 several risks and/or risk drivers;and transboundary risks are emerging across sectors,jurisdictions and population groups and both within and across national borders.These elements will substantially influence the magnitude,duration,rate of emergence and spatial spreading of severe climate risks(ON

178、eill,van Aalst and Ibrahim 2022).7.The IPCC recognizes the clear evidence on the role climate change plays in exacerbating inequity(in terms of gender,socioeconomics,loss of traditional knowledge and culture,stigma of colonialism,and so forth)through impacts to resources and livelihoods and,in turn,

179、the role of increasing inequity in exacerbating climate risks(IPCC 2022).As a result,the IPCC states with high confidence that equity and justice are core pillars of the adaptation challenge,together with more specific decisions and actions to reduce climate risks(e.g.coastal protection,crop diversi

180、fication).Box 1.1 Financing for implementation of the Paris Agreement adaptation goal on systematic observations:the Systematic Observations Financing FacilityAll weather,climate and water services,including early warning systems,are based on the use of basic hydrometeorological data from around the

181、 globe.Systematic observation data generation and exchange are part of the elements that underpin the effectiveness of adaptation.So far,the assumption has been that national governments bear the sole responsibility for acquiring and sharing such data,even though the data contribute to the provision

182、 of a global public good.Indeed,global data are needed for any weather and climate prediction horizon beyond 2436 hours.Currently,less than 10 per cent of required basic weather and climate data are available from LDCs and SIDS.For this reason,WMO,UNDP and UNEP established the SOFF as a United Natio

183、ns multi-partner trust fund at COP 26.SOFF leverages the expertise of multiple partners to address the perennial problem of missing data.It provides long-term,systematic,technical and financial support to the countries with the largest capacity gaps,with a focus on LDCs and SIDS.The UNFCCC Subsidiar

184、y Body for Scientific and Technological Advice(SBSTA)at COP 26 in Glasgow encouraged Parties and relevant organizations to support SOFF to enhance and sustain the implementation of the Global Basic Observing Network in developing countries,including SIDS and LDCs.SOFF investments underpin the effect

185、iveness and sustainability of other climate funds and act as a multiplier of climate finance.For every US$1 invested in SOFF,US$25 in socioeconomic benefits can be realized.For more information on the SOFF,please see:https:/alliancehydromet.org/soff/.1.3 Framing of the Adaptation Gap Report 2022 Sin

186、ce 2020,the AGR has delivered regular assessments of adaptation efforts globally(box 1.2)in order to help answer three linked questions:1.What has been done to adapt until today?2.To what extent have climate risks been reduced?3.Depending on the temperature trajectory,which is a function of mitigati

187、on action,are current adaptation efforts likely to reduce future climate risks?The AGR2022 builds on national-level data from governments(for example,documents submitted under the UNFCCC),as well as project-level information from the databases of multilateral organizations and the OECD,and peer-revi

188、ewed scientific literature focusing on climate impacts and adaptation occurring at various scales(global to local).Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too Slow62 The foci of the AGRs between 2014 and 2018 were:2014 defining the adaptation gap and developing a preliminary framework for assessing it

189、;2016 assessing the adaptation finance gap;2017 discussing approaches and challenges to assessing global progress on adaptation;2018 assessing the adaptation gap in the health sector.All the AGRs are available at https:/www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report.Box 1.2 The role of the new look Ad

190、aptation Gap ReportThe AGR series was commissioned in 2014,in response to a request from UNFCCC Parties for a global assessment of adaptation that could support UNFCCC discussions on adaptation ahead of COP21 in Paris.In the 2014 to 2018 editions of the AGR,the report series focused on either advanc

191、ing knowledge on how to assess the adaptation gap at the global level or providing in-depth assessments of the adaptation gap in certain sectors.2 From 2020 onwards however,the format of the report was altered in order to provide negotiators of Parties to the UNFCCC,the broader UNFCCC constituency a

192、nd civil society with regular and robust assessments of global adaptation efforts and their effectiveness.Given its focus,the objectives of the new look AGR are closely aligned with that of the UNFCCCs global stocktake.While this is the case,the AGR nevertheless remains an independent assessment tha

193、t employs a distinct framework for assessing global adaptation efforts and is thus well positioned to provide valuable input to the global stocktake.The three aforementioned questions(see chapter 6)raise important methodological issues and data challenges that the AGR attempts to address by:Focusing

194、 on national-level efforts and international cooperation,using information from policy documents,international agencies and donors.Focusing on three core dimensions of assessing adaptation progress at the global level:planning(chapter 2),finance(chapter 3)and implementation(chapter 4).Assessing adap

195、tation outputs(i.e.processes,products and services)and outcomes(i.e.the effects of adaptation on risk reduction)in both quantitative and qualitative terms.Examples of output metrics used in this report are:the number of plans,the amount of financing committed,the type and scale of implementation act

196、ivities and,from a more qualitative aspect,how actionable plans are and how they address climate risks,and the types and targets of action.The AGR2022 recognizes that assessing outcomes is substantially harder than tracking outputs,for example because of a gap in understanding the effects of adaptat

197、ion on current climate risk levels(UNEP 2021b),as well as the value 3 The need for development to be consistent with low-emission pathways is already a component of the IPCCs definition of climate-resilient de-velopment,which defines the term as“the process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation

198、and adaptation measures to support sustainable development for all”(IPCC 2022).To cater for those not familiar with the IPCC definition however,the AGR uses the term net-zero climate-resilient development to emphasize that low emissions is a core component of achieving climate-resilient development.

199、judgements associated with assessing the results of actions(UNEP 2017).Synthesizing knowledge on a specific topic such as nature-based solutions in the 2020 edition of the AGR(UNEP 2021c)and,in this years report,on the effectiveness of adaptation(chapter 5).The AGR2022 understands effectiveness in a

200、daptation as actions that reduce climate risks,building on the IPCCs climate risk framework(IPCC 2022),by reducing exposure and/or vulnerability(in the sense of sensitivity)to climate hazards.While such an approach does not necessarily capture well the wide range of enabling conditions and structura

201、l changes needed to achieve net-zero climate-resilient development,3 it allows the report to focus on what is genuinely climate-related.Lastly,as a new feature,this report includes an analysis of the interlinkages that exist between adaptation and mitigation.Adaptationmitigation interlinkages are di

202、scussed across the planning,finance and implementation chapters and synthesized in chapter 6.The cross-chapter analysis focuses on the direct synergies and trade-offs that exist between adaptation and mitigation as they apply to adaptation planning,financing and implementation.The analysis included

203、in this report highlights opportunities to reflect on Chapter 1 Setting the scene7synergies and trade-offs between climate risk reduction,GHG emissions reduction and sustainable development and,in this way,support the design of net-zero climate-resilient 4 The analysis in this report is primarily li

204、mited to focusing on the interlinkages between adaptation and mitigation.When striving to achieve net-zero climate-resilient development however,policymakers will also need to consider how adaptation and mitigation measures will interact with develop-ment trajectories and objectives.Failure to do so

205、 will increase the likelihood that measures will fail to deliver development co-benefits(or worse,have negative consequences on development)or decrease their effectiveness in achieving their mitigation and adaptation objectives due to unexpected changes in development trajectories.development strate

206、gies.4 Table 1.1 provides an overview of the three broad types of adaptationmitigation interlinkages that have been analysed in this years AGR.Table 1.1 Types of adaptationmitigation interlinkages analysed in the AGR2022Adaptation mitigation interlinkagesDescriptionFuture-proof adaptation and mitiga

207、tion planningAs the magnitude of climate impacts is inherently linked to the extent to which climate change is mitigated,it is important that both adaptation and mitigation measures are compatible with a full range of possible future climate trajectories.The need to consider future temperature and p

208、recipitation regimes is most obvious for adaptation,where the failure to consider future climate trajectories will result in the effectiveness of adaptation measures degrading over time as the scale of climate impacts begins to exceed the parameters in which these measures can reduce climate risk ef

209、fectively.In extreme situations,this may lead to adaptation measures becoming redundant or leading to maladaptive outcomes(e.g.the ability of coral reefs to reduce wave impacts will largely disappear above 2C global warming).Similar risks apply with regards to mitigation,whereby failure to consider

210、future climate changes in planning processes will increase the likelihood that mitigation investments will fail due to climate impacts undermining their ability to operate(e.g.investments in hydroelectric power generation could be undermined by decreases in water availability).Adaptation and mitigat

211、ion co-benefitsIn addition to delivering benefits associated with their primary objective,adaptation and mitigation measures can in some cases deliver additional benefits that contribute to the other policy goal(e.g.mitigation measures can contribute to adaptation goals by reducing climate risk and

212、vice versa).Adaptation and mitigation co-benefits can be promoted in adaptation and mitigation planning processes by integrating the ability of measures to either reduce GHG emissions or reduce climate risk(as relevant)into the broader criteria against which measures are selected or prioritized.Trad

213、e-offs between adaptation and mitigationTrade-offs between adaptation and mitigation refer to scenarios in which measures aimed at achieving one policy goal undermine efforts to achieve the other.Trade-offs can manifest themselves in two main ways:First,in some cases the limited availability of reso

214、urces means that countries are often unable to pursue all the options that they consider to be a priority.Thus,countries may be required to choose between allocating resources towards achieving their adaptation goals at the expense of their mitigation goals or vice versa(Klein et al.2007).Second,in

215、some cases adaptation or mitigation measures will have negative implications for achieving goals in the other policy area.For example,adaptation to increased temperatures through cooling technologies can lead to increases in GHG emissions.Likewise,tree species optimal for carbon sequestration may no

216、t be well adapted to future climate conditions,thus leading to losses in the ecosystems overall resilience to climate change(Frey and Gasbarro 2019).While trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation typically receive less attention than co-benefits,they must be considered if countries are to avoid

217、unintended negative consequences from their adaptation and mitigation efforts(e.g.maladaptation)and are to maximize the effectiveness of resources used across adaptation and mitigation investments.829Lead authors:Motsomi Maletjane(Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Cha

218、nge UNFCCC),Fatin Tawfig(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Michal Nachmany(Climate Policy Radar)Contributing authors:Maryam Navi(Secretariat of the UNFCCC),Marcus Davies(Climate Policy Radar),Danny Waite(Climate Policy Radar)Photo:UNEP/Duncan MooreGlobal progress on adaptation planning Chapter 210Adaptatio

219、n Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowKey messages1 The analysis presented in this chapter looks at national planning instruments created by country Parties to the UNFCCC.Thus,percentage values provided in this chapter that relate to countries are percentages of the 197 country Parties to the UNFCCC(

220、this excludes the European Union,which is not a country Party).193 of the country Parties to the UNFCCC are also Parties to the Paris Agreement.Countries are continuing to establish national adaptation planning instruments,including plans,strategies,laws and policies.At least 84 per cent of countrie

221、s now have at least one adaptation planning instrument in place,up from 79 per cent in 2021.1 As the world moves towards complete coverage by national adaptation planning instruments,a rapid shift towards financing and implementation will become even more vital.Quantified and time-bound adaptation t

222、argets are a growing part of national adaptation planning;at least one third of countries have incorporated quantified targets into their adaptation planning.However,the majority of these targets do not yet capture the outcomes of adaptation action,such as the degree to which people and ecosystems a

223、re more resilient or less vulnerable to climate change.Countries are systematically adhering to good practices that strengthen the implementability of their adaptation planning instruments.These include defining clear visions,goals and objectives to guide actions and to serve as the basis for assess

224、ing achievement of outcomes;clearly articulating trends in climate changes to strengthen the climate science basis of adaptation interventions;clearly prioritizing adaptation actions with indicative time frames;and building capacity and the partnerships needed to ensure effective implementation.A ra

225、nge of adaptationmitigation interlinkages are highlighted in national adaptation planning instruments and related documents.These interlinkages are commonly identified in the agriculture,forestry,water and energy sectors,with particular focus on the potential to realize adaptation and mitigation co-

226、benefits in these sectors.While co-benefits are an important type of interlinkage,it is important that countries also consider trade-offs.Data suggest that adaptation laws and policies are increasingly considering the needs of women and other historically disadvantaged groups,such as persons with di

227、sabilities,indigenous peoples and migrants.Almost 90 per cent of adaptation laws and policies studied contained reference to at least one disadvantaged group.2.1 IntroductionThis chapter seeks to offer insights into the current status of national adaptation planning worldwide and how countries are i

228、ntegrating key elements of adequate and effective adaptation planning.It builds on the previous editions of this chapter contained within the 2020 and 2021 editions of the Adaptation Gap Report(AGR).In the 2020 edition of the AGR,the chapter provided a snapshot of the number of countries that have a

229、t least one national adaptation planning instrument(e.g.a national adaptation plan NAP,strategy,law or policy)in place,and the extent to which these adaptation planning instruments are likely to be adequate and effective.To assess the potential adequacy and effectiveness of these planning instrument

230、s,the chapter examined five proxy criteria(comprehensiveness,inclusiveness,implementability,integration and monitoring and evaluation M&E).The 2021 report updated this analysis,offering an up-to-date picture of where countries stand on adaptation planning,demonstrating progress made since the 2020 a

231、ssessment.Instead of updating the analysis conducted in 2020 and 2021,this years chapter seeks to provide deeper analysis on specific dimensions of adequate and effective national adaptation planning.To do this,the chapter focuses on analysing the inclusiveness and implementability of national adapt

232、ation planning instruments.These two 11Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planningdimensions were not selected because they are more important than the other three,but rather as a response to recent developments in the realm of adaptation.Inclusive planning and governance,for example,was highli

233、ghted by the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working GroupII Sixth Assessment Report(IPCC WGII AR6)as important in avoiding maladaptation and leading to more effective and sustainable adaptation outcomes(IPCC 2022).Implementation,meanwhile,has been emphasized as the core focus area

234、by the incoming presidency of the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC(COP27),which is taking place under the slogan of“together for implementation.”Better understanding the implementability of NAPs can thus help inform this shift toward

235、s paying greater attention to the implementation of climate action.2.2 Progress in national adaptation planning worldwide 2.2.1 Status of national adaptation planningCountries around the world have continued to add new plans,strategies,laws and policies to their portfolios of adaptation instruments(

236、see figure 2.1).In 2022,84 per cent of countries have at least one adaptation planning instrument in place,a total of five percentage points higher compared with 2021(United Nations Environment Programme UNEP 2021a).At least 32 countries added new national adaptation planning instruments in this per

237、iod.For eight of these countries,this represented their first such instrument(see figure 2.2).Annex 2.A(online)provides an overview of the data sources used in this assessment and the assessment presented in section 2.2.2.Figure 2.1 Status of adaptation planning worldwide,as at 31 August 2022Note:Fi

238、gure 2.1 was also informed by the UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Expert Group(LEG)report(2012)on NAPs.2.2.2 QuantifiedtargetsAs at 31 August 2022,over one third of countries have incorporated quantified adaptation targets in their adaptation communications(adcoms),nationally determined contributio

239、ns(NDCs),or NAPs submitted to the UNFCCC alone.This represents an increase since 2018,at which point around a quarter of countries had defined quantified adaptation targets(UNEP 2018).The presence of such targets may suggest a trend towards“outcome-oriented and measurable adaptation planning”(UNEP20

240、21a).The majority of these targets are based on process-related outputs that lend themselves to quantification and measurement.For example,these include targets related to actions such as planting trees,developing adaptation plans at various levels of governance or increasing the amount of designate

241、d marine or coastal protected areas.By contrast,only a few are based on the intended outcomes of adaptation measures.For example,achieving a 10 per cent reduction in the number of cases of human vector-borne diseases associated with climate change(decadal average)by 2030.Table 2.B.1,Annex 2.B(online

242、)showcases a range of examples of quantified targets from different sectors.12Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowFigure 2.2 Progress in global adaptation planning since 2000In order for such targets to be measured and in turn facilitate increasingly more effective adaptation action over t

243、ime,it is important that countries clearly articulate and establish mechanisms for their assessment.However,in the documents in which these targets are outlined,the arrangements for such assessments are often unclear.This may lead to challenges,in particular where quantified targets are centred on a

244、bstract concepts(such as vulnerability,resilience and adaptive capacity)that pose significant methodological challenges when it comes to measurement(UNFCCC Adaptation Committee 2021).A number of countries have anchored targets expressed in their NDCs in national laws and policies.For example,the for

245、est coverage target expressed in Kenyas NDC is reaffirmed in the countrys 20182022 National Climate Change Action Plan(Kenya 2018;Kenya 2020).Targets expressed in national laws and policies may take on legal force,be attached to budgets and be subject to M&E and interministerial or inter-agency coor

246、dination.It is therefore critical that countries take measures to integrate targets from NDCs into their national legal and policy frameworks.2.3 Assessment of adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planningOf the five criteria of adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning defined previousl

247、y(UNEP 2021a;UNEP 2021b),this chapter focuses on two:inclusiveness and implementability.The purpose of focusing on only two is to enable deeper and more nuanced analysis compared with the broader but more surface-level analyses conducted in previous years.2.3.1 Inclusiveness When analysing the inclu

248、siveness of national adaptation planning,the 2021 edition of the AGR found that 70 per cent of countries developed their adaptation plans through stakeholder consultations,while 73 per cent noted the importance of integrating gender considerations into adaptation planning.This section expands on thi

249、s analysis by examining national laws and policies to assess whether the following disadvantaged groups are being considered in planning processes:Persons with disabilities Children,young people and future generationsNumber of countriesScientific milestonePolicy milestone2000200120022003200420052006

250、2007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022First plan,strategy,law or policySecond plan,strategy,law or policyThird plan,strategy,law or policyFourth plan,strategy,law or policy2001IPCC Third Assessment Report2007IPCC Fourth Assessment Report2007Bali Action Plan2010Cancun Agreem

251、ents2014IPCC Fifth Assessment Report2015Paris Agreement2018IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C2021IPCC Working Group I Sixth Assessment Report2022IPCC Working Group II Sixth Assessment Report 02040608010012014016018019713Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planning Gender2 Indigenous p

252、eoples Migrants Local communitiesThese are groups whose participation in these processes is often overlooked and whose rights the preamble to the Paris Agreement recognizes as requiring particular consideration in the formulation of climate change policies.Therefore,an appraisal of the degree to whi

253、ch they are included in adaptation planning,while not to be taken as an indication of whether policies are specifically being targeted towards meeting the needs of these groups,provides a proxy indicator of how inclusive the resulting plans are.To conduct this assessment,keyword lists were created f

254、or each of the above groups,and instances of each keyword were identified across the full texts of 563 English-language national law and policy documents that relate directly to climate change adaptation.Annex 2.C(online)provides further information about the methodology underlying thisassessment.SU

255、MMARY OF FINDINGS The analysis suggests the following overall points about inclusiveness in adaptation laws and policies:3 Frequency:reference to gender and disadvantaged groups in adaptation laws and policies appears to have increased with time,as does the number of adaptation laws and policies wit

256、h titles that indicate an explicit focus on gender or disadvantaged groups.2 While gender is not a social group in itself,in this section we have analysed reference both to groups(e.g.women or girls)and to gender-relevant concepts(e.g.gender equality or reproductive rights);see Annex 2.C(online)for

257、a full list of search terms included.3 For a full account of the detailed findings from this section,please see Annex 2.C(online).Framing:reference to gender and disadvantaged groups ranges from emphasis on the particular vulnerability of these groups to emphasis on their agency and roles in respond

258、ing to the impacts of climate change.Representation:different groups appeared to be represented to differing extents in adaptation laws and policies.For example,while references to children,young people and future generations were identified in most documents studied,relatively low reference was fou

259、nd to indigenous peoples.However,this may reflect the fact that this is only a relevant term for communities living in certain countries.Diversity of policy response:although references to certain groups were identified across the laws and policies of a large number of countries,this does not necess

260、arily represent a uniform policy response to groups needs.For example,while Kiribatis 2013 National Framework for Climate Change and Climate Change Adaptation articulates the Governments advocacy for“permanent migration as a form of adapting to the adverse effects of climate change”,the Federated St

261、ates of Micronesias 2013 Nationwide Integrated Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Policy makes the strategic objective to“Prevent environmental migration through adaptation strategies”(Kiribati 2013;Federated States of Micronesia 2013).The total number of laws and policies containing refere

262、nce to each group is shown in figure 2.3.Figure 2.3 Number of climate laws and policies referencing different stakeholder groups01020304050607080Persons with disabilitiesMigrantsLocal communitiesIndigenous peoplesGenderFuture generationsChildren and young people48693261423372Number of climate laws a

263、nd policies14Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowThe apparent increase in frequency with which adaptation laws and policies refer to historically overlooked groups is encouraging.Countries should continue to increase their efforts to integrate consideration of these groups into adaptation

264、planning and to ensure that recognition of the particular needs of each group in adaptation laws and policies translates into concrete measures that aim to meet those needs.As alluded to in the 20212022 NAP Global Network Synthesis Report(Daz and Hunter 2022),it is also important that such considera

265、tion of historically overlooked groups extends beyond the positioning of,for example,women or persons with disabilities as vulnerable or disadvantaged,and towards measures which emphasize the roles of these groups as agents of change in responding to climate change.Further research should examine po

266、ssible disparities in the degree to which different groups are represented in adaptation laws and policies.2.3.2 Implementability The 2020 and 2021 editions of the AGR examined the implementability of adaptation plans by evaluating four indicators,namely the presence of:1)a central administrative bo

267、dy to oversee adaptation policymaking and implementation,2)regulations,3)incentives and 4)direct investments/funding.At the same time,the 2021 edition of the AGR concluded by stating that“the ultimate test of the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation planning will be whether these plans are imple

268、mented and,in turn,whether this implementation reduces risk and vulnerability and bolsters resilience and adaptive capacity”.This years chapter looks at the evidence of the consideration of the following additional elements that are essential to enable implementation of adaptation based on submitted

269、 NAPs before 31 August 2022:Adaptation vision,goals and/or objectives of the specific country Trends in climate change Prioritized adaptation actions and indicative time frames Capacity needs for implementation Partners to support implementation4 For a full account of the detailed findings from this

270、 section,please see Annex 2.D(online).Other indicators equally important for implementation but not considered in this section include indication of the adaptation needs(additionality),costing of adaptation actions,lessons learned,barriers and risk factors.Annex2.D(online)provides for further inform

271、ation about the methodology underlying this assessment.SUMMARY OF FINDINGSBelow are key findings from the analysis of the above-mentioned elements:4 The NAPs contain clearly defined visions,goals and/or objectives to guide adaptation at the national level.Though different among countries,key feature

272、s include interlinkages to sustainable development,a focus on reducing vulnerability,strengthening resilience and building adaptive capacity,details on coordination and leadership,regulatory frameworks,inclusiveness,implementation,finance and cooperation towards climate-resilient development.The vis

273、ions,goals or objectives serve as the primary guide for leadership and institutional arrangements,regulatory frameworks,implementation and M&E.Integration with national development:Countries adaptation priorities are becoming strongly aligned with national development,thereby enhancing their viabili

274、ty and investment potential,which are key to ensuring implementability.This is consistent with the explicit UNFCCC objective to formulate and implement NAPs that integrate adaptation into national development planning processes.Essential capacity for implementation:In addition to adaptation prioriti

275、es in key systems,the NAPs contain activities to strengthen adaptation planning at the national and subnational levels and to facilitate implementation.A majority of these relate to institutional arrangements and coordination,capacity development,systems to access financial and other support,systems

276、 to facilitate integration of adaptation into national development planning,data and information collection and analysis,and multi-stakeholder engagement.Expanded set of partners:A wide range of national,regional and international partners are identified throughout the NAPs to support implementation

277、.Government agencies in charge of coordinating climate change work and related national committees will serve as central coordination mechanisms for implementation,to engage and coordinate with different partners.15Chapter 2 Global progress on adaptation planning2.4 Promoting adaptationmitigation in

278、terlinkages in adaptation planningReflecting the three broad types of adaptationmitigation interlinkage presented in table 1.1,countries present interlinkages between adaptation and mitigation in a wide variety of ways in their national planning instruments and related documents.In the case of mitig

279、ation benefits arising from adaptation actions,for example,some simply observe the potential that some adaptation interventions may result in mitigation co-benefits,while others highlight that they have specifically designed programmes to both strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity and also mak

280、e mitigation contributions.While not exhaustive,mitigation co-benefits are commonly cited in sectors such as agriculture(e.g.reduced emissions from improved crop or post-harvest management),forestry(e.g.increased carbon sequestration from forest restoration),water(e.g.improved water availability to

281、sustain hydropower stations)and energy(e.g.reduced emissions from efforts to diversify energy resources and promote efficiency).In some cases,effective adaptation is also framed as a precondition for effective mitigation efforts.For example,in their updated NDC,Fiji(2020)notes that investments in cl

282、imate adaptation will help ensure that investments in renewable solutions are sustainable and resilient to climate adversities”.Countries also highlight a range of adaptation co-benefits arising from mitigation actions.For example,introducing high-efficiency stoves is expected to reduce pressure on

283、forest resources,which in turn is expected to reduce impacts from extreme rainfall events.Increasing public transport is expected to lead to increased mobility for low-income populations and increased resilience of transport infrastructure in addition to reducing emissions.Because large climate impa

284、cts are already being observed and the benefits of mitigation are not expected to materialize in the near term,the climate impacts and negative consequences on development in vulnerable countries could be reduced by prioritizing adaptation over mitigation action(GIZ 2018).Some countries thus take ad

285、ditional steps to understand and mitigate potential trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation.For example,Zimbabwe(2021)stated that adaptation is their overriding priority and therefore assessed all proposed mitigation actions to understand potential impacts,both positive and negative,on climate

286、resilience.Chile(2020)has specified various conditions that its afforestation measures must meet in order to deliver adaptation benefits on top of their carbon sequestration functions.In practice,however,there are a range of challenges associated with navigating and exploiting the potential synergie

287、s that exist between adaptation and mitigation in planning and implementation(UNFCCC Adaptation Committee 2022).For example,integrating mitigation objectives into adaptation projects(or vice versa)requires engaging more stakeholders with diverging expertise and interests.Ultimately,this will increas

288、e the coordination burden of such projects and make them more difficult to implement.Additionally,countries also note the absence of appropriate methodologies for quantifying the mitigation co-benefits of adaptation and point to domestic efforts to improve such quantification and understanding more

289、broadly.Moreover,striving to achieve adaptation and mitigation co-benefits does not necessarily lead to an optimal mix of adaptation and mitigation interventions being achieved.Nonetheless,pursuit of adaptationmitigation co-benefits(and consideration of interlinkages between adaptation and mitigatio

290、n more broadly)can,however,help countries make the best use of limited resources and ensure that the various strands of their climate action are proceeding in a coherent and complementary manner.National adaptation planning provides a key entry point for this consideration.Looking ahead,the recently

291、 established work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in article 6,paragraph 8,of the Paris Agreement has the potential to help enhance our understanding of challenges and innovative solutions in integrating interlinkages between mitigation and adaptation actions in n

292、ational planning,taking account of both co-benefits and trade-offs.It may,for example,provide countries with opportunities for non-market-based cooperation to implement mitigation and adaptation actions in their NDCs.16317Lead authors:Paul Watkiss(Paul Watkiss Associates),Georgia Savvidou(Chalmers U

293、niversity of Technology),Pieter Pauw(Eindhoven University of Technology),Dipesh Chapagain(Center for Development Research)Contributing authors:Blanche Butera(independent),Arjuna Dibley(University of Melbourne and University of Oxford)The Thames Barrier is a retractable barrier system built to protec

294、t the floodplain of most of Greater London from exceptionally high tides and storm surges moving up from the North Sea.Photo:Tom WheatleyGlobal progress on adaptation financing in developing countriesChapter 318Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Little,Too SlowKey messages New estimates of adaptation fi

295、nance needs for developing countries have emerged in recent years.The 76 developing countries that have communicated such estimates in updated nationally determined contributions(NDCs)or national adaptation plans(NAPs)indicate finance needs of US$71 billion per year from now to 2030.An extrapolation

296、 of this figure to all developing countries,on a per capita basis,indicates that adaptation finance needs could be around US$202 billion/year(ranging from US$79 billion/year to US$612 billion/year)this decade.This new evidence reinforces the estimates reported in previous editions of the Adaptation

297、Gap Report(AGR).Combined mitigation and adaptation finance flows in 2020 fell short of the annual US$100 billion global goal pledged by developed countries,even by finance providers own accounting,which according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)amounts to US$83.3 b

298、illion.Self-reporting of finance providers indicates that there has been a trend of gradually increasing international adaptation finance to developing countries in recent years,reaching US$28.6 billion in 2020.However,the share of adaptation in total climate finance to developing countries was 34 p

299、er cent in 2020,still far behind mitigation finance.This evidence suggests that for developing countries,estimated adaptation costs and likely adaptation financing needs could be five to 10 times greater than current international adaptation finance flows.The outcome of the United Nations climate co

300、nference in Glasgow(COP 26)urged developed countries to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025.However,even when assuming a steep increase in finance as well as its effective use,the analysis here finds that this would be insufficient to close the a

301、daptation finance gap.The nature and size of the new collective,quantified goal on climate finance,to be set prior to 2025 by the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC),will be fundamental to closing the adaptation finance gap.A growing body of evidence indicate

302、s that finance providers are not strategically targeting adaptation assistance towards the most vulnerable countries and population groups.Among the most vulnerable populations,access to and provision of adaptation finance should be considered carefully in finance for adaptation,including addressing

303、 gender and other social inequities.Climate finance rarely addresses mitigation and adaptation simultaneously.This could change in the context of article 2.1(c)of the Paris Agreement to make finance flows consistent with low greenhouse gas(GHG)emissions and climate-resilient development.However,this

304、 will involve barriers,trade-offs and risks that need to be considered carefully.3.1 IntroductionThe adaptation finance gap is defined as the difference between the estimated costs of meeting a given adaptation target and the amount of finance available(United Nations Environment Programme UNEP 2014

305、).In practice,this is a simplification since estimating the finance gap is challenging,both conceptually and quantitatively(UNEP2016).Furthermore,while a monetary metric helps communicate the scale and urgency of the gap,finance is a means rather than an end as the availability of funds does not gua

306、rantee that they will be used efficiently and effectively(see chapter 5)and there will be soft and hard limits to adaptation(see glossary).19Chapter 3 Global progress on adaptation financing in developing countriesThis chapter provides an update on the adaptation finance gap for developing countries

307、(the non-Annex I countries defined under the UNFCCC1).It reviews the evidence base on the estimated costs of adaptation and considers the emerging estimates of reported country adaptation needs(section 3.2).The chapter also reviews the latest data on global adaptation finance flows to developing cou

308、ntries(section 3.3).The comparison of adaptation costs versus finance flows is then used to assess the indicative adaptation finance gap(section 3.5).In addition,the chapter discusses the interlinkages between mitigation and adaptation finance(section 3.4).3.2 The costs of adaptation and adaptation

309、finance needs for developing countriesPrevious editions of the AGR have reviewed the evidence base for the costs of adaptation in developing countries,concluding that there is no definitive estimate,not least because there is no agreed(quantitative)adaptation goal.The wide range of cost estimates in

310、 the scientific literature reflects major differences in targets,future scenarios,methods,assumptions,coverage(sectors and impacts),investment periods,and the costs of implementation(UNEP 2016;UNEP 2021a).A key challenge in assessing the global costs of adaptation is the uncertainty associated with

311、alternative future emission scenarios(i.e.whether or not Paris Agreement goals will be achieved),socioeconomic scenarios,and climate model outputs.The amount of adaptation needed also depends on the benefits that it delivers(its effectiveness),including the potential level of maladaptation,and the o

312、bjectives that are set,due to the trade-off between costs,benefits and residual damages.Estimates also vary depending on 1 See www.unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states.2 All values in this chapter are reported in 2020 prices.This has included updat

313、ing previous AGR estimates and aggregating adaptation finance needs to a consistent year.whether countries existing adaptation deficits are included(from natural climate variability and extremes)and on the differentiation between development and adaptation.3.2.1 Global costs of adaptation in develop

314、ing countriesBased on a combination of global integrated,global sectoral,and national studies,the data presented in the 2016 edition of the AGR,adjusted to current levels(2020 prices2),estimate that the annual costs of adaptation in developing countries could be between US$160 billion and US$340 bil

315、lion by 2030.With increasing levels of climate change,this annual cost was projected to increase to between US$315 billion and US$565 billion by 2050.The costs of adaptation are lower if the Paris Agreement goals are met,especially in the medium to long term.Since the 2016 edition of the AGR,there h

316、ave not been any major new global assessments.However,the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working GroupII Sixth Assessment Report(IPCC WGII AR6)provides an update to the literature.Chapter 17(New et al.2022)reviewed the global costs of adaptation for developing countries.This drew o

317、n the AGR series as well as other literature.The corresponding values are shown in table 3.1.The upper range of reported values in the IPCC WGII AR6 are higher than the AGR estimates,though the median estimates are below those mentioned in the AGR.However,the IPCC WGII AR6 included very low estimate

318、s of the costs of adaptation(which affect its reported median values),which the AGR does not include,because these lower values are an order or magnitude smaller than the current global goal for adaptation finance,and significantly lower than current annual finance flows for adaptation.Table 3.1 Com

319、parison between the AGR and the IPCC WGII AR6Annual cost of adaptation for developing countries20302050AGRUS$160 billion/year to US$340 billion/year US$315 billion/year to US$565 billion/yearIPCC WGII AR6US$15 billion to US$411 billion/year(median US$127 billion/year)US$47 billion to US$1,088 billio

320、n/year(median US$295 billion/year)The IPCC WGII AR6 also provided additional synthesis information on sector and national studies.A comparison of this literature with earlier AGRs indicates higher adaptation costs.For example,the coastal chapter(Glavovic et al.2022)reports adaptation costs that are

321、significantly higher than in the original AGR analysis.Similarly,the chapter on Africa(Trisos et al.2022)reports estimates of the costs of adaptation that are higher than the original AGR estimates and identifies a large adaptation finance gap for the continent.20Adaptation Gap Report 2022:Too Littl

322、e,Too Slow3.2.2 Adaptation finance needs in developing countriesThe finance needs reported in countries domestic adaptation ambitions,as submitted to the UNFCCC in the form of NDCs and NAPs,provide alternative insights into the cost estimates for adaptation in developing countries.They use different

323、 assumptions and methods(focusing on programme-and project-based costing).A significant number of updated NDCs and NAPs have emerged since the 2021 edition of the AGR.As at 31 August 2022,all but two of the 197 country Parties had submitted their first NDCs and 161 country Parties had revised them(U

324、NFCCC Secretariat 2022a).A total of 37 developing countries had submitted their NAPs(UNFCCC Secretariat2022b).A total of 76 developing countries have communicated their adaptation finance needs for the 20212030 period in their NDCs or NAPs(figure 3.1).These are highly heterogeneous in terms of their

325、 objectives,sectoral coverage,implementation period and other aspects.They have limited transparency regarding the underlying methodology for estimation(Chapagain et al.2020;Pauw et al.2020;UNEP,2021a)and should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.Figure 3.1 Information on adaptation finan

326、ce needs in developing countries NDCs or NAPsNote:N/A refers to Annex I countries.Source:Data taken from UNFCCC(2022c).Recent analysis undertaken by Chapagain and Watkiss for the UNFCCC Adaptation Committees synthesis report on the efforts of developing countries in assessing and meeting the costs o

327、f adaptation(UNFCCC 2022c)has normalized and collated these estimates.In aggregate,the above-mentioned 76 developing countries indicated that they need around US$71 billion per year(on average)during 20212030.Most developing countries make these ambitions conditional to international support in the

328、form of finance,capacity-building and/or technology,but often this conditionality is neither well defined nor well described(see also Pauw et al.2020).These adaptation finance needs were further analysed(Chapagain and Watkiss 2020)to produce adaptation finance needs in per capita adaptation terms an

329、d as a percentage of gross domestic product(GDP)see table3.2.The per capita adaptation finance needs range from US$10/year to US$95/year(interquartile range,median US$30/year)for the 20212030 period.Annual adaptation finance needs as a percentage of GDP range from 0.7 per cent to 4.2 per cent(median

330、 2.1 per cent).For those countries that have reported,the median per capita annual adaptation finance needs are around US$23 for low-income countries(LICs),US$36 in lower-middle-income countries(LMCs)and US$63 in upper-middle-income countries(UMCs).The median estimate of annual adaptation finance ne

331、eds as a percentage of GDP in LICs is 3.5 per cent but it is 1.9 per cent in LMCs and 1.1 per cent in UMCs.This indicates that,on average,rich countries have higher adaptation finance needs in absolute US$values,but the adaptation finance needs in poor countries are much larger relative to theirGDP.

332、These estimates have been used to extrapolate to all developing countries and derive an indicative global estimate for this AGR.This has used the aforementioned median and interquartile range and 2020 population sizes.This extrapolation estimates that total adaptation finance needs for all developin

333、g countries is in the range of US$79 billion to US$612 billion per year with a median estimate of US$202 billion for the 20212030 period.21Chapter 3 Global progress on adaptation financing in developing countriesTable 3.2 Potential developing countries adaptation finance needs for the 20212030 period by region RegionAnnual adaptation finance needs in US$billion(2020 value)Annual adaptation finance