2020半導體的地緣政治 -歐亞集團（英文版）（15頁）.pdf

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1、The Geopolitics of Semiconductors PREPARED BY EURASIA GROUP SEPTEMBER 2020 Prepared by Eurasia Group This report is based on the opinions of Eurasia Group analysts and various in-country specialists. Eurasia Group is a private research and consulting firm that maintains no affiliations with governme

2、nts or political parties. Report issued September 2020 | 2020 Eurasia Group CONTACTS Paul Triolo Practice Head, Geo-technology +1 202.903.0006 Kevin Allison Director, Geo-technology +49 151.2882.3945 PREPARED BY EURASIA GROUP SEPTEMBER 2020 The Geopolitics of Semiconductors CONTENTS Key findings 3 U

3、S-China semiconductor competition will have global consequences 3 Semiconductors are a strategic bottleneck, and China is vulnerable 4 Fallout for Taiwan as US attempts to drive wedge between “red” and “blue” supply chains 9 US seizes on Chinas semiconductor vulnerability in its campaign against Hua

4、wei 10 Industry revenue at risk as further US action targeting broader array of Chinese tech companies increasingly likely 11 New US semiconductor industrial policy coming into focus: Build it and others will come 11 Chinas response will heighten risks for Taiwan 13 US pressure will push China to em

5、brace alternatives to ARM and x86 ASIC architectures, but huge challenges loom 13 Looking ahead 14 eurasia group | 3 Prepared by Eurasia Group | September 2020 THE GEOPOLITICS OF SEMICONDUCTORS Key findings Technology and market trends over the past decade have concentrated cutting-edge semiconducto

6、r manufacturing capabilities among a handful of companies located in global hotspots, including South Korea and, most importantly, Taiwan. This trend is now having geopolitical consequences. Semiconductors are a strategic vulnerability for China and its most important tech company, Huawei, which rel

7、ies on cutting-edge manufacturing facilities in Taiwan to make the chips it needs to remain globally competitive. Despite massive government investment in semiconductors, it is unlikely that Chinese compa- nies will enter the top tier of global semiconductor manufacturers over the next decade, leavi

8、ng the countrys technology sector dependent on access to foreign chips. US moves to restrict Huaweis access to cutting-edge chips threaten the viability of the compa- nys global business and have been decisive in giving Washington the upper hand in its bid to convince key European allies and other m

9、ajor economies to ban or sharply restrict the Chinese supplier from their 5G rollouts. A separate US initiative to encourage semiconductor industry leaders including Taiwan Semi- conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to build advanced chip manufacturing facilities on US soil will further raise the

10、stakes for China and Taiwan, with global chip suppliers increasing- ly under pressure to choose between “blue” (US) and “red” (China) supply chains. Taiwan and TSMC have taken on increased geopolitical importance in this environment; if the US broadens technology restrictions targeting semiconductor

11、s to other Chinese firms and succeeds in driving a wedge between China and Taiwan in the area of semiconductors, it would provoke a sharp response from Beijing, raising risks for global technology supply chains. Military action over Taiwan regarding this issue is unlikely; however, China has other o

12、ptions that it can use to try to gain leverage, including nationalization of TSMC facilities in China, IP theft, recruiting key industry talent, retaliatory actions against US and other Western technolo- gy firms operating in China, and greater investment in the domestic technology sector. As the US

13、 presses ahead with stricter and broader controls over semiconductors and related technologies, it will hasten decoupling of the two countries tech sectors while further spurring Chinas attempts to establish a separate R some Taiwan-based companies have already responded to President Tsai Ing-wens d

14、rive to reshore from the mainland to the island by moving some operations out of China. Military action over Taiwan regarding the semiconductor issue remains unlikely. Beijing and Washington will both attempt to avoid initiating a course of action that could lead to uncontrolled escalation between t

15、he worlds two leading military powers. That said, China has other options short of military action that it can use to try to gain leverage, including increased saber rattling, nationalization of TSMC facilities in China, recruitment of key TSMC or Samsung personnel, IP theft, retaliatory actions aga

16、inst US and other Western technology firms operating in China, and greater investment in its domestic technology sector, including leveraging capital markets via the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or the new high-tech STAR market in Shanghai. US pressure will push China to embrace alternatives to ARM and

17、x86 ASIC architectures, but huge challenges loom As the technology decoupling process gains momentum, Chinese companies, backed by Beijing, will increasingly pursue alternatives to Western development frameworks that rely to some degree on a US technology nexus. This includes semiconductor design, w

18、here a debate has been raging within China over dependence on the Arm architecture and specific key pieces of IP such as cores. Founded in 1990 as Advanced RISC Machines, Arm creates and licenses designs for semiconductor cores that power modern CPUs, GPUs, mobile systems on a chip (SOCs), telecommu

19、nications baseband chips, semiconductors used in high-performance computing, and other modern electronic devices and digital applications. Arm, which originated in the UK as a joint venture among Apple, Acorn Computer, and VLSI Technology, is also 49% owner of a Chinese joint venture, Arm China, tha

20、t as of 2018 claimed to license chip designs used in 95% of Chinese- designed SOCs. Arm was acquired by Softbank in 2016 for $32 billion, and by this summer had eurasia group | 14 Prepared by Eurasia Group | September 2020 THE GEOPOLITICS OF SEMICONDUCTORS become the subject of fevered takeover spec

21、ulation, with both US GPU leader NVIDIA and Samsung reported as potential suitors. In 2019, Arm and its China joint venture, which is 51% owned by a consortium of state-controlled Chinese investors, became caught up in the US campaign against Huawei. Shortly after the US entity list action targeted

22、the telecom gear maker in May 2019, the UK-based parent company of Arm instructed its employees to halt cooperation with Huawei, citing US-origin technology contained in its chip designs. Nearly all Chinese-designed semiconductors, including chips that power Huaweis base stations, servers, and smart

23、phones, use Arm designs. The company subsequently resumed cooperation with Huawei (and HiSilicon) after concluding that it could supply the Chinese company designs for its Armv8-A instruction set architecture and subsequent generations of the technology used in Huaweis Kirin line of mobile SOCs and

24、other products using UK, but not US, IP. More recently, the Arm Chinese joint venture has become the subject of a power struggle between its investors and its Chinese CEO, in which 200 employees took the extraordinary step of calling on Beijing to intervene to “protect” what they dubbed a “strategic

25、 asset” and a “Chinese-controlled joint venture that should abide by the Chinese laws and fulfill the social responsibility in China.” US officials suspect the goal of Chineselikely government-backedinvestors buying into the China ARM unit is to eventually make it an independent operating unit that

26、remains untouchable by US export control laws and help fuel Chinas independent semiconductor industry development. Uncertainty about the ventures future and its access to technologies that include substantial amounts of US IP, meanwhile, has spurred Chinas interest in alternatives to Arms proprietar

27、y chip architecture, including the open-source RISC-V community. Illustrating how US pressure on China over semiconductors is increasingly disrupting the industry, the Delaware-incorporated RISC-V Foundation, which includes more than 325 members and drives the development and adoption of an open-sou

28、rce instruction set architecture for microprocessors, opted to relocate to Switzerland last year to minimize future uncertainty and the potential for disruption to the groups open collaboration approach from the US export control system. Although the move sparked concern among some US lawmakers, RIS

29、C-V is an open source architecture that has been available to Chinese players for some time. It remains unclear whether US officials could exert control over the foundation, even though some of the initial funding for development of the architecture came from the Defense Advanced Research Projects A

30、gency. Looking ahead Although serious market challenges remain, the new US industrial policy on semiconductors taking shape will be in place well beyond Novembers election. Democratic challenger Joe Biden will almost certainly support the effort to attract more cutting-edge fabs to the US if he wins

31、 the presidency, while also maintaining a tough approach on Huawei. At the same time, he would continue to promote broader US technology policy initiatives, likely to include 5G, AI, and quantum computing. Beijings eventual reaction to US pressure may complicate US efforts to build trusted semicondu

32、ctor supply chains in multiple ways. A strong reaction from Beijing that seeks to punish Taiwan or TSMC would roil markets, provide added impetus to US attempts to bring advanced semiconductor manufacturing to US shores, and throw industry supply chains into turmoil, accelerating the bifurcation of

33、the US and Chinese tech ecosystems. Although this could occur swiftly in many aspects of US-China economic integrationsuch as the internet, electric vehicles, and 5G decoupling in the technology underpinning all of thesevast This report is based on the opinions of Eurasia Group analysts and various

34、in-country specialists. Eurasia Group is a private research and consulting firm that maintains no affiliations with governments or political parties. Report issued September 2020 | 2020 Eurasia Group Braslia London New York San Francisco So Paulo Singapore Tokyo Washington D.C. THE GEOPOLITICS OF SE

35、MICONDUCTORS changes to the semiconductor sector would be more difficult and painful. Constraints on capital, personnel, and technology will limit the potential emergence of two wholly separate systems. But the process is likely to be messy and costly, creating new risks for the $5 trillion ICT indu

36、stry and market participants throughout 2020 and beyond. For leading technology firms in China such as Huawei, which are used to easy access to advanced manufacturing in Taiwan or elsewhere, the search is on for an alternative semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. Beijing will be there to help, wit

37、h the National IC Investment Fund, preferential policies for the industry including new ones released in August, and an expedited listing process for semiconductor firms on the new high-tech STAR market in Shanghai. Yet major challenges will persist for some time given constraints such as a shortage

38、 of domestic talent, lack of experience with cutting-edge manufacturing technologies, and the steady advance of the global cutting edge. A slowdown of Moores Law and a stretched-out industry roadmap below 3 nm, coupled with the sky-high costs of building and operating a cutting-edge fab, will mean t

39、hat the pace of growth in the gap between Chinese domestic players and global industry leaders will likely slow in the coming years, improving prospects for Chinese companies to move faster up the curve. Huaweis deep pockets, industry experience, management system, and entrepreneurial attitude will

40、also enable progress in some areas. Other efforts will be aimed at devising system-level solutions with less advanced semiconductors that are “good enough” for some applications. Chinas advantages in this competition, including its STEM education system, dedicated industrial ministries, funding mech

41、anisms, and market size will eventually produce breakthroughs, but the US will continue to hold key advantages and harbor a willingness to use punitive measures. If the US decides to further restrict semiconductor manufacturing equipment exports to China in addition to other measures such as the foreign direct product rule, Chinas timeline for achieving greater self-sufficiency will be pushed further out. In any case, the global semiconductor industry will be in for a prolonged period of adjustment as the US-China-Taiwan triangle moves toward a new and hopefully more stable equilibrium.