麥肯錫：2017自動化時代勞動力轉變報告(160頁)PDF（160頁）.pdf

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1、DECEMBER 2017 JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED: WORKFORCE TRANSITIONS IN A TIME OF AUTOMATION About MGI Copyright McKinsey it is not commissioned by any business, government, or other institution. For further information about MGI and to download reports, please visit James Manyika | San Francisco Susan Lund

2、| Washington, DC Michael Chui | San Francisco Jacques Bughin | Brussels Jonathan Woetzel | Shanghai Parul Batra | San Francisco Ryan Ko | Silicon Valley Saurabh Sanghvi | Silicon Valley DECEMBER 2017 JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED: WORKFORCE TRANSITIONS IN A TIME OF AUTOMATION PREFACE Automation is not a ne

3、w phenomenon, and fears about its transformation of the workplace and effects on employment date back centuries, even before the Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 1960s, US President LyndonJohnson empaneled a “National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Pro

4、gress.” Among its conclusions was “the basic fact that technology destroys jobs, but not work.”* Fast forward and rapid recent advances in automation technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and robotics are now raising the fears anewand with new urgency. In our January 2

5、017 report on automation, A future that works: Automation, employment, and productivity, we analyzed the automation potential of the global economy, the timelines over which the phenomenon could play out, and the powerful productivity boost that automation adoption could deliver. This report goes a

6、step further by examining both the potential labor market disruptions from automation and some potential sources of new labor demand that will create jobs. We develop scenarios that seek to address some of the questions most often raised in the public debate. Will there be enough work in the future

7、to maintain full employment, and if so what will that work be? Which occupations will thrive, and which ones will wither? What are the potential implications for skills and wages as machines perform some or the tasks that humans now do? The report is part of the McKinsey Global Institutes research p

8、rogram on the future of work, and is by no means the final word on this topic. The technology continues to evolve, as will our collective understanding of the economic implications. Indeed, we highlight some of the limitations of our analysis and scenarios, and areas for further research. The report

9、 builds on our previous research on labor markets, incomes, skills, and the expanding range of models of work, including the gig economy, as well as the potential impacts on the global economy of digitization, automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence. The research was led by JamesManyika, c

10、hairman and director of the McKinsey Global Institute and McKinsey senior partner based in San Francisco; SusanLund, an MGI partner based in Washington, DC; MichaelChui, an MGI partner in San Francisco; JacquesBughin, MGI director and McKinsey senior partner based in Brussels; and JonathanWoetzel, M

11、GI director and McKinsey senior partner in Shanghai. ParulBatra, RyanKo, and SaurabhSanghvi headed the research team at different times over the course of the project. The team comprised JulianAlbert, GurneetSingh Dandona, NicholasFletcher, DarienLee, NikNayar, SoniaVora, and RachelWong. We are deep

12、ly grateful to our academic advisers, who challenged our thinking and provided valuable feedback and guidance throughout the research. We thank RichardN.Cooper, Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics at Harvard University; Sir ChristopherPissarides, Nobel laureate and Regius Professor

13、of Economics at the London School of Economics; MichaelSpence, Nobel laureate and William R. Berkley Professor in Economics and Business at the NYU SternSchool of Business; and LauraTyson, Professor of Business Administration and Economics at the HaasSchool of Business, University of California, Ber

14、keley. * Technology and the American economy: Report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, February 1966. Colleagues from around the world offered valuable insights into various aspects of our research. We thank

15、JensRiisAnderson, JakeBryant, RichardDobbs, RajatGupta, KimberlyHenderson, TasukuKuwabara, MeredithLapointe, JanMischke, AnuMadgavkar, DeepaMahajan, MonaMourshed, ChandrikaRajagopalan, JaanaRemes, JimmySarakatsannis, KatharinaSchumacher, JeongminSeong, BobSternfels, and EckartWindhagen. We are also

16、grateful to the following McKinsey colleagues who provided technical advice and analytical support: PeterAagaard, JonathanAblett, RohitAgarwal, TarunAgarwal, MoinakBagchi, DrewBaker, SergioBalcazar, TimBeacom, ShannonBouton, LeonChen, DebadritaDhara, EduardoDoryan, AlanFitzGerald, IsabelleFisher, Sa

17、rahForman, BoyanGerasimov, EnriqueGonzalez, NicolasGrosman, JoseMora Guerrero, ShishirGupta, FernandaHernandez, ShumiJain, FrederikJensen, KarenJones, PriyankaKamra, ArpitKaur, MekalaKrishnan, PriyankaKumar, KrzysztofKwiatkowski, AlisonLai, FreyaLi, MikeMunroe, JesseNoffsinger, EmilioNoriega, ErikRo

18、ng, MartinSchultz- Nielsen, NarasimhanSeshadri, RamanSharma, VivienSinger, RachelValentino, CharlottevanDixhoorn, JerryvanHouten, MikeWang, WendyWong, HankYang, and DesmondZheng. This report was edited and produced by MGI senior editor PeterGumbel, editorial production manager JuliePhilpot, senior g

19、raphic designers MarisaCarder, MargoShimasaki, and PatrickWhite, and data visualization editor RichardJohnson. RebecaRobboy, MGI director of external communications, managed dissemination and publicity, while digital editor LaurenMeling provided support for online publication and social media. We th

20、ank DeadraHenderson, MGIs manager of personnel and administration, for her support. This report contributes to MGIs mission to help business and policy leaders understand the forces transforming the global economy, identify strategic locations, and prepare for the next wave of growth. As with all MG

21、I research, this work is independent and has not been commissioned or sponsored in any way by any business, government, or other institution. While we are grateful for all the input we have received, the report and views expressed here are ours alone. We welcome your comments on this research at MGI

22、. Jacques Bughin Director, McKinsey Global Institute Senior Partner, McKinsey ongoing research is required. Indeed, in Box E2 at the end of this summary, we highlight some of the potential limitations of the research presented in this report. Our findings suggest that several trends that may serve a

23、s catalysts of future labor demand could create demand for millions of jobs by 2030. These trends include caring for others in aging societies, raising energy efficiency and meeting climate challenges, producing goods and services for the expanding consuming class, especially in developing countries

24、, not to mention the investment in technology, infrastructure, and buildings needed in all countries. Taken from another angle, we also find that a growing and dynamic economyin part fueled by technology itself and its contributions to productivitywould create jobs. These jobs would result from grow

25、th in current occupations due to demand and the creation of new types of occupations that may not have existed before, as has happened historically. This job growth (jobs gained) could more than offset the jobs lost to automation. None of this will happen by itselfit will require businesses and gove

26、rnments to seize opportunities to boost job creation and for labor markets to function well. The workforce transitions ahead will be enormous. We estimate that as many as 375million workers globally (14percent of the global workforce) will likely need to transition to new occupational categories and

27、 learn new skills, in the event of rapid automation adoption. If their transition to new jobs is slow, unemployment could rise and dampen wage growth. Indeed, while this report is titled Jobs lost, jobs gained, it could have been, Jobs lost, jobs changed, jobs gained; in many ways a big part of this

28、 story is about how more occupations will change than will be lost as machines affect portions of occupations and people increasingly work alongside them. Societal choices will determine whether all three of these 1 A future that works: Automation, employment, and productivity, McKinsey Global Insti

29、tute, January 2017. 2 We use the term “jobs” as shorthand for full-time equivalent workers (FTEs), and apply it to both work displaced by automation and to new work created by future labor demand. In reality, the number of people working is larger than the number of FTEs, as some people work part-ti

30、me. Our analysis of FTEs covers both employees within firms as well as independent contractors and freelancers. Summary of findings McKinsey Global Institute2 coming workforce transitions are smooth, or whether unemployment and income inequality rise. History shows numerous examples of countries tha

31、t have successfully ridden the wave of technological change by investing in their workforce and adapting policies, institutions, and business models to the new era. It is our hope that this report prompts leaders in that direction once again. AUTOMATION COULD DISPLACE A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF WORK GLO

32、BALLY TO 2030; 15PERCENT IS THE MIDPOINT OF OUR SCENARIO RANGE In our prior report on automation, we found that about half the activities people are paid to do globally could theoretically be automated using currently demonstrated technologies.3 Very few occupationsless than 5percentconsist entirely

33、 of activities that can be fully automated. However, in about 60percent of occupations, at least one-third of the constituent activities could be automated, implying substantial workplace transformations and changes for all workers. All this is based on our assessments of current technological capab

34、ilityan ever evolving frontier (ExhibitE1). While technical feasibility of automation is important, it is not the only factor that will influence the pace and extent of automation adoption. Other factors include the cost of developing and deploying automation solutions for specific uses in the workp

35、lace, the labor market dynamics (including quality and quantity of labor and associated wages), the benefits of automation beyond labor substitution, and regulatory and social acceptance. Taking into account these factors, our new research estimates that between almost zero and 30percent of the hour

36、s worked globally could be automated by 2030, depending on the speed of adoption. In this report we mainly use the midpoint of our scenario range, which is 15percent of current activities automated. Results differ significantly by country, reflecting the mix of activities currently performed by work

37、ers and prevailing wage rates. They range 3 Our definition of automation includes robotics (machines that perform physical activities) and artificial intelligence (software algorithms that perform calculations and cognitive activities). Companies may adopt these technologies for reasons other than l

38、abor cost savings, such as improved quality, efficiency, or scale, although worker displacement could still be a consequence. A glossary of automation technologies and techniques is in the technical appendix. Exhibit E1 Global workforce numbers at a glance SOURCE: McKinsey Global Institute analysis

39、1 By adapting currently demonstrated technologies. 2 Full-time equivalents. 3 In trendline labor-demand scenario. Technical automation potential 50% of current work activities are technically automatable1 6/10 current occupations have more than 30% of activities that are technically automatable Adop

40、tion by 2030 SlowestMidpointFastest Work potentially displaced by adoption of automation, by adoption scenario % of workers (FTEs2) 0% (10 million) 15% (400 million) 30% (800 million) Workforce that could need to change occupational category, by adoption scenario3 % of workers (FTEs) 0% (10 million)

41、 3% (75 million) 14% (375 million) 3Jobs lost, jobs gained: Workforce transitions in a time of automationMcKinsey Global Institute from 9percent in India to 26percent in Japan in the midpoint adoption rate scenario (ExhibitE2). This is on par with the scale of the great employment shifts of the past

42、, such as out of agriculture or manufacturing (BoxE1, “The historical evidence on technology and employment is reassuring”). Exhibit E2 SOURCE: World Bank; Oxford Economics; McKinsey Global Institute analysis Color = Average age (projected), 2030 26 24 18 6 17 16 15 22 19 23 25 27 21 20 9 12 0 11 14

43、 8 10 1,000 13 7 5 100,00010,000 Singapore Germany Thailand Brazil Morocco Costa Rica Argentina South Africa Saudi Arabia Malaysia Egypt Nigeria Bahrain Kuwait Indonesia UAE Turkey Colombia India United States Peru Mexico Kenya Oman Philippines China Australia Austria Percentage of current work acti

44、vities displaced by automation, 201630, midpoint adoption scenario Spain Greece Italy Japan Switzerland Sweden United Kingdom South Korea Chile Canada Russia Poland Netherlands France Czech Republic Norway 2530 6,000 adults and children; each received the equivalent of 20%30% of an average household

45、s income No impact on reducing work hours, while entrepreneurialism, education, and female empowerment increased Kenya (full experiment: 201729; pilot launched 2016) 2- to 12-year controlled experiments comparing 4 groups (total of 26,000 recipients across 200 villages); full experiment projected to

46、 produce some of the most comprehensive basic income data yet Aims to study economic status, time use, risk-taking, gender relations, aspirations and outlook on life Initial evidence of economic empowerment (i.e., cash used to purchase livestock, fishing nets, motorbikes) 5. Managing the workforce t

47、ransitions McKinsey Global Institute122 Apprentices at a car plant, Ulsan, South Korea Yonhap News/YNA/Newscom Automation will be a powerful motor of future economic growth, but the challenges it presents for workforce transitions are sure to be very substantial. Policy makers, business leaders, and

48、 individual workers will need to be flexible, creative, and even visionary as they look to harness these rapidly-emerging technologies and ensure that the time of automation is a productive and prosperous one. A range of outcomes is possible, from one in which economic growth and productivity grow s

49、trongly, creating myriad new jobs, as automation is adopted rapidly, to one marked by slow automation adoption, weak economic growth and low net job growth. Faced with the scale of worker transitions we have described, one reaction could be to try to slow the pace and scope of adoption in an attempt to preserve as much of the status quo as possible. But this would be a mistake. Although slower adoption might limit the scale of workforce transitions, it would curtail the contributions that these technologies make to business dynamism and economic growth.