外交關系委員會：世界秩序的終結與美國外交政策（英文版）（43頁）.pdf

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1、Robert D. Blackwill and Thomas Wright Council Special Report No. 86 May 2020 The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy Council Special Report No. 86 May 2020 The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy Robert D. Blackwill and Thomas Wright The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an

2、 independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government ofcials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand

3、 the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, with special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders; convening meetin

4、gs at its headquarters in New York and in Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government ofcials, members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together with Council members to discuss and debate major international issues; supporting a Studies Program that fosters indep

5、endent research, enabling CFR scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and hold roundtables that analyze foreign policy issues and make concrete policy recommendations; publishing Foreign Afairs, the preeminent journal on international afairs and U.S. foreign policy; sponsoring Independent T

6、ask Forces that produce reports with both fi ndings and policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy topics; and providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and American foreign policy on its website, CFR.org. The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional

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8、isis or contribute to the publics understanding of current policy dilemmas. CSRs are written by individual authorswho may be CFR fellows or acknowledged experts from outside the institutionin consultation with an advisory committee, and are intended to take sixty days from inception to publication.

9、The committee serves as a sounding board and provides feedback on a draft report. It usually meets twiceonce before a draft is written and once again when there is a draft for review; however, advisory committee members, unlike Task Force members, are not asked to sign of on the report or to otherwi

10、se endorse it. Once published, CSRs are posted on CFR.org. For further information about CFR or this Special Report, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065, or call the Communications ofce at 212.434.9888. Visit our website, CFR.org. Copyright 2020

11、by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reproduction permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C. Sections 107 and 108) and exce

12、rpts by reviewers for the public press, without express written permission from the Council on Foreign Relations. To submit a letter in response to a Council Special Report for publication on our website, CFR.org, you may send an email to publicationscfr.org. Alternatively, letters may be mailed to

13、us at: Publications Department, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. Letters should include the writers name, postal address, and daytime phone number. Letters may be edited for length and clarity, and may be published online. Please do not send attachments. All let

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15、erica Inc. Contentsiii iv Foreword vii Acknowledgments 1 Introduction 4 World Order Before COVID-19 8 The End of World Order 13 The Road Forward 15 Recommendations 24 Conclusion 26 Endnotes 33 About the Author CONTENTS ivForeword World order is a fundamental concept of international relations. At it

16、s core, world order is a description and a measure of the worlds condi- tion at a particular moment or over a specifi ed period of time. It tends to refl ect the degree to which there are widely accepted rules as to how international relations ought to be carried out and the degree to which there is

17、 a balance of power to buttress those rules so that those who disagree with them are not tempted to violate them or are likely to fail if in fact they do. Any measure of order necessarily includes elements of both order and disorder and the balance between them. Until recently, articles and books ex

18、plicitly examining world order have been few in number, principally because for the past seventy-fi ve years world order was clearly defi ned. During the Cold War, the order was bipolar, split between American- and Soviet-led camps. A balance of power, bolstered by nuclear deterrence, kept the centr

19、al peace, and shared understandings (mostly implicit) of the legitimate aims of for- eign policy circumscribed the behavior of both superpowers. Follow- ing the Cold Wars end and the Soviet Unions collapse some three decades ago, a U.S.-led world order prevailed, underpinned by Amer- ican absolute e

20、conomic and military strengths and relative advantage over others. Now, however, against the backdrop of a retrenching United States, a rising China, a resentful and assertive Russia, a nuclear North Korea, and an ambitious Iran, not to mention a number of seri- ous global challenges, much of what h

21、ad been assumed can no longer be taken for granted. Both the balance of power and the consensus at the heart of world orders has faded. At this moment of uncertainty and potential transition, accelerated by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Robert D. Blackwill, the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for

22、U.S. foreign policy here at the Council FOREWORD v on Foreign Relations, and Thomas Wright, the director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, present this new Council Special Report, The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy. The re

23、port is both analytical and prescriptive. As regards the former, the authors note that along with U.S.-Soviet competition and the Cold War, the COVID-19 pandemic represents the most serious challenge to the U.S.-led international order. They call this “a moment of radical international uncertainty”

24、that “occurs at a troubling time geopolitically, including the withdrawal of the United States from global leadership.” Blackwill and Wright present the case that the old order has given way to multiple orders, which in efect is disorder. “The world has moved away from a Kissingerian standard of wor

25、ld order, in which nations work within the same set of constraints and aspire to meet the same set of rules, toward a model where many countries choose their own paths to order, without much reference to the views of others.” More specif- ically, the two argue the pandemic has undermined order by st

26、raining governments, dividing societies, exacerbating societal inequalities, heightening tensions between the United States and China, and demon- strating the vast gap between global problems and the worlds ability to address them through existing international institutions. The authors go on to pro

27、vide recommendations that would allow the United States to “preserve its national interests and its own notion of international order.” First, they argue that American foreign policy must begin at home, and the United States needs to focus on improv- ing domestic governance and its economic competit

28、iveness so that the country regains the will and the capacity to play an active role abroad. They then call for the United States to invest in its relations with Foreword viForeword Canada and Mexico, develop a more collaborative approach to allies, increase partnership with Europe, upgrade relation

29、s with India, invest in international institutions, seek a way to resume engagement with Russia, and focus less on the Middle East and more on Asia. More than anything else, the approach to order advocated here places managing inevitable and growing competition with China at the heart of Ameri- can

30、diplomacy and its search for order in the world. I expect what is written in the report about order may be too narrow or too traditional for some readers. This is to be expected. Such debate refl ects the reality that this is a moment of real change in the world, cou- pled with intellectual foment a

31、bout how to understand it and what to do about it. This Council on Foreign Relations Special Report makes an important, rigorous, and considered contribution to this emerging and critical debate. Richard N. Haass President Council on Foreign Relations May 2020 viiAcknowledgments This Council Special

32、 Report greatly benefi ted from the dozens of spe- cifi c suggestions and valuable improvements by Hal Brands, Tarun Chhabra, Francis J. Gavin, Lyndsay Howard, William Inboden, Bruce Jones, Shankar Menon, Lord Charles Powell, Ed Rogers, Dennis Ross, Gary Roughead, Shyam Saran, Jake Sullivan, Stephen

33、 M. Walt, Philip Zelikow, and Robert Zoellick. We took many of their suggested fi xes but, as they will see, not all. We also thank the speakers and members of the CFR World Order Study Group for their insights during our sessions over the past eight months. To pay attention to smart people always m

34、akes one smarter, or, as George Shultz once observed, “Lis- tening is an underrated way of acquiring knowledge.” We also thank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) President Richard N. Haass for his review and comments. We appreciate the work of Patricia Dorf and the CFR Publications team for their ed

35、itorial contributions. Our spe- cial thanks to Daniel Clay for his extensive work on this report. The analysis and conclusions herein are the authors responsibility alone. Robert D. Blackwill and Thomas Wright ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1 INTRODUCTION Introduction Along with U.S.-Soviet competition during the

36、Cold War, COVID- 19 is one of the two greatest tests of the U.S.-led international order since its founding over seven decades ago.1 Nothing else since that time approaches the societal, political, and economic efects of the virus on populations around the world. Not the dozens of violent confl icts

37、 that erupted in the international system since 1945. Not the many regional and global economic downturns over the years that reduced the quality of life of ordinary citizens. Not the international efects of the “Time of Troubles” in the United States, from the assassinations, urban riots, and mass

38、demonstrations of 1968, to the presidential resignation in 1974. Not even the two million people who died of smallpox in 1967 in a far less connected world. At the time of writing, millions are infected globally with millions more likely to come, and hundreds of thousands are dead.2 Entire pop- ulat

39、ions remain indoors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) quarterly report World Economic Outlook labeled the crisis the Great Lockdown and estimated a reduction in global growth of 3 percent, which makes it the most severe recession since the Great Depression and far worse than the 2008 global fi

40、nancial crisis.3 Accumulated losses in 2020 and 2021 could reach $9 trillion, which is more than the German and Japanese economies combined. During this crisis, two billion people could fall into abject poverty, half of all jobs in Africa could be lost, oil exports in the Middle East could drop by $

41、250 bil- lion, more than ninety countries could receive aid from the IMF, the number of unemployed people in the United States is over 38.6 million, and the European Union (EU) forecasts the deepest economic reces- sion in its history with EU economies to shrink by 7.4 percent this year.4 Even as th

42、e world goes back to work, any reopening will be partial, The End of World Order and American Foreign Policy2 with large sectors of society in many nations staying closed. There is a near-consensus among health experts that the crisis will last in one form or another for well over a year, and perhap

43、s longer. The economic and societal consequences will prevail much longer. There will be no V-shaped economic rebound.5 This is a moment of radical international uncertainty. Despite many commentaries to the contrary, it is difcult to predict what the long- term impact of the COVID-19 crisis will be

44、 on the quest for world order.6 The last major pandemic, in 191819, is not generally judged to have had a major efect on the 1920s and 1930s, but that is likely because it happened in a world already fragmented by World War I.7 By contrast, although this crisis occurs at a troubling time geopolitica

45、lly, including the withdrawal of the United States from global leadership, until the pandemic it was a period of interdependence and prosperity for many countries. This plague puts immense strain on individual governments, divides societies, and exacerbates societal inequalities. It encourages leade

46、rs to act unilaterally and nationally, rather than in concert. It demonstrates the weaknesses of most international organizations. It exacerbates tensions between the United States and China.8 It prompts the United States adversaries to try to take advantage of Washingtons tardy and confused reactio

47、n to the epidemic. The crisis poses enveloping international questions. When will the global economy recover? Can Washington and Beijing avoid per- manent confrontation with potential catastrophic consequences?9 Will China advance its national interests at the expense of the United States? Will the

48、U.S. alliance system continue to erode? Will the crisis empower or undermine nationalists and populists? Will the European Union undertake sufcient economic reform that it can retain the alle- giance of countries such as Italy by showing that it will be there for all of its member states in a crisis

49、? What will happen in the developing world, where governments have limited health-care capacity and minimal ability to enforce social distancing? Will medical shortcomings trigger mass migration? Will mass digital surveillance become more attractive if it ofers an alternative to economic shutdown? These matters are of enormous import, but they are impossible to answer with any confi - dence at this stage. The objective of this report is not to predict the long-term conse- quences of the present crisis (as the American philosopher Yogi Berra stressed, “Its tough to